Dreaming of the Avant-Garde: Georges Bataille, Nathalie Sarraute, Pierre Michon, Agnès VardabyMaia Lea Beyler-NoilyDoctor of Philosophy in FrenchDesignated Emphasis in Film StudiesUniversity of California, BerkeleyProfessor Michael Lucey and Professor Jean-François Louette, Co-ChairsThis dissertation focuses on the ways in which the avant-garde proposes new models for the community throughout the twentieth century in France, specifically in the works of writers Georges Bataille, Nathalie Sarraute and Pierre Michon, and filmmaker Agnès Varda. This research was spurred by a turn-of-the century sociology obsessed with the supposed decay of community and the necessity to revitalize it. According to sociology's forefather, Emile Durkheim, if the traditional community is rooted in religion, a secular and individualistic modernity ignores the very notion of community, leaving a dangerous vacuum too easily filled by totalitarian systems of thought. This work argues that the avant-garde is simultaneously critical of the traditional community, deemed closed and exclusive, and of modern secularism, characterized by individualism and mercantilism. Hence, rejecting both traditional community and modern society, the avant-garde attempts to imagine new, open alternatives. However, by following a party line, be it political or aesthetic, the avant-garde becomes susceptible to the same pitfalls of exclusivity and authority as the traditional community. As such, the artists upon which this dissertation focuses cannot be affiliated with any specific avant-garde movement. Rather, they remain in the avant-garde's margins, keeping their distance, i.e. their freedom, from it: Bataille in regard to surrealism, Sarraute in regard to the Nouveau Roman, Michon in regard to Tel Quel, and Varda in regard to the New Wave. Bataille's twin philosophical notions of sovereignty-servility shed light on what these marginal avant-garde artists are gesturing towards: on the one hand, they are attempting to break away from the traditional and hierarchical, that is the servile community, and on the other, they are innovating by imagining a free and equal community, i.e. one that is sovereign. However, the question asked throughout this research is whether these dreams of communities, here featured in novels, short stories and films, could, or even should, be turned into concrete realities.Chapter One focuses on the avant-garde writers' novels and their attempt to bring about a sovereign community through their criticism of traditional Judeo-Christian morals. Rejecting Christian and fascistic communities, as well modern secularism, Bataille's Julie imagines an erotic community made up of perverts and lunatics. It seems that only an erotic community could achieve sovereignty by being unredeemable, that is by stubbornly resisting all political and aesthetic re-appropriation. In Sarraute's Martereau, a new community can come about through the suspicion of all our preconceived notions of identity. Only the anxiety-ridden search for the community, never its establishment, can lead to sovereignty. Michon's La Grande Beune, an implicit tribute to Bataille, can be read in dialogue with the avant-garde. However, while paying homage to his fiercely antireligious predecessor, Michon imagines a sovereign community that might find a way to be in relation, however tentative, with Christianity.The second chapter of this work explores both the avant-garde's attacks against a visual culture deemed authoritative and dictatorial, and the communities born from these attacks. Bataille's Histoire de l'oeil strikingly illustrates the avant-garde's desire to defile and literally deface the human image. The sovereign community here imagined by Bataille is one of felons and outlaws that could never be corralled into a well-functioning society. Showcasing a face-off between a fervent collector and his snide children, Sarraute's Vous les entendez? ridicules the ways that art takes over religion in the twentieth century. Refusing to adore literal and figurative images, Sarraute imagines a community of people who never settle for answers, but keep searching for them. Michon's Maîtres et Serviteurs and Corps du roi are meditations on painting and photography, respectively. Here, Michon succeeds in conjuring a community of lovers of the visual arts that remembers the avant-garde's wariness towards them, but refuses to indict all representation once and for all.Chapter Three explores modern literature's compulsion to self-sabotage and the communities brought about by this self-destruction. Bataille's L'Abbé C. points an accusing finger at Literature as another model for authoritative, exclusive communities. Self-combusting through haphazard writing and self-plagiarism, L'Abbé C. attempts to challenge the authority of its writer and avoid any future co-optations, but, in turn, leaves its readers stranded. Sarraute's Le Mensonge similarly disowns Literature, and Literature's authoritative tendencies, by writing for the radio-waves. The radio seems to short-circuit Literature's normative bent and to give way to a sovereign community. Michon's Mythologies d'hiver similarly alludes to the avant-garde's hostility towards a narrative accused of bringing together the traditional, i.e. religious, community. While constantly throwing his enterprise into self-doubt, Michon paradoxically reintroduces both the narrative and the possibility of Christian faith as potential ways to a sovereign community. Featuring a behind-the-scenes look at a globalized economy, Varda's film, Les Glaneurs et la glaneuse, focuses on what happens to unproductive, i.e. sovereign, things and beings. Chapter Four of this dissertation looks at how Varda's marginals, who live off of the system without any political inklings, successfully dodge all political re-appropriation while, through solidarity, offering alternative models for sovereign communities.Having looked at how these four artists on the margins of the avant-garde, Bataille, Sarraute, Michon and Varda, reject the traditional, that is the religious and servile community and try to image new, sovereign ones, this work concludes by asking whether they accomplished what they set out to do. While some call their attempts to imagine new communities irrelevant, since these communities could never be put into effect without betraying themselves, this analysis argues that it is those very attempts that in fact allow the avant-garde to continue dreaming of and arguing over what could be.
This thesis is situated at the intersection of two historical phenomena: the publicization of social problems and the transformation of activist commitment. The research undertaken has sought to explain, through an approach that is both local and international in scope, the rise of grassroots volunteering since the 1970s in working-class urban neighborhoods on the periphery of Paris and Buenos Aires. The first part presents an analysis of the various political theories which relate to the voluntary movement, and discusses their place within an empirical sociological study of grassroots volunteering. The intellectual genealogy of the notion of civil society is considered in relation to the appearance of modern democracy, in order to situate the rise of volunteerism in recent decades within a larger historical perspective. Attention is given to the emergence of three characteristic themes: the third sector, social capital, and activism. The second part relates volunteerism to socio-economic transformations within the working class and to the development of social policy at the local community level. The study of grassroots organization in France reveals the importance of possibilities created by the breakdown of the communist political system in certain Paris suburbs (banlieues rouges) along with increased state intervention in working-class neighborhoods through urban policy initiatives. An analysis of the activities and the workings of the grassroots organizations which appeared in these neighborhoods between the 1980s and the 2000s, reveals that these organizations had the capacity to self-organize for the purpose of addressing public problems at a local level, and that tensions resulted from partnership arrangements with local public authorities. In Argentina, consequences of the labor society's weakening in terms of working-class social solidarity in neighborhoods on the outskirts of Buenos Aires are analyzed through the prism of grassroots organizations operating in the wake of social movements among unemployed workers (piqueteros). The grassroots organization's role as an intermediary for social policy raises questions concerning the link between these popular movements and public authorities, and the possible redeployment of Peronist corporatism. The third part relates volunteer participation to historical transformations within the principal working-class political parties and to the changes observed in the local political landscape. In France, popular withdrawal from communism and the disassociation of the Party's former "satellite organizations" are considered through an analysis of a grassroots organization composed primarily of former communist partisans. Their personal trajectories as activists, as well as the workings of their organization, reveal the causes of a change in the operative forms of political commitment and give rise to questions concerning the processes by which these local organizations are made autonomous of political systems. In Argentina, new links emerging between the Justicialist party and the working class are considered through the study of an organization founded by Peronist partisans in a context where political institutions are represented as lacking legitimacy. The adaptation of these political activists to grassroots volunteerism is likewise indicative of changes in the operative forms of political commitment and gives rise to questions concerning the proximity between grassroots organizations and political parties. ; La thèse se positionne au croisement de la problématique de la publicisation des problèmes sociaux et de celle de la transformation des engagements militants. La recherche entend expliquer, par une double approche locale et internationale, l'essor de la participation associative depuis les années 1970 dans les quartiers populaires urbains situés en périphérie de Paris et de Buenos Aires. La première partie est consacrée à l'analyse des théories politiques du fait associatif et à leur insertion au sein d'une sociologie empirique de la participation associative. La généalogie de la notion de société civile est mise en relation avec l'avènement de la démocratie moderne afin d'inscrire l'essor associatif des dernières décennies dans une perspective historique de longue portée. Notre approche de la participation associative est ensuite explicitée en référence à trois grandes thématiques du fait associatif : le tiers secteur, le capital social et l'engagement militant.La deuxième partie articule la participation associative avec les transformations socio-économiques des classes populaires et le développement des politiques sociales territorialisées. L'analyse d'une association dans le territoire français illustre d'abord les possibilités offertes par la désagrégation du système politique communiste des « banlieues rouges » et l'intervention croissante de l'État dans les quartiers populaires au travers de la politique de la ville. L'étude de l'activité et du fonctionnement de cette association, des années 1980 aux années 2000, met en lumière à la fois la capacité des acteurs à s'auto-organiser en référence à un problème public local et les tensions générées par la relation partenariale avec les pouvoirs publics. En Argentine, les conséquences de la fragilisation de la société salariale sur les formes de sociabilités populaires dans la périphérie urbaine de Buenos Aires sont analysées au travers d'une association qui s'inscrit dans le prolongement du mouvement social des travailleurs au chômage (piqueteros). Le rôle d'intermédiaire des politiques sociales joué par cette association permet de questionner les liens qui unissent ces organisations populaires aux pouvoirs publics et le possible redéploiement des réseaux politiques clientélaires du péronisme.La troisième partie s'attache à analyser la participation associative en relation avec les évolutions des principaux partis politiques des classes populaires et les changements intervenus dans les configurations politiques locales. Dans le cas français, les phénomènes de désengagement communiste et de désarticulation des « organisations satellites » du parti sont intégrés à l'analyse d'une association regroupant d'anciens militants communistes. Les trajectoires de ces militants et le fonctionnement de cette association permettent de cerner les raisons d'un changement dans les formes d'engagement et de s'interroger sur le processus d'autonomisation des associations locales à l'égard des systèmes politiques. Dans le cas argentin, la recomposition des liens entre le parti justicialiste et les classes populaires est questionnée au travers de l'analyse d'une association fondée par des militants péronistes dans le contexte d'un discrédit des institutions politiques. L'adaptation de ces militants politiques à la forme associative illustre les changements dans les modalités d'engagement et permet une réflexion sur la proximité entre les associations locales et les partis politiques.
The present global environmental condition is a consequence of the increasing consumption of natural resources whose depletion exceeds what is physically possible to sustain in the long term. The construction sector is a considerable contributor to this resource depletion and sustainability is adopted in the form of the theory of ecological modernization. The implementation depends to varying extents on sustainability demands at the global, national, regional, local, corporate and individual levels. In addition, there appears to be a lack of new knowledge transfer from the international research community to local construction project managers, particularly in the process of construction works in line with the objective of sustainability. According to environmental legislation, it is the client who is the responsibility party, performing activities as owner and administrator of construction works. The aim of the research is, first, to define what sustainability in construction works is. The understanding and meaning of sustainability can vary considerably through the perspective of a client and a construction project manager, within corporate organizations and through sporadic knowledge transfer. A critical review of the use of the terminology of sustainable construction and sustainable building is carried out and a model for enabling a client to manage sustainability matters in relation to construction works and then validate this model within a defined context is established. The construction sector is complex and fragmented and has, therefore, a tendency to resist changes leading towards sustainability. Clients and project managers are facing barriers to the implementation of sustainability, e.g. lack of pro-active sustainable measures, conflicts in real and perceived costs and inadequate implementation expertise. A common misunderstanding is that sustainability in construction works is more expensive in terms of investment costs compared to 'normal' mainstream buildings. It is critical to transfer knowledge from the research community to mainstream practitioners efficiently to help facilitate the implementation of corporate sustainability without delay or confusion of methodology. By adopting the standard ISO 15392: "Sustainability in building construction – General principles", it is possible to interpret sustainability for construction works accordingly, despite the different backgrounds of stakeholders. Therefore, different and confusing interpretations of sustainable building, sustainable construction or green building can be avoided. To meet the holistic conditions of sustainability according to the standard above, it is crucial to implement a platform of multiple corporate management systems such as those focused on quality-, environment-, work safety-, stakeholders-, and knowledge into an integrated system of sustainability. By utilizing the STEPS (Start-up, Take-off, Expansion, Progressive, Sustainability) maturity roadmap, it is possible to achieve continual improvement in knowledge management in a 'many-small-steps' approach on the corporate level. It is also crucial to transfer knowledge horizontally, to formulate a sustainability policy regarding sustainability, to translate corporate activities into adequate key figures/ indicators in order to fulfil the commitment of continual improvement, and meet the community´s sustainability objectives. This information should be placed within the property instead of being held by the owner. A framework of assessment is necessary, objective-led, taking into account site-specific, corporate-specific and service-life issues. The STURE (Stakeholder-Urban Evaluation) model is a product of the research and represents an approach that optimizes the sustainability demands and abilities of a client, stakeholders and authorities relevant to a single or multiple construction works. Five cases of construction works were used as input to validate the STURE model in line with the principles of the ISO 15932 standard. The cases studies were drawn from different phases in the life-cycle of construction works and in different stages of construction process. Furthermore, the cases represented buildings with different functions. The result of the validation implies the possibility to use the STURE model with some minor adjustments, to assess construction work or works in order to determine whether or not it is heading towards a sustainable, a partly sustainable or non-sustainable development. The proposed STURE model connects to the STEPS maturity roadmap on the corporate level and the combinations of ISO standards are a way of structuring stakeholder demands or outcomes of expectancy with regard to sustainability objectives, optimized from national, regional, local and corporate levels together with technical and functional demands. Use of these methods also promotes continual improvement in project performance and basic organizational activities. This is, as noted earlier, a 'many-small-steps' approach and depends on the client's ability, level of knowledge and inclination. The aim is not to be a world leader, but rather to recognize that improvement comes through successive small steps and, thus, creates a means for measuring improvement along the path of sustainability in the field of construction works. Progress towards sustainability in construction works is rather slow, in spite of the short timescale before potential irreversible damage occurs from climate change. In the long run it is not enough to sustain on the level of present environmental depletion; it has to be a regenerative development. By these means, it is time for action by transferring current and new knowledge from the research community into an adaptive and practical framework for implementation. This knowledge must be complete with clearly defined economic incentives, and the gap between researchers and practitioners must be bridged with arguments of economic value. It is also important to bridge the gap of knowledge transfer in both directions between industrialized and developing countries, as local decisions and solutions affecting the built environment have both local and global impact. Last, it is the client/owner/developer, as the responsible performer of activities concerning construction works, who has the main responsibility concerning construction works and the obligation to commit sustainability. At the same time, there is an opportunity and a challenge to make the built environment more sustainable and begin regenerative development in the earnest.
It is common ground that in the EU the role of adjudication has always been, and continues to be, more important than in the Member States as the degree of political consensus is much more limited at European level. Therefore, issues which could be decided politically in the Member States had to be solved legally in the European context. At the same time, the authority and legitimacy of European court decisions is more fragile than that of national ones - not only as the EU crucially depends on the collaboration of national administrations and courts for the effective implementation and enforcement of its legal system, but also because the legitimacy of the EU itself as a political entity is more fragile than that of European Nation States, most of which are firmly rooted in democratic traditions and enjoy a considerable degree of political stability. These weaknesses notwithstanding, legal integration in the EC has been a long success story reconstructed by Joseph Weiler and others. Judicial activism led to important progress of the integration process not only in the foundationary period, but also in the years of political stagnation after the 1967 crisis and after the relance of the integration process following the Single Market project 1985. This kind of activism primarily relates to the constitutional foundations of the EC: the structural constitution (i.e. the relationship of European and national law including the famous doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, state li-ability), the substantive constitution (mainly composed of the basic market freedoms, competition law, and the protection of human rights) and the institutional constitution (setting forth the competencies and the rules of interaction of the various European institutions). In these fields, the ECJ has successfully developed the treaties into a full and mostly coherent constitutional system. On the whole, these developments have met the acceptance of Member States and enjoy a sufficient degree of legitimacy. This is probably so because they are primarily related to the initial project of market integration through the abolition of national restrictions and the establishment of a system of undistorted competition - on which there was an initial consensus of all Member States and which has in most cases led to economic benefits for a majority of them. In the case of human rights protection, this only replicated a more or less com-mon standard reflecting common historical and cultural heritage and achievements. Yet, in other areas - specifically in areas covered by European secondary legislation, which the ECJ is bound to administer so to speak as an ordinary court - European adjudication has proven to be far less successful. This is particularly true for the field of European private law which is a relative new-comer to legal harmonisation policy. European private law is characterised by selective European acts limited in scope which aim in most cases at consumer protection and which have to co-exist with a more or less coherent and encom-passing body of national law ("islands and archipelagos in an ocean"). In this constellation, numerous problems exist: First, one finds problems of access and effectiveness of justice, as the most frequent preliminary reference procedure usually lasts more than 2 years and only provides interpretations of European law, without resolving the case - which frequently leads to a "ping-pong" game between European and national courts to the detriment of the parties which has lasted in some cases more than 10 years. Moreover, we are con-fronted with quality problems, as it becomes ever more apparent that the ECJ judges cannot deal convincingly, without a meaningful degree of specialisation, with all legal matters ranging from constitutional to company and tax law. More generally, the usual methodological style of the ECJ, a combination between legal formalism and effect utile-oriented interpretation, is not suited to private law, whose essential task is to balance opposed interests among the parties in a just way. This is particularly so as the overall effects of the combined application of European and national law - which alone determines the outcome of a case - is almost never considered by the ECJ which limits itself to the interpretation of European law only. But there are more structural problems related to the specific characteristics of the field. Due to the fragmentation of European sources, decisions on European acts in private law often concern their scope of applicability and do not lead, unlike in national law, to an ever more precise and coherent systematisation of the field. Specifically, the ECJ is not well suited to decide on dispositive law issues, which typically do not reflect public policy matters, but consists of a balancing of party interests. This requires significant knowledge of the social and economic context of specific types of transactions - knowledge which the ECJ frequently lacks. Taken together, these problems render the effectiveness and legitimacy of European adjudication in private law thin in many instances. A way out from this dilemma is not easy to design in general terms. How-ever, basic provisos may still be formulated: The ECJ should handle private law with caution and more often resort to judicial self restraint. It should be aware of the fact that it is not the suitable court to do the fine-tuning in private law systems and to deliver private law justice (mostly commutative and only exceptionally distributive justice). Correspondingly, it should limit itself to implementing basic European principles such as market freedoms and human rights, and to instigating and monitoring learning and rationalisation processes in national law (a "procedural" function). Moreover, it should systematically reflect the consequences of its decisions resulting from the combined application of European and national law. In short, one might say that it is by behaving like a constitutional court for private law that the ECJ might replicate its constitutional law success story there.
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One ray of hope in the current political scene comes from the land of deep blue. However one views the immense expenditure on solar panels, windmills and electric cars, (produced in the US by US union labor, of course), plus forced electrification of heat and cooking, a portion of the blue-state left has noticed that this program cannot possibly work given laws and regulations that have basically shut down all new construction. And a substantial reform may follow. I am prodded to write by Ezra Kleins' interesting oped in the New York Times, "What the Hell Happened to the California of the '50s and '60s?," a question repeatedly asked to Governor Gavin Newsom. The answer is, of course "you happened to it." For those who don't know, California in the 50s and 60s was famous for quickly building new dams, aqueducts, freeways, a superb public education system, and more. Gavin Newsom states the issue well. "..we need to build. You can't be serious about climate and the environment without reforming permitting and procurement in this state."You can't be serious about business, housing, transportation, wildfire control, water, and a whole lot else without reforming permitting and procurement, but heck it's a start. Hitting these [climate] goals requires California to almost quadruple the amount of electricity it can generate — and shift what it now gets from polluting fuels to clean sources. That means turning huge areas of land over to solar farms, wind turbines and geothermal systems. or, heaven forbid, nuclear, which among other things works at night. I don't think most of San Francisco's progressive gentry really understand how massive their envisioned "transition" really is. It means building the transmission lines to move that energy from where it's made to where it's needed. It means dotting the landscape with enough electric vehicle charging stations to make the state's proposed ban on cars with internal combustion engines possible. Taken as a whole, it's a construction task bigger than anything the state has ever attempted, and it needs to be completed at a speed that nothing in the state's recent history suggests is possible....John Podesta, a senior adviser to President Biden on clean energy, said in a speech last month. "We got so good at stopping projects that we forgot how to build things in America."Newsom:"I watched as a mayor and then a lieutenant governor and now governor as years became decades on high-speed rail," he said. "People are losing trust and confidence in our ability to build big things.Losing? That train left long ago, unlike the high speed one. The part that really caught my eye: Klein complains that Newsom's current proposal is a collection of mostly modest, numbingly specific policies. When a lawsuit is brought under the California Environmental Quality Act, should all emails sent between agency staff members be part of the record or only those communications seen by the decision makers? Should environmental litigation be confined to 270 days for certain classes of infrastructure? Should the California Department of Transportation contract jobs out by type, or does it need to run a new contracting process for each task? Should 15 endangered species currently classified as fully protected be reclassified as threatened to make building near them less onerous? And on it goes.Maybe, as Klein suggests, this is a measure of the bill being small and marginal. But I think the point is deeper: this is what regulatory reform is all about. Which is why regulatory reform is so hard. "Stimulus" is easy to understand: Hand out money. Regulatory reform, especially reform to stop the litany of lawsuits and dozens of veto points which are the central problem in the US, is all about the mind-numbing details. "should all emails sent between agency staff members be part of the record" sounds like a mind-numbing detail. But think how these lawsuits work. Is discovery and testimony going to allow this entire record to be searched for an email where staffer Jane writes to staffer Bob one line that can be used to restart the whole proceedings? "Only" 270 days rather than 10 years? That matters a lot. Contracting process, which can be the basis for a lawsuit. I'll retell a joke. Fixing regulation is a Marie-Kondo job; long hard and unpleasant, each drawer at a time. The article is also interesting on the fight within the left. There is really a deep philosophical divide. On the one hand are basically technocrats who really do see climate as an issue, and want to do something about it. They believe their own ideology that time matters too. If it takes 10 years to permit every high power line, Al Gore's oceans will boil before anything gets done. On the other side are basically conservatives and degrowthers. "Conservative" really is the appropriate word -- people who want to keep things exactly the way they are with no building anything new. Save our neighborhoods they say, though those were built willy nilly by developers in the 1950s. (Palo Alto now applies historic preservation to 1950s tract houses, and forbids second stories in those neighborhoods to preserve the look and feel. How can you not call this "conservative?") "Degrowth" is a self-chosen word for the Greta Thunberg branch of the environmental movement. Less, especially less for the lower classes, not really for us who jet around the world to climate conferences. Certainly do not allow the teeming billions of India and Africa to approach our prosperity. I think "deliberate impoverishment" is a better word. Some of it has an Amish view of technology as evil. And some is, I guess, just habit, we've been saying no to everything since 1968, why stop now. Klein characterizes the opponents: More than 100 environmental groups — including the Sierra Club of California and The Environmental Defense Center — are joining to fight a package Newsom designed to make it easier to build infrastructure in California.... opposition groups say that moving so fast "excludes the public and stakeholders and avoids open and transparent deliberation of important and complicated policies."...The California Environmental Justice Alliance sent me a statement that said, in bold type, "Requiring a court to resolve an action within 270 days to the extent feasible is harmful to low-income and EJ" — which stands for environmental justice — "communities." It doesn't get much clearer than that.I am delighted to see in the New York Times, finally, the word "communities" adorned with scare quotes. But there is the tension: You can't both be really serious that climate change is a looming existential threat to humanity that demands an end to carbon emission by year 20X in the near future, and the view that in 270 days we cannot possibly figure out how to do so in a way that protects "communities." Climate must not really be that bad, or perhaps it was just an unserious talking point in a larger political project. These are the beginning stages of a transition from a liberalism that spends to a liberalism that builds. It's going to be messy. Until now, progressives have been mostly united in the fight against climate change. They wanted more money for clean energy and more ambitious targets for phasing out fossil fuels and got them. Now that new energy system needs to be built, and fast. And progressives are nowhere near agreement on how to do that.The last three sentences are telling. Did they really want just to announce goals and spend a few hundred billions and feel good? Or did they actually want all the windmills, solar cells, and power lines involved? But the fight isn't just about this package. Everyone involved believes there are many permitting reforms yet to come, as the world warms and the clock ticks down on California's goals and the federal government begins to apply more pressure.Once something becomes partisan in the US, it freezes and little gets done. I am hopeful here, because it plays out within one party. California is a one-party state, but that does not put it above politics. It does mean that progress is more likely. Can we hope that "a liberalism that builds," in reasonable time and somewhat less than astronomical cost, projects that might be actually useful, could emerge from all this? In the larger picture, a movement among good progressive democrats in places like California has figured out that if we want more housing at more reasonable prices, just letting people build houses might be a good idea. Houses, apartments, any houses and apartments, not just dollops of incredible expensive government-allocated ("affordable") and homeless housing. This is the YIMBY movement in California. It is sadly instantly opposed by Republicans, but maybe that's for the better given how reviled that brand is in Sacramento. And it is also making slow headway.
The issue of minority rights protection has been actively implemented in international legal practice at the United Nations and the Council of Europe levels since the 1990s. The problem of political representation of minority interests began regulating at the level of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe with the establishment of the High Commissioner on National Minorities office. At the level of this institution with international experts participation were developed the next documents: the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Political Life (1999), the Warsaw Guidelines to Assist National Minority Participation in the Electoral Process (2001), the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations (2008), the Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies (2012), the Graz Recommendations on Access to Justice and National Minorities (2017), etc.The purpose of article is to highlight the international legal framework for ensuring the effective political representation of minority ethnic groups and the practice of their implementation in European countries. The author has analyzed three levels of political representation of minority ethnic groups: 1) central (nationwide); 2) regional and local (self-government); 3) advisory (consultative).During the XX – early XXI centuries the institution of ethnic party became established from the multi-ethnic areas of Western Europe to the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. The electoral system should facilitate minority representation and influence. Where minorities are concentrated territorially, single-member districts may provide sufficient minority representation (Italy, Albania, etc.). Proportional representation systems, where a political party's share in the national vote is reflected in its share of the legislative seats, may assist in the representation of minorities (Finland, Slovakia, etc.). Some forms of preference voting, where voters rank candidates in order of choice, may facilitate minority representation and promote inter-communal cooperation (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Lower numerical thresholds for representation in the legislature may enhance the inclusion of national minorities in governance (Poland, Serbia, etc.). A number of European countries (Croatia, Slovenia, Romania, Hungary, etc.) use a reserved number of seats in one or both chambers of parliament or in parliamentary committees. Ethnic minority representation at the government level is realized through the establishment of specialized central executive bodies, which are usually represented in the structure of culture and education ministries. Representatives of ethnic minorities are involved in these government institutions. The Republic of Croatia has a positive experience of ethnic minority representation in the judiciary and law enforcement agencies.Effective ethnic minority participation is realized through the functional system of local self-governments, which are formed on territorial and non-territorial levels. A number of European ethnic communities have the territorial autonomies (Italy, Spain, France, Denmark, Finland, Moldova) owing to the processes of regionalization and decentralization. The corporative model of minority non-territorial autonomy is represented by so-called Sámi Parliaments in northern parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. The personal model of minority non-territorial autonomy is the most common in the world. It is provided through non-governmental organizations. Advisory (consultative) bodies functionate as a channel for dialogue between government and ethnic communities for protection of education, linguistic and cultural rights. They are formed at the Government (Austria) and President (Ukraine) levels as well.Given the European states experience, the following aspects of minority representation should be improved: 1) re-establishment Hungarian and Romanian single-member districts; 2) review of legislative norms regarding the principles of ethnic party institutionalization; 3) application of open-list proportional representation for minority parties in the regions of Ukraine with a multi-ethnic population. ; Починаючи з 1990-х років питання захисту прав етнічних, мовних і релігійних меншин активно впроваджується в міжнародно-правову практику на рівні ООН та Ради Європи. Однією з важливих постала проблема політичного представництва інтересів меншин, яка починає регулюватися на рівні ОБСЄ з запровадженням посади Верховного Комісара у справах національних меншин. На рівні цієї інституції за участі міжнародних експертів вироблені Лундські рекомендації про ефективну участь національних меншин у суспільно-політичному житті (1999), Варшавські рекомендації щодо сприяння участі національних меншин у виборчому процесі (2001), Больцанські/Боценські рекомендації щодо національних меншин у міждержавних відносинах (2008), Люблянські рекомендації щодо інтеграції різноманітних суспільств (2012), Грацькі рекомендації щодо доступу до правосуддя і національних меншин (2017) та ін.Метою статті є висвітлення міжнародно-правового формату забезпечення ефективного політичного представництва інтересів етнічних меншин та практики їх застосування в європейських країнах. Автор розглядає три рівні політичного представництва міноритарних етнічних груп: 1) центральний (загальнодержавний); 2) регіональний та локальний (самоврядування); 3) дорадчий (консультативний).У контексті аналізу політичного представництва етнічних меншин важливу роль займає інститут етнополітичної партії. Впродовж XX – початку XXI ст. він розширив свій ареал із поліетнічних регіонів Західної Європи до країн Центральної та Південо-Східної Європи. Справедливому представництву етнічних меншин у органах влади сприяє створення одномандатних округів (Італія, Албанія та ін.), пропорційна виборча система (Фінляндія, Словаччина та ін.), преференційне голосування (Австралія), зниження відсоткового бар'єру для проходження до парламенту етнополітичних партій (Польща, Сербія та ін.). Ряд країн Європи (Боснія і Герцеговина, Косово, Хорватія, Словенія, Румунія, Угорщина) застосовують практику резервування місць у парламенті для організацій етнічних громад. Представництво меншин на рівні уряду реалізується шляхом створення спеціальних органів центральної виконавчої влади, які зазвичай представлені в структурі міністерств культури та освіти. До роботи в цих урядових інституціях залучаються представники етнічних груп. Позитивний досвід репрезентації етнічних меншин у судових і правоохоронних органах має Республіка Хорватія.Ефективна політична участь та представництво у владі етнічних меншин реалізується через функціональну систему місцевого самоврядування, яка створюється на екстериторіальній та територіальній основі. Корпоративна модель екстериторіальної автономії меншин представлена так званими саамськими парламентами на півночі Норвегії, Швеції, Фінляндії та Росії. Найбільш розповсюджна у світі персональна модель екстериторіальної автономії етнічних меншин забезпечується шляхом створення неурядових організацій. Завдяки процесам регіоналізації та децентралізації ряд етнічних громад Європи мають статус національно-територіальних автономій (Італія, Іспанія, Франція, Данія, Фінляндія, Молдова). Дорадчі (консультативні) органи слугують каналами для діалогу між державною владою та етнічними громадами в питаннях використання земельних ресурсів, житла, захисту освітніх, мовних і культурних прав. Вони формуються як на рівні уряду (Австрія), так на рівні президентської влади (Україна).Враховуючи досвід цих держав, потребують вдосконалення наступні аспекти політичної репрезентації етнічних меншин: 1) відновлення адміністративних меж угорськомовного та румунськомовного виборчих одномандатних округів; 2) перегляд законодавчої норми щодо принципів інституціоналізації етнополітичних партій; 3) застосування на регіональному та локальному рівнях пропорційної системи відкритих списків із можливістю репрезентації партій меншин у регіонах України з поліетнічним складом населення. ; Починаючи з 1990-х років питання захисту прав етнічних, мовних і релігійних меншин активно впроваджується в міжнародно-правову практику на рівні ООН та Ради Європи. Однією з важливих постала проблема політичного представництва інтересів меншин, яка починає регулюватися на рівні ОБСЄ з запровадженням посади Верховного Комісара у справах національних меншин. На рівні цієї інституції за участі міжнародних експертів вироблені Лундські рекомендації про ефективну участь національних меншин у суспільно-політичному житті (1999), Варшавські рекомендації щодо сприяння участі національних меншин у виборчому процесі (2001), Больцанські/Боценські рекомендації щодо національних меншин у міждержавних відносинах (2008), Люблянські рекомендації щодо інтеграції різноманітних суспільств (2012), Грацькі рекомендації щодо доступу до правосуддя і національних меншин (2017) та ін.Метою статті є висвітлення міжнародно-правового формату забезпечення ефективного політичного представництва інтересів етнічних меншин та практики їх застосування в європейських країнах. Автор розглядає три рівні політичного представництва міноритарних етнічних груп: 1) центральний (загальнодержавний); 2) регіональний та локальний (самоврядування); 3) дорадчий (консультативний).У контексті аналізу політичного представництва етнічних меншин важливу роль займає інститут етнополітичної партії. Впродовж XX – початку XXI ст. він розширив свій ареал із поліетнічних регіонів Західної Європи до країн Центральної та Південо-Східної Європи. Справедливому представництву етнічних меншин у органах влади сприяє створення одномандатних округів (Італія, Албанія та ін.), пропорційна виборча система (Фінляндія, Словаччина та ін.), преференційне голосування (Австралія), зниження відсоткового бар'єру для проходження до парламенту етнополітичних партій (Польща, Сербія та ін.). Ряд країн Європи (Боснія і Герцеговина, Косово, Хорватія, Словенія, Румунія, Угорщина) застосовують практику резервування місць у парламенті для організацій етнічних громад. Представництво меншин на рівні уряду реалізується шляхом створення спеціальних органів центральної виконавчої влади, які зазвичай представлені в структурі міністерств культури та освіти. До роботи в цих урядових інституціях залучаються представники етнічних груп. Позитивний досвід репрезентації етнічних меншин у судових і правоохоронних органах має Республіка Хорватія.Ефективна політична участь та представництво у владі етнічних меншин реалізується через функціональну систему місцевого самоврядування, яка створюється на екстериторіальній та територіальній основі. Корпоративна модель екстериторіальної автономії меншин представлена так званими саамськими парламентами на півночі Норвегії, Швеції, Фінляндії та Росії. Найбільш розповсюджна у світі персональна модель екстериторіальної автономії етнічних меншин забезпечується шляхом створення неурядових організацій. Завдяки процесам регіоналізації та децентралізації ряд етнічних громад Європи мають статус національно-територіальних автономій (Італія, Іспанія, Франція, Данія, Фінляндія, Молдова). Дорадчі (консультативні) органи слугують каналами для діалогу між державною владою та етнічними громадами в питаннях використання земельних ресурсів, житла, захисту освітніх, мовних і культурних прав. Вони формуються як на рівні уряду (Австрія), так на рівні президентської влади (Україна).Враховуючи досвід цих держав, потребують вдосконалення наступні аспекти політичної репрезентації етнічних меншин: 1) відновлення адміністративних меж угорськомовного та румунськомовного виборчих одномандатних округів; 2) перегляд законодавчої норми щодо принципів інституціоналізації етнополітичних партій; 3) застосування на регіональному та локальному рівнях пропорційної системи відкритих списків із можливістю репрезентації партій меншин у регіонах України з поліетнічним складом населення.
La tesi analizza i principi generali del diritto privato europeo, così come elaborati nei principali progetti di uniformazione quali la Proposta di Regolamento su un diritto comune europeo della vendita, il Draft Common Frame of Reference, il Code Européen des Contrats. Finalità dell'analisi è quella di verificare se essi, quali valori comuni posti a fondamento degli ordinamenti giuridici europei, trovino o meno effettiva rispondenza nelle scelte di ordine politico-strutturale adottate dalle Istituzioni comunitarie. L'analisi viene svolta in un'ottica di raffronto tra: a) la Proposta di Regolamento su un diritto comune europeo della vendita, presentata dalla Commissione europea al Parlamento ed al Consiglio con la Comunicazione 11 ottobre 2011 n.635; b) il Draft Common Frame of Reference (Bozza di Quadro Comune di Riferimento) presentato tra il 2008 ed il 2009 da una rete di esperti incaricata dalla Commissione europea di redigere un quadro regolatorio di principi, definizioni e regole modello del diritto contrattuale; c) il Code Européen des Contrats, realizzato dall' Accademia dei Giusprivatisti Europei, da applicarsi ai contratti tra imprenditori, a quelli tra consumatori ed a quelli tra imprenditore e consumatore. Caratteristica del progetto dell'Accademia è che l'opera armonizzatrice si fonda sull'utilizzo di una tecnica di stampo legislativo e conseguente elaborazione non di principi indeterminati ma di regole vere e proprie. Vengono esaminati in particolare i principi generali del diritto contrattuale quali l'autonomia contrattuale, la buona fede e la correttezza, ed il principio di collaborazione. La prima, strettamente connessa alla natura opzionale della proposta presentata dalla Commissione europea, starebbe a fondamento della scelta delle parti dello strumento regolativo da applicare alla negoziazione. Il medesimo principio viene sancito anche dal Code Europeèn des Contrats art. 2 e dal DCFR art. II.-1:102: le parti godono dunque della libertà di determinare il contenuto del contratto o di consentire ad un terzo di determinarlo e altresì stabilire che gli effetti del contratto si dispieghino verso un soggetto non coinvolto nell'attività di negoziazione. Tra i principi generali rileva quello della buona fede, e del suo corollario della trasparenza del contenuto contrattuale, regola fondamentale dell'acquis communautaire. Nel Code il dovere di correttezza è disciplinato dall'art. 6, dove si ha specifico riguardo alla condotta delle parti durante le trattative precontrattuali. Il dovere di informazione, puntualmente disciplinato dal Code all'art. 7, trova applicazione nel corso delle trattative ma anche dopo l'eventuale conclusione del contratto, Il principio viene affermato in via generale anche dal DCFR all'art. I.-1:103, Book I, dove con buona fede e correttezza si intende uno standard di condotta connotata da onestà, chiarezza e considerazione degli interessi della controparte della trattativa o del rapporto in questione. Il dovere di osservare un comportamento conforme a buona fede è in particolare sancito dal DCFR, nel capitolo 3, Book II, «Marketing and pre-contractual duties», rispetto alle trattative individuali, e nella Section 4 del capitolo 9, Book II, con riferimento alle clausole vessatorie. La proposta di Regolamento per un diritto comune sulla vendita, dopo aver introdotto in forma generale il principio di buona fede e correttezza (art. 2), ne disciplina il momento applicativo nella fase delle trattative precontrattuali. Il Capo II, della Parte II, avente ad oggetto la disciplina della conclusione di un contratto vincolante, è infatti intitolato «Informazioni precontrattuali». Rilievo particolare assume anche il dovere di collaborazione tra le parti, sancito in via generale dall'art. 3 della Proposta di regolamento e dall'art. III.-1.104 del DCFR. La verifica dell'effettiva operatività dei principi generali è oggetto di valutazione anche allo scopo di consentire la corretta interpretazione teleologica del corpus normativo di cui essi si pongono a fondamento. Viene, dunque, accertato se oltre alla finalità di miglioramento delle condizioni per l'instaurazione e per il funzionamento del mercato interno, siano riscontrabili – in base ad esigenze solidaristiche, ispirate ad un criterio di giustizia sociale - anche esigenze di tutela dei soggetti cd. Deboli del mercato (consumatori e PMI). In tal senso, il concetto di principio generale viene associato, nel diritto europeo dei contratti, al concetto di diritto fondamentale: così ad esempio il Draft Common Frame of Reference, che dedica un intero capitolo del Libro II al diritto/principio di non discriminazione. Viene infine esaminata la problematica centrale del legislatore attuale, quella cioè di realizzare un diretto collegamento tra i principi ordinanti del diritto dei contratti ed i diritti fondamentali, contenuti dalla Carta europea dei diritti fondamentali. Tre sono le possibilità messe in luce dalla dottrina: a) realizzazione di un diretto richiamo, senza l'esplicita riproduzione di essi; b) interpretazione/applicazione dei testi di diritto privato europeo alla luce di tali principi così come previsti dalla Carta europea dei diritti fondamentali; c) considerazione dei principi fondamentali quali norme imperative. In quest'ultima ipotesi tali norme sarebbero oggetto di futura applicazione. L'analisi sarà approfondita dalla riflessione sul recente progetto di codice civile e commerciale argentino, presentato nel marzo 2012. L'idea offerta dal progetto menzionato è di particolare interesse in vista del processo di unificazione attualmente in corso in Sud America, solo per alcuni aspetti simile a quello europeo. ; The thesis analyzes the general principles of European private law elaborated in the uniformization projects of European contract law such as the Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law, the Draft Common Frame of Reference, the Code Européen des Contrats. The purpose of the analysis is to check if these principles, as common values of European legal systems, are in compliance with the policies and structural choices adopted by UE Institutions. The analysis is carried out comparing: - the Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law - (hereinafter CESL), presented by the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council with the Communication of 11th October 2011 n. 635; - the Draft Common Frame of Reference, presented between 2008 and 2009 by a networks of experts appointed by the European Commission to draw up a toolbox and a frame of reference containing principles, definitions and model rules of European contract law; - the Code Européen des Contrats, presented by the Academy of European Private Lawyers. The project should to be applied to B2B contracts, to C2C contracts and to B2C contracts. The Code's peculiarity is that the harmonization is not based on vague and undetermined principles, but rather on the use of a legislative type technique which allows for proposing clear, determined rules. Specific principles, such as freedom of contract, good faith and fairness, cooperation are analyzed. The freedom of contract, strictly connected with the optional nature of Proposal of the CESL, is the basic principle of the parties choice to determine the regulatory instrument of their contract. The same principle is also laid down in the Code Européen des Contrats art. 2 and in art. II.-1: 102 DCFR. The parties can determine the content of the contract, or exercise their freedom to allow a third party to determine the content or they can choose to direct the effects of the contract to a person not involved in it. Between general principles of European contract law detects the good faith, and its corollary the transparency of the contractual content, fundamental rule of the acquis communautaire. In the Code Europèen des Contrats, the general principles of fairness is established by the art. 6, on the precontractual duties. The duty to disclose, governed by art. 7, is applied during the negotiations but even after the conclusion of the contract. The same principles is established by art. I.-1:103, Book I, DCFR, where good faith and fairness are conduct standard characterized by honesty, clarity and consideration of the interests of the other party in the contractual relationship. The duty of good faith is established by the DCFR, in Chapter 3, Book II, "Marketing and pre-contractual duties" with regard to individual negotiations, and in Section 4 of Chapter 9, Book II, with regard to the unfair terms. The CESL introduces the general principle of good faith with its art. 2, setting specific application in precontractual duties in Part II, Chapter 2, about «Precontractual information». Particular attention should have the cooperation, established by art. 3 of the CESL and by art. III.-1104 of the DCFR. The check of effectiveness of general principles is aimed to allow a teleological interpretation of the set of rules, in which they are incorporated. It's necessary clarify if, in addition to the purpose of improving the conditions for the establishment of the internal market, is possible to comply - on the basis of a solidarity inspired by a social justice criteria - also the needs of protect for the weak subjects of internal market. In this sense, the concept of the general principle is associated, in European contract law, to the concept of fundamental right, as well as in the Draft Common Frame of Reference, where is possible to find a specific chapter of Book II on right / principle of non-discrimination. Finally, the thesis examines the central question of the current legislature, that is how to create a direct link between the principles of contract law and fundamental rights, as referred to by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The academics highlight three possibilities: a) a direct reference, without the explicit reproduction of them; b) interpretation / application of the texts of European private law in the light of these principles as laid down in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights; c) qualification of fundamental principles as mandatory rules, necessarily to be applied.The analysis will be deepened by reflection on the recent project of argentine civil and commercial code, presented in March 2012. The idea offered by the mentioned project is of particular interest in view of the unification process currently in South America, only in some respects similar to the European one.
President Obama travelled to Europe this week for a one-day summit of the G-20 in London and a NATO summit in Strasbourg and Kehl. He then went to Prague to deliver a non-proliferation speech, which, with exquisite timing on the part of the North Koreans, came on the same day as that country tested a ballistic missile delivery system over Japan. In both the G-20 and the NATO summit, protestors took to the streets, in some cases becoming quite destructive.Obama's performance in Europe is being debated in the strongest terms in the United States: did he deliver? While many were again moved by his ability to dazzle European audiences, a consensus seems to be emerging that he is coming back home empty-handed. It would be easy to dismiss this divergence of views as politics as usual, with the Republicans criticizing him harshly while his own party lavishes praise on his performance, but it is somewhat more complicated than that: the question today is how much his popularity and charisma translate into getting palpable results that meet US interests.Dominique Moïsi recently commented on the risks of ignoring the dichotomy between Obama's essence (whohe is)and his performance (what he does). For the rest of the world in general, and for Europeans in particular, his electoral triumph has evoked enthusiasm and restored confidence in the resilience and vitality of American democracy, which many had come to doubt. With Obama, the man himself is the message. They like who he is, but will they also like what he does to protect American interests around the world? Changes in foreign policy are often less about grand declarations than they are about alterations in tone, outlook and priorities. However, underlying the rhetoric and the diplomatic dialogue, there are always the nation's interests which are much more immutable than changes in leadership. Obama has already changed the tone and texture of American diplomacy, but transforming the substance of US foreign policy will take much longer and will be much more difficult to achieve.Speaking to a spell-bound audience of French and German students in Strasbourg, France, he urged Europeans to join in a common effort to restructure the global economy and renew the trans-Atlantic alliance. In his cool yet direct way, Obama managed to talk to Europeans in some pretty harsh terms about the strained relationship. He had a difficult message to convey. To soften it, he first confessed America's own hubris: "In America there is a failure to appreciate Europe's leading role in the world. Instead of celebrating your dynamic union.there have been times when America has shown arrogance and been dismissive and even derisive."Then it was Europe's turn:"…But in Europe there is an anti-Americanism that is… casual but that can also be insidious…there have been times when Europeans choose to blame America for much of what is bad…these attitudes have become too common. They are not wise. They do not represent the truth. They fail to acknowledge that America cannot confront the challenges of this century alone but that Europe cannot confront them without America."He then reminded them that Islamic extremism is a threat to Europe as much as it is a threat to the United States. He pointed out some changes his administration has already made to bring it more in line with international sentiment: the closing of Guantánamo, the outlawing of torture, abandoning the use of the terms "enemy combatant" and "the war on terror." "America is changing but it cannot be America alone that changes," he said. He pledged a united front to tackle the Afghanistan war, the Palestinian conflict and the global crisis. Now it is up to Europe to do more, he implied.His speech brought applause from the crowd at several instances. Unfortunately, he was less effective in obtaining what he wanted from European decision-makers. This led pundits here to comment acidly that while Obama's aura and Michelle's grace are both national assets, they are not enough to persuade allies to do what is in the American interest. His harshest critics in the US said that in order to conquer their sympathies, Obama deferred to the European agenda and conceded too much: his mea culpa about American arrogance was too much for the opposition party to swallow. The truth is that he had two very difficult cases to make: first he had to persuade European leaders to increase their fiscal stimulus to 2% of their GDP; then he had to coax them into contributing more troops to the Afghan war. He was rebuffed on both fronts.On the economic front, it was a demand Europeans were not ready to make, given that, unlike the US, these social democracies already are financing large welfare states. Also in contrast with the US, Europe still has room left to use monetary policy to stimulate their economies. However, Obama was successful in starting to rebuild frayed relations not only with Europe but also with Russia and China. The G-20 communiqué contains several important steps toward strengthening international financial regulation, and it includes a directive to triple the IMF resources to 750 billion dollars to help distressed countries as well as a new trade finance initiative of 250 billion by the World Bank. An extra 100 billion in aid for the poorest countries will be raised from capital markets rather than the embers themselves. For a one-day summit, this is indeed progress: Obama is moving the ball down the line without turning it over to the other side. Later down the road, if and when the global economy needs further stimulus, he will be in a good position to make the case for more.In the case of NATO, his success was even perhaps more modest: he got a token increase in European troops for Afghanistan, but these are temporary only and will be deployed to train Afghan police and military, not in a fighting capacity. However, Obama used the forum to redefine America's intention there in much narrower terms, away from the unrealistic goal of establishing a Jeffersonian- style democracy and towards a new focus on rebuilding relations with the native population and containing Al Qaeda. He is also going to travel to Turkey next, to assuage fears in the Muslim world about American intentions toward them.In spite of the new commitment to increase the numbers of boots on the ground, it is clear that the Europeans are looking for an exit strategy in Afghanistan and that Americans, now more than ever, own that war: Obama is increasing the number of troops from 35.000 to 68.000 and has widened the theater of operations to include Pakistan. It is undoubtedly now an American war, a decision that may haunt him for years to come.The lost irony here is that Europeans have been very strident in opposing American unilateralism in Iraq, but when asked for a multilateral effort in Afghanistan, this one being the "legal" war that was approved by the UN Security Council, their response is a tepid 5,000 troops with no permission to engage, only to train Afghan military and police. Europe today has neither the stomach nor the resources for any type of war.In Prague, Obama outlined his vision for a world free of nuclear weapons. He warned that the non-proliferation regime is breaking down and called for a global summit on nuclear security. He said he hoped to negotiate a new treaty to end the production of fissile materials. On the deployment of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe, he opened two big loopholes: he said the US will deploy it "if it is effective" and "if Iran does not change its behavior." This is a major change of policy from the Bush years. It was very well received by the Russians but Obama will be severely criticized if his efforts to change the course in Iran fall flat, which is the most likely scenario.Ironically, while Obama's Prague speech on non-proliferation focused on preventing Iran and North Korea to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems, Pakistan, a US ally, is not only a nuclear state itself, in possession of around five dozen nuclear weapons, but has a pathetically weak government that lacks the most rudimentary capacity of a modern state: it cannot control its own territory, its institutions are shaky and it is therefore very close to becoming a failed state. For now, it seems that the administration's best bet is to take a minimalist posture of what success here would look like: setting the bar for victory in the region lower, for example to the more modest goals of denying Al Qaeda safe havens and preventing the total collapse of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Otherwise, the US runs again the risk of being trapped in a quagmire with no end in sight.The greatest paradox of the present world crisis is that among steep criticism of the American model and proposals to "rethink the American paradigm", the rest of the world is still looking to the United States to save them. No other power or world order is emerging to take its place and there is immense yearning and expectation that Obama will deliver a miracle and restore growth, prosperity and order around the world. However, under the new reality of dispersion of power, which is already becoming the defining trait of the 21st century, conflicts will at best be managed by concerted action among allies, but no longer solved by the absolute power and domination of the United States.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
Approaching the Front National electoral conglomerate from a different angle, that of its female component, leads to a more in-depth examination of the results of quantitative surveys published over several decades on the subject. The meeting of 28 women who "voted at least once for the National Front" in the Vaucluse and Bouches du Rhône regions encourages us to go beyond the strictly political definition of this electoral preference. While it is important to take into account the geographic specificity of the survey field (the FN's long and lasting presence in the PACA region), the complementarity between qualitative interviews and ethnographic observations does not make it any less possible to deconstruct the life paths of the individuals we met in order to place the FN's preference at a precise moment in these singular biographical trajectories. By looking for what each respondent can put behind the expression of a FN preference, we have touched on identity problems linked to the redefinition of sexual and social roles in our society. We were able to observe the persistence of systematic discrepancies between expected roles (which could legitimately be expected in view of the elements of the value systems we encountered) and lived roles in terms of work, family and especially marriage. This observation leads us to question the place of politics - or at least of the preferences designated as such by the specialists - within matrimonial exchanges. The analysis of this not very politicized sample, like the FN electorate as a whole, underlines the extent to which the FN preference can only be a mediocre expression of political competence. The majority of our respondents have a low level of politicization and hide behind the apparently political "choice" of the FN modes of relationship to the "Other". Facilitating a rapprochement with the parental unit, the concretization of a new matrimonial relationship, a means of filling an emotional solitude, a bargaining chip in the matrimonial relationship or all of these successively, the female preference in favor of the FN can leave the political field to touch on the complex (re)construction of women's identities. By investing the public sphere after ages of confinement in the private sphere, do women with the least cultural and social capital not reappropriate politics to make private use of it? Don't women instrumentalize the political tools in order to manage at best the sometimes perverse effects of a sexual and social liberation to which not all have access or at least not by the main door? Our reflections concern essentially women exercising professions that are not very valorizing, not chosen and often poorly paid in order to achieve social existence. The FN preference can sometimes allow them to take the offensive in their relations with men (in a context where the latter are also struggling with a redefinition of male identity, shaken up by the redistribution of sexual and social roles). The FN preference can often be associated with a "tinkering with identity" rather than with the expression of politically oriented convictions.This approach, which is not exclusive of other explanatory principles of the FN vote, highlights certain aspects that are often marginalized in the name of a sometimes global vision of the female condition. However, isn't this vision first and foremost the luxury of those who have the means (cultural in particular)? For the others, of which our sample is largely representative, it is above all their own condition that they seek to improve and, for many, within the framework of what is most familiar to them, i.e. the couple and the family, regardless of whether this involves a preference for a party that is retrograde from the point of view of the improvement of women's condition. It is an altruism that they cannot afford and that often concerns them only from afar. Which women are we talking about when we talk about those who do not vote FN? What part of them actually invokes programmatic reasons? Without doubt, many of those who do not vote FN do not do so for the "good" reasons traditionally given, but evolve above all in configurations and family, marital and professional contexts that do not contribute to bringing them closer to this party. This fieldwork gives flesh to variables that are often disembodied, it opens up perspectives on the interweaving of the public and private spheres, and it gives "gender" its rightful place in the approach to an extreme political preference. With a multitude of interview excerpts, this study does not seek to construct a typical portrait of the FN voter, a task made all the more difficult by the fact that this is an electorate in perpetual evolution, but rather to deconstruct the possible mechanisms of rapprochement with this political family. ; L'approche du conglomérat électoral Front national par le biais d'un angle décalé, celui de sa composante féminine, conduit à approfondir les résultats d'enquêtes quantitatives publiées depuis maintenant plusieurs décennies sur le sujet. La rencontre de 28 femmes « ayant voté au moins une fois pour le Front national » dans le Vaucluse et les Bouches du Rhône, encourage à dépasser la définition strictement politique de cette préférence électorale. S'il convient de tenir compte de la spécificité géographique du terrain de l'enquête (implantation ancienne et durable du FN en PACA), la complémentarité entre entretiens qualitatifs et observations ethnographiques ne permet pas moins de déconstruire les parcours de vie des individus rencontrés pour replacer la préférence FN à un instant précis de ces trajectoires biographiques singulières. En cherchant ce que chaque enquêtée peut mettre derrière l'expression d'une préférence FN, nous avons touché à des problèmes d'identité liés à la redéfinition des rôles sexuels et sociaux dans notre société. Nous avons pu observer la permanence de décalages systématiques entre rôles attendus (qui pouvaient légitimement l'être eu égard aux éléments des systèmes de valeurs rencontrés) et rôles vécus tant sur le plan professionnel, familial mais surtout matrimonial. Un tel constat conduit à interroger la place du politique –ou du moins des préférences désignées comme telles par les spécialistes- au sein des échanges matrimoniaux. L'analyse de cet échantillon peu politisé, à l'image de l'électorat FN dans sa globalité, souligne combien la préférence FN ne peut être que médiocrement l'expression d'une compétence politique. Présentant dans leur majorité un indice de politisation faible, nos enquêtées dissimulent derrière le « choix » apparemment politique du FN des modes de relations à « l'Autre ». Facilitant un rapprochement avec la cellule parentale, la concrétisation d'une nouvelle relation matrimoniale, moyen de combler une solitude affective, monnaie d'échange dans la relation matrimoniale ou bien encore tout cela successivement, la préférence féminine en faveur du FN peut quitter le terrain politique pour toucher à la complexe (re)construction d'identités de femmes. En investissant la sphère publique après des lustres de confinement dans la sphère privée, les femmes les moins dotées en capital culturel et social, ne se réapproprient-elle pas le politique pour en faire un usage privé ? Les femmes n'instrumentalisent-elles pas les outils politiques en vue de gérer au mieux, les effets parfois pervers d'une libération sexuelle et sociale à laquelle toutes n'ont pas accès ou du moins pas par la grande porte ? Nos réflexions concernent essentiellement des femmes exerçant des professions peu valorisantes, non choisies et souvent mal rémunérées pour parvenir à exister socialement. La préférence FN peut parfois leur permettre de reprendre l'offensive dans leurs rapports aux hommes (dans un contexte où ces derniers sont également aux prises avec une redéfinition de l'identité masculine, bousculée par la redistribution des rôles sexuels et sociaux). C'est souvent à un « bricolage identitaire » que la préférence FN peut être associée plus qu'à l'expression de convictions politiquement orientées.Cette approche, non exclusive d'autres principes explicatifs du vote FN, en souligne certains aspects souvent marginalisés au nom d'une vision parfois globalisante de la condition féminine. Pourtant cette vision n'est-elle pas d'abord le luxe de celles qui en ont les moyens (culturels notamment) ? Pour les autres, dont notre échantillon est largement représentatif, c'est avant tout leur propre condition qu'elles cherchent à améliorer et, pour beaucoup, dans le cadre de ce qui leur est le plus familier c'est à dire le couple et la famille, peu importe si cela passe par la préférence pour un parti rétrograde du point de vue de l'amélioration de la condition de la femme. C'est un altruisme dont elles n'ont pas les moyens et qui ne les concerne souvent que de loin. De quelles femmes parlent-on quand on évoque celles qui ne votent pas FN ? Quelle est la part de ces dernières qui invoque effectivement des raisons programmatiques ? Sans doute beaucoup de celles qui ne votent pas FN ne le font pas pour les « bonnes » raisons traditionnellement retenues mais évoluent avant tout dans des configurations et des contextes familiaux, matrimoniaux, professionnels qui ne contribuent pas à les rapprocher de ce parti. Travail de terrain, cette enquête donne un peu de chair à des variables souvent désincarnées, elle ouvre des perspectives quant à l'imbrication de la sphère publique et de la sphère privée, elle donne toute sa place au « genre » dans l'approche d'une préférence politique extrême. Riche d'une multitude d'extraits d'entretiens, ce travail d'enquête ne cherche pas à construire un portrait type de l'électeur FN, tâche d'autant plus difficile qu'il s'agit d'un électorat en perpétuelle évolution, mais à déconstruire des mécanismes possibles de rapprochement avec cette famille politique.
This doctoral thesis examines how European merger control law is applied to the energy sector and to which extent its application may facilitate the liberalisation of the electricity, natural gas and petroleum industries so that only those concentrations will be cleared that honour the principles of the liberalisation directives (IEMD and IGMD ). In its communication on an energy policy for Europe, adopted on 10/01/2007, the Commission emphasized that a real internal European energy market is essential to meet Europe's three energy objectives, i.e. competitiveness to cut costs for citizens and undertakings to foster energy efficiency and investment, sustainability including emissions trading, and security of supply with high standards of public service obligations (Art. 106 TFEU). The EU issued three pre-liberalisation directives since the 1990s. Dissatisfied with the existing monopolistic structures, i.e. in Germany through demarcation and exclusive concession agreements for the supply of electricity and natural gas, which were until 1998 exempted from the cartel prohibition provision (§ 1 GWB), and the prevalence of exclusive rights on the energy markets, the Commission triggered infringement proceedings against four member states under Art. 258 TFEU. The CJEU confirmed that the Commission has the power to abolish monopoly rights under certain circumstances and the rulings had the effect of convincing the member states to enter into negotiations for an opening up of energy markets owing to the internal market energy liberalization directives of 1996 / 1998 / 2003 / 2009 / 2019 (IEMD and IGMD) . The core element of the IEMD and IGMD is to abolish exclusive rights and offer primarily at least large industrial electricity and gas consumers to choose their supplier (market opening for eligible consumers) and to grant negotiated or regulated third party access to transmission and distribution grids so to address natural monopolies. The second liberalization package of 2003 brought a widening of market opening and acceleration of pace of market opening to a greater number of eligible customers (all non-household consumers since July 2004 and all consumers since July 2007) and an increase in the provisions on management and legal unbundling. In parallel, two regulations regulate the access to cross-border electricity infrastructure (interconnectors) and the third party access to gas transmission networks. Two further Directives addressed the security of natural gas and power supply and a third deals with energy end use efficiency and services , a fourth dealt with the promotion of co-generation and a fifths covers marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive in combination with the Hydrocarbons-Licensing Directive ) backed by the public procurement directive in the energy sector. A regulation covers energy statistics. The implementation of the second energy package was slow and the Commission launched infringement proceedings against 5 member states in front of the CJEU (Art. 258, 256 TFEU). The 3rd energy package of 2009 addressed ownership unbundling of key-infrastructure ownership and energy wholesale and retail supply consisting of three regulations and two directives, deals with independent regulators, an agency for the cooperation of energy regulators (ACER) and cross-border cooperation (the European Network for transmission system operators for electricity and gas [ENTSO-E/G] and a regulation on cross-border grid access for electricity and natural gas. Another new regulation deals with market integrity and transparency . Hence, new regulations regulate guidelines on electricity balancing, congestion management, long-term capacity allocation, the code for grid access and transmission system operation . Other regulations address the guidelines for a European cross-border energy infrastructure, which has to be interpreted in the context of European environmental impact assessment law, the submission of data in electricity markets, establish a network code on demand connection , rule on a network code for grid access for direct current transmission systems, define guidelines on electricity transmission system operation, regulate a network code on electricity emergency , deal with security of natural gas supply and establish a programme to aid economic recovery by granting financial assistance. Finally, Directives promote the usage of renewable energies, regulate common oil stocks, the safety of offshore oil and gas production and the quality of petrol and diesel fuels. The 4th liberalization package consists of a new IEMD2019 and IGMD2019, of a new regulation on European cross-border electricity trade, of a regulation on risk preparedness in the electricity sector, of a new agency for the cooperation of European energy regulators, addresses energy efficiency and rules on good governance in the energy union. Since 2008, the Art. 194 I-II TFEU governs the ordinary legislation procedure in the energy sector (internal market in energy, security of energy supply, energy efficiency, energy saving, renewable energies, interconnection of energy grids) notwithstanding of unanimous decision making in case of energy taxation matters (Art. 194 III TFEU). A brief analysis of the economic implications of concentrations is followed by an assessment of the evolution of European merger control law under Art. 66 ECSCT, Art. 101 and 102 TFEU, the merger control regulation of 1989 and its significant amendments of 1997 and 2004. Then, the theoretical findings are contrasted to the results of recent merger proceedings in the energy sector with a focus on the VEBA/VIAG decision. Several deficiencies are established which limit the efficacy of merger control as a tool of offsetting shortcomings in the secondary EC law with regard to the liberalisation of the electricity and gas supply industry (IEMD and IGMD). Commitments proposed by the parties of a given concentration and accepted by the Commission as being sufficient to remedy a serious potential of dominance may only be of subsidiary relevance to the liberalisation of sectors owing to a number of analytical and practical drawbacks. One dominant drawback relates to the fact that the commitments depend always on parties' proposals and can never be imposed ex officio. Others relate to the blunt authorisations provided by the wording of Art. 6 and 8 MR1997 and MR2004 as to the implementation of undertakings. With regard to acquisitions of U.K. regional electricity companies by EdF, it is elaborated that the current merger control law leaves no scope for reciprocity considerations regarding acquisitions by incumbent companies in liberalised markets even though the acquirer is a protected public undertaking. Moreover, it is established that different decisions apply inconsistent market definitions. By means of the VEBA/VIAG and RWE/VEW cases, the question is addressed which causes are responsible for the established analytical and practical deficiencies of merger control in the energy sector. It is stated that the weaknesses of the IEMD 2009/72/EC and IGMD 2009/73/EC are partly responsible for weak undertakings which do not sufficiently remove the scope for dominance on the affected markets and which do not rule out any possibility of impediments of effective negotiated or regulated TPA and do not remove any commercial incentive of the grid subsidiaries of the vertically integrated companies as to access which discriminates between intra and extra group applicants. It is reported that another argument relates to the limited scope that the Commission has if it wants to remedy deficiencies of written primary law owing to the extraordinary nature of the implied powers doctrine based on the principle of constitutional state. Adverse political influence against competition authorities is also judged. Further, it is analysed that accidental regulation based on incidental provisions imposed on undertakings which may or not implement a concentration is by no means a consistent and non-discriminatory and predictable tool to overcome drawbacks of primary or secondary European law in a given sector owing to the democratic principle and the constitutional state doctrine. It is discussed that secondary legislation with regard to energy networks is inter alia restricted by Art. 345 TFEU and provisions of national constitutions which protect property rights against dis-proportionate expropriations or re-definitions of property. Further, legal authorisations of said calibre will have to be connected to a system of state liability law. Adverse political pressures are considered. The same is true for egoistic national policies which abstain from transnational task forces in order to settle difficulties and disputes. Furthermore, the adverse effect of different stages of the maturity of domestic markets, different consumer patterns and a potential isolation of the system is not neglected, because these conditions make it more difficult to apply consistent standards as to the appropriate market definition in order to facilitate harmonisation. The implementation of the VEBA/VIAG merger is discussed, as the former was further complicated owing to specifically evaluated circumstances which were difficult to predict. Nevertheless, the Commission is not exempted from the duty to take due care concerning potential impediments as to the realisation of parties' commitments. In contrast to the negative aspects, it can be highlighted that the Commission quickly realised flaws of the energy liberalisation project as expressed by the present form of the IEMD and IGMD. Consequently, the co-ordinative and innovative mechanisms of Florence and Madrid were created in order to boost the development of effective cross border trade - i.e. tariff systems and interconnector congestion management. It will be concluded that undertakings put forward by the parties and accepted by the Commission should be restricted to a subsidiary legal instrument, only applied if strictly necessary to overcome certain detrimental aspects of given concentrations in order to provide a hint for the legislator, to specify its legislation. Competition as a de-central distributor of risk, wealth and power will be extended to its maximum extent, if wholesale consumers benefit from lower energy prices which allow greater productivity of European products on the world markets in combination with higher environmental standards owing to modern, cost-efficient plants. A successful implementation will be described by liquid spot markets for power accompanied by tools of financial risk management like forwards, futures and options. These will be valuable indicators of efficient liberalisation of the European electricity and gas supply industries. ; Diese Doktorarbeit untersucht wie das Europäische Fusionskontrollverfahrensrecht auf den Energiesektor angewendet wird und in welchem Ausmaß seine Anwendung die Liberalisierung der Elektrizitäts-, Gas- und Erdölmärkte unterstützt, so dass nur solche Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse freigegeben wurden, die die Prinzipien der Liberalisierungsrechtsakte (Binnenmarktstromrichtlinie und Binnenmarktsgasrichtlinie). In ihrer Mitteilung über eine Energiepolitik für Europa, angenommen am 10.01.2007, betonte die Kommission, dass ein realer Energiebinnenmarkt essentiell ist, um Europas drei Energieziele zu erreichen, d.h. Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, um Kosten für Bürger und Unternehmen zu senken, um Energieeffizienz und Investitionen zu fördern, und Nachhaltigkeit, darin eingeschlossen ein Emissionshandel, und Energieversorgungssicherheit mit hohen Standards von öffentlichen Dienstleistungspflichten (Art. 106 AEUV). Die EU erließ drei Prä-Liberalisierungsrechtsakte seit den 1990er Jahren . Unzufrieden mit den existierenden monopolartigen Strukturen, d.h. in Deutschland durch Demarkationsverträge und ausschließliche Konzessionsverträge für die Versorgung von Strom und Erdgas, die bis 1998 vom allgemeinen Kartellverbot ausgenommen waren (§ 1 GWB), und die Vorherrschaft von ausschließlichen Rechten auf den Energiemärkten, löste die Kommission Vertragsverletzungsverfahren gegen vier Mitgliedstaaten gemäß Art. 258 AEUV . Der Gerichtshof bestätigte, dass die Kommission das Recht hat, ausschließliche Rechte unter gewissen Bedingungen abzuschaffen, und die Urteile hatten den Effekt, die Mitgliedstaaten zu überzeugen, in Verhandlungen für eine Marktöffnung der Energiemärkte gemäß den Energiebinnenmarktrichtlinien von 1996, 1998, 2003, 2009 und 2019 einzutreten (Strombinnenmarktrichtlinie und Gasbinnenmarktrichtlinie). Das Kernelement der Strombinnenmarktrichtlinie und Gasbinnenmarktsrichtlinie ist es, ausschließliche Rechte abzuschaffen und primär zumindest großen industriellen Strom und Gasverbrauchern das Recht einzuräumen, ihren Versorger frei zu wählen (Marktöffnung für auswählbare Verbraucher) und einen verhandelten oder regulierten Drittparteizugang zu Übertragungsnetzen und Verteilungsnetzen zu gewähren, um natürliche Monopole zu regulieren. Das zweite Liberalisierungspaket von 2003 brachte eine erweiterte Marktöffnung und Beschleunigung der Geschwindigkeit der Marktöffnung zu einer größeren Zahl von auswählbaren Verbrauchern (alle Nicht-Haushaltskunden seit Juli 2004 und alle Konsumenten ab Juli 2007) und eine Ausweitung der Vorschrift über Management- und rechtliche Entflechtung . Parallel dazu regeln zwei Verordnungen den Zugang zu grenzüberschreitenden Elektrizitätsinfrastrukturen (Interkonnektoren) und den Drittparteizugang zu Gas Übertragungsnetzwerken. Zwei weitere Richtlinien adressieren die Versorgungssicherheit von Erdgas und Strom und eine dritte behandelt die Energieendnutzungseffizienz und Dienstleistungen , eine vierte Richtlinie beschäftigte sich mit der Förderung von Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung und eine fünfte deckt Meeresumweltschutzpolitik ab (Marine Strategie Rahmenrichtlinie in Verbindung mit der Kohlenwasserstoff-Lizensierungsrichtlinie, verstärkt durch die Richtlinie über das öffentliche Auftragswesen im Energiesektor. Eine Verordnung behandelt Energiestatistiken. Die Umsetzung des zweiten Energiepakets war langsam und die Kommission leitete Vertragsverletzungsverfahren gegen 5 Mitgliedstaaten ein beim Europäischen Gerichtshof (Art. 258, 256 TFEU). Das dritte Energiepaket von 2009 adressierte die eigentumsrechtliche Entflechtung von Schlüssel-Infrastrukturen und die Energiegroßhandelsversorgung und die Kleinkundenenergieversorgung bestehend aus drei Verordnungen und zwei Richtlinien, beschäftigt sich mit unabhängigen Energieregulierungsbehörden, einer Agentur für die Zusammenarbeit von Energieregulierungsbehörden (ACER) und der grenzüberschreitenden Kooperation (das Europäische Netzwerk für Übertragungsnetzwerkoperatoren für Strom und Gas [ENTSO-E/G] und eine Verordnung über grenzüberschreitenden Netzzugang für Strom und Erdgas . Eine andere Verordnung behandelt die Marktintegrität und Transparenz. Außerdem regulieren neue Verordnungen Grundzüge der Strom-Balancierung, Verstopfungsmanagement, langfristige Kapazitätszuweisung, den Kodex für den Netzzugang und die Operation des Übertragungsnetzes. Andere Verordnungen regulieren die Grundsätze für eine europäische grenzüberschreitende Energie-Infrastruktur, welche im Kontext des europäischen Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfungsrechts interpretiert werden muss, die Einreichung von Daten über Strommärkte, etablieren einen Netzwerkkodex über Nachfrageverbindung, regeln einen Netzwerkkodex für den Netzzugang für Gleichstromübertragungssysteme, definieren Richtlinien über Stromübertragungssystemoperation, regulieren einen Netzwerkkodex über Stromversorgungsnotfälle, behandeln Erdgasversorgungssicherheit und etablieren ein Programm, um der ökonomischen Wiederherstellung zu helfen, indem finanzielle Hilfen gewährt werden. Schließlich fördern Richtlinien die Nutzung von erneuerbaren Energien, regulieren gemeinsame Erdölvorräte, die Sicherheit der Hochsee Erdöl- und Erdgasproduktion und die Qualität von Benzin und Diesel Kraftstoffen. Das vierte Liberalisierungspaket besteht aus einer neuen Strombinnenmarktrichtlinie 2019 und einer Erdgasbinnenmarktrichtlinie 2019, aus einer neuen Verordnung über europäischen grenzüberschreitenden Stromhandel, aus einer Verordnung übrer Risikovorbereitung im Stromsektor, aus einer neuen Agentur für die Zusammenarbeit der Europäischen Energie-Regulatoren, adressiert Energieeffizienz und regelt die gute Geschäftsführung in der Energieunion. Seit 2008 regelt Art. 194 I-II AUEV das ordentliche Gesetzgebungsverfahren im Energiesektor (Binnenmarkt für Energie, Energieversorgungssicherheit, Energieeffzienz, Energieeinsparung, erneuerbare Energien und die Interkonnektion von Energienetzen) unabhängig vom einstimmigen Entscheiden im Bereich von Energiebesteuerungen (Art. 194 III AEUV). Eine kurze Analyse der wirtschaftlichen Implikation von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen folgt die Untersuchung der Evolution des Europäischen Fusionskontrollverfahrensrechts gemäß dem ehemaligen Art. 66 EGKSV, Art. 101 and 102 AEUV, der Fusionskontrollverfahrensverordnung von 1989 und ihrer signifikanten Änderungen von 1997 und 2004. Dann werden die theoretischen Ergebnisse den Resultaten der Fusionskontrollverfahren im Energiesektor gegenübergestellt mit einem Schwerpunkt auf der VEBA/VIAG Entscheidung. Mehrere Schwachstellen werden herausgestellt, welche die Effektivität der Fusionskontrolle im Energiesektor herausstellen, die die Effektivität der Fusionskontrolle als ein Werkzeug zum Ausgleich der Schwachstellen im Sekundärrecht der EU mit Bezug auf die Liberalisierung der Strom- und Erdgasversorgungsindustrien mindern (Elektrizitätsbinnenmarktrichtlinie und Erdgasbinnenmarktrichtlinie). Verpflichtungszusagen auf Vorschlag der Partien eines Unternehmenszusammenschlusses, die von der Kommission angenommen worden sind, um hinreichend zu sein, um ein seriöses Potential von Marktbeherrschung zu adressieren können nur auf hilfsweise Relevanz zur Liberalisierung on Wirtschaftssektoren dienen gemäß einer Anzahl von analytischen und praktischen Nachteilen. Ein relevanter Nachteil bezieht sich auf das Faktum, dass die Verpflichtungszusagen der Parteien immer auf den Parteivorschlägen fußen und dass sie niemals ex officio auferlegt werden können. Andere Nachteile beziehen sich auf die grobe Autorisierung der Kommission, wie sie nahegelegt wird durch den Wortlaut von Art. 6 and 8 Fusionskontrollverordnung 1997 und 2004 bezogen auf die Umsetzung von Nebenbestimmungen. Mit Bezug auf die Akquisition von regionalen Stromunternehmen im Vereinigten Königreich durch EdF wird herausgearbeitet, dass das gegenwärtige Fusionskontrollverfahrensrecht keinen Ansatz für Reziprozitätserwägungen lässt mit Bezug auf Akquisitionen durch amtierende Unternehmen in liberalisierten Märkten, auch wenn der Erwerber eine geschützte öffentliche Unternehmung ist. Außerdem wird herausgearbeitet, dass unterschiedliche Entscheidungen inkonsistente Marktdefinitionen herausarbeitet. Durch die VEBA/VIAG and RWE/VEW Entscheidungen wird die Frage beantwortet, welche Ursachen verantwortlich sind für die etablierten analytischen und praktischen Nachteile der Fusionskontrolle im Energiesektor. Es wird herausgestellt, dass die Schwächen der Elektrizitätsbinnenmarktrichtlinie 2009/72/EG und der Erdgasbinnenmarktrichtlinie 2009/73/EG zu gewissen Anteilen verantwortlich sind für schwache Nebenbestimmungen, die nicht hinreichend den Anwendungsbereich für Marktbeherrschung auf den betroffenen Märkten eliminieren und die nicht jedwede Möglichkeit von Erschwernissen des verhandelten oder regulierten Drittparteizugangs zu Infrastrukturen ausschließen und welche nicht den kommerziellen Anreiz der Netztochtergesellschaften der vertikal integrierten Unternehmen entfernen, zu unterscheiden zwischen Intra- und Extra-Gruppen Netzzugangspetenten. Es wird geschildert, dass sich ein anderes Argument auf den limitierten Anwendungsbereich bezieht, dass die Kommission, wenn sie es möchte, um Nachteile zu adressieren des primären Gemeinschaftsrechts gemäß der außergewöhnlichen Natur der impIizierten Befugnisse Doktrin basieren auf dem Prinzip des Rechtsstaates. Gegenteilige politische Einflussnahme gegen Wettbewerbsbehörden wird außerdem untersucht. Darüber hinaus wird analysiert, dass akzidentielle Regulierung basierend auf Nebenbestimmungen, die vielleicht oder nicht einen Unternehmenszusammenschluss implementieren unter keinem Gesichtspunkt ein konsistentes und vorhersehbares Werkzeug ist, um Nachteile des primären oder sekundären Europäischen Rechts in einem gegebenen Sektor zu überwinden gemäß dem Demokratieprinzip und dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip. Es wird diskutiert, dass sekundäre europäische Rechtssetzung mit Bezug auf Energienetzwerke unter anderem durch Art. 345 AEUV begrenzt wird und dass Vorschriften nationaler Verfassungen, die Eigentumsrechte garantieren, gegen die unverhältnismäßige Enteignung oder Inhalts- und Schrankenbestimmungen des Eigentum schützen . Darüber hinaus werden rechtliche Ermächtigungen des besagten Kalibers gewürdigt und mit einem System von Staatsverantwortlichkeitsrecht verbunden. Gegenteilige politische Drücke wurden erwogen. Das gleiche trifft zu für egoistische nationale Politiken, die von nationalen Taskforces Abstand nehmen, um Schwierigkeiten und Streitigkeiten zu adressieren. Außerdem wird der gegenteilige Effekt von unterschiedlichen Phasen der Reife häuslicher Märkte, unterschiedlichem Verbraucherverhalten und einer möglichen Isolation des Systems untersucht und nicht vernachlässigt, weil diese Bedingungen es schwieriger machen, konsistente Standards mit Bezug auf die sachgerechte Marktdefinition anzuwenden, um die Harmonisierung zu erleichtern. Die Einflüsse der VEBA/VIAG Fusion wird diskutiert, weil diese Entscheidung weiter erschwert war und kompliziert wurde durch spezielle ausgewertete Umstände, die schwierig vorherzusehen waren. Dennoch war die Kommission nicht befreit von der Verpflichtung, um notwendige Sorgfalt anzuwenden bezogen auf potentielle Erschwernisse bezogen auf die Realisierung der Verpflichtungszusagen der Parteien. Im Gegensatz zu den negativen Aspekten kann herausgestellt werden, dass die Kommission schnell Schwachstellen des Enerigeliberalisierungsprojektes erkannt hat, wie es durch die gegenwärtige Form der Elektrizitätsbinnenmarktrichtlinie und der Erdgasbinnenmarktrichtlinie geprägt wird. Konsequenterweise wurden die koordinierenden und innovativen Mechanismen der Foren von Florenz und Madrid geschaffen, um die Entwicklung effektiven grenzüberschreitenden Energiehandels voranzutreiben, d.h. Tarifsysteme und Interkonnektorenverstopfungsmanagements. Es wird der Schluss gezogen, dass Unternehmen, vorangetrieben durch die Parteien und angenommen durch die Kommission, davon ausgenommen wurden sollen, ein subsidiäres rechtliches Instrument zu begrenzen, um gewisse schädliche Aspekte einer gegebenen Unternehmenskonzentration zu überwinden, um für einen Hinweis and den Gesetzgeber zu sorgen, seine Gesetzgebung zu spezifizieren. Wettbewerb als ein dezentrales Verfahren zur Verteilung von Risiko, Wohlstand und Macht wird ausgedehnt zu seinem maximalen Ertrag, wenn Großhandelsverbraucher von geringeren Energiepreisen profitieren, die eine gesteigerte Produktivität Europäischer Produkte auf den Weltmärkten bewirken in Kombination mit höheren Umweltstandards durch den Einsatz moderner, kosteneffzienter Produktionsstätten. Eine erfolgreiche Implementierung wird beschrieben durch liquide Spot-Märkte für Energie, begleitet durch Werkzeuge des finanziellen Risikomanagements wie Forward-Derivate, Future-Derivate und Optionen. Diese wurden wertvolle Indikatoren einer effizienten Liberalisierung der Europäischen Elektrizitäts- und Erdgasversorgungsindustrien sein.
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The Conference of Defence Associations Institute made a splash this week with an open letter "Call for Action: Canada's National Security and Defence in Peril." It made a heap of news given who signed it: a heap of former ministers of defence, a bunch of ambassadors and high ranking civil servants, and several retired generals and admirals (tis funny to me that the title of the piece omits the squids and skimmers):I respect the hell out of many of the signers as well as folks at CDAI, which as been a terrific partner of the CDSN. However, I have quibbles, both minor and major, which I would have shared this morning on the radio had the host not gotten the wrong talking points--he asked me about Elon Musk and the CBC. While it was fun to rant about bad faith actors engaged in vice-signalling, I did prep for the interview and didn't want to waste it, so here's some thoughts about this piece. First, I want to address a few specific gripes before getting to the larger context.The letter talks about our military capabilities being woefully inadequate to protect our landmass. That is not only true, that will ALWAYS be true. How so? The primary military threat to Canada are missiles launched by Russia/China/North Korea. We can't stop those. No matter how much we spend, we can't because we don't have ballistic missile defenses. The Americans have been working on such defenses since Reagan's Star Wars speech, and they really haven't made much progress on it. So, we should be clearer about what are the threats and what we need to defend ourselves from those threats. The biggest threats to Canadian lives and property are stuff outside the military domain: climate change, pandemics, and cyber attacks (while the military has a cyber role, we should not be spending the scarce commodity of disciplined, trained people in uniform on jobs civilians can and should do). People can cite Russian investments in the north, but we have to keep in mind that they have a whole lot of north to defend. I do really worry about a war with China, but that is a China-Taiwan conflict that will spillover, and we will never have a navy big enough to make a dent in that conflict. I say all this, even as I agree with the basic premise--we need to spend more. But there are some difficulties with that, as I get to, below."We have also fallen short in meaningful contributions to burden sharing for the collective defence and security of our allies and partners." Oh really? What burden has Canada shirked? Canada paid the third highest price of any ally in Afghanistan and had far less restrictions until it became a training mission. Canada is one of four framework nations organizing the defense/deterrence/reassurance missions in the Baltics and Poland. While our contingent has been smaller than the others, the resulting need to organize many smaller and less respected (sorry) contingents has earned Canada a heap of kudos for stepping up when France refused to do so. Canada has played a leading role in training Ukrainian forces before the Russian invasion of 2022 and since. Canada has shipped a comparative level of arms and ammunition and other supplies to Ukraine. When people say Canada has not burden-shared enough, they really mean Canada hasn't spent enough on its military. But that is not "burden-sharing" because spending on our own military really does not lift the burden that much from the others. Here's a secret: the US would spend as much as it currently does even if Canada doubled its spending. Indeed, given the domestic political dynamics driving American defense spending, I am pretty sure that if each and every US ally spent the equivalent of 2% of GDP on defense, the US would still spend about the same. Which branch of the US military will say: hey, our allies have spent more, we don't need to spend as much? Which defense contractors? Which Senators and Representatives? And, yes, the easiest way to make progress to 2% is to tank the economy since it is all about spending relative to one's economy. If one's economy grows pretty well, one might find one spending more money absolutely but not relative to that metric. Canada is spending more on its military than it was a decade ago--more dollars, even if not a greater % of GDP. More importantly input measures are dumb. See Anessa Kimball's book for more on the craptastic nature of the 2% conversation.Canadian civil-military relations conversations don't really address the challenges posed by having retired senior officers take political stances the same way these are raised in the US. But perhaps they should. If JC Boucher and I get funding, we will be studying whether the signals sent by retired officers cause Canadians to think that they are speaking for the active military. If so, well, damn. Because then the military is seen, rightly or wrongly, as taking a partisan stance. And that ain't good. Folks can say this is a bipartisan letter since it has both former Conservative and Liberal politicians signing it, but nope, that doesn't do the trick since this letter is calling on this government, this party, to do better. It does not call on Parliament to get its house in order even as the role of parliament in Canadian defence is so much weaker than damn near any other democracy. So, this is critical of this PM and the Liberal party because they are the ones in power. Speaking of the former ministers, how many of them are responsible for the current mess? How many of them cut spending, pushed back procurement processes, under-invested in procurement expertise, and so on? Most of them? All of them? So much easier for them to criticize this stuff now that they are no longer beholden to parties and no longer running for office. Which gets to the part that is most unrealistic: "the Government must radically accelerate timelines for procurement..." Um, through magic? A great application of Green Lantern theory. DND doesn't have enough people to do the procurement stuff to buy the equipment and such. So, that needs a heap of work to make happen before one can spend the money. If one were to magically allocate $15b more, the current staffing at DND couldn't spend it. Ok, the larger context. The letter is right that the latest budget is disappointing from a defence/security perspective as it had no new money. In my humble opinion, the gravest threat to the Canadian military is its recruitment and retention crisis. That being short 16k people means not only that the CAF can't do as much, but that those in the CAF are stressed. Stressed by having to do multiple jobs, stressed by not being well served by various offices that are understaff, and so on. These pressures are likely to make it harder to retain people and harder to recruit, which will exacerbate the crisis--a downward spiral. It would seem to me that while throwing money at the problem won't solve it, it probably could help. Increase pay, increase benefits, spend more money on recruiting efforts, improve military bases, etc. I do wonder what is happening to the money that is supposed to be going to the 16k soldiers, sailors, and aviators who aren't in the CAF. Anyhow, that is one place where the money should be going. Another key part of the current context is that the Defence Policy Update is late and has generally been an opaque, underwhelming process. Canada should have a quadrennial process--to review how well the last four years went and whether goals were attained, why DND/CAF fell short, and plans for improving as well as responding to new developments. Instead, the DPU was going to be, from what folks have gleaned, a sales pitch for spending more money on NORAD modernization (which is necessary but won't actually lead to us being much safer due to that aforementioned missile defence problemo). We will only be able to evaluate the DPU after it comes out. The previous review was much better than expected. Maybe people liked it since it didn't make any hard choices as it didn't force any real tradeoffs. But it did cost out the spending for the various programs and was pretty transparent. Of course, when rolled out, much was made of putting personnel first in the document to suggestion putting personnel first in reality, but then Trudeau kept around a Defence Minister who kept around a Chief of Defence Staff that was abusing his power and engaged in sexual misconduct. So, the proof is in the doing, not in the words on the page.Finally, the political pressures run against most of this. If we wanted good ships fast and less expensive, we'd buy them from countries that are good at that. Instead, notice how the ship building is pitched by this government (and by the previous one, just not quite so starkly): That graphic is the cover for the 2015 Liberal Defence Platform. Notice the purpose of naval investments--jobs. Not ships. Jobs. Not defending maritime approaches. This is one of the primary reasons why Canada doesn't have the equipment the CAF needs--that decisions are made about jobs and votes. Stephen Harper's plan was to capture Halifax and Vancouver via the shipbuilding program, but now all the parties are held hostage by Irving, Seaspan, and now Davie shipyards. Folks can argue we need this capacity to maintain and upgrade the ships, but the choice to do it this way is incredibly expensive and ... no frigates (the AOPS ships the navy didn't really want are mostly broken). When we do import stuff, there is an urge to Canadianize it to make it fit Canadian standards. So, now we have helicopters that are too heavy. Oy. The military always wants to put as much stuff as they can, so that the equipment can operate in all kinds of scenarios since they can only get one type of plane, one type of ship, and so forth. But that goldplating makes the systems more expensive and less effective. Again, choices need to be made, which might mean that a ship is good at one thing and not so good at another. Because you know.... 👉While this government is not great at delivering, most of this is hard-wired into Canadian politics. Which party is going to get more votes by spending more money on defense? "We believe this could be best accomplished on a non-partisan basis and would have broad public support." Um, no.Structural problems can't be fixed with just a call to arms and a smidge more political will (whatever that is). Maybe this letter might impact those writing the Defence Policy Update, but that impact is likely to be on the packaging as the money is already set. Trudeau has already made the decision for this year, and given the context--the war in Ukraine, the DPU, etc--I doubt that next year will be any different as we get closer to the next election. I get the frustration of those signing this letter. I share it. I write blog posts out of frustration. Other folks write open letters. But move the policy needle? I think not.
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It is time to retire the phrase "military-industrial complex."President Dwight Eisenhower coined this immortal phrase during his January 17, 1961 farewell address to warn Americans against the "acquisition of unwarranted influence" by the conjunction of "an immense military establishment and a large arms industry."As a five-star general, Ike knew, perhaps better than anyone, the self-serving and mutually beneficial relationship between the defense industry and the military. But he neglected to mention Congress's role in the arrangement, nor could he necessarily have foreseen the ways in which corporate interests would intertwine themselves with the various bureaucracies that keep the Pentagon's coffers flowing.While the phrase "military-industrial-congressional-information complex" would be more accurate, it doesn't exactly roll off the tongue. And like Eisenhower's snappier appellation, it still suggests an element of conspiracy. But, of course, none of this is theoretical. The Pentagon, Congress, the defense industry, think tanks, lobbyists, and industry-sponsored media outlets are all very real. When combined, they make up what is better termed the "National Security Establishment," which Americans see in action all the time.We see it when a retired general goes on television to explain exactly how the Ukrainian army can defeat the Russians — but only if Congress passes the latest billion-dollar aid package. No mention is made of the rather relevant fact that the general's think tank is funded by defense contractors who stand to benefit from the aid package he is calling for.We see it when another general retires from his post as the head of his service branch and turns up six months later on the board of a major defense contractor. Coincidentally, it's the same defense contractor that celebrated a year earlier when that general announced the company had won the $21.4 billion contract to build a fleet of bombers.We see it when a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee proposes the U.S. spend 5% of the gross domestic product every year on the military — a $55 billion increase to the current Pentagon budget. Predictably, he fails to mention that the majority of this money would go to defense contracts awarded to the same organizations that have given him more than $530,000 in campaign money since 2019. He fails to acknowledge how flush Pentagon budgets over the past 25 years created the sorry state of the military today.We even see it when we least expect to, as when the country's largest defense contractor runs advertisements during the Oscars and posts an interactive map on the company's website touting the economic benefits of a weapon program. The company wants everyone to know how many jobs could be lost if Congress votes to disrupt the program in any way.The American people also see the impact of these actions by the National Security Establishment.We see tens of billions spent on a fighter jet that can only be reliably ready for combat a third of the time. We also see more than $60 billion spent designing and building warships that were so flawed Navy officials apparently can't get rid of them fast enough. The Navy decommissioned one of these ships less than 5 years after its commissioning ceremony, roughly two decades ahead of the ship's planned lifespan. Starting in 2003, the Army spent at least $8 billion, and some sources say the better part of $20 billion, developing the Future Combat System, a family of armored vehicles to replace Cold War-era tanks, personnel carriers, and artillery vehicles. The Pentagon then canceled the program in 2009 with little to show for the effort and expense.There are plenty of other examples of failed acquisition efforts from the past 25 years which partially explain why annual defense spending is now a whopping 48% higher than it was in 2000. Compounding these efforts is the Pentagon's reliance on contractors to perform many roles once performed by uniformed service members at a much lower financial rate. The Department of Defense itself analyzed one case where hiring a group of contractors cost 316% more than the government employees tasked with similar work.In a city where partisanship and political rancor impacts nearly every debate, wasteful and ineffective defense policies are a conspicuous exception. That is because the National Security Establishment is party-agnostic. Military contractors donate money to candidates and lobbyists on both sides of the aisle, those candidates vote for Pentagon budget increases and fund weapons programs long after their failures are widely known, and lobbyists and corporate-sponsored media groups generate public support for those programs. Without massive structural changes, this pattern is all but certain to continue into future generations. Today's National Security Establishment has launched several major weapons programs in recent years that, if allowed to continue on their current trajectories, will drive the annual Pentagon budget to truly unprecedented levels.As programs like the B-21, Constellation-class frigate, Next Generation Air Dominance fighter jet, Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, several ground vehicle programs, the Sentinel nuclear missile, and myriad space and cyber systems mature and enter full-rate production in the coming decades, the Pentagon budget will expand to cover the costs. But this doesn't have to be the case, if Congress actually does its oversight job. Several of these programs are already behind schedule and over budget. Costs for the Sentinel missile program have increased 81% to $140.9 billion from the original $77.7 billion estimate and it will still be several years before the first missile is installed in its silo. Yet, given the massive financial influence, even these egregious failures are all but glossed over, a simple footnote for most, and then prepared for a rubber stamp.The services and their bureaucracies, the defense industry, members of Congress, and the paid mouthpieces promoting their interests in the media and during lobbying visits all comprise the all-too-real National Security Establishment. Identifying this network is the first step to avoid saddling future generations with the crushing debt associated with unsustainable U.S. military policies today.While it is long-past time to update the name, Eisenhower's warning is still more real than ever. Americans must remain vigilant and guard against the self-serving nature of this apparatus that is more intent on lining its own pockets than it is actually keeping Americans and our allies safe.-
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Bossier City's long history of trying to count coup on Shreveport for once might serve it well, with an opportunity presenting itself through a blunder by the latter.
For decades, Bossier City leaders have burdened themselves with a psychological inferiority complex relating to their larger and better-known (and, to many outsiders, with a more easily-pronounceable name) neighbor across the Red River. Feeling overshadowed, they have pursued policies attempting to make their city stand out from, if not look better than, Shreveport.
Usually, it has led to undesirable consequences. Leaders chafed when no comprehensive hospital located in Bossier City, so they decided to build the government-run Bossier Medical Center. That worked out until it became apparent that Willis-Knighton Systems would come to town with an initial offer allegedly for $42 million to buy BMC, whereupon egos kicked in and city leaders refused it. WKS then built its own, drove BMC numbers steeply into the red, and in a short time the city had a fire sale of the facility, which no longer operates, for $18 million. (Two city councilors from that era, no party Jeff Darby and Democrat Bubba Williams, still serve on the Council.)
That was just an opportunity missed, as opposed to the current money pit that is the Brookshire Grocery Arena. Built just after the BMC debacle for tens of millions more dollars than at first contemplated, it has consistently lost money year after year. But city leaders wanted a modern indoor arena to contrast with what Shreveport had available (the Hirsch Memorial Coliseum, which technically isn't even the city's but is part of a nonprofit organization), so rather than wait on a nongovernment entity to build one it took the plunge, to taxpayers' everlasting regret.
Typically, it has been the heavy hand of government intervention, spending more to bulk up, that Bossier City has turned to in order to draw its intended contrast which then backfired, stubbornly resisting the idea that a government that spent less with lower taxation and fees would create more incentive for people to live and work there. To paraphrase Edmund Burke, to make people love their city, the city ought to be lovely.
Now there presents a way to do that with a much more valid dose of government intervention, courtesy of Shreveport's impending jettison of a total smoking ban at its casinos. Earlier this week it changed its ordinance regarding smoking to require just a quarter of the area of a casino, boat or land, to be nonsmoking. It's uncertain whether Republican Mayor Tom Arceneaux will veto it or, if so, that veto would be overridden as it passed on a 4-2 vote.
Practically speaking, that means there is no ban at all. No technology can prevent smoke from wafting around nonsmoking areas. In essence, this puts the facilities off-limits to anybody who suffers physiologically from having to breathe smoke.
Shreveport thusly becomes the first jurisdiction in the country to reverse itself on a smoking ban. The rationale for the declining city, facing sharp population loss and revenue retrenchment as a result, to do this was the restriction hurt the bottom line of the city's casinos and therefore related city tax collections. Theoretically, one could make an argument that enforcement of nonsmoking could do this, for gambling is an addictive behavior like smoking with a relatively high association between the two, Thus, a smoking ban disproportionately could chase away chumps.
Yet the data don't indicate as such. Smoking bans have gone into place in all of the state's largest cities for casinos, but changes in revenue in places that did largely have tracked those located in jurisdictions that continue to allow smoking. Indeed, a review of Shreveport and Bossier City markets, with the latter continuing to allow people to smoke up in casinos, shows no significant difference in revenue changes.
Changes trending down, of course, that have little to do with smoking and everything to do with increased competition from Texas but particularly tribal casinos in Oklahoma. It seems that smoking bans are basically unrelated with revenues because of a substitution effect. Smokers tend to be older, less educated, and lower-income compared to nonsmokers, so it may be that potentially fewer admittances by smokers could be partially offset by some nonsmokers who then lose more lucre.
Regardless, a deeper civil rights issue remains. A growing portion of the population suffers from pulmonological conditions where even a hint of smoke can send them into distress, something they can't control – as opposed to smoking, which is an entirely voluntary action where consequences are exported to other people who can avoid these only by curtailing their own autonomy. In fact, with smoking in the population at nearly half its rate of two decades ago, the proportions of smokers and people with pulmonological diseases are about equal.
While argumentation about exportation of smoke onto others, such as casino employees, that can impact negatively their health merit investigation as there appears to be some association between someone's health and breathing in smoke, there is no doubt that a causal mechanism exists where smoke negatively affects directly some people's pulmonological health. In essence permitting smoking in any part of a casino denies a portion of the population the ability to work there, eat there, gamble there, and be entertained in whatever other way there – meaning smokers are privileged in their conduct of a voluntary behavior over those who suffer from a disability they must bear involuntarily.
Decades ago, when mainly in the South and profusely in Shreveport and Bossier City citizens shamefully were discriminated against merely for the color of their skin in the conduct of commerce, the U.S. Congress stepped in and legislated to guarantee that people couldn't be denied commercial access solely on the basis of that. In our constitutional system, health matters are governed by states, and local governments if delegated that way by the states. A statewide ban by Louisiana on smoking in casinos would be best, but absent that local governments should take up that in order to protect equal access for vulnerable citizens.
Bossier City instituting a smoking ban in its casinos would produce a rare instance where the city in trying to distinguish itself from Shreveport acted on the whole actually to increase its citizens' autonomy and quality of life. That it hasn't done this to date is to its discredit, but that's magnified if it fails to act when served this reminder of the west bank's stupidity.
The objective of our paper is to analyse the political activity of Polish, and Slovak, women in EP elections; we aim to determine, among other things: whether gender quotas are a decisive factor for women's electoral success, or do other factors result in an increase/decrease in the number of female candidates and the number of women MEPs? What are the particular characteristics of women representing Poland, and Slovakia, in the EP? What was their path to the EP? Which (conservative, liberal) parties are more willing to put women forward in EP elections? Poland introduced the socalled gender quotas into the electoral system, while Slovakia does not have such legal solutions in place. However, when comparing Slovakia to the situation in Poland, it can be stated that although there is a system of election quotas in Poland, its practical implementation may be purely theoretical. In percentage terms, the number of Slovak women elected to the European Parliament (except 2019) was signifi cantly higher than in Poland, even though there is no quota system in the Slovak Republic. Th e success of Polish, and Slovak, women in the elections to the EP of the 9th term is the result of many factors, which include so-called electoral engineering (quotas, gender balance, fi rst and second places on lists), electoral strategy of a party, but above all, political and social activity of the women themselves. We consider the last factor to be determinant in this respect. ; Dorota Lis-Staranowicz: staran@uwm.edu.pl ; Róbert Jáger: robert.jager@umb.sk ; Dorota Lis-Staranowicz - is an Assistant Professor and the Head of Department of Constitutional Law and State Science in the Faculty of Law and Administration, Warmia and Mazury University in Olsztyn, Poland. ; Róbert Jáger - is an Associate Professor in Faculty of Law, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia. ; Dorota Lis-Staranowicz - University Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Poland ; Róbert Jáger - Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia ; Adamiec D., Wąsowicz R., Wybory do Parlamentu Europejskiego 2014. 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Digital ; Actualmente el mal manejo del dinero y la falta de control financiero por parte de los terceros es deficiente ya que no se tiene un registro de los recursos económicos que perciben, la contabilidad de manera personal no se registra, ni se lleva control de una forma óptima, si no de forma mental, y casi maneja de bolsillo todo su dinero y no se tiene un registro por escrito; estos son problemas que identifica un desorden de la información, teniendo datos que no son exactos y sin ayudar de esta manera a solución viable al problema financiero. El panorama planteado presenta diversos factores que se deben manejar, como son: conocimiento financiero, manejo de contabilidad personal, análisis de costo, beneficio, manejo de cuentas bancarias, y contacto con aplicaciones móviles, sin embargo, estos factores y la problemática mencionada se manejaría con el uso de la aplicación Casorin-finanzas, que tiene como finalidad el manejo adecuado de las finanzas, un tema el cual en términos generales sería todo ingreso o egreso que genere el tercero, tener claridad en su economía a partir de un criterio justificado en el que se tenga espacio para saber en qué se gastan, se invierten, o se adquieren nuevos recursos en las finanzas. Con el desarrollo de la aplicación CASorin finanzas, se plantea controlar, solucionar y manejar la problemática en mención, ya que la situación requiere plantear el uso un sistema para el manejo de presupuesto personal financiero, para el personal de nómina del convenio EEW-UDES, mediante una aplicación móvil-Casorin finanzas que ya existe y es acta para sistemas operativos Android, se puede usar desde el celular, o tableta esta aplicación servirá para el manejo de los estados contables personales, teniendo de manera óptima la importancia del dinero y dinero plástico al momento de generar una salida de dinero. ; Currently the mismanagement of money and the lack of financial control by third parties is deficient since there is no record of the economic resources they receive, personal accounting is noto recorded, nor is it controlled in an optimal way , if not mentally, and he almost manages all his money out of pocket and there is no written record; These are problems that an information disorder identifies, having data that are not exact and without helping in this way to a viable solution to the financial problem. The outlook presented presents various factors that must be managed, such as: financial knowledge, personal accounting management, cost analysis, benefit, bank account management, and contact with mobile applications, however, these factors and the aforementioned problem would be managed With the use of the AMP application, which aims at the proper management of finances, an issue which in general terms would be all income or expenditure generated by the third party, have clarity in its economy based on a justified criterion in which there is space to know what new resources are spent on, invested in, or acquired in finance. With the development of the CASorin finance application, it is proposed to control, solve and manage the problem in question, since the situation requires the use of a system for the management of personal financial budget, for the payroll personnel of the EEW-UDES agreement, Through a mobile application-Casorin finance that already exists and is minutes for Android operating systems, it can be used from the cell phone, or tablet this application will be used to manage personal financial statements, optimally taking into account the importance of money and plastic money at the time of generating an outflow of Monet. ; NTRODUCCIÓN . 17 1. PRESENTACIÓN DEL TRABAJO DE GRADO . 18 1.1 PLANTEAMIENTO DEL PROBLEMA . 19 1.2 ALCANCE . 24 1.3 JUSTIFICACIÓN . 26 1.4 OBJETIVOS . 28 1.4.1 Objetivo general . 28 1.4.2 Objetivos específicos . 28 2 BASES TEÓRICAS . 28 2.1 ESTADO DEL ARTE . 28 2.1.1 Como Elaborar Su Presupuesto Personal . 29 2.1.2 Las Finanzas Personales . 29 2.1.3 Estrategia nacional de educación económica y financiera de Colombia 30 2.1.4 Educación financiera para el aula . 30 2.1.5 La Importancia De Los Recursos Financieros Personales . 31 2.1.6 Inteligencia Financiera. Una manera de aprender, educación transversal para la vida diaria. . 32 2.1.7 Inteligencia financiera de los estudiantes de noveno semestre de Contaduría Pública de la Universidad Militar Nueva Granada. 32 2.1.8 Conocimientos financieros y capacidades financieras en colaboradores de una organización del Noreste Colombiano . 33 2.1.9 La importancia de la educación financiera para niños en edad escolar 33 2.1.10 Educación financiera para estudiantes de media vocacional del Colegio Pablo Neruda en Bogotá D.C . 33 2.1.11 Análisis de la educación e inclusión financiera en Colombia como insumo para el proyecto de investigación en educación financiera escolar de Eafit Social. . 34 2.1.12 Las finanzas personales desde la educación básica en instituciones de pamplona . 34 2.2 MARCO REFERENCIAL . 35 2.2.1 Marco Teórico . 35 2.2.2 Marco Conceptual . 37 3 DISEÑO METODOLÓGICO . 40 3.1 TIPO DE INVESTIGACIÓN . 40 3.2 HIPÓTESIS . 41 3.3 VARIABLES O CATEGORÍAS . 41 3.4 OPERACIONALIZACIÓN DE VARIABLES O DESCRIPCIÓN DE CATEGORÍAS . 42 3.5 POBLACIÓN Y MUESTRA . 42 3.6 PROCEDIMIENTO . 43 3.7 INSTRUMENTOS DE RECOLECCIÓN DE INFORMACIÓN . 48 3.7.1 Encuestas . 49 3.7.2 Encuesta de caracterización . 49 3.7.3 Prueba diagnostica . 50 3.8 TÉCNICAS DE ANÁLISIS DE DATOS . 50 4 CONSIDERACIONES ÉTICAS . 52 5 DIAGNÓSTICO INICIAL . 53 5.1 Análisis de Encuesta a terceros . 54 6 estructura de la propuesta de intervención . 60 6.1 PROPUESTA PEDAGÓGICA . 60 6.2 COMPONENTE TECNOLÓGICO . 64 6.2.1 Wireframe o bocetos iniciales . 64 6.2.2 Desarrollo de la app . 65 6.3 IMPLEMENTACIÓN . 73 6.3.1 Integración de la Propuesta con el desarrollo de las Actividades . 73 6.3.2 Encuesta de pre saberes de presupuesto personal con el uso de APP 80 6.3.3 Análisis General de Prueba de conceptos básicos e información financiera básica: . 92 6.3.4 Capacitación e inicio de implementación . 94 7 ANÁLISIS E INTERPRETACIÓN DE DATOS . 105 7.1 Prueba de validación . 105 7.1.1 Análisis general de prueba de validación . 112 7.2 Encuesta de satisfacción . 113 7.2.1 Análisis encuesta de satisfacción . 118 7.3 Análisis comparativo de la prueba diagnóstica vs prueba de validación 119 8 CONCLUSIONES . 122 9 LIMITACIONES . 123 10 IMPACTO / recomendaciones / TRABAJOS FUTUROS . 123 10.1 Impacto . 123 10.2 Trabajos Futuros . 124 BIBLIOGRAFÍA . 125 ANEXOS . 131 ; Maestría ; Magíster en Tecnologías Digitales Aplicadas a la Educación ; 1° ed.
