Suchergebnisse

Las preguntas por la dependencia y el desarrollo, enterradas primero con las dictaduras de mediados de los años setenta, luego sepultadas por las democracias "de baja intensidad" en los ochenta y noventa, volvieron a irrumpir en América Latina en el nuevo siglo, en sintonía con procesos sociales que agitaron, al decir del sociólogo peruano Aníbal Quijano, los "fantasmas propios de un pasado inconcluso". Un regreso de dichas discusiones en el que la cuestión del Estado y del poder político se colocó en el centro del debate. En ese marco de un retorno teórico y político de los interrogantes sobre la dependencia y el desarrollo en América Latina en los comienzos del Siglo XXI, esta tesis se propone revisitar las teorías que resultan el principal reservorio conceptual existente en las ciencias sociales latinoamericanas, al cual es posible acudir para reflexionar en torno de aquellos interrogantes. Así, el presente trabajo intentará recuperar el amplio y heterogéneo conjunto de contribuciones que, en los años sesenta y setenta en nuestra región, formaron parte de las "teorías de la dependencia", buscando sistematizar sus conceptualizaciones acerca del Estado y el poder político. Tal revisión se nutrirá, a su vez, de otros aportes realizados durante esos dos decenios, como aquellos del "estructuralismo cepalino", las "teorías del desarrollo latinoamericano" y las "teorías de la modernización" (aunque nos concentraremos fundamentalmente en los textos dependentistas). La tesis se valdrá, entonces, de las contribuciones teóricas de los siguientes intelectuales: Raúl Prebisch, Aldo Ferrer, Florestan Fernandes, Jorge Graciarena, Aldo Solari, Celso Furtado, Pablo González Casanova, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Aníbal Pinto, Osvaldo Sunkel, Pedro Paz, Gino Germani, José Medina Echavarría, Darcy Ribeiro, Helio Jaguaribe, Norbert Lechner, Agustín Cueva, Fernando H. Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Sergio Zermeño, Francisco Weffort, Edelberto Torres Rivas, José Serra, Ruy Mauro Marini, Vania Bambirra, André Günder Frank, Theotonio dos Santos, René Zavaleta, Marcos Kaplan y Sergio Bitar. Nos focalizaremos en el problema del Estado y el poder político, partiendo de la centralidad que han asumido tales dimensiones en los procesos de transformación más salientes de la historia latinoamericana (como por ejemplo: en la construcción "desde arriba" de los EstadosNación, en la industrialización sustitutiva, e incluso, en procesos de transformación social radical). Nuestra hipótesis sostiene que, pese a tal centralidad del Estado y el poder político en la dinámica de la región, en los textos clásicos de los años sesenta y setenta sobre la dependencia y el desarrollo, tales cuestiones no han recibido un abordaje teórico específico. Es por eso que sostenemos aquí como hipótesis principal que en el corpus escogido ha existido una oscilación entre la ausencia, la latencia y la presencia de las conceptualizaciones sobre el Estado y el poder político en clave latinoamericana, con un predominio de la ausencia y la latencia. Cuando hagamos referencia a una ausencia, no hablaremos en términos literales, sino de una carencia en materia de una conceptualización específica y en complejidad de la región de lo político, que se inscriba a su vez en toda una tradición de pensamiento acerca de ese aspecto particular de la totalidad social. Mientras tanto, cuando aludamos a aquellos textos donde encontremos una presencia del Estado y el poder político, hablaremos de la existencia en ellos de un abordaje específico de tales problemas, que dé cuenta de dilemas tales como: la especificidad estatal en sociedades estructuralmente heterogéneas, la relación entre Estado y clases subalternas en situaciones de dependencia, o bien, la cuestión nacional en sociedades construidas "desde arriba" como producto de su incorporación al mercado mundial (por solo mencionar algunos aspectos). Una presencia que predomina en diversos textos de fines de los años setenta y comienzos de los ochenta, cuando diferentes intelectuales, permaneciendo aún en el horizonte conceptual de la dependencia y el desarrollo, realizaron una lectura crítica (o en algunos casos, autocrítica) de los moldes teóricos adoptados por el dependentismo en las dos décadas precedentes. Por último, hablaremos de una latencia en aquellas oportunidades en que en los textos apenas despunte un interés por estudiar los fenómenos específicos de la región de lo político, aunque sin lograr acabadamente ese objetivo. Considerando lo dicho anteriormente, esta tesis se estructurará en cinco capítulos. En el primero presentaremos las coordenadas generales del trabajo (objetivos, corpus e hipótesis principales), junto con algunos elementos teóricos acerca de aquello que entenderemos en el conjunto del trabajo como la dimensión específicamente política de la dependencia y el desarrollo. Luego, ingresaremos ya en el análisis de los textos de los años sesenta y setenta. En el segundo capítulo, nos dedicaremos al problema de la influencia de aquello que muchos trabajos sobre la dependencia y el desarrollo han llamado el "factor externo". En el tercero, nos detendremos en el modo en que las asincronías o desajustes de las estructuras sociales latinoamericanas han tenido una presencia en los textos que integran nuestro corpus, prestando especial atención a la constitución de sujetos políticos y a su relación con la forma de concebir teórica y políticamente la democracia en su relación con la dependencia y el desarrollo. En el cuarto, nos concentraremos en el concepto de Estado. Es decir, en qué medida y de qué modos lo estatal fue problematizado en los textos. En el quinto capítulo, será el tiempo de las conclusiones, donde realizaremos una exploración en torno al vínculo entre dependencia y marxismo. Y a su vez, para finalizar este trabajo, llevaremos a cabo allí un breve repaso por los dilemas propios de la dimensión específicamente política de la dependencia y el desarrollo que han sido planteados a la luz de los procesos políticos desplegados en la región en los primeros quince años de este Siglo XXI, señalando de forma sucinta las rupturas y continuidades que presentaron con respecto a las producciones teóricas de los años sesenta y setenta. ; The questions about dependency and development, buried first with the dictatorships of the mid-seventies, then by the democracies "of low intensity" in the eighties and nineties, reentered to Latin America in the new century, in tune with social processes that agitated, according to the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano, the "ghosts of an unfinished past". A return of these discussions in which the question of the State and political power was placed at the center of the debate. In this framework of a theoretical and political return of the questions about dependency and development in Latin America at the beginning of the 21st century, this thesis aims to revisit the theories that are the main conceptual reservoir existing in the Latin American social sciences, to which It is possible to go to reflect on those questions. Thus, the present work will attempt to recover the broad and heterogeneous set of contributions that, in the sixties and seventies in our region, formed part of the "theories of dependency", seeking to systematize their conceptualizations about the State and political power. Such revision will be fed, in turn, by other contributions made during those two decades, such as those of the "CEPAL structuralism", the "theories of Latin American development" and the "modernization theories" (although we will concentrate fundamentally on dependency´s texts). The thesis will follow, then, the theoretical contributions of the following intellectuals: Raúl Prebisch, Aldo Ferrer, Florestan Fernandes, Jorge Graciarena, Aldo Solari, Celso Furtado, Pablo González Casanova, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Aníbal Pinto, Osvaldo Sunkel, Pedro Paz, Gino Germani, José Medina Echavarría, Darcy Ribeiro, Helio Jaguaribe, Norbert Lechner, Agustín Cueva, Fernando H. Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Sergio Zermeño, Francisco Weffort, Edelberto Torres Rivas, José Serra, Ruy Mauro Marini, Vania Bambirra, André Günder Frank , Theotonio dos Santos, René Zavaleta, Marcos Kaplan and Sergio Bitar. We will focus on the problem of the State and political power, based on the centrality that these dimensions have assumed in the most salient transformation processes of Latin American history (such as: the construction "from above" of the Nation-States, the substitution industrialization, and also, the processes of radical social transformation). Our hypothesis holds that, despite such centrality of the State and political power in the dynamics of the region, in the classic texts of the sixties and seventies on dependency and development, such issues have not received a specific theoretical approach. That is why we hold here as a main hypothesis that in the chosen corpus there has been an oscillation between absence, latency and presence of conceptualizations about the State and political power in a Latin American perspective, with a predominance of absence and latency. When we refer to an absence, we will not speak in literal terms. In opposite, we will do in terms of a specific conceptualization and complexity of the political region, which in turn will be inscribed in a whole tradition of thinking about that particular aspect of the social totality. Meanwhile, when we refer to those texts where we find a presence of the State and political power, we will talk about the existence in them of a specific approach to such problems, which involves dilemmas such as: state specificity in structurally heterogeneous societies, relationship between State and subaltern classes in situations of dependency, or, the national problem in societies built "from above" as a result of their incorporation into the world market (to mention only some few aspects). A presence that predominates in various texts of the late seventies and early eighties, when different intellectuals, still remaining in the conceptual horizon of dependency and development, made a critical approach (or in some cases, with a self-criticism perspective) of the Theoretical look adopted by dependentism in the two preceding decades. Finally, we will talk about a latency in those opportunities in which the texts scarcely show any interest in studying the specific phenomena of the political region, although without achieving that objective. Considering the above, this thesis will be structured in five chapters. In the first we will present the general coordinates of the work (objectives, corpus and main hypotheses), together with some theoretical elements about what we will understand in the whole work as the specifically political dimension of dependency and development. Then, we will enter to the analysis of the texts of the sixties and seventies. In the second chapter, we will focus on the problem of the influence of what many works on dependency and development have called the "external factor". In the third, we will dwell on the way in which the asynchronies or imbalances of Latin American social structures have had a presence in the texts that make up our corpus, paying special attention to the constitution of political subjects and their relation to the theoretical and political way of conceiving democracy in its relation with dependence and development. In the fourth, we will concentrate on the concept of State. That is, to what extent and in what ways the state was problematized in the texts. In the fifth chapter, it will be the time of the conclusions, where we will carry out an exploration around the link between dependence and Marxism. And in turn, to complete this work, there we will conduct a brief review of the dilemmas of the specifically political dimension of dependency and development that have been raised in light of the political processes deployed in the region in the first fifteen years of this XXI Century, indicating in a succinct way the ruptures and continuities that they presented with respect to the theoretical productions of the sixties and seventies. ; Fil: Tzeiman, Andrés. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales; Argentina

Mención Especial en Investigación Arquitectónica en el XXV Premio de Arquitectura convocado por el Colegio Oficial de Arquitectos de Huelva ; [SPA] La clase proletaria en España habría de recorrer un largo y tedioso trayecto de algunas décadas hasta la definitiva consecución del derecho a unas vacaciones anuales retribuidas. Esta demanda histórica será satisfecha por vez primera en la Constitución Republicana del año 1931, y consolidada algunos años después con la promulgación del Fuero del Trabajo de 1938, lo que llevará al régimen franquista a afrontar el reto de idear modelos para la organización del ocio y las vacaciones de los trabajadores del país. Con la mirada puesta en aquellas experiencias de problemática similar llevadas a cabo previamente por otros regímenes totalitarios en Italia, Alemania o Portugal, la conocida como Obra Sindical de Educación y Descanso instauraría en España una compleja red de albergues y residencias de veraneo con localizaciones diversas a lo largo y ancho de la geografía del país, resultando significativo el número de instalaciones de este tipo emplazadas en el ámbito litoral. El rotundo éxito que entre las masas trabajadoras cosechase la labor desempeñada por este organismo estatal durante las dos primeras décadas del régimen franquista, propiciaría el escenario idóneo para la implementación de un novedoso modelo para la organización, como sin duda el control, del descanso y el ocio estival de los productores españoles: las ciudades de vacaciones de Educación y Descanso. Promovidas durante el tramo intermedio de la década de los años cincuenta, la Obra Sindical de Educación y Descanso construiría en España hasta tres ciudades de vacaciones para trabajadores, ejecutadas ex nihilo como asentamientos autosuficientes estratégicamente localizados en privilegiadas parcelas a pie de playa, y destinadas no sólo a garantizar el descanso de sus residentes durante el asueto estival, sino también a un adoctrinamiento político que, de manera soterrada, se pondría en práctica en el distendido ambiente que estas instalaciones vacacionales ofrecerían. El modelo ciudad de vacaciones de Educación y Descanso, objeto de un profundo estudio en este trabajo, encuentra su punto de partida en la playa Larga de Tarragona, extendiéndose en pocos años a sendas parcelas en Marbella y Perlora, convirtiéndose así en una sutil avanzadilla de lo que la década siguiente depararía al litoral español. El presente trabajo se propone dar respuesta a tres interrogantes surgidos en torno a este novedoso modelo de organización y control del descanso proletario en España. El primero de ellos aborda la especificidad que, como consecuencia de sus singulares circunstancias, se le presume a este tipo de asentamientos vacacionales. Para ello, se ha elaborado un análisis comparativo entre las ciudades de vacaciones de Educación y Descanso y otros modelos alternativos para la organización de las masas trabajadoras en el territorio que, contemporáneamente, se estarían desarrollando en España tanto en las periferias de la ciudad industrial tradicional, como en el ámbito rural como resultado del proceso de urbanización al que el Instituto Nacional de Colonización sometería al campo español. El segundo de los interrogantes planteados en este trabajo aflora tras la elaboración del estado del conocimiento sobre la materia, y versa sobre la posible continuidad del modelo en el tiempo. Esta investigación pone en entredicho la literatura especializada en las ciudades de vacaciones de Educación y Descanso, que sitúa dicho modelo como un hecho puntual y aislado de la década de los cincuenta, negando de forma precipitada la existencia de experiencias adicionales promovidas durante la etapa final del régimen franquista. El tercer y último interrogante que se plantea en este trabajo se centra en la revisión del modelo, tratando de identificar la probable influencia que sobre el mismo ejerciera el cambio de contexto experimentado con la llegada de la década de los años sesenta, cuando el fenómeno turístico de masas, tanto nacional como internacional, irrumpiría definitivamente en las casi inalteradas costas de nuestro país. Como colofón de esta investigación se han planteado una serie de conclusiones como resolución de las hipótesis de partida formuladas en el trabajo. La identificación de algunos parámetros inherentes a las tres ciudades de vacaciones ejecutadas por Educación y Descanso en la década de los años cincuenta, como la especificidad de su programa o su especial posicionamiento respecto al lugar y el paisaje, ha resultado determinante a la hora de demostrar la singularidad de estos conjuntos respecto de otros modelos analizados para la organización de las clases obreras en el territorio. Así mismo, como aportación al conocimiento sobre la temática, se han documentado hasta dos nuevos proyectos de ciudades de vacaciones promovidos por Educación y Descanso en la segunda mitad de los años sesenta, en Guardamar del Segura (Alicante) y en Punta Umbría (Huelva), ignoradas hasta hoy por la bibliografía específica. A pesar de no haber sido ejecutadas, estas propuestas han permitido constatar las intenciones de la Obra Sindical de dar continuidad a su novedoso modelo de organización y control del descanso de los trabajadores durante la etapa final del régimen franquista, un periodo en el que, sin embargo, asistiremos a la pérdida de la hegemonía sobre las costas españolas de la institución estatal Educación y Descanso en beneficio de las arrolladoras promociones de apartamentos y hoteles de promoción privada que ocuparán a partir de entonces las privilegiadas posiciones a pie de playa. Este contexto obligará a introducir variaciones sustanciales sobre el modelo objeto de este trabajo ante la ineludible necesidad de competir con otras actuaciones que en el orden privado se comenzarían a ejecutar en el litoral español. Situado este episodio de las ciudades de vacaciones de Educación y Descanso dentro del debate sobre la gestación del fenómeno turismo de masas en España, se abren ahora nuevos interrogantes que conducen a futuras líneas de trabajo, como desentrañar las causas reales que llevaron a la Obra Sindical al abandono prematuro de un modelo aparentemente exitoso, o identificar las posibles reminiscencias del mismo sobre otras propuestas de organización del ocio turístico en el territorio implementadas en las décadas posteriores, como los denominados resorts turísticos que tan en boga estuvieron en España a partir de los años noventa. ; [ENG] The proletarian class in Spain had to go through a long and tedious journey of some decades until the final attainment of the right to a paid annual vacation. This historical demand was fulfilled in the Republican Constitution of 1931 and consolidated some years later with the enactment of the Jurisdiction of Labour in 1938. It made the Franco's regime face the challenge of devising models for the organization of leisure and vacation of workers. With an eye towards those similar experiences carried out previously by other totalitarian regimes in Italy, Germany or Portugal, the so-called Trade Union Work of Education and Rest established a complex network of hostels and summer residences with different locations throughout Spain, being significant the number of this kind of facilities located in the coastal area. The clear success that the labour of this State institution had among the working class in the first two decades of Franco's regime favoured the perfect setting for the implementation of a new model for the organization, as well as the control, of Spanish producers' rest and summer leisure: holiday cities of education and rest. Promoted during the middle part of the 1950s, the Trade Union Work of Education and Rest built three holiday cities for workers in Spain. They were performed ex nihilo as self-sufficient settlements, strategically located in privileged plots at the beach and intended not only to guarantee the rest of its residents during the summer holidays, but also to a political indoctrination which would be covertly implemented in the relaxed atmosphere that these holiday facilities offered. The model of holiday city of education and rest, object of a deep study in this research, has its starting point at Larga beach, in Tarragona, extending itself in a few years to two plots in Marbella and Perlora. Therefore, it became a subtle advance of what the next decade would bring to the Spanish coast. The present study intends to answer three questions about this new model of organization and control of proletarian rest in Spain. The first question is about the specificity that, as a consequence of its unique circumstances, this kind of holiday settlements is assumed to have. To do this, a comparative analysis has been carried out among holiday cities of Education and Rest and other alternative models for organization of working masses in the territory that at the same time would be developing in Spain, not only in the surroundings of the traditional industrial city, but also in the rural area. This is the result of the urbanization process that the National Institute of Colonization would subject to Spanish countryside. The second question, which is raised in this study after the development of the state of knowledge on the subject, deals with the possible continuity of the model over time. This research calls into question the specialized literature in the holiday cities of Education and Rest. This literature finds this model as a punctual and isolated fact from the fifties, hastily denying the existence of additional experiences promoted during the final stage of Franco's regime. The third and final question of this study focuses on the review of the model, trying to identify the probable influence that the change of context experienced with the arrival of the sixties had on it, when mass tourism phenomenon, both national and international, would definitely break into the almost unchanged coasts of our country. As a culmination of this research, some conclusions have been proposed as a resolution of the starting hypotheses formulated in the study. The identification of some parameters inherent in the three holiday cities performed by Education and Rest in the fifties, such as the specificity of its program or its special positioning regarding place and landscape, has proved to be decisive to demonstrate the uniqueness of these sets in relation to other models analyzed for the organization of working classes in the territory. Likewise, as a contribution to knowledge on the subject, two new projects of holiday cities promoted by Education and Rest have been documented in the second half of the sixties, in Guardamar del Segura (Alicante) and in Punta Umbría (Huelva), being ignored until today by specific bibliography. Despite not having been performed, these proposals have revealed the intentions of the Trade Union Work to continue its innovative model of organization and control of workers' rest during the final stage of Franco's regime. However, there will be a loss of hegemony of the state institution Education and Rest over Spanish coasts for the benefit of overwhelming promotions of apartments and hotels of private promotion which will be on privileged positions at the beach from then on. This context will force the introduction of substantial variations on the model being studied in this work because of the unavoidable need to compete with other performances which would privately start to be carried out in Spanish coast. Having placed this episode of holiday cities of Education and Rest within the debate on the gestation of the mass tourism phenomenon in Spain, there are some new questions leading to future lines of study, such as finding the real causes that made the Trade Union Work leave prematurely a model apparently successful or finding its possible reminiscences on other proposals for organizing tourist leisure in the territory being implemented in subsequent decades. An example of this aspect would be the so-called tourist resorts which were so popular in Spain since the 1990s. ; Escuela Internacional de Doctorado de la Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena ; Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena ; Programa Oficial de Doctorado en Arquitectura y Tecnología de la Edificación

 At the end of a summer with at least a little time to read books not directly connected to teaching or writing I picked up Melinda Cooper's Counterrevolution: Extravagance and Austerity in Public Finance and Stéphane Legrand's Ayn Rand: Femme Capital. The first I had been meaning to get to since it came out, and the second has lingered on my shelf for awhile. I was always curious what a French philosopher who has worked on Marx and Foucault would say about the very American (and anti-Marxist) phenomena of Ayn Rand.Reading both of them at the same time helped me think about a question that I have been thinking about and writing about for awhile. It is something that I sometimes refer to as "right workerism," the way in which work and the virtues of work appear less and less to be the terms of some contestation of capitalism than its strongest pillar of support. All of this leads to the inverted and bizarro world in which it is the right that positions itself as defending the worker, while the left is seen as synonymous with a parasitic dependent. This parasite is not identified with capitalists, but with everyone from "welfare queens" to "public workers." Those people who work in the public sphere are seen to be not truly workers, since their status, wages, and protections stem from unions and political organization, and, even more paradoxically, business owners, or capitalists, are seen to be the true workers, even the creators of work itself. As Etienne Balibar describes this situation, "The capitalist is defined as worker, as an 'entrepreneur'; the worker, as the bearer of a capacity, of a human capital."The second chapter of Cooper's book gives something of a genealogy of this reversal, by focusing on the particular role of the construction worker in articulating a representation of the working class. This genealogy has a few key moments. One of the first was the "hard hat riots" of 1970 in which a group of construction workers attacked student antiwar demonstrators. This visible moment of a vocal minority took place against a larger backdrop of a silenced majority, as Cooper argues, "polling data consistently showed that blue collar workers were more opposed to the war then the college-educated middle class--after all, their sons were more likely to be serving there." It was not just the war, Cooper situates the image of the conservative blue collar worker against the revolutionary challenges to not only wages, but the organization of work itself. "From the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, who refused to take orders from the ostensibly progressive United Auto Workers, to flight attendants, secretaries, and domestic workers, this was an era of unprecedented organizing on the part of those who had been relegated to the margins of the Fordist labor contract. Industrial unions were even beginning to form promising new alliances with the New Left Student movement, despite the inauspicious experience of the 1970s hard-hat riots." Cooper, like Chamayou, situates neoliberalism as a new form of governmentality against the interregnum of contestation and disorder. Integral to this new form of governmentality is the fragmentation of any solidarity, any unity of workers, as workers. This fragmentation took purchase in the existing divisions of society, divisions of race, gender, and nationality, but also in the instituted division of the working class. As Cooper argues public and private workers had both different demographic make ups, different levels of organizing, and different wage pressures. The basis for this division was institutionalized during the extension of labor protections in the middle of the twentieth century, but it was further driven asunder in the struggles over taxes and inflation. It is one particular worker, that of construction that stands as not just the symbol of a different worker politics, but a different idea of worker struggle. "It was in the construction sector, however, that the dividing lines between traditional employment and small business ownership were truly blurred. For much of the twentieth century it was common practice among specialized trades workers and journeymen to alternate between unionized employment on large construction sites and off-season work as sole traders on small residential projects. This resulted in an ambiguous class position very different from that of industrial wage worker. Labor historians note that "in large enterprises, the distinction between owner-manager and employee worker became ever clear as the rift between them widened. But for carpenters these distinctions remained blurred, for decades longer. Unlike an industrial worker, a carpenter often owned the tools of his trade. There was considerable fluidity between working as an employee and becoming the owner of a small construction business. In some ways, many construction workers were more like small businessmen than industrial laborers.""Ironically, it was this hybrid class status that had conferred on the building trades their unique bargaining power throughout much of the twentieth century. As holders of a specialized skill set who could readily withdraw their labor by setting up shop on their own, tradesmen were able to demand consistently better working conditions than industrial workers. This helps explain both their exemplary position within the midcentury union movement and their recurrent tendency to eschew solidarity with other workers. As unionized workers, building tradesmen had the power to extract wage concessions that other workers could only dream of, yet their part-time status as small owner-managers also created a sense of distance from the rest of the working class. Ultimately, the ambivalent class position of building trades workers would be used against them in particular, as it was in the construction sector that the instrument of legal misclassification would be wielded most ruthlessly as a tool of wage suppression."It is Reagan who in some sense played both sides against the middle, stressing the unique status of construction workers as aspiring small businesses in order to subject them to more exploitation. Many people know the story of Reagan firing the striking air traffic control workers, pitting public workers against private workers, but I did not known about his long history espousing the ideal of the independent contractor to further atomize the working class. There are some interesting passages in Cooper's book on Reagan's longstanding interest in the status of the independent contractor, stemming from his years in Hollywood. As Cooper writes, "In reaching out to blue-collar workers, Reagan addressed them first and foremost as taxpayers and made every effort to downplay their connections with other wage workers. With government spending now coded as inflationary and biased toward the "unproductive" public-sector employee. Reagan sought to persuade his audience that tax cuts, not direct spending, were the best way to restore the blue-collar wage." Reagan's rhetoric created both new commonalities between trade workers and small business owners, while exacerbating divisions between public and private workers. It also fundamentally changed the strategy of workers, moving them away from the collective strategy of organizing to an individual strategy of hustling. The ideal of the independent contractor promises individual freedom but what it offers is collective disenfranchisement, stripping the collectively gained protections of workers and cutting them off from their collective power. As Cooper writes, "There can be no doubt that Reagan's paeans to small-scale entrepreneurial freedom played to the real aspirations of blue-collar wage workers. Yet the more he insisted on the effective identity between the worker and the small business owner, the more elusive the transition became for those who started out as wage dependents. The long-term effect of the Republican war on labor was to multiply the number of workers toiling under the direct authority of small business owners and sharpen the class divide between them, making it increasingly difficult of the misclassified workers to assert their bargaining power qua wage workers, let alone accede to the position of owner manager."As with Reagan's welfare queen this is a myth that long outlasted his presidency. The idea that the true worker is an independent worker, and thus in some sense that the true worker is a capitalist enterprise  of one, has longstanding effects on our image and ideal of work. It posits a different strategy and a different subjectivity than worker solidarity, one predicated on not just self interest, but on pitting worker against worker. The struggle against taxes is also a struggle against those workers whose wages are paid by taxes. Yves Citton has described the period from the Reagan into the present as one of the attenuation of class struggle. Class struggle is still lived experienced, in increased worker hours, dwindling wages, and loss of job security, but class struggle ceases to be the way people represent or thematize either their condition, their insecurity, or their strategy, their struggle. We could say that a corollary of this way of thinking is that the attenuation of class struggle leads to a displacement of struggle. We get pseudo class struggles pitting private workers against public workers, tax payers against teachers and so on. It just so happens that I was reading Stéphane Legrand's Ayn Rand: Femme Capital at the same time as Cooper's book. I do not recall why or how I picked up this book. I was curious what Legrand, a philosopher that I know of primarily from his  work on Foucault and Marx, would have to say about Rand. Rand has always been weirdly fascinating to me even though I could never make it through any of her books, or, more to the point, she is fascinating to me because I could never make it through any of her books. It has always seemed strange that such a flatfooted propagandist elicited such cult like following. It just so happened that Legrand's book functioned as interesting complement to Cooper's. If Cooper showed the politics, the policy, that worked to produce the worker as human capital, as investor in themselves, Legrand shows how Rand made this seem sexy, made it seemed like a rebellion to some kind of dominant sense. Legrand's book is in part on the person Rand, part on her novels, and part on the people who have made her into a religion, up to and including Paul Ryan. As Legrand writes about the mediocrity referre above, "Ayn had this rare capacity, in her novels as in her life, to transfigure mediocrity into greatness, to operate a narrative transubstantiation which--as the ritual of the mass is supposed to change the most noxious swill into the blood of God--leads us to venerate as the paradigm of the great man a comedian of his own ideal, a ridiculous, capricious and narcissistic type who in the real world would be treated with a mixture of irritation and amusement." Despite Rand's absolute hostility to dialectical thinking, and her attempt to make tautology the center of her own philosophy and politics, A=A, the individual is self interest, one can see a strange dialectic in her thought in which what is culturally dominant, selfishness, is treated as rebellious, and the impersonal and abstract imperatives of capitalism are made into the pinnacle of humanity. Tautology is not entirely accurate as Legrand argues Rand's thought could be considered its own strategy of the "sive," after Spinoza's famous Deus sive Natura, God, that is nature. "If one prefers, Spinoza does not demonstrate that nature is divine--which would amount to adding a supplementary property to the idea of nature--he dissolves the concept of divinity into that of nature (in the philosophical scientific sense of the term, not the birds and the bees)--which in fact amounts to removing a whole series of properties which are traditionally attributed to it (personality, emotions, free will, transendence...). The concepts of morality and egoism (or capitalism) in Rand are in the same relation." The formulation of Rand's thought is "egoism that is morality." Such a definition strips morality of all that is generally meant by the term, such as an imperative or an ought, making it less an ideal than a justification. Oddly Spinoza might offer one way of thinking about what made Rand possible. Abstract ideals, even the ideal of rationality itself, need particular figures, particular representations in order to make them imaginable. This is what Rand did, created an image, a myth, to make capital, an impersonal system of domination, seem to be the expression of individual qualities. Here again we see a reversal of Spinoza's strategy, where Spinoza equated God and nature to de-anthropomorphize the former Rand equates capitalism to morality, egoism or capitalism is morality, to give the former flesh and blood, to make it a person. To cite Legrand again, "Where Chaplin in Modern Times fifty years earlier, utilized his iconic, charismatic, and recognized character to give body and visibility to the impersonal powers at work in the capitalist enterprise and society that crushes bodies and souls, make its inhumanity apparent, Rand does an absolutely inverse operation, personalizing and humanizing it..."There is much more that could be said about both of these books. What strikes me is the way in which policy and mythology, politics and poetics, appear as two sides of the same relation, necessarily supplementing and reinforcing each other. Could we have had Reagan without Rand or Rand without Reagan. The order and connection of ideology is the same as the order and connection of exploitation. Or, maybe this is just what happens when you read two books at the same time at the end of the summer. 

This September, when member states gather in New York for the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, they will have more than the UN budget and the current state of global affairs to consider. They will be putting the final touches on key documents that could move the needle on some of the world's most pressing issues such as climate change and possibly contribute to shaping a new era of multilateralism that includes a reconfiguration of international financial architecture and the UN Security Council.
The documents are a result of a months-long intergovernmental negotiation process that will culminate in an ambitious "Summit of the Future",[1] which has been billed as "a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reinvigorate multilateralism" by the organisers,[2] in reference to the need to renew and strengthen international cooperation amidst rising geopolitical instability, rapid technological advances, and increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather.[3]Scientists now say 2024 could become the world's hottest year, even surpassing the record-shattering 2023.[4] Rising temperatures and shifting weather patterns are reducing crop yields and squeezing food supplies, creating what could become a permanent source of inflation, the Financial Times reported.[5] Already, one in 11 people globally are chronically hungry and nearly a third cannot afford healthy diets.[6] Rising food prices and failed harvests could push millions more further into extreme poverty and hunger, worsen inequalities and lead to social upheaval.
All of these could lead to a rise in migration in search of better economic opportunities. Yet elections held so far this year have also shown a deeply divided world where a significant section of the populace is attracted by rhetorics that scapegoat immigrants, provide empty solutions to rising costs and dismiss climate action as unaffordable, unachievable and unfashionable.
We need multilateralism now more than ever. But the key question is: can the Summit of the Future help the world course-correct? Or will it become yet another example of a broken system, with much talk and little action?A Pact for the Future
The Summit of the Future was borne out of a declaration made at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic.[7] It was in commemoration of the UN's 75th anniversary, with world leaders committing to a host of initiatives, including upgrading the UN, protecting the environment, achieving gender equality and working with the youth. A resolution adopted two years later defined the Summit's modalities, including when it will be held: 22 and 23 September 2024.[8]
It will be preceded by "Action Days" on 20 and 21 September. Representatives from member states, civil society, private sector, academia, local and regional authorities, youth, and many more will come together, starting with "a dedicated, youth-led afternoon", according to the Summit's website and draft programme.[9] The second day will focus on three priorities: digital and technology, peace and security, and sustainable development and financing. So far, however, the agenda and scale of the four days remain somewhat unclear.
The key outputs to look out for are three documents: "Pact for the Future",[10] "Declaration on Future Generations" and the "Global Digital Compact", all currently being negotiated and revised. The Pact for the Future is the main text while the other two will be annexed to it.
The latest version of the 30-page Pact covers five areas: sustainable development and related financing; international peace and security; science, technology and innovation and digital cooperation; youth and future generations; and transforming global governance.[11] Climate change, peace and governance featured prominently and across four out of five areas, but the pledge in a previous version to "fundamentally transform our food systems for the benefit of people, planet and prosperity"[12] was dropped in favour of a blander sentence: "promote equitable, resilient and sustainable agrifood systems".[13] There was no other mention of food systems. Migration was mentioned twice.
The biggest space – nearly eight pages – was dedicated to "Transforming Global Governance", possibly the most important as well as the most difficult area. A significant chunk concerns the reform of the international financial architecture to make it more diverse and inclusive, address existing inequalities and make it able to support poor nations in their path to a greener and more sustainable development.
The reform of the Security Council, a big bone of contention because of perceived unfairness and ineffectiveness in its current make up,[14] is also on the table, although there is currently no agreed language on this front. A placeholder sentence said, "[We] will present language on this issue as soon as possible in light of ongoing deliberations" in other UN fora.[15]
For its part, the 14-page Global Digital Compact is focused on overcoming digital, data and innovation divides and building "an open, free, secure and human-centered digital future".[16] Its latest draft includes time-bound commitments by 2030 to develop principles for environmental sustainability across the life cycle of digital technologies and to ensure that digital infrastructures are sustainably designed to be able to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. If agreed, the UN Secretary-General is to prepare a progress report starting in 2026, followed by a high-level review a year later.
At five pages long, the Declaration on Future Generations is the shortest and most straightforward. It goes beyond the participation of youth in policy decisions, and is also concerned with those yet to be born.[17] Here, climate change, conflicts, hunger and migration are recurring themes. If agreed, this will require regular updates and reviews on whether and how nations are keeping to their commitments to undertake strategies to achieve inclusive economic growth and prioritise urgent action on climate change.A breakdown or a breakthrough?
In a consensus-based system, agreements tend to be based on the lowest common denominator instead of striving for ambitious actions necessary to tackle today's complex challenges. There is widespread disillusionment among veterans of multilateral negotiations, who, despite being staunch supporters of multilateralism, have grown weary of a never-ending roster of summits and conferences that consistently fail to deliver substantial results.
Sofía Monsalve Suárez, secretary general of human rights organisation FIAN International and member of the International Panel of Experts on Food Systems (IPES-Food), illustrates this frustration. She criticises the draft Pact for the Future for its omission of the right to food and the lack of prominent focus on food issues. "The only concrete measure regarding food insecurity and malnutrition pertains to science, technology, and innovation", she noted.[18] While these areas are undoubtedly important, Suárez cautions that prioritising them without addressing deeper systemic issues such as corporate power and the concentration of land, market power and wealth in food systems might ultimately benefit corporations more than the people suffering from hunger and ecological destruction.
David Archer, head of programmes and influencing at ActionAid, echoed this scepticism, expressing doubts about the event's potential for meaningful change. "The draft Pact has warm words but little real substance. We are focused on making breakthroughs in changing the colonial nature of the global financial architecture", he said,[19] mentioning activities outside the Summit such as the Financing for Development process and ongoing negotiations for a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, which he believes hold more promise for real breakthroughs.
Reflecting on the unmet commitments made at past climate summits, Dhanush Dinesh, founder of Clim-Eat, questioned the need for an event such as this. "These summits are increasingly becoming platforms for countries and international organisations to greenwash citizens, making promises they do not intend to keep", he said,[20] criticising the significant time, financial and human resources these summits consume.
Instead, Edward Davey, head of World Resources Institute Europe's UK office and senior advisor of the Food and Land Use Coalition, maintained a more optimistic outlook. He believes that the Summit can "elevate important multilateral challenges to world leaders' attention" while acknowledging the limitations of such meetings. Still, Davey believes that a well-executed multilateral meeting can drive political attention and action, particularly if it raises the profile of crucial issues like food systems.[21]
Therein lies the complex landscape under which the Summit of the Future is being held, and the significant frustration and scepticism, as well as hope, riding on it.Looking ahead
It is clear that there is potential for the Summit to lay the groundwork for several critical initiatives, even if it falls short of complete systemic transformation. But there is also a clear risk it could fall into a well-worn pattern of past gatherings which produced lofty declarations but no real change on the ground.
One achievable outcome is the adoption of the Global Digital Compact, with time-bound goals to bridge digital divides. But whether the Summit can go beyond symbolic gestures remains to be seen. A key litmus test will be a bold, forward-looking Pact that will commit world leaders to concrete, time-bound actions on critical issues, including reforming global governance structures within the UN and other international bodies to make them more inclusive and representative.
For example, the proposal in the latest draft of the Pact to create a chair on the IMF Executive Board for sub-Saharan Africa is one specific step towards diversifying the international financial architecture.[22] So are the pledges to finalise negotiations on an international, legally-binding treaty on plastic pollution and to provide "universal coverage of early warning systems by 2027" against climate change-induced disasters.[23] More such steps are needed: currently they are few and far between.
These steps themselves may not resolve all issues, but they can act as a significant push towards reinvigorating multilateralism, because the alternative is worse. Without multilateral frameworks, individual countries are likely to prioritise national interests over collective well-being and this could precipitate a domino effect of worsening geopolitical tensions and economic instability and stymieing the world's ability to effectively address transnational challenges.Thin Lei Win is an award-winning multimedia journalist specialising in the intersections of food systems and climate change. This commentary was prepared within the framework of the project Nexus25–Shaping Multilateralism. Views expressed are the author's alone.[1] See the official website: https://www.un.org/en/node/209909.[2] UN News, Summit of the Future 'Unique Opportunity' to Rebuild Trust: Guterres, 21 September 2023, https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/09/1141187.[3] Indermit Gill and M. Ayhan Kose, "5 Major Risks Confronting the Global Economy in 2024", in Brookings Commentaries, 17 January 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/?p=1754935.[4] Kate Abnett and Alison Withers, "2024 Could Be World's Hottest Year as June Breaks Records", in Reuters, 8 July 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/2024-could-be-worlds-hottest-year-june-breaks-records-2024-07-08.[5] Susannah Savage, "Climate Change Is Pushing Up Food Prices – and Worrying Central Banks", in Financial Times, 3 July 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/125e89c0-308a-492f-ae8e-6834847d1186.[6] FAO et al., The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024, Rome, FAO, 2024, p. xvi, https://doi.org/10.4060/cd1254en.[7] UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Commemoration of the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations, 21 September 2020, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/75/1.[8] UN General Assembly, Modalities for the Summit of the Future, 8 September 2022, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/76/307.[9] Summit of the Future website: Action Days, https://www.un.org/en/node/217887.[10] Summit of the Future website: Pact for the Future - Revisions, https://www.un.org/en/node/217496.[11] Summit of the Future, Pact for the Future: Rev.2, 17 July 2024, https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/pact_for_the_future_-_rev.2_-_17_july.pdf.[12] Summit of the Future, Pact for the Future: Rev.1, 14 May 2024, point 6(d), https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/sotf-pact-for-the-future-rev.1.pdf.[13] Summit of the Future, Pact for the Future: Rev.2, cit., point 19(c).[14] Stewart Patrick (ed.), UN Security Council Reform: What the World Thinks, Washington, Carnegie Endowment, 28 June 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/06/un-security-council-reform-what-the-world-thinks.[15] Richard Gowan, "What the Draft UN 'Pact for the Future' Tells Us About International Insecurity", in Just Security, 26 July 2024, https://wp.me/p5gGh3-pwI.[16] Summit of the Future website: Global Digital Compact, https://www.un.org/en/node/215109.[17] Summit of the Future website: Declaration on Future Generations, https://www.un.org/en/node/213103.[18] Based on an e-mail interview conducted on 9 July 2024 for this commentary.[19] Based on an e-mail interview conducted on 11 July 2024 for this commentary.[20] Based on an e-mail interview conducted on 5 July 2024 for this commentary.[21] Based on an e-mail interview conducted on 11 July 2024 for this commentary.[22] Summit of the Future, Pact for the Future: Rev.2, cit., point 73.[23] Ibid., point 25(c).

When, on 29 June 2023, the EU Deforestation-free Regulation (EUDR) entered into force, it was like a small earthquake – at least for whoever was dealing with EU agricultural imports. Never before, neither in the EU nor in the rest of the world, such an ambitious anti-deforestation piece of legislation has ever been enacted. Perhaps more importantly, it was the first to directly address the leading cause of global deforestation: agriculture. The EUDR indeed completely forbids the entry into the EU market of key agricultural commodities[1] whose production caused deforestation after a cut-off date (identified as 31 December 2020).
As the EU is one of the leading importers of tropical deforestation (through agricultural commodities), the Regulation has indeed the potential to become one of the most important tools to protect global forests, and to be successful where other plans and initiatives have failed (as in the case of the UN's REDD+[2] and the EU's FLEGT).[3] However, its approval has triggered significant protests first from key partner countries (Indonesia and Brazil in particular), which then extended to a larger share of the Global South in 2023[4] and even reached EU member states, the US and Australia in 2024.[5] Opposition has been so significant that, despite having entered into force more than a year ago, its future is still unclear and there are growing chances its application will be even delayed by one or two years – the Regulation is structured in a way that is should be applied at a later stage than its entry into force, currently set for December 2024. A mix of political support and fine-tuning of the tools available for implementation will be required to guarantee the EUDR's now uncertain success.Agriculture and deforestation
Agriculture is by far and large the leading cause of deforestation worldwide, accounting for approximately 90 per cent of all clearings.[6] Yet, despite decades of international efforts, it has been only indirectly addressed by initiatives and policies aimed at protecting forests. The 2010 EU Timber Regulation (EUTR)[7] exclusively applied to timber imports and so did the 2008 US Lacey Act and the 2019 Chinese Forest Law. The UN REDD+ framework instead has only focused on land-use-related emissions, aiming at compensating countries that decide to adopt forest-positive practices. Agriculture was left in the background, despite soy farming or palm oil production having been the most evident cause of deforestation respectively in the Amazon and in Borneo, for instance.
There are many reasons for this, and the first is that regulating agriculture to prevent deforestation is no easy task. National legislations can greatly vary between producing countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, etc.) and buyers (the EU), so that forest clearings and cultivations can be illegal for one side, but perfectly legal for the other. In several cases, agricultural exports represent such a significant share of the national economy that governments are very keen to turn a blind eye and allow illegal and destructive practices (as in the case of the forest fires for new palm oil plantations in Indonesia). Corruption, involvement of organised crime groups and lack of governance, among other issues, tend to further hide the environmental impact of agriculture.
The key to regulating agriculture is indeed tracing, i.e. the ability to follow the commodity in each different step of the supply chain, from production to consumption. This allows for a full understanding and visibility of the impact of cultivations – also and particularly on forests. Tracing mechanisms are however scarce and have been so far only applied for timber in the EU as a consequence of the EUTR (with scarce success),[8] and by certification organisations for other agricultural commodities. These include schemes such as Fairtrade (for coffee) or the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC, for timber and rubber), and similarly have had a limited impact especially because of their voluntary nature and of complications in gathering information – FSC in particular has been accused of certifying well-known environmental offenders.[9]The turn of the EUDR
While in recent years technological developments and growing global environmental awareness have increased the reach of certification schemes, the share of certified production has remained scarce – for coffee, the most covered sector, this is around 30 per cent.[10] Most of the players indeed have had very little interest in changing the situation; traced, deforestation-free agricultural commodities are generally more expensive, and neither European and international buyers nor local producers have historically wanted to pay the additional sustainability price. The EUDR has marked perhaps the most significant change to this situation: it has introduced a "due diligence" requirement on companies importing the seven commodities covered by the Regulation into the EU, so that they would have to trace all their batches back to the original producer, to prove that they did not cause deforestation. By imposing traceability, not only has the EUDR delivered the tool mostly needed for its main objective (that is, reducing EU-related deforestation), but it also hopes that this will stimulate producers to expand traced production beyond EU demand – a sort of Brussels effect, which leads EU regulations to have a de facto impact that is larger than its de jure scope.
While such an approach has definitely more chances for success than the much milder one adopted in the past by the EUTR and other policies, it contains all the elements needed to upset producing countries – and it has. Indonesia, a country with a long history of unregulated deforestation and a major exporter of palm oil to the EU, has been one of the first to oppose the EUDR only a few days after its entry into force[11] and was rapidly followed by Malaysia, Brazil and other countries, which ultimately became a sort of informal coalition of 17 countries which sent a letter to the European Commission in September 2023.[12] In June 2024 also the US joined the opposition[13] and were followed by Australia shortly thereafter. Reasons for oppositions are generally of two kinds: all countries, Brazil, Australia and the US in particular, complain about the unfeasibility of the Regulation, which they lament will be just too complicated to be successfully applied. Most of the countries in the Global South also object that they have been imposed EU rules, without having a say. While these countries' primary interest clearly lies in maintaining access to the European market without paying this sustainability price, the complaints are reasonable: building a traceability system for sectors that had limited to no attempts in the past will be very hard and very expensive, considering especially how convoluted global agricultural supply chains still are (in terms of number of intermediaries, lack of transparency, etc.). Equally, the EUDR saw very little debate with third countries and a great deal of unilateralism that was to some extent aimed at avoiding the endless negotiations that undermined the effectiveness of previous initiatives and regulations (the FLEGT, for instance). Such a unilateral approach was however likely designed also to increase the control of the EU on key commodities and improve food security, at a time in which China and other players are playing an increasingly greater role in South East Asia and Latin America.[14]The way forward
The situation is getting more and more complicated for the EUDR. The opposition has spread to some EU member states in March 2024[15] and even to the European Parliament, with the EPP group leading calls for a two-year delay of the Regulation application in June 2024, shortly after the latest elections.[16] Governments and MEPs are likely being pushed by the domestic farming sector (which will also be affected by the Regulation) and by national importers, and the recent political wave against some of the Green Deal legislation (the Nature Restoration Law in particular) probably allowed these protests to grow louder.
The EU should address these concerns rapidly, or risk failing the EUDR. This will not only delay much-needed forest protection, but will also discourage other countries from taking the same direction – something the US is now trying to achieve through the FOREST Act that has been recently re-proposed.[17] The EU should work on two sides: the technical and the political one.
From a technical perspective, many tools can now significantly reduce the costs of tracing, and are easily and readily available to European and non-European users: satellite images from the EU Copernicus programme can offer a free and clear view of the farms where commodities are supposedly coming from (traceability always includes coordinates), and thanks to historic series it is possible to understand how the landscape has evolved over time, for instance. Apps such as Koltitrace, by agri service provider Koltiva, allows for easier collection of information along the supply chain, since it will be the different operators (farmers, intermediate buyers, etc.) that will directly insert them step by step, and not the final operator.
However, even these advancements will have little impact without the cooperation of local and national institutions, and even of companies, in producing countries. Indeed, these will ultimately be the ones gathering and providing the information on which EU institutions will decide whether imports will be EUDR-compliant or not. Brussels should first improve relations with producing countries, ideally through dedicated platforms such as the task force the EU launched with Indonesia and Malaysia on palm oil already in 2023.[18] Engagement with the private sector should also be a priority, since companies often have the best understanding of their own supply chains, but dialogue has been very limited before and after the entry into force of the Regulation. The EU will however have the difficult task of balancing the demands of these players while maintaining the real effectiveness of the Regulation, in order not to transform one of the boldest attempts to protect global forests into just a very expensive bureaucratic exercise.Lorenzo Colantoni is senior fellow of the Energy, Climate and Resources programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).
This Commentary has been produced under the PRODIGEES project, which has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 873119.[1] The EUDR covers the seven commodities that are more responsible for global deforestation: soy, coffee, cocoa, palm oil, rubber, beef and timber.[2] See UNFCCC REDD+ Web Platform, https://redd.unfccc.int.[3] On the 2005 Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Regulation, see Fredy D. Polo Villanueva et al., "Effects of EU Illegal Logging Policy on Timber-Supplying Countries: A Systematic Review", in Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 327 (1 February 2023), Article 116874, DOI 10.1016/j.jenvman.2022.116874.[4] Isabel Marques da Silva, "Why the Global South Is Against the EU's Anti-Deforestation Law", in Euronews, 20 September 2023, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/09/20/why-the-global-south-is-against-the-eus-anti-deforestation-law.[5] Sofia Sanchez Manzanaro, "Agriculture Ministers Push to Weaken Anti-Deforestation Rules for EU Farmers", in Euractiv, 25 March 2024, https://www.euractiv.com/?p=2067436.[6] UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), "FRA 2020 Remote Sensing Survey", in FAO Forestry Papers, No. 186 (2022), p. xii, https://doi.org/10.4060/cb9970en.[7] European Parliament and Council of the EU, Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of 20 October 2010 Laying Down the Obligations of Operators Who Place Timber and Timber Products on the Market, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2010/995/oj.[8] Michael Munk Sørensen, Lorenz Carl Wähler and Malene Sand Jespersen, Impact Assessment Study for the Revision of the Product Scope of the EU Timber Regulation. Final Report, Brussels, European Commission, May 2019, https://op.europa.eu/s/zOdq.[9] Earthsight, "FSC Hall of Shame: The Ethical Wood Label's Long Line of Scandals", in Earthsight Blog, 25 October 2021, https://www.earthsight.org.uk/news/blog-fsc-hall-of-shame-the-ethical-wood-label-long-list-of-scandals.[10] Sjoerd Panhuysen and Frederik de Vries, Coffee Barometer 2023, Coffee Barometer Consortium, September 2023, p. 12, https://coffeebarometer.org/documents_resources/coffee_barometer_2023.pdf.[11] "Indonesia Invites Affected Countries to Oppose EUDR Policy: Minister", in ANTARA, 13 July 2023, https://en.antaranews.com/news/288156.[12] Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 Like-Minded Countries Convey Official Concern Regarding the EUDR, 8 September 2023, https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/5234/berita/17-like-minded-countries-convey-official-concern-regarding-the-eudr.[13] Andy Bounds and Alice Hancock, "EU's Use of Incorrect Deforestation Data 'Risks Blocking Imports", in Financial Times, 15 July 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/ab2aabbc-8978-444b-844b-3d0d70553266; Kate Abnett, "United States Asks EU to Delay Deforestation Law, Letter Shows", in Reuters, 20 June 2024, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/united-states-asks-eu-delay-deforestation-law-letter-shows-2024-06-20.[14] Katharina Weber, "Forests, Foreign Policy and Trade. What the EU Deforestation Regulation Means from a Foreign Policy Perspective", in CEPS Explainers, No. 2023-15 (November 2023), https://www.ceps.eu/?p=41589.[15] Austria (which leads the opposition), Finland, Italy, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland and Sweden. See Sofia Sanchez Manzanaro, "Agriculture Ministers Push to Weaken Anti-Deforestation Rules for EU Farmers", cit.[16] Robert Hodgson, "EPP Environment Lead Calls for Delay to Anti-Deforestation Law", in Euronews, 27 June 2024, https://www.euronews.com/green/2024/06/27/epp-environment-lead-calls-for-delay-to-anti-deforestation-law.[17] David E. Bond, Matt Solomon and Ian Saccomanno, "US Congress Reintroduces Bill to Restrict Imports Linked to Illegal Deforestation", in White & Case Insight Alerts, 7 December 2023, https://www.whitecase.com/node/120176.[18] European External Action Service (EEAS), Joint Press Release: The 2nd Meeting of the ad hoc Joint Task Force on the EUDR, Putrajaya, Malaysia, 2 February 2024, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/438155_en.

Along the journey to achieve the net-zero target by 2050, emissions reductions from all sectors are essential. While the power sector has benefitted from renewables' expansion due to declining costs of these technologies over the past decade, governments are considering measures to foster decarbonisation in the other sectors as well. In this regard, the industry sector – especially energy-intensive industries (EIIs)[1] – is particularly relevant given its environmental footprint and socioeconomic relevance. Therefore, several member states must design and provide a policy framework to accelerate the sector's decarbonisation while preserving its competitiveness that is deeply undermined by the energy crisis. Cooperation among large manufacturing countries like Italy and Germany is key to achieving these targets, which will define economic and climate trajectories at the national and European levels.Energy-intensive industries between decarbonisation and competitiveness
At the European level, the industrial sector accounted for 21 per cent of EU-27 carbon dioxide emissions in 2022[2] while representing 25 per cent of total employment;[3] its share of total gross value added was around 17 per cent. Within the industry sector, energy-intensive industries alone are responsible for around 70 per cent of its total emissions. These industries are now facing two existential challenges: a loss of competitiveness and the urgency to adapt to the net-zero scenario. For EU countries, it is essential to address these challenges in a cooperative matter; otherwise, they could face higher competition not only from abroad but also from within the Union, leading to fragmentation and the risk of missing climate objectives with limited economic benefit.
Regarding the economic challenge, EIIs have particularly suffered from the rise of energy prices since mid-2021. As energy costs constitute a large proportion of their total production costs, these industries are increasingly seeing their competitiveness eroding compared to international producers, such as China and India. Although the European Emission Trading System (ETS) contributed to the emissions reduction in the European countries, it also entails higher costs for European EIIs. The additional increase in energy prices in the last three years has put an extra layer of complexity. Even though European countries have extensively addressed this threat by introducing measures to shield consumers and firms from rising energy prices[4] and by providing state aid to companies, industrial production has not recovered.[5] Furthermore, these emergency measures cannot be pursued in the long term due to economic challenges. While Italy lacks a significant budgetary space, the ruling decision of the German Constitutional Court limits the space of manoeuvre to invest in the energy transition at the national level.[6]
Therefore, there are a number of reasons for cooperation between Germany and Italy in finding new ways to finance the adjustment and protection of their industries. Coordination in terms of industrial policy and funds is needed at the European level and the new European institutional cycle provides an opportunity to deliver in these areas also by allocating and streamlining existing funds. Otherwise, the extensive use of state aid will lead to the fragmentation of the single market due to different fiscal capabilities among member states. In parallel, to further reduce energy costs, European countries will need to bring as much energy as possible into the market in the foreseeable future. This means that European countries will need to ensure enough energy imports, while accelerating (ideally the domestic production of) low-carbon solutions.
Linked to this element, the other major challenge for EIIs is represented by the need to adjust their production routes and processes in order to comply with and contribute to EU and national climate objectives. In order to decarbonise the sector, stakeholders can pursue different technological solutions, namely electrification, hydrogen and carbon capture and storage (CCS), depending on political preferences and technological opportunities. Italy and Germany could cooperate in designing the regulatory and financial framework to develop these solutions at the European and national levels.[7] National best practices and lessons learnt could be mutually shared and replicated. At the same time, companies' transformation is hindered not only by higher capital expenditure (CAPEX) in order to invest in cleaner technological solutions, but also, for many technologies, higher operational expenditure (OPEX) compared the existing fossil fuels-based production routes.[8] This dual challenge urges governments to find schemes to address it also through the use of EU ETS revenues. Additionally, Italy and Germany could enhance cooperation in the construction and expansion of energy interconnections to integrate solar generation in the Mediterranean and wind generation in the North Sea.[9]The case of green steel
Among EIIs, the steel industry is one of the most crucial and promising areas for cooperation between Italy and Germany. Steel, which is an ever-present element of our modern life, accounts for 7 per cent of world's greenhouse gas emissions.[10] The two countries are some of the largest steel producers in Europe and in the world. In 2022, Germany produced 36.8 million tonnes (Mt) of crude steel, being the world's seventh-largest producer and corresponding to 27 per cent of EU crude steel production.[11] Italy produced 21.6 Mt being the world's eleventh largest producer and accounting for 16 per cent of the EU's steel production in the same year.[12] The sector accounts for around 4.5 per cent of Italy's GHG emissions and for 7 per cent of Germany's total emissions.
However, the two countries differ significantly regarding the production routes: Germany relies mainly on primary steelmaking (almost 70 per cent of national crude steel production in 2022), while Italy on secondary steelmaking (84 per cent of national steel production).[13] These two different production routes entail different technological solutions, energy requirements and hence emissions.
Primary steelmaking uses blast furnaces, which are fuelled by coal or coke, and basic oxygen furnaces (BF-BOF) to turn iron ore into steel, while secondary steelmaking uses electric arc furnaces (EAF) to produce steel, thanks to steel scrap. Based on this difference, Italy's steel sector has a below-average carbon intensity (the lowest among the G7 countries), and in general, is in a good starting position for implementing decarbonisation strategies. Italian companies can share expertise and know-how on lower carbon-intense steel production. Although Italy's steel production relies more on electricity, the country will need to speed up renewable installation to further decarbonise its power and steel sectors, reduce its overdependence on natural gas and provide clean electricity at competitive costs. To accelerate renewable deployment, Italy (as well as Germany) will need to continue to accelerate authorisation procedures for projects and investment as already envisaged by the REPowerEU.
For steel decarbonisation, hydrogen is a promising area for both countries. For Germany, hydrogen could be used in direct iron reduction (DRI) plants in order to replace the current fleets of BF-BOF plants. For Italy, hydrogen would be instrumental in decarbonising its downstream sector where electrification is much more difficult. As of today, a major obstacle to the development and use of (green) hydrogen in the steel sector is economic as its cost is higher than conventional sources. Therefore, the two countries should continue to work on establishing the right incentives for the development of hydrogen and production of 'green' steel. In this sense, Germany announced the use of carbon contracts for difference (CCfDs)[14] that are expected to facilitate investment in low-carbon technologies. Italy should develop a similar measure for its industry.
Although the two countries are working to ramp up renewable generation aimed also at producing green hydrogen domestically, they will need to rely on imports. In this area, the joint commitment to the SoutH2 Corridor project is particularly relevant, which will transport cheap hydrogen from North Africa to Germany via Italy and Austria. They will need to collaborate on regulatory and market frameworks along the infrastructural developments.[15] Moreover, the two countries could enhance cooperation on another technological solution to reduce emissions from the steel industry: CCS. Despite some technological and economic challenges, Italy and Germany are increasingly looking into this solution to preserve their industrial capacity. They will need to collaborate to facilitate a regulatory framework at the European level and invest in joint projects to ramp up the development of CCS.
The two countries could also collaborate on further research and development for green steel production given their large producer status by working on joint research projects and existing network of companies and academia.[16] This network would also be crucial to help reskill the workforce in the industry in line with technological and production developments. While great attention has been devoted to the supply side, it is equally crucial for the two countries to cooperate in encouraging the demand for clean products. To pull demand upward, governments could revise and promote the use of public procurement requirements. Moreover, the two countries could work – both bilaterally and at the European level – towards promoting green lead market[17] by setting standards and regulations. Only through incentives on both the supply and demand side, the two countries' steel sector could remain competitive vis-à-vis their international competitor and lead the transformation of the sector.Looking ahead
Today, European countries and industries are facing multiple challenges, spanning from the energy and climate crisis to a loss of industrial competitiveness and growing geopolitical and industrial competition from international players. To overcome these challenges countries like Italy and Germany need to find common solutions to adapt their existing industries to the new international and climate scenario. Without a common strategy and convergence in terms of policy, regulations, infrastructure and investments, European industries may lose ground vis-à-vis external competitors. The relevance of the industrial sector both in Italy and Germany provides a unique opportunity for further bilateral cooperation that could shape the important decision of the upcoming Commission.
The steel sector represents a perfect case study as it will imply great coordination in a variety of domains, such as technological solutions, standards, infrastructure and regulatory aspects. As the European integration process started with the steel industry and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in the aftermath of World War II, the steel industry can prove once again its crucial role in bringing together European countries amid the multiple transformations and challenges at the global level.Pier Paolo Raimondi is a Researcher in the Energy, Climate and Resources Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and PhD Candidate at the Catholic University of Milan.
This commentary presents some of the key issues discussed during two workshops organised by IAI, which brought together industrial and steel sector representatives from both Germany and Italy. The events are part of a broader IAI project, "An Italian-German Dialogue on Energy Security and Transition amid Russia's War on Ukraine", supported by the German Federal Foreign Office.[1] EIIs covers iron & steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, non-metallic minerals, paper & pulp.[2] Statista, Distribution of Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions in the European Union (EU-27) in 2022, by Sector, April 2024, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1240108.[3] World Bank Data, Employment in Industry (% of total employment) – European Union, 7 February 2024, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.IND.EMPL.ZS?locations=EU.[4] Giovanni Sgaravatti et al., "National Fiscal Policy Responses to the Energy Crisis", in Bruegel Datasets, 26 June 2023, https://www.bruegel.org/node/7844.[5] Akos Losz and Anne-Sophie Corbeau, "Anatomy of the European Industrial Gas Demand Drop", in SIPA CGEP Commentaries, 18 March 2024, https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/?p=19758; Patricia Nilsson and Sam Jones, "German Emissions Fall by a Fifth amid Stagnant Industrial Output", in Financial Times, 4 January 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/c9aa5a8e-cd6d-4583-b0af-131c8c448913.[6] Max Münchmeyer and Pier Paolo Raimondi, "Between Security and Transition: Prospects for German-Italian Energy Cooperation", in IAI Commentaries, No. 23|66 (December 2023), p. 2, https://www.iai.it/en/node/17912.[7] Pier Paolo Raimondi and Max Münchmeyer, "From Interconnection to Integration: German-Italian Energy Relations and the SoutH2 Corridor", in IAI Commentaries, No. 24|03 (January 2024), p. 5, https://www.iai.it/en/node/17992.[8] Sander de Bruyn et al., "Energy-intensive Industries. Challenges and Opportunities in Energy Transition", in European Parliament Studies, July 2020, p. 50, https://doi.org/10.2861/427814.[9] Max Münchmeyer and Pier Paolo Raimondi, "Between Security and Transition", cit., p. 4.[10] Holger Stamm and Nils Naujok, "Why Steel Can Be an Unexpected Leader in Decarbonization", in World Economic Forum Agenda, 29 August 2023, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/08/why-steel-can-be-an-unexpected-leader-in-decarbonization.[11] Eurofer, European Steel in Figures 2023, May 2023, p. 13, https://www.eurofer.eu/publications/brochures-booklets-and-factsheets/european-steel-in-figures-2023; and World Steel Association, World Steel in Figures 2023, November 2023, https://worldsteel.org/?p=47823.[12] Ibid.[13] World Steel Association, World Steel in Figures 2023, cit.[14] CCfDs are contracts for difference "on the CO2 price between the operator of an innovative project and the government, linked dynamically to the actually achieved emissions reductions. As a result, when the CO2 market price is below the strike price, the CCfD pays out the difference to the CO2 market price to the project, whereas in case of high CO2 market prices, the project owner needs to pay back the difference to the agreed-upon price to the government. As a result of the CCfD, the project is incentivised by a constant CO2 price at the contract price level." See Oliver Lösch et al., "Carbon Contracts for Difference as Essential Instrument to Decarbonize Basic Materials Industries", in ECEEE Summer Study Proceedings, 6-11 June 2022, p. 1399-1408 at p. 1400, https://doi.org/10.24406/publica-596.[15] Pier Paolo Raimondi and Max Münchmeyer, "From Interconnection to Integration", cit.[16] Alessio Sangiorgio, "Civil Society and the Energy Transition: Fostering Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue in Germany and Italy", in IAI Commentaries, No. 24|20 (May 2024), https://www.iai.it/en/node/18443.[17] Lead markets generally denote a geographically distinct submarket that pioneers the successful adoption of an innovative design and/or product. In green lead markets, this innovation refers to products being more sustainable and low-carbon. See Bellona, Lead Markets 101, 20 January 2023, https://bellona.org/?p=33496.

IntroductionIndo-Pacific institutional development has been intensifying amid growing strategic competition. A rising China has rolled out new initiatives, Washington is building like-minded coalitions like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) faces challenges to its status as a hub for multilateral diplomacy. The dynamics this institutional flux produce is critical to the Indo-Pacific's trajectory and US interests. The emerging Indo-Pacific institutional mix in the coming years will help shape norms, the balance of power and policy areas of US importance across core Indo-Pacific subregions such as the Indian Ocean, the Pacific and Southeast Asia. This policy brief explores the ongoing Indo-Pacific institutional flux and the opportunities and challenges it creates. It is informed by conversations with policymakers and experts across key Indo-Pacific capitals, including multiple trips across the region. The brief makes three main arguments. First, this period of Indo-Pacific institutional flux is notable for the increasing pressure on multilateralism, the formation of looser bilateral partnerships as well as several varieties of minilaterals. Four types of minilaterals are particularly evident: sectoral, partnership, major-power led and issue-based minilaterals. Second, these changes impact evolving dynamics in the institutional space. Five components are especially notable: centeredness; inclusivity; value; efficiency; and transparency. Third, actors, including regional states as well as the US and its partners, can help shape the direction of this Indo-Pacific institutional flux in ways that advance a shared vision of a free and open region. Indo-Pacific Institutional Flux in PerspectiveThis period of Indo-Pacific institutional flux is just the latest we have seen over the decades. During the Cold War, Asian states formed indigenous groupings apart from the network of US alliances. This included ASEAN in Southeast Asia in 1967 or the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in South Asia in 1985. Some set up new institutions to accommodate balance of power shifts, with a case in point being the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) between Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore in the face of British withdrawal from Southeast Asia. The post-Cold War period in the 1990s and into early 2000s saw greater impetus to utilize new institutions like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to pursue integration. Meanwhile, ASEAN cemented its role as an Indo-Pacific convenor by hosting annual leader meetings via the East Asia Summit (EAS) process. But periodic crises also revealed the limits of these new institutions. The clearest example of this in the early 2000s was the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which sparked the first iteration of the subsequently revived and recalibrated Quad. The 2010s and 2020s have seen a period of Indo-Pacific institutional flux. This is characterized by greater pressures on multilateralism, proliferating minilaterals and bilateral partnerships as well as cementing of the Indo-Pacific strategic concept. Existing institutions like ASEAN are facing growing headwinds, while new groups are being created as countries seek more flexible cooperation amid a series of factors including erosion of aspects of the rules-based order; US-China competition; and the intensification of trends such as climate change and digitalization. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia, traditionally one of the Indo-Pacific's most diplomatically active countries, has termed this an "age of flux". The headlines around minilateral institutions tend to focus heavily on cases like the Australia-UK-US trilateral security mechanism (AUKUS). Beyond AUKUS or the Quad, countries apart from the US, including in Southeast Asia, are also pursuing minilateralism to address challenges more quickly and flexibly. This includes the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) kicked off between Chile, New Zealand and Singapore, or the Sulu Sea trilateral patrols between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Beyond AUKUS or the Quad, countries apart from the US, including in Southeast Asia, are also pursuing minilateralism to address challenges more quickly and flexibly.As it stands today, the minilateral label has been applied loosely to institutions of different types. These groupings exist alongside relatively newer bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. These include the EU-India Trade and Technology Council (TTC) established in 2021 or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) grouping ASEAN, Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea – the world's largest free trade pact that entered into force in 2022. Some minilaterals, such as the Australia-India-Japan trilateral, India-Israel-UAE-US mechanism (I2U2) or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership CPTPP) in the trade space, are partnership minilaterals, with multiple countries working on issues across sectors. This is in contrast to minilaterals led by one power, as seen in the Mekong subregion in Southeast Asia with China's Lancang Mekong Cooperation (LMC) or the Mekong-US Partnership (MUSP). Similarly, some minilaterals are focused around a specific sector. Examples here include DEPA and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Others have an even narrower focus. For example, the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) in place since the 2000s involve policing in the Malacca Straits, and Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) touch on energy and the environment. Despite these categorizations, institutions can overlap or move across them over time for various reasons. These include membership expansion, agenda shifts and changing leaderships. Table 1: Select Categories of Minilateral Institutions in the Recent SpotlightImage CreditEvolving Strategic Dynamics This new period of Indo-Pacific institutional flux contributes to several strategic dynamics that affect calculations of key actors including ASEAN, China, the US and powers such as Australia, India and Japan. Dynamics are notable across five areas: centeredness; inclusivity; value; efficiency; and transparency. They add up to the acronym CIVET. The first is around centeredness. Most notably, the challenges ASEAN faces as an institution, coupled with the consequences of minilaterals like the Quad and AUKUS, have intensified fears in ASEAN of loss of the grouping's traditional "centrality". This threatens to sideline an organization that is the Indo-Pacific's default diplomatic convener even if it has fallen short on addressing challenges such as Myanmar or the South China Sea. The second is around inclusivity. The growth of new US- and China-led institutions amid growing competition complicates the idealistic quest for open, inclusive regionalism. The US and its partners are spearheading more exclusive and like-minded groupings like AUKUS to address Beijing's growing military capabilities in ways that multilateral fora cannot. Though China cries foul about containment, Beijing is building exclusive, China-led mechanisms to boost its influence. At times, this is done with the window dressing of "Asia for Asians" that one official described to the author as "China-first" with an "Asia -first disguise". Beyond what it means for US interests, Beijing's moves also raise concerns for other powers, be it India in the Indian Ocean or Australia in the Pacific. Periodic developments have spotlighted some of this, be it new China-led mechanisms on the Indian Ocean or aspects of Beijing's agreements with the Pacific. The third is around value. The birth of new institutions has intensified the value proposition challenge for existing and newer mechanisms alike. For instance, in the economic realm, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) has made select inroads in areas like supply chains. But it faced initial questions about its value proposition for lacking market access provisions. In the security realm, the Quad has been gradually clearer about its regional value proposition. The Quad's efforts to support scholarships and establish working groups across shared priority areas like health and climate defined an agenda beyond just balancing China. Indeed, some survey data point to relatively greater support in regions like Southeast Asia for the Quad after initial skepticism. The birth of new institutions has intensified the value proposition challenge for existing and newer mechanisms alike.The fourth is around efficiency. The growth of institutions has intensified concerns around inefficiency caused by overlaps, duplication and siloing. Silos can hamper the performance of proliferating regional frameworks, with major powers having different conceptions of how this strategic space fits into their mind maps. The Mekong subregion is an example. There have been repeated calls within the region for limiting inefficiencies caused by duplication among the over dozen Mekong frameworks in place. These include those led by regional states like Thailand or by powers like Japan and South Korea. One senior official from a Mekong country described the institutional dilemma to the author as being caught between "overdominance" by China and "overcrowding" by institutional proliferation to further national interests and check Beijing's rise. The fifth is around transparency. This is often most referenced in the security realm, with cases including the perceived lack of adequacy in initial AUKUS consultations or the disclosure of China-driven secret regional agreements on police presence or naval facilities. But this applies to the economic realm too. For instance, original Trans-Pacific Partnership talks saw repeated requests for more transparency by legislatures and civil society actors in the US and among some other negotiating partners. This raises broader questions about the extent of transparency required as countries enter looser and more informal partnerships that may not require formal approval. Table 2: Select Strategic Dynamics Components Amid Indo-Pacific Institutional FluxImage CreditPolicy ImplicationsAdjusting to this period of Indo-Pacific institutional flux will require actions from a range of actors including institutions, regional states and key powers. For the US and its partners, efforts to adjust to Indo-Pacific institutional flux would ideally both provide a foundation for countries to address shared challenges while also reinforcing a free, open and multipolar regional order rather than one dominated by China.1. Shoring Up ASEANASEAN is an indispensable part of sustainably adjusting to Indo-Pacific institutional flux as the region's default convening hub for diplomacy. At a minimum, all Southeast Asian states must set a clear floor of commitment to ASEAN centrality that includes avoiding self-inflicted wounds, as we saw with the lack of a South China Sea joint statement in 2012. Preserving a semblance of unity is part of the "collective responsibility" of member states enshrined in the ASEAN Charter. More forward-leaning Southeast Asian states should push internal structural reforms to make ASEAN more responsive and flexible. Strengthening select institutions like the East Asia Summit would be a useful step to maintain major power interest in ASEAN, even if oft-discussed steps like a formal softening of consensus-based decision-making by expanding "ASEAN Minus X" arrangements prove difficult. Efforts should also be made to streamline institutional work and boost connectivity between ASEAN and minilaterals within Southeast Asia. Recent examples include the quest for greater institutional clarity in the maritime domain and more engagement with the Mekong River Commission."ASEAN is an indispensable part of sustainably adjusting to Indo-Pacific institutional flux as the region's default convening hub for diplomacy."2. Strengthening Subregional Mechanisms and Connections to Regional ArchitectureOther active states should strengthen subregional institutions and connect them to the wider regional architecture. The Pacific is a case in point, with the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent providing an indigenous longer-term subregional plan which major powers can dock on to rather than the agenda being externally-driven. In South Asia, India plays an important bridging role given its heft and connectivity potential with institutions in other parts of the region. These include the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and Mekong Ganga Cooperation Initiative (MGC) that connect New Delhi to Southeast Asia. More diplomatically active countries like Indonesia can play a role to advocate for more ASEAN engagement with other regional institutions to facilitate connectivity. 3. Managing New Institutional Development in a Context of US-China CompetitionBoth the US and China should be mindful of actions that can undermine institutional development as the Indo-Pacific's two leading powers, be it China's lack of transparency in its Pacific engagement or the initial US discouraging of certain partners to not join Beijing's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Other regional actors like ASEAN also have a role in setting out common principles for institutional development amid major power divergences.4. Greater US Engagement in Regional "Variable Geometry"The US should engage Indo-Pacific institutions sustainably with a narrative that balances creating new institutions and engaging with the existing architecture. This counters notions that Washington is undermining ASEAN centrality or dividing the region. For example, US officials could apply the articulation of "variable geometry" to describe its global approach to institutions to message US comprehensive institutional engagement in the Indo-Pacific. This narrative would go beyond security institutions like the Quad or AUKUS and highlight US economic institutional examples, such as the private partnership under the I2U2 or the new US-Singapore technology pact – which officials say Washington only currently has with three other countries in India, Israel and South Korea.5. Entrenching a Shared Multipolar Vision in Institutional DevelopmentOther major powers have a critical role to play in shaping the institutional agenda through an open, transparent, inclusive process that promotes a multipolar region. Examples include Australia's socializing of AUKUS with the wider region after its initial mixed reception as well as Japan encouraging Washington to be more inclusive in searching for IPEF partners. Speaking out on the need for open regionalism can be helpful. One example referenced by regional interlocutors was Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar's 2022 speech, where he warned that "Asia for Asians" conceptions pushed by Beijing can seem like "narrow Asian chauvinism." 6. Linking Global Institutions to Regional ArchitectureRegional and global actors and institutions can help boost connections with Indo-Pacific architecture. This would create more options for states amid greater calls for representation in parts of the Global South and expansion efforts by other institutions such as the BRICS. Cases in point include the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) efforts to kickstart more Indo-Pacific country partnerships as well as the G-7 and G-20 being more representative about agendas and even adjusting membership as we have seen with the African Union.

IntroductionIndo-Pacific institutional development has been intensifying amid growing strategic competition. A rising China has rolled out new initiatives, Washington is building like-minded coalitions like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) faces challenges to its status as a hub for multilateral diplomacy. The dynamics this institutional flux produce is critical to the Indo-Pacific's trajectory and US interests. The emerging Indo-Pacific institutional mix in the coming years will help shape norms, the balance of power and policy areas of US importance across core Indo-Pacific subregions such as the Indian Ocean, the Pacific and Southeast Asia. This policy brief explores the ongoing Indo-Pacific institutional flux and the opportunities and challenges it creates. It is informed by conversations with policymakers and experts across key Indo-Pacific capitals, including multiple trips across the region. The brief makes three main arguments. First, this period of Indo-Pacific institutional flux is notable for the increasing pressure on multilateralism, the formation of looser bilateral partnerships as well as several varieties of minilaterals. Four types of minilaterals are particularly evident: sectoral, partnership, major-power led and issue-based minilaterals. Second, these changes impact evolving dynamics in the institutional space. Five components are especially notable: centeredness; inclusivity; value; efficiency; and transparency. Third, actors, including regional states as well as the US and its partners, can help shape the direction of this Indo-Pacific institutional flux in ways that advance a shared vision of a free and open region. Indo-Pacific Institutional Flux in PerspectiveThis period of Indo-Pacific institutional flux is just the latest we have seen over the decades. During the Cold War, Asian states formed indigenous groupings apart from the network of US alliances. This included ASEAN in Southeast Asia in 1967 or the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in South Asia in 1985. Some set up new institutions to accommodate balance of power shifts, with a case in point being the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) between Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore in the face of British withdrawal from Southeast Asia. The post-Cold War period in the 1990s and into early 2000s saw greater impetus to utilize new institutions like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to pursue integration. Meanwhile, ASEAN cemented its role as an Indo-Pacific convenor by hosting annual leader meetings via the East Asia Summit (EAS) process. But periodic crises also revealed the limits of these new institutions. The clearest example of this in the early 2000s was the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which sparked the first iteration of the subsequently revived and recalibrated Quad. The 2010s and 2020s have seen a period of Indo-Pacific institutional flux. This is characterized by greater pressures on multilateralism, proliferating minilaterals and bilateral partnerships as well as cementing of the Indo-Pacific strategic concept. Existing institutions like ASEAN are facing growing headwinds, while new groups are being created as countries seek more flexible cooperation amid a series of factors including erosion of aspects of the rules-based order; US-China competition; and the intensification of trends such as climate change and digitalization. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia, traditionally one of the Indo-Pacific's most diplomatically active countries, has termed this an "age of flux". The headlines around minilateral institutions tend to focus heavily on cases like the Australia-UK-US trilateral security mechanism (AUKUS). Beyond AUKUS or the Quad, countries apart from the US, including in Southeast Asia, are also pursuing minilateralism to address challenges more quickly and flexibly. This includes the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) kicked off between Chile, New Zealand and Singapore, or the Sulu Sea trilateral patrols between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Beyond AUKUS or the Quad, countries apart from the US, including in Southeast Asia, are also pursuing minilateralism to address challenges more quickly and flexibly.As it stands today, the minilateral label has been applied loosely to institutions of different types. These groupings exist alongside relatively newer bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. These include the EU-India Trade and Technology Council (TTC) established in 2021 or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) grouping ASEAN, Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea – the world's largest free trade pact that entered into force in 2022. Some minilaterals, such as the Australia-India-Japan trilateral, India-Israel-UAE-US mechanism (I2U2) or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership CPTPP) in the trade space, are partnership minilaterals, with multiple countries working on issues across sectors. This is in contrast to minilaterals led by one power, as seen in the Mekong subregion in Southeast Asia with China's Lancang Mekong Cooperation (LMC) or the Mekong-US Partnership (MUSP). Similarly, some minilaterals are focused around a specific sector. Examples here include DEPA and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Others have an even narrower focus. For example, the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) in place since the 2000s involve policing in the Malacca Straits, and Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) touch on energy and the environment. Despite these categorizations, institutions can overlap or move across them over time for various reasons. These include membership expansion, agenda shifts and changing leaderships. Table 1: Select Categories of Minilateral Institutions in the Recent SpotlightImage CreditEvolving Strategic Dynamics This new period of Indo-Pacific institutional flux contributes to several strategic dynamics that affect calculations of key actors including ASEAN, China, the US and powers such as Australia, India and Japan. Dynamics are notable across five areas: centeredness; inclusivity; value; efficiency; and transparency. They add up to the acronym CIVET. The first is around centeredness. Most notably, the challenges ASEAN faces as an institution, coupled with the consequences of minilaterals like the Quad and AUKUS, have intensified fears in ASEAN of loss of the grouping's traditional "centrality". This threatens to sideline an organization that is the Indo-Pacific's default diplomatic convener even if it has fallen short on addressing challenges such as Myanmar or the South China Sea. The second is around inclusivity. The growth of new US- and China-led institutions amid growing competition complicates the idealistic quest for open, inclusive regionalism. The US and its partners are spearheading more exclusive and like-minded groupings like AUKUS to address Beijing's growing military capabilities in ways that multilateral fora cannot. Though China cries foul about containment, Beijing is building exclusive, China-led mechanisms to boost its influence. At times, this is done with the window dressing of "Asia for Asians" that one official described to the author as "China-first" with an "Asia -first disguise". Beyond what it means for US interests, Beijing's moves also raise concerns for other powers, be it India in the Indian Ocean or Australia in the Pacific. Periodic developments have spotlighted some of this, be it new China-led mechanisms on the Indian Ocean or aspects of Beijing's agreements with the Pacific. The third is around value. The birth of new institutions has intensified the value proposition challenge for existing and newer mechanisms alike. For instance, in the economic realm, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) has made select inroads in areas like supply chains. But it faced initial questions about its value proposition for lacking market access provisions. In the security realm, the Quad has been gradually clearer about its regional value proposition. The Quad's efforts to support scholarships and establish working groups across shared priority areas like health and climate defined an agenda beyond just balancing China. Indeed, some survey data point to relatively greater support in regions like Southeast Asia for the Quad after initial skepticism. The birth of new institutions has intensified the value proposition challenge for existing and newer mechanisms alike.The fourth is around efficiency. The growth of institutions has intensified concerns around inefficiency caused by overlaps, duplication and siloing. Silos can hamper the performance of proliferating regional frameworks, with major powers having different conceptions of how this strategic space fits into their mind maps. The Mekong subregion is an example. There have been repeated calls within the region for limiting inefficiencies caused by duplication among the over dozen Mekong frameworks in place. These include those led by regional states like Thailand or by powers like Japan and South Korea. One senior official from a Mekong country described the institutional dilemma to the author as being caught between "overdominance" by China and "overcrowding" by institutional proliferation to further national interests and check Beijing's rise. The fifth is around transparency. This is often most referenced in the security realm, with cases including the perceived lack of adequacy in initial AUKUS consultations or the disclosure of China-driven secret regional agreements on police presence or naval facilities. But this applies to the economic realm too. For instance, original Trans-Pacific Partnership talks saw repeated requests for more transparency by legislatures and civil society actors in the US and among some other negotiating partners. This raises broader questions about the extent of transparency required as countries enter looser and more informal partnerships that may not require formal approval. Table 2: Select Strategic Dynamics Components Amid Indo-Pacific Institutional FluxImage CreditPolicy ImplicationsAdjusting to this period of Indo-Pacific institutional flux will require actions from a range of actors including institutions, regional states and key powers. For the US and its partners, efforts to adjust to Indo-Pacific institutional flux would ideally both provide a foundation for countries to address shared challenges while also reinforcing a free, open and multipolar regional order rather than one dominated by China.1. Shoring Up ASEANASEAN is an indispensable part of sustainably adjusting to Indo-Pacific institutional flux as the region's default convening hub for diplomacy. At a minimum, all Southeast Asian states must set a clear floor of commitment to ASEAN centrality that includes avoiding self-inflicted wounds, as we saw with the lack of a South China Sea joint statement in 2012. Preserving a semblance of unity is part of the "collective responsibility" of member states enshrined in the ASEAN Charter. More forward-leaning Southeast Asian states should push internal structural reforms to make ASEAN more responsive and flexible. Strengthening select institutions like the East Asia Summit would be a useful step to maintain major power interest in ASEAN, even if oft-discussed steps like a formal softening of consensus-based decision-making by expanding "ASEAN Minus X" arrangements prove difficult. Efforts should also be made to streamline institutional work and boost connectivity between ASEAN and minilaterals within Southeast Asia. Recent examples include the quest for greater institutional clarity in the maritime domain and more engagement with the Mekong River Commission."ASEAN is an indispensable part of sustainably adjusting to Indo-Pacific institutional flux as the region's default convening hub for diplomacy."2. Strengthening Subregional Mechanisms and Connections to Regional ArchitectureOther active states should strengthen subregional institutions and connect them to the wider regional architecture. The Pacific is a case in point, with the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent providing an indigenous longer-term subregional plan which major powers can dock on to rather than the agenda being externally-driven. In South Asia, India plays an important bridging role given its heft and connectivity potential with institutions in other parts of the region. These include the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and Mekong Ganga Cooperation Initiative (MGC) that connect New Delhi to Southeast Asia. More diplomatically active countries like Indonesia can play a role to advocate for more ASEAN engagement with other regional institutions to facilitate connectivity. 3. Managing New Institutional Development in a Context of US-China CompetitionBoth the US and China should be mindful of actions that can undermine institutional development as the Indo-Pacific's two leading powers, be it China's lack of transparency in its Pacific engagement or the initial US discouraging of certain partners to not join Beijing's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Other regional actors like ASEAN also have a role in setting out common principles for institutional development amid major power divergences.4. Greater US Engagement in Regional "Variable Geometry"The US should engage Indo-Pacific institutions sustainably with a narrative that balances creating new institutions and engaging with the existing architecture. This counters notions that Washington is undermining ASEAN centrality or dividing the region. For example, US officials could apply the articulation of "variable geometry" to describe its global approach to institutions to message US comprehensive institutional engagement in the Indo-Pacific. This narrative would go beyond security institutions like the Quad or AUKUS and highlight US economic institutional examples, such as the private partnership under the I2U2 or the new US-Singapore technology pact – which officials say Washington only currently has with three other countries in India, Israel and South Korea.5. Entrenching a Shared Multipolar Vision in Institutional DevelopmentOther major powers have a critical role to play in shaping the institutional agenda through an open, transparent, inclusive process that promotes a multipolar region. Examples include Australia's socializing of AUKUS with the wider region after its initial mixed reception as well as Japan encouraging Washington to be more inclusive in searching for IPEF partners. Speaking out on the need for open regionalism can be helpful. One example referenced by regional interlocutors was Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar's 2022 speech, where he warned that "Asia for Asians" conceptions pushed by Beijing can seem like "narrow Asian chauvinism." 6. Linking Global Institutions to Regional ArchitectureRegional and global actors and institutions can help boost connections with Indo-Pacific architecture. This would create more options for states amid greater calls for representation in parts of the Global South and expansion efforts by other institutions such as the BRICS. Cases in point include the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) efforts to kickstart more Indo-Pacific country partnerships as well as the G-7 and G-20 being more representative about agendas and even adjusting membership as we have seen with the African Union.

Italy and Germany share relevant similarities and challenges in the energy domain. They are both large energy consumers (145 and 270 million tonnes of oil equivalent, respectively)[1] with large populations (60 million and 80 million, respectively), high GDP per capita (43,788 US dollars Italy, 53,560 US dollars Germany)[2] and energy-intensive sectors – such as steel, cement, glass, refineries and metallurgic industries. Likewise, they face common challenges regarding the energy trilemma (energy security, affordability and sustainability). In the current context, navigating the energy trilemma requires coordinated policies to steer a successful European energy transformation. Energy security remains a crucial consideration for both Italy and Germany. Major concerns over high energy prices and their impact on competitiveness have necessitated a new approach in terms of demand curtailment or energy subsidies at the EU and bilateral levels in order to prevent detrimental intra-European competition. Meanwhile, the EU has not cooled down its climate ambitions, it has instead further enhanced them through the crisis. Therefore, Italy and Germany need to find ways to reconcile energy security and climate objectives set by national and European legislation.
In this context, the complementarities between the two countries provide some relevant opportunities for a more coordinated approach towards these multiple issues. Joint efforts, further cooperation and deeper dialogue would yield positive results for their economies and energy systems, as well as for the entire EU. To achieve that, the two countries will need to overcome domestic and bilateral constraints and leverage their similarities to shape the future of their energy transformations.Different policy drivers for the transition
At first glance, the political drivers and ambition towards energy transition in Italy and Germany seem to differ considerably. For Italy, the main driver has been the EU climate and energy legislative framework. Furthermore, the current government headed by Giorgia Meloni, compared to the Draghi government, has expressed less enthusiastic support for the energy transition, prioritising energy security and affordability as illustrated by the name-change of the Ministry for Ecological Transition (Draghi) to the Ministry of Environment and Energy Security (Meloni). In this context, some political parties argue that the development of nuclear energy is an avenue for reconciling security with climate objectives, although some major challenges remain.[3]
In Germany, the main political driver of climate policy ambition is a member of the coalition: the Green Party. The Party has strongly pushed for expanding renewable capacity and climate policies, while advocating for a phase-out of coal and nuclear power plants, which resulted in the last three remaining of the latter being shut down in April 2023. However, Germany's political preferences are quite fragmented in terms of energy transition and decarbonisation strategy. The Green Party's ambitions have, in the past, clashed with the objectives of another coalition party, the liberal FDP, on the issue of financing the transition. This tension has intensified following the German Constitutional Court's recent ruling holding that the government acted unconstitutionally by reallocating 60 billion euros in emergency loans to a climate fund.[4] Its constitutional and budgetary implications for Germany's approach to the energy transition are uncertain, as the government now needs to find alternative ways to fund its climate action beyond already announced policies.
Italy and Germany have also experienced strong debates over increasingly ambitious climate policies at the EU level. The most notable examples of such debate are the phase-out of sales of internal combustion engine cars,[5] the phase-out of fossil fuel heating systems,[6] and energy efficiency improvements in the building sector.[7] More generally, the two countries are embracing diverging strategic thinking regarding the transition. Germany has encapsulated the concept of energy transition (Energiewende, which dates back to 2010) into its energy policy. In Italy, the development of the energy transition has unfolded through different phases, especially depending on the availability of generous subsidies, without putting forward long-term strategies.
At the same time, political dialogue and energy cooperation are spurred by the reconfiguration of energy flows caused by the decoupling between Europe and Russia. Italy seeks to seize this opportunity to become an energy hub and an energy bridge between Europe and Africa thanks to its position in the Mediterranean. From this perspective, Italy could contribute to enhancing diversification and energy security in Central and Eastern European countries as well as Germany. However, while doing so, Italy will also need to take into consideration future gas demand in the EU and coordinate with potential importing EU countries, such as Germany. Indeed, Berlin has drastically expanded its liquefied natural gas (LNG) import capacity, potentially lowering its import needs from the south.Coordinating economic transition and investments
There is a strong economic case for closer energy cooperation between Italy and Germany. The perhaps best-known similarity between the two countries is their traditionally strong automotive manufacturing industry. In absolute terms, Germany ranks first among vehicle-producing countries in the EU by some distance, with 3.7 million units produced in 2022, with Italy sixth with 783,000 units.[8] Germany is by far the most important trade partner for Italy in terms of automotive parts accounting for nearly a quarter (23.7 per cent) of all Italian exports of this kind in 2022.[9] Given such deep economic and trade interconnections, dialogue and coordination between Italy and Germany on how the transition towards net-zero will unfold and impact EU industry will be important to facilitate mutually beneficial adjustments.
This is especially true for industrial strategy, although Germany tends to be ahead in developing a long-term strategy.[10] Italy's industrial strategy, instead, has usually been more short-term due to constraints regarding cost and promotion of growth along the entire supply chain. Furthermore, the diverging fiscal capacity of the two countries may lead to markedly different outcomes in their industrial transitions. Italy's fiscal weakness undermines the ability to invest in new solutions and transformation. Given the challenges, EU funding will be required, while Italy needs to prove that it can actually spend the existing resources in a timely and efficient manner. The implementation of Italy's revised Recovery and Resilience Plan, which has been positively assessed by the European Commission on 24 November 2023 and which would see 39 per cent of its value of 194.4 billion euros allocated to Green Deal objectives, will be an important indicator in this regard.
Despite these differences, Italy and Germany need to work jointly to explore ways in which to leverage their economic similarities and interconnections into more efficient climate action. Both countries should continue to promote communication of Green Deal policies as an opportunity rather than an obstacle to economic advancement, which however is becoming more difficult as Green Deal law and policy are increasingly perceived to be in conflict with industrial competitiveness.[11] In this context, it is vital for both countries to address the question of just transition to try to compensate those communities that will be disadvantaged by the decarbonisation process.Cooperation through infrastructure
Infrastructure plays a critical role for both energy security and transition. However, the expansion of energy infrastructure entails domestic and European challenges. Regarding the energy transition, one of the key issues for both countries is to build adequate network infrastructure to bring energy to the main consuming hubs. In the case of Germany, the bulk of energy demand is located in the southern regions, while renewables – especially offshore wind – are and will be produced in the North. Instead, Italy is rich in renewables in the South, while its main consumption is in the northern regions. Local opposition and long permitting processes may hinder the pace of the required infrastructure network expansion.
The challenge of infrastructural development also holds for gas infrastructure, which Italy would need to expand in order to achieve its ambition to become an energy hub. Furthermore, the country needs to carefully assess the future gas demand both in Italy and in Europe to avoid the risk of lock-in effect and stranded assets.
In parallel, Italy and Germany could cooperate in the development of hydrogen, given the relevance of hard-to-abate sectors. Italy is seeking to become a transit country for cheap low-carbon hydrogen from North Africa, leveraging on its position, existing infrastructure and positive relations with key countries. Given its industrial capacity, Germany is set to become a key demand centre for hydrogen as the decarbonisation process unfolds. To maximise the potential of hydrogen trade, however, the two countries need to expand North-South cross-border infrastructures within Europe. An initial step is the SoutH2 Corridor project which aims to bring 4 million tonnes of hydrogen from Algeria to Italy, Austria and Germany.
Lastly, given the complementarity of renewable potential (solar in Italy and wind in Germany), there is room for synergies over flexibility in the power system infrastructure, both on electricity and hydrogen.Contribution to EU decarbonisation objectives
National initiatives in Germany and Italy, and cooperation between the two countries, are crucial to pursuing the objectives of the European Green Deal, as well as meeting the EU's energy security targets in an efficient way.
The achievement of the EU's overarching target of achieving a 42.5 per cent share of renewables in gross final energy consumption by 2030 is a key challenge. German-Italian cooperation may result in considerable added value by helping efficiently meet the European Green Deal's targets, particularly by addressing the infrastructural challenges mentioned above.
The signature of an Action Plan between Germany and Italy on 22 November 2023, finalising a process initiated under the Draghi government, provided a clear signal of intent to collaborate more closely, including on energy. Though not providing a detailed roadmap, the Action Plan promises greater coordination in involving the private sector to meet EU climate targets, as well as greater cooperation on energy market issues, including at the European level.[12] Notably, a more formalised bilateral programme of action could also strengthen trilateral cooperation with France.Looking ahead
In the context of the energy transition and amidst the current debate on energy security, there is much at stake, not just for Italy and Germany, but for the entire EU. Political cooperation and dialogue are strongly required to overcome misunderstandings and misperceptions, such as fragmented interests within the government coalition in Germany and decreasing enthusiasm towards decarbonisation as well as fiscal weakness in Italy.
A priority for German-Italian energy cooperation should be to ensure coherence between gas diversification strategies and to coordinate on the associated infrastructure for interconnection between both countries. This needs to go beyond the SouthH2 Corridor to involve broader strategic considerations, also at the EU level, as to how European energy security should best be guaranteed.
Coordination on decarbonisation and competitiveness of the Italian and German industries should not only aim to ensure that the energy transition in one country does not hurt the economy of the other; this partnership should also enable joint strategic thinking about other objectives of the Green Deal Industrial Plan, such as, for example, the strengthening of supply chains for critical raw materials. Given a host of complex interdependencies, continuous, deeper dialogue will be key as Italy and Germany, along with the rest of the EU, pursue a sustainable and secure energy future.Max Münchmeyer is Researcher of the Energy, Climate and Resources Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Pier Paolo Raimondi is Researcher of the Energy, Climate and Resource Programme at IAI and PhD Candidate of the Catholic University, Milan.
This commentary presents some of the key issues discussed during a workshop organised by IAI, which brought together energy policy experts from both Germany and Italy. The event is part of a broader IAI project, "An Italian-German Dialogue on Energy Security and Transition amid Russia's War on Ukraine", supported by the German Federal Foreign Office.[1] In 2022. see Enerdata, "Total Energy Consumption", in World Energy & Climate Statistics – Yearbook 2023, 2023, https://yearbook.enerdata.net/total-energy/world-consumption-statistics.html.[2] World Bank Data, GDP per Capita PPP (constant 2017 international $) in 2022, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD.[3] Pier Paolo Raimondi, "Italy and Norway: Perspectives for a Further Energy Cooperation", in IAI Papers, No. 23|18 (July 2023), https://www.iai.it/en/node/17342.[4] Maria Martinez and Christian Kraemer, "German Court Deals 60 Billion Euro Budget Blow to Scholz Government", in Reuters, 15 November 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-court-make-key-ruling-budget-manoeuvre-2023-11-15.[5] Philip Oltermann, "German Government in Crisis over EU Ban on Car Combustion Engines", in The Guardian, 23 March 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/p/ntkx4.[6] Sören Amelang, "Q&A – Germany Agrees Phaseout of Fossil Fuel Heating Systems", in Clean Energy Wire, 11 September 2023, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/node/12040. These sometimes very public tensions between the coalition partners have also contributed to a general dissatisfaction with the government among German voters, see Julian Wettengel, "Public Discontent with Government Risks Slowing Germany's Climate Efforts", in Clean Energy Wire, 10 August 2023, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/node/12341.[7] Crispian Balmer and Valentina Za, "Italy Gets Cold Feet over EU Greener Buildings Plan", in Reuters, 3 February 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/italy-gets-cold-feet-over-eu-greener-buildings-plan-2023-02-03; and Nikolaus J. Kurmayer, "Germany Industry Launches Last-Minute Bid to Salvage EU Buildings Law", in Euractiv, 10 October 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/?p=1990439.[8] European Automobile Manufacturers' Association (ACEA), Motor Vehicle Production in the EU, by Country, 1 May 2023, https://www.acea.auto/?p=1306.[9] Trade Map website: List of Importing Markets for a Product [8708] Exported by Italy, accessed on December 2023, https://www.trademap.org/Country_SelProductCountry_TS.aspx?nvpm=1|381||||8708|||4|1|1|2|2|1|2|4|1|1.[10] The most recent German Industrial Strategy, presented on 24 October 2023, can be accessed here: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, Minister Habeck Presents Industrial Strategy – Industrial Policy in Changed Times, 24 October 2023, https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2023/10/20231024-minister-habeck-presents-industrial-strategy.html.[11] This is reflected, for example, in the recent, heated debates in the European Parliament on the Nature Restoration Law. See Louise Guillot, "EU Nature Law Fight Ends in Pyrrhic Victory for Green Deal Defenders", in Politico, 10 November 2023, https://www.politico.eu/?p=3842718.[12] Germany and Italy, Piano di Azione italo-tedesco per la cooperazione strategica bilaterale e nell'Unione europea [Action Plan to strengthen cooperation at both bilateral and European level], 22 November 2023, https://www.governo.it/en/node/24362; Deutsch-italienischer Aktionsplan für strategische Zusammenarbeit auf bilateraler und EU-Ebene, https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975228/2244468/dc5441c1b7497c5855a723c87ffbf3a8/2023-11-22-dtitaktionsplan-data.pdf.

Two attacks, and one defense, of classical liberal ideas appeared over the weekend. "War and Pandemic Highlight Shortcomings of the Free-Market Consensus" announces Patricia Cohen on p.1 of the New York Times news section.  As if the Times had ever been part of such a "consensus." And Deirdre McCloskey reviews Simon Johnson and Daron Acemoglu's "Power and Progress," whose central argument is, per Deirdre, "The state, they argue, can do a better job than the market of selecting technologies and making investments to implement them." (I have not yet read the book. This is a review of the review only.) I'll give away the punchline. The case for free markets never was their perfection. The case for free markets always was centuries of experience with the failures of the only alternative, state control. Free markets are, as the saying goes, the worst system; except for all the others. In this sense the classic teaching of economics does  a disservice. We start with the theorem that free competitive markets can equal -- only equal -- the allocation of an omniscient benevolent planner. But then from week 2 on we study market imperfections -- externalities, increasing returns, asymmetric information -- under which markets are imperfect, and the hypothetical planner can do better. Regulate, it follows. Except econ 101 spends zero time on our extensive experience with just how well -- how badly -- actual planners and regulators do. That messy experience underlies our prosperity, and prospects for its continuance. Starting with Ms. Cohen at the Times, The economic conventions that policymakers had relied on since the Berlin Wall fell more than 30 years ago — the unfailing superiority of open markets, liberalized trade and maximum efficiency — look to be running off the rails.During the Covid-19 pandemic, the ceaseless drive to integrate the global economy and reduce costs left health care workers without face masks and medical gloves, carmakers without semiconductors, sawmills without lumber and sneaker buyers without Nikes.That there ever was a "consensus" in favor of "the unfailing superiority of open markets, liberalized trade and maximum efficiency" seems a mighty strange memory. But if the Times wants to think now that's what they thought then, I'm happy to rewrite a little history. Face masks? The face mask snafu in the pandemic is now, in the Times' rather hilarious memory, the prime example of how a free and unfettered market fails. It was  a result of "the ceaseless drive to integrate the global economy and reduce costs?" (Here, I have a second complaint -- the ceaseless drive to remove subjects from sentences. Who is doing this "ceaseless drive?" Where is the great conspiracy, the secret meeting of old white men "driving" the economy? Nowhere. That's the point of free markets.)The free market has a plan, imperfect as it might be, for masks in a pandemic. Prices rise. People who really want and need masks -- doctors, nurses, police -- pay what it takes to get them. People who don't really need them -- nursery schools -- look at the price, think about the benefit, and say, "maybe not," or take other measures. People reuse masks. Producers, seeing high prices, work day and night to produce more masks. Others, knowing that every 10 years there is a spike in prices, pay the costs of storing masks to make great profits when the time comes. The actual story of masks in the pandemic is the exact opposite. Price controls, of course. Instantly, governments started prosecuting businesses for "price gouging" who dared to raise the price of toilet paper. Governments redistribute income; markets allocate resources efficiently. As usual, the desire to redistribute tiny amounts of income to those willing to stand in line to get toilet paper won out. An entrepreneur tried to start producing masks. The FDA shut him down. (I hope I recall that story right, send comments if not.) China wanted to ship us masks. Yes, China the new villain of globalization gone mad. But their masks were certified and labeled by EU rules, not US rules, so like baby formula they couldn't be imported and sold. More deeply, even I, devoted free-marketer; even at the late night beer sessions at the CATO institute, nobody puts mask distribution in a pandemic as the first job of free markets. There is supposed to be a public health function of government; infectuous diseases are something of an externality; safety protocols in government labs doing government funded research are not a free-market function. As we look at the covid catastrophe, do we not see failures of government all over the place, not failures of some hypothetical free market? California even had mobile hospitals after H1N1. Governor Brown shut them down to save money for his high speed train. We might as well blame free markets for the lines at the DMV.  The idea that trade and shared economic interests would prevent military conflicts was trampled last year under the boots of Russian soldiers in Ukraine.Does anyone think a prime function of free market economics is to stops wars, usually prosecuted by, eh, governments? The standard history of WWI is enough. We do allege that free markets, and free markets alone, make a country wealthy enough to fight and win wars, if the country has the will and desire to do so. The US and NATO military budget vs. Russia's, larger by a factor of 10 at least, seems to bear that out, along with the much greater quality of our weapons.  Heaven help us militarily once the protectionists lead us to state-directed penury. inflation, thought to be safely stored away with disco album collections, returned with a vengeance.Did anyone every vaguely hint that inflation control is a function of free markets? Inflation comes from government monetary and fiscal policy.  And increasing bouts of extreme weather that destroyed crops, forced migrations and halted power plants has illustrated that the market's invisible hand was not protecting the planet.Doe the Times even vaguely think of news as fact not narrative? There have been a lot of migrations. "Forced?" Many due to violence, poverty, ill government. None due to temperature. Halted power plants (more passive voice)? Yes, it was that pesky unfettered free market that shut down power plants... The favored economic road map helped produce fabulous wealth, lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and spur wondrous technological advances.Well, a peek of sunlight, an actual correct fact! But there were stunning failures as well. Globalization hastened climate change and deepened inequalities. More fact free narrative spinning. How are "inequalities" plural? Globalization brought the sharpest decline in global inequality in the history of our species. Perhaps it "hastened climate change" in that if China had stayed desperately poor they wouldn't be building a new coal fired power plant a week. US emissions went down because of... choose 1: enlightened policy 2: fracking, a shift to natural gas made only possible by the curious US property rights system absent in Europe, and pretty much over the dead body of the entire energy regulatory apparatus. ***Meanwhile over at WSJ, Deirdre is in classic form. (Again, I have not read the book, so this is Deirdre coverage.) The paragraph that caught my attention and demanded a blog post: We need [according to Acemoglu and Johnson] ... the legislation currently being pushed by left and right to try again the policies of antitrust, trade protection, minimum wage and, above all, subsidy for certain technologies. Messrs. Acemoglu and Johnson are especially eager to regulate digital technologies such as artificial intelligence. "Technology should be steered in a direction that best uses a workforce's skills," they write, "and education should . . . adapt to new skill requirements." How the administrators of the Economic Development Administration at the Department of Commerce would know the new direction to steer, or the new skills required, remains a sacred mystery."Technology should be steered." There it is, the full glory of the regulatory passive voice. Steered by who? Deirdre answers the question with that gem of rhetoric, specificity.  "Administrators of the Economic Development Administration at the Department of Commerce" for example. The theme uniting the two essays: If there is one lesson of the last 20 years it is this: The catastrophic failure of our government institutions. From bungled wars, a snafu of financial regulation in 2008 just now repeated in FTX, SVB, and inflation the evident collapse of the FDA CDC and plain commonsense in the pandemic, the free market is bravely forestalling a collapse of government (and associated, i.e. universities) institutions. we need the state to use its powers "to induce the private sector to move away from excessive automation and surveillance, and toward more worker-friendly technologies." Fear of surveillance is a major theme of the book; therefore "antitrust should be considered as a complementary tool to the more fundamental aim of redirecting technology away from automation, surveillance, data collection, and digital advertising."The question what institution has the technical competence to do this seems to be begging.  "Government subsidies for developing more socially beneficial technologies," the authors declare, "are one of the most powerful means of redirecting technology in a market economy." Well, interpreting the sentence literally,  you have to give it to them. Government subsidies are powerful means of "redirecting technology." Usually to ratholes. Messrs. Acemoglu and Johnson warmly admire the U.S. Progressive Movement of the late 19th century as a model for their statism: experts taking child-citizens in hand.Their chapters then skip briskly through history...seeking to show how at each turn new innovations tended to empower certain sections of society at the expense of others. The "power" that concerns them, in other words, is private power.This is, in fact, the central question dividing free-marketers and others. Private power being subject to competition, we worry more about state power. The essence of state power is monopoly, and a monopoly of coercion, fundamentally violence.  The heart of the book is that technological gains create winners and losers, and Acemoglu and Johnson want that directed by a nebulous bureaucracy. Which will somehow never be infected by, oh, Republicans, or turn in to the endless stagnation of most of the last millennium which actually did pursue policies that forbade technological improvement in order to sustain the incomes of incumbents. Deirdre, who coined the lovely phrase "trade tested betterment" takes it on.  During the past two centuries, the world has become radically better off, by fully 3,000% inflation adjusted. Even over the past two decades the lives of the poor have improved. The "great enrichment" after 1800 and its resulting superabundance has brought us out of misery. Even the poor workers who did not benefit in the short run have done so enormously in the long run. In 1960, 4 billion of the 5 billion people on the planet lived on $2 a day. Now it's fallen to 1 billion out of 8, and the income average is $50 a day. The state didn't do it, and forcing short-run egalitarianism or handing power to the Office of Economic Development can kill it, as it regularly has. Messrs. Acemoglu and Johnson see great imperfections in the overwhelmingly private sources of the enrichment. With such imperfections, who needs perfection?Another way to see the problem is to remember the common sense, refined in Economics 101 and Biology 101, of entry at the smell of profit. ...The great fortunes they deprecate have the economic function of encouraging entry into the economy by other entrepreneurs who want to get rich. This competition cheapens goods and services, which then accrues to the poor as immense increases in real income.Many fortunes, for instance, were made by the invention of the downtown department store. The profit attracted suburban competitors, and at the mall the department-store model began to fail. Jeff Bezos reinvented the mail-order catalog. He is imitated, and the fortunes are dissipated in enormous benefit to consumers called workers. .... It's what happened and happens in a liberal economy.The book uses a lot of history, surveyed by McCloskey. As before, it's criticized a bit as history lite. The history Deirdre covers has the usual imperfections of the free market. I wonder if the book has any history of success of this plan, of governments successfully guiding technological transformations to protect the rights and incomes of incumbents, without in the process killing technical change.  Governments habitually screw up basics like rent control. Figuring out what new technology will do is pretty much beyond the capacity of private investors and book-writing economists. The  idea that bureaucracy has the capacity to figure out not just what new technology will work, but to guide its social and distributional consequences seems... far beyond the historical record of bureaucratic accomplishment. But I am straying beyond my promise to review the review, not the book, before reading the latter. ****I recognize the desire on both sides. Partisan politics needs "new" ideas and a "new" propaganda. In particular, the right is aching for something shiny and new that it can sell to voters, which it regards with the same sort of noblesse-oblige intellectual disdain as the left does. Mind the store, mend the institutions, freedom, rights, opportunity and make your own prosperity are, apparently, not sexy enough. So both sides need new initiatives, expanded governments, to excite the rabble. But we're not here to supply that demand, merely to meditate on actual cause-and-effect truth of what works. Beware the temptation. Update:  In retrospect, perhaps the issue is much simpler. The bulk of economic regulation serves exactly the purpose McCloskey basically alleges of Acemoglu and Johnson: Preserve rents of incumbents against the threats of technological improvements. From medieval guilds to trade protection to taxis vs. Ubers, that is really its main function. So we have an extensive bureaucracy that is very good at it, and extensive experience of just how well it works. Which is, very well, at protecting rents and stifling growth.  

The Silicon Valley Bank failure strikes me as a colossal failure of bank regulation, and instructive on how rotten the whole edifice is. I write this post in an inquisitive spirit. I don't know the details of how SVB was regulated, and I hope some readers do and can chime in. As reported so far by media, the collapse was breathtakingly simple. SVB paid a bit higher interest rates than the measly 0.01% (yes) that Chase offers. It attracted large deposits from venture capital backed firms in the valley. Crucially, only the first $250,000 are insured, so most of those deposits are uninsured. The deposits are financially savvy customers who know they have to get in line first should anything go wrong. SVB put much of that money into long-maturity bonds, hoping to reap the difference between slightly higher long-term interest rates and what it pays on deposits.  But as we've known for hundreds of years, if interest rates rise, then the market value of those long-term bonds fall. Now if everyone comes asking for their money back, the assets are not worth enough to pay everyone back.  In sum, you have "duration mismatch" plus run-prone uninsured depositors. We teach this in the first week of an MBA or undergraduate banking class. This isn't crypto or derivatives or special purpose vehicles or anything fancy. Where were the regulators? The Dodd Frank act added hundreds of thousands of pages of regulations, and an army of hundreds of regulators. The Fed enacts "stress tests" in case regular regulation fails. How can this massive architecture fail to spot basic duration mismatch and a massive run-prone deposit base? It's not hard to fix, either. Banks can quickly enter swap contracts to cheaply alter their exposure to interest rate risk without selling the whole asset portfolio. Michael Cembalist assembled numbers. This wasn't hard to see. Even Q3 2022 -- a long time ago -- SVB was a huge outlier in having next to no retail deposits (vertical axis, "sticky" because they are insured and regular people), and a huge asset base of loans and securities. Michael then asks .. how much duration risk did each bank take in its investment portfolio during the deposit surge, and how much was invested at the lows in Treasury and Agency yields? As a proxy for these questions now that rates have risen, we can examine the impact on Common Equity Tier 1 Capital ratios from an assumed immediate realization of unrealized securities losses ... That's what is shown in the first chart: again, SVB was in a duration world of its own as of the end of 2022, which is remarkable given its funding profile shown earlier.Again, in simpler terms. "Capital" is the value of assets (loans, securities) less debt (mostly deposits). But banks are allowed to put long-term assets into a "hold to maturity" bucket, and not count declines in the market value of those assets. That's great, unless people knock on the door and ask for their money now, in which case the bank has to sell the securities, and then it realizes the market value. Michael simply asked how much each bank was worth in Q42002 if it actually had to sell its assets. A bit less in each case -- except SVB (third from left) where the answer is essentially zero. And Michael just used public data. This is not a hard calculation for the Fed's team of dozens of regulators assigned to each large bank. Perhaps the rules are at fault? If a regulator allows "hold to maturity" accounting, then, as above, they might think the bank is fine. But are regulators really so blind? Are the hundreds of thousands of pages of rules stopping them from making basic duration calculations that you can do in an afternoon? If so, a bonfire is in order. This isn't the first time. Notice that when SBF was pillaging FTX customer funds for proprietary trading, the SEC did not say "we knew all about this but didn't have enough rules to stop it." The Bank of England just missed a collapse of pension funds who were doing exactly the same thing: borrowing against their long bonds to double up, and forgetting that occasionally markets go the wrong way and you have to sell to make margin calls. (That's week 2 of the MBA class.)  Ben Eisen and Andrew Ackerman in WSJ ask the right question (10 minutes before I started writing this post!) Where Were the Regulators as SVB Crashed? "The aftermath of these two cases is evidence of a significant supervisory problem," said Karen Petrou, managing partner of Federal Financial Analytics, a regulatory advisory firm for the banking industry. "That's why we have fleets of bank examiners, and that's what they're supposed to be doing."The Federal Reserve was the primary federal regulator for both banks.Notably, the risks at the two firms were lurking in plain sight. A rapid rise in assets and deposits was recorded on their balance sheets, and mounting losses on bond holdings were evident in notes to their financial statements.moreover, "Rapid growth should always be at least a yellow flag for supervisors," said Daniel Tarullo, a former Federal Reserve governor who was the central bank's point person on regulation following the financial crisis...In addition, nearly 90% of SVB's deposits were uninsured, making them more prone to flight in times of trouble since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. doesn't stand behind them.90% is a big number. Hard to miss.  The article echoes some confusion about "liquidity"SVB and Silvergate both had less onerous liquidity rules than the biggest banks. In the wake of the failures, regulators may take a fresh look at liquidity rules,...This is absolutely not about liquidity. SBV would have been underwater if it sold all its securities at the bid prices. Also Silvergate and SVB may have been particularly susceptible to the change in economic conditions because they concentrated their businesses in boom-bust sectors...That suggests the need for regulators to take a broader view of the risks in the financial system. "All the financial regulators need to start taking charge and thinking through the structural consequences of what's happening right now," she [Saule Omarova] saidAbsolutely not! I think the problem may be that regulators are taking "big views," like climate stress tests. This is basic Finance 101 measure duration risk and hot money deposits. This needs a narrow view! There is a larger implication. The Fed faces many headwinds in its interest rate raising effort. For example, each point of higher real interest rates raises interest costs on the debt by about $250 billion (1 percent x 100% debt/GDP ratio). A rate rise that leads to recession will lead to more stimulus and bailout, which is what fed inflation in the first place. But now we have another. If the Fed has allowed duration risk to seep in to the too-big to fail banking system, then interest rate rises will induce the hard choice between yet more bailout and a financial storm. Let us hope the problem is more limited - as Michael's graphs suggest. Why did SVB do it? How could they be so blind to the idea that interest rates might rise? Why did Silicon Valley startups risk cash, that they now claim will force them to bankruptcy, in uninsured deposits? Well, they're already clamoring for a bailout. And given 2020, in which the Fed bailed out even money market funds, the idea that surely a bailout will rescue us should anything go wrong might have had something to do with it. (On the startup bailout. It is claimed that the startups who put all their cash in SVB will now be forced to close, so get going with the bailout now. It is not startups who lose money, it is their venture capital investors, and it is they who benefit from the bailout. Let us presume they don't suffer sunk cost fallacy. You have a great company, worth investing $10 million. The company loses $5 million of your cash before they had a chance to spend it. That loss obviously has nothing to do with the company's prospects. What do you do? Obviously, pony up another $5 million and get it going again. And tell them to put their cash in a real bank this time.) How could this enormous regulatory architecture miss something so simple? This is something we should be asking more generally. 8% inflation. Apparently simple bank failures. What went wrong? Everyone  I know at the Fed are smart, hard working, honest and dedicated public servants. It's about the least political agency in Washington. Yet how can we be seeing such simple o-ring level failures? I can only conclude that this overall architecture -- allow large leverage, assume regulators will spot risks -- is inherently broken. If such good people are working in a system that cannot spot something so simple, the project is hopeless. After all, a portfolio of long-term treasuries is about the safest thing on the planet -- unless it is financed by hot money deposits. Why do we have teams of regulators looking over the safest assets on the planet? And failing? Time to start over, as I argued in Towards a run free financial systemOr... back to my first question, am I missing something? ****Updates: A nice explainer thread (HT marginal revolution). VC invests in a new company. SVB offers an additional few million in debt, with one catch, the company must use SVB as the bank for deposits. SVB invests the deposits in long-term mortgage backed securities. SVB basically prints up money to use for its investment! "SVB goes to founders right after they raise a very, very expensive venture round from top venture firms offering:- 10-30% of the round in debt- 12-24 month term- interest only with a balloon payment- at a rate just above prime For investors, it also seems like a no-downside scenario for your portfolio: Give up 10-25 bps in dilution for a gigantic credit facility at functionally zero interest rate.If your PortCo doesn't need it, the cash just sits. If they do, it might save them in a crunch. The deals typically have deposit covenants attached. Meaning: you borrow from us, you bank with us.And everyone is broadly okay with that deal. It's a pretty easy sell! "You need somewhere to put your money. Why not put it with us and get cheap capital too?"Update:1) Old Eagle Eye's comment below is fascinating. I am getting the sense that the rules actually preclude putting 2+2=4 together here. Copied here in totoSIVB did have a hedge put on during 2022, but it was limited to its available-for-sale securities ("AFS"). It was precluded from hedging its interest rate risk in held-to-maturity securities ("HTM") by U.S. GAAP rules. [My emphasis] Here is the explanation found at PwC:[PWC Viewpoint Commentary: "The notion of hedging the interest rate risk in a security classified as held to maturity is inconsistent with the held-to-maturity classification under ASC 320, which requires the reporting entity to hold the security until maturity regardless of changes in market interest rates. For this reason, ASC 815-20-25-43(c)(2) indicates that interest rate risk may not be the hedged risk in a fair value hedge of held-to-maturity debt securities." "ASC 815-20-25-12(d) provides guidance on the eligibility of held-to-maturity debt securities for designation as a hedged item in a fair value hedge."][Extracted subsection:"Chapter 6: Hedges of financial assets and liabilities. "6.4 Hedging fixed-rate instruments"6.4.3.4 Hedging held-to-maturity debt securities"ASC 815-20-25-12(d)"If the hedged item is all or a portion of a debt security (or a portfolio of similar debt securities) that is classified as held to maturity in accordance with Topic 320, the designated risk being hedged is the risk of changes in its fair value attributable to credit risk, foreign exchange risk, or both. If the hedged item is an option component of a held-to-maturity security that permits its prepayment, the designated risk being hedged is the risk of changes in the entire fair value of that option component. If the hedged item is other than an option component of a held-to-maturity security that permits its prepayment, the designated hedged risk also shall not be the risk of changes in its overall fair value."]Source: PWC Viewpoint (viewpoint.pwc.com) Publication date: 31 Jul 2022https://viewpoint.pwc.com/dt/us/en/pwc/accounting_guides/derivatives_and_hedg/derivatives_and_hedg_US/chapter_6_hedges_of__US/64_hedging_fixedrate_US.htmlUpdate 2: Thanks to anonymous below for a pointer to a good New York Times article about SVB, what the Fed knew and when. Apparently the bank's supervisors knew about problems for a long time before the bank failed. Whether this is good or bad news for the regulatory project I leave to you. 

NOTICIAS / NEWS ("Transfer", 2016) 1) CONGRESOS / CONFERENCES: 1. Languages & the Media – Agile Mediascapes: Personalising the Future, Hotel Radisson Blu, Berlín, 2-4 Nov. 2016 www.languages-media.com 2. Third Chinese Drama Translation Colloquium Newcastle University, UK, 28-19 Junio 2016. www.ncl.ac.uk/sml/about/events/item/drama-translation-colloquium 3. 16th Annual Portsmouth Translation Conference – Translation & Interpreting: Learning beyond the Comfort Zone, University of Portsmouth, UK, 5 Nov. 2016. www.port.ac.uk/translation/events/conference 4. 3rd International Conference on Non-Professional Interpreting & Translation (NPIT3) Zurich University of Applied Sciences, Suiza
5-7 Mayo 2016. www.zhaw.ch/linguistics/npit3 5. 3rd Postgraduate Symposium – Cultural Translation: In Theory and as Practice. University of Nottingham, UK, 18 Mayo 2016. Contact: uontranslation2016@gmail.com 6. 3rd Taboo Conference – Taboo Humo(u)r: Language, Culture, Society, and the Media, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona) 20-21 Sep. 2016.
https://portal.upf.edu/web/taco 7. Postgraduate Conference on Translation and Multilingualism Lancaster University, UK, 22 Abril 2016. Contacto: c.baker@lancaster.ac.uk 8. Translation and Minority University of Ottawa (Canadá), 11-12 Nov. 2016. Contacto: rtana014@uottawa.ca 9. Translation as Communication, (Re-)narration and (Trans-)creation Università di Palermo (Italia), 10 Mayo 2016 www.unipa.it/dipartimenti/dipartimentoscienzeumanistiche/convegni/translation 10. From Legal Translation to Jurilinguistics: Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Study of Language and Law, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Sevilla,
27-28 Oct. 2016. www.tinyurl.com/jurilinguistics 11. Third International Conference on Research into the Didactics of Translation. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 7-8 Julio 2016 http://grupsderecerca.uab.cat/pacte/en/content/second-circular-1 12. EST Congress – Expanding the Boundaries or Strengthening the Bases: Should Translation Studies Explore Visual Representation? Aarhus University (Dinamarca), 15-17 Sep. 2016 http://bcom.au.dk/research/conferencesandlectures/est-congress-2016/panels/18-expanding-the-boundaries-or-strengthening-the-bases-should-translation-studies-explore-visual-representation/ 13. Tourism across Cultures: Accessibility in Tourist Communication Università di Salento, Lecce (Italia). 25-27 Feb. 2016 http://unisalento.wix.com/tourism 14. Translation and Interpreting Studies at the Crossroad: A Dialogue between Process-oriented and Sociological Approaches – The Fourth Durham Postgraduate Colloquium on Translation Studies Durham University, UK. 30 Abril – 1 Mayo 2016. www.dur.ac.uk/cim 15. Translation and Interpreting: Convergence, Contact, Interaction Università di Trieste (Italia), 26-28 Mayo 2016 http://transint2016.weebly.com 16. 7th International Symposium for Young Researchers in Translation, Interpreting, Intercultural Studies and East Asian Studies. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1 Julio 2016. http://pagines.uab.cat/simposi/en 17. Translation Education in a New Age The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, China 15-16 Abril 2016. Contact: Claire Zhou (clairezhou@cuhk.edu.cn) 18. Audiovisual Translation: Dubbing and Subtitling in the Central European Context, Constantine the Philosopher University, Nitra (Eslovaquia). 15-17 Junio 2016. https://avtnitraconference.wordpress.com 19. Cervantes, Shakespeare, and the Golden Age of Drama Madrid, 17-21 Oct. 2016 http://aedean.org/wp-content/uploads/Call-for-papers.pdf 20. 3rd International Conference Languaging Diversity – Language/s and Power. Università di Macerata (Italia), 3-5 Marzo 2016 http://studiumanistici.unimc.it/en/research/conferences/languaging-diversity 21. Congreso Internacional de Traducción Especializada (EnTRetextos) Universidad de Valencia, 27-29 Abril 2016 http://congresos.adeituv.es/entretextos 22. Translation & Quality 2016: Corpora & Quality Université Charles de Gaulle Lille 3 (Francia), 5 Feb. 2016 http://traduction2016.sciencesconf.org/?lang=en 23. New forms of feedback and assessment in translation and interpreting training and industry. 8th EST Congress – Translation Studies: Moving Boundaries, Aarhus University (Dinamarca), 15-17 Sep. 2016. www.bcom.au.dk/est2016 24. Intermedia 2016 – Conference on Audiovisual Translation University of Lodz (Polonia), 14-16 Abril 2016 http://intermedia.uni.lodz.pl 25. New Technologies and Translation Université d'Algiers (Argelia). 23-24 Feb. 2016 Contacto: newtech.trans.algiers@gmail.com 26. Circulation of Academic Thought - Rethinking Methods in the Study of Scientific Translation. 11 - 12 Dec. 2015, University of Graz (Austria).https://translationswissenschaft.uni-graz.at/de/itat/veranstaltungen/circulation-of-academic-thought 27. The 7th Asian Translation Traditions Conference Monash University, Malaysia Campus, 26-30 Sep. 2016. http://future.arts.monash.edu/asiantranslation7 28. "Translation policy: connecting concepts and writing history" 8th EST Congress – Translation Studies: Moving Boundaries Aarhus University (Dinamarca), 15-17 Sep. 2016 http://bcom.au.dk/research/conferencesandlectures/est-congress-2016/panels/13-translation-policy-connecting-concepts-and-writing-history 29. International Conference – Sound / Writing: On Homophonic Translation. Université de Paris (Francia), 17-19 Nov. 2016 www.fabula.org/actualites/sound-writing-on-homophonic-translationinternational-conference-paris-november-17-19-2016_71295.php 30. Third Hermeneutics and Translation Studies Symposium – Translational Hermeneutics as a Research Paradigm Technische Hochschule, Colonia (Alemania), 30 Junio-1 Julio 2016 www.phenhermcommresearch.de/index.php/conferences 31. II International Conference on Economic Financial and Institutional Translation. Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières (Canadá), 17-18 Agosto 2016. www.uqtr.ca/ICEBFIT 32. International Congress - liLETRAd 2016-Cátedra LILETRAD. Literature Languages Translation, Universidad de Sevilla, 6-8 Julio 2016. https://congresoliletrad.wordpress.com 33. Transmediations! Communication across Media Borders Linnæus University, Växjö (Suecia), 13–15 Oct. 2016 http://lnu.se/lnuc/linnaeus-university-centre-for-intermedial-and-multimodal-studies-/events/conferences/transmediations?l=en 34. Translation Education in a New Age, 15-16 Abril 2016. School of Humanities and Social Science, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen. Contacto: chansinwai@cuhk.edu.cn 35. Translation and Time: Exploring the Temporal Dimension of Cross-cultural Transfer, 8-10 Diciembre 2016. Departamento de Traducción, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Contacto: translation-and-time@cuhk.edu.hk. 36. Du jeu dans la langue. Traduire les jeux de mots / Loose in Translation. Translating Wordplay, 23-24 Marzo 2017, Université de Lille (France) https://www.univ-lille3.fr/recherche/actualites/agenda-de-la-recherche/?type=1&id=1271. Contacto: traduirejdm@univ-lille3.fr, julie.charles@univ-lille3.fr 37. Translation and Translanguaging across Disciplines. EST Congress 2016 "Translation Studies: Moving Boundaries", European Society for Translation Studies, Aarhus (Dinamarca), 15-17 Sep. 2016 http://bcom.au.dk/research/conferencesandlectures/est-congress-2016/panels/12-translation-and-translanguaging-across-disciplines/ Contacto: nune.ayvazyan@urv.cat; mariagd@blanquerna.url.edu; sara.laviosa@uniba.it http://bcom.au.dk/research/conferencesandlectures/est-congress-2016/submission/ 38. Beyond linguistic plurality: The trajectories of multilingualism in Translation. An international conference organized jointly by Bogaziçi University, Department of Translation and Interpreting Studies, and Research Group on Translation and Transcultural Contact, York University, Bogaziçi University, 1-12 Mayo 2016. Contacto: sehnaz.tahir@boun.edu.tr, MGuzman@glendon.yorku.ca 39. "Professional and Academic Discourse: an interdisciplinary perspective". XXXIV IConferencia Internacional de la Sociedad Española de Lingüística Aplicada (AESLA), 14-16 Abril 2016. Interuniversity Institute for Applied Modern Languages (IULMA) / Universidad de Alicante. http://web.ua.es/aesla2016. Contacto: antonia.montes@ua.es. 2) CURSOS, SEMINARIOS, POSGRADOS / COURSES, SEMINARS, MASTERS: 1. Seminario: Breaking News for French>English and English>French Translators King's College Cambridge, UK, 8-10 Agosto 2016 Contacto: translateincambridge@iti.org.uk 2. Curso on-line: Setting Up as a Freelance Translator Enero – Marzo 2016. Institute of Translation & Interpreting, UK https://gallery.mailchimp.com/58e5d23248ce9f10c161ba86d/files/Application_Form_SUFT_2016.pdf?utm_source=SUFT+December+Emailer&utm_campaign=11fdfe0453-Setting_Up_as_a_Freelance_Translator12_7_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6ef4829e50-11fdfe0453-25128325 3. Curso: Using Interpreters for Intercultural Communication and Other Purposes (COM397CE) http://darkallyredesign.com/what-we-do/using-interpreters-for-intercultural-communication 4. Workshop: How to Write and Publish Your Scholarly Paper In cooperation with the European Association of Science Editors (EASE) New Bulgarian University, Sofia (Bulgaria), 21-23 Marzo 2016 www.facebook.com/events/1511610889167645 http://esnbu.org/data/files/resources/ease-nbu-seminar-march-2016-fees.pdf 5. Posgrado: II Postgraduate Course on Spanish Law Taught in English "Global study". Universidad Internacional de Andalucía / Colegio de Abogados de Málaga. www.unia.es/cursos/guias/4431_english.pdf 3) CURSOS DE VERANO / SUMMER COURSES: 1. STRIDON – Translation Studies Doctoral and Teacher Training Summer School, Piran (Eslovenia), 27 Junio – 8 Julio 2016 www.prevajalstvo.net/doctoral-summer-school 2. Training in Translation Pedagogy Program School of Translation and Interpretation, University of Ottawa (Canadá), 4-29 Julio 2016. https://arts.uottawa.ca/translation/summer-programs 3. 2016 Nida School of Translation Studies. Translation, Ecology and Entanglement, San Pellegrino University Foundation, Misano Adriatico, Rimini (Italia), 30 Mayo – 10 Junio 2016. http://nsts.fusp.it/Nida-Schools/NSTS-2016 4. TTPP - Intensive Summer Program in Translation Pedagogy University of Ottawa (Canadá), 4-29 Julio 2016. http://arts.uottawa.ca/translation/summer-programs-2016/ttpp 5. CETRA Summer School 2016. 28th Research Summer School University of Leuven, campus Antwerp (Bélgica), 22 Agosto – 2 Sep. 2016. Contacto: cetra@kuleuven.be. http://www.arts.kuleuven.be/cetra 4) LIBROS / BOOKS: 1. Varela Salinas, María-José & Bernd Meyer (eds.) 2016. Translating and Interpreting Healthcare Discourses / Traducir e interpretar en el ámbito sanitario. Berlín : Frank & Timme. www.frank-timme.de/verlag/verlagsprogramm/buch/verlagsprogramm/bd-79-maria-jose-varela-salinasbernd-meyer-eds-translating-and-interpreting-healthcare-disc/backPID/transued-arbeiten-zur-theorie-und-praxis-des-uebersetzens-und-dolmetschens-1.html 2. Ordóñez López, Pilar and José Antonio Sabio Pinilla (ed.) 2015. Historiografía de la traducción en el espacio ibérico. Textos contemporáneos. Madrid: Ediciones de Castilla-La Mancha. www.unebook.es/libro/historiografia-de-latraduccion-en-el-espacio-iberico_50162 3. Bartoll, Eduard. 2015. Introducción a la traducción audiovisual. Barcelona: Editorial UOC. www.editorialuoc.cat/introduccion-a-la-traduccion-audiovisual 4. Rica Peromingo, Juan Pedro & Jorge Braga Riera. 2015. Herramientas y técnicas para la traducción inglés-español. Madrid: Babélica. www.escolarymayo.com/libro.php?libro=7004107&menu=7001002&submenu=7002029 5. Le Disez, Jean-Yves. 2015. F.A.C.T. Une méthode pour traduire de l'anglais au français. París: Ellipses. www.editions-ellipses.fr/product_info.php?cPath=386&products_id=10601 6. Baker, Mona (ed.) 2015. Translating Dissent: Voices from and with the Egyptian Revolution. Londres: Routledge. www.tandf.net/books/details/9781138929876 7. Gallego Hernández, Daniel (ed.) 2015. Current Approaches to Business and Institutional Translation / Enfoques actuales en traducción económica e institucional. Berna: Peter Lang. www.peterlang.com/download/datasheet/86140/datasheet_431656.pdf 8. Vasilakakos, Mary. 2015. A Training Handbook for Health and Medical Interpreters in Australia. www.interpreterrevalidationtraining.com/books-and-resources.html 9. Jankowska, Anna & Agnieszka Szarkowska (eds) 2015. New Points of View on Audiovisual Translation and Media Accessibility. Oxford: Peter Lang. www.peterlang.com/index.cfm?event=cmp.ccc.seitenstruktur.detailseiten&seitentyp=produkt&pk=83114 10. Baer, Brian James (2015). Translation and the Making of Modern Russian Literature, Londres: Bloomsbury. Translation and the Making of Modern Russian Literature is the inaugural book in a new Translation Studies series: Bloomsbury's "Literatures, Cultures, Translation." 11. Camps, Assumpta. 2016. La traducción en la creación del canon poético (Recepción de la poesía italiana en el ámbito hispánico en la primera mitad del siglo XX). Berna: Peter Lang. 5) REVISTAS / JOURNALS: 1. JoSTrans, The Journal of Specialised Translation, nº especial sobre Translation & the Profession, Vol. 25, Enero 2016. www.jostrans.org 2. Translation and Interpreting – Nº especial sobre Community Interpreting: Mapping the Present for the Future www.trans-int.org/index.php/transint. 3. inTRAlinea – Nº especial sobre New Insights into Specialised Translation. www.intralinea.org/specials/new_insights 4. Linguistica Antverpiensia NS-Themes in Translation Studies, 2015 issue, Towards a Genetics of Translation. https://lans-tts.uantwerpen.be/index.php/LANS-TTS/issue/view/16 5. Quaderns de Filologia, Nº especial sobre Traducción y Censura: Nuevas Perspectivas, Vol. 20, 2015. https://ojs.uv.es/index.php/qdfed/issue/view/577 6. The Translator – Nº especial sobre Food and Translation, Translation and Food, 2015, 21(3). www.tandfonline.com/eprint/ryqJewJUDKZ6m2YM4IaR/full 7. Current Trends in Translation Teaching and Learning E, 2015, 2 www.cttl.org/cttl-e-2015.html 8. Dragoman Journal of Translation Studies. www.dragoman-journal.org 9. Current Trends in Translation Teaching and Learning E. Edición especial sobre Translation Studies Curricula Across Countries and Cultures. www.cttl.org 10. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, Nº especial sobre Translation Policies and Minority Languages: Theory, Methods and Case Studies http://fouces.webs.uvigo.es/CallForPapersIJSLTranslationPolicies.pdf 11. Nº especial de The Interpreter and Translator Trainer 11(2) – Employability and the Translation Curriculum www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1750399X.2015.1103092 12. InTRAlinea. Nº especial sobre Building Bridges between Film Studies and Translation Studies www.intralinea.org/news/item/cfp_building_bridges_between_film_studies_and_translation_studies 13. Nº especial de TranscUlturAl: Comics, BD & Manga in translation/en traduction https://ejournals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/TC/announcement/view/290 14. The Journal of Translation Studies 2015, 16(4) Nº especial sobre Translator and Interpreter Training in East Asia Contacto: Won Jun Nam: wjnam@hufs.ac.kr, wonjun_nam@daum.net 15. TRANS Revista de Traductología, 19(2), 2015. www.trans.uma.es/trans_19.2.html 16. Between, 9, 2015 – Censura e auto-censura http://ojs.unica.it/index.php/between/index 17. Translation Studies, Nº especial sobre Translingualism & Transculturality in Russian Contexts of Translation http://explore.tandfonline.com/cfp/ah/rtrs-cfp3 18. Translation & Interpreting, 7:3, 2016 www.trans-int.org/index.php/transint/issue/view/38 19. "The translation profession: Centres and peripheries" The Journal of Specialised Translation (Jostrans), Nº. 25, Enero 2016. The Journal of Translation Studies is a joint publication of the Department of Translation of The Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Chinese University Press. Contact: jts.tra@cuhk.edu.hk, james@arts.cuhk.edu.hk 19. Nuevo artículo: "The Invisibility of the African Interpreter" por Jeanne Garane, Translation: a transdisciplinary journal http://translation.fusp.it/. Contact: siri.nergaard@gmail.com.

The phenomenon of artificial intelligence and robotics, which has been under investigation for several years, has given rise to new taxation models, which have opened a lively ethical and legal debate in the scientific and cultural community which has not yet subsided. This essay, analyzing the tax effects of the relationship between intelligent machines and humans in the light of the perspectives offered by the new economy and after verifying compatibility with the founding principles of the Italian legal system (first of all, the rule of 'ability to pay' pursuant to Article 53 of the Constitution), assesses new taxable cases and tax-levy techniques related to the applications of artificial intelligence, also in the light of the possible tax subjectivity of the robot, in an attempt to make a contribution, from a de iure condendo perspective, to the taxation dynamics concerning automated production processes. ; University of Bari 'Aldo Moro', Italy ; Salvatore Parente is Researcher in Tax Law in the Department of Economics, Management and Business Law, University of Bari 'Aldo Moro', Italy. ; salvatore.parente@uniba.it ; 135 ; 151 ; 3 ; Allena M., The Web Tax and Taxation of the Sharing Economy. 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En el dossier que se presenta en este volumen se propuso invitar a una reflexión sobre la manera en que la comunicación intersecta con la ciudadanía y los derechos humanos. De esta manera, el dossier recoge una tradición abocada a conceptualizar la comunicación con perspectiva de derechos. Esta inquietud, emparentada con reflexiones de larga data en el continente latinoamericano y en el sur global, adquiere renovada importancia en el presente. Pensar en la comunicación y la ciudadanía con perspectiva de derechos humanos resulta crucial en sociedades desiguales, donde resurgen problemáticas antiguas y emergen otras nuevas, asociadas al desarrollo de plataformas digitales de comunicación y su relación con potenciales vulneraciones de derechos. En términos globales, situamos esta reflexión en torno a la pregunta sobre la manera en que distintas dinámicas de exclusión social se producen y reproducen en el ámbito comunicacional, así como en torno a la necesidad de comprender de mejor manera las consecuencias de estas inequidades comunicacionales para las posibilidades de expresión, visibilidad y reconocimiento de distintos grupos sociales, y por extensión, para las posibilidades del ejercicio pleno de la ciudadanía.
La temática propuesta para el dossier, adquiere -sin duda- una urgencia renovada en el contexto latinoamericano actual y en el caso local, con posterioridad al estallido social iniciado el 18 de octubre de 2019 en Chile. Este último proceso de movilización social ha sostenido una serie de demandas, que apuntan a distintas reclamaciones asociadas a una expansión de derechos en contextos de desigualdad económica, social y política, y que cuestiona, además, las formas de ciudadanía de baja intensidad que esa misma inequidad ha consolidado. Lo que esta edición especial propone es reconocer que estas demandas se disputan en un plano comunicativo, en el cual se tensionan las posibilidades de voz, visibilidad y reconocimiento de distintos grupos dentro de la sociedad. Estas tensiones se han expresado con fuerza durante este 2019. En el caso chileno, por ejemplo, la ciudadanía ha juzgado públicamente el rol jugado por ciertos medios de comunicación en la cobertura del conflicto social, evidenciando la existencia de expectativas de representatividad no cumplidas. Por otra parte, la agenda político-institucional a través de la cual se intenta encausar el estallido social ha colisionado con la agenda de los grupos movilizados en el espacio público, evidenciando otro tipo de desconexiones. Estas tensiones seguirán expresándose en un horizonte cercano, en la medida en que se desarrolle el proceso constituyente que ya inició su curso.
Si bien un mapeo de las distintas tradiciones que han problematizado la comunicación desde una perspectiva de derechos excede las posibilidades de esta introducción, podemos identificar algunos abordajes posibles frente a esta temática. Uno de estos abordajes se ha dado desde el plano regulatorio a través de la discusión de políticas de comunicación o la identificación de condiciones estructurales que atentan contra derechos fundamentales como la libertad de expresión y opinión, o bien eluden principios de inclusión. Un hito inicial en este abordaje se produce en 1980 con la publicación del Informe de Unesco "Un Solo mundo, voces múltiples: comunicación e información en nuestro tiempo" (también conocido como Informe McBride), documento que proponía un orden comunicacional que promoviera flujos informativos no dominados por las grandes corporaciones. Este documento tuvo un carácter controversial y encontró una oposición activa al tiempo de su publicación, inaugurando en el ámbito latinoamericano un enfrentamiento largo, y hasta cierto punto estéril desde el punto de vista de sus resultados (Beltrán, 2006; Fuchs, 2015; Pasquali, 2005), entre grupos de la sociedad civil y la academia con actores que representan visiones de mercado de las industrias de la comunicación. Entre los elementos clave que han formado parte de estas discusiones, frecuentemente situadas en un plano de economía política de la comunicación, se puede mencionar la constitución de los mercados de medios de comunicación y la concentración de la propiedad en estas industrias (entre otros, Becerra & Mastrini, 2017; Couso, 2012; Sunkel & Geoffroy, 2002), la captura de los mercados de medios por parte poderes económicos y políticos (Guerrero & Márquez-Ramírez, 2014; Stiglitz, 2017), la falta de pluralismo informativo, los derechos de las audiencias, la distribución de la publicidad gubernamental, las amenazas a la privacidad y la propiedad de datos personales en las nuevas economías digitales, entre otros aspectos que se agrupan bajo la idea del derecho a la comunicación, o de manera más amplia, de la comunicación con perspectiva de derechos (Montiel Vega, 2012; Padovani & Calabrese, 2014; Uppal, Sartoretto, & Cheruiyot, 2019). Estas problemáticas, no obstante, traspasan con creces el ámbito regulatorio asociado a la discusión sobre políticas públicas de comunicación. Esto porque los contextos institucionales que inhiben o vulneran derechos en el ámbito comunicacional, así como sus expresiones tecnológicas, moldean, por una parte, prácticas de comunicación y modos de participación en el espacio público, y por otra, generan prácticas alternativas de resistencia y activismo que demandan un abordaje interdisciplinar para su mejor comprensión.
La relación entre comunicación y ciudadanía se colige de la relación estrecha que existe entre las posibilidades expresivas de las personas y sus posibilidades de participación en el espacio público. Si se acepta la premisa de la existencia de inequidades comunicacionales como punto de partida, se concluirá que las asimetrías existentes entre distintos grupos sociales tienen consecuencias directas en la amplitud de sus repertorios comunicacionales, sus modos de representación en el espacio mediático, así como en sus capacidades de visibilidad e incidencia en el debate público. No limitamos la ciudadanía acá a conceptualizaciones restrictivas asociadas al conjunto de derechos y deberes de una persona hacia un Estado-nación, sino que, de manera más amplia a la pertenencia a una comunidad, a la identificación con identidades o valores comunes y a las posibilidades de participación en la vida colectiva (Kiwan, 2012; Nash, 2009). Así, en sociedades mediatizadas como las que habitamos, las posibilidades de participación de personas y colectivos están asociadas a sus posibilidades de volverse visibles, de tener voz y de ser reconocidas por otros en procesos de tomas de decisión.
Los cambios en las tecnologías de información y comunicación se asocian estrechamente a cambios en los regímenes de visibilidad, y por extensión, a cambios en la configuración de lo que entendemos por espacio público y en la organización de las relaciones de poder (Thompson, 1995) . La relación entre visibilidad y poder es estrecha. Como señala Brighenti (2007) esta relación se expresa tanto en las posibilidades de los poderosos de obtener visibilidad para sí mismos o ciertas agendas, así como para hacerse invisibles cuando esto parece más conveniente. En otras palabras, tiene valor político tener acceso a los sitios de visibilidad tanto como tener niveles de control sobre el tipo de representaciones que se construyen en esos espacios.
Las reflexiones sobre tipos de visibilidad se emparentan también con aquellas sobre la voz y el reconocimiento. Esto porque estos conceptos ponen el acento en la naturaleza dialógica de la comunicación. Que ciertos grupos vulnerables se hagan visibles en plataformas mediáticas, por ejemplo, no es equivalente a tener voz sobre el tipo de representación que se construye sobre ellos. La política de la voz, tiene en los estudios sobre comunicación, un lugar relevante, toda vez que se asocia a las posibilidades de reconocimiento de otro (Couldry, 2009). Entre otras cosas, en términos de cómo se validan públicamente las demandas por justicia y reconocimiento, cómo el conflicto se visibiliza o se omite, cómo se construyen representaciones sobre ciertos grupos sociales o se les ignora (Maia, 2014).
Recogiendo de manera amplia y con perspectiva interdisciplinar este conjunto de problemáticas, el dossier abre con dos contribuciones recibidas después del 18 de octubre, a propósito de una convocatoria extraordinaria que realizamos al considerar necesario actualizar una reflexión crítica sobre el rol de la comunicación social en el actual contexto sociopolítico. Saavedra Utman respondió a ese llamado con un artículo de carácter teórico que problematiza el concepto de voz como un "común" que ha sido expropiado bajo lógicas neoliberales. El autor asocia la idea de voz con la existencia de un vínculo comunicativo que permita la vida en común, y se pregunta cómo avanzar hacia procesos de reapropiación y reconstrucción de la voz, en contextos donde las lógicas de diálogo han sido desalentadas y las reglas de ese diálogo suelen ser unilateralmente impuestas. Por su parte, Álvarez analiza el diseño del proceso constituyente que se avecina en Chile desde la teoría de la comunicación política. En su ensayo, tomando elementos de la pragmática del lenguaje, releva la importancia de la forma que va a adquirir el diálogo constituyente, anteponiendo este proceso al de la generación de contenidos que integrarán una nueva constitución. Sin dar recetas, propone que la comunicación constituyente debiera seguir ciertos principios de colaboración y cortesía que habiliten posibilidades reales de comunicación, y que reduzcan el espacio para malas interpretaciones o confusiones que hagan fracasar el propósito de diálogo.
El ámbito de los medios de comunicación se aborda a través de dos contribuciones. Jumique Castillo aborda problemáticas históricas y persistentes en el panorama de medios latinoamericano como es la co-optación de los medios de prensa por parte del poder político y económico. Específicamente, analiza el caso guatemalteco y las acusaciones de corrupción contra el Partido Patriota. Con este estudio de caso muestra cómo las relaciones entre la política y los medios de comunicación, en los últimos años, han provocado daños en la libertad de expresión y, por lo tanto, en la democracia en Guatemala y América Latina. La segunda contribución se centra en la estigmatización territorial que se construye desde el discurso mediático por medio de la cobertura de casos de violencia. Para ello, Sibrian y Reyes analizan el discurso sobre violencia que construyen dos medios chilenos (El Mercurio y La Tercera) evidenciando cómo la criminalización permanente de ciertos sectores de la ciudad y la victimización de otros en las noticias, construye estigmas territoriales y acarrea formas de segregación.
La violencia también es estudiada por García Santamaría, pero enfocándose en aquella ejercida contra periodistas. Específicamente, contra periodistas alternativos en Cuba, mostrando cómo su deslegitimación discursiva y legal ha servido para justificar ataques de diverso tipo. La autora cuestiona los acercamientos positivistas que ignoran las agresiones simbólicas y estructurales de las que son víctimas estos profesionales. Propone que para comprender el rechazo y miedo que experimentan los periodistas, así como la resiliencia y resistencia a través de redes, es necesario una perspectiva interdisciplinar que conjugue la teoría crítica y la teoría decolonial.
En la contribución escrita por Tobar y Rodríguez los medios de comunicación se problematizan como un espacio donde se construyen lenguajes morales y se vivencian experiencias de reconocimiento. A partir de un trabajo etnográfico con el grupo indígena embera chamí del resguardo Wasiruma, en Colombia, los autores identifican los usos que esta comunidad hace de medios y tecnologías de información, para luego problematizar de qué manera este consumo de medios se relaciona con conflictos culturales al interior de la comunidad.
De Ponson du Terrail, Buccioni y Tapia aportan desde una perspectiva aplicada al desarrollo de una agenda incipiente de investigación sobre comunicación y organizaciones de la sociedad civil. Este artículo explora las dificultades que enfrentan los comunicadores que se desempeñan en ONGs chilenas, identificando nudos de conflicto como la dependencia de los medios tradicionales en la ejecución de planes de comunicación, las dificultades para navegar entornos digitales cambiantes y el lugar que ocupa la comunicación como herramienta de gestión organizacional y de comunicación con la ciudadanía para las organizaciones del tercer sector.
En una línea similar pero enfocada en organizaciones por los derechos digitales en Latinoamérica, Segura revisa las principales características de estos nuevos actores, que suelen ser capítulos regionales de organizaciones internacionales o bien parte de redes internacionales. A través de diversos casos, caracteriza el trabajo de estos activistas que promueven políticas públicas basadas en los derechos al acceso, producción y gestión digital y de datos. El propósito de estos grupos, según muestra la autora, sería garantizar los derechos a la comunicación a través de la presión para la formulación de políticas públicas basadas en derechos y el desarrollo de prácticas autogestivas para ejercer estos derechos.
Finalmente, Molina y Sagredo aportan desde la politología con un artículo que aborda críticamente el tema de la educación en derechos humanos desde una perspectiva disciplinar. Los autores constatan una distancia entre el desarrollo investigativo que han tenido los derechos humanos en la ciencia política chilena y la baja densidad de los programas formativos en derechos humanos, los que suelen abordar esta temática de manera marginal e indirecta. Como consecuencia, se califica a la educación en derechos humanos como una asignatura pendiente para la politología nacional.
El dossier cierra con dos reseñas a libros recientes que aportan en la dirección planteada por esta convocatoria. Se trata del libro "La mujer (1877): el primer periódico de mujeres en Chile", de Verónica Ramírez y Carla Ulloa, y del libro "De la resistencia a la incidencia. Sociedad civil y derecho a la comunicación en la Argentina", de María Soledad Segura.
Este conjunto de contribuciones permite identificar distintas rutas investigativas para el abordaje de la relación entre comunicación y ciudadanía con una perspectiva de derechos humanos. Se trata de una agenda extensa y de naturaleza eminentemente interdisciplinar, que se vuelve fundamental explorar en contextos de crecientes inequidades sociales aparejadas de una creciente complejización de los sistemas mediáticos: fragmentación de audiencias, polarización, deslegitimación de los medios tradicionales, desinformación y proliferación de canales informativos. Se trata, a la vez, de una agenda estrechamente ligada a las posibilidades de participación de las personas y a la calidad de las democracias.

WOS:000468428300001 ; This paper presents the combinations of single-top-quark production cross-section measurements by the ATLAS and CMS Collaborations, using data from LHC proton-proton collisions at = 7 and 8 TeV corresponding to integrated luminosities of 1.17 to 5.1 fb(-1) at = 7 TeV and 12.2 to 20.3 fb(-1) at = 8 TeV. These combinations are performed per centre-of-mass energy and for each production mode: t-channel, tW, and s-channel. The combined t-channel cross-sections are 67.5 +/- 5.7 pb and 87.7 +/- 5.8 pb at = 7 and 8 TeV respectively. The combined tW cross-sections are 16.3 +/- 4.1 pb and 23.1 +/- 3.6 pb at = 7 and 8 TeV respectively. For the s-channel cross-section, the combination yields 4.9 +/- 1.4 pb at = 8 TeV. The square of the magnitude of the CKM matrix element V-tb multiplied by a form factor f(LV) is determined for each production mode and centre-of-mass energy, using the ratio of the measured cross-section to its theoretical prediction. It is assumed that the top-quark-related CKM matrix elements obey the relation |V-td|, |V-ts| « |V-tb|. All the |f(LV)V(tb)|(2) determinations, extracted from individual ratios at = 7 and 8 TeV, are combined, resulting in |f(LV)V(tb)| = 1.02 +/- 0.04 (meas.) +/- 0.02 (theo.). All combined measurements are consistent with their corresponding Standard Model predictions. ; ANPCyT, ArgentinaANPCyT; YerPhI, Armenia; ARC, AustraliaAustralian Research Council; BMWFW, Austria; FWF, AustriaAustrian Science Fund (FWF); ANAS, AzerbaijanAzerbaijan National Academy of Sciences (ANAS); SSTC, Belarus; CNPq, BrazilNational Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq); FAPESP, BrazilFundacao de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de Sao Paulo (FAPESP); NSERC, CanadaNatural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada; NRC, Canada; CFI, CanadaCanada Foundation for Innovation; CERN; CONICYT, ChileComision Nacional de Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnologica (CONICYT); CAS, ChinaChinese Academy of Sciences; MOST, ChinaMinistry of Science and Technology, China; NSFC, ChinaNational Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC); COLCIENCIAS, ColombiaDepartamento Administrativo de Ciencia, Tecnologia e Innovacion Colciencias; MSMT CR, Czech RepublicMinistry of Education, Youth & Sports - Czech RepublicCzech Republic Government; MPO CR, Czech RepublicCzech Republic Government; VSC CR, Czech RepublicCzech Republic Government; DNRF, Denmark; DNSRC, DenmarkDanish Natural Science Research Council; IN2P3-CNRS, CEA-DRF/IRFU, France; SRNSFG, Georgia; BMBF, GermanyFederal Ministry of Education & Research (BMBF); HGF, Germany; MPG, GermanyMax Planck Society; GSRT, GreeceGreek Ministry of Development-GSRT; RGC, Hong Kong SAR, ChinaHong Kong Research Grants Council; ISF, IsraelIsrael Science Foundation; Benoziyo Center, Israel; INFN, ItalyIstituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN); MEXT, JapanMinistry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan (MEXT); JSPS, JapanMinistry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan (MEXT)Japan Society for the Promotion of Science; CNRST, Morocco; NWO, NetherlandsNetherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO)Netherlands Government; RCN, Norway; MNiSW, PolandMinistry of Science and Higher Education, Poland; NCN, Poland; FCT, PortugalPortuguese Foundation for Science and Technology; MNE/IFA, Romania; MES of Russia, Russian FederationRussian Federation; NRC KI, Russian Federation; JINR; MESTD, Serbia; MSSR, Slovakia; ARRS, SloveniaSlovenian Research Agency - Slovenia; MIZS, Slovenia; DST/NRF, South Africa; MINECO, Spain; SRC, Sweden; Wallenberg Foundation, Sweden; SERI, Switzerland; SNSF, SwitzerlandSwiss National Science Foundation (SNSF); Canton of Bern, Switzerland; MOST, TaiwanMinistry of Science and Technology, Taiwan; TAEK, TurkeyMinistry of Energy & Natural Resources - Turkey; STFC, United KingdomScience & Technology Facilities Council (STFC); DOE, United States of AmericaUnited States Department of Energy (DOE); NSF, United States of AmericaNational Science Foundation (NSF); BCKDF, Canada; CANARIE, Canada; CRC, Canada; Compute Canada, Canada; COST, European Union; ERC, European UnionEuropean Union (EU)European Research Council (ERC); ERDF, European UnionEuropean Union (EU); Horizon 2020, European Union; Marie Sk lodowska-Curie Actions, European Union; Investissements d' Avenir Labex and Idex, ANR, FranceFrench National Research Agency (ANR); DFG, GermanyGerman Research Foundation (DFG); AvH Foundation, GermanyAlexander von Humboldt Foundation; Greek NSRF, Greece; BSF-NSF, Israel; GIF, IsraelGerman-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development; CERCA Programme Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain; Royal Society, United KingdomRoyal Society of London; Leverhulme Trust, United KingdomLeverhulme Trust; BMBWF (Austria); FWF (Austria)Austrian Science Fund (FWF); FNRS (Belgium)Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; FWO (Belgium)FWO; CNPq (Brazil)National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq); CAPES (Brazil)CAPES; FAPERJ (Brazil)Carlos Chagas Filho Foundation for Research Support of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ); FAPERGS (Brazil)Foundation for Research Support of the State of Rio Grande do Sul (FAPERGS); FAPESP (Brazil)Fundacao de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de Sao Paulo (FAPESP); MES (Bulgaria); CAS (China)Chinese Academy of Sciences; MoST (China)Ministry of Science and Technology, China; NSFC (China)National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC); COLCIENCIAS (Colombia)Departamento Administrativo de Ciencia, Tecnologia e Innovacion Colciencias; MSES (Croatia); CSF (Croatia); RPF (Cyprus); SENESCYT (Ecuador); MoER (Estonia); ERC IUT (Estonia)Estonian Research Council; ERDF (Estonia)European Union (EU); Academy of Finland (Finland)Academy of Finland; MEC (Finland); HIP (Finland); CEA (France)French Atomic Energy Commission; CNRS/IN2P3 (France)Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); BMBF (Germany)Federal Ministry of Education & Research (BMBF); DFG (Germany)German Research Foundation (DFG); HGF (Germany); GSRT (Greece)Greek Ministry of Development-GSRT; NKFIA (Hungary); DAE (India)Department of Atomic Energy (DAE); DST (India)Department of Science & Technology (India); IPM (Iran); SFI (Ireland)Science Foundation Ireland; INFN (Italy)Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN); MSIP (Republic of Korea); NRF (Republic of Korea); MES (Latvia); LAS (Lithuania); MOE (Malaysia); UM (Malaysia); BUAP (Mexico); CINVESTAV (Mexico); CONACYT (Mexico)Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia (CONACyT); LNS (Mexico); SEP (Mexico); UASLP-FAI (Mexico); MOS (Montenegro); MBIE (New Zealand); PAEC (Pakistan); MSHE (Poland); NSC (Poland); FCT (Portugal)Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology; JINR (Dubna); MON (Russia); RosAtom (Russia); RAS (Russia)Russian Academy of Sciences; RFBR (Russia)Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR); NRC KI (Russia); MESTD (Serbia); SEIDI (Spain); CPAN (Spain); PCTI (Spain); FEDER (Spain)European Union (EU); MOSTR (Sri Lanka); MST (Taipei); ThEPCenter (Thailand); IPST (Thailand); STAR (Thailand); NSTDA (Thailand); TAEK (Turkey)Ministry of Energy & Natural Resources - Turkey; NASU (Ukraine); SFFR (Ukraine)State Fund for Fundamental Research (SFFR); STFC (United KingdomScience & Technology Facilities Council (STFC); DOE (U.S.A.)United States Department of Energy (DOE); NSF (U.S.A.)National Science Foundation (NSF); Marie-Curie programmeEuropean Union (EU); Horizon 2020 Grant (European Union)European Union (EU) [675440]; Leventis Foundation; A.P. Sloan FoundationAlfred P. Sloan Foundation; Alexander von Humboldt FoundationAlexander von Humboldt Foundation; Belgian Federal Science Policy OfficeBelgian Federal Science Policy Office; Fonds pour la Formation a la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture (FRIA-Belgium)Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie (IWT-Belgium)Institute for the Promotion of Innovation by Science and Technology in Flanders (IWT); F.R.S.-FNRS (Belgium)Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; FWO (Belgium)FWO [30820817]; Beijing Municipal Science & Technology CommissionBeijing Municipal Science & Technology Commission [Z181100004218003]; Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) of the Czech RepublicMinistry of Education, Youth & Sports - Czech Republic; Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Hungary)Hungarian Academy of Sciences; New National Excellence Program UNKP (Hungary); NKFIA (Hungary) [123842, 123959, 124845, 124850, 125105]; Council of Science and Industrial Research, IndiaCouncil of Scientific & Industrial Research (CSIR) - India; HOMING PLUS programme of the Foundation for Polish Science; European Union, Regional Development FundEuropean Union (EU); Mobility Plus programme of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education; National Science Center (Poland)National Science Centre, PolandNational Science Center, Poland [Harmonia 2014/14/M/ST2/00428, Opus 2014/13/B/ST2/02543, 2014/15/B/ST2/03998, 2015/19/B/ST2/02861, Sonata-bis 2012/07/E/ST2/01406]; National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund; Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigacion Cientfica y Tecnica de Excelencia Maria de Maeztu [MDM-2015-0509]; Programa Severo Ochoa del Principado de Asturias; EU-ESFEuropean Union (EU); Greek NSRFGreek Ministry of Development-GSRT; Rachadapisek Sompot Fund for Postdoctoral Fellowship, Chulalongkorn University (Thailand); Chulalongkorn Academic into Its 2nd Century Project Advancement Project (Thailand); Welch FoundationThe Welch Foundation [C-1845]; Weston Havens Foundation (U.S.A.); Canton of Geneva, Switzerland; Herakleitos programme; Thales programme; Aristeia programme; European Research Council (European Union)European Union (EU)European Research Council (ERC); Science and Technology Facilities CouncilScience & Technology Facilities Council (STFC) [ST/N000242/1, ST/N000331/1] Funding Source: researchfish ; We thank CERN for the very successful operation of the LHC, as well as the support staff from our institutions without whom ATLAS and CMS could not be operated efficiently. We acknowledge the support of ANPCyT, Argentina; YerPhI, Armenia; ARC, Australia; BMWFW and FWF, Austria; ANAS, Azerbaijan; SSTC, Belarus; CNPq and FAPESP, Brazil; NSERC, NRC and CFI, Canada; CERN; CONICYT, Chile; CAS, MOST and NSFC, China; COLCIENCIAS, Colombia; MSMT CR, MPO CR and VSC CR, Czech Republic; DNRF and DNSRC, Denmark; IN2P3-CNRS, CEA-DRF/IRFU, France; SRNSFG, Georgia; BMBF, HGF, and MPG, Germany; GSRT, Greece; RGC, Hong Kong SAR, China; ISF and Benoziyo Center, Israel; INFN, Italy; MEXT and JSPS, Japan; CNRST, Morocco; NWO, Netherlands; RCN, Norway; MNiSW and NCN, Poland; FCT, Portugal; MNE/IFA, Romania; MES of Russia and NRC KI, Russian Federation; JINR; MESTD, Serbia; MSSR, Slovakia; ARRS and MIZS, Slovenia; DST/NRF, South Africa; MINECO, Spain; SRC and Wallenberg Foundation, Sweden; SERI, SNSF and Cantons of Bern and Geneva, Switzerland; MOST, Taiwan; TAEK, Turkey; STFC, United Kingdom; DOE and NSF, United States of America. In addition, individual groups and members have received support from BCKDF, CANARIE, CRC and Compute Canada, Canada; COST, ERC, ERDF, Horizon 2020, and Marie Sk lodowska-Curie Actions, European Union; Investissements d' Avenir Labex and Idex, ANR, France; DFG and AvH Foundation, Germany; Herakleitos, Thales and Aristeia programmes co-financed by EU-ESF and the Greek NSRF, Greece; BSF-NSF and GIF, Israel; CERCA Programme Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain; The Royal Society and Leverhulme Trust, United Kingdom. We acknowledge the enduring support for the construction and operation of the LHC and the CMS detector provided by the following funding agencies: BMBWF and FWF (Austria); FNRS and FWO (Belgium); CNPq, CAPES, FAPERJ, FAPERGS, and FAPESP (Brazil); MES (Bulgaria); CERN; CAS, MoST, and NSFC (China); COLCIENCIAS (Colombia); MSES and CSF (Croatia); RPF (Cyprus); SENESCYT (Ecuador); MoER, ERC IUT, and ERDF (Estonia); Academy of Finland, MEC, and HIP (Finland); CEA and CNRS/IN2P3 (France); BMBF, DFG, and HGF (Germany); GSRT (Greece); NKFIA (Hungary); DAE and DST (India); IPM (Iran); SFI (Ireland); INFN (Italy); MSIP and NRF (Republic of Korea); MES (Latvia); LAS (Lithuania); MOE and UM (Malaysia); BUAP, CINVESTAV, CONACYT, LNS, SEP, and UASLP-FAI (Mexico); MOS (Montenegro); MBIE (New Zealand); PAEC (Pakistan); MSHE and NSC (Poland); FCT (Portugal); JINR (Dubna); MON, RosAtom, RAS, RFBR, and NRC KI (Russia); MESTD (Serbia); SEIDI, CPAN, PCTI, and FEDER (Spain); MOSTR (Sri Lanka); Swiss Funding Agencies (Switzerland); MST (Taipei); ThEPCenter, IPST, STAR, and NSTDA (Thailand); TUBITAK and TAEK (Turkey); NASU and SFFR (Ukraine); STFC (United Kingdom); DOE and NSF (U.S.A.).; Individuals have received support from the Marie-Curie programme and the European Research Council and Horizon 2020 Grant, contract No. 675440 (European Union); the Leventis Foundation; the A.P. Sloan Foundation; the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation; the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office; the Fonds pour la Formation a la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture (FRIA-Belgium); the Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie (IWT-Belgium); the F.R.S.-FNRS and FWO (Belgium) under the "Excellence of Science -EOS" -be.h project n. 30820817; the Beijing Municipal Science & Technology Commission, No. Z181100004218003; the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) of the Czech Republic; the Lendulet ("Momentum") Programme and the Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the New National Excellence Program UNKP, the NKFIA research grants 123842, 123959, 124845, 124850, and 125105 (Hungary); the Council of Science and Industrial Research, India; the HOMING PLUS programme of the Foundation for Polish Science, cofinanced from European Union, Regional Development Fund, the Mobility Plus programme of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, the National Science Center (Poland), contracts Harmonia 2014/14/M/ST2/00428, Opus 2014/13/B/ST2/02543, 2014/15/B/ST2/03998, and 2015/19/B/ST2/02861, Sonata-bis 2012/07/E/ST2/01406; the National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund; the Programa Estatal de Fomento de la Investigacion Cientfica y Tecnica de Excelencia Maria de Maeztu, grant MDM-2015-0509 and the Programa Severo Ochoa del Principado de Asturias; the Thalis and Aristeia programmes cofinanced by EU-ESF and the Greek NSRF; the Rachadapisek Sompot Fund for Postdoctoral Fellowship, Chulalongkorn University and the Chulalongkorn Academic into Its 2nd Century Project Advancement Project (Thailand); the Welch Foundation, contract C-1845; and the Weston Havens Foundation (U.S.A.).; In addition, we gratefully acknowledge the computing centres and personnel of the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid for delivering so effectively the computing infrastructure essential to our analyses. In particular, the support from CERN, the ATLAS Tier-1 facilities at TRIUMF (Canada), NDGF (Denmark, Norway, Sweden), CC-IN2P3 (France), KIT/GridKA (Germany), INFN-CNAF (Italy), NL-T1 (Netherlands), PIC (Spain), ASGC (Taiwan), RAL (U.K.) and BNL (U.S.A.), the Tier-2 facilities worldwide and large non-WLCG resource providers is acknowledged gratefully. Major contributors of ATLAS computing resources are listed in ref. [127].