Suchergebnisse

Collegiality and Bureaucracy in American Corporate Law Firms.
This article summarizes existing literature pertaining to the organizational form of American corporate law firms (the Cravath model), and the current changes experienced by such firms resulting from market pressures and internal growth processes. These changes correspond to the bureaucratization of structure (increased hierarchical organization, departmentalization, polycentric arrangements) and management policies (concerning such issues as work flow, compensation, marketing, evaluation of work quality, management of associates). The author also describes the resistance offered by the collegial form to this bureaucratization, as well as the emergence of new organizational forms (mega-firms, franchized firms, multi-disciplinary partnerships), and the resulting debates concerning the redefinition of professionalism. Given the future uncertainty of the American model in the United States context and the spreading of the Cravath model in continental Europe, European firms will undoubtedly encounter similar changes and difficulties.

Examines the covenantal political tradition of the Nuer of the southern Sudan, focusing on the concept of covenant & its basis in common conceptions of God as the source of human creation. It is shown how the Nuers' concept of covenant influences not only their institutional organization, but also their interpersonal relationships. A brief description of Nuer cosmology is given, the central role of the "spokesman" as a virtuous figure in the Nuer political system is examined, & an explanation is offered as to how duer (ie, a code of rules for punishing wrongdoing) developed as a means of coping with an imperial order that wsa corrupting the Nuer way of life. It is concluded that the Nuer have developed a highly functional political & social order despite their lack of either a clear center of authority or a ruling bureaucracy. 1 Table. Adapted from the source document.

The federal government's three branches—executive, legislative, judicial, and that unwieldy mass known simply as "the bureaucracy" have, during the last half-decade—1987-1991—produced a dizzying crop of laws, policies, proclamations, regulations, and court decisions which have served simultaneously to 1) reaffirm tribal sovereignty; 2) permit and encourage greater state interference within Indian Country; 3) enhance federal legislative authority over tribes; and 4) deny constitutional free-exercise protections both to individual Indians and to tribes. On the legislative side, Congress has established the experimental Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project which is a major step towards restoring the tribal right of self-determination, and is discussing the potentiality of reestablishing a more constitutionally-grounded policy with tribes—"New Federalism." This policy would resemble the bilateral agreement period between tribes and the U.S. which lasted from 1875 to 1914.

Abstract: Max Weber's model of bureaucracy has been widely criticised as incapable of adequately capturing empirical reality, internally inconsistent, and inappropriately juxtaposed with the concepts of efficiency and rationality. This article first argues that much of this criticism can be disregarded as irrelevant, insofar as it has been largely based on a misinterpretation of Weber's conceptions, and then explores a variety of reasons for this misinterpretation. It is argued that the fundamental problem is the consideration of Weber's model in the context of a microanalysis of organisation, since it was not constructed by Weber for use in this way. Weber was an historical sociologist, concerned with the distinctive features of society, who utilised the comparative method as an aid to explanation and who developed the ideal type to assist in achieving that end. It is, therefore, irrational for organisation theorists to use his means to their ends.

Observers often complain that Congress slights defense oversight. Their conclusions, however, are typically based on the assumption that the House and Senate will act like bureaucracies capable of comprehensive, systematic, and dispassionate oversight. Yet Congress is a political institution, and its ability to oversee defense issues is limited by its institutional makeup and by the nature of defense policy. As a result, the tendency to treat Congress as if it were a bureaucracy produces inflated expectations about congressional oversight. It also obscures the incentives that encourage legislators to conduct oversight-namely, parochialism, ambition, and duty. Although Congress does more oversight than critics acknowledge, congressional oversight is not flawless. Most reform proposals focus on structural changes at the Pentagon or on Capitol Hill. The key to improving congressional oversight, however, lies in reducing the ideological bias of the defense committees.

An analysis of the economic adjustment policies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan during the 1970s and 1980s shows that these East Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs), which faced common problems in sustaining their recent industrial growth, responded to the challenge with industrial adjustment strategies that differed in their degree of intensity of state involvement and emphasis on national control. To explain this divergence in adjustment strategies, the article explores the variations in the national political structures of the four NICs and focuses particularly on three aspects of state structure: the organization of the economic bureaucracy, the institutional links between the state and private sector, and the larger state-society relations. The article demonstrates the usefulness of moving beyond the generalizations of the "developmental state" view by carefully disaggregating these aspects of state structure and by exploring the ordering logic that gives coherence to them.

A principal-agent perspective has been employed in recent studies to rediscover the importance of democratic hierarchies in shaping public bureaucratic outputs. I test the robustness of the hierarchy model for explaining outputs from an agency that has often been cast in the image of bureaucratic independence, the Environmental Protection Agency. Examining the effect of the Reagan presidency on EPA outputs for clean air, Box-Tiao models are constructed to explain shifts in the vigor of air pollution enforcements between 1977 and 1985. The analysis shows that the influence of elected institutions is limited when an agency has substantial bureaucratic resources and a zeal for their use. Moreover, under these conditions, bureaucracy can even move outputs in directions completely opposite from what a model of hierarchy would predict. The implication is that for some agencies it is necessary to give greater consideration to the agent in explaining implementation outcomes through time.

AbstractTanzania did not have the kind of agricultural policies, popular participation, or government bureaucratic capacity necessary for integrated rural development projects to perform well. Nonetheless the World Bank, EEC, and United States each implemented such projects there during the 1970s. The implementation and achievements of the projects varied considerably due to differences in their design as well as decisions made by the implementation teams. However the experiences of all three projects demonstrate two things: no agricultural development project can adapt to producer price disincentives; and both participation and project management require a 'critical minimum' level of finance and resources which the Tanzanian bureaucracy does not have. The latter observation raises the question of whether donors should attempt to build management capacity in fourth world bureaucracies or, as Goran Hyden suggests, avoid the government and work through other institutions and local organizations.

Empirical studies suggest that mission-oriented bureaucrats bias their design of program alternatives to increase the odds that a superior will choose the kind of program the officials want. However, political executives may anticipate this manipulation and try to reassert control. These struggles are examined in three models. In Model 1 a senior bureaucrat is interested only in missions; the bureaucrat's political superior controls him or her by rejecting inferior proposals and entertaining new options from other policy specialists. Model 2 is a principal-agent analysis. Here the official is interested only in budgets; the official's superior reduces search bias by creating an ex ante incentive scheme. In Model 3 the bureaucrat cares about both budgets and programs; the superior uses both his or her final review authority and ex ante incentives to reduce agenda manipulation. The models' contrasting implications for the political control of bureaucracy are examined.

Alvin Gouldner's oeuvre is examined in terms of its confrontation with and critical appropriation of both empirical social research and Marxism. Traversing an enormous range of diverse topics‐the sociology of knowledge; industrial sociology; problems of bureaucracy and democracy; studies in leadership; the role of intellectuals and ideologies; sociolinguistics; functionalism, Marxism, Stalinism, and anarchism; and studies of Plato, Saint‐Simon, Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Parsons‐Gouldner's work retains a basic thematic focus. This work is neither a harmonious synthesis of these various topics nor does it remain totally consistent with any topic taken individually. Nonetheless there is a thematic continuity underlying the creative tensions and contradictions in his work. This continuity is identified as the classical political and historical mission of social theory; namely, the Enlightenment quest for rational discourse and the establishment of the social conditions for a truly humane society.

Ethiopia's imperial regime was overthrown by a coalition of civilian and military forces. However, civil-military relations deteriorated when civilian groups demanded a democratically elected government, to which the military was unwilling to concede. The ruling military council's (PMAC) reluctance to share power with civilians, whom they distrust, and the failure of civilian groups to present a united front against the PMAC led to their demise. A military oligarchy headed by Mengistu has consolidated its power and outmaneuvered civilian opposition by militarizing the society and the bureaucracy, and by controlling urban and peasant associations. Civil-military relations in Ethiopia have thus evolved from a period during imperial rule when the armed forces were small and excluded from politics to one (in 1974) of active civil-military cooperation, to the current situation-in which the military wields unprecedented political power-with no prospects for a democratic government.

The Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (Zimcord) was held in Salisbury from March 23-27, 1981. Thirty-one nations and twenty-six international agencies pledged about $1.45 billion in economic aid to be disbursed over a three-year period beginning in July of 1981. The United States government, through the Agency for International Development, pledged $225 million. USAID has just begun to set up a mechanism for the distribution of those funds. Because of the presence of well-trained personnel and the substantial bureaucracy that has remained intact during the transition from a white- to a black-led government, USAID intends to utilize the existing decision-making structure in Salisbury as much as possible. For those interested in potential Zimbabwean projects, one of the key documents that needs to be studied is the Zimcord Conference Document. In the following discussion the main points of the document are summarized.

The US-Mexico border is both a line of separation & a span of contact between cultures. National & local perceptions about this boundary often differ, & so the formulation & implementation of border policy is subject to many conflicting pressures, not the least of which are those generated by government agencies with border responsibilities. Attitudes & policies of local, border, & field offices, combined with interagency rivalry & uncertain jurisdictions, lead to border management operations that are inconsistent with national policy. This is illustrated by the complex bureaucracy in El Paso, Tex, the largest border city. Proposed solutions cluster around improvement of the existing structure (with better equipment, budgets, & staffing), or reorganization of the primary border agencies. Recent government efforts to introduce changes based on both these approaches have been markedly unsuccessful, reflecting a continuing inability to resolve fundamental differences of opinion about border policy. Modified HA.

Football is a major sport in the United States because of its dramatic enact ment of social values of violence, bureaucracy, sexism, and commercialism. The spec tators of this game are particularly enthralled in the state of Nebraska. Here, a state with a large geographical area and a small, predominanty rural population, the fans have elevated Nebraska fottball to a significant ritual and source for iden tification. As avid supporters they dress in the team colors, red and white; partici pate in pre- and postgame celebrations; travel great distances; and emotionally express their loyalty and dedication to "Big Red.''By combining the dramaturgical perspective of Erving Goffman with Victor Turner's concepts of liminality and communitas, we have a theoretical framework for analyzing and evaluating cultural dramas in modern society. Nebraska football as a dramatic ritual, then, reveals its creative and destructive roots in American society.

A crucial feature of political life in twentieth-century Brazil has been the growing role of the state as the central regulator of social, economic, and political life. One aspect of the expansion of the public sector in Brazil, as elsewhere, has been the accumulation by the state of a number of important social and economic functions previously exercised outside the public domain. One important function adopted by the state in Brazil is that of social protection, in the form of an elaborate and complex social insurance system. Presently some form of social protection reaches almost the entire rural population and some 78 percent of the urban population. The main social protection organization—Instituto Nacional da Previdência Social (INPS)— boasts the second largest budget in the nation (in 1975 CR $43 billion in contrast to the federal budget of Cr $113 billion) and a bureaucracy of over 102,700 employees.