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When, on 29 June 2023, the EU Deforestation-free Regulation (EUDR) entered into force, it was like a small earthquake – at least for whoever was dealing with EU agricultural imports. Never before, neither in the EU nor in the rest of the world, such an ambitious anti-deforestation piece of legislation has ever been enacted. Perhaps more importantly, it was the first to directly address the leading cause of global deforestation: agriculture. The EUDR indeed completely forbids the entry into the EU market of key agricultural commodities[1] whose production caused deforestation after a cut-off date (identified as 31 December 2020).
As the EU is one of the leading importers of tropical deforestation (through agricultural commodities), the Regulation has indeed the potential to become one of the most important tools to protect global forests, and to be successful where other plans and initiatives have failed (as in the case of the UN's REDD+[2] and the EU's FLEGT).[3] However, its approval has triggered significant protests first from key partner countries (Indonesia and Brazil in particular), which then extended to a larger share of the Global South in 2023[4] and even reached EU member states, the US and Australia in 2024.[5] Opposition has been so significant that, despite having entered into force more than a year ago, its future is still unclear and there are growing chances its application will be even delayed by one or two years – the Regulation is structured in a way that is should be applied at a later stage than its entry into force, currently set for December 2024. A mix of political support and fine-tuning of the tools available for implementation will be required to guarantee the EUDR's now uncertain success.Agriculture and deforestation
Agriculture is by far and large the leading cause of deforestation worldwide, accounting for approximately 90 per cent of all clearings.[6] Yet, despite decades of international efforts, it has been only indirectly addressed by initiatives and policies aimed at protecting forests. The 2010 EU Timber Regulation (EUTR)[7] exclusively applied to timber imports and so did the 2008 US Lacey Act and the 2019 Chinese Forest Law. The UN REDD+ framework instead has only focused on land-use-related emissions, aiming at compensating countries that decide to adopt forest-positive practices. Agriculture was left in the background, despite soy farming or palm oil production having been the most evident cause of deforestation respectively in the Amazon and in Borneo, for instance.
There are many reasons for this, and the first is that regulating agriculture to prevent deforestation is no easy task. National legislations can greatly vary between producing countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, etc.) and buyers (the EU), so that forest clearings and cultivations can be illegal for one side, but perfectly legal for the other. In several cases, agricultural exports represent such a significant share of the national economy that governments are very keen to turn a blind eye and allow illegal and destructive practices (as in the case of the forest fires for new palm oil plantations in Indonesia). Corruption, involvement of organised crime groups and lack of governance, among other issues, tend to further hide the environmental impact of agriculture.
The key to regulating agriculture is indeed tracing, i.e. the ability to follow the commodity in each different step of the supply chain, from production to consumption. This allows for a full understanding and visibility of the impact of cultivations – also and particularly on forests. Tracing mechanisms are however scarce and have been so far only applied for timber in the EU as a consequence of the EUTR (with scarce success),[8] and by certification organisations for other agricultural commodities. These include schemes such as Fairtrade (for coffee) or the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC, for timber and rubber), and similarly have had a limited impact especially because of their voluntary nature and of complications in gathering information – FSC in particular has been accused of certifying well-known environmental offenders.[9]The turn of the EUDR
While in recent years technological developments and growing global environmental awareness have increased the reach of certification schemes, the share of certified production has remained scarce – for coffee, the most covered sector, this is around 30 per cent.[10] Most of the players indeed have had very little interest in changing the situation; traced, deforestation-free agricultural commodities are generally more expensive, and neither European and international buyers nor local producers have historically wanted to pay the additional sustainability price. The EUDR has marked perhaps the most significant change to this situation: it has introduced a "due diligence" requirement on companies importing the seven commodities covered by the Regulation into the EU, so that they would have to trace all their batches back to the original producer, to prove that they did not cause deforestation. By imposing traceability, not only has the EUDR delivered the tool mostly needed for its main objective (that is, reducing EU-related deforestation), but it also hopes that this will stimulate producers to expand traced production beyond EU demand – a sort of Brussels effect, which leads EU regulations to have a de facto impact that is larger than its de jure scope.
While such an approach has definitely more chances for success than the much milder one adopted in the past by the EUTR and other policies, it contains all the elements needed to upset producing countries – and it has. Indonesia, a country with a long history of unregulated deforestation and a major exporter of palm oil to the EU, has been one of the first to oppose the EUDR only a few days after its entry into force[11] and was rapidly followed by Malaysia, Brazil and other countries, which ultimately became a sort of informal coalition of 17 countries which sent a letter to the European Commission in September 2023.[12] In June 2024 also the US joined the opposition[13] and were followed by Australia shortly thereafter. Reasons for oppositions are generally of two kinds: all countries, Brazil, Australia and the US in particular, complain about the unfeasibility of the Regulation, which they lament will be just too complicated to be successfully applied. Most of the countries in the Global South also object that they have been imposed EU rules, without having a say. While these countries' primary interest clearly lies in maintaining access to the European market without paying this sustainability price, the complaints are reasonable: building a traceability system for sectors that had limited to no attempts in the past will be very hard and very expensive, considering especially how convoluted global agricultural supply chains still are (in terms of number of intermediaries, lack of transparency, etc.). Equally, the EUDR saw very little debate with third countries and a great deal of unilateralism that was to some extent aimed at avoiding the endless negotiations that undermined the effectiveness of previous initiatives and regulations (the FLEGT, for instance). Such a unilateral approach was however likely designed also to increase the control of the EU on key commodities and improve food security, at a time in which China and other players are playing an increasingly greater role in South East Asia and Latin America.[14]The way forward
The situation is getting more and more complicated for the EUDR. The opposition has spread to some EU member states in March 2024[15] and even to the European Parliament, with the EPP group leading calls for a two-year delay of the Regulation application in June 2024, shortly after the latest elections.[16] Governments and MEPs are likely being pushed by the domestic farming sector (which will also be affected by the Regulation) and by national importers, and the recent political wave against some of the Green Deal legislation (the Nature Restoration Law in particular) probably allowed these protests to grow louder.
The EU should address these concerns rapidly, or risk failing the EUDR. This will not only delay much-needed forest protection, but will also discourage other countries from taking the same direction – something the US is now trying to achieve through the FOREST Act that has been recently re-proposed.[17] The EU should work on two sides: the technical and the political one.
From a technical perspective, many tools can now significantly reduce the costs of tracing, and are easily and readily available to European and non-European users: satellite images from the EU Copernicus programme can offer a free and clear view of the farms where commodities are supposedly coming from (traceability always includes coordinates), and thanks to historic series it is possible to understand how the landscape has evolved over time, for instance. Apps such as Koltitrace, by agri service provider Koltiva, allows for easier collection of information along the supply chain, since it will be the different operators (farmers, intermediate buyers, etc.) that will directly insert them step by step, and not the final operator.
However, even these advancements will have little impact without the cooperation of local and national institutions, and even of companies, in producing countries. Indeed, these will ultimately be the ones gathering and providing the information on which EU institutions will decide whether imports will be EUDR-compliant or not. Brussels should first improve relations with producing countries, ideally through dedicated platforms such as the task force the EU launched with Indonesia and Malaysia on palm oil already in 2023.[18] Engagement with the private sector should also be a priority, since companies often have the best understanding of their own supply chains, but dialogue has been very limited before and after the entry into force of the Regulation. The EU will however have the difficult task of balancing the demands of these players while maintaining the real effectiveness of the Regulation, in order not to transform one of the boldest attempts to protect global forests into just a very expensive bureaucratic exercise.Lorenzo Colantoni is senior fellow of the Energy, Climate and Resources programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).
This Commentary has been produced under the PRODIGEES project, which has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 873119.[1] The EUDR covers the seven commodities that are more responsible for global deforestation: soy, coffee, cocoa, palm oil, rubber, beef and timber.[2] See UNFCCC REDD+ Web Platform, https://redd.unfccc.int.[3] On the 2005 Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Regulation, see Fredy D. Polo Villanueva et al., "Effects of EU Illegal Logging Policy on Timber-Supplying Countries: A Systematic Review", in Journal of Environmental Management, Vol. 327 (1 February 2023), Article 116874, DOI 10.1016/j.jenvman.2022.116874.[4] Isabel Marques da Silva, "Why the Global South Is Against the EU's Anti-Deforestation Law", in Euronews, 20 September 2023, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/09/20/why-the-global-south-is-against-the-eus-anti-deforestation-law.[5] Sofia Sanchez Manzanaro, "Agriculture Ministers Push to Weaken Anti-Deforestation Rules for EU Farmers", in Euractiv, 25 March 2024, https://www.euractiv.com/?p=2067436.[6] UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), "FRA 2020 Remote Sensing Survey", in FAO Forestry Papers, No. 186 (2022), p. xii, https://doi.org/10.4060/cb9970en.[7] European Parliament and Council of the EU, Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of 20 October 2010 Laying Down the Obligations of Operators Who Place Timber and Timber Products on the Market, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2010/995/oj.[8] Michael Munk Sørensen, Lorenz Carl Wähler and Malene Sand Jespersen, Impact Assessment Study for the Revision of the Product Scope of the EU Timber Regulation. Final Report, Brussels, European Commission, May 2019, https://op.europa.eu/s/zOdq.[9] Earthsight, "FSC Hall of Shame: The Ethical Wood Label's Long Line of Scandals", in Earthsight Blog, 25 October 2021, https://www.earthsight.org.uk/news/blog-fsc-hall-of-shame-the-ethical-wood-label-long-list-of-scandals.[10] Sjoerd Panhuysen and Frederik de Vries, Coffee Barometer 2023, Coffee Barometer Consortium, September 2023, p. 12, https://coffeebarometer.org/documents_resources/coffee_barometer_2023.pdf.[11] "Indonesia Invites Affected Countries to Oppose EUDR Policy: Minister", in ANTARA, 13 July 2023, https://en.antaranews.com/news/288156.[12] Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 Like-Minded Countries Convey Official Concern Regarding the EUDR, 8 September 2023, https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/5234/berita/17-like-minded-countries-convey-official-concern-regarding-the-eudr.[13] Andy Bounds and Alice Hancock, "EU's Use of Incorrect Deforestation Data 'Risks Blocking Imports", in Financial Times, 15 July 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/ab2aabbc-8978-444b-844b-3d0d70553266; Kate Abnett, "United States Asks EU to Delay Deforestation Law, Letter Shows", in Reuters, 20 June 2024, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/united-states-asks-eu-delay-deforestation-law-letter-shows-2024-06-20.[14] Katharina Weber, "Forests, Foreign Policy and Trade. What the EU Deforestation Regulation Means from a Foreign Policy Perspective", in CEPS Explainers, No. 2023-15 (November 2023), https://www.ceps.eu/?p=41589.[15] Austria (which leads the opposition), Finland, Italy, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland and Sweden. See Sofia Sanchez Manzanaro, "Agriculture Ministers Push to Weaken Anti-Deforestation Rules for EU Farmers", cit.[16] Robert Hodgson, "EPP Environment Lead Calls for Delay to Anti-Deforestation Law", in Euronews, 27 June 2024, https://www.euronews.com/green/2024/06/27/epp-environment-lead-calls-for-delay-to-anti-deforestation-law.[17] David E. Bond, Matt Solomon and Ian Saccomanno, "US Congress Reintroduces Bill to Restrict Imports Linked to Illegal Deforestation", in White & Case Insight Alerts, 7 December 2023, https://www.whitecase.com/node/120176.[18] European External Action Service (EEAS), Joint Press Release: The 2nd Meeting of the ad hoc Joint Task Force on the EUDR, Putrajaya, Malaysia, 2 February 2024, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/438155_en.

Yes, it's already time to be worried — very worried. As the wars in Ukraine and Gaza have shown, the earliest drone equivalents of "killer robots" have made it onto the battlefield and proved to be devastating weapons. But at least they remain largely under human control. Imagine, for a moment, a world of war in which those aerial drones (or their ground and sea equivalents) controlled us, rather than vice-versa. Then we would be on a destructively different planet in a fashion that might seem almost unimaginable today. Sadly, though, it's anything but unimaginable, given the work on artificial intelligence (AI) and robot weaponry that the major powers have already begun. Now, let me take you into that arcane world and try to envision what the future of warfare might mean for the rest of us.By combining AI with advanced robotics, the U.S. military and those of other advanced powers are already hard at work creating an array of self-guided "autonomous" weapons systems — combat drones that can employ lethal force independently of any human officers meant to command them. Called "killer robots" by critics, such devices include a variety of uncrewed or "unmanned" planes, tanks, ships, and submarines capable of autonomous operation. The U.S. Air Force, for example, is developing its "collaborative combat aircraft," an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) intended to join piloted aircraft on high-risk missions. The Army is similarly testing a variety of autonomous unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), while the Navy is experimenting with both unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and unmanned undersea vessels (UUVs, or drone submarines). China, Russia, Australia, and Israel are also working on such weaponry for the battlefields of the future.The imminent appearance of those killing machines has generated concern and controversy globally, with some countries already seeking a total ban on them and others, including the U.S., planning to authorize their use only under human-supervised conditions. In Geneva, a group of states has even sought to prohibit the deployment and use of fully autonomous weapons, citing a 1980 U.N. treaty, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, that aims to curb or outlaw non-nuclear munitions believed to be especially harmful to civilians. Meanwhile, in New York, the U.N. General Assembly held its first discussion of autonomous weapons last October and is planning a full-scale review of the topic this coming fall.For the most part, debate over the battlefield use of such devices hinges on whether they will be empowered to take human lives without human oversight. Many religious and civil society organizations argue that such systems will be unable to distinguish between combatants and civilians on the battlefield and so should be banned in order to protect noncombatants from death or injury, as is required by international humanitarian law. American officials, on the other hand, contend that such weaponry can be designed to operate perfectly well within legal constraints.However, neither side in this debate has addressed the most potentially unnerving aspect of using them in battle: the likelihood that, sooner or later, they'll be able to communicate with each other without human intervention and, being "intelligent," will be able to come up with their own unscripted tactics for defeating an enemy — or something else entirely. Such computer-driven groupthink, labeled "emergent behavior" by computer scientists, opens up a host of dangers not yet being considered by officials in Geneva, Washington, or at the U.N.For the time being, most of the autonomous weaponry being developed by the American military will be unmanned (or, as they sometimes say, "uninhabited") versions of existing combat platforms and will be designed to operate in conjunction with their crewed counterparts. While they might also have some capacity to communicate with each other, they'll be part of a "networked" combat team whose mission will be dictated and overseen by human commanders. The Collaborative Combat Aircraft, for instance, is expected to serve as a "loyal wingman" for the manned F-35 stealth fighter, while conducting high-risk missions in contested airspace. The Army and Navy have largely followed a similar trajectory in their approach to the development of autonomous weaponry.The Appeal of Robot "Swarms"However, some American strategists have championed an alternative approach to the use of autonomous weapons on future battlefields in which they would serve not as junior colleagues in human-led teams but as coequal members of self-directed robot swarms. Such formations would consist of scores or even hundreds of AI-enabled UAVs, USVs, or UGVs — all able to communicate with one another, share data on changing battlefield conditions, and collectively alter their combat tactics as the group-mind deems necessary."Emerging robotic technologies will allow tomorrow's forces to fight as a swarm, with greater mass, coordination, intelligence and speed than today's networked forces," predicted Paul Scharre, an early enthusiast of the concept, in a 2014 report for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). "Networked, cooperative autonomous systems," he wrote then, "will be capable of true swarming — cooperative behavior among distributed elements that gives rise to a coherent, intelligent whole."As Scharre made clear in his prophetic report, any full realization of the swarm concept would require the development of advanced algorithms that would enable autonomous combat systems to communicate with each other and "vote" on preferred modes of attack. This, he noted, would involve creating software capable of mimicking ants, bees, wolves, and other creatures that exhibit "swarm" behavior in nature. As Scharre put it, "Just like wolves in a pack present their enemy with an ever-shifting blur of threats from all directions, uninhabited vehicles that can coordinate maneuver and attack could be significantly more effective than uncoordinated systems operating en masse."In 2014, however, the technology needed to make such machine behavior possible was still in its infancy. To address that critical deficiency, the Department of Defense proceeded to fund research in the AI and robotics field, even as it also acquired such technology from private firms like Google and Microsoft. A key figure in that drive was Robert Work, a former colleague of Paul Scharre's at CNAS and an early enthusiast of swarm warfare. Work served from 2014 to 2017 as deputy secretary of defense, a position that enabled him to steer ever-increasing sums of money to the development of high-tech weaponry, especially unmanned and autonomous systems.From Mosaic to ReplicatorMuch of this effort was delegated to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Pentagon's in-house high-tech research organization. As part of a drive to develop AI for such collaborative swarm operations, DARPA initiated its "Mosaic" program, a series of projects intended to perfect the algorithms and other technologies needed to coordinate the activities of manned and unmanned combat systems in future high-intensity combat with Russia and/or China."Applying the great flexibility of the mosaic concept to warfare," explained Dan Patt, deputy director of DARPA's Strategic Technology Office, "lower-cost, less complex systems may be linked together in a vast number of ways to create desired, interwoven effects tailored to any scenario. The individual parts of a mosaic are attritable [dispensable], but together are invaluable for how they contribute to the whole."This concept of warfare apparently undergirds the new "Replicator" strategy announced by Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks just last summer. "Replicator is meant to help us overcome [China's] biggest advantage, which is mass. More ships. More missiles. More people," she told arms industry officials last August. By deploying thousands of autonomous UAVs, USVs, UUVs, and UGVs, she suggested, the U.S. military would be able to outwit, outmaneuver, and overpower China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). "To stay ahead, we're going to create a new state of the art… We'll counter the PLA's mass with mass of our own, but ours will be harder to plan for, harder to hit, harder to beat."To obtain both the hardware and software needed to implement such an ambitious program, the Department of Defense is now seeking proposals from traditional defense contractors like Boeing and Raytheon as well as AI startups like Anduril and Shield AI. While large-scale devices like the Air Force's Collaborative Combat Aircraft and the Navy's Orca Extra-Large UUV may be included in this drive, the emphasis is on the rapid production of smaller, less complex systems like AeroVironment's Switchblade attack drone, now used by Ukrainian troops to take out Russian tanks and armored vehicles behind enemy lines.At the same time, the Pentagon is already calling on tech startups to develop the necessary software to facilitate communication and coordination among such disparate robotic units and their associated manned platforms. To facilitate this, the Air Force asked Congress for $50 million in its fiscal year 2024 budget to underwrite what it ominously enough calls Project VENOM, or "Viper Experimentation and Next-generation Operations Model." Under VENOM, the Air Force will convert existing fighter aircraft into AI-governed UAVs and use them to test advanced autonomous software in multi-drone operations. The Army and Navy are testing similar systems.When Swarms Choose Their Own PathIn other words, it's only a matter of time before the U.S. military (and presumably China's, Russia's, and perhaps those of a few other powers) will be able to deploy swarms of autonomous weapons systems equipped with algorithms that allow them to communicate with each other and jointly choose novel, unpredictable combat maneuvers while in motion. Any participating robotic member of such swarms would be given a mission objective ("seek out and destroy all enemy radars and anti-aircraft missile batteries located within these [specified] geographical coordinates") but not be given precise instructions on how to do so. That would allow them to select their own battle tactics in consultation with one another. If the limited test data we have is anything to go by, this could mean employing highly unconventional tactics never conceived for (and impossible to replicate by) human pilots and commanders.The propensity for such interconnected AI systems to engage in novel, unplanned outcomes is what computer experts call "emergent behavior." As ScienceDirect, a digest of scientific journals, explains it, "An emergent behavior can be described as a process whereby larger patterns arise through interactions among smaller or simpler entities that themselves do not exhibit such properties." In military terms, this means that a swarm of autonomous weapons might jointly elect to adopt combat tactics none of the individual devices were programmed to perform — possibly achieving astounding results on the battlefield, but also conceivably engaging in escalatory acts unintended and unforeseen by their human commanders, including the destruction of critical civilian infrastructure or communications facilities used for nuclear as well as conventional operations.At this point, of course, it's almost impossible to predict what an alien group-mind might choose to do if armed with multiple weapons and cut off from human oversight. Supposedly, such systems would be outfitted with failsafe mechanisms requiring that they return to base if communications with their human supervisors were lost, whether due to enemy jamming or for any other reason. Who knows, however, how such thinking machines would function in demanding real-world conditions or if, in fact, the group-mind would prove capable of overriding such directives and striking out on its own.What then? Might they choose to keep fighting beyond their preprogrammed limits, provoking unintended escalation — even, conceivably, of a nuclear kind? Or would they choose to stop their attacks on enemy forces and instead interfere with the operations of friendly ones, perhaps firing on and devastating them (as Skynet does in the classic science fiction Terminator movie series)? Or might they engage in behaviors that, for better or infinitely worse, are entirely beyond our imagination?Top U.S. military and diplomatic officials insist that AI can indeed be used without incurring such future risks and that this country will only employ devices that incorporate thoroughly adequate safeguards against any future dangerous misbehavior. That is, in fact, the essential point made in the "Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy" issued by the State Department in February 2023. Many prominent security and technology officials are, however, all too aware of the potential risks of emergent behavior in future robotic weaponry and continue to issue warnings against the rapid utilization of AI in warfare.Of particular note is the final report that the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence issued in February 2021. Co-chaired by Robert Work (back at CNAS after his stint at the Pentagon) and Eric Schmidt, former CEO of Google, the commission recommended the rapid utilization of AI by the U.S. military to ensure victory in any future conflict with China and/or Russia. However, it also voiced concern about the potential dangers of robot-saturated battlefields."The unchecked global use of such systems potentially risks unintended conflict escalation and crisis instability," the report noted. This could occur for a number of reasons, including "because of challenging and untested complexities of interaction between AI-enabled and autonomous weapon systems [that is, emergent behaviors] on the battlefield." Given that danger, it concluded, "countries must take actions which focus on reducing risks associated with AI-enabled and autonomous weapon systems."When the leading advocates of autonomous weaponry tell us to be concerned about the unintended dangers posed by their use in battle, the rest of us should be worried indeed. Even if we lack the mathematical skills to understand emergent behavior in AI, it should be obvious that humanity could face a significant risk to its existence, should killing machines acquire the ability to think on their own. Perhaps they would surprise everyone and decide to take on the role of international peacekeepers, but given that they're being designed to fight and kill, it's far more probable that they might simply choose to carry out those instructions in an independent and extreme fashion.If so, there could be no one around to put an R.I.P. on humanity's gravestone.This article was republished with permission from Tom Dispatch

Update 9/15: The Biden Administration announced Thursday that it will only withhold $85 million of its committed military aid to Egypt, releasing $235 million of aid that had been conditioned on improving human rights in the country. The administration had withheld $130 million in 2021 and 2022.Today, the State Department must decide whether to withhold some of the $1.3 billion in military support that the U.S. gives to Egypt each year. Under normal circumstances, this would have been an easy decision. Washington has given Cairo more than $50 billion in weapons aid since 1978, a testament to the long and close relationship between the two countries.But the past few years have been more complicated. As President Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi has increasingly cracked down on dissent in the country, a growing group of Democratic lawmakers has fought to reduce aid to his government. The Biden administration withheld $130 million each of the last two years in response to heavy congressional pressure, and the State Department announced on Monday that it would block at least $85 million in aid this year. But lawmakers are determined to go further."Over the last year, Egypt's human rights record has continued to deteriorate, despite the Egyptian government's claims to the contrary," wrote a group of leading Democratic senators in July. "Therefore, we urge you to withhold the full amount of $320 million.""[T]he bilateral security relationship can be effectively sustained at a reduced level of assistance while upholding our values," argued the lawmakers, which included prominent progressives like Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) as well as centrist leaders like Tim Kaine (D-Va.) and Dick Durbin (D-Ill.).To better understand the factors influencing today's decision and the history of the relationship, RS spoke with retired Maj. Gen. F.C. "Pink" Williams, who served as the U.S. defense attaché to Egypt from 2008 to 2011. Williams recently wrote a chapter on the history of U.S.-Egypt military relations in an edited volume entitled "Security Aid in the Middle East." The following conversation has been edited for length and clarity.RS: The State Department is set to decide whether it will withhold up to $320 million in military aid to Egypt, citing human rights concerns. How should the Biden administration think about that decision?Williams: It's a mixed bag whether this does any good or not. Over the years, we've threatened to withhold aid. Sometimes we've carried through with that; sometimes we haven't. My personal opinion is that it hasn't had any broad effect on governance or the human rights situation in Egypt.There are those that would argue that it's somewhat effective around the edges, and I could probably support that. When Sisi releases a few political prisoners, some people will say, "well, that's in part because of the pressure we applied on the funds." I think that's hard to assess, but I do believe that withholding of funds is not going to make any substantive change in how Sisi acts.RS: Something you talked about in your chapter in this recent book is this idea that Egypt and the U.S. have pretty different views of the military relationship. Can you spell that out a little bit?Williams: Given that the whole relationship was initially built around the Camp David Accords, Egypt decided that the funding was basically a reward, or a bribe, if you want to put it that way. They've never really moved away from that. They're not trying to change the world here. They're trying to, frankly, get money for their regime and their government.Now, we, on the other hand, began to move away from the Camp David [approach] as we saw that it was unlikely that another conflict would occur between the Israelis and the Egyptians. We don't see the aid anymore as needed to get the Egyptians to keep the peace because it's clearly in their best interest to do so anyway. So then we started coming up with other reasons why we're giving the aid. As human rights and democracy became tied more and more to foreign aid, it was only natural that we would go down that road. So we started with some differences anyway, but then they widened quite a bit over time.RS: In the long sweep, how has U.S. military aid in particular affected the shape of politics and the political system in Egypt?Williams: I don't think it's had very much effect. We tend to forget that nations and regimes act in their perceived best interest. It's only natural that they would do so. Of course, we see support for democracy and human rights as not just an altruistic goal but also something that's in our best interest. However, when you push those themes in other countries with other cultures and other backgrounds, I think you have to be careful. From the Egyptian point of view, the regime's going to do what it thinks it needs to to strengthen itself and to ensure its longevity. Unfortunately, many authoritarian regimes see repression as a tool for staying in power. It's just that simple. So the idea that, for any amount of money, a dictator is going to do something that he thinks is going to weaken his position is pretty far-fetched.RS: What most surprised you about the relationship during your time in Cairo? Did Egypt's military and that relationship meet the expectations you had going in?Williams: I'm a fighter pilot by trade, and when we sold Egypt the F-16 back in 1980, I was part of that program. They sent two of us to Egypt as instructors for a year. When I returned many years later, I was not surprised at the state of the Egyptian military or their ability to effectively use the equipment that we had provided because I had the background from early on.What surprised me quite a bit was the shallowness of the relationship. We really didn't — and do not, as far as I know, to this day — have any significant knowledge of the Egyptian planning processes, their strategic plans. We're still just giving them money and equipment, and they're keeping the peace. They are doing other things for us too that I shouldn't give short shrift in terms of intelligence, but I was very surprised that we didn't have a deeper relationship after all those years.RS: Can you talk more about what the U.S. does get out of the relationship? It's kind of striking that you're saying that our influence appears limited.Williams: Some of that comes back to expectations. The idea of influence is that we'll give them this money, and we'll guide them. Again, you go back to differences in culture and differences in perceived interest. This idea that you're going to have all this influence because you give them money — which is a very widespread opinion in Washington in my experience — is unrealistic.However, on a practical level, the intelligence situation is not something we can go into in any depth, but obviously they are positioned and have resources that we don't have that can provide some decent information to us. And on the counterterrorism front, I think they've been quite helpful. And the Suez Canal priority and the overflight [permissions] that they provide us save us all kinds of time and money.RS: You were stationed in Egypt during the Arab Spring protests. How did that political turmoil affect your work and affect the country's ties with the US?Williams: Everything didn't come to a complete standstill, but it really ground down. All the non-essential personnel were evacuated from the embassy. There were roughly 400 embassy personnel on a normal day, and we were down a little bit below 100.We had various bases scattered about Egypt, where we had small contingents of American pilots and maintainers and other advisers. We pulled all those people in from those bases, and they were either subsequently evacuated or they worked work for me in the embassy. So all the interaction and advising at the outlying sites came to a halt. From the point of normal day-to-day interaction, it was pretty much nil.Now there was a lot of interaction because there was, of course, great concern in Washington about what the Egyptian military was going to do with all this. If you recall, they weren't doing anything initially. They were trying to stay out of it initially. When people wanted to talk to the Egyptians, they generally would come through my office because they knew that we could get contact with them and access to them, and we could set up phone calls. The way they were doing it was that they would have a counterpart call their counterpart. In other words, they would have Robert Gates, who was secretary of defense, and he would want to talk to the Egyptian defense minister [Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein] Tantawi.They were trying to maintain this contact and get some assurances from these guys that there's not going to be a bloodbath out there in Tahrir Square. The majority of those contacts were negotiated and coordinated by the Office of Military Cooperation because we had the access. So what do we get for all this money? Well, we at least got them to take our phone calls. And they were not taking [other calls]. There were ambassadors from other countries calling me saying, "What do you know? What is happening?"That is not the same thing as me claiming that we materially influenced the actions of the [Egyptian Armed Forces] in that time. They are sitting there assessing the situation and saying, "What is in our best interest? How do we get through this and still be an intact military and an intact regime on the other side?"RS: That's a really good example of an acute moment where there's an attempt to have an influence in favor of democracy, in favor of human rights. Do you think over the long term that U.S. aid to Egypt has had a positive effect on human rights in the country?Williams: It's probably had some good effect in individual cases. In other words, we're bringing pressure, and Sisi or [former President Hosni] Mubarak is looking to get us off his neck, so he releases some political prisoners. For those people, that's a big, big outcome. Not being in Egyptian prison is a really good thing.I would not ever claim that it has resulted in some philosophical shift in the outlook of either the Mubarak regime or the Sisi regime or the [Mohamed] Morsi regime for that matter. They view things differently, and they run governments differently than we do.I'll give you an example. During the revolt, of course, we were right there. We were very close to Tahrir square. I walked into work one morning, and I get a photo. My staff says, "Look at this." It's a photo taken from the embassy looking out, and there's an Egyptian tank with some soldiers, and they've got this guy strung up by his heels on the gun barrel there. I don't know what he did or what caused the situation, but there he was, and he's alive and everything. So I take this over to the Egyptians and say, "Hey, guys, this is exactly the kind of thing that you don't need to be doing. You don't need to hurt yourself with this." And that was a theme we were talking to them about. We were talking to them about these stories coming through of interior forces abusing people, and that's bad. Frankly, [we told them] "That's bad press. It hurts your cause, and you should not be doing this." Well, I show him this photo, and what are they interested in? They were taken at night, right? What they're interested in is "How did you get that photo? What is that technology?" They didn't even blink about this guy strung up from his heels on this tank. It just kind of shows you the mindset.RS: How should we handle the future of US aid to Egypt?Williams: First, we need to stay engaged. When people say, "Why are we doing all that for Egypt?" I say, "look at a map. You can't change geography." Same reason we have to put up with Turkey. You can't change geography. So we need to stay engaged. Russian influence building, Chinese influence building, the perception throughout the region that we can't be trusted — all these things only make it harder to try to engage and have any influence at all. Nevertheless, I think we have to try.To the money, we're not talking about a ton of money here. I would continue to fund it. You can tie it to human rights, but I wouldn't go through this exercise of conditioning the funds or taking away the funds once a year. They know we're interested in human rights. We can have those discussions. But I don't know that tying the funds has had any substantive effect.So I would stay engaged, I would be careful about tying the aid to their human rights performance, and I would try to assure them that, as we have been there through the years for the long haul, we're still going to be there for the long haul.

Alex Nowrasteh


The recent Supreme Court case about affirmative action in university admissions (SFFA v. Harvard) paralleled a broader social debate over meritocracy. Those opposed to affirmative action broadly say they are supportive of meritocracy. They believe individual achievement should be more prominent in university admissions, at least when the government is involved in university funding. The debate over affirmative action and meritocracy intersects with the immigration debate in two ways. First, immigration restrictions are the most destructive form of affirmative action. Second, immigrants and their descendants have been essential in reducing the scope of affirmative action in the United States over the last 30 years.
Meritocrats believe that individuals should rise or fall on their achievements. Those supportive of affirmative action are more skeptical of meritocracy, at least how it exists under the current system. They argue that meritocracy is bad, a myth, unfair, or that current means of identifying merit are insufficient because systemic rules or practices hold back some people in specific racial, ethnic, or other categories.
I'm a supporter of meritocracy, but a compelling point raised by skeptics is that the design of meritocratic systems can select wildly different types of merit. In other words, there's a principal-agent problem whereby the most meritocratic people design methods of gauging merit that favor themselves and people like them.
This problem could be to the detriment of specific organizations relying on merit and, eventually, to the rest of society.
Hard work, fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, personality, luck, physical attractiveness, and other characteristics contribute to merit in different endeavors and extents. A one-size-fits-all approach across all organizations doesn't make sense and is slightly less bad in organizations in the same industry. That doesn't mean some of the factors listed above aren't good predictors of merit in most endeavors, some certainly are, but their relative weights are important.
For instance, the combination of characteristics that make a successful film actor differs from those required to be a successful astrophysicist, CEO, or farmer. But that's just the supply side of merit; there's also a demand side. What consumers demand of people in different endeavors changes over time. Consumers want the best over time, but what they think is best changes.
That's why I favor the "competitive meritocracy;" that is, the meritocracy of the market over alternatives like massive government examination systems that exist in other countries. Under competitive meritocracy, firms and individuals seeking to increase profits, economic efficiency, and consumer surplus under competitive market conditions are incentivized to develop means to identify meritorious individuals that deliver. Otherwise, firm profits shrink, they go bankrupt, and consumers are left unsatisfied.
One of the beneficial results of a competitive market system is the identification and use of merit. Of course, government rules and regulations reduce the effectiveness of new merit identification techniques, but the market is better at identifying and producing meritocratic identification methods than other alternatives because it best aligns incentives to do so on the supply and demand sides.
U.S. immigration restrictions are the most anti-meritocratic policies today, and they are intended as affirmative action for native-born Americans. Ignore the myriad ways that immigration laws disadvantage certain immigrants relative to others, such as with the per-country quotas that make immigrants from populous countries wait longer for green cards. Just peruse nativist websites, and you'll see many arguments about immigrants taking jobs from more Americans who are more deserving because of where they were born. When people think of anti-meritocratic policies, they rightly jump to quotas, race-based affirmative action, or class-based affirmative action.
It's true; those are all anti-meritocratic and likely wouldn't exist in a free market outside of a handful of organizations in the non-profit sector. But U.S. immigration restrictions are worse. The U.S. population is about 4.2 percent of the global population. Immigration laws prevent the other 95.8 percent of the world from trying their hand in the U.S. market meritocracy. The cost of immigration restrictions is in the trillions of dollars, which makes the real costs of affirmative action seem small by comparison. Those who truly favor meritocracy and oppose affirmative action on principle should reject the anti-meritocratic affirmative action of American immigration laws.
Nativists agree with my analysis. They argue that the U.S. government exists to protect Americans from market competition, so it should do so with immigration restrictions. Nationalist affirmative action is still affirmative action. And lest you accuse me of hypocrisy, of working behind the protection of immigration restrictions while others labor exposed to the brutality of globalist labor competition, the sector of the economy where I labor is more exposed to legal immigrant competition than yours is.
One of the main arguments for immigration restrictions is to protect Americans. That makes sense when protecting Americans from criminals, terrorists, national security threats, or those with severe contagious diseases, because they could physically harm Americans or their property. It makes sense in the same way that the NYPD exists to protect the life, liberty, and private property of New Yorkers and shouldn't be enforcing laws in North Dakota.
But protecting jobs and wages or shielding people from the market doesn't make sense. On a purely principled opposition to preferences, meritocrats should oppose almost all immigration restrictions regardless of the wage effects. Immigration restrictions don't even work well to protect American workers. Ironically, immigration restrictions do more to protect the wages of immigrant workers in the United States than native-born workers. Affirmative action likely helps the beneficiaries more than immigration restrictions help American workers.
The idea of shielding Americans from market competition to protect them under the theory that that would make them better is silly. Industries protected behind tariffs and trade barriers tend to stagnate because they have no incentive to innovate or improve. Why would they when the government removes competition by legal fiat? Americans similarly shielded from immigration have less of a reason to get more skills, improve their human capital, or be more productive. As I wrote in my review of Reihan Salam's Melting Pot or Civil War?, labor protectionism incentivizes stagnation among American workers.
Salam fails to draw additional connections between wages and education. He worries about low levels of educational attainment among the descendants of immigrants but also favors restricting low-skilled immigration to raise the wages of high school dropouts. He does not explain how raising the wages for dropouts relative to other educational cohorts will incentivize workers to spend more time in school (hint: it won't). Salam is worried that automation will destroy lots of jobs, so he wants to stop low-skilled immigration by raising wages for low-skilled Americans and immigrants already here, which will just make it more likely that their jobs will be automated.

Maybe you favor meritocracy in university admissions and affirmative action through immigration restrictions. You wouldn't be the first person to have inconsistent policy opinions, but you support less meritocracy than you probably believe. Most people recognize that Texas' "Top 10 Percent Law" is thinly disguised affirmative action because it guarantees admission to the University of Texas to all students in the top 10 percent of their high school graduating class. Since students are geographically clustered in Texas by race, this law advantages some students based on race who otherwise wouldn't be admitted.
Harvard tried something similar when it adopted an admissions policy that accepted top-ranking students nationwide under geographic quotas rather than relying on admissions exam scores. The intent was to reduce Harvard's Jewish population. The Harvard freshman class was 21 percent Jewish in 1922, up from about 7 percent in 1900. Harvard's President Abbott Lawrence Lowell wanted to bring their percentage down to 15 percent and faced fierce opposition from Jewish students, the Boston press, and the meritocrats of his day. The geographic distribution system discriminated against Jewish students and reduced their numbers to 15 percent of the student body by 1931. Harvard later eased the geographic system and then ended it altogether. One should view the admissions policy as anti-Semitic, and the effect was identical to a policy that favored the admission of other groups like white Protestants. Regardless, the geographic admissions system was anti-meritocratic.
Despite restrictions on immigration, immigrants and their descendants are already indirectly improving meritocracy in the United States. Edward Blum, the attorney behind numerous challenges to affirmative action, including SFFA v. Harvard, lost a challenge to affirmative action in 2015 when he had a white female plaintiff. There are many reasons why that challenge failed, but afterward, Blum said, "I needed Asian plaintiffs." Law and the Constitution always matter to the Court, but politics and optics also matter for major controversial questions. When the issues are controversial and Congress or the President don't want to resolve conflicts or are otherwise at loggerheads, the Court steps in as a sort of super-legislature to decide the issue. Sometimes they rule to maintain their own institutional power in an environment where the power of Congress is declining, and that of the Presidency is increasing. Viewing the Court as a sometimes-super-legislature makes it clear that political narratives, public opinion, and other normal tools of political persuasion are important to ruling in a certain way. Without Asian American plaintiffs, it's hard to see how SCOTUS would have struck down affirmative action this time. It may have happened eventually because the arguments are good, but sympathetic plaintiffs and damning facts are just as important.
Beyond the plaintiffs in SFFA v. Harvard, immigrants, their descendants, and the diversity they bring to the United States have greatly helped reduce affirmative action through politics. As I wrote in 2022:
Voters in California—the most diverse state and the one with the highest immigrant share of the population—first voted to ban affirmative action when presented with Proposition 209 in 1996. Since then, progressives in the state have attempted to revive the issue. But in 2011, Governor Jerry Brown vetoed a bill that would have weakened the affirmative-action ban. Another proposal to re-institute affirmative action failed in 2014 after several Asian-American state senators defected from the effort in response to opposition from their constituents. "As lifelong advocates for the Asian-American and other communities," Democratic state senators Ted Lieu, Carol Liu, and Leland Yee wrote, "we would never support a policy that we believed would negatively impact our children." In 2020, voters affirmed the state's ban on affirmative action by a wider margin than the original vote to ban it 24 years earlier.

Asian Americans are the most likely to be foreign-born of any racial group. In 2019, two-thirds of Asian Americans in California were immigrants. As is clear to all after SFFA v. Harvard, Asians are the biggest losers in any race-based affirmative action system. Without them, it would be tougher to make the case that affirmative action is unjust. That's an unfortunate commentary on the state of political debate in the United States because the arguments against affirmative action are convincing regardless of who wins or loses, but those are the facts.
Furthermore, states with a higher foreign-born share of the population are likelier to have banned affirmative action than states with a lower foreign-born share. Interestingly, the share of the non-citizen population is best correlated with a state banning affirmative action. According to a piece I coauthored a few years ago, a 1 percent increase in the share of non-citizens is associated with a 27–34 percent increase in the probability of the state banning affirmative action. The share of the white population is not statistically significant in any regression we ran, and the measure of population-wide diversity is only significant at the 10 percent level in the 3‑and‐​5‐​year lags.
Affirmative action is more politically stable when they are two groups, one of which is large and the other that is small. Malaysia has a Chinese minority punished by affirmative action and a Malaysian majority aided. Apartheid South Africa punished blacks and favored whites, which was then reversed after the end of apartheid. The United States, with blacks favored and whites punished before large waves of immigrants in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, are such cases.
Of the above examples, only the United States has a substantial immigrant-induced demographic change that upended that relatively stable institutional dynamic by adding mainly Asian and Hispanic immigrants. Suddenly, Asians became the biggest losers of affirmative action, whites the second biggest, and Hispanics moderate beneficiaries. The goals of affirmative action became murkier – why would the U.S. government help Hispanic immigrants and their descendants with a program designed to help the descendants of black slaves?
Even more so, competition between disadvantaged groups seeking affirmative action lessened the benefits. Worse for the supporters of affirmative action, the biggest victims became a large and growing immigrant group and their children, a group whose ancestors were also targeted by racist laws like the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, various Alien Land Laws that barred Asians from owning land, and Japanese Internment.
There are three significant motivations for supporting redistribution, of which affirmative action is a type. They are self-interest, compassion, and malicious envy. Self-interest and compassion are obvious. Malicious envy is hatred toward a group that has done better. Immigration weakens all three supports for affirmative action. Immigration weakens self-interest by spreading the benefits among more groups, it weakens compassion because new beneficiaries have dubious claims to racial preferences under the justifications for the schemes, and malicious envy is weakened because the biggest victims are no longer whites.
Immigrants weakened affirmative action in the United States by being the specific plaintiffs in SFFA v. Harvard and changing the politics of the issue. But a far more substantial and destructive apparatus of affirmative action operates today through our immigration laws that bar about 96 percent of the world's population from participating in the American market meritocracy. Opponents of affirmative action should rest on their laurels by embracing just a touch more meritocracy just among Americans; they should embrace a true global meritocracy.

Do Spew and 2 rhyme?  I sure hope so as I begin my review of the year that was.  The last time I blogged less than I did in 2022 was ... in 2008, when I didn't blog at all.  What explains the decline?  Partly exhaustion, partly a decline in imagination, partly other social media sucking up my time (the podcasts, now tooting as well as tweeting), and partly the reality that I have written enough stuff before that when the topic comes up, it is just easier to repost.  Maybe a look at this year's posts will tell me a bit about what inspires me to write here and what does not, although survivor and recency biases may mesh nicely with my confirmation bias to prevent me from learning that much.  Hmmm.JanuaryI started by pondering whether JK Rowling has utterly destroyed her legacy--whether I can still consume Harry Potter stuff.  While I concluded that I could still enjoy the world she created, even as she betrays damn near all of it, my behavior, my choices, says otherwise as I had multiple opportunities to watch HP movies while hanging out at my mother-in-law's over the holidays and dodged all of them.  Something I had not done in the past.  Later in the month, I returned to the theme of what kinds of stuff can I read and enjoy given the complex realities of our time.  I wrote about how it has become harder to watch and read cop shows given what we know about cops these days.  I am finishing the latest John Sandford book which features multiple cops, Virgil Flowers and Lucas Davenport, solving a serial murder spree by bitcoin assholes, and have found it fairly compelling (unlike the most recent Jack Reacher book).  So, maybe I am less affected by the topics than by the behavior of the artist?The month ended with the start of the occupation of Ottawa by extremists--far right white supremacists.  The year ended with an examination of whether the government should have invoked the Emergency Act.   Um, yeah, but because the emergency was that the provincial leaders were cowards who wanted the feds to own it.FebruaryThe extremists in Ottawa became a focus for me, as it did for most of my city, for most of the month with posts on: outbidding, explaining why the Conservatives were pandering to the extremistsanger, discussing how pissed off this made me, triggered indeed.policing, as I learned that Canadians think that the cops should not be directed by the politicians as if policing is not inherently political,my take on the Emergency Act.And then the past came back to bite Ukraine and me.  My previous work on irredentism became relevant again with Russia's invasion of yet more Ukrainian territory. In this post, I explained the basics of irredentism--that it is always bad for the country doing the invading even as it may or may not be bad for its leader, that domestic dynamics are key, and so on.March The focus of March was very much on the war in Ukraine.  I argued via a bit of screenwriting why a No Fly Zone was a bad idea. I elaborated about the disease of MOAR.  And, yes, I then invoked my work on irredentism to explain why Putin was willing to kill Russia's kin in order to "save" them.  I wrote about limited war, a topic that got new energy this week as some retired generals expressed much frustration at the unwillingness of the US to send deep strike weapons to Ukraine.I also blogged about my appearance before the House of Commons Defence Committee.AprilThis month had only a few posts, with nearly all focused on CDSN events.  The outlier was a post discussing the appearance of Minister of National Defence Anita Anand in my Civil-Military Relations class. That was super-cool--a great way to finish off that course.MayI marked my 300,000th tweet before twitter's death spiral... maybe I caused it?I discussed the two events organized by the CDSN Undergraduate Excellence Scholars--a conference and a hackathon.  I also went to Germany for another conference. Woot!My last post took a first look at the Arbour report, where a retired Supreme Court Justice assessed the Canadian Armed Forces and why it has fallen short, yet again, on reforming itself when it comes to sexual misconduct.  I took a quick tour of the 48 recommendations.  June I didn't write much in June, but two of my posts continued my examination of the Arbour Report: here and here.  In the first one, I pushed on a point that will become a key question in my next project--what is the proper rule of a defence department or ministry or agency?  Arbour says DND is to support the CAF, and, no, nope, nuh uh.  This does help to explain a big problem with this and previous reports--having a very limited view of what DND's job is.  I also focus on the lack of a recommendation for an Inspector General, which is now a topic of research of this year's Visiting Defence Fellow.I also marked my 10 years in Ottawa with this post. I am so glad that the tides of the academic job market washed me ashore here.  It was not my plan, but it has worked out wonderfully.JulyJuly was a month of ups and downs.  I started the month by pondering how long might the autocratic moment in the US last if Democracy were to give way.  The most pivotal building at my old summer camp burned down, but there was much resilience that day and beyond to give me hope for its future.One of the ups was the new season of Battle Rhythm.  I am forever grateful to Stéfanie von Hlatky for helping us launch our podcast, and I was sad to see her move to admin stuff at her university.  But we got re-energized by a new crew of co-hosts.  Artur, Anessa, Erin, and Linna have provided a variety of perspectives since they joined us.  I am most grateful to Melissa Jennings for doing most of the heavy lifting in this effort and to Carelove Doreus and Racheal Wallace for their carrying the rest of the load.  It has been a big year in Canadian civil-military relations, and one of the highlights was the decision to adjust the uniform standards to make the CAF more welcoming to more people.  I addressed these changes with some accidental foreshadowing of the awful Vimy speech by one of those responsible for the culture crisis that prevented the CAF from adapting sooner.The month, which started with COVID finally hitting me and Mrs. Spew thanks to a conference trip to Berlin, ended in an upswing with both Beulahfest as my mom celebrated her 90th birthday and, yes, Stevefest, as I did a heap of stuff to celebrate another year of me. AugustNot many posts this month as I was very busy organizing and then hosting the first in-person CDSN Summer Institute.  It was one of the original ideas animating the big grant application, and it was great to see it finally come to fruition with so many sharp people speaking and participating.  Plus it was an excuse to have a reception or three.  Just a great week worth all the effort by the CDSN team.Much news about classified documents thanks to Trump hoarding documents he should have had anymore, so I shared what I had learned during the year I had a top secret clearance and worked every day in a SCIF--secure compartmented information facility.Finally, I said goodbye to a key part of my life--ultimate frisbee.  I just kept getting injured and could not stay on the field.  I could still throw well, but that whole running thing proved to be too much.  I very much miss it, it gave me friends across North America, it gave me some level of fitness, it gave me heaps of silliness, and nothing can fill the hole it left behind, alas.  SeptemberAnother light month for blogging.  I wrote a guide for those visiting Montreal for the American Political Science Association meeting.  The focus of the month and of my career these days was/is civil-military relations.  I wrote about the retired generals and SecDefs providing advice on how to manage this relationship. And then I addressed a recurring challenge up here--should the Canadian military prioritize domestic emergency operations? Whether the CAF wants to or not (not), climate change is going to make this happen.  It already has.  I am getting more and more interested in studying domestic emergency ops in part because few defence scholars have done so.  Nothing like having a wide open field to pass the disk into.  Oh wait, that was last month's post about ultimate.One reason I didn't post more in September is that I was headed west to Disneyland and to visit my daughter (not necessarily prioritized that way?).OctoberI gave thanks for all kinds of stuff as Canada celebrates Thankgiving in October when Americans debate the role of Columbus.I spent the rest of the month preparing both the CDSN Midterm Report for one of our funders and a conference to mark the midway point in our SSHRC grant.  It was great to hear from the co-directors of the various research efforts--Civ-Mil Relations, Personnel, Security, and Operations.  We were once told that the CDSN was just me and my friends dong stuff, but, to be clear, when it started, many of those who joined as co-directors were not friends and some were barely acquaintances.  Now, we are friends, but isn't that how networking works when it works well?  I am very proud of what we have put together even if it put a major dent in my blogging.November Was the theme of the month commenting on other people's mistakes?  Seems like it with a post on twitter's dramatic decline thanks to Musk and then the craptastic speech by a retired general.  That post generated more hits than any other this year and is in the top five of my 13 years of blogging.  The related tweet was also the most tweeted/impressioned tweet of the year and then some.  It led to a post addressing "woke" and being "anti-woke," which helped me think about vice-signaling, the flipside of virtue-signaling. I got to put on my old NATO hat when some errant missiles from Ukraine's war with Russia landed in Poland.  I did much media as well to explain that NATO does not work the way may folks think--that there is nothing automatic about it, even if the attack had been deliberate.One reason I blog less is that I simply have not been writing that much about pop culture here.  Why?  Mostly due to lack of time.  One exception to this was thinking about the International Politics of the second Black Panther movie.DecemberThe year ended with much CDSN and much cookies!I went to Winnipeg for the first time for a CDSN workshop on Domestic Emergency Operations.  This is the focus of one of our four MINDS (DND) funded research projects.  I learned a great deal from sharp people both in and out of the government.  There is much work to do here, and I am glad we have made this one of our foci over the next three years. Once again, we held an end of the year conference, the Year Ahead, which addresses some of the issues on the horizon.  This year, we also launched the new CDSN Podcast Network at the event!  The CDSN Podcast Network brings together four podcasts--Battle Rhythm, Conseils de Sécurité, SecurityScape and NATO Field Report.  We are open to adding others down the road.  Along the way, we fixed our Apple podcast feed.  I am most excited not just for having a new home for BattleRhythm but connecting and amplifying some student-run podcasts.I finished the year with a heap of baking--cookies for friends around Ottawa.  The basic idea is this: I want to eat a lot of different kinds of cookies.  But then making so many different kinds means finding people who are willing to take most off my hands or else I will gain a heap of weight (winterfest did that anyway).  I enjoyed my first cookiefest in 2020, which was the first time I saw many people after months and months of quarantining.  So, I keep doing it, now armed with better equipment (kitchen aid stand mixer makes it much easier than the first cookie fest) and more recipes.  It is not just the baking and the eating.  I got to chat with a bunch of great people as I delivered the cookies.  If the cookies are joy (and, yes, they are), giving joy leads to receiving much joy.One of the interesting dynamics of 2022 was the re-emergence of blogging.   That many folks started writing on substack, which, to me, seems like blogging but with the chance of income.  I have not moved over there as I am pretty happy with this perch. It does not make me money, but I doubt that people would pay that much for my half-baked (semi-spewed) writings.  One of my New Year's Resolutions is to blog more.  My guess is that I will be more successful at that than the ones focused on dietary restraint.May you and yours have a terrific 2023!

Die globale Biodiversitätskrise stellt neben dem Klimawandel die größte Herausforderung für die Menschheit dar. Um den Schutz der Biodiversität langfristig zu garantieren, sind zwischen allen beteiligten Akteuren abgestimmte Ziele zu vereinbaren, in Konzepten festzulegen und geeignete Naturschutzmaßnahmen zu ergreifen. Dabei sind divergierende Bedürfnisse von Natur und Menschen zu berücksichtigen und ethisch-moralische Fragen über den Wert der Natur sowie unterschiedliche Ansätze zum Naturschutz zu untersuchen. In dieser Dissertation werden Ziele und naturschutzfachliche Werte in deutschen Waldnaturschutzkonzepten in einem interdisziplinären Ansatz unter Berücksichtigung ökologischer, politischer und gesellschaftlicher Aspekte analysiert. Dabei werden der derzeitige Zustand des Waldnaturschutzes in Deutschland bewertet sowie aktuelle und zukünftige Herausforderungen beschrieben. Die Dissertation stellt neue Methoden zur Klassifizierung von Naturschutzzielen und zur Bewertung von Schutzgütern im Wald vor und erörtert mögliche Veränderungen der Naturschutzverantwortung vor dem Hintergrund des Klimawandels. Der langfristige Erhalt sowie eine nachhaltige Nutzung der Wälder sind angesichts des Klimawandels wichtiger denn je geworden, denn Wälder leisten einen wichtigen Beitrag zum Schutz der Biodiversität und erbringen zahlreiche Ökosystemleistungen. Aufgrund der vielfältigen Schutz- und Nutzungsanforderungen ist im Waldnaturschutz ein Konsens über die Ziele erforderlich. Nur ein auf übereinstimmenden Zielen und Maßnahmen beruhendes transparentes System dürfte ausreichend akzeptiert und umgesetzt werden. Daher wurde in Kapitel 2 dieser Dissertation ein hierarchisches System zur Klassifikation von Naturschutzzielen entwickelt. Innerhalb von übergeordneten Zielbereichen wurden Schutzgütern angestrebte Zieleigenschaften zugeordnet, die durch bestimmte Maßnahmen erreicht werden sollen. Anhand dieses Systems wurden die Inhalte von Biodiversitäts- und Waldnaturschutzkonzepten auf Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede untersucht. In den Konzepten wurde ein breiter Konsens hinsichtlich der Schutzziele über verschiedene Interessensgruppen und räumliche Bezugsebenen hinweg festgestellt, wobei die Erhaltung von Arten, Ökosystemen und Strukturen in Wäldern als besonders wichtig eingestuft wurde. Im Hinblick auf die genetische Vielfalt, abiotische Ressourcen und soziokulturelle Ziele wurden Defizite festgestellt, ebenso wie eine skalenbedingte Inkonsistenz beim Wissenstransfer. Als Ursachen für diese Divergenzen im Waldnaturschutz können Zielkonflikte, eine mangelnde Abstimmung über Skalenebenen hinweg und eine unzureichende Umsetzung der Ziele identifiziert werden. Im Privatwald, der die Hälfte der deutschen Waldfläche ausmacht, ist die Umsetzung von Naturschutzmaßnahmen eine besondere Herausforderung. Privatwaldbesitzer haben oftmals Vorbehalte gegenüber hoheitlichen Naturschutzauflagen und aufgrund des finanziellen Aufwands eine geringere Teilnahmebereitschaft. Um für mehr Akzeptanz zu sorgen, sollten Naturschutzmaßnahmen im Wald finanziell ausgeglichen werden. Die vertragliche Vereinbarung von Naturschutzleistung und finanzieller Gegenleistung (= Vertragsnaturschutz) findet im Privatwald jedoch bisher wenig Anwendung. Da die erfolgreiche Umsetzung des Waldvertragsnaturschutzes ein System sinnvoller Maßnahmen erfordert, wurde den in Kapitel 2 identifizierten Schutzgütern (Waldbiotoptypen, Strukturen und Prozessen im Wald) in Kapitel 3 ein naturschutzfachlicher Wert auf Grundlage der Schutzbedürftigkeit und der Schutzwürdigkeit zugeordnet. Einen hohen Naturschutzwert haben Eichen- und Eichenmischwälder, trocken-warme Buchenwälder, historische Waldnutzungsformen (Mittel- oder Hutewälder) und natürliche Strukturelemente wie starkes Totholz (Laubbaumarten, stehend und liegend) oder Habitatbäume. Auf Grundlage des Ausgangswertes und der erwarteten Wertentwicklung wird abgeschätzt, ob Erhaltungs- bzw. Wiederherstellungsmaßnahmen im Rahmen von Vertragsnaturschutz mit unterschiedlichen Laufzeiten sinnvoll sind. Vertragsnaturschutz ist besonders bei Schutzgütern mit einem hohen Ausgangswert geeignet, wenn damit ein Wertverlust vermieden werden kann und wenn mit einer hohen Aufwertung zu rechnen ist. Bei niedrigem Ausgangswert und geringer Aufwertungswahrscheinlichkeit ist Vertragsnaturschutz nicht sinnvoll. Mit diesem Bewertungssystem können Privatwaldbesitzer überprüfen, welche Naturschutzmaßnahmen in ihrem Wald geeignet sind und damit in Zukunft zu einer erhöhten Anwendung des Waldvertragsnaturschutzes beitragen. Der Klimawandel und seine prognostizierten Auswirkungen hinsichtlich Intensität und Häufigkeit von Störungen erfordern eine Anpassung der waldbaulichen Bewirtschaftung. Waldbauliche Planungsinstrumente wie Waldentwicklungstypen (WET) sind in Deutschland oft nur an der wirtschaftlichen Produktivitätsfunktion orientiert, während naturschutzfachliche Anforderungen wenig Berücksichtigung finden. Daher wurde das in Kapitel 3 entwickelte System zur naturschutzfachlichen Bewertung von Waldbiotoptypen in Kapitel 4 an die wirtschaftlich relevanten Hauptbaumarten (Buche, Eiche, Kiefer, Fichte, Tanne, Douglasie und Lärche) angepasst und für die flächendeckende Anwendung im Waldbestand entsprechend der potenziellen natürlichen Vegetation des Standortes weiterentwickelt. Mit dem neuen System können naturschutzfachliche Auswirkungen der waldbaulichen Planung und zukünftigen Baumartenzusammensetzung in Waldbeständen räumlich-explizit eingeschätzt werden. Bestimmte forstliche Baumartenkombinationen können dabei zu einer Verschlechterung des naturschutzfachlichen Ausgangswertes führen, welcher durch den dort natürlicherweise vorkommenden Waldbiotoptyp bestimmt wird. Der höchste Naturschutzwert kann erhalten werden, wenn die geplanten Baumarten sowohl autochthon als auch natürlicher Bestandteil des spezifischen Waldbiotoptyps sind. Anhand eines deutschlandweiten Transekts wurde die naturschutzfachliche Bewertung von zukünftig geplanten WET erprobt. In den meisten Fällen führten die WET-Kombinationen zu einer Verschlechterung des ursprünglichen Naturschutzwertes, da die eingeschränkte Baumartenwahl der WET nicht die vielfältige Artenzusammensetzung der natürlichen Waldbiotoptypen widerspiegelte. Mit diesem Bewertungssystem lässt sich die Waldbauplanung auch naturschutzfachlich einschätzen und auf eine möglichst naturnahe und standortheimische Baumartenzusammensetzung ausrichten. Die Unsicherheiten des Klimawandels und die damit verbundenen Veränderungen der Umweltbedingungen stellen auch den Naturschutz vor neue Herausforderungen und können eine Anpassung von Zielen und Schutzbegründungen erforderlich machen. In Kapitel 5 wurde daher untersucht, ob der günstige Erhaltungszustand von FFH-Waldlebensraumtypen angesichts des Klimawandels ein gut begründetes Ziel bleiben kann. Dabei wurde sowohl auf die Frage der Schutzbegründung eingegangen als auch eine Einschätzung des zukünftigen Entwicklungstrends des Erhaltungszustandes von FFH-Waldlebensraumtypen vorgenommen. Es konnte gezeigt werden, dass aktuelle Nischen- und Artverbreitungsmodelle von Lebensraumtypen und Baumarten darauf hindeuten, dass eine Klimawandel-bedingte Zunahme der Trockenheit für Waldlebensraumtypen wie den subalpinen Bergahorn-Buchenwald sowie den montan-alpinen bodensauren Fichtenwald zu Arealverlusten führen kann. Bei Moor- und Auenwäldern sollte zunächst eine erfolgreiche Renaturierung im Vordergrund stehen, bevor eine zukünftige Entwicklung abgeschätzt werden kann. Waldlebensraumtypen auf Sekundärstandorten wie Eichenmischwälder benötigen wahrscheinlich weiterhin aktive Pflegemaßnahmen, um einen günstigen Erhaltungszustand wiederherzustellen und langfristig zu sichern. Bei den Verbreitungsmodellen für Buchenwaldlebensraumtypen konnte eine zunehmende Unsicherheit bezüglich der zukünftigen Verbreitung festgestellt werden und es ließ sich auch unter Klimawandel überwiegend keine deutlich negative Veränderung erkennen. Eine Flexibilisierung und Anpassung von naturschutzfachlichen Zielsetzungen sollte demnach nur evidenzbasiert und im Rahmen eines adaptiven Managements erfolgen. Insgesamt ergeben sich vorerst keine eindeutigen Hinweise darauf, den günstigen Erhaltungszustand der Waldlebensraumtypen unter Klimawandel als ein gut begründetes Ziel des Naturschutzes aufzugeben. In dieser Dissertation werden die Bedeutung von Waldnaturschutzkonzepten in der heutigen Zeit und die Schwierigkeiten, die bei der Einordnung und Umsetzung von Waldnaturschutzzielen auftreten können, diskutiert. Ferner werden die Herausforderungen, die sich bei der naturschutzfachlichen Bewertung von Schutzgütern und Baumarten sowie bei der zukünftigen Umsetzung von Waldnaturschutzmaßnahmen ergeben können, identifiziert. Dabei wurde festgestellt, dass die systematische Analyse von naturschutzfachlichen Zielsetzungen in der Naturschutzforschung an Bedeutung gewonnen hat und ein insgesamt breiter Konsens über die Ziele im Waldnaturschutz in Deutschland herrscht. Trotzdem besteht ein erheblicher Präzisierungsbedarf, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Umsetzung des Vertragsnaturschutzes im Privatwald. Die vorgestellten Systeme zur Ableitung von Naturschutzwerten können insofern hilfreich sein, als dass abstrakte Eigenschaften wie Naturschutzwerte in ein vereinfachtes und nachvollziehbares System eingeordnet wurden. Forstliche und naturschutzfachliche Akteure können damit für den Naturschutzwert der Wälder sensibilisiert werden. Um bestehende Vorurteile zwischen den Akteuren abzubauen, ist es zudem notwendig, das Fördersystem in Deutschland im Hinblick auf den finanziellen Umfang und die Wirksamkeit von Naturschutzmaßnahmen weiter zu überarbeiten sowie praktische Handlungsempfehlungen auf der Grundlage wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse zu geben. Diese Dissertation unterstreicht, dass eine ständige Anpassung der Waldbehandlungsstrategien für den Waldnaturschutz und Waldbau notwendig ist, um die Herausforderungen des Klimawandels zu bewältigen. Damit Wälder ihre vielfältigen Funktionen und Ökosystemleistungen auch in Zukunft erhalten können, sollten naturnahe, artenreiche und aus überwiegend heimischen Baumarten aufgebaute resiliente Mischwäldern bevorzugt und die bestehenden Ziele im Naturschutz nicht ohne Grund aufgegeben werden. Nur so kann Waldnaturschutz in Deutschland und auch weltweit langfristig erfolgreich sein. ; The global biodiversity crisis is, along with climate change, the greatest challenge facing mankind. To ensure the long-term protection of biodiversity, conservation objectives must be agreed upon by all stakeholders, defined in concepts, and appropriate actions taken. This involves considering the often contrasting needs of nature and people and examining ethical-moral issues about the value of nature as well as different approaches to nature conservation. In this thesis, conservation objectives and values in German forest conservation concepts, considering ecological, political and social aspects are analysed in an interdisciplinary approach. The present state of forest conservation in Germany is discussed and current and future challenges are described. Based on this assessment of needs new methods for the classification of conservation objectives and for the assessment of forest conservation objects are presented and possible changes in conservation responsibility in view of climate change are proposed. Forests support a significant proportion of global biodiversity and provide essential ecosystem services, and their long-term conservation and sustainable use is becoming more important than ever in the face of climate change. Due to the diverse demands for conservation and use, a consensus on the objectives is necessary in forest conservation. Only a transparent system based on consistent objectives and measures is likely to be sufficiently accepted and implemented. Therefore, a hierarchical framework for the classification of nature conservation objectives was developed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Within higher-level target areas, desired target properties were assigned to conservation objects, which are to be achieved through certain measures. Using this framework, the contents of biodiversity and forest conservation concepts were examined for commonalities and differences. A broad consensus on conservation objectives was found in the concepts across different stakeholder groups and spatial scales, with the conservation of species, ecosystems and structures in forests rated as particularly important. Deficits were identified with regard to genetic diversity, abiotic resources and social-cultural objectives, as well as a mismatch in the transfer of knowledge. The reasons for these inconsistencies in forest conservation include conflicting objectives, lack of coordination across scales and inadequate implementation of objectives. In private forests, which make up half of the German forest area, the implementation of nature conservation measures is a particular challenge. Private forest owners often have reservations about sovereign nature conservation regulations and are less willing to participate due to the financial expenses involved. In order to ensure higher acceptance, forest conservation measures should be financially compensated. However, the contractual agreement of nature conservation services and financial remuneration (= contract-based nature conservation) has so far found limited application in private forests. Since the successful implementation of contract-based forest conservation requires a system of reasonable measures, the conservation objects identified in Chapter 2 (forest habitat types, structures and processes in forests) were assigned a conservation value in Chapter 3 on the basis of the need for, and the worthiness of, protection. Oak and mixed oak forests, dry-warm beech forests, historical forms of forest use (coppice forests or wood pastures) and natural structures such as deadwood (deciduous tree species, standing and lying) or habitat trees have a high nature conservation value. Based on the initial value and the expected value development, it was assessed whether conservation or restoration measures within the framework of contract-based forest conservation with varying durations are suitable. Contract-based forest conservation is particularly suitable for conservation objects with a high initial value if a loss of value can be avoided and if a high increase in value can be expected. It is not suitable for low initial values and a low restoration potential. With this framework, private forest owners can easily assess which nature conservation measures are suitable in their forest, increasing the likelihood that they will apply contract-based forest conservation in the future. Climate change and its predicted effects in terms of intensity and frequency of disturbances require an adaptation of silvicultural management. In Germany, silvicultural planning tools such as forest development types are often only related to the economic productivity function, while nature conservation demands are given little consideration. Therefore, the framework developed in Chapter 3 for the conservation value assessment of forest habitat types was adapted in Chapter 4 to the economically relevant tree species (beech, oak, pine, spruce, fir, Douglas-fir and larch) and further developed for application in forest stands according to the potential natural vegetation of the location. With the new framework, the nature conservation impacts of silvicultural planning and future tree species composition in forest stands can be spatially-explicitly assessed. Certain silvicultural combinations of tree species can lead to a reduction in the initial nature conservation value, which is determined by the forest habitat type naturally occurring there. The highest nature conservation value can be achieved if the planned tree species are both autochthonous and a natural component of the respective forest habitat type. The framework was trialled to assess planned forest development types using a Germany-wide transect. In most cases, the forest development type combinations led to a reduction of the initial nature conservation value, as the restricted tree species selection of the forest development types did not correspond to the diverse species composition of the natural forest habitat types. With this evaluation framework, forest planning can also be assessed in terms of nature conservation and be adapted to a tree species composition that is as close to nature and site-specific as possible. The uncertainties of climate change and the associated changes in environmental conditions also pose new challenges for nature conservation and may require an adaptation of the conservation objectives and justifications. Chapter 5 therefore investigated whether the favourable conservation status of forest habitat types of the Habitats Directive remains a well-founded objective when confronted with climate change. In this context, both the question of the conservation justification and an assessment of the future development trend of the conservation status of forest habitat types of the Habitats Directive were addressed. It was shown that current niche and species distribution models of habitat types and tree species indicate that a climate change-induced increase in drought can lead to losses in area of forest habitat types such as the subalpine sycamore-beech forest and the montane-alpine soil-acid spruce forest. In the case of bog woodland and alluvial forests, successful restoration should be the first priority before future development can be assessed. Forest habitat types on secondary sites, such as mixed oak forests, will probably continue to require active management measures to restore and secure a favourable conservation status in the long term. The distribution models for beech forest habitat types showed increasing uncertainty regarding future distribution, and for the most part no significant negative change could be identified, even under climate change. Flexibilisation and adaptation of conservation objectives should therefore only take place on the basis of evidence and within the framework of adaptive management. Overall, no clear indications is found to abandon the favourable conservation status of forest habitat types under climate change as a well-founded objective of nature conservation. This thesis discusses the importance of forest conservation concepts in today's world and the difficulties that can arise in the classification and implementation of forest conservation objectives. Furthermore, the challenges that may arise in the conservation value assessment of conservation objects and tree species as well as in future implementation of forest conservation measures are identified. It was found that the systematic analysis of conservation objectives has gained importance in conservation research and that there is a broad consensus on the objectives of forest conservation in Germany. Nevertheless, there is a considerable need for more specification, especially with regard to the implementation of contract-based nature conservation in private forests. The frameworks presented for the derivation of nature conservation values can be helpful in turning abstract properties such as nature conservation values into a simplified and comprehensible system. Forestry and nature conservation stakeholders can thus be sensitised to the conservation value of forest biodiversity. In order to reduce existing prejudices between stakeholders, it is also necessary to further revise the funding system in Germany with regard to its financial scope and the effectiveness of conservation measures, and to provide practical recommendations for action based on scientific findings. This thesis underlines that a constant adaptation of forest management strategies is necessary for forest conservation and silviculture to cope with the challenges of climate change. For forests to maintain their diverse functions and ecosystem services in the future, semi-natural, species-rich resilient mixed forests composed of predominantly native tree species should be favoured and the existing objectives in nature conservation should not be abandoned without reason. Only in this way can forest conservation in Germany and also worldwide be successful in the long term. ; 2022-04-28

This dissertation consists in an empirical study of the relationship between democracy and political confidence in East Asia, a region of our globe that goes from Mongolia to Indonesia, as Northern and Southern limits, and from Myanmar to Japan, as Western and Eastern borders. The study of individuals' confidence in public institutions, often linked with the more general discussion about political legitimacy, arguably represents one of the most analysed and debated topics of political science. Nonetheless, the almost entirety of our knowledge about this relationship derives from theoretical discussion and empirical investigations about the impact, or potential impact, of citizens' confidence in institutions on democratic viability. Although during the last two decades a burgeoning number of studies about the the interplay between institutions and individuals' political confidence has been produced, studies investigating this relationship from the opposite perspective, namely the extent to which democracy impacts on individual confidence in institutions, has been seldom investigated. Institutional studies of political confidence have been increasingly focusing on the extent to which the economic or political performance of state institutions and authorities, or other features of the political system, such as the fairness, responsiveness, and honesty of political process, affect citizens' confidence in institutions. In those few cases in which the essential features of a democratic system have been considered as potential antecedents of individual confidence in institutions these effects have been investigated in and across democratic regimes, especially in the European and North American contexts. As a consequence, what it is contended is that our knowledge of this relationship, and the largely positive view about said relationship, is to a large extent contingent on the contexts in which it has been studied. For this reason, this work steps out from the usual yard of normative debates and empirical studies about this topic, and focuses on East Asia, a region of our globe providing several opportunities (and challenges) to empirically investigate individual confidence in institutions and its interplay with political institutions. East Asia nowadays represents one of the most heterogeneous regions of our world on a plethora of structural and systemic features. Among these, East Asia presents a remarkable variety of political systems, ranging from single-party autocratic regimes to pluralistic liberal-democracies, and including several types of 'hybrid' regimes, fitting in neither categories. Since the late 1990s and early 2000s data about individual attitudes and behavior across this variety of regimes have been collected, allowing scholars and researchers to reassess, and in some cases challenge, issues and assumptions about a long list of political phenomena, including political confidence. In- deed, while individual-level studies of political confidence in this region have shown that the dynamics generating different degrees of confidence across individuals overlap with those seen in other regions of our globe, descriptive studies of cross-national variations of political confidence in this region have shown that individual confidence in institutions, during the last two decades, has been invariably higher in non-democratic regimes as compared to democratic countries. Several hypotheses and arguments, although scarcely investigated, have been developed in order to explain these aggregate regularities. Some authors attempted to explain these variations following socio-deterministic theories about an increasing mismatch between individual basic orientations to politics and the reality of their political systems determined by socioeconomic modernization, that is the so-called 'critical citizens' theory, or enduring cultural traditions, the so-called 'Asian Values' argument. Others have pointed their attention on differences in terms of (especially economic) performance of East Asian governments. Still others have called into question the reliability and validity of individual confidence measures in non-democratic settings. Few scholars have considered the idea that these differences may be related to structural characteristics of the political processes that differentiate democratic regimes from non-democratic ones. In this work, although accounting for alternative explanations both theoretically and empirically, this latter perspective is developed and investigated. Building on arguments and evidence concerning the effects of political competition outputs (namely, election results) on individual-level variations of confidence in institutions, and relying on the renowned theoretical and analytical comparative framework developed by Robert Dahl (1971) in its seminal study on political participation and opposition, this thesis aims to investigate how an essential characteristic of any political system, namely the extent to which a regime provides institutional guarantees for public contestation to a more or less broad share of its population, affects individuals' confidence in institutions. In order to provide a rigorous, specific, but also comprehensive empirical assessment of this topic, this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 1 is dedicated to a theoretical and conceptual discussion about the notion of political confidence and the main explanations of its origins, starting from which the broad research question inspiring this dissertation is presented. About the former topic, building on relatively recent theoretical and conceptual developments, what it is contended is that the notion of confidence is conceptually distinct to the notion of trust, and the former should be preferred to the latter in order to conceptualize the relationship between individuals and public institutions (Ch. 1, Sect. 1.2.1). Furthermore, the relationship between this notion and the related concepts of regime legitimacy and political support is critically assessed in order to define the peculiar nature of the individual attitude under investigation (Ch. 1, Sect. 1.2.2). The chapter, then, continues with a reassessments of the second topic mentioned above, namely a review of theories and explanations of political confidence, based on the ubiquitous categorization of theories of political phenomena distinguishing between culturalist and institutionalist arguments (Ch. 1, Sect. 1.3). Building on these two sections the chapter ends with a discussion concerning the scope of these explanations, and briefly reviewing the debate about the relationship between democracy and political confidence (Ch. 1, Sect. 1.4). In particular, what is claimed is that, while providing opposite and to some extent irreconcilable perspectives about the determinants of political confidence, current theories and explanations of this phenomenon lack arguments assessing the systemic impact of democracy on individual confidence in institutions, for both theoretical reasons and the already mentioned focus of theoretical discussions and empirical investigation on democratic settings, driving to a contingent understanding of the relationship between democracy and political confidence. What it is contended, thus, is that for assessing this issue a different analytical strategy is needed. Chapter 2 is, thus, dedicated to developing the specific argument of this thesis (Ch. 2, Sect. 2.2), discussing the state of art of the empirical research dedicated to political confidence in East Asia, thus introducing the geopolitical context in which this work is situated (Ch. 2, Sect. 2.3), and finally presenting the research design adopted to investigate the main puzzle and related research questions of this research effort (Sect. 2.4). The first section (Sect. 2.2.1) clarifies which is the notion of democracy adopted in this study, that consists in Dahl's (1971, 1989, 1998) notion of polyarchy and the theoretical and analytical framework that has been produced around this notion (e.g. Coppedge and Reinicke 1990; Coppedge et al. 2008; Teorell et al. 2019). The section then continues (Sect. 2.2.2) with an explanation of why varying levels of democracy are interpreted as variations of levels of public contestation, one of the two dimensions informing the notion of democracy used in this work. The following pages are then dedicated to a discussion about why and how variations of institutional features and dimensions identified by the notion of democracy used in this thesis can be related to varying levels of individuals' confidence in institutions (Sect. 2.2.3). What it is contended is that variations of these attributes shape the structure of incentives and constraints affecting individuals assessments of institutions and authorities trustworthiness, and that higher degrees of public contestation are likely to produce both positive and negative incentives for individuals' confidence in public institutions. The following section is then dedicated to the state of art of the study of political confidence in this region, that highlights the main findings and gaps about aggregate- level and individual-level studies of political confidence in this region. By doing so, in this section the East Asian context is presented and the opportunities and challenges given by the structural heterogeneity of this region are discussed, and the necessity of a study able to fill the the lack of contextual analyses of political confidence in this region is underlined. Then, Finally, the chapter ends presenting the specific research questions investigated in the following chapters and the research strategy employed to address these questions (Sect. 2.4.1), as well as the main individual-level and contextual-level data bases of this empirical study (Sect. 2.4.2). The following three chapters of the thesis (Chs. 3, 4, and 5) consist in the three sets of empirical analyses used to address the research questions and the main hypothesis grounding this work. Chapter 3 presents a dimensionality analysis of political confidence in East Asia. What it is claimed is that in order to properly analyse the relationship between democracy and political confidence, what is needed is a prior assessment of whether East Asians confidence in institutions represent a single and general assessment of public institutions, or rather a multidimensional attitude (an assessment seldom performed in previous research). Consequently, this chapter, building on the ongoing debate about political confidence dimensionality in Europe (Ch. 3, Sect. 3.2), and after presenting the main expectations derived by translating this debate in investigates this issue through the means of exploratory and (multi-group) confirmatory factor analyses (EFA and CFA), applied to (almost) all the studies composing the first four rounds of the ABS (Ch. 3, Sect. 3.3). The main finding of this chapter is that, despite the crucial diversities of the countries included in this study on a series of structural factors potentially affecting the way in which East Asians organize their attitudes toward public institutions, a common factor structure of political confidence in this region can be found, and that this configuration consists in a two-dimensional conception distinguishing between confidence in political institutions (e.g. national governments and national assemblies) and confidence in implementative institutions (e.g. civil services and police forces). Chapter 4 is then dedicated to an analysis of these two types of political confidence in the aggregate. In the first part of the chapter, a descriptive analysis of East Asians' confidence in both political and implementative institutions is provided (Ch. 4, Sect. 4.2). In this part the cross-national variations of political confidence already highlighted by previous research are presented, although in a broader picture, spanning across approximately fifteen years of evidence provided by the ABS data. The stable differences between East Asian countries are then assessed through a bivariate and multivariate correlational analyses, performed in order to test alternative explanations of these cross-national patterns (Ch. 4, Sect. 4.4 and Sect. 4.5). What it is shown is that the selected indicator of political contestation levels consistently negatively correlates with the index dedicated to ABS respondents' political confidence, representing the best predictor of cross-national variations of aggregate levels of these attitudes, outperforming all the alternative explanations. What the chapter shows, however, is that the impact of contestation on aggregate levels of political confidence is much stronger for confidence in political institutions as compared to confidence in implementative ones. Chapter 5 then represents the last empirical chapter of this dissertation, and presents a multilevel analysis of political confidence, spanning across the second, third, and fourth rounds of the ABS, and providing an assessment of both individual-level and contextual-level determinants of political confidence, and their interplay. After providing hypotheses concerning the relationship between relevant individual-level antecedents of political confidence as identified by previous research, and expectations concerning the direct and indirect effect of the contextual variable of interest (Ch. 5, Sect. 5.2), a series of hierarchical linear regression models (HLMs) are performed in order to account for both individual-level and contextual-level variation of political confidence (Ch. 5, Sect. 5.4). What these models provide is, first, a reassessment of previous findings about the direct effect of political contestation on confidence in political institutions and confidence in implementative institutions, partially confirming previous results, but also highlighting even more the different impact of political contestation on the two indices of political confidence, strong and statistically significant for average levels of confidence in political institutions, while much weaker and even not significant in affecting confidence in implementative ones. Second, the HLMs return a clear picture about the individual-level determinants of political confidence in this region, showing how institutional performance indicators represent the best individual-level predictors of confidence across all the contexts considered, and how their effects vary according to the type of political confidence taken into account. Third, these models show how the indirect effect of political contestation, considered as a moderating factor of the effect of some individual-level determinants, operates differently according to the type of political confidence considered, moderating the effect of individual-level variables when considering confidence in implementative institutions but not in the case of the other type investigated in this work. The chapter, hence, returns a rather puzzling scenario that is further discussed in the last section of this chapter (Ch. 5, Sect. 5.5). The dissertation, then, concludes with a reassessment of the main findings proposed in previous chapters, the limitations of the study, and the main implications for the empirical study of political confidence in East Asia and beyond.

The importance of direct patient reporting has been highlighted by recent European legislation on pharmacovigilance, and in addition, there is also an increasing attention worldwide for this subject. In Europe, the legislation directs member states to take all appropriate measures to encourage patients to report suspected adverse drug reactions (ADR) to the relevant national authorities. The introduction of patient reporting in pharmacovigilance indicates a change in attitude in which patient reporting is valued due to their potential to contribute useful information on drug safety. The aim of this project is to give a better understanding of the role of patients in pharmacovigilance systems. The chosen approach during this project intended to lead to a better understanding of the awareness and perception of the risk involved with medicine use and how patients and healthcare professionals can contribute to optimize the current pharmacovigilance system. For the purpose of this study, the project was divided in several parts, for which specific objectives were designed and described below, together with main results of the thesis. The first study described in Chapter 2 discusses the experiences of patient reporting to pharmacovigilance in Portugal and quantifies consumers motivation for reporting ADRs, investigating patient opinions about reporting with a quantitative analysis in a large group of consumers. The objective was to describe the attitudes and knowledge of the general public regarding spontaneous reporting and the reasons and opinions that can influence consumers adverse drug reaction underreporting. The study reveals that consumers are more likely to do spontaneous report about severe reactions or if they are worried about the symptoms. Also, more altruistic motives as the contribution to research and knowledge, the contribution to improvement of drugs and prevent harm to other people are seen as motives to report ADRs by patients. These motives can be classified in reporting for oneself (severity, worried, problems), reporting for others (share experiences, preventing harm, feeling responsible) or reporting for improvement (research and knowledge, patient information leaflet). It appeared that multiple patient characteristics (gender, age and level of education) had an effect on the motives of patients to report their ADR. In Chapter 3 were described the attitudes toward patient reporting systems, and progress toward implementing such systems among national competent authorities participating in the World Health Organization Programme for International Drug Monitoring. The study shows that most countries accept ADR reports from patients by an official reporting system designed for patients or through the existing system for Healthcare Professionals (HCPs). The main reasons for not having a Patient Reporting System (PRS) are financial restraints and a lack of information/education of patients. Attitudes toward a PRS are positive, but some countries fear 181 that they will not be able to handle an increase in reports. Most countries accept ADR reports from the general public. The lack of resources/budget and the lack of information/education for patients are highlighted as the major obstacles to the implementation of PRS. Chapter 4 focused on patient organizations role to promote patient reporting. In Chapter 4.1, it was studied the role of European patient organizations with the objective of understand the role of European patient organizations as stakeholders to optimize patient involvement in pharmacovigilance. There is a wide range of interest in drug safety issues among patient organizations, which appear to have an important role in encouraging patients to talk with their doctors/pharmacists about ADRs experienced, or to help him/her report the ADRs to the pharmacovigilance systems. A lack of resources, budget, and support from National Competent Authorities (NCAs) are seen as the main barriers to being involved in pharmacovigilance. On the other hand, an important part of the organizations appears to not have any activities or involvement related to pharmacovigilance. Bringing pharmacovigilance stakeholders and patient organizations together could create a more optimal patient reporting culture. Members of a patient organization showed more positive opinions related to pharmacovigilance. They would like to have more information about ADRs related to their medication and a higher intention to have information on how to report when compared to other patients. The other study in Chapter 4 described medicines and attitudes and opinions regarding pharmacovigilance in people with diabetes. The study explored the impact of the patient reports being followed by a patient diabetes association. The objective was to assess risk perception of developing adverse drug reactions and knowledge, attitudes and opinions regarding pharmacovigilance in patients with diabetes and to investigate whether being a member of a patient organization for diabetes had an effect on these factors. Patients followed in a diabetes patient association presented a higher score of risk perception, experiences using the medicines, but also by the information received from the patient organization. Being a member of a patient organization seems to have an important role in increasing risk perception since they presented the highest risk perception scores for medicines related to their disease. Those patients affirmed that their doctor explained the possible ADRs of their medication and they have higher intention to report ADRs in the future if they are serious or unexpected. Patient organizations are well positioned to be a source where patients can obtain reliable information, changing their attitudes and perceptions about the disease and drug treatments. An additional chapter was provided, related with HCPs role as active agents to improve the involvement of patients in pharmacovigilance. Chapter 5.1 objective was to describe the attitudes and knowledge of different community pharmacy professional groups regarding the spontaneous reporting of adverse drug reactions to identify the factors that can influence adverse drug reaction under-reporting. Despite HCPs knowledge of the pharmacovigilance system, only a small 182 percentage of Community pharmacy professionals had reported ADRs, and approximately half did not usually encourage consumers to report possible ADRs. In Chapter 5.2, the objective was to evaluate community pharmacy professionals as role players . Reporting of ADRs is fundamental to pharmacovigilance, and consumer reporting is a significant contribution to creating useful information on drug safety. Community pharmacy professionals can play a major role in pharmacovigilance by reporting ADRs directly or encouraging consumers to report them. Measures to overcome under-reporting as encouraging HCPs and consumers to play an active role in pharmacovigilance, namely continuous education and training should be incorporated to increase the level of risk perception and encourage a better attitude about reporting for both HCPs and consumers. Chapter 6 presents a general discussion about the role of general public in pharmacovigilance, providing recommendations that arose from the results with different points of view of patient participation in pharmacovigilance (national competent authorities, HCPs, patient organizations and patients themselves). In conclusion, this thesis has focused on an overview of the participation of different stakeholders in pharmacovigilance, including HCPs, NCAs, Patient Organizations and patients themselves. Further research and developments for pharmacovigilance systems and for patients themselves arose from the results provided. ; Recientemente, la legislación europea sobre farmacovigilancia ha resaltado la importancia de la participación de los ciudadanos en la notificación espontánea de sospechas de reacciones adversas (RAMs), siendo este asunto objeto de atención creciente en todo el mundo. En Europa, la legislación establece que los Estados miembros deben tomar las medidas apropiadas para alentar a los pacientes a notificar las de sospechas de RAMs a las autoridades nacionales competentes. La introducción de esta posibildad, indica un cambio de actitud en el que se valora el informe del paciente debido a su potencial para aportar información útil sobre la seguridad de los medicamentos. El objetivo de esta tesis es comprender mejor el papel de los pacientes en los sistemas de farmacovigilancia. El enfoque elegido pretende describir la conciencia y la percepción del riesgo por parte de los pacientes en relación con el uso de medicamentos y cómo tanto ellos, como los profesionales de la salud (PS) pueden contribuir a optimizar el sistema actual de farmacovigilancia. Con este propósito, la tesis se dividió en varias partes, cuyos objetivos específicos y principales resultados, se describen a continuación. En el primer estudio descrito en el Capítulo 2, se discuten las experiencias de la notificacion ciudadana al sistema de farmacovigilancia en Portugal y cuantifica la motivación de los consumidores, investigando sus opiniones a través de un análisis cuantitativo llevado a cabo en un gran grupo de usuarios. El objetivo de este estudio es describir las actitudes y el conocimiento de los ciudadanos en general con respecto a las notificaciones espontáneas y las razones y opiniones que pueden influir en la escasa notificación de RAMs por su parte. El estudio revela que es más probable la notificación espontánea por parte de los ciudadanos, cuando se trate de reacciones graves o si existiera preocupación por los síntomas generados por la RAM. Además, otros motivos más altruistas como la contribución a la investigación y al conocimiento, la contribución a la mejora de los fármacos y la prevención del daño en otras personas, también fueron considerados por los pacientes como motivos para notificar RAM. Estas motivaciones pueden clasificarse en: notificar para uno mismo (gravedad, preocupación, problemas), para otros (compartir experiencias, prevenir daños, sentirse responsable) o para la mejora (investigación y conocimiento, hoja de información para el paciente). Asimismo, diferentes características del paciente como género, edad y nivel de educación, tenían influencia en sus motivos para notificar sus RAMs. El Capítulo 3 describe las actitudes de las autoridades nacionales de los participantes en el Programa de la Organización Mundial de la Salud de Vigilancia Farmacéutica Internacional acerca de la notificación ciudadana de sospechas de RAM y del progreso en su implementación. 187 El estudio muestra que la mayoría de los países aceptan notificaciones de sospechas de RAMs de los ciudadanos mediante un sistema oficial diseñado especialmente para ellos, o bien mediante el sistema existente para PS. Las principales razones para no disponer de un Sistema de Notificación de sospechas de RAM para Ciudadanos (SNRC) son las restricciones económicas y la falta de información / educación de los pacientes. Las actitudes acerca de los SNRC son positivas, aunque algunos países temen no poder manejar un aumento de las notificaciones de sospechas. La falta de recursos y la falta de información/educación de los pacientes se destacan como los principales obstáculos para la implementación del SNRC. El Capítulo 4 se centró en el papel de las organizaciones de pacientes para promover la notificación. En el Capítulo 4.1 se estudió el papel de las organizaciones europeas de pacientes como partes interesadas en optimizar la participación del paciente en la farmacovigilancia. Existe un amplio interés en los problemas de seguridad de los medicamentos entre las organizaciones de pacientes. Estas organizaciones parecen tener un papel importante alentando a los pacientes a hablar con sus médicos / farmacéuticos sobre las RAM experimentadas, o ayudándolo a informar las sospechas de RAM a los sistemas de farmacovigilancia. La falta de recursos y apoyo de las Autoridades Nacionales Competentes se consideran las principales barreras para participar en la farmacovigilancia. Por otro lado, una parte importante de las organizaciones parece no tener ninguna actividad relacionada con la farmacovigilancia. Reunir a las partes interesadas en farmacovigilancia con las organizaciones de pacientes podría crear una cultura de notificaciones de sospechas por los pacientes optimizada. De un estudio realizado en una organización de pacientes de pacientes diabéticos (Capítulo 4.2) sabemos que sus miembros mostraron opiniones positivas relacionadas con la farmacovigilancia. En general, a los pacientes asociados les gustaría tener más información sobre las RAMs de sus medicación y tenían mayor interés en disponer de información sobre cómo notificar que los pacientes diabéticos que no formaban parte de la asociación. El capítulo 5.1 se centró en el papel de los PS como agentes activos para mejorar la participación de los pacientes en la farmacovigilancia. El objetivo del Capítulo 5.1 era describir las actitudes y el conocimiento de los diferentes grupos profesionales de Farmacias Comunitarias con respecto a la notificación espontánea de RAM para identificar los factores que puedan influir en la falta de notificación. A pesar de que los PS conocen el sistema de farmacovigilancia, solo un pequeño porcentaje de los profesionales de Farmacia Comunitaria ha informado de RAMs, y aproximadamente la mitad no suele alentar a los ciudadanos a informar sospechas de RAMs. En el Capítulo 5.2, el objetivo fue evaluar a los profesionales de Farmacia Comunitaria como actores en la mejora de la participación de los ciudadanos en la farmacovigilancia y describir sus actitudes en relación con el sistema de farmacovigilancia y la notificación ciudadana de sospechas de RAMs. Las notificaciones de RAMs son fundamentales para la farmacovigilancia, y los informes de los ciudadanos son una contribución significativa a la creación de información útil sobre la seguridad de los medicamentos. Los profesionales de la Farmacia Comunitaria pueden desempeñar un papel importante en la farmacovigilancia notificando directamente o 188 alentando a los ciudadanos. Se deben implementar medidas como estrategias de educación y capacitación continua para superar la falta de información de los ciudadanos y alentar a los profesionales sanitarios a desempeñar un papel activo en la farmacovigilancia, mejorando su nivel de percepción de riesgo y promoviendo una mejor actitud. El Capítulo 6 presenta una discusión general sobre el papel del ciudadano en la farmacovigilancia, brindando recomendaciones surgidas de los resultados de los estudios sobre los diferentes puntos de vista (autoridades nacionales competentes, profesionales sanitarios, organizaciones de pacientes y los propios pacientes) acerca de la participación del paciente en la farmacovigilancia. En conclusión, esta tesis se ha centrado en una visión general de la participación de diferentes partes interesadas en la farmacovigilancia, incluidos los PS, las autoridades nacionales competentes, las organizaciones de pacientes y los propios pacientes. De los resultados proporcionados, surge la necesidad de un desarrollo adicional de medidas dirigidas a los PS, pacientes y a los propios sistemas de farmacovigilancia para mejorar la participación de los ciudadanos en los sistemas de farmacovigilancia.

In Italy, Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR) manages the second reception of forced migrants. This organization was founded by the Bossi-Fini law n. 189/2002 and is composed by the network of local governments, which uses the available resources of National Fund for Asylum Policies and Services provided by Government finance law and managed by the Ministry of Interior. Its principal goal is to realize integrated reception projects for refugees, asylum seekers, subsidiary and humanitarian protection holders in order to ensure their socio-economic inclusion within local contexts in cooperation with voluntary and third sector organizations. On 10th July 2014, local governments were signed an agreement between national and regional executive to create a national reception system to face the growing number of people who have arrived on the Italian coasts. The main goal of this system is to overcome only a material reception (food and lodging), in order to offer a "widespread reception" within urban areas. The strategy is to create an individual project and an accompaniment to ensure the integration of each person in the local community. The services provided consist in inclusion of migrants in the national health and scholastic system, orientation and access to other local services, professional training, job placement, legal assistance and social and housing integration . Indeed, it is crucial to emphasize that the Italian reception system is characterized by extreme fragmentation. Only SPRAR provides these services with the goal of enabling social and economic inclusion of hosted people in local context, which is why we talk about second reception centres. In Italy, there are, however, many different types of first and extraordinary reception centres for migrants . They are managed by the prefectures and differ in terms of goals, structural characteristics, services and receptive capacity. Only 18.7% of migrants are hosted in the SPRAR structures, while the remainder incurs the possibility of carrying out the entire procedure of the asylum application in the centres of first and extraordinary reception (IDOS, 2017). In recent years, the Italian reception structures have undergone a reorganization and redenomination phase, in which the SPRAR should have become a reference standard. In fact, this system has positively distinguished itself for its objectives, the structuring of his interventions and many best practices. This did not prevent bad reception occurrences even within SPRAR structures, as well as a large number of violent and verbal conflicts, some of which carried out by Italian citizens to the detriment of asylum seekers and owners of a status of international protection. These episodes, exacerbated by a political and media discourse that represents migrants as a threat (Battistelli et al., 2016), are the consequence and symbol of the fragmentary and contradictory reception policies adopted at a European level, in the individual countries and at a local level (IDOS, 2016). Instability and political, economic and social uncertainty, rulers in this historical period, are manifested in an emergency approach that is characterized by insufficient planning and a lack of coordination between the reception agencies. This orientation, supported by many and incongruent legislative changes, deprives the system of a strong structure and facilitates the overturning of the same principles of "widespread reception" of migrants in local communities. Moreover, this facilitates the affirmation of nationalist, xenophobic and localist drifts, as well as reception situations in which human rights are violated and which do not provide real opportunities for inclusion in the territories in a safe and dignified manner. Therefore, the conceptual distinction of the terms danger, risk and threat, used as the interpretative line of this work, appears fundamental to understand why subjective responses, in terms of perception and actions, differ according to the situations, as well as to manage the effects that derive in a consistent manner (Battistelli e Galantino, 2018). In order to realize the analysis, I decided to use an ethnographic approach that is traced back to the constructivist philosophical paradigm, where the vision of facts is investigated locally. Ethnographers, indeed, study subjects, artefacts and actions in their interactions, from an interpretative-dialectical point of view, without the claim of absolute objectivity of the results (Piccardo and Benozzo, 1996). Then, I have chosen to use focused narrative interviews because they turn to individuals, they aim for their "understanding", and this is part of the renewed interest in the subject's centrality and in the "deliberately intentional" social action (Weber, 1922). It is also an approach that allows investigating deeply the phenomena. It is very interactive, flexible and able to empathize in the perspective of the subject being studied. This makes it easier to interview marginal subjects neglected by "official knowledge" and to rediscover the social function of research, which is "giving voice to those who do not have it" (Crespi, 1985, pp. 351) In addition, observation and fieldwork are supported by a strong theoretical basis that offers its help to the researcher for the understanding of the social world, providing an order that supports they in their critical analysis of the facts. So, empirical work and theory support each other (Silverman, 2002). Then, narrative approach is highly adaptable to the study of organizations and to analyse the collected data. In fact, this approach is characterized for attention given to concrete situations and not to general theorizations (Czarniawska, 2000). Hence, the empirical research carried out in 2016-2018 can be summarized in the following phases: 1- Analysis of secondary data and documents produced by European and national statistical institutes, private associations, protection bodies and by SPRAR itself. 2- Participant observation in: - a political protest demonstration against the opening of a SPRAR centre in XIII Town Hall, on the north-western suburb of Rome; - nine meetings of social operators working in SPRAR network of Rome and in the national CARA and CAS reception centres; - a SPRAR centre (20 reception places increased to 40 in the south-eastern suburbs of Rome, VII Town Hall). One year of observation and shadowing of operators: 16th January 2017 – 22th January 2018; - a SPRAR apartment (14 reception places for families in the residential area of Monte Sacro neighbourhood, Town Hall III). Five days of observation and shadowing of operators in January 2018; - a seminar of reflection organized by SPRAR and ANCI on the reception system in Lazio, focused on the role of the Regions and Municipalities. 3- Forty-one narrative focused interviews: - Twenty-four SPRAR operators working in SPRAR centres of Rome; - Seventeen asylum seekers and refugees from SPRAR centre observed in Town Hall VII of Rome. The intent behind this ethnographic research started in a restructuring phase aimed to make the SPRAR a reference standard of reception for all asylum seekers who came to our country. But it was characterized, as still today, by speculative situations, the high presence on the territory of large collective reception centres and managing bodies without the necessary experience (Olivieri, 2011; Lunaria 2016). Therefore, the analysis of the risk management and the operators perception of the SPRAR of Rome has the objective to unveil and analyse the contradictions and weaknesses that may arise within this model due to a reckless management that produces specific factors of risk. The hypothesis underlying the case study is that, although the SPRAR has been recognized as an ordinary model, it can also be reproduced in a distorted manner, not respecting the reference guidelines. The alteration between SPRAR in books, the theoretical expression of a principle, and SPRAR in action, its implementation (Pound, 1910), is caused by specific factors that can cause significant effects from several points of view. To bring to light these aspects, closely related to the risk management and the perception that its operators have, I achieve a classification of the risks that I applied to three different types of SPRAR structures (large, medium and single apartment). Then, I identified a series of outcomes involving the people hosted, the operators, the local community and the SPRAR organization itself. The decision to draw the case study at the SPRAR of the city of Rome is driven by the complexity that distinguishes this territory on a social, cultural and political level. In fact, I believe it can bring out the contradictions of the model as new forms of confinement compared to territories with reduced complexity. However, allowing a glimpse of a reception of asylum seekers and holders of a protection status also possible within urban and metropolitan areas. The empirical survey shows that an increase in the distortion compared to the assumptions of an integrated and widespread reception in the territories corresponds to a greater possibility that specific risk factors are produced. Which in their turn, crystallizing into unhealthy forms, can involve the people hosted, the operators, the local community and the SPRAR organization itself. The case study and the application of the risk classification, which I achieved based on the evidence revealed from the field, reveal how the identified risk areas (socio-spatial context, production of the service, recipients) and the corresponding categories, do not produce in itself a negative result. However, this can occur if a short-sighted management acts on these aspects and does not align with the proposed guidelines. Therefore, this classification appears to be a useful tool to identify problems and to develop preventive measures, aimed to improve the management of SPRAR centres in metropolitan cities such as Rome (and other contexts), by intervening on the identified risk categories and reducing the factors that eventually emerge. The analysis, focused on three different types of SPRAR structure (large, medium, single apartment) of the Capital, shows how this alteration occurs in a disruptive way in the large collective centres, the most represented in Rome. Meanwhile, greater adherence to the model is shown, with a modality proportional to the size, in the medium-sized structure and in the apartment. The distortion detected in the large SPRAR collective centres of Rome and partly also in the medium-sized centre, reflects the ambivalence of the general reception system. It promotes on the one hand the principles of a good reception that respects human rights and the autonomy of people and by another implements foreclosure practices and new forms of borders (Vacchiano, 2011; Van Haken, 2008). The field research shows that this happens on different levels due to specific material factors (location and capacity of the centres, management of internal spaces, activation of the services provided, etc.) and through the daily practices of the operators who, in a more or less assenting, controlling and disciplining the people hosted, shape their conduct. Therefore, in the daily life of the structures in which the situations described are involved, the principles of freedom, inclusion and autonomy supported by the rhetoric of reception system are governed by a neoliberal logic of citizenship that suggests the criteria to distinguish, in the same integration paths, who is more worthy than other beneficiaries (Van Haken, 2008). Although the case study highlights strong contradictions and weaknesses that come to life in the implementation of the SPRAR model, it also shows the realization of a good reception. That which, despite being included in an extremely complex context such as Rome, attempts to oppose the "logic of large numbers and profits" of large cooperatives and which implements functional inclusion paths to achieve the objectives. Alignment and consistency with the guidelines and the SPRAR operating manual, in fact, allow the construction of a real project of individualized socio-economic integration for the person hosted. Only by acting in a widespread manner on the territory, in apartments or small centres, the genesis of new forms of borders beyond those already present is avoided. In fact, through this management most of the risks identified are eliminated or at least reduced, precisely because the "trajectory of opportunities" of risk (Reason, 1997) towards unfavourable outcomes generally develops within large collective centres. References Battistelli Fabrizio, Farruggia Francesca, Galantino Maria Grazia and Ricotta Giuseppe. 2016. "Affrontarsi o Confrontarsi? Il "Rischio" Immigrati sulla Stampa Italiana e nella Periferia di Tor Sapienza a Roma". Sicurezza e Scienze Sociali 1:86-112. Battistelli Fabrizio e Galantino Maria Grazia. 2018. "Dangers, Risks and Threats: An Alternative Conceptualization to the Catch-All Concept of Risk". Current Sociology 1-15. Czarniawska Barbara. 2000. Narrare l'organizzazione. La costruzione dell'identità istituzionale. Tr.it. Torino: Edizioni di Comunità. 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The paper addresses the problem of the place of deconstruction in the history of transcendental philosophy. J. Derrida's project is considered as one of the most representative and consistent realizations of theoretical foundations of transcendentalism along with prominent conceptions such as Kant's critique and Husserl's phenomenology. The author suggests a number of attributes of transcendental thinking that allow historical reconstruction of the transcendental paradigm. Derridian approach is considered as a turn towards this tradition, conceived as a transcendental tradition par exellence, guided by the attitude of «turning. Historical legacy of deconstructive «turning» is analyzed with respect to Husserlian Rückfrage: return-inquiry as method, idea and attitude, reproducing in deconstructive strategy of interpretative critique. A concept of hyperbolic transcendentalism is introduced in order to (1) define a deconstructive version of transcendental philosophy and (2) indicate an immanent tendency in the transcendental thought, constitutive for both Kantian critical project and Husserlian strive towards intellectual radicalism extending from methodological hyperboles (reduction and epoche) to radicalization of «transcendental motive». The author relies upon the concept of quasi-transcendental (thematized by Derrida himself), which defines a mode of de-dogmatization, critical purifying and preservation of proper transcendental foundations of philosophical thinking. ; Статья посвящена определению места деконструкции в истории трансцендентальной философии. Проект Ж. Дерриды рассматривается как одно из наиболее репрезентативных и последовательных воплощений теоретических оснований трансцендентализма, наряду с такими выдающимися концепциями, как Кантова критика и Гуссерлева феноменология. Предлагается ряд характеристик трансцендентального мышления, на основании котрого представяется возможной историко-философская реконструкция трансцендентальной парадигмы. Дерридианский поход рассматривается как поворот к традиции, понимаемой как par exellence традиция трансцендентальная, которая как таковая руководствуется установкой на «поворотность». Анализируется историко-философская преемственность деконструктивного «обратного поворота» по отношению к гуссерлевскому Rückfrage – обратному вопрошанию: методу, идее и установке, воспроизводящимся в деконструкционной стратегии интерпретативной критики. Вводится понятие гиперболического трансцендентализма с целью (1) характеристики деконструктивной версии трансцендентальной философии и (2) указания на имманентную тенденцию трансцендентального мышления, конститутивную как для кантовского критического проекта, так и для Гуссерлевой установки на радикализм мышления, обусловливающий как методологические гиперболы (редукцию и эпохе), так и историко-философскую интенцию на радикализацию «трансцендентального мотива». В обосновании своей исследовательской позиции автор опирается на тематизированное самим Дерридой понятие «квази-трансцендентального», характеризующее способ де-догматизации, критического очищения и сохранения собственно трансцендентальых оснований философской мысли.СПИСОК ЛИТЕРАТУРЫАвтономова (2011): Автономова, Н. Философский язык Жака Деррида. Москва: РОССПЭН, 2011, 506 с.Ильина (2011): Ильина, А. «Концепт Другого в ракурсе трансцендентализма». В: Койнонія, Спецвипуск № 2, Вісник Харківського національного університету ім. В.Н. Каразіна, 2011, № 950, С. 165–195.Ильина (2014): Ильина А. «Буквальность метафоры и присутствие вопроса: еврейский лейтмотив в философии Ж. Деррида». В: Sententiae, Вип. ХХХІ, 2014, № 2, С. 80–100.Йосипенко (2012): Йосипенко, О. Від мови філософії до філософії мови: проблема мови у французькій філософії другої половини ХХ початку ХХІ століть. Київ: Український центр духовної культури, 2012, 479 с.Ільїна (2014a): Ільїна, А. «"Навколо кола": трансцендентальна деконструкція метафізики». В: Практична філософія, 2014, № 2, С. 152–158.Ільїна (2014b): Ільїна, А. «Ідея повторення у філософських концепціях Серена К'єркегора та Жака Деріда». В: Практична філософія, 2014, №1, С. 30–44.Кант (2000): Кант І. Критика чистого розуму. Київ: Юніверс, 2000, 501 с.Bello (2011): Bello, A. A. «The Transcendental: Husserl and Kant». In: Analecta Husserliana, 2011, Vol. CVIII: Transcendentalism Overturned, P. 229–243.Bennington, Derrida (1999): Bennington, J., Derrida, J. Jacques Derrida. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, 420 p.Chung Chin-Yi (2008): Chung Chin-Yi. «Deconstruction and the Transformation of Husserlian Phenomenology». In: Kritike, Vol. 2, 2008, № 2, P. 77–94.Chung Chin-Yi (2011): Chung Chin-Yi. «On Derrida's Methodology». In: Movimiento Paroxista, 2011, Año 1, Vol. 1, P. 33–47.Colerbrook (2003): Colebrook, C. «The Opening to Infinity: Derrida's Quasi-Transcendentals». In: From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the Idea of the Transcendental. London, New York: Routledge, 2003, P. 162–183.Crépon (2006): Crépon, M. «Traduire, témoigner, survivre». In: Rue Descartes, Vol. 52, 2006, № 2, P. 27–38.Derrida (1962): Derrida, J. «Introduction à l'Origine de la Géométrie de Husserl». In: Husserl, E. l'Origine de la Géométrie. Paris: PUF, 1962, P. 3–172.Derrida (1967a): Derrida, J. De la grammatologie. Paris: Minuit, 1967, 450 p.Derrida (1967b): Derrida, J. La Voix et le Phénomène. Paris: PUF, 1967, 117 p.Derrida (1977): Derrida, J. Limited Inc. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1977, 160 p.Derrida (1993): Derrida, J. Spectres de Marx. Paris: Galilée, 1993, 279 p.Derrida (2003): Derrida, J. The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003, 229 p.Derrida (2007a): Derrida, J. «Envoi». In: Derrida, J. Psyche: Inventions of the other. Vol. 1. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2007, P. 94–128.Derrida (2007b): Derrida, J. Psyche: Inventions of the Other. Vol. 2. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2007, 333 p.Derrida, Roudinesco (2001): Derida, J., Roudinesco, E. De quoi demain… Paris: Fayard; Galilée, 2001, 316 p.Doyon (2014): Doyon, M. «The Transcendental Claim of Deconstruction». In: A Companion to Derrida. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014, P. 132–149.Forestier (2015): Forestier, F. Le Réel et le transcendental. Grenoble: Millon, 2015, 240 p.Gasché (1986): Gasché, R. The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1986, 348 p.Gasché (1999): Gasché, R. Of Minimal Things: Studies on the Notion of Relation. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999, 380 p.Gasché (2009): Gasché, R. «European Memories: Jan Patocka and Jacques Derrida on Responsibility». In: Critical Inquiry, Vol. 33, 2007, No. 2, P. 291–311.Haddad (2013): Haddad, S. Derrida and the Inheritance of Democracy. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2013, 192 p.Hurst (2004): Hurst, A. «Derrida's quasi-transcendental thinking». In: South African Journal of Philosophy, 2004, Vol. 23, №. 3, P. 244–266.Husserl (1970): Husserl, E. Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity. In: Husserl, E. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Evaston: Northwestern UP, 1970, P. 269–299.Husserl (1976): Husserl, E. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. In: Husserliana, Bd. VI. Hague: Nijhoff, 1976, 559 S.Husserl (1984): Husserl, E. Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phäno-menologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis.In: Husserliana, Bd. XIX. Hague: Nijhoff, 1984, 1024 S.Kern (1964): Kern, I. Husserl und Kant: Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus. Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1964, 448 S.Levinas (2004): Levinas, E. «Tout autrement». In: L'Herne, Derrida. Paris: Herne, 2004, P. 16–19.Lawlor (2002): Lawlor, L. Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2002, 304 p.Lipka (2011): Lipka, D. «Derrida, Husserl's Disciple: How We Should Understand Deconstruction of Transcendental Philosophy». In: Analecta Husserliana, 2011, Vol. CVIII: «Transcendentalism Overturned», P. 245–260.Mohanty (1996): Mohanty, J.N. «Kant and Husserl». In: Husserl Studies, 1996, Vol. 13, Iss. 1, P. 19–30.Naas (2003): Naas, M. Taking on the Tradition: Jacques Derrida and the Legacies of Deconstruction. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003, 211 p.Nancy (2006): Nancy, J.-L. «Derrida da capo». In: Rue Descartes, 2006, № 2, P. 112–117.Plotka (2009): Plotka, W. «The Riddle of Reason: In Search of Husserl's Concept of Rationality». In: Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique, 2009, Vol. 5, №2, URL = .Rheinberger (2010): Rheinberger, H.-J. On Historicizing Epistemology. Stanfond: Stanford UP, 2010, 128 p.Ricoeur (1955): Ricoeur P. «Kant et Husserl». In: Kant-Studien, 1955, Vol. 46, Iss. 1–4, P. 44–67.Rorty (1995): Rorty, R. «Is Derrida a "Quasi"-Transcendental Philosopher?». In: Contemporary Literature, 1995, Vol. 36, №1, P. 173–200.Taylor (1990): Taylor, M.C. Tears. Albany: SUNY Press, 1990, 263 p. ; Статтю присвячено визначенню місця деконструкції в історії трансцендентальної філософії. Проект Ж. Деріди розглядається як одне з найрепрезентативніших і найпослідовніших втілень теоретичних засад трансценденталізму, поряд із такими визначними концепціями, як Кантова критика та Гусерлева феноменологія. Пропонується ряд характеристик трансцендентального мислення, на основі якого уможливлюється історико-філософська реконструкція трансцендентальної парадигми. Дерідіанський підхід розглядається як поворот до традиції, зрозумілої як par exellence традиція трансцендентальна, що як така керується настановою на «поворотність». Аналізується історико-філософська спадковість деконструктивного «зворотнього повороту» у стосунку до гусерлівського Rückfrage – зворотнього запитування: методу, ідеї та настанови, що відтворюються в деконструкційній стратегії інтерпретативної критики. Запроваджується поняття гіперболічного трансценденталізму, яке має на меті (1) охарактеризувати деконструктивну версію трансцендентальної філософії та (2) вказати на іманентну тенденцію трансцендентального мислення, конститутивну як для Кантового критичного проекту, так і для Гусерлевої настанови на мисленнєвий радикалізм, межі якого сягають від методологічних гіпербол (редукції та епохе) до історико-філософської інтенції на радикалізацію «трансцендентального мотиву». В обґрунтуванні своєї дослідницької позиції авторка спирається на тематизоване самим Дерідою поняття «квазі-трансцендентального», що характеризує спосіб де-догматизації, критичного очищення та збереження властиво трансцендентальних засад філософського мислення.СПИСОК ЛІТЕРАТУРИАвтономова (2011): Автономова, Н. Философский язык Жака Деррида. Москва: РОССПЭН, 2011, 506 с.Ильина (2011): Ильина, А. «Концепт Другого в ракурсе трансцендентализма». В: Койнонія, Спецвипуск № 2, Вісник Харківського національного університету ім. В.Н. Каразіна, 2011, № 950, С. 165–195.Ильина (2014): Ильина А. «Буквальность метафоры и присутствие вопроса: еврейский лейтмотив в философии Ж. Деррида». В: Sententiae, Вип. ХХХІ, 2014, № 2, С. 80–100.Йосипенко (2012): Йосипенко, О. Від мови філософії до філософії мови: проблема мови у французькій філософії другої половини ХХ початку ХХІ століть. Київ: Український центр духовної культури, 2012, 479 с.Ільїна (2014a): Ільїна, А. «"Навколо кола": трансцендентальна деконструкція метафізики». В: Практична філософія, 2014, № 2, С. 152–158.Ільїна (2014b): Ільїна, А. «Ідея повторення у філософських концепціях Серена К'єркегора та Жака Деріда». В: Практична філософія, 2014, №1, С. 30–44.Кант (2000): Кант І. Критика чистого розуму. Київ: Юніверс, 2000, 501 с.Bello (2011): Bello, A. A. «The Transcendental: Husserl and Kant». In: Analecta Husserliana, 2011, Vol. CVIII: Transcendentalism Overturned, P. 229–243.Bennington, Derrida (1999): Bennington, J., Derrida, J. Jacques Derrida. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, 420 p.Chung Chin-Yi (2008): Chung Chin-Yi. «Deconstruction and the Transformation of Husserlian Phenomenology». In: Kritike, Vol. 2, 2008, № 2, P. 77–94.Chung Chin-Yi (2011): Chung Chin-Yi. «On Derrida's Methodology». In: Movimiento Paroxista, 2011, Año 1, Vol. 1, P. 33–47.Colerbrook (2003): Colebrook, C. «The Opening to Infinity: Derrida's Quasi-Transcendentals». In: From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the Idea of the Transcendental. London, New York: Routledge, 2003, P. 162–183.Crépon (2006): Crépon, M. «Traduire, témoigner, survivre». In: Rue Descartes, Vol. 52, 2006, № 2, P. 27–38.Derrida (1962): Derrida, J. «Introduction à l'Origine de la Géométrie de Husserl». In: Husserl, E. l'Origine de la Géométrie. Paris: PUF, 1962, P. 3–172.Derrida (1967a): Derrida, J. De la grammatologie. Paris: Minuit, 1967, 450 p.Derrida (1967b): Derrida, J. La Voix et le Phénomène. Paris: PUF, 1967, 117 p.Derrida (1977): Derrida, J. Limited Inc. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1977, 160 p.Derrida (1993): Derrida, J. Spectres de Marx. Paris: Galilée, 1993, 279 p.Derrida (2003): Derrida, J. The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003, 229 p.Derrida (2007a): Derrida, J. «Envoi». In: Derrida, J. Psyche: Inventions of the other. Vol. 1. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2007, P. 94–128.Derrida (2007b): Derrida, J. Psyche: Inventions of the Other. Vol. 2. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2007, 333 p.Derrida, Roudinesco (2001): Derida, J., Roudinesco, E. De quoi demain… Paris: Fayard; Galilée, 2001, 316 p.Doyon (2014): Doyon, M. «The Transcendental Claim of Deconstruction». In: A Companion to Derrida. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014, P. 132–149.Forestier (2015): Forestier, F. Le Réel et le transcendental. Grenoble: Millon, 2015, 240 p.Gasché (1986): Gasché, R. The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1986, 348 p.Gasché (1999): Gasché, R. Of Minimal Things: Studies on the Notion of Relation. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999, 380 p.Gasché (2009): Gasché, R. «European Memories: Jan Patocka and Jacques Derrida on Responsibility». In: Critical Inquiry, Vol. 33, 2007, No. 2, P. 291–311.Haddad (2013): Haddad, S. Derrida and the Inheritance of Democracy. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2013, 192 p.Hurst (2004): Hurst, A. «Derrida's quasi-transcendental thinking». In: South African Journal of Philosophy, 2004, Vol. 23, №. 3, P. 244–266.Husserl (1970): Husserl, E. Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity. In: Husserl, E. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Evaston: Northwestern UP, 1970, P. 269–299.Husserl (1976): Husserl, E. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. In: Husserliana, Bd. VI. Hague: Nijhoff, 1976, 559 S.Husserl (1984): Husserl, E. Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil. Untersuchungen zur Phäno-menologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis.In: Husserliana, Bd. XIX. Hague: Nijhoff, 1984, 1024 S.Kern (1964): Kern, I. Husserl und Kant: Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus. Den Haag: Nijhoff, 1964, 448 S.Levinas (2004): Levinas, E. «Tout autrement». In: L'Herne, Derrida. Paris: Herne, 2004, P. 16–19.Lawlor (2002): Lawlor, L. Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2002, 304 p.Lipka (2011): Lipka, D. «Derrida, Husserl's Disciple: How We Should Understand Deconstruction of Transcendental Philosophy». In: Analecta Husserliana, 2011, Vol. CVIII: «Transcendentalism Overturned», P. 245–260.Mohanty (1996): Mohanty, J.N. «Kant and Husserl». In: Husserl Studies, 1996, Vol. 13, Iss. 1, P. 19–30.Naas (2003): Naas, M. Taking on the Tradition: Jacques Derrida and the Legacies of Deconstruction. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003, 211 p.Nancy (2006): Nancy, J.-L. «Derrida da capo». In: Rue Descartes, 2006, № 2, P. 112–117.Plotka (2009): Plotka, W. «The Riddle of Reason: In Search of Husserl's Concept of Rationality». In: Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique, 2009, Vol. 5, №2, URL = .Rheinberger (2010): Rheinberger, H.-J. On Historicizing Epistemology. Stanfond: Stanford UP, 2010, 128 p.Ricoeur (1955): Ricoeur P. «Kant et Husserl». In: Kant-Studien, 1955, Vol. 46, Iss. 1–4, P. 44–67.Rorty (1995): Rorty, R. «Is Derrida a "Quasi"-Transcendental Philosopher?». In: Contemporary Literature, 1995, Vol. 36, №1, P. 173–200.Taylor (1990): Taylor, M.C. Tears. Albany: SUNY Press, 1990, 263 p.

To cope with the economic uncertainties of the changes, transformations, and transitions affecting current European and world agriculture, many farmers are rethinking the purposes of their business and are looking to diversify their activities. Taking advantage of certain assets related to their operation and of opportunities for tourism development in the region (such as availability of buildings, subsidies related to ecology and environment images), some of them have chosen agritourism, a tourist activity proposed by the farmer on his/her farm. The literature includes many studies on this topic, but there is no consensus on terminology, definitions, and concepts: they vary from one author to another and evolve over time. Having distinguished different agritourist typologies in which accommodation is a basic element, we have personally chosen to study agritourism defined as "all tourist and leisure activities and services present in a working farm". Wallonia and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, our geographical research areas, are neighbouring entities, with similar agriculture, and their tourist markets offer some similarities. Included in rural tourism, agritourism is nevertheless marginal compared to the overall tourist product offered. Some successes might suggest that agritourism could be the panacea against the crisis in agriculture. But is this always the case? Agritourism should be defined, localized, and differentiated. Working on these two periurban entities of Western Europe which are not yet discussed in the literature, we wanted to understand and to identify agritourist dynamics. We wanted to understand the geographic relationship between agritourism, periurban countryside, local resources, and agricultural and tourist specializations. We wanted to understand the logic of the emergence of tourism on a farm and the links between tourist and agricultural functions in a specific spatial context. Finally, we wanted to understand the integration of the motivations of different types of tourists and their reasons for visiting particular regional and local contexts. To do this, we analyse both the location and the agritourist geographical position in relation to the different markets. To meet the objectives, we conducted a comparative heuristic analysis of agritourism in both territories. We interviewed key organisational representatives (31 persons), we made field observations, documents comparisons. We conducted interviews with various Walloon and Luxembourg farmers (34 life histories) affording different agritourist practices that we synthesized by circumstantial geographical sketches. We conducted surveys with potential tourists (1148surveys) in seven Walloon and Luxembourg tourist spots. These steps and the statistical and cartographic processing based on the results allowed us to build a heuristic geographical model of the Walloon and Luxembourg agritourism. The experiences of farmers interviewed allowed us to understand the position of the agritourist system in its spatial context. Each of them develops opportunities and experience threats (economic, social, from heritage) in connection with the launch of the project, a true survival kit in some cases. It appears that agritourism is not always a panacea for farmers. On the farm, the tourist function comes after the agricultural one and is based on the latter, but the agricultural function also benefits from the tourist function because both activities are related. The emergence of tourism is an autonomous decision of the farmers who can be influenced by other actors, including authorities, but also by other factors such as the existence of a local demand or the regional real estate pressure. There is no particular profile of tourists visiting agritourism, but some features, including those of family, are more favourable to the experience of this type of tourism. Definitions and representations as well as the reasons and expectations differ depending on the characteristics of the interviewed tourists: urban or rural origin, level of experience. Three agritourist profiles were also highlighted: those seeking accommodation in a rural environment, those who think about accommodation linked to gastronomy, those who prefer accommodation that would be a comfortable basis from which to tour in a tourist area. The comparison between the experiences of farmers and the expectations of tourists shows that there is a risk of developing different organizational temporalities in the farm "open" to tourists as well as of favouring unbalanced images of agritourism, which could lead to a vision and a promotion of agriculture which does not correspond to its regional reality. By combining the different results and by linking the typology of the Walloon and Luxembourg agritourist products, the types of rural areas and the geographical components, it appears that agritourism should not only be analysed according to the environmental dimensions, but that the analysis must also take into account other factors such as accessibility, local communities, hospitality, rural development policies, the real estate market, the agricultural orientation of farm operations, as well as the degree of complementarity with tourist spots. We have demonstrated that agritourism, combining agriculture with tourism, is not developing, either everywhere, or in the same manner, and differs between different types of periurban countryside, depending on local resources. Moreover, agritourism is not always a solution for all countrysides, nor always a path for each farmer, nor always a perfect tourist destination for all tourists. However, even if strict regionalization of agritourism does not seem possible when we consider all the factors involved in the different regions, trends may emerge depending on agritourist types. There is thus a link between agritourism type and countryside type, which the heuristic model we propose should allow to improve in order to increase the convergence between the expectations of the different stakeholders. ; Pour faire face aux incertitudes économiques auxquelles les mutations, transformations et transitions actuelles confrontent les agricultures européennes et mondiales, nombre d'agriculteurs repensent les finalités de leur métier et cherchent à diversifier leurs activités. Profitant des atouts liés à leur exploitation et des opportunités de développements touristiques régionaux (tels que disponibilité de bâtiments, subsides, images liées à l'écologie et à l'environnement), certains d'entre eux se sont orientés vers l'agritourisme, cette activité de tourisme proposée par l'agriculteur dans son exploitation agricole. La littérature abonde d'études relatives à ce phénomène, mais il n'y a pas de consensus quant à la terminologie, aux définitions et aux concepts y afférant : ceux-ci varient d'un auteur à l'autre et évoluent avec le temps. Après en avoir dégagé différentes typologies de l'agritourisme, où l'hébergement est à considérer comme un produit de base, nous avons choisi d'étudier un agritourisme défini comme « l'ensemble des activités et services de tourisme et de loisirs présents dans une exploitation agricole en activité ». La Wallonie et le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, cadre géographique de la recherche, sont des entités contiguës, proches par leur agriculture, dont les marchés touristiques offrent certaines similitudes. Inclus dans le tourisme de terroir, l'agritourisme y est pourtant marginal par rapport à l'offre touristique globale. Toutefois, quelques réussites donnent à penser que l'agritourisme pourrait être une panacée pour cette agriculture en crise. Mais est-ce le cas partout ? L'agritourisme demande à être défini, localisé, différencié. En travaillant sur ces deux entités périurbaines d'Europe occidentale non encore analysées dans la littérature, nous voulions comprendre et faire émerger des dynamiques agritouristiques. Nous voulions comprendre la relation géographique entre agritourismes, campagnes périurbaines, ressources locales et spécialisations agricoles et touristiques. Nous voulions comprendre les logiques d'émergence du tourisme au sein d'une exploitation agricole et les liens entre les fonctions touristiques et agricoles dans un contexte spatial particulier. Enfin, nous voulions comprendre l'intégration des raisons et motivations des touristes par rapport aux contextes régional et local. Pour ce faire, il s'agissait d'analyser à la fois la localisation et la position géographique de l'agritourisme par rapport aux différents marchés. Afin de pouvoir répondre aux objectifs, nous avons procédé à une analyse heuristique comparative de l'agritourisme au sein des deux territoires cités. Nous avons interviewé des témoins privilégiés (31 personnes), nous avons fait des observations de terrain, des comparaisons documentaires . Nous avons effectué des interviews auprès de différents agriculteurs wallons et luxembourgeois (34 récits de vie) proposant différentes pratiques agritouristiques que nous avons synthétisées sous forme de schémas circonstanciels géographiques. Nous avons réalisé des enquêtes auprès de touristes potentiels (1148 enquêtes) dans sept lieux touristiques wallons et luxembourgeois. Ces étapes et les traitements statistiques et cartographiques effectués sur les résultats nous ont permis de construire un modèle heuristique géographique de l'agritourisme wallon et luxembourgeois. Les expériences des tenanciers interrogés nous ont permis de renforcer le positionnement de l'agritourisme dans son contexte spatial. Chacun d'eux développe des circonstances positives et négatives (patrimoniales, économiques et sociales) en rapport avec le lancement de son projet, véritable kit de survie dans certains cas. Il en ressort que l'agritourisme n'est pas toujours une panacée pour les agriculteurs. Au sein de l'exploitation, la fonction touristique arrive après la fonction agricole et repose sur cette dernière, mais la fonction agricole bénéficie aussi de la fonction touristique puisque les devenirs des deux activités sont liés. L'émergence de l'activité touristique est une décision autonome de l'exploitant qui peut être influencé par d'autres acteurs, notamment par les autorités publiques mais aussi par d'autres facteurs comme l'existence d'une demande à proximité ou la pression immobilière. Il n'existe pas un profil particulier de touristes fréquentant l'agritourisme, mais certaines caractéristiques, notamment familiales, sont plus favorables à la pratique de ce type de tourisme. Les définitions et représentations ainsi que les raisons et attentes diffèrent selon les caractéristiques des touristes interrogés : origine urbaine ou rurale, degré d'expérience. Trois profils d'agritouristes ont aussi été mis en évidence : ceux qui cherchent un hébergement situé dans un environnement rural, ceux qui pensent à un hébergement lié à la gastronomie, ceux qui privilégient un hébergement qui serait un pied-à-terre confortable pour rayonner dans une région touristique. La comparaison entre les expériences des tenanciers et les attentes des touristes fait apparaître le risque de développer des temporalités organisationnelles en concurrence au sein même de l'exploitation agricole « ouverte » aux touristes ainsi que de favoriser des images déséquilibrées de l'agritourisme, ces dernières pouvant aboutir à une vision et à une promotion de l'agriculture qui ne correspondent pas à sa réalité régionale. En combinant les différents résultats et en reliant la typologie des produits agritouristiques wallons et luxembourgeois, les types de milieux ruraux et les composantes géographiques, il ressort que l'analyse de l'agritourisme ne doit pas seulement tenir compte des aspects environnementaux, mais qu'elle doit aussi tenir compte d'autres facteurs tels l'accessibilité, les communautés locales, l'hospitalité, les politiques de développement rural, le marché immobilier, l'orientation agricole de l'exploitation et le degré de complémentarité avec les lieux touristiques. Nous avons ainsi mis en évidence que l'agritourisme, combinaison de l'agriculture avec le tourisme, ne se développe ni partout, ni de la même manière, quel que soit le type de campagne périurbaine puisqu'il utilise les ressources locales. De plus, il n'est ni toujours une solution pour toutes les campagnes, ni toujours une solution possible pour tous les agriculteurs, ni toujours une destination de tourisme idéale pour tous les touristes. Cependant, même si une régionalisation stricte de l'agritourisme ne semble pas possible quand on considère l'ensemble des facteurs intervenant dans les différentes régions, des tendances peuvent se dégager en fonction de types agritouristiques. Il existe donc un lien entre type d'agritourisme et type de campagne, lien que le modèle heuristique que nous proposons doit permettre de resserrer pour augmenter la convergence entre les attentes des différents acteurs. ; Um sich den wirtschaftlichen Unsicherheiten zu stellen, welche Änderungs, Umwandlungs und Transitionsprozesse in der europäischen und globalen Landwirtschaft mit sich ziehen, überdenken viele Landwirte ihre berufliche Positionierung und versuchen ihre Tätigkeitsfelder zu diversifizieren. Eine Option zur Diversifikation bietet die zusätzliche Nutzung der Ressourcen des landwirtschaftlichen Betriebs (Verfügbarkeit von Gebäuden, ökologische Ressourcen und kulturelle Umwelt) für eine touristische Inwertsetzung. Diese von Landwirten angebotene Form des Fremdenverkehrs wird als Agrotourismus bezeichnet. In der Fachliteratur findet sich eine Vielzahl von Untersuchungen zu diesem Thema, allerdings werden Terminologien, Definitionen und Konzepten in der Literatur bisher nicht einheitlich verwendet. Die Anwendung von Begrifflichkeiten und Konzepten hat sich zudem im Zeitablauf verändert. Aus diesem Grund wurde für die vorliegende Untersuchung zunächst eine Differenzierung der verschiedenen Typologien von Agrotourismus, in der "Beherbergung" als Basisprodukt betrachtet wird, durchgeführt. Auf Basis der Ergebnisse kann ""Agrotourismus" hier als "die Gesamtheit der dem Tourismus und der Freizeit dienenden Aktivitäten und Dienste, die auf einem Bauernhof in Betrieb zu finden sind" definiert werden. Die Wallonie und das Großherzogtum Luxemburg, die das Untersuchungsgebiet dieser Forschungsarbeit darstellen, sind benachbarte Gebiete mit einer ähnlichen landwirtschaftlichen Struktur und einem vergleichbarem Tourismussektor. Im Vergleich mit dem gesamten Tourismusangebot dieser Regionen ist die Bedeutung des Agrotourismus bisher noch begrenzt gleichwohl ist er ein wichtiger Bestandteil des regionalen Tourismus. In Zukunft könnte der Agrotourismus jedoch eine wichtige Rolle als Mittel zur Überwindung der Krisen in der regionalen Landwirtschaft spielen. Doch, um zu beurteilen, ob dies wirklich überall der Fall ist, muss "Agrotourismus" zunächst genauer charakterisiert, differenziert und lokalisiert betrachtet werden. Durch die Untersuchung der beiden ausgewählten periurbanen Gebiete in Westeuropa, die bisher noch nicht in der Fachliteratur analysiert wurden, soll deshalb die Dynamik des Agrotourismus erfasst und Besonderheiten herausstellt werden. Ziel war es die geographische Beziehung zwischen Agrotourismus, periurbanen Landschaften, lokalen Ressourcen und landwirtschaftlichen und touristischen Spezialisierungen zu verstehen. Dazu wurde zum einen die Struktur des Tourismusaufkommens in landwirtschaftlichen Betrieben sowie das Verhältnis zwischen touristischen und landwirtschaftlichen Tätigkeiten in diesem spezifischen räumlichen Kontext untersucht. Zum anderen wurden auch die Gründe und Motivation der Touristen im regionalen und lokalen Kontext erfasst und die geographische Verteilung und Position des Agrotourismus im Bezug auf die verschiedenen Tourismusmarktsegmente analysiert. Zur konkreten Bearbeitung dieser Fragestellungen wurde eine heuristische Vergleichsanalyse des Agrotourismus in beiden Gebieten durchgeführt. Dazu wurden umfangreiche empirische Erhebungen in Form von Expertengesprächen (31 Personen) und Beobachtungen vor Ort sowie dem Vergleich von Dokumente durchgeführt. Zusätzlich wurden Interviews mit 34 luxemburgischen und wallonischen Landwirten, die verschiedene agrotouristische Praktiken anwenden, geführt. Diese Praktiken wurden mittels umstandsabhängige geographische Schemata zusammengefasst. Zudem wurden Touristen an sieben touristischen Orten der Wallonie und des Großherzogtums von Luxemburg befragt (1148 Befragungen). Diese Schritte und die statistische und kartographische Bearbeitung der Ergebnisse haben uns erlaubt, ein geographisches heuristisches Modell des wallonischen und luxemburgischen Agrotourismus zu erstellen. Die Erfahrungen der befragten Betreiber haben uns erlaubt, die Position des Agrotourismus in seinem räumlichen Kontext besser zu verstehen. Jeder der Befragten hat sowohl positive als auch negative Erfahrungen (patrimonial, wirtschaftlich und sozial) seitdem Start seines Projektes gemacht, in einigen Fällen hat sich der Agrartourismus als überlebenswichtig erwiesen. Es zeigt sich aber auch, dass das Agrotourismus nicht immer ein Wundermittel für die Landwirte darstellt Im landwirtschaftlichen Betrieb kommt die touristische Funktion nach der landwirtschaftlichen Funktion und beruht auf ihr. Allerdings profitiert der landwirtschaftliche Bereich von der touristischen Funktion. Die Endscheidung über den Umfang der touristischen Aktivität liegt bei den Landwirten, die jedoch durch andere Akteure, wie Behörden, und weitere Faktoren, wie lokale Nachfrage oder Druck auf dem Immobilienmarkt, beeinflusst werden kann. Die Untersuchung hat gezeigt, dass Touristen, die Urlaub auf dem Bauernhof verbringen, keine klares Profil haben, das aber bestimmte Gruppen wie Familien diese Art von Tourismus bevorzugen. Die Definitionen und Vorstellungen sowie die Gründe und Erwartungen hängen zudem von der Herkunft der befragten Touristen, städtische oder ländliche Herkunft, sowie vom Erfahrungsgrad ab. Zusammenfassend lassen sich drei Profile von Agrotouristen definieren: jene, die eine Unterkunft im ländlichen Raum suchen, jene, die eine Unterkunft mit einem gastronomischen Angebot suchen, und jene, die eine angenehme Bleibe in einer touristischen Gegend suchen. Der Vergleich zwischen den Erfahrungen der Betreiber und den Erwartungen der Touristen zeigt, dass die Schwierigkeiten darin bestehen organisatorische Zeitabläufe innerhalb des landwirtschaftlichen Betriebs, zu entwickeln, die beide Bereichen gerecht werden. Zudem besteht die Gefahr, dass verzerrte Bilder von Agrotourismus entstehen, die zu einer Vorstellung und einer Förderung der Landwirtschaft führen können, die nicht der regionalen Wirklichkeit entsprechen. Durch die Kombination der verschiedenen Ergebnisse und durch das Verbinden der Typologie der wallonischen und luxemburgischen Agrotourismusprodukte, der ländlichen Gebietstypen und der geographischen Aspekte, geht hervor, dass das Agrotourismus nicht nur anhand von Umweltaspekten analysiert werden darf. Die Analyse muss auch andere Faktoren wie Erreichbarkeit, lokale Gemeinschaften, Gastfreundlichkeit, Entwicklungspolitiken des ländlichen Raumes, Immobilienmärkte, landwirtschaftliche Orientierung des Bauernhofes sowie das Vorhandensein von Sehenswürdigkeiten, berücksichtigen. Unsere Untersuchungen zeigen, dass Agrotourismus, als Kombination von Landwirtschaft und Tourismus, sich weder überall, noch auf dieselbe Art und Weise selbstständig entwickelt, da es für die Entwicklung lokaler Ressourcen bedarf. Außerdem ist Agrotourismus keine Pauschalösung für alle periurbane Landschaften und nicht alle landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe sind als Reiseziele für alle Touristen geeignet. Dennoch, auch wenn eine strikte Regionalisierung des Agrotourismus nicht möglich scheint, können wenn alle Faktoren gemeinsam betrachtet werden gemeinsame Tendenzen hervorgehoben werden. Es besteht demnach eine Verknüpfung zwischen dem Agrotourismus und seinen Landschaften, diese identifizierten Verknüpfungen können helfen das heuristische Modell, das wir vorschlagen, zu verbessern und die Erwartungen der verschiedenen Akteure zusammenzuführen.

Dottorato di ricerca in Economia e territorio ; Il cambiamento tecnologico comporta una "rimodellatura" e, a volte, un vero e proprio rovesciamento dell'ordine esistente all'interno delle organizzazioni produttive. La conoscenza generata dall'innovazione tecnologica, per essere "assorbita", necessita di un corredo di pratiche organizzative adeguate: per tale ragione è sempre più stretto il processo co-evolutivo tra sviluppo tecnologico e cambiamento organizzativo. Il coordinamento e la gestione delle sinergie e dei feedbacks tra diversi aspetti dell'attività innovativa diventa una specifica linea d'azione strategica per le imprese al fine di ottenere performances economiche superiori. La stretta complementarità tra investimenti in beni tangibili (nuove tecnologie) e intangibili (struttura organizzativa), da cui scaturisce una maggiore crescita della produttività, è il fulcro del nuovo approccio a queste tematiche. L'ipotesi di complementarità nei processi innovativi assume particolare rilievo con l'avvento delle tecnologie ICT, con la loro natura generalista o aspecifica (general purpose technology), il loro carattere ampiamente pervasivo, e l'esigenza connessa di una prestazione a più alto contenuto cognitivo e relazionale (Breshnahan et al. 2002, Brynjolfsson et al., 2000, Brynjolfsson et al., 2002, Bugamelli e Pagano 2004). La penetrazione di queste tecnologie nel tessuto produttivo favorisce lo sviluppo di diversi input complementari e comporta diverse ondate di innovazioni "secondarie" che creano nuovi prodotti e nuovi processi, dando luogo a periodi più o meno prolungati di aggiustamento strutturale che coinvolgono la riorganizzazione aziendale e l'implementazione delle pratiche del lavoro ad alta performance o High Performance Workplace Practices (Breshanan e Trajtenberg 1995). Quest'ultime si esplicitano in una serie di azioni che hanno nell'empowerment delle risorse umane l'elemento centrale, e che si concretizzano nella riduzione dei livelli gerarchici, nell'assunzione generalizzata di responsabilità, nel coinvolgimento dei lavoratori, nello svolgimento di ruoli attivi, nel lavoro in team, nella polivalenza e nella policompetenza, nei sistemi di valutazione della performance e dei suggerimenti dal basso, e infine nelle buone relazioni industriali. La concettualizzazione dell'organizzazione come un insieme di elementi profondamente eterogenei ma complementari risale a Milgrom e Roberts (1990 e 1995) che, dapprima, ne forniscono una definizione basata sulle proprietà di supermodularità della funzione di redditività dell'impresa, e poi modellano il raggruppamento delle pratiche risultanti dalla complementarità tra innovazioni tecnologiche e cambiamenti organizzativi. Implicita nella definizione di complementarità è l'idea che fare di più in una certa attività non impedisce di fare di più in un'altra, contrariamente alla teoria tradizionale dell'impresa in cui l'ipotesi di rendimenti di scala decrescenti può porre dei vincoli alla possibilità di incremento simultaneo delle variabili di scelta dell'impresa. Le analisi empiriche hanno messo in rilievo come frequentemente innovazioni tecnologiche ed organizzative siano adottate congiuntamente e come entrambe influiscano sulle performances delle imprese (Black e Lynch 2000, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson e Hitt 2002, Brynjolfsson, Lindbeck e Snower 1996, Malone et al. 1994, Pini 2006, Pini et al. 2010). Nel nostro paese gli studi empirici sulle complementarità tra sfere innovative sono ancora pochi. I principali lavori di natura econometrica realizzati, sulla base di limitati campioni di imprese a livello provinciale, sono attribuibili a Cristini et al. (2003 e 2008), Leoni (2008), Mazzanti et al. (2006), Piva et al. (2005), Pini et al. (2010). Un aspetto poco indagato, anche nei lavori citati, è quello dell'interazione tra tecnologie ICT, cambiamenti organizzativi e pratiche lavorative ad alta performance sulla produttività del lavoro, che è proprio l'argomento specifico che ci siamo proposti di indagare. Preliminarmente abbiamo ricostruito il dibattito teorico ed empirico sul ruolo di driver al fine dell'ottenimento di performances superiori delle tecnologie ICT, dei cambiamenti organizzativi e delle nuove pratiche del lavoro, singolarmente presi. In una seconda fase abbiamo verificato l'esistenza di legami virtuosi tra le tre attività innovative e la produttività del lavoro mettendo in evidenza le complementarità tra le sfere innovative. Per questo abbiamo effettuato un'analisi empirica utilizzando due fonti principali: IX e X indagine sulle imprese manifatturiere del Mediocredito Centrale (ora Capitalia) e la Community Innovation Survey (Cis-4) dell'Istat. Questi ultimi dati sono integrati con quelli di bilancio delle imprese società di capitali attive dal 2001 al 2008, con i caratteri strutturali del Registro delle imprese (Asia), con i dati del commercio estero (Coe), e dell'occupazione (Oros). Seguendo il productivity approach, abbiamo ricercato i legami di complementarità eseguendo, con il software STATA 10, una serie di regressioni multivariate, utilizzando funzioni di produzione aggiustate con le strategie innovative e le loro interazioni. I modelli, stimati con la tecnica dell'Ordinary Least Square (OLS), sono differenti a seconda della tipologia di dati disponibili: con i dati Mediocredito si è stimata una funzione di produzione di tipo Cobb-Douglas, per i dati Cis-4 un stimato un modello a effetti fissi tramite una funzione di produzione di tipo Translog. Se il ricorso alla funzione Cobb-Douglas è ricorrente nella letteratura internazionale, soprattutto per stimare gli effetti delle singole strategie innovative sulla produttività del lavoro (Black e Lynch 2001, 2004, Breshnan et al. 2002, Gera e Gu 2004), l'utilizzo di una funzione Translog, è scelta assolutamente non ricorrente in letteratura per quanto riguarda l'oggetto di analisi. A tal riguardo ci si è ispirati al lavoro di Amess (2003), nel quale vengono valutati gli effetti del management buyouts sull'efficienza di lungo termine delle imprese manifatturiere della Gran Bretagna. Inoltre abbiamo testato la presenza di complementarità attraverso l'analisi delle differenze in termini di performance, suddividendo le imprese in base a diverse combinazioni nell'utilizzo delle strategie innovative. Un aspetto da rilevare è che, le nostre analisi realizzate sul panel integrato Cis-4 utilizzano un campione particolarmente numeroso e rappresentativo della realtà industriale italiana, un fatto, come detto, non frequente negli studi sull'argomento condotti nel nostro Paese. I risultati ottenuti dall'analisi di entrambi i campioni sono in linea con i principali studi empirici italiani (Cristini et al. 2003 e 2008, Mazzanti et al. 2006, Pini 2006, Pini et al. 2010), convalidando ampiamente l'ipotesi di un impatto positivo delle tre strategie innovative sull'aumento delle performances produttive delle imprese, anche se implementate singolarmente in azienda. Per quanto riguarda la verifica di un legame di complementarità tra le tre aree innovative emerge, chiaramente un effetto additivo sul valore aggiunto attraverso l'analisi dei differenziali e seguendo l'approccio sulla supermodularità di Milgrom e Roberts (1990, 1995). L'aspetto più rilevante dei risultati ottenuti è costituito dal fatto che alcune variabili diventano particolarmente significative quando le imprese le adottano simultaneamente: ciò vale in particolare per la formazione e la partnership in R&D. L'attività di formazione è associata positivamente alla presenza di tecnologie ICT e all'innovazione organizzativa, intesa come instaurazione di partnership per la R&D. Inoltre dall'analisi sui dati Mediocredito emerge, in conformità alla teoria skill biased technical change, una propensione a domandare lavoratori in possesso di qualifiche più elevate da parte delle imprese che hanno implementato in maniera significativa cambiamenti tecnologico-organizzativi (Berman, Bound e Griliches1994, Breshnan et al. 2002, Draca, Sadun e Van Reenen 2006). ; Technological development results in a "reshaping" and, sometimes, a complete change within existing productive structures. The knowledge brought about by technological innovations, to be incorporated need a wealth of suitable structural procedures: for this reason the evolution between the technological development and the structural change is getting narrower. The coordination and management of the sinergies and feedbacks among the different aspects of the innovative activity becomes a line of strategic action within the companies to obtain superior economic performances. The strict complementarity between investments in tangible goods (new technologies) and intangibles ones ( organization structure), which brings about a better productivity growth, is the pivot of the new approach to these thematics. The complementarity hypothesis in the innovative processes is particularly important with the advent of the ICT technologies, with their general purpose technology, their widely pervesive characters and the associated requirements of a knowledge at a higher contexct. (Breshnahan et al. 2002, Brynjolfsson et al., 2000, Brynjolfsson et al., 2002, Bugamelli e Pagano 2004). The penetration of these technologies in the productive frame favours the development of the different complementary inputs and allows several flows of "secondary" innovations, which creates new products and processes, bringing more or less long sructural adjustments which include the business reorganization and to carry out work documentation at high performance or High Performance Workplace Practices (Breshanan e Trajtenberg 1995). The latter can be explained in a series of actions which have in the human resources empowerment its central element (unit) and which are reliased with the reduction of the hierarchical levels of employment at general responsibility level, bringing in the employees in active running roles, in working as a team with many duties and competence, in the methods of valuing performance and suggesions from below and lastly in good industial relations. La concettualizzazione dell'organizzazione come un insieme di elementi profondamente eterogenei ma complementari risale a Milgrom e Roberts (1990 e 1995) che, dapprima, ne forniscono una definizione basata sulle proprietà di supermodularità della funzione di redditività dell'impresa, e poi modellano il raggruppamento delle pratiche risultanti dalla complementarità tra innovazioni tecnologiche e cambiamenti organizzativi. Implicita nella definizione di complementarità è l'idea che fare di più in una certa attività non impedisce di fare di più in un'altra, contrariamente alla teoria tradizionale dell'impresa in cui l'ipotesi di rendimenti di scala decrescenti può porre dei vincoli alla possibilità di incremento simultaneo delle variabili di scelta dell'impresa. The notion of the organisation as a collection of elements extremely different, but complementary, goes back to Milgrom and Roberts (1990 e 1995) who, at first, gave a definition based on the properties of modular dimensions of the firm income capacity and then they (the set of elements) put together the resulting documentation due to the complementarity between technological innovations and structural changes. Implicit to the complementariety definition, is the idea that to do more in a certain activity does not exclude to do more in another one; this is to the contrary to the firm traditional theory where the hypothesis of decreasing range efficiency can limit the possible simultaneous increase of the firm variable choices. The empiric analysis have put in evidence that often technological and structural innovetions are taken together and that both influence the firms performances (Black e Lynch 2000, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson e Hitt 2002, Brynjolfsson, Lindbeck e Snower 1996, Malone et al. 1994, Pini 2006, Pini et al. 2010). In our country the empiric studies on the complementarity within the innovative fields are still few. The major econometric works realised, based on limited samples at provincial level are ascribed to Cristini et al. (2003 e 2008), Leoni (2008), Mazzanti et al. (2006), Piva et al. (2005), Pini et al. (2010). The integration within the ICT technologies, stuctural changes, work habits at high performance on work productivity are aspects investigated insufficiently even on the studies already mentioned. This is the specific subject we propose to examine. At first we have reconstructed the theoric and empiric argument on the driver role aiming to obtain performances better than the the ICT technologies, stuctural developments, work habits, each taken individually. In a second phase we have verified the existence of virtual bonds between the innovative activities and labour productivity putting in evidence the complementariety within the innovative areas. For this reason we carried out an empiric analysis using two main sources: IX and X investigation on manufactury firms of Mediocredito Centrale (now Capitalia) and the Community Innovation Survey (Cis-4) by Istat. These last data are put together with the ones of active plc (public limited companies) balances from 2001 to 2008 with structural characteristics according to Companies Register (Asia), foreign trade data (Coe) and employment (Oros). By following the productivity approach we searched complementarity bonds, achieved with software STATA 10, a range of changeble regressions, using production activities related to innovative strategies and their interactions. The samples, based on the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique, are different according to the type of data: available with Mediocredito data, we valued a production function of the Cobb-Douglas type; for the Cis-4 was valued a sample at fixed results using a production function of Tanslog type. If going back to the Cobb-Douglas function appears again in the international literature, especially to value the consequences of single innovative strategies on labour productivity (Black e Lynch 2001, 2004, Breshnan et al. 2002, Gera e Gu 2004), the use of a Translog funtion, is chosen absolutely, without going back to literature when referring to the object of the analysis. From this point of view, we were influenced by Amess' (2003) work, where were valued the results of the management buyouts on the long term efficiency of manifacturing industies in Great Britain. Besides we tested the presence of complementarity by using the analysis of the differences based on performance, by dividing the firms according to their different utilization of innovative strategies. An aspect to take into consideration is that, our analysis carried out on the integrated Cis-4 panel utilise a rather special and large sample which represents the Italian industrial reality, a fact, as already mentioned, not common in the studies undertaken in our Country on this subject. The results obtained from the analysis of both samples are in line with the principal Italian empiric studies (Cristini et al. 2003 e 2008, Mazzanti et al. 2006, Pini 2006, Pini et al. 2010), widely confirming the hipothesys of a positive impact within the three innovative strategies on the companies increase of the producteve performances, even if singularly employed by the business. As regards the examination of a complementarity connection within the three innovative areas, emerges clearly an additive effect on its added value using the analysis of the differentials and approching the super modularity of Milgrom e Roberts (1990, 1995). The most important aspect of these results is that some variables become particularly significative when the firms use them simultaneously: this is particularly valid at educational level and partnership in R&D. The activity at educational level is positively associated to ICT technologies and structural innovetions, understood as the setting up of partnership for R&D. In addition from the analysis of Mediocredito data emerges, according to the skill biased technical change theory, a tendency by the companies, which have made significant techinical-structural changes to look for employees with higher qualification levels (Berman, Bound e Griliches1994, Breshnan et al. 2002, Draca, Sadun e Van Reenen 2006).

"If there was ever a doubt about just how American Mr. Obama is, Sunday's raid eliminates it better than any long-form birth certificate. This was his finest hour." Bret Stephens, the Wall Street Journal Late at night on Sunday May 1st President Obama announced to the nation that Osama Bin Laden had been found and killed by a US Navy Special Operations team. The Navy SEAL team Six, as it is known here, landed two helicopters inside a walled three-story compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where years of painstakingly gathered intelligence had led authorities to believe there was a high chance the Al Qaeda leader may be hiding. This may well have been the largest, most successful intelligence operation in US history; the President acted boldly and decisively and for that he received accolades from both sides of the political divide. Coming as it did just a month after the President launched his re-election campaign, this victory immediately boosted his approval rate by eleven points, according to surveys.Even if the strategic defeat of Al Qaeda has not yet been accomplished, this was a huge milestone and the closing of a chapter that started ten years ago when the hunt for Osama Bin Laden was launched by the Bush administration. Last week's operation resulted in the largest trove of data ever found on Al Qaeda, including information on immediate threats being planned, location and structure of its leadership, and scores of data that will help piece together a deeper understanding of their long-term tactics, techniques and procedures.Disposing of such a reviled figure who, for over ten years had ordered the killing of innocent civilians around the world, is undoubtedly a great blow both symbolic and real, to Al Qaeda, a decentralized movement whose members are tied together mainly by feelings, emotions and mythology. But does it sound the death knell for the organization? What are its short and long term implications? Al Qaeda has proven to be quite resilient, but is it still spreading and growing? More importantly, how relevant is it in the face of the Arab Spring moving throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa?All these questions need to be pondered carefully, since they have deep implications for US foreign policy in the region, for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for its difficult and troubled relation with Pakistan. This unexpected win will lead to a comprehensive reassessment of US military presence in the area, its strategies of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and its alliance with Pakistan.American reaction to Osama Bin Laden's death was one of noisy, overt celebration in New York and DC, and of relief and jubilation in the rest of the country. It was indeed the reverse of the deep shock, terror and bereavement of 9-11, but both instances had one common denominator: there was a sense of collective emotion, of a long-forgotten and now recovered national unity. However, this did not last long as incipient criticism and second-guessing started 24 hours later over Bin Laden's burial at sea and the decision by the administration not to show pictures of his death. It came from both sides of the ideological spectrum and, in some cases, it was bolstered by strong arguments. For example Alan Dershowitz, the Harvard Law professor, considered the burial at sea a "willful destruction of evidence that may arise suspicions that there was something to hide." Others used the occasion to stir up doubts and demanded pictures to certify Bin Laden's death, but then again, these are not to be taken seriously sine they were the same groups that had to be shown a long version of the President's birth certificate as evidence he was American. A second criticism coming mainly from some Neo-conservatives, was the administration's failure to recognize publicly that the intelligence gathering that led to the finding and killing of Bin Laden was a vindication of the "enhanced interrogation techniques" (read: water boarding) used by the Bush administration in foreign detention centers and at Guantánamo, which Obama had consistently and very publicly condemned during the 2008 campaign and into his years in office.To the first, members of the administration responded that the point was to dispose of his body in a respectful manner, not because he deserved it but to deny a source of friction with other Muslims and to deprive his followers with a shrine and an opportunity to exploit him as an iconic martyr. A similar argument was used to explain the decision not to release the pictures: the President wants to avoid ostentatious displays of triumphalism that may come back to haunt him. His sobriety and restraint further reinforce the boldness of his decision and his steadfast determination to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat" Al Qaeda and not be distracted from his goal by premature claims of "mission accomplished".To the second claim, the White House responded that the success of the operation is far from a vindication of such unconstitutional techniques, since it was the result of the hard work of professionals over time and across two administrations, who integrated thousands of small pieces of intelligence gathering coming from human and technological sources into one gigantic puzzle, and that no one single piece led the US to Bin Laden. It took all the resources only the US can muster, from military bases to networks of human intelligence, to electronic eavesdropping, to specially trained forces, to locate and kill one hidden individual in a foreign country, and then match his DNA in an aircraft carrier before disposing of the corpse. But it also took a courageous American president to make such a risky call, namely, authorizing a covert operation deep into Pakistani territory based on circumstantial evidence at best, and without alerting the Pakistani authorities about it. Fortunately, wide recognition was given to the President's courage and many on the Right called it "Obama's Finest Hour". Both former President Bush and his prickly vice-president Cheney congratulated Obama and gave him full credit.A more productive conversation that has already started in academic and diplomatic circles is how relevant Bin Laden's death is for the Arab world. If he had died eight years ago, says one French scholar, he would have instantaneously become a martyr in the Arab street, an icon of anti-Western sentiment. However, in 2011, he had receded into the back of the consciousness of young Arabs for several reasons. First, because he had been in hiding for so long that his presence in the media had been noticeably diminished: out of sight, out of mind. Time spent out of the limelight erases mystiques and cools down emotions. Secondly because many saw him as the culprit for bringing the United States into Iraq and Afghanistan, which in turn gave an excuse for authoritarian regimes in the region to become even more repressive and extend their time in power. In Iraq, local Sunnis blame Al Qaeda for bringing the Shiites to power and expanding the influence of Iran in their country. Also, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda had increasingly lost the allegiance of many Muslims around the world for their indiscriminate bombings of hospitals, mosques and shrines and the killings of non-combatant Muslims in Baghdad, Basra and Amman (even if many were Shiite, the slaughter of innocent women and children caused revulsion in these populations).More importantly, the wave of pluralistic revolutions sweeping the Middle East and North Africa has rendered Al Qaeda irrelevant. There is an emerging sense of strong national identities, whereby the masses are thinking of themselves first as Egyptians, Tunisians or Libyans, with ethnicity and religion taking a secondary role. Indeed, Nasser's Pan-Arabism died the 1960sm, and the dream of a Caliphate "extending Islamic rule from Indonesia to Spain", which Bin Laden proposed as Al Qaeda's ultimate goal is no longer an interesting proposition to the extremely young populations of the region, many of whom have access to the new social media in the Internet, and who crave freedom and modernity more than anything else. The "Arab Spring" may spell the end of Al Qaeda's political aspirations for the region: the Turkish model of a secular, modern state with an overwhelmingly Islamic population and a pluralistic party system is far more appealing than the pan-Islamic caliphate of the Prophet's era. In the words of Professor Fouad Ajami, "It is risky to say, but Arabs appear to have wearied of violence…It was Bin Laden's deserved fate to be struck down when an entirely different Arab world was struggling to be born."Time and treasure spent in a ten-year war have also changed perspectives in America, especially for the younger generations. There is an on-going unofficial revision of the Bush doctrine of invading whole countries "that harbor, train or fund terrorists" in favor of narrower, more focused actions against the terrorists themselves. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken their toll on the American military as far as recruitment and resources. The main concern of voters is the American economy, especially unemployment and the ever-expanding national debt. A hundred and forty thousand American and NATO troops are involved in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, with no endgame in sight. Killings of Americans by despondent Afghan soldiers and other groups whose "hearts and minds" the US is supposed to win, occupy the headlines daily. Counter-terrorism increasingly seems to be a much more appealing and productive strategy. Expressing this widely-held sentiment, Senator Kerry recently declared: "There is no possible victory to be had in Afghanistan".Even though President Obama called it a war of necessity and has invested deeply in it, this is no longer a popular war: two-thirds of the American electorate is against it. Therefore, there will be pressure on President Obama to accelerate the phased withdrawal from Afghanistan, and complete it before the set deadline of 2014. He is a rational decision-maker who does not easily cave under pressure, but the 2012 election is likely to enter into his calculations. As a champion of counter-terrorism and opposing counter-insurgency from early on, Vice-president Biden might still be vindicated in his wisdom. When Obama opted for the surge in Afghanistan two years ago, he overruled Biden and sided with the military. Will he change his mind and speed up the withdrawal now? The killing of Bin Laden certainly gives him an opening to change his initial timetable. "Al Qaeda is no longer there, and the Taliban must be beaten by Afghans themselves", says Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council of Foreign Relations.Finally, the fact that Pakistan has proved to be an unreliable partner in the war against terrorism is also putting pressure on the President to review his Afghan policy. The alliance is frayed; Pakistan is giving sanctuary to violent militants of all sorts, and another high Al Qaeda operative now in American custody, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, was also found in Pakistan (Rawalpindi). Indeed, by the rationale of the Bush doctrine, the US should be invading Pakistan next. The White House says they have no evidence that there was any "foreknowledge" by the Pakistani leadership that Bin Laden was holed up in a one-million-dollar compound, in a military town, only 30 miles away from Islamabad. Pakistan will conduct its "own investigation" and will have to prove itself a worthy ally, for example, by sharing information gleaned from Bin Laden's three wives and several children now held under Pakistani custody. On the other hand, veteran security experts retort, more terrorists have been arrested by the Pakistani authorities since 2001 than anywhere else in the world. In this case, was it incompetence or complicity? Pakistan is a very complex country, where the military are an autonomous force above civilian rule, and they also control the Intelligence Services (ISI). It is a house divided against itself. It harbors numerous militant groups, and goes after some but not others. It hedges its bets this way so as not to lose influence and power in the region, for example by supporting the Taliban and Haqqani networks fighting to seize power in Afghanistan, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba organization against India in Kashmir. Pakistan's foreign and national security policy is built around its obsession with India, its most vilified enemy and against which it has fought several wars. It is clear now that ISI gave sophisticated support to the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2009. Pakistan needs a friendly government in Afghanistan so that it can maintain its "strategic depth" vis à vis India. Armed with over a hundred nuclear weapons and with some control over this wide array of militant groups, Pakistan is pivotal in the stability of South Asia. Those are the two main reasons why the US-Pakistani relationship survived after the Cold War ended. Because of the weakness and corruption of civilian governments, past and present, the US has preferred to engage with the military, who control the nuclear arsenal, and has made them the recipient of most US aid (indeed, by the end of this year alone the Pakistani military will have received $3 billion from the US). But this may be about to change if Pakistan rejects the US request to be in charge of the internal investigation on whether Bin Laden was given sanctuary, and if so, by whom.Now that its main leader has been killed, and in spite of its virtual irrelevance, Al Qaeda is likely to undergo an internal struggle to determine its future. The mystique of its international role has already somewhat dissipated and the different groups in the network are shifting their focus to their national agendas. Indeed, this has already been the case in Egypt, where after days of ominous silence on the Tahrir Square Revolution, Al Qaeda's second in command, Egyptian-born Al-Zwahiri injected himself in the process by supporting the leader of an Islamist party that wants post-Mubarak Egypt to adopt Sharia law. But his attempt did not resonate with the young revolutionaries, most of which want a pluralistic society and are much more concerned with jobs and government accountability than with religious utopia. However, revolutions are just the beginning of a long process, transition periods are by definition unstable, and post-revolutionary regimes have historically been highjacked by extremists. So one can only be cautiously optimistic about what will come next, but it appears as if the Middle East and the Arab world are moving on and beginning to spell the end of Al Qaeda's aspirations. Bin Laden's demise is the appropriate end of this chapter in the region's history.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

Pierwszy globalny konflikt międzynarodowy w XX wieku doprowadził do rozbioru Turcji. Nowy układ sił usankcjonowany został wprowadzeniem systemu mandatowego będącego w rzeczywistości jedynie zawoalowaną formą kolonialnego charakteru zaboru arabskiej części tego państwa. Porozumienia między Wielką Brytanią i Francją dotyczące podziału stref wpływów na tym obszarze powierzało pieczę nad Mezopotamią władzom w Londynie. Umowa otwierała drogę do powstania na tym terytorium odrębnego państwa. Powołana przez Wielką Brytanię do życia monarchia iracka o powierzchni o 1/3 większej od obszaru dzisiejszej Polski była całkowicie sztucznym tworem politycznym, niewydzielonym tradycją historyczną konglomeratem etniczno–wyznaniowym, stanowiącym poza okręgami północnymi wykrojony z świata arabskiego fragment mający jedynie czytelną, opartą w przybliżeniu na kryterium narodowościowym granicę na wschodzie. Protektorzy i polityczni budowniczowie tego quasi–państwa, desygnując na tron króla Fajsala, ustanawiając powolne rządy i sterując procesem legislacyjnym, zapewnili tu sobie niemal nieograniczone wpływy . Nadzorowali politykę zagraniczną i obronną Iraku, a przede wszystkim tutejsze złoża ropy naftowej. Zmagania zbrojne II wojny światowej wykazały, jak bardzo ważne dla odniesienia sukcesu militarnego było zapewnienie nieograniczonego dostępu do źródeł tego surowca. Międzynarodowa ranga Iraku wyraźnie wzrosła. Zawiadywanie znajdującymi się na jego terytorium zasobami naturalnymi nabrało teraz dodatkowo zupełnie nowego, nie w pełni docenianego dotąd pozaekonomicznego wymiaru. Stały się one bowiem elementem strategicznym. Równie istotne zaczęło być samo położenie geopolityczne tego kraju. Oba te faktory, łącząc się w jedną całość, czyniły Irak niezwykle ważnym państwem bliskowschodnim. Posiadanie dominujących w nim wpływów pozwalało kształtować nie tylko rozmiary produkcji ropy ale przez długie lata ze względu na istniejącą infrastrukturę także cały prowadzony za pośrednictwem rurociągów transfer naftowy do arabskich portów Zatoki Perskiej i Morza Śródziemnego. W konsekwencji Irak pozostawał w ścisłym spektrum zainteresowania światowych mocarstw, a za takie uchodzić będą tu: Wielka Brytania, Stany Zjednoczone, Związek Radziecki oraz przez wzgląd na silne wpływy w świecie arabskim także Francja. Rezultaty agresywnej polityki tych potęg wobec Iraku, całkowicie determinujące sytuację i stan stosunków międzynarodowych w skali makroregionalnej a pośrednio globalnej, z różnych względów nie zostały jednak dotąd opracowane. Podstawowym celem badawczym pracy było zatem ustalenie wpływu, jaki wywierała w analizowanym okresie polityka mocarstw na sytuację wewnętrzną i zewnętrzną Iraku, a także ukazanie konsekwencji zajmowanego wobec tego państwa stanowiska dla stanu istniejących stosunków w obszarze Bliskiego i Środkowego Wschodu oraz globalnych relacji międzynarodowych. ; The analysis of the material confirms a wide range of political actions lead by Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union towards Iraq. The main reasons for such a state of affairs were Iraq's geopolitical location, and rich and easy to develop Iraqi oil fields. It was also the infrastructure enabling transit of home stock to Mediterranean ports and, in prospect, sending oil of Saudi, Kuwaian and Irani origin forward. As a result, in the time of post-war monarchy (1945 – 1958) Iraq was completely deprived of any influence on forming its own internal situation and international position. In the first case, the existence of such a situation was clearly expressed by the court's dependence on Great Britain and personal relationships between the king's family and the members of the government, and local political establishment. A similar evidence of inability to make independent decisions was Iraqi political parties financed by British and American groups of interest. They also manipulated, through the Iraqi offices, the work of both local legislatures and, at the same time, they helped each succeeding Baghdad cabinet in every respect. An equally obvious proof of Iraqi government dependence was their consultations on home affairs with representatives of Downing Street and the White House, as well as British forces stationing in Iraq and American military presence. Much the same should be judged from the fact that the basic branches of economy were under control of companies representing former mandatories and the treaties signed at that time. The external supervision reached even the political underground, which was kept under surveilance and secretely supported by the Soviet Union. Iraq was made a centre of British influence in the region, and was given a crucial role in all preparations to accomplish projects serving to restore British influence in the Middle East, which also shows Iraq's independence in the sphere of political relations. Equally visible symptom of this phenomenon was dubious attitude of Iraqi government during Sues Crisis. It included providing with weapon and fuel for planes taking off British airports to shell Egypt, protection for oil instalation and oil pipelines, planning Syria neutralization in the case it took any offensive actions against Israel – clearly contrasting to attitude of other Arabian countries. We can give the same explanation to Iraqi membership in Baghdad Pact strictly connected with the rest of British plans to get back the domination in the Middle East. The strong influence of western powers, especially Great Britain, on Iraqi government contributed significantly to support of political tension in the Middle East. Returning attempts to accomplish the Fertile Crescent unification under rule of probritish Hashimids favouring monopolization of oil transit towards Mediterranean coast destabilized the situation in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan making even Kuwait an object of potential expansion. These attempts also met a firm counteraction of remaining powers and authorities in Kuwait and Riyadh, which were unfavorable to british-iraqi aspirations. A seroius consequence of subjecting Iraq to strong external pressure, apart from ruinous results for stabilisation, was its destructive influence on the process of political integration of the Arabian world. It efficiently hampered introduction of existing unification ideas, which lay in the interest of each power. It is also worth to pay attention to the consequences of Iraqi membership in Baghdad Pact. Through the influence of western powers it became one of the bases of antirussian military pact by breaking the existing east Arabian neutrality and making it a new front of the Cold War confrontation. The changes in external situation and international Iraq position brought about by the revolution of July 14, 1958, were not only the effect of the Soviet Union's actions. Each power applied a completely different policy towards Iraq. The division lines of existing rivalry for this country were drawn not only along the standing bipolar confrontation border between east and west but first of all within the sphere of this last pole. Great Britain and the United States cooperation was limited to a very small range of issues. Political activity of American administration during presidencies of H. Truman and D. D. Eisenhower in relation to Iraq was directed towards changing the face of things in that country and replacing British interests by American ones. It proved totally inefficient. By destroying the existing balance it contributed significantly to loss of American influence, and, unable fill the empty space, it only prepared the political ground for Soviet penetration in Iraq. The Cremlin supported Arabian aspirations favouring independence. As a result, the western powers were deprived of their previous possibilities to influence this country. The revolution raised Iraqi independence on a new quality status. During the first decade of the republican government (1958 – 1967) the world powers retained their significant influence on Iraq. They interfered into the country's affairs in two ways: through economic relations and through oppositional groups. Both forms of the pressure used turned out to be very effective and forced the local government to take into consideration interests of Great Britain and the Soviet Union when making any decisions important for the country. The strength of this reaction was reflected in both trade deals, and mass riots and demonstrations started by Kurds. As a result not only the country's international position but its internal affairs as well were defined by the policy of the world powers towards Iraq. Pains of Iraqi leaders aimed at weakening the relations which cramped the country's independence were stopped by their deaths. A.K. Kasim was murdered whereas S. A. Arif died in a mysterious plane crash, which shows the complexity of this problem. The main reason which let the world powers influence strongly the Republic of Iraq during the years of 1958 – 1967 were the huge debts of this country in the face of the eastern block, whereas its income – due to the way in which the concession treaties based on proportional share in oil sale were written – came from the western oil consortiums and depended on the level of production. It gave both sides unlimited possibilities of political manipulations. It was only the nationalization of the Iraq's biggest company– Iraq Petroleum Company - on July 1, 1972, and of some of the other oil giants – Mosul Petroleum Company, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Mobil Oil, Gulbekian and a significant part of Royal Dutch shares during the next year – together with steep crude oil price boost and introduction of embargo on its deliveries to western countries by Arabian countries that granted a unique opportunity for the then Iraqi regime to limit radically foreign influence for more than a quarter of a century. Резюме Анализ подтвердил широкий спектр политический действий, предпринимавшихся Великобританией, Соединенными Штатами и Советским Союзом в отношении Ирака. Главной причиной такой ситуации стало геополитическое положение Ирака, богатые, не представляющие трудностей при добыче нефтяные месторождения и инфраструктура, позволяющая транспортировать сырье к портам Средиземного моря, а в перспективе – пересылать нефть из Ирана, Кувейта и Саудовской Аравии. Итак, в период послевоенной монархии (1945–1958) Ирак был полностью лишен возможности оказывать влияние как на ситуацию внутри страны, так и на международное положение. В первом случае это выражалось в зависимости дворцовых кругов от Великобритании и личных связях королевской семьи и членов правительства Ирака c английским политическим истеблишментом. О невозможности самостоятельного принятия решений свидетельствует также финансирование английскими и американскими деловыми кругами иракских парламентских партий, манипуляция с их помощью деятельностью обеих законодательных палат и оказание всесторонней поддержки со стороны западных держав очередным иракским правительствам. Очевидным симптомом зависимости иракских властей были консультации с представителями Великобритании и США относительно внутриполитических проблем, размещение на своей территории английских вооруженных сил и присутствие постоянной американской военной миссии. Подобным же образом нужно, по всей видимости, расценивать и тот факт, что основная отрасль экономики оставалась под контролем компаний, представляющих интересы бывших мандатариев, а также относящееся к тому же времени заключение международных договоров. Внешний контроль простирался даже на политическое подполье, контролируемое и тайно финансируемое Советским Союзом. Значимым для подчиненного положения в сфере международных отношений было выделение Ираку роли центра английского воздействия в регионе и подготовки разнообразных проектов, имеющих целью восстановление влияния этой державы на Ближнем Востоке. Заметным симптомом названного явления стала неоднозначная позиция иракского правительства во время Суэцкого кризиса: снабжение оружием и топливом вылетающих с местных аэродромов для бомбардировки Египта британских самолетов, защита установок и нефтепроводов, планы нейтрализации Сирии в случае, если она вступит в войну против Израиля – все это ярко контрастировало с позицией остальных арабских государств. Подобным образом объясняется и проблема иракского участия в Багдадском Пакте, тесно связанная с британскими намерениями вернуть себе господство на Ближнем Востоке. Сильное влияние западных держав, особенно Великобритании, на иракское правительство способствовало поддержанию политической напряженности в ближневосточном регионе. Постоянные попытки осуществить объединение "Благодатного Полумесяца" под властью пробританской династии Хашимидов, содействовали монополизации транзита нефти к средиземноморскому побережью, дестабилизировали ситуацию в Сирии, Ливане и Иордании, превращая даже Кувейт в объект потенциальной экспансии. Одновременно попытки эти сталкивались с решительным противоборством остальных мировых держав, каирских и риядских властей, не приветствовавших британо-иракские планы. Серьезным последствием того, что Ирак подвергался сильному внешнему давлению, кроме пагубных для региональной стабилизации результатов, было сильное деструктивное влияние на процесс политической интеграции арабского мира. Оно успешно тормозило распространение объединительных концепций, что, как следует подчеркнуть, было выгодно каждой из держав. Необходимо обратить внимание и на последствия иракского участия в Багдадском Пакте: силами западных стран Ирак стал одной из опор антисоветского военного соглашения, нарушив существовавшую до сих пор нейтральность арабского востока и превратив его в новый фронт холодной войны. Перемены во внутренней ситуации и международном положении Ирака, пришедшие с революцией 14 июля 1958 года, не были результатом только лишь эффективных действий Советского Союза, что следует отметить со всей решительностью. Каждая держава осуществляла особую политику в отношении этого ближневосточного государства. Линии раздела влияния проходили не только вдоль существовавшей тогда биполярной конфронтации Восток – Запад, но, прежде всего, внутри самого последнего полюса. Великобритания и Соединенные Штаты сотрудничали только в очень ограниченной сфере вопросов. Дипломатическая деятельность американской администрации президентов Г. Трумэна и Д.Д. Эйзенхауэра по отношению к Ираку, ориентированная на осуществление "смены караула" в этой стране и замещение британских интересов своими собственными, оказалась совершенно безрезультатной. Нарушая установившееся равновесие, она в значительной степени способствовала потере британцами влияния, но, не сумев заполнить образовавшуюся пустоту, лишь приготовила политическую почву для советского проникновения в Ирак. Кремль в нужный момент поддержал стремление арабов к независимости, в результате чего западные державы оказались лишены прежних способов воздействия. Революция вывела иракскую суверенность на качественно новый уровень. В первой декаде республиканского правления (1958–1967) мировые державы продолжали оказывать значительное влияние на ситуацию в стране. Вмешательство во внутренние дела осуществлялось двумя способами: через использование экономических связей и оппозиционных группировок. Обе формы воздействия были весьма эффективны, заставляя местные власти при принятии важных для страны решений учитывать интересы Советского Союза или той же Великобритании. Силу этого воздействия отражали то торговые договора, то массовые беспорядки и демонстрации или курдские восстания. В результате не только международное положение Ирака, но и отношения внутри страны определялись позицией мировых держав. Старания иракских лидеров, направленные на ограничение связывающих самостоятельность страны факторов, обрывались с их смертью: А.К. Касем был убит, а А.С. Ариф погиб в авиакатастрофе, произошедшей при загадочных обстоятельствах, что, по сути, отражает уровень сложности проблемы. Основной причиной, позволяющей мировым державам оказывать сильное влияние на Иракскую Республику в 1958–1967 гг. были огромные задолженности государства восточному блоку, а полученные доходы, из-за формулировок концессионных договоров, опиравшихся на процентное участие в продаже нефти, шли от западных монополий и зависели от размера добычи. Это давало обеим сторонам неограниченные возможности политических манипуляций. Лишь национализация 1 июня 1972 года самого крупного на территории Ирака предприятия Иракской Нефтяной Компании, а через год и других видных представителей отрасли: Мосульской Нефтяной Компании, Standard Oil of New Jersy, Mobil Oil, Gulbelkian и значительной части капитала Royal Dutch при одновременном резком повышении цен на сырье и введении арабскими странами эмбарго на поставки в западные страны предоставило тогдашнему иракскому режиму исключительный шанс, чтобы радикально ограничить внешнее воздействие на более чем четверть века. ; Piotr Kwiatkiewicz

China realized during the last 15 years spectacular economic growth success. However, its economic growth was also accompanied by serious environmental degradation problems. China has been ranked as one of the most polluted countries in the world by some international organizations, particularly on the aspect of air pollution. Although many scholars start to consider China as the future number one economic power given its current marvelous economic success, the verification of such hypothesis closely depends on the sustainability of China's future growth path—its actual economic growth speed can be sustainable only if today's economic achievement is not obtained by mortgaging that of tomorrow. This dissertation, focusing on the case of industrial SO2 emission in China, aims to study the potential relationship between economic growth, trade liberalization and environment in China, in the aims of identifying the possibility, the sufficient and necessary conditions for China to realize its sustainable development. After a comprehensive literature review on the existing Environmental Kuznets Curve studies, I started my analysis by a reduced-form Environmental Kuznets Curve analysis (Chapter 2). The results showed that although the EKC analysis predicts a turning point at about 9000 yuan (1990 price) for the case of per capita industrial SO2 emission, the evolution of total industrial SO2 emission seems to continue its increasing tendency. To understand the underlying reasons for the increasing tendency in total SO2 emission, I further carried out two structural analyses, in which the structural determinants of SO2 emission are decomposed either parametrically (Chapter 3) or non-parametrically (Divisia index decomposition method based on the detailed data on production and SO2 emission intensity of 13 industrial sectors in each province during 1991-2001, Chapter 4) into scale, composition and technique effects. The results showed that, the per capita income, acting as an omnibus variable representing all the three aspects of underlying structural determinants, only impart a "net-effect" of income growth on environment. The real reason for the ever-increasing trend of total industrial SO2 emission in China is actually due to the domination of pollution-increasing impact of scale enlargement over the pollution-reducing contribution from technical progress, combined with a province-specific composition transformation which exerts modest pollution-increasing impact in most of the Chinese provinces, given their current industrialization process. The second part of this dissertation further amplified my decomposition efforts by giving particular attention to the emission determination role of international trade. Previously redeemed by some pessimistic economists as a channel for the richer developed countries to discharge their pollution burdens to their poorer trade-partners, international trade has been considered as a static explanation for the formation of the inverted-U-shaped growth-pollution relationship. Nevertheless, all three analyses carried out in this part, by investigating the different channels through which international trade can exerts impact on the three determinants of emission, only provide very limited supportive evidence for the "pollution haven" hypothesis in China. As China's factor-endowment-based comparative advantages are much attractive than its potential as a "pollution haven", the conclusion of the ACT-style (Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor, 2001) model estimation in Chapter 5 shows that trade liberalization can actually reduce the pollution burden of China's industrialization process by deviating its industrial composition transformation towards less polluting labour-intensive sectors. By noticing that the actual role of trade is more complicated, in Chapter 6, I re-employed the decomposed results of Chapter 4 and further checked the indirect impact of trade (export and import separated this time) on industrial emission through its three structural determinants. This study confirmed the significantly positive impact of trade in both scale enlargement and technical progress. The analysis based on a simultaneous system in Chapter 7 permits me to combine these three aspects' indirect impact of international trade on emission into the same estimation. Its results reveal the total role of export in China is environment-friendly while that of import (measured by the accumulation of imported machinery and equipments) is pollution-enhancing. In the CGE model analysis in Chapter 8 (Part 3), I related emission results directly to energy input used in production activities and included the principal coefficients estimated in the previous into the modelling and simulation work. This model offered me an opportunity to parameterise the multiple aspects of trade-pollution and growth-pollution nexus and to finally obtain an explicit numerical comparison between the magnitude of environmental impact of trade and economic growth. This analysis reveals that, compared to the scale effect resulting from rapid economic expansion in China, the actual pollution-increasing impact of trade liberalization is very small. The most important pollution reduction contribution actually comes from efficiency improvement in energy uses and depends largely on the existence of a more stringent and efficient pollution control policies combined with a flexible energy substitution process. Facing the potential dangers for China's future environmental situation, I investigated in the chapter 9 (Part 3) the potential feedback effect from pollution to China's future growth sustainability. The analysis reveals a significant negative relationship between industrial SO2 emission and public health after the industrial SO2 emission density attains the critical threshold of 8g/m2. Fortunately, the estimated model inn this chapter seems also to reveal some possible dynamism through which the significant negative impact of industrial SO2 emission on public health status can be gradually reduced with economic growth. But to realize this dynamism, China need to realise a more-than-proportion increase in de-sulfur technology investment with respect to its economic growth rate in the coming years. To sum up, the analyses carried out in this dissertation actually indicate both opportunity and challenge for China's pursuit for a sustainable development path. Given the current environmental deterioration tendency, whether China can preserve its future growth sustainability actually depends on the existence of the technological capacities to improve the pollution abatement efficiency (sufficient condition) and the correct function of a stricter pollution control policies (necessary condition). Both aspects further put forward the requirement for the availability of efficient institutional and market system in China. ; La Chine, pays le plus peuplé du monde, connaît depuis une quinzaine d'années des taux de croissance spectaculaires. Malheureusement, cette croissance a aussi été accompagnée d'une très forte dégradation de l'environnement et a positionné la Chine parmi les pays les plus pollués du monde, notamment au niveau de son atmosphère. Ainsi, le considérable succès que représente cette croissance économique, au point de vouloir présenter la Chine comme la prochaine première puissance économique mondiale, conduit à poser la question de sa soutenabilité. Nous postulons que la croissance actuelle de la Chine ne pourra être durable que dans la mesure où elle n'hypothèque pas celle de son futur. Cette thèse se base sur le cas de l'émission industrielle de SO2 – la pollution aérienne la plus importante en Chine. En analysant son évolution au cours des années 1990 et en se focalisant sur ses relations avec la croissance économique, l'industrialisation et l'ouverture commerciale – les trois caractères les plus évidents du développement économique chinois –, cette thèse vise à identifier la possibilité et les conditions nécessaires et suffisantes pour la Chine de réaliser un développement soutenable. Après une revue de la littérature sur la Courbe de Kuznets Environnementale (CKE), nous commençons notre analyse par l'étude d'une CKE de forme réduite (Chap. 2), qui révèle une relation assez optimiste entre la croissance chinoise et l'émission industrielle de SO2 par tête. Cependant, cette CKE « par tête » ne garantit pas un même retournement de trajectoire pour l'émission industrielle totale de SO2. Bien que notre analyse prédise ce retournement aux environs de 9000 yuan par tête (prix constants 1990) pour le cas de l'émission industrielle de SO2 par tête, l'évolution de l'émission industrielle de SO2 totale semble continuer à augmenter. Pour comprendre les raisons de cette tendance à la hausse de l'émission industrielle de SO2 totale, nous menons deux analyses structurelles, dans lesquelles les variations de l'émission sont décomposées de façon paramétrique (Chap. 3) et non-paramétrique (la méthode de décomposition de l'indice de Divisia basée sur des données détaillées de la production et de l'intensité d'émission de SO2 de 13 secteurs industriels dans chaque province entre 1991 et 2002, Chap. 4) en contributions de ses trois déterminants structurels - effets d'échelle, de composition et de technique. Les résultats montrent que le revenu par tête fonctionne comme une variable omnibus qui capte les effets des trois déterminants structurels et révèle seulement un « effet net » de la croissance sur l'environnement. Le détail de nos analyses permet cependant de trouver les véritables raisons de cette tendance à la hausse de l'émission industrielle de SO2. Cela serait principalement dû à une domination de l'effet d'échelle sur l'effet réducteur d'émission issu des progrès techniques, le tout combiné à une transformation de la composition industrielle exerçant un modeste impact à la hausse des émissions dans la plupart des provinces chinoises. La seconde partie de cette thèse accroît ses efforts de décomposition en donnant une attention particulière au rôle déterminant du commerce international sur l'émission. Perçu par certains économistes pessimistes comme un canal à travers lequel les pays riches déchargeaient leurs fardeaux de pollution sur leurs partenaires commerciaux relativement plus pauvres (hypothèse de « havre de pollution »), le commerce international a ainsi souvent été considéré comme une explication statique de la formation d'une relation en U inversé entre le revenu et la pollution. Cependant, les trois analyses menées dans cette partie, en recherchant les différents canaux de transmission à travers lesquels le commerce affecte les trois déterminants structurels de l'émission, nous offrent pour la Chine des preuves très limitées en faveur de l'hypothèse de « havre de pollution ». Etant donné que l'avantage comparatif de la Chine basé sur sa dotation extrêmement riche en travail est beaucoup plus attractif que son avantage de « havre de pollution », la conclusion d'une analyse de style Antweiler, Copeland et Taylor (ACT, 2001) au Chapitre 5 nous montre que la libéralisation commerciale peut réduire les dangers d'une augmentation de pollution liée à l'effet de « havre de pollution » en guidant la transformation de la composition industrielle chinoise vers les secteurs intensifs en travail, souvent considérés comme moins polluants. Le rôle du commerce sur l'environnement n'est cependant pas aussi simple. Dans le Chapitre 6, en re-employant les résultats de la décomposition de Divisia du Chapitre 4, nous vérifions les impacts indirects du commerce (exportations et importations introduites de façon séparées) sur l'émission à travers les trois déterminants structurels. Cette analyse confirme l'impact significativement positif du commerce dans l'élargissement de l'échelle de production et sur les progrès techniques. Les analyses basées sur un système d'équations simultanées au Chapitre 7 nous permettent de combiner ces trois aspects des impacts indirects du commerce sur l'émission et d'inclure leurs interactions potentielles dans une même estimation. Les résultats révèlent que le rôle total des exportations est positif pour l'environnement mais que celui des importations (mesurées par l'accumulation de machines et d'équipements importés) est négatif. Dans le modèle en Equilibre Général Calculable (EGC) du Chapitre 8 (Partie 3), nous relions directement les résultats de l'émission à la combustion des énergies dans les activités productives et incluons toutes les interactions entre les variables économiques et l'environnement dont nous avons pu discuter dans les chapitres précédents pour la spécification du modèle. Ce modèle nous offre l'opportunité de paramétrer et de simuler de multiples aspects des relations entre croissance, ouverture commerciale et émission. Les simulations basées sur ce modèle nous permettent d'obtenir des comparaisons numériques de l'ampleur des impacts environnementaux du commerce et de la croissance économique. La conclusion de ce chapitre montre que, sans une politique de contrôle de pollution plus efficace, la croissance économique chinoise devrait s'avérer très polluante et que l'accession à l'OMC devrait provoquer une hausse supplémentaire mais marginale de pollution. En considérant les dangers potentiels de cette situation sur l'environnement chinois, nous décidons de rechercher dans le dernier chapitre de cette thèse (Chap. 9) l'effet de « feedback » potentiel de la pollution sur la capacité de croissance de l'économie chinoise. Les résultats confirment un effet négatif de l'émission de SO2 sur la prévalence des maladies chroniques au sein de la population. Une fois dépassé le seuil de 8 g/m2, une augmentation de 1g/m2 de la densité de l'émission industrielle de SO2 accroît la probabilité pour une personne représentative de souffrir de maladies chroniques de 0,25%. Cependant, si les progrès techniques réalisés dans les activités de contrôle de la pollution augmentent de façon continue dans le temps, nos résultats indiquent également une dynamique potentielle pouvant réduire de façon graduelle l'impact négatif de la pollution sur la santé avec la croissance économique. En résumé, les analyses menées dans cette thèse présentent un certain nombre de défis à relever et d'opportunités à saisir pour que la Chine puisse poursuivre un chemin de développement qui soit soutenable. Etant donnée la tendance actuelle à la détérioration de son environnement, la capacité de la Chine à préserver une croissance soutenable dans le futur dépendra étroitement de l'adoption de progrès techniques (conditions suffisantes) et d'un fonctionnement efficace et plus strict des politiques de contrôle de pollution (conditions nécessaires), ainsi que d'une meilleure efficacité des systèmes institutionnels et de marché.