El autoritarismo del ala de derechas y la orientación a la dominancia social constituyen dos variables claves en el análisis de diversos fenómenos abordados por la Psicología Política. En esa línea, se afirma que se trata de dos constructos independientes que apuntan a visiones del mundo diferentes, pero que se encontrarían vinculados, variando su nivel de asociación, en función de determinadas características del contexto social en el que se estudian. El objetivo principal de este trabajo fue analizar las relaciones entre el autoritarismo del ala de derechas y la orientación a la dominancia social en el contexto socio-político argentino caracterizado por su bajo nivel de contraste ideológico. De esta manera, se testeo la hipótesis de Duckitt (2001) en el contexto local, respecto de que las vinculaciones entre ambos constructos serían fuerte en contextos de alta polarización ideológica y débil en escenarios políticos no estructurados en función del eje izquierdaderecha. Para tal fin, se trabajó con cuatro muestras (NTotal = 1511) de estudiantes universitarios/as, con edades comprendidas entre los 18 y 52 años divididos/as, de los/as cuales 1061 participantes fueron mujeres (70,21%). Las relaciones entre el autoritarismo del ala de derechas y la orientación a la dominancia social varían en los diferentes estudios desde valores débiles a moderados (.25 < r < .35; p < .01). En función de los resultados, se discuten las particularidades que adquiere la vinculación entre estos dos constructos en el escenario socio-político argentino y se sugieren futuras líneas de análisis. ; O autoritarismo de direita e orientação à dominância social são duas variáveischave na análise de vários fenômenos abordados pela Psicologia Política. Nesse sentido, afirma-se que é duas construções independentes que têm como alvo diferentes visões de mundo, mas que seria encontrada ligada, variando o seu nível de parceria, com base em certas características do contexto social em que são estudados. O principal objetivo deste estudo foi analisar a relação entre o autoritarismo de direita e orientação à dominância social no contexto sóciopolítico argentino caracterizado pelo seu baixo nível de contraste ideológico. Assim, a hipótese do Duckitt (2001) teste no contexto local, sobre as ligações entre as duas construções seriam contextos ideológicos fortes e fracos de alta polarização em cenários políticos não estruturados, dependendo do eixo esquerda-direita. Para este fim, trabalhamos com quatro amostras de estudantes universidade (NTotal = 1511), com idade entre 18 e 52 anos, dos quais 1.061 eram mulheres (70,21%). As relações entre o autoritarismo de direita e orientação à dominância social variam em diferentes estudos de fraca a moderadas (.25 < r < .35; p < 0,01). Dependendo dos resultados, as particularidades entre estas duas construções teóricas são discutidas no cenário sócio-político argentino e futuras linhas de análise são sugeridas. ; Right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are two main variables for the analysis of different phenomena in Political Psychology. In this line, it is stated that both independent constructs are targeting different worldviews, but that would be found linked, varying its level of relations, based on certain characteristics of the social context in which they are studied. The aim of this study was to analyze the relationship between the right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation in Argentinian socio-political context characterized by its low level of ideological contrast. Thus, the hypothesis tested in the local context, regarding the linkages between the two constructs would be strong in ideological contexts of high polarization and weak political scenarios unstructured depending on the left-right axis Duckitt (2001). To this purpose, we worked with four university students samples (NTotal = 1511), aged between 18 and 52 years old and 1061 of them were women (70.21%). Relations between right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation vary in different studies from weak to moderate values (.25 < r <.35; p < .01). On the whole, the particularities acquired by the link between these two constructs in the Argentinian socio-political scenario are discussed and future lines of analysis are suggested. ; Fil: Etchezahar, Edgardo Daniel. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Saavedra 15. Centro Interdisciplinario de Investigaciones en Psicología Matemática y Experimental Dr. Horacio J. A. Rimoldi; Argentina ; Fil: Imhoff, Débora Soledad. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba; Argentina
The paper aims to articulate an "encounter" between Autonomist Marxism (AM) and World-Ecology (WE), that is, between two theoretical paradigms increasingly discussed at the global level, but so far never analyzed in close connection to one another. AM is a current of unorthodox Marxism that is characterized, methodologically, by the partiality of the point of view, the constitutive unity of thought and conflict, the ambivalence of the working-class condition (labor force / abstract labor within capital, working class / living labor against capital), and the centrality of class composition. Politically, AM proposes two main innovations: the practice of refusal of work, and the so-called Copernican revolution, according to which class struggle comes first and capitalist organization follows suit (instituting, therefore, a causal and incremental link between workers' unrest and capitalist development).WE can be defined as a global conversation that develops the analysis of the world-system along distinctively environmental lines: capitalism, therefore, does not have an ecological regime, but rather is an ecological regime, i.e. a specific way of organizing nature. Beyond any residue of Cartesian dualism, the concept of world-ecology refers to an original mixture of social dynamics and natural elements that make up the capitalist mode of production in its historical development, and in its tendency to become a world-market. In this framework, the capitalist theory of value imposes space as flat and geometric, time as homogeneous and linear, and nature as external, infinite, and free.The aim of this paper is to show that, although the two perspectives relate to the question of the (ecological) crisis in a very different way, they can be effectively integrated if juxtaposed on a different level - that of the historico-political analysis of the question concerning the environment. Both approaches originally rework Marx's crisis theory, but they do not completely avoid the polarization that marked its evolution: development vs. catastrophe.AM tends to renew the tradition that sees the crisis as a moment of development and historicizes it through original interpretations of the cycle of struggles 1968-1973, claiming its defeat was "peculiar" as it imposed a change in the structure of capitalist valorization in the direction of an expansion of its accumulation base. The causes of this transition are to be found in the intersection between the financialization of the economy, the cognitization of labor and, above all, the becoming-productive of the sphere of social reproduction. On the other hand, WE elaborates the so-called "breakdown" theory in unprecedented fashion. The starting point is a convincing reconstruction of the historical succession of long waves of economic cycles through an articulation of underproduction (of ecological surplus) and overproduction (of commodities). Thus, WE provides an instrumental ecological counterpoint to the socio-centric reading of AM through the fundamental notion of negative value — the most innovative analytical element with regard to the neoliberal form of crisis theory. However, the general discursive strategy follows that of every breakdown theory ever since the "classical" debate within the Second International. Therefore, it is aimed at showing that, although the crises of the twentieth century were developmental (that is, they fostered the capitalist restructuring at a higher level), the crisis we live through nowadays presents itself as epochal in that its result is deemed to be an inevitable collapse.The convergence between the two paradigms —which is actually a rather demanding theoretical exchange, and as such require some deep rethinking for both positions— can take place through a re-reading of the historical process of politicization of ecology. Although it is customary to date it between the mid-seventies and the following decade —i.e. after the great cycle of Fordist conflicts— in recent years a different hypothesis is being tested: that such politicization occurred not only a decade earlier, but also, and above all, because of rather than despite the struggles of the workers' movement (in close connection with the rise cycle of revolutionary feminism). With particular regard to the Italian context, the struggles against noxiousness, which multiplied between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, and often in opposition to the confederal unions, were the first to fiercely criticize the so-called monetization of risk; that is,the idea that wage increases and/or organizational benefits could "compensate" for exposure to pollutants, even hazardous ones. Although this criticism would never become common sense of trade union action, such occurrence does not deny that it was first of all the strength of organized workers that blew up the compensatory mechanism and (im)posed the ecological question as politically unavoidable. Only at a later stage will the environmental movement emerge along with a new post-materialist sensitivity among the urbanized intermediate strata.Against this background, the paper proposes an analysis of neoliberal green economy —i.e. the capitalist attempt to internalize the ecological limit, turning it from obstacle to valorization, through an innovative strategy of accumulation— as simultaneously assuming the form of development (in accordance with AM hypothesis) and of anti-development (in accordance with WE hypothesis). From this plausible "convergence" could then emerge a political interpretation of the contemporary ecological crisis, capable of questioning the relationship between capitalism and nature by avoiding both catastrophism and the elective affinity between the logic of profit and the logic of environmental protection.In this unprecedented context, WE can grasp the second aspect through the concept of negative value, which correctly conveys the message that climate change, health-related emergencies, and the narrowing of waste borders make the ecological crisis an unprecedented everyday reality in the history of capitalism. In fact, negative value implies an internal contradiction of the dynamics of capital and, above all, an ontological challenge to the valorization project, therefore to capitalist civilization tout court.On the other hand, AM is in a privileged position to make sense of the shift from the rhetoric of limits to growth, which somehow alluded to environmental noxiousness as a crisis of capitalism, to a rhetoric of growth of limits, which identifies these latter as drivers of accumulation, as "filters" that turn the ecological constraint into a crisis for capitalism. Furthermore, AM can now show that commodities traded on environmental markets contain value as they are produced by hybrid units of labor (reproductive / informational) and nature (financialized). However, the developmental potential of such green economy must also be relativized. In fact, the process of enhancing the "free" activity of nature seems, at least until now, to be unable both to "repair" the environmental damage already done and to provide widespread social protections potentially able to compensate for the class polarization that invariably accompanies the multiplication of financial dividends. What neoliberal capitalism lacks is an inclusive mechanism capable of (partially) socializing financial profits either through a decarbonization of the economy, or through the formation of a new middle class (or both). ; Este artículo pretende articular un encuentro entre el operaísmo y la ecología-mundo, es decir, un encuentro entre dos paradigmas teóricos cada vez más objeto de debate a nivel global, pero que, hasta el momento, no han sido analizados en estrecha relación. El operaísmo es una corriente del marxismo heterodoxo caracterizada por centrarse en la ambivalencia de la condición de la clase obrera (fuerza de trabajo/trabajo abstracto dentro del capital, clase obrera/trabajo vivo contra el capital) y la noción de la composición de clases sociales. La ecología-mundo puede definirse como un diálogo internacional que desarrolla el análisis del sistema-mundo desde una perspectiva ambiental: el capitalismo, por lo tanto, no tiene un régimen ecológico, sino que es un régimen ecológico, es decir, constituye un modo especifico de organizar la naturaleza. El objetivo de este artículo es demostrar que, a pesar de que las dos perspectivas se relacionan con la cuestión de la crisis (ecológica) de forma muy distinta, ellas pueden integrarse eficazmente si son yuxtapuestas a otro nivel: el del análisis histórico-político de la cuestión medioambiental. En su origen, ambos planteamientos revisan la teoría de la crisis de Marx, pero no eluden la polarización que caracteriza su evolución: mientras que el operaísmo tiende a reafirmar la tradición que considera la crisis como un momento de desarrollo, la ecología-mundo desarrolla la teoría de la brecha metabólica de un modo bastante inaudito. La convergencia entre estos dos paradigmas —lo que, en realidad, constituye un exigente intercambio teórico y que, por lo tanto, requiere una intensa reflexión por parte de ambas posiciones— puede producirse a través de una relectura del proceso histórico de la politización de la ecología. Aunque se suele situarlo entre mediados de los años setenta y la siguiente década —tras el gran ciclo de conflictos fordistas—, en los últimos años se está comprobando una hipótesis distinta: esta politización no sólo ocurrió una década antes, pero también, y, sobre todo, sucedió debido a, y no a pesar de, las luchas del movimiento obrero (en estrecha relación con el surgimiento del feminismo revolucionario). En ese contexto, la economía verde neoliberal —es decir, el intento capitalista de internalizar el límite ecológico, transformándolo de un obstáculo a la valorización a una estrategia innovadora de acumulación— asume simultáneamente la forma de desarrollo (en línea con la hipótesis postulada por el operaísmo) y la de antidesarrollo (en línea con la hipótesis defendida por la ecología-mundo). De esta "convergencia" plausible podría emerger entonces una interpretación política de la crisis ecológica contemporánea capaz de cuestionar la relación entre el capitalismo y la naturaleza, al evitar tanto el catastrofismo como la afinidad electiva entre la lógica del beneficio y la lógica de la protección medioambiental.
Rwanda is a country with a troubled history. Its genocide in 1994, fifteen years ago, is still considered as one of the most shocking episodes of the twentieth century. Since then, however, Rwanda seems to be recovering well. Economic growth in the immediate post-war period was spectacular and remained considerable in the years thereafter (8,6% between 1996 and 2001). The Rwandan government elaborated a poverty reduction policy (PRSP), which was implemented between 2001 and 2006. Rwanda was widely applauded for the efficiency in the elaboration and execution of policy objectives, and could count on extensive financial engagements from the international community. Some even speak of a 'Rwandan Renaissance' to refer to this seemingly spectacular success. There is however also a bleaker picture next to the growth success. The poverty problem remains pressing, certainly in rural areas. Indeed, the percentage of people living below the national poverty line of 1.22$ (PPP, 2006 prices) decreased between 2001 and 2006, from 60.3% to 56.8%. But because of the impressive population growth, the absolute number of poor people increased. In the countryside, an additional half million people lived in poverty in 2006 in comparison to 2001. In this rural environment, the problem of land scarcity is enormous. The overall majority of the rural population has to survive with less than 1 hectare per family and limited possibilities to diversify their income sources beyond subsistence agriculture. In addition, there is a strong inequality. In 2001, the 20% richest consumed as much as the remaining 80% of the population. Since then, inequality has further been rising. Several research questions arise. *) How are the peasants, the overall majority of the Rwandan population surviving in this optimistic post-genocide economic growth climate? Are they able to profit from economic growth? *) How are they dealing with the problem of extreme resource scarcity? They have to deal with enormous hazards and uncertainties, to which they have to adapt their livelihood strategies through risk avoidance and diversification. Are they able to productively exploit their land, and how do they survive if their land holdings are not (no longer) sufficient to produce enough food? *) How does the Rwandan government capture the challenges in the fight against poverty? How do policy makers see their role in rural development, and which type of agricultural and land policy do they adopt? The PhD provides an answer to these questions. It provides a unique insight in how the process of rural change - including the role of rural policies in this process - impacts upon the differentiation and polarization in livelihood profiles in the context of rural Rwanda. It points to the danger of the current Rwandan development model, based on large-scale professionalised farming. Moreover, it elaborates an alternative more sustainable development model based on broad-based economic growth and brings forward technically feasible solutions that build upon the potential and capacity of the large majority of small-scale farmers. But it also reflects upon the current political economy context in which the division of power and wealth make this technically feasible alternative development model politically unrealistic. The PhD points to the crucial role of international donors to support structures that help the voices from below reach the surface, the voices of the Rwandan small-scale peasants. The diversity in focus, level and techniques adopted in the various papers of the PhD allows us to look at the overarching theme - faces of rural poverty - from very different angles. Indeed, as mentioned by Scoones et alii (1996: 10), "models of change that oversimplify, standardise and aggregate in order to ease computation can be highly misleading; instead a methodological pluralism that includes qualitative and quantitative methods is seen to be most appropriate for increasing our understanding of complex, diverse and risk-prone agricultural systems". Some of the chapters analyse macro-level tendencies; others look with a micro-lens at particular case studies. Parts of the PhD engage in a quantitative analysis of nationally representative data. Other parts draw conclusions from in-depth qualitative field research in particular local settings. Some chapters focus on policy makers' perspectives, others literally bring in the voices of the Rwandan peasants. We consider this variety of approaches both relevant and complementary for a comprehensive understanding of the process of rural change and polarization in livelihood profiles in the context of rural Rwanda. The first two chapters provide an analysis of the policy makers' perspective with regards to rural development. The first chapter is titled: "Striving for growth, bypassing the poor? A critical review of Rwanda's rural sector policies". It studies Rwanda's current rural policies, which aim to modernise and 'professionalise' the rural sector. The chapter points to the risk for currently formulated rural policy measures to be at the expense of the large mass of small-scale peasants. A second chapter, "Reengineering rural society: The visions and ambitions of Rwandan elites" illuminates a general trend of policy makers misplaced belief in the potential to socially engineer rural development. Based upon interviews conducted by the author in mid-2007, the chapter focuses upon three engineering ambitions: 1) policy makers aim to transform the agricultural sector into a professionalised motor for economic growth, with little place left for traditional smallholder agriculture; 2) policy makers have a vision on how to artificially upgrade the portrait of rural life by inserting 'modern' tools and concepts into the local realities, while hiding true poverty and inequality; 3) policy makers hope to transform Rwanda into a target-driven society from the highest up to the lowest level. The chapter takes the necessity of rural development and poverty reduction as the bench mark to point to the (potential) dangers, flaws and shortcomings of the reengineering mission of Rwandan policy makers. The next two chapters study the livelihoods of rural peasants on the basis of a quantitative approach. The third chapter, "Rural poverty and livelihood profiles in post-genocide Rwanda", identifies different livelihood profiles that prevail in the Rwandan rural post-conflict context. By means of exploratory tools such as principal component and cluster analysis, it combines variables that capture natural, physical, human, financial and social resources in combination with environmental factors to identify household groups with different livelihood profiles. The chapter also explores how household groups differ with regards to the intra-cluster incidence of poverty. Finally, for a subsample, it looks in detail at how the identified household clusters perceive changes in their living conditions between 2001 and 2004. The analysis allows identifying policies for poverty alleviation that take into account the different livelihood profiles and pathways in the rural setting. The fourth chapter focuses particularly upon the land resource, using a nationally representative database to analyse "the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity in rural Rwanda". Policies aiming for agricultural modernisation concentrate on promoting regional crop specialisation and monocropping. This chapter, however, identifies the strong inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity under the current land management system; also when taking into account farm fragmentation, crop diversification, frequency of multicropping and household size. In addition, increased farm fragmentation and a higher frequency of multicropping seem to have a positive (although modest) impact upon productivity. This seems to suggest that small-scale peasants' risk-cooping strategies not only protect them against risks but also pay off in terms of productivity. The chapter's findings are formulated at an aggregated meso level and are relevant for national rural policies. The final chapter, "Views from below on the pro-poor growth challenge: The case of rural Rwanda", is complementary to the previous two. It adopts a qualitative approach to focus on peasants' livelihoods and rural class differentiation at the micro-level. Based on field data from six case-study settings, we analyse local peasants' perceptions of the characteristics and degree of poverty for different locally-present socio-economic categories. This results in classifications that are based upon livelihood strategies (self-subsistent versus market-oriented peasants, agricultural and non-agricultural wage labour, …), and that relate much closer to local level dynamics (in comparison to the third and fourth chapter). We look at the opportunities and constraints of those categories, which are crucial determinants for their capacity to participate in growth strategies and for their social mobility potential. Further, we analyse how the peasant categories perceive specific policy measures included in the Rwandan government's 'pro-poor' agricultural strategies. Whereas the two quantitative chapters capture trends in rural livelihoods and land productivity at the macro level, and can claim representativity and external validity, they fail to capture local-level dynamics. The final chapter does provide insights into class (trans)formation processes at the local level, but can by no means claim validity beyond these local settings. Both approaches contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the process of rural change. The concluding chapter of the PhD is a reflection on the insights of the previous chapters with regards to the process of rural change and class (trans)formation in contemporary Rwanda. It looks at the causes, processes, mechanisms, contexts and symptoms of the rural differentiation process. It pleads for an alternative rural policy that promotes broad-based agricultural growth with a key role for small-scale peasants, in combination with an activation of the potential of (nearly) landless rural agents in the local off-farm sector. The technical feasibility and societal desirability of this solution for the Rwandan development problem has been proven in the previous chapters of the PhD. The final part of the concluding chapter however reflects upon the political feasibility of this technical solution, given the current political economy context. It points to the responsibility of donors to support mechanisms that allow bringing in the voices from below to the surface, the voices of the Rwandan small-scale peasants.
Rwanda is a country with a troubled history. Its genocide in 1994, fifteen years ago, is still considered as one of the most shocking episodes of the twentieth century. Since then, however, Rwanda seems to be recovering well. Economic growth in the immediate post-war period was spectacular and remained considerable in the years thereafter (8,6% between 1996 and 2001). The Rwandan government elaborated a poverty reduction policy (PRSP), which was implemented between 2001 and 2006. Rwanda was widely applauded for the efficiency in the elaboration and execution of policy objectives, and could count on extensive financial engagements from the international community. Some even speak of a 'Rwandan Renaissance' to refer to this seemingly spectacular success. There is however also a bleaker picture next to the growth success. The poverty problem remains pressing, certainly in rural areas. Indeed, the percentage of people living below the national poverty line of 1.22$ (PPP, 2006 prices) decreased between 2001 and 2006, from 60.3% to 56.8%. But because of the impressive population growth, the absolute number of poor people increased. In the countryside, an additional half million people lived in poverty in 2006 in comparison to 2001. In this rural environment, the problem of land scarcity is enormous. The overall majority of the rural population has to survive with less than 1 hectare per family and limited possibilities to diversify their income sources beyond subsistence agriculture. In addition, there is a strong inequality. In 2001, the 20% richest consumed as much as the remaining 80% of the population. Since then, inequality has further been rising. Several research questions arise. *) How are the peasants, the overall majority of the Rwandan population surviving in this optimistic post-genocide economic growth climate? Are they able to profit from economic growth? *) How are they dealing with the problem of extreme resource scarcity? They have to deal with enormous hazards and uncertainties, to which they have to adapt their livelihood strategies through risk avoidance and diversification. Are they able to productively exploit their land, and how do they survive if their land holdings are not (no longer) sufficient to produce enough food? *) How does the Rwandan government capture the challenges in the fight against poverty? How do policy makers see their role in rural development, and which type of agricultural and land policy do they adopt? The PhD provides an answer to these questions. It provides a unique insight in how the process of rural change - including the role of rural policies in this process - impacts upon the differentiation and polarization in livelihood profiles in the context of rural Rwanda. It points to the danger of the current Rwandan development model, based on large-scale professionalised farming. Moreover, it elaborates an alternative more sustainable development model based on broad-based economic growth and brings forward technically feasible solutions that build upon the potential and capacity of the large majority of small-scale farmers. But it also reflects upon the current political economy context in which the division of power and wealth make this technically feasible alternative development model politically unrealistic. The PhD points to the crucial role of international donors to support structures that help the voices from below reach the surface, the voices of the Rwandan small-scale peasants. The diversity in focus, level and techniques adopted in the various papers of the PhD allows us to look at the overarching theme - faces of rural poverty - from very different angles. Indeed, as mentioned by Scoones et alii (1996: 10), "models of change that oversimplify, standardise and aggregate in order to ease computation can be highly misleading; instead a methodological pluralism that includes qualitative and quantitative methods is seen to be most appropriate for increasing our understanding of complex, diverse and risk-prone agricultural systems". Some of the chapters analyse macro-level tendencies; others look with a micro-lens at particular case studies. Parts of the PhD engage in a quantitative analysis of nationally representative data. Other parts draw conclusions from in-depth qualitative field research in particular local settings. Some chapters focus on policy makers' perspectives, others literally bring in the voices of the Rwandan peasants. We consider this variety of approaches both relevant and complementary for a comprehensive understanding of the process of rural change and polarization in livelihood profiles in the context of rural Rwanda. The first two chapters provide an analysis of the policy makers' perspective with regards to rural development. The first chapter is titled: "Striving for growth, bypassing the poor? A critical review of Rwanda's rural sector policies". It studies Rwanda's current rural policies, which aim to modernise and 'professionalise' the rural sector. The chapter points to the risk for currently formulated rural policy measures to be at the expense of the large mass of small-scale peasants. A second chapter, "Reengineering rural society: The visions and ambitions of Rwandan elites" illuminates a general trend of policy makers misplaced belief in the potential to socially engineer rural development. Based upon interviews conducted by the author in mid-2007, the chapter focuses upon three engineering ambitions: 1) policy makers aim to transform the agricultural sector into a professionalised motor for economic growth, with little place left for traditional smallholder agriculture; 2) policy makers have a vision on how to artificially upgrade the portrait of rural life by inserting 'modern' tools and concepts into the local realities, while hiding true poverty and inequality; 3) policy makers hope to transform Rwanda into a target-driven society from the highest up to the lowest level. The chapter takes the necessity of rural development and poverty reduction as the bench mark to point to the (potential) dangers, flaws and shortcomings of the reengineering mission of Rwandan policy makers. The next two chapters study the livelihoods of rural peasants on the basis of a quantitative approach. The third chapter, "Rural poverty and livelihood profiles in post-genocide Rwanda", identifies different livelihood profiles that prevail in the Rwandan rural post-conflict context. By means of exploratory tools such as principal component and cluster analysis, it combines variables that capture natural, physical, human, financial and social resources in combination with environmental factors to identify household groups with different livelihood profiles. The chapter also explores how household groups differ with regards to the intra-cluster incidence of poverty. Finally, for a subsample, it looks in detail at how the identified household clusters perceive changes in their living conditions between 2001 and 2004. The analysis allows identifying policies for poverty alleviation that take into account the different livelihood profiles and pathways in the rural setting. The fourth chapter focuses particularly upon the land resource, using a nationally representative database to analyse "the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity in rural Rwanda". Policies aiming for agricultural modernisation concentrate on promoting regional crop specialisation and monocropping. This chapter, however, identifies the strong inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity under the current land management system; also when taking into account farm fragmentation, crop diversification, frequency of multicropping and household size. In addition, increased farm fragmentation and a higher frequency of multicropping seem to have a positive (although modest) impact upon productivity. This seems to suggest that small-scale peasants' risk-cooping strategies not only protect them against risks but also pay off in terms of productivity. The chapter's findings are formulated at an aggregated meso level and are relevant for national rural policies. The final chapter, "Views from below on the pro-poor growth challenge: The case of rural Rwanda", is complementary to the previous two. It adopts a qualitative approach to focus on peasants' livelihoods and rural class differentiation at the micro-level. Based on field data from six case-study settings, we analyse local peasants' perceptions of the characteristics and degree of poverty for different locally-present socio-economic categories. This results in classifications that are based upon livelihood strategies (self-subsistent versus market-oriented peasants, agricultural and non-agricultural wage labour, …), and that relate much closer to local level dynamics (in comparison to the third and fourth chapter). We look at the opportunities and constraints of those categories, which are crucial determinants for their capacity to participate in growth strategies and for their social mobility potential. Further, we analyse how the peasant categories perceive specific policy measures included in the Rwandan government's 'pro-poor' agricultural strategies. Whereas the two quantitative chapters capture trends in rural livelihoods and land productivity at the macro level, and can claim representativity and external validity, they fail to capture local-level dynamics. The final chapter does provide insights into class (trans)formation processes at the local level, but can by no means claim validity beyond these local settings. Both approaches contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the process of rural change. The concluding chapter of the PhD is a reflection on the insights of the previous chapters with regards to the process of rural change and class (trans)formation in contemporary Rwanda. It looks at the causes, processes, mechanisms, contexts and symptoms of the rural differentiation process. It pleads for an alternative rural policy that promotes broad-based agricultural growth with a key role for small-scale peasants, in combination with an activation of the potential of (nearly) landless rural agents in the local off-farm sector. The technical feasibility and societal desirability of this solution for the Rwandan development problem has been proven in the previous chapters of the PhD. The final part of the concluding chapter however reflects upon the political feasibility of this technical solution, given the current political economy context. It points to the responsibility of donors to support mechanisms that allow bringing in the voices from below to the surface, the voices of the Rwandan small-scale peasants.
"Firepower explores how the NRA gradually transformed itself from a relatively small organization with close ties to the federal government and a mission dedicated to marksmanship, competitive shooting, and military preparedness to what it is today: A political juggernaut that pushes a right-wing, populist world view and enjoys a prominent position in the Republican Party coalition. As Lacombe shows, NRA members and supporters participate in politics at unusually high rates, and have for decades, successful opposing gun regulations despite the shockingly high rates of gun violence in the U.S. relative to other countries and deep, durable public support for stricter rules on gun ownership. Understanding how and why this came to be can not only teach us about the evolution of one of the most influential interest groups operating today, but can also shed light on how interest groups more generally can marshal the political behavior of their supporters over time in order to build and exercise power. Most of the work done on interest group influence focuses on behind-the-scenes tactics such as lobbying and campaign support. Yet this is not the source of the NRA's power. Instead, it is the group's ability to shape the political outlooks of its supporters on behalf of its agenda. The NRA has done this by creating a gun owner culture and social identity that mobilizes individuals to engage in various forms of political participation, and by linking gun rights to other political issues, generating a broader political ideology. Drawing on almost a century of archival data, Lacombe illuminates the NRA's identity- and ideology-building efforts in fine-grained, historical detail, ultimately showing how the group came to align with the Republican Party and considering the causes and consequences of the NRA's increasingly deep relationship with the GOP in the age of Donald Trump"--
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In einer Reihe deutscher Großstädte zeichnet sich seit Jahren eine positive Bevölkerungsentwicklung ab, während Suburbanisierungstendenzen rückläufig sind. Diese Entwicklung hat in Fachkreisen eine umfassende Re-Urbanisierungsdebatte ausgelöst. Damit verbunden die Hoffnung, das planerische Ideal von Urbanität, kompakter Stadtentwicklung sowie von weniger Pendlerverkehr und Zersiedelung werde sich nun endlich umsetzen lassen. Wie schätzen die Städte selber diesen Trend, seine Ursachen und Folgen ein? Wer wandert in die Städte und in welche Stadtquartiere? Wie geht die Stadtplanung mit dem Wachstum um, was hat sie dazu beigetragen? In einem Ressortforschungsprojekt des Bundesministeriums für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung (BMVBS) hat das Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung (BBSR) dieses Thema zusammen mit Vertreterinnen und Vertretern aus der Verwaltung deutscher Großstädte behandelt, die in den letzten Jahren ein kontinuierliches Wachstum ihrer Bevölkerungszahlen zu verzeichnen hatten - darunter München, Bonn, Jena und Ingolstadt. Die Publikation lenkt den Blick ganz konkret auf einige der wachsenden Städte, die an dem Projekt beteiligt waren, auf die Ursachen sowie stadtentwicklungspolitischen Implikationen ihres Wachstums. Expertenbeiträge greifen zudem aktuelle Aspekte der Entwicklung der Städte und des Städtischen auf.
Im sozialistischen Teil Europas konnte man bis 1990 kaum an grenzenlose Freizügigkeit denken. 25 Jahre später verlaufen die Grenzen in Europa anders: Grenzen verschwanden und Grenzen entstanden. Die deutsche Einheit ist eng mit der europäischen Integration verbunden. Mit den Erweiterungsrunden sind viele postsozialistische Regionen in den EU-Binnenmarkt eingebunden worden – mit Auswirkungen auf die sozioökonomischen Entwicklungen in diesen Regionen. Die europäische Integrationspolitik war mit der Hoffnung verbunden, dass die Disparitäten zwischen Ost und West schnell aufgehoben würden. Wie Analysen des Europäischen Raumbeobachtungsnetzwerks ESPON jedoch zeigen, sind die Unterschiede nicht verschwunden. Während einige postsozialistische Regionen im europäischen Vergleich gut dastehen, drohen woanders neue Polarisierungen. So zeichnet sich in den neuen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten das Risiko einer inneren Polarisierung zwischen den Hauptstadt- und den übrigen Regionen ab.
Im Beitrag wird auf Grundlage aggregatstatistischer Indikatoren (Mikrozenzus und Innerstädtische Raumbeobachtung (IRB) des BBSR) beschrieben, wie sich im Jahr 2010 Individualisierung in Bezug auf die Struktur privater Haushalte kleinräumig materialisiert. Ein Blick richtet sich darauf, in welchem Maß Individualisierung und Armut bzw. Armutsgefährdung mit einer räumlichen Konzentration bzw. Polarisierung einhergehen. Die Analyse beschränkt sich auf vier Variablen: Einpersonenhaushalte, Haushalte Alleinerziehender, SGB-II-abhängige Haushalte und SGB-II-abhängige Haushalte Alleinerziehender. Vorgestellt werden neben den Verteilungen dieser Haushalte auf innerstädtische Wohnlagen auch deren residenzielle Segregation, um auf mögliche Risiken solch individualisierter Wohnformen hinzuweisen
"Seit Herbst letzten Jahres kommt es in Bangkok regelmäßig zu Protestkundgebungen, an denen sich bis zu 100.000 Menschen beteiligen. Sie fordern den Rücktritt von Premierminister Thaksin. Um die Legitimität seiner Regierung neu zu untermauern, hat dieser für Anfang April Neuwahlen angesetzt. Die Enthüllung von Korruptionsfällen und die Vermischung wirtschaftlicher und politischer Interessen haben der Legitimität der Regierung Thaksin in Teilen der thailändischen Funktionselite und der städtischen Bevölkerung Bangkoks schweren Schaden zugefügt. Nach umstrittenen ökonomischen Transaktionen Thaksins hat sich eine heterogene Protestbewegung geformt, die den Rücktritt des Premierministers und politische Reformen verlangt. Der in der ländlichen Bevölkerung beliebte Thaksin weigert sich bislang zurückzutreten. Die Proteste offenbaren eine tiefe Spaltung zwischen der ländlichen und der städtischen Bevölkerung Thailands. Der Grund dafür liegt in der großzügigen Förderung der ländlichen Regionen durch Thaksins Regierung. Bei den Gegnern Thaksins handelt es sich um ein breites Sammelbecken zivilgesellschaftlicher Gruppen, deren gemeinsames Ziel darin besteht, den Premierminister zu stürzen. Dieser lehnt einen Rücktritt jedoch ab, weil er sich durch den Wahlsieg im Februar 2005 hinreichend legitimiert sieht. Mit der zunehmenden Polarisierung der Gesellschaft wächst die Gefahr eines militärischen Eingreifens. Dies dürfte aber nur dann geschehen, wenn der Konflikt zwischen Regierung und Demokratiebewegung gewalttätig eskaliert." (Autorenreferat)
