Suchergebnisse

A number of writers have argued in recent years that massive international currency substitution has been a major cause of exchange rate volatility and monetary instability in the United States and other major countries. Such analysis is frequently coupled with recommendations for a return to pegged exchange rates. This paper critically examines the evidence presented for this currency substitution view. It argues that the weight of latest research suggests that direct international currency substitution has not been of major quantitative importance for the U.S. However, empirical evidence supports traditional views that international capital mobility can generate substantial short‐run monetary interdependence even under flexible exchange rates. Thus, even though international currency substitution is of little importance to U.S. monetary conditions, a broader range of international considerations may be of considerable importance for the U.S. economy.

PurposeThere has been significant interest in the classification of exchange rate regimes in order to investigate a wide range of hypotheses. Studies of the effects of exchange rate regimes on crises and other aspects of economic performance can have important implications for policy choices. The paper provides a guide to the major new large data sets that classify exchange rate regimes and to critically analyze important methodological issues.Design/methodology/approachThe study surveys and critiques the literature and provides theoretical analysis of major issues involved in classifying exchange rate regimes.FindingsThe study finds that all of the new data sets have problems but some have more problems than others and several of them are substantial improvements on what was previously available. It is also shown that the best ways to classify depend on the issue being addressed and that for detailed studies variants of measures using the concept of exchange market pressure are the most promising. Directions for future research are also discussed.Originality/valueThe paper makes researchers aware of the new data sets that are available and discusses their strengths and weaknesses. It also presents original analysis of several of the major conceptual issues involved in classifying exchange rate regimes.

Two leaders engaged in international co-operation must each build trust by credibly signalling that they will not exploit the other by defecting at the implementation stage. Previous research does not reveal the difficulty and cost of such international reassurance. The role that costly adjustments by markets play in international reassurance is analysed, showing that fully efficient information revelation can be achieved when market actors under intense competitive pressures undergo sufficiently costly adjustments in expectation of international co-operation. 'Nice' leaders can reveal their true preferences simply by saying they intend to co-operate, because 'mean' leaders are unwilling to mislead market actors into undergoing futile costly adjustments. However, market imperfections prevent full information revelation unless market actors prefer international co-operation to the status quo. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)