Suchergebnisse

This article focuses on changes in regulation of financial markets abroad after the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and provides comments on the effectiveness of such regulation. Specially the author analyzes the risks that the derivatives market creates for the financial sector and proposes mechanisms to enhance transparency and stability of the market. The author considers how introduction rules of FATCA and FCPA to the U.S. will influence on the financial sector, the possibility of continuing Russian banks overseas financial transactions, the cost of loans to Russian companies. Also the author writes how the introduction of Tobin tax will impact on international financial transactions in Europe. He describes the changes in the area of offshore jurisdictions in the world occur. There is the experience of creating an international financial center abroad. He gives information on what measures taken to transform the emirate of Dubai to International Financial Centre. In conclusion, the author proposes measures of increase of investment attractiveness of Russia and the possibility of establishing a Russian international financial center.

Lo scambio automatico di informazioni è sostenuto dalla comunità internazionale quale modalità principale in grado di assicurare efficacia alla lotta contro l'evasione fiscale. L'OCSE, su mandato del G20, e a seguito dell'introduzione da parte della disciplina FATCA è stata incaricata di redigere un modello di comunicazione da utilizzare a livello mondiale per l'invio delle informazioni di carattere finanziario. In ambito europeo, la previgente direttiva 77/799 è stata abrogata per rendere obbligatorio lo scambio automatico di informazioni relativamente a determinate categorie reddituali. Tale direttiva è stata progressivamente ampliata nel suo ambito di applicazione fino a ricomprendere oltre allo scambio di dati finanziari anche lo scambio di ruling, delle informazioni delle multinazionali e delle informazioni sulla ricerca del beneficiario effettivo così come rileva nella disciplina antiriciclaggio. Il quadro giuridico si è progressivamente arricchito e modificato di nuovi strumenti normativi per i quali è necessario delimitarne l'ambito di applicazione. Definire lo scambio automatico di informazioni come nuovo standard internazionale non implica unicamente l'utilizzo di un modello di comunicazione comune. Occorre anche predisporre un sistema giuridico in grado di garantire la tutela del contribuente i cui dati fiscali e finanziari vengono scambiati in massa. Se da un lato quindi, le modalità di realizzazione dello standard in ambito comunitario e internazionale sono sempre più convergenti, attualmente il meccanismo di tutela dei contribuenti non risulta essere stato oggetto di valutazioni condivise, rimanendo sostanzialmente rimesso alle disposizioni interne, con conseguente mancanza di uniformità della tutela dei contribuenti. ; International Organizations, such as the OECD or G20 has been supporting the Automatic Exchange of Information in fiscal matters as a key factor in the fight against tax evasion and elusion. The OECD, on behalf of Ministers of Finance and Governors of the Central Banks, following the entry into force of FATCA legislation has implemented a Model of Communication for Financial Information, known as "Common Reporting Standard". At European level, the previous Directive n. 77/799 regarding administrative assistance in tax matters has been repealed in order to enlarge and include the mandatory automatic exchange of information as well as new other methods of cooperation. The new Directive has been amended five times so as to include not only exchange of financial information but also rulings, country by country reports, information on the beneficial owner deriving from the AML sector. The legal framework is so far complex and pronged in two levels: international and European. A legal protection of taxpayers' rights has to be guaranteed at both levels, but it does not seem so far to be standardized or jointly agreed between jurisdictions. It stems from this consideration that the taxpayers' protection is not standard but jeopardized according to domestic provisions.

Over the years, many OECD countries, including the United States, have identified tax havens as a significant problem, and have acted to limit the ability of their taxpayers to use tax havens to reduce their taxes. The United States has implemented tax regimes, including subpart F and the passive foreign investment company rules, and disclosure regimes, such as the recently-enacted FATCA rules, to prevent U.S. taxpayers from taking advantage of tax haven jurisdictions. But the intersection of a number of U.S. tax rules, it turns out, makes the United States an attractive place for foreigners to invest—and hide—their money. Principal among these is the revenue rule, an eighteenth-century common law rule that prevents the United States from recognizing and enforcing foreign tax judgments. As a result, if a foreign taxpayer hides money in the United States and fails to pay taxes at home, her government has no recourse to satisfy the tax debt with the taxpayer's U.S. assets. Such hidden money disparately impacts developing countries by reducing their ability to finance government through developing tax infrastructure, and instead forcing them to remain dependent on foreign aid.

Today's global economic environment is characterized by the high mobility of capital and labour across national borders. Against the backdrop of a legal framework governing taxation of cross-border income, this may lead to double taxation on the one hand, as well as provide opportunities for tax evasion and tax avoidance on the other. It is well-established that a prerequisite for effective taxation of foreign- sourced income earned by "domestic taxpayers" (i.e. tax residents) is the system of administrative co-operation across national boundaries, mainly in the form of exchange of tax-relevant information between tax authorities. Since the lack of information- exchange mechanisms is linked with tax havens and the proliferation of "harmful tax practices", the OECD put the issue high on the global political agenda as early as 1998. Further developments strengthened the importance of the exchange of information, leading to the so-called "big bang" of 2009, i.e. to a significant increase in the number of concluded tax information exchange agreements, caused by the growing concern about international tax evasion and avoidance in the post-crisis period. Nowadays the so-called automatic exchange of information (AEOI) between tax authorities has emerged as a new global standard. This is mostly due to the development of specific national and international models, aimed at enhancing intergovernmental cooperation in fighting offshore tax evasion. In this regard special attention should be drawn to the 2014 release of the OECD's Common Reporting Standard (CRS), which is based on the idea that banks and other financial institutions should play a crucial role in providing information on taxpayer's income and assets to tax authorities around the globe. The aim of this paper is to explore some of the most important implications of the adoption of the CRS as a global AEOI model. While there are marked advantages of the new standard – mainly related to its potential in curbing large-scale offshore tax evasion – some important ...

Intro -- Title Page -- Who the hell is Larry Lipsher (and why is he doing this)? -- For the seventh time….. My not so infamous, semi-annotated Table of Contents -- The introduction - for the seventh time I'm doing an introduction to a tax book. -- What is income? -- Tax rules applying to you, the expatriate U.S. tax filer -- My Frequently asked questions by expats section....! -- The Form 1040-NR 'Section' -- F(u)BAR & -- FinCEN114 -- FATCA -- Tax forms that the overseas U.S. tax filer needs to know about -- A brief refresher about capital gains and losses -- Penalties, penalties....and more penalties -- Streamlined Procedures -- So you are planning to move back to the U.S. -- Expatriation, as an alternative you might seriously want to consider….. -- NINE ESSAYS FROM A TRANS-PACIFIC ROCK N TAX MAN -- Finally! -- The Los Angeles Years -- Bob Dylan (to me, was an acquired taste) and The Band -- The Quest for Deep Purple -- Life as a Sheep Farmer - the northern California years -- Freddie and Mick and their Respective Back-Up Bands -- Living in the PR of C - a Quarter Century of the Ultimate Mid-Life Crisis -- Evolution - the Dead End…..or the Dawn of the Dead? -- Life in China for a quarter of a century - the second half….. -- The sort of stuff one writes upon completion of a 7th book - my End Notes….

Money is money, securities are securities, and banking is banking. Their fundamentals are not changed by whether technology rails are centralized (classic) or pseudo-decentralized (virtual assets) – the song remains the same. As such, this paper does not reinvent the wheel on why we should regulate cryptoasset centralized exchanges (CEXs), as there is enough bibliography from today to the XVII century to go around on that. Instead, we focus on how to regulate the CEXs, which comes into play in a world where their distributed ledger technology (DLT) rails are off-the-grid and hinder regulators from: (i) collecting market data (information asymmetry); and (ii) practical enforcement (technology/operational asymmetry). After revising current regulatory practices from various countries, we identify grounds for a practical approach – we propose that regulators might enforce full trading/financial intermediation obligations on the CEXs by enacting an indirect regulation/gatekeeper scheme, as inspired by the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). In this model, regulators would restrict traditional institutions (i.e., banks, broker-dealers, clearings, funds) from transacting with CEXs which do not provide adequate evidence of material compliance with their trading/financial intermediation obligations. On a final remark, we narrate a growing movement which aims to insulate non-compliant crypto from the financial systems altogether, avoiding risks of contagion.