Suchergebnisse

The aim of this article is to analyse the reasons behind the Finnish co-belligerency with Germany in the Operation Barbarossa. The investigation reveals the main reasons and key moments which contributed to Finnish rapprochement with Nazi Germany following the Winter War when their relations reached the nadir. Therefore, the article looks at the attitude of Finnish, German and Soviet decision-makers following the Winter War and sets the Finnish decision within the frame of Finnish national interest as defined by its elites and not in an ideological choice of Totalitarian doctrine of National-Socialism. Ironically, after cooperating in the war against Soviet Union, Finland and Germany became open enemies after the Finnish armistice with Soviet Union was concluded.

Among the problems most frequently arising in connection with insurrections and civil wars, are those relating to the status of foreign vessels in the areas of hostilities, and the rights of contesting factions to interfere with such vessels. According to international rules of conduct gradually evolved during the nineteenth century and generally enforced in time of civil disturbance,
contending factions enjoy the right to control the movements and activities of foreign shipping within territorial waters, but are not authorized
to go upon the high seas and there interfere with foreign vessels unless the states having jurisdiction over such vessels have recognized the belligerency of the contestants.1

War in the full sense, according to
international law, can exist only by declaration
or recognition of belligerency by a state. War in
the material sense of an actual contest of armed
forces may and does often exist without such
declaration or recognition. However desirous a
party using armed force within a state and in
opposition to it may be to be regarded as a
belligerent, such a party has not the legal
capacity to raise itself to a belligerent status.
This status can be gained only by action of the
parent state or of a foreign state. An armed
contest may, nevertheless, exist and of this fact
others must often take notice.

THE GROATIAN TRADITION OF WAR DEVELOPED IN A PARTICULAR MANNER IN THE LAST QUARTER OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FRAMING OF THE MODERN LAWS OF WAR. THIS ARTICLE SEEKS TO TRACE THE CORE ELEMENTS OF THIS TRADITION, WHICH DREW HEAVILY ON THE WRITINGS OF HUGO GROTIUS (1583-1645). ITS IMPORTANT VALUES WERE LAW, ORDER, POWER, AND AN ATTACHMENT TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE. AS THE GROTIAN TRADITION OF WAR WAS "INDEX-LINKED" TO LEGITIMATE POWER, ITS CENTRAL AMBITION WAS TO LIMIT THE RIGHTS OF BELLIGERENCY TO A PARTICULAR CLASS OF PARTICIPANT (THE SOLDIER), AND TO EXCLUDE ALL OTHERS FROM THE RIGHT TO BECOME ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN POLITICAL OR MILITARY ACTION IN TIMES OF WAR AND MILITARY OCCUPATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY EUROPE.

Conclusiveness of Statements of the Executive States as international persons — In general — Sovereignty and independence — Conclusiveness of statements of the executive — Existence of a state of war — Matter for the executive and not for the courts — Conflict between India and Pakistan — The law of PakistanWar and neutrality — War in general — Termination of war Declaration of the commencement of war and existence of a state of war — Cessation of hostilities — Declaration of ceasefire in the Security Council of the United Nations — Joint declaration of warring parties acknowledging end of belligerency — Original declaration of war not revoked — Whether war terminated — Whether courts competent to decide the question — Authority competent to do so — Proper procedure when question arises — Enemy subject residing in foreign territory — Whether entitled to institute legal proceedings — The law of Pakistan

The absence of a legitimate, democratic global regulative power with real competencies, which the United Nations was originally meant to be, and the incapacity of the international community, especially the 'West' or rather the Europeans, to put the UN Security System 'into effect', have led to a situation where governments, to guarantee the safety and protection of their respective populations, take recourse to 'self help' and legal remedies. The Japanese Constitution is exemplary, for making a prior concession by renouncing the sovereign right of belligerency in the hope of achieving a future legal order of peace, it sets extraordinarily strict measures. The American engagement as a regulative power ('global policeman') as well as the attempt of the global community to put 'human Security' in the forefront and to codify 'State responsibility', are to be seen as remedies, which, however do not relieve governments of their responsibility, to follow up on their words and good intentions, and create an effective and legally binding order of peace, where general and complete disarmament, distributive justice, guaranties of human rights and Collective Security can be realized. The question why Japan supported the Iraq War has to be answered to the effect that on the one hand the island monarchy doesn't want to give up its basic pacifist stance, but on the other hand also can't keep aloof from its responsibility to contribute to global security and order. ; The absence of a legitimate, democratic global regulative power with real competencies, which the United Nations was originally meant to be, and the incapacity of the international community, especially the 'West' or rather the Europeans, to put the UN Security System 'into effect', have led to a situation where governments, to guarantee the safety and protection of their respective populations, take recourse to 'self help' and legal remedies. The Japanese Constitution is exemplary, for making a prior concession by renouncing the sovereign right of belligerency in ...

Seeking fame, but without fortune -- Selling western lands to French emigrés -- Joining the French Revolution -- Waiting for a diplomatic opening to Algeria -- Setting out to complete the Donaldson Treaty -- Saving the treaty, freeing the captives -- Waiting out treaties with Tunis and Tripoli -- Critiquing U.S. policy toward France -- Keeping busy in Paris, riding out the political storm at home -- Home at last: touting a "national institution" of learning -- Nurturing nephews, defending a president -- Watching the worsening relations with Britain and France -- Beginning the French mission-with lively exchanges -- Outlining a treaty, waiting for a response -- Sorting out the issues in Franco-American co-belligerency -- Brain-storming a solution to the indemnities issue -- Failed mission, fallen diplomat -- Having served his country, not always well, but faithfully

Part I. International Humanitarian Law and Neighbouring Frameworks -- Chapters 1. You Say Precautions, I Say Prevention: Towards the Systemic Integration of International Humanitarian Law and International Environmental Law -- Chapter 2. International Humanitarian Law and International Investment Law: Mapping a Developing Relationship -- Chapter 3. Defences to State Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law -- Chapter 4. Thinking with IHL in Contexts of Counterterrorism: The Case of Criminal Justice Systems in the Sahel. Part II. Focus Section: International Humanitarian Law and the Russian Aggression against Ukraine -- Chapter 5. Who is at War? On the Question of Co-Belligerency -- Chapter 6. "Inside" and "Outside": Assessing the Russian Blockade against Ukraine -- Chapter 7. Heads of State as War Criminals: The Prospects and Challenges of Tracing War Crimes to Senior political Leaders in Russia -- Part III. Year in Review -- Chapter 8. Year in Review 2022 -- Table of Cases -- Index.

This study is concerned with the relationship between the domestic and foreign conflict behavior of nations. Specifically, it is postulated that two key variables, type of nation and nature of conflict, determine the nature of this relationship. A population of 74 nations are divided into three groups, personalist, centrist, and polyarchic. A correlation analysis is then performed on these groups for all possible pairs of domestic conflict behavior dimensions - 'turmoil', 'revolutionary,' 'subversive' - and foreign conflict behavior dimensions - 'war,' 'diplomatic,' 'belligerency.' Stage 2 of the analysis, using raw data and covering a period from 1955 to 1960, facilitat s the investigation of time lags as a possible additional factor. The results of the study indicate that the postulated relationships do exist, with joe of nation constituting perhaps the key element in the nature of this relationship.

This article details an applied methodology to operationalize an irregular approach to conflict and competition—in particular, external support to intrastate resilience or resistance. It introduces two foundational learning concepts: the resilience and resistance model and the resistance continuum. Using the resistance continuum, analysts can categorize the general nature of resistance movements across a spectrum from nonviolent protest through belligerency. Subsequently, this article offers several ways to identify and then assess resistance organizations. It then prescribes methods to make recommendations concerning potential external support in another state's intrastate conflict consisting of three primary options: to support current governance, to support opposition to governance or occupation, or to do nothing. Finally, it provides practical application with a real-world case study—China and Taiwan—which demonstrates the utility of this methodology in understanding intrastate conflict and the possibilities offered to external sponsors of change.

Laws regulating armed conflict have existed for centuries, but the bulk of these provisions have been concerned with wars between states. Relatively little attention has been paid to the enormously important area of internal armed conflict. At a time when international armed conflicts are vastly outnumbered by domestic disputes, this book seeks to redress the balance through a comprehensive analysis of those rules which exist in international law to protect civilians during internal armed conflict. From regulations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries according to the doctrine of recognition of belligerency, this book traces the subsequent development of international law by the Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols, as well as through the more recent jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals. The book also considers the application of human rights law during internal armed conflict, before assessing how effectively the applicable law is, and can be, enforced

Histories of political science and of the laws of war identify the nineteenth-century scholar Francis Lieber as their modern founder. His 1863 General Orders 100 codified the modern laws of war, internationalizing his political thought. Yet, relatively unremarked is that Lieber wrote his foundational texts during U.S. settler colonization, which he justified in whole. I argue that GO100 facilitated settler colonial violence by defining modern war as a public war, arrogating it to sovereign states; distinguishing revenge from retaliation, attributing revenge to the "savage"; and elevating a certain racialized/gendered governance, ascribing it to the Cis-Caucasian race. Producing Native peoples and Native wars as lacking in the proper characteristics of sovereign belligerency resulted in a subordination of status and a legitimation of exterminatory tactics that were subsequently universalized and (re)internationalized through GO100's determinative influence on the laws of war. Tracing GO100 further exposes the founding of the discipline in Native peoples' dispossession and extermination.