Suchergebnisse

210Human rights — Protection of property — Right to respect for private and family life — Right to an effective remedy — Prohibition of discrimination — Applicants forced to flee homes and property in Azerbaijan during Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh — Applicants claiming prevented from returning to homes and property in Armenian occupied territory — Applicants not receiving compensation — Admissibility of applicants' application — Armenian Government raising preliminary objections — Whether matter already submitted to other international procedure — Whether Court having jurisdiction ratione temporis — Whether applicants failing to exhaust domestic remedies — Whether applicants lacking victim status — Whether Armenia having jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding territories — Whether matters complained of within Armenia's jurisdiction — Whether continuing violation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 — Whether continuing violation of Article 8 of Convention — Whether continuing violation of Article 13 of Convention — Whether separate issue arising under Article 14 of ConventionJurisdiction — Extraterritorial jurisdiction — Whether Armenia having jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding territories — Whether Armenia exercising effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding territories, including district of Lachin — Question of fact — Primary determining factor — Military presence — Other relevant factors — Military, economic and political support — Whether matters complained of within Armenia's jurisdiction for purposes of Article 1 of European Convention on Human Rights, 1950Human rights — Property rights — Whether applicants having "possessions" within meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 — Right to respect for family and private life under Article 8 of Convention — Armenia ratifying Convention on 26 April 2002 — Relevance of earlier events — Applicants forced to flee homes and property after military attack in May 1992 — Whether interference with peaceful enjoyment of applicants' possessions — Whether justification for interference — Whether proprietary rights remaining 211valid — Applicants denied access to homes — Whether justified — Whether Armenia responsible for continuing violations of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 and Article 8 of ConventionHuman rights — Right to effective remedy — Applicants denied access to property and homes — Lack of compensation — Whether adequate and effective remedy available to applicants — Whether realistic displaced Azerbaijanis afforded effective redress — Whether Armenia responsible for continuing violation of Article 13 of ConventionWar and armed conflict — Occupation — Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh — Applicants fleeing district of Lachin in Azerbaijan — Armenia occupying territory — Internally displaced persons — Applicants claiming loss of property and home — Whether applicants having victim status — Evidence — Whether Armenia having jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding territories, including district of Lachin — Whether Armenia exercising effective control — Military presence — Military, economic and political support — Whether Armenia violating Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 and Articles 8 and 13 of ConventionStates — Recognition — Entity proclaimed as State — "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" — "NKR" not recognized by any State or international organization — Armenian–Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh — Armenia, Azerbaijan and "NKR" signing ceasefire agreement in 1994 — 2001 undertaking to settle conflict peacefully — Whether "NKR" and Armenia integrated — Level of dependency between Armenia and "NKR" — Whether Armenia exercising effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories, including the district of Lachin — Whether matters complained of under European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 within jurisdiction of ArmeniaInternational tribunals — Procedure and evidence — Evidence — Ownership of property — Human rights application — Whether flexible standard of proof — Whether account to be taken of practical difficulty for applicants in obtaining evidence

Im Zentrum der hier dokumentierten Gespräche mit den Außenministern Armeniens und Aserbeidschans steht der Konflikt um Nagorny Karabach. Der armenische Außenminister nimmt Stellung zu den Beziehungen Armeniens zu Rußland und zur Türkei sowie zu den politischen Lösungsmöglichkeiten des Karabach-Konflikts. Während Armenien darauf besteht, daß das Problem zwischen Aserbeidschan und Nagorny Karabach gelöst werden muß, stellt der Konflikt in Nagorny Karabach nach Ansicht des aserbeidschanischen Außenministers einen Konflikt zwischen der Republik Armenien und der Republik Aserbeidschan da. Die Frage eines Korridors zwischen Aserbeidschan und der Exklave Nachitschewan sowie die Beziehungen Aserbeidschans zur GUS werden ebenfalls angesprochen. (BIOst-Srt)

The self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), known to Armenians as Artsakh, will cease to exist as of January 1, 2024. The newly elected de facto president, Samvel Shahramanyan, signed a decree on September 28 citing "the difficult and complicated military-political situation, based on the priority of securing the physical security and vital interests of the people of Artsakh."Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, meanwhile, has described the mass flight of ethnic Armenian civilians precipitated by this development as tantamount to an episode of ethnic cleansing. The decision on dissolving the NKR came after an Azerbaijani offensive on September 19 that saw Karabakh Armenian forces surrender within a day and begin talks on reintegration with Azerbaijan. Shahramanyan's decree reads that alongside the gradual dissolution of all state institutions and their subordinate agencies, Karabakh's Armenian population is to be familiarized with "the reintegration conditions presented by the Republic of Azerbaijan after the entry into force of this decree, so that they can make decisions independently and individually on the possibility of staying in (returning to) Nagorno-Karabakh." The NKR was born out of a civic movement that started in 1988 with the aim of establishing Armenian control over the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), which was then part of Soviet Azerbaijan but had an approximately 85 percent ethnic Armenian population. The twilight years of the Soviet Union saw episodes of communal violence and displacements of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Armenians from Azerbaijan and vice versa. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the conflict escalated into an interstate war pitting independent Azerbaijan against the Republic of Armenia and the Armenians of the former NKAO. The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was proclaimed during the war on the basis of a referendum held in 1991. After a 1994 ceasefire codified an Armenian victory, the NKR took effective control over most of the territory of the former NKAO and seven surrounding districts of Azerbaijan from which at least 600,000 Azerbaijanis had been expelled. Over the next two and half decades, the NKR maintained its own political institutions while its economy and military and security apparatus were tightly integrated with those of the Republic of Armenia. In 2020, Azerbaijan launched an offensive to retake the territory. It received substantial help from Turkey and weapons from Israel. Over 44 days of fighting, Azerbaijan regained the majority of the land it had lost in the first war. The NKR was reduced to a small rump of territory patrolled by peacekeepers from Russia, which brokered a ceasefire on November 9, 2020. Azerbaijan and Armenia then embarked on a negotiating process aimed at a comprehensive peace deal that achieved little due primarily to differences over the fate of the Karabakh Armenian population. Last week's offensive has triggered a mass exodus of Armenians from Karabakh mistrustful of assurances from Baku that their rights will be protected under Azerbaijani rule. An Azerbaijani-enforced blockade imposed over the past nine months has only deepened suspicions. As of 2:00 p.m. local time on September 28, 70,500 people had poured over the border into Armenia, according to the Armenian government. That accounts for well over half of the roughly 120,000 people said by Armenian sources to have lived in the self-described republic.Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry released a statement rejecting the Armenian prime minister's allegation of ethnic cleansing and insisting that Karabakh Armenians are welcome to stay and are leaving of their own free will. Baku has meanwhile created a web portal, Reintegration.gov.az, providing information to Armenians interested in taking up Azerbaijani citizenship. Azerbaijan arrests Karabakh's ex-state minister One of the Armenians in that exodus was not allowed to pass, however. On September 27, Azerbaijan's border service arrested former NKR State Minister Ruben Vardanyan as he tried to leave through the Lachin border checkpoint.The Russian-Armenian billionaire businessman and philanthropist was born in Yerevan and lived for years in Moscow. Late last year he renounced his Russian citizenship and moved to Stepanakert, NKR's capital, and was appointed state minister. His close ties with the Russian elite, including in the past with President Vladimir Putin, fueled widespread speculation that he had been sent to Karabakh at the Kremlin's behest to ensure that Russia maintained influence there. But after just over three months on the job, he was ousted. (Now that he's been arrested, Russia has shown no sign that it will help him.) Vardanyan remained in Karabakh, establishing himself as a political opponent of both the then-NKR leadership and the Armenian government in Yerevan.On September 28, Azerbaijan's State Security Service released video footage of Vardanyan in custody. The agency said he had been placed in pre-trial detention for four months and would face charges of financing terrorism, creating and participating in illegal armed groups, and illegally crossing Azerbaijan's border. Elsewhere, David Babayan, the NKR's former foreign minister, who most recently served as an advisor to President Shahramanyan, announced on September 28 that he was handing himself over to Azerbaijani law enforcement."You all know that I am included in the blacklist of Azerbaijan, and the Azerbaijani side demanded my arrival in Baku for an appropriate investigation. This decision will naturally cause great pain, anxiety and stress, primarily to my loved ones, but I am sure they will understand," he wrote on Facebook. This article has been republished with permission from Eurasianet.

The purpose of the article is to study the concept of transnationalism, to study transnational processes in the process of integration of Azerbaijani migrants into the European socio-cultural environment, the level of transnationalism among Azerbaijani migrants. The article examines the theoretical foundations of transnationalism and analyzes its practical aspects in the example of Azerbaijani migrants. It is noted that transnationalism explains a new form of intercultural relations between the migrant and the receiving country, which is a new approach that transcends national, state, territorial and political borders. Transnational migration is perceived as a migration model in which migrants cross the borders of national states and settle in a new country, but simultaneously become carriers of socio-cultural values of both origin (sender society) and host (receiver) society, identifys itself with both societies, intensively interacts with the country of origin (sender). The article also examines the activities of the most famous schools and scholars in the field of transnationalism. Among them are Joseph S. Nye, Robert O. Keohane, Martin Albrow, Nina Glick-Schiller, Linda Bash, Christina Szanton-Blanck, Foner N, Pries L, Levitt P. Portes A, Faist T. The integration problems of Azerbaijani immigrants living in European countries are studied from the perspective of transnationalism. It is noted that the number of Azerbaijanis living in Europe living as dual immigrants is increasing. Despite the fact that Azerbaijani migrants live in European countries, they have extensive relations with Azerbaijan, and some even continue their work and cultural life both in Europe and in Azerbaijan. These migrants are engaged both in business and other areas in the country of origin, acquire properties in Azerbaijan, open offices and live an active socio-cultural life almost in both the sending society and the receiving society. It is noted in the article that immigrants with a higher socio-economic status are more likely to act as transnational migrants. Multilateral interaction of immigrants leads to the inclusion in the general sphere of communication of the country that perceives socio-cultural relations with the country of origin. Thus, according to these provisions, migration is not moving of people from one country to another, but a way to expand the space of socio-cultural interaction. ; Метою статті є дослідження концепції транснаціоналізму, вивчення транснаціональних процесів у процесі інтеграції азербайджанських мігрантів у європейське соціокультурне середовище, рівня транснаціоналізму серед азербайджанських мігрантів. У статті розглядаються теоретичні основи транснаціоналізму та аналізуються його практичні аспекти на прикладі азербайджанських мігрантів. Зазначається, що транснаціоналізм пояснює нову форму міжкультурних стосунків між мігрантом і країною, що приймає, що є новим підходом, що виходить за межі національних, державних, територіальних та політичних кордонів. Транснаціональна міграція сприймається як міграційна модель, за якої мігранти перетинають кордони національних держав і оселяються в новій країні, але водночас стають носіями соціокультурних цінностей як походження (суспільство відправник), так і приймаючого (одержувача) суспільства, ототожнює себе з обидва суспільства, інтенсивно взаємодіє з країною походження (відправником). У статті також розглядається діяльність найвідоміших шкіл і вчених у галузі транснаціоналізму. Серед них Джозеф С. Най, Роберт О. Кеохейн, Мартін Олброу, Ніна Глік-Шіллер, Лінда Баш, Крістіна Сзантон-Бланк, Фонер Н, Пріс Л, Левіт П. Портес А, Файст Т. Проблеми інтеграції азербайджанських іммігрантів проживання в європейських країнах досліджуються з точки зору транснаціоналізму. Зазначається, що збільшується кількість азербайджанців, які живуть в Європі як подвійні іммігранти. Незважаючи на те, що азербайджанські мігранти живуть в європейських країнах, вони мають широкі зв'язки з Азербайджаном, а деякі навіть продовжують свою роботу та культурне життя як в Європі, так і в Азербайджані. Ці мігранти займаються як бізнесом, так і іншими сферами в країні походження, набувають нерухомість в Азербайджані, відкривають офіси та живуть активним соціокультурним життям майже як у суспільстві, що відправляє, так і в суспільстві, що приймає. У статті зазначається, що в якості транснаціональних мігрантів частіше виступають іммігранти з вищим соціально-економічним статусом. Багатостороння взаємодія іммігрантів призводить до включення в загальну сферу спілкування країни, яка сприймає соціокультурні відносини з країною походження. Таким чином, відповідно до цих положень, міграція – це не переміщення людей з однієї країни в іншу, а спосіб розширення простору соціокультурної взаємодії. ; Метою статті є дослідження концепції транснаціоналізму, вивчення транснаціональних процесів у процесі інтеграції азербайджанських мігрантів у європейське соціокультурне середовище, рівня транснаціоналізму серед азербайджанських мігрантів. У статті розглядаються теоретичні основи транснаціоналізму та аналізуються його практичні аспекти на прикладі азербайджанських мігрантів. Зазначається, що транснаціоналізм пояснює нову форму міжкультурних стосунків між мігрантом і країною, що приймає, що є новим підходом, що виходить за межі національних, державних, територіальних та політичних кордонів. Транснаціональна міграція сприймається як міграційна модель, за якої мігранти перетинають кордони національних держав і оселяються в новій країні, але водночас стають носіями соціокультурних цінностей як походження (суспільство відправник), так і приймаючого (одержувача) суспільства, ототожнює себе з обидва суспільства, інтенсивно взаємодіє з країною походження (відправником). У статті також розглядається діяльність найвідоміших шкіл і вчених у галузі транснаціоналізму. Серед них Джозеф С. Най, Роберт О. Кеохейн, Мартін Олброу, Ніна Глік-Шіллер, Лінда Баш, Крістіна Сзантон-Бланк, Фонер Н, Пріс Л, Левіт П. Портес А, Файст Т. Проблеми інтеграції азербайджанських іммігрантів проживання в європейських країнах досліджуються з точки зору транснаціоналізму. Зазначається, що збільшується кількість азербайджанців, які живуть в Європі як подвійні іммігранти. Незважаючи на те, що азербайджанські мігранти живуть в європейських країнах, вони мають широкі зв'язки з Азербайджаном, а деякі навіть продовжують свою роботу та культурне життя як в Європі, так і в Азербайджані. Ці мігранти займаються як бізнесом, так і іншими сферами в країні походження, набувають нерухомість в Азербайджані, відкривають офіси та живуть активним соціокультурним життям майже як у суспільстві, що відправляє, так і в суспільстві, що приймає. У статті зазначається, що в якості транснаціональних мігрантів частіше виступають іммігранти з вищим соціально-економічним статусом. Багатостороння взаємодія іммігрантів призводить до включення в загальну сферу спілкування країни, яка сприймає соціокультурні відносини з країною походження. Таким чином, відповідно до цих положень, міграція – це не переміщення людей з однієї країни в іншу, а спосіб розширення простору соціокультурної взаємодії.

Next month, President Biden could hold two separate meetings with Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.


These meetings, which reporting suggests could happen at both the UN General Assembly in New York and the G20 in India, represent an opportunity to kickstart a lackluster U.S.-Brazil relationship. Past tensions between the U.S. and Brazil, exemplified by the fallout from the 2010 Tehran Declaration, serve as a cautionary tale to the Biden administration to not let a difference in perspective on Ukraine cloud other areas of potential collaboration.


Disagreements over the war in Ukraine have put the U.S.-Brazil relationship in hot water in recent months. On the campaign trail, Lula suggested, with some controversy, that Ukraine and Russia are equally responsible for the conflict. Once in office, Lula's visit to the White House in February was short and understated; Biden initially only offered $50 million to the Amazon Fund, a figure so low it was omitted from the official joint statement.


Additionally, Lula's proposal to create a peace club of nonaligned countries appears to have been a nonstarter in Washington. In a particularly heated back and forth, Lula said the U.S. should stop "encouraging" the war and start talking about peace. U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby responded by accusing Lula of "parroting Russian and Chinese propaganda."


Most observers agree that Ukraine has become something of a flashpoint for U.S.-Brazil relations and soured expectations of a more expansive reset in the wake of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro's 2022 electoral defeat.


Despite this international criticism, Lula has continued to speak about the need for a negotiated peace settlement in Ukraine. Just last week, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said this week's BRICS summit should be used to debate the war in Ukraine. Lula sees a universalist foreign policy as crucial to becoming a major global player in an increasingly multipolar world, which involves taking on global issues of international security like Ukraine that have historically been left to the great powers.


In other words, Biden isn't going to change Lula's mind on Ukraine, and Lula doesn't seem likely to give up on what has become one of his signature foreign policies. As a result, the two presidents shouldn't allow disagreements over Ukraine to spill over into other areas of cooperation.


The fallout between the U.S. and Brazil over the 2010 Tehran Declaration, an event both Lula and Biden will remember well, can serve as a cautionary tale.


In 2010, Lula and his advisers sought a fuel-swap agreement between Turkey and Iran intended to facilitate Iran's nuclear cooperation. Initially, then-President Barack Obama pledged that the United States would "support and facilitate action on a proposal that would supply Iran with nuclear fuel using Iran's enriched uranium." Only when that proposal was successful did the United States — and its European allies — change course. Just a month later, the United Nations Security Council imposed a series of harsh sanctions on Iran.


From this, Brazilian diplomats concluded that the U.S. did not think Brazil would succeed and even sought to privately press against the behind-the-scenes negotiations. Then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim summarized Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's attitude in his memoir as, "I have not read (the Declaration). But I don't like it."


When the U.S. dismissed the Tehran Declaration in 2010, it led to what Federal University of São Paulo professor Cristina Pecequilo has labeled the "low point of Lula's foreign policy" for complicating the U.S.-Brazil relationship. According to Pecequilo, this was part of Obama's "changing US policy from accommodation to containment of emerging nations." Brazil, in response, distanced itself further from the United States. The new "reset" of bilateral relations didn't come until 2014 when then Vice President Joe Biden visited Brazil during the World Cup.


These events should offer a warning to Biden. Oliver Stunekel, an associate professor of international relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation, writes that "[j]ust as Brazil's ambitious Iran initiative failed because it lacked Western buy-in — and ultimately complicated Brasília's ties to Washington — Lula's desire to negotiate a peace deal in Ukraine could have the same fate."


Rather than disengage with Brazil over Lula's comments on Ukraine, Biden should look to areas of more natural potential collaboration such as energy, deforestation, jobs creation, and trade. The two presidents recently shared a 30-minute phone call that suggested some positive signs of doing just that, even discussing a joint initiative focused on improving labor conditions. A congressional delegation of progressives also spent several days in Brazil last week, meeting with key Lula advisers and carving out another blueprint for constructive engagement between the two countries based on shared domestic priorities.


Even if Ukraine is a flashpoint for the current relationship, that doesn't mean Biden should ignore other thorny questions of international security with Lula. But doing so requires recognition that any U.S.-led proposal will inevitably look different from a joint initiative or Brazil-led proposal. At the G7 in Japan, Lula expressed interest in working to resolve other conflicts outside of Europe.


"Israelis and Palestinians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Kosovars and Serbs need peace," Lula exclaimed. "Yemenis, Syrians, Libyans and Sudanese all deserve to live in peace. These conflicts should receive the same degree of international mobilization." If Lula takes on these issues, Biden should work with him on areas of mutual interest rather than view it as a challenge to U.S. hegemony.


Another potential area of collaboration could be in Latin America. Relations between the U.S. and Venezuela have shown some signs of thawing, but the U.S. still refuses to formally recognize Nicolás Maduro as the president. The Biden administration has also restored some engagement with Cuba, yet Cuba remains on the State Department's state sponsors of terrorism list. These complicated realities make Brazil a valuable potential partner for possible backchannel talks or track II diplomatic efforts, given Brazil's positive relations with the two countries.


Brazil has occupied this role before, attempting to mediate the Cuban Missile Crisis and broker U.S.-Cuban reconciliation during the 1960s. As Obama once acknowledged, according to Amorim, "we need friends who can talk to countries that refuse to talk to us."


One of the lessons of the Tehran Declaration should be that the U.S. needs to sometimes accept taking on a smaller role when it serves its interests. Brazil brings many strengths as an outsider and a diplomatic heavyweight, but also simply by not being the U.S. As Camila Feix Vidal, professor at the Federal University of Santa Catarina, points out: "Brazil is respected internationally…Countries don't have a negative history with Brazil so it can be easier for Brazil to arbitrate, unlike the United States."


For instance, Brazil's success as an advocate against nuclear weapons is taken more seriously given that it renounced interest in nuclear weapons in the 1990s. By contrast, the U.S. today has well over 5,000.


Nearly a decade and a half on from the Tehran Declaration, the United States is operating in a more multipolar world. That may require more compromise, especially with emerging powers such as Brazil as they gain more leverage. Even if the two countries are at an impasse on Ukraine for the time being, the U.S. should heed the lessons of 2010 and consider the benefits of pursuing a more constructive partnership with Brazil.

The article on the example of the Republic of Azerbaijan (AR) considers the role of external impulses in the development of hate intolerance and aggressive nationalism. The history of the genocidal behavior of AR dates back to the 19th century when the Caucasus passed from Persia to the Russian Empire. In order to remove the region from the political influence of Persia (deiranization), the empire united the mixed tribes that penetrated from Persia, gave them the ethnonym of the Caucasian Tatars, and provided them with wide privileges. The privileges granted to this orthodox community, which has been deprived of ethnic identity, have built the most permissive behavior in relations with the natives. The Empire 1905-1907 used it to punish Armenians actively involved in political movements. 1918 The Caucasian Tatars took part in the Armenian massacres committed by the Ottoman Turks who entered the region. Permissiveness towards Armenians, acquired under the conditions of the Russian Empire, grew into a deliberate genocidal behavior. 1920-1921 the Bolsheviks, who entered into a deal with the Kemalist Turks, encouraged this behavior by forcibly alienating Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh from the Arm. SSR in favor of Az. SSR. Stalin's plan to build a new Azerbaijani nation in the 1930s was aimed at halting the final Turkification of Caucasian Tatars by assimilating them to non-Turkish indigenous Islamic peoples. However, pro-Turkish figures trapped in state structures turned the program into a program of forcible Turkification of non-Turkish peoples, looting of their history and culture, and expulsion of Armenians from the republic. The publicity policy announced by Gorbachev, the new leader of the Communist Party of the USSR in 1985, seemed to pave the way for the restoration of justice and the reunification of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic with the Armenian SSR. However, Moscow described the NKAO regional council's request as "extreme" and addressed the solution to the crowd of Azerbaijanis. The genocide of Armenians of Azerbaijan began with the Sumgait massacre. The Gorbachev Center could have prevented these atrocities. However, subsequent events showed that Gorbachev needed that conflict to dismantle the USSR according to the Soviet republics. The West agreed with him on the issue, refraining from calling it a genocide. He feared recognizing a state that had declared itself a genocidal state after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ignoring the genocide of one of the founding peoples of the Republic of Azerbaijan, he recognized the RA in 1992 within the borders of Az. SSR. It was a genocide encouragement. AR has become a center for the export of aggressive nationalism and genocidal behavior today. There is the contribution of foreign players in it. Their responsibility for instilling a genocidal culture in the Eastern Transcaucasia has not yet been systematically studied. ; Հոդվածում Ադրբեջանական Հանրապետության օրինակով դիտարկվում է ատելության, անհանդուրժողականության և ագրեսիվ ազգայնականության ձևավորման գործում արտաքին ազդակների դերը: Ադրբեջանի ցեղասպանական վարքի ձևավորման նախապատմությունը սկսվում է XIX դարից, երբ Այսրկովկասը Պարսկաստանից անցել է Ռուսական կայսրությանը: Երկրամասը Պարսկաստանի քաղաքական ազդեցությունից հեռացնելու (իրանազերծելու) համար կայսրությունը այնտեղից թափանցող խառնամբոխ ցեղերին միավորել է, նրանց տվել կովկասյան թաթարներ էթնոնիմը և տրամադրել լայն արտոնություններ: Էթնիկական ինքնությունց զուրկ տարախառն այդ հանրույթին տրված արտոնությունները ձևավորել են արտոնյալ վարք բնիկների նկատմամբ: Կայսրռությունը 1905-1907 թթ. դա օգտագործել է քաղաքական շարժումներում ակտիվորեն ներգրավված հայերին պատժելու համար: 1918 թ. կովկասյան թաթարները մասնակցեցին երկրամաս մտած օսմանյան թուրքերի իրագործած հայկական ջարդերին: Ռուսական կայսրության պայմաններում հայերի հանդեպ ամենաթողությունը վերաճեց ցեղասպանական գիտակցված վարքի: 1920-1921 թթ. քեմալական թուրքերի հետ գործարքի մեջ մտած բոլշևիկները խրախուսեցին այդ վարքը՝ ՀԽՍՀ-ից բռնությամբ օտարելով Նախիջևանն ու Լեռնային Ղարաբաղը հօգուտ Ադր. ԽՍՀ-ի: 1930-ականներին ադրբեջանական նոր ազգ կառուցելու ստալինյան ծրագիրը նպատակ ուներ կասեցնել կովկասյան թաթարների վերջնական թուրքացումը՝ իսլամադավան ոչ թուրք բնիկ ժողովուրդների հետ ձուլելու ճանապարհով: Սակայն պետական կառույցներում խրամատավորված թուրքամետ գործիչները տեղում ծրագիրը փոխակերպեցին ոչ թուրք ժողովուրդների բռնի թուրքացման, նրանց պատմության ու մշակույթի կողոպուտի և հայերին հանրապետությունից դուրս մղելու ծրագրի: Բողոքողները մեղադրվում էին ազգայնամոլության մեջ և պատժվում: Անպատասխան էին մնում նաև Լեռնային Ղարաբաղից Մոսկվային հղված բողոքները: ԽՍՀՄ տարիներին կովկասյան թաթարներ կեղծ էթնիկ հանրությանը փոխարինեց դարձյալ ազգային ինքնությունից զերծ մեկ այլ էթնիկ հանրություն՝ ադրբեջանցիներ անվամբ: 1985-ին ԽՄԿԿ նոր առաջնորդ Մ.Գորբաչովի հռչակած հրապարակայնության ուղեգիծը, թվում էր, արդարության վերականգնման և ՀԽՍՀ հետ ԼՂԻՄ-ի վերամիավորման հնարավորություն էր տալիս: Սակայն Մոսկվան ԼՂԻՄ մարզխորհրդի խնդրանք-դիմումը որակեց «ծայրահեղական» և խնդրի լուծումը հասցեագրեց ադրբեջանցիների ամբոխին: Բարեկամության կեղծ լոզունգների տակ մինչ այդ քողարկվող Ադր. ԽՍՀ իշխանությունը և ամբոխը ստացան ինքնաարտահայտման ազատություն: Սումգայիթի հայերի ջարդով սկսվեց ադրբեջանահայության ցեղասպանությունը: Գորբաչովյան Կենտրոնը կարող էր կանխել այդ վայրագությունները: Սակայն հետագա դեպքերը ցույց տվեցին, որ այդ կոնֆլիկտը Գորբաչովին պետք էր ըստ միութենական հանրապետությունների ԽՍՀՄ-ը կազմաքանդելու համար: Արևմուտքը նրա համախոհն էր այդ հարցում և նույնպես ձեռնպահ մնաց տեղի ունեցածը ցեղասպանություն որակելու հարցում: Ադր. ԽՍՀ հիմնադիր ժողովուրդներից մեկի ցեղասպանությունը անտեսելով՝ նա Ադրբեջանական Հանրապետությունը 1992-ին ճանաչեց Ադր. ԽՍՀ սահմաններում: Դա խրախուսանք էր ցեղասպանին: Ադրբեջանն այսօր դարձել է ագրեսիվ ազգայնականության և ցեղասպանական վարքի դրսևորման կենտրոն, և դրանում արտաքին խաղացողների ներդրումը կա նաև: Այդ մշակույթը ներդրողների ցանկում են՝ Ռուսական կայսրությունը, սուլթանական և հանրապետական Թուրքիան, բոլշևիկյան Ռուսաստանը, գորբաչովյան ԽՍՀՄ-ը և մերօրյա Արևմուտքը՝ ի դեմս ԵԱՀԿ-ի: Արևելյան Անդրկովկասում ցեղասպանական մշակույթ ձևավորելու համար նրանց պատասխանատվությունը դեռևս համակարգված ուսումնասիրված չէ: ; В статье рассматривается роль внешних импульсов в формировании ненависти, нетерпимости и агрессивного национализма на примере Азербайджанской Республики. История геноцидного поведения Азербайджана восходит к XIX веку, когда Кавказ перешел от Персии к Российской империи. Чтобы вывести регион из-под политического влияния Персии, империя объединила проникавшие оттуда смешанные племена, дала им этноним кавказских татар и предоставила им широкие привилегии. Привилегии, предоставленные этой этнически смешанной общине, привели к преференциальному отношению к коренным народам. Империя использовала его в 1905–1907 годах для наказания армян, активно участвовавших в политических движениях. В 1918 году кавказские татары приняли участие в резне армян, совершенной вторгшимися в регион турками-османами. В условиях Российской империи толерантность к армянам превратилась в геноцидное поведение. Большевики, заключившие сделку с турками-кемалистами в 1920-1921 годах, поощряли такое поведение, насильственно отчуждая Нахичевань и Нагорный Карабах от Армянской ССР в пользу Азербайджанской ССР. План Сталина по созданию новой азербайджанской нации в 1930-х годах был направлен на то, чтобы остановить окончательную тюркизацию кавказских татар путем ассимиляции исламистских нетурецких коренных народов. Однако протурецкие деятели в государственных структурах превратили этот план в план насильственной тюркизации нетурецких народов, разграбления их истории и культуры и изгнания армян из страны. Протестующих обвинили в национализме и наказали. Жалобы из Нагорного Карабаха в Москву остались без ответа. В советское время кавказские татары заменили ложную этническую общность другой этнической общностью без национальной идентичности, именуемой азербайджанцами. Публичная позиция, объявленная в 1985 году новым лидером Коммунистической партии Советского Союза М. Горбачевым, казалось, предоставила возможность восстановить справедливость и воссоединить НКАО с Армянской ССР. Однако в Москве охарактеризовали запрос-заявление облсовета НКАО как "крайнее" и обратились к решению проблемы к толпе азербайджанцев. Под фальшивыми лозунгами дружбы, ранее замаскированного правительства Азербайджанской ССР толпа получила свободу слова. Геноцид армян Азербайджана начался с резни сумгаитских армян. Горбачев мог предотвратить эти зверства. Однако последующие события показали, что Горбачеву был нужен этот конфликт для развала СССР. Запад согласился с ним и также не стал называть случившееся геноцидом. Игнорируя геноцид одного из народов-основателей Азербайджанской ССР, он в 1992 году признал Азербайджанскую Республику в границах Азербайджанской ССР. Это было поощрением геноцида. Сегодня Азербайджан стал центром выражения агрессивного национализма, геноцидного поведения и вовлечения в него иностранных игроков.

After more than three decades of conflict and several bloody wars, the Republic of Azerbaijan recaptured the Armenian-inhabited enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh on September 28. Azerbaijan's lightning victory followed a nine-month blockade of the Lachin Corridor, the only link between the Karabakh region to mainland Armenia, effectively depriving the roughly 120,000 Karabakh Armenians who lived there of food and other necessities.Following Azerbaijan's victory, there was a mass exodus of Armenians from Karabakh and the creation of a severe humanitarian crisis that reminded some of the Armenians' flight from the Ottoman Empire during 1915-16 when as many as a million people died or were killed — considered a genocide by Armenians and part of World War I's tragic collateral damage by the Turks.Many factors contributed to Azerbaijan's final victory in its long-simmering conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Some factors are rooted in the South Caucasus' complex history as part of the Iranian state until 1813, followed by the Russian and Soviet empires, the USSR's nationalities policies and its practice of using various ethnic groups as levers of influence, and finally the messy breakup of the USSR beginning in 1988. Other factors relate to the disparity in Armenia's and Azerbaijan's size, population, and resources. Unlike Armenia, which has few natural resources, Azerbaijan is an energy-rich country and thus capable of spending large sums on arms.Additional factors include Armenia's persistent internal political differences on the country's foreign policy orientation, as well as rivalries and disagreements between Armenian and Karabakh political elites.Since gaining independence after the Soviet collapse, Armenia has mostly depended on Russian support. But largely due to the 20-month-old war in Ukraine, Moscow's priorities have changed. Both Turkey and Azerbaijan became more important for Moscow, and its failure to adequately support Armenia, particularly by deploying its peacekeeping force to dismantle the blockade, sealed last month's outcome.Unfortunately for Armenia, Azerbaijan also became more important for the West in light of the Ukraine war. This meant that neither Europe nor the United States was willing to take major risks to restrain Baku.Lastly, international and regional geopolitical rivalries and Armenia's vulnerable geopolitical position contributed to its ultimate defeat. Among these factors were the larger Russia-West rivalry for control of Eurasia and Washington's 30-year-old efforts to contain and isolate Iran by denying Tehran any role in the emerging post-Cold War economic and security structures of the Southern Caucasus, most importantly in the construction of pipelines to transport oil and gas from Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia to Western markets.To accomplish this aim, the U.S. and Europe effectively assigned a leading role to Turkey in the Caucasus and Central Asia both as a model to be emulated by the Central Asian states and as the West's major regional partner. Perhaps, at the time, Armenia should have seen the writing on the wall and aligned itself more closely with the West while seeking some form of accommodation with Turkey. But given Armenians' history with the Ottomans and Turkey, this was not easy to do, and Yerevan chose to align itself more closely to Russia instead.Armenia did, in fact, retain ties with the West and even joined NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Yet, despite religious and cultural bonds with the West and a politically active Diaspora community, particularly in France and the U.S., Yerevan's closer ties to Moscow resulted in a lingering Western distrust. And, as time went on, the lure of Azerbaijan's energy resources became too strong for the West to resist.Surrounded by Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia saw Iran with which it built a constructive relationship after independence, as a potential counterweight to Azerbaijan. But Iran, fearful of antagonizing its own Azeri population concentrated in the northwestern part of the country and concerned about antagonizing a fellow Muslim and mostly Shi'a country, was limited in its response. At the same time, Moscow worked to enhance Armenia's dependence on Russia, making it more difficult for Yerevan to develop closer economic and energy ties with Tehran. In short, U.S. containment of Iran and Russia's desire to control Armenia deprived Yerevan of alternative sources of support.The regional involvement of Israel, the Middle East's most important military power and a sworn enemy of the Islamic Republic, has further complicated matters. As a minority state in the Muslim world that was itself born in part as a result of the Nazi genocide against the Jews in Europe, Israel should theoretically have felt a natural affinity for Armenia. But a desire to expand its diplomatic relations with Muslim states (long before the 2020 Abraham Accords), the lure of energy resources and markets, and its hostility toward Iran have pulled Israel ever closer to Azerbaijan.Over time, Israel became a key supplier of weapons for Baku, providing it with as much as 69 percent of its total arms imports, including some of its most advanced weapons systems, between 2016 and 2020, a trend that intensified significantly as Azerbaijan prepared its offensive to take Karabakh. Moreover, Baku's principal patron and mentor, Turkey, which has its own regional ambitions, supplied additional weaponry and assistance, even to the extent of reportedly providing Syrian mercenaries for Baku to fight in Karabakh during the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.Since Ottoman times, Turkey has coveted what is now the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as the Iranian province of Azerbaijan. Pan-Turkist and neo-Ottoman forces, with which President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is identified, have long wanted to create a land bridge between, first, Turkey and Azerbaijan, and subsequently through northern Iran to Central Asia. In this way, Turkey hopes to realize a direct land route to link all Turkic peoples.Azerbaijan's conquest of Karabakh marks the first step towards this goal. Now, Turkey is insisting on the creation of a land corridor between Azerbaijan and Nakhicevan, an Azerbaijani exclave bounded by Armenia, Iran and Turkey. This would amount to the incorporation of what the Armenians call Syunik and the Azerbaijanis call Zangezur into Azerbaijan, thus bypassing Iran. In a demonstration of Turkey's aims, Erdoğan himself visited Nakhichevan for a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on September 25, two weeks before Baku's Karabakh offensive, and talked about the opening of the so-called Zangezur Corridor.Iran is understandably concerned by all of these developments. While relations between Baku and Tehran have oscillated between warm and cold since Azerbaijan's independence, they have grown more tense in recent years, particularly as Israel became increasingly critical to Baku's military buildup, possibly in exchange for oil and reportedly also for access to Iran for Israeli intelligence operations. Iran has long been concerned that Azerbaijan may serve as a launch pad for an Israeli, U.S., or joint attack on its territory.As for Turkey's ambitions, it should be noted that the Nakhicavan exclave lies only 90 miles from Tabriz, the capital of Iranian Azerbaijan, which Baku claims is occupied territory it refers to as Southern Azerbaijan. Erdogan appears to share that sentiment; in 2020, his recitation of a poem that claimed that Iran had usurped the region provoked protests in Tehran.Iran has said clearly that it opposes any other territorial changes in the region, especially the creation of a corridor that would eliminate its common border with Armenia. In early October, Iran's president, Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi, expressed this view to Armenian and Azerbaijani officials who met with him. Earlier, members of parliament had warned that Iran would not tolerate any changes to its border with Armenia, while an article that appeared in Tehran's influential "Iran Diplomacy" even suggested that Iran unilaterally create a 20-mile buffer zone within Karabakh, Nakhichevan, and Syunik in order to prevent any incursions into Iranian territory. A year ago, Iran held large-scale military exercises along its Azerbaijani border, signaling its determination to resist further territorial changes to its detriment.Against this background, the steady rapprochement between Turkey and Israel since last year's exchange of ambassadors — Erdogan was reportedly preparing to host Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu later this month or in November before the latest Gaza war broke out last weekend – has done little to calm Tehran's concerns. Earlier this year, 30-plus members of Israel's Knesset also called for international support for "the national aspirations of the peoples of South Azerbaijan."Thus, the latest Caucasus conflict is not finished, and larger clashes may lie ahead, especially if Azerbaijan pursues its irredentist claims against Iran with the backing of Turkey and Israel. In the last few days, there have been reports that Baku and Tehran are now trying to normalize bilateral relations and even discuss opening a new transit route through Iran to Nakhicevan, which could alleviate some of Tehran's key concerns. However, the deep-rooted sources of tension between Iran and Azerbaijan are unlikely to be quickly resolved, and thus the risk of possible conflict remains high, especially if Iran's rivals pressure Baku.