[spa] El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar los impuestos como instrumento para el control de la contaminación y medir sus efectos sobre la actividad industrial. La investigación se centra en un ámbito de contaminación concreto, el de las aguas residuales, poniendo el énfasis en el estudio de la respuesta del sector industrial a la aplicación de tributos con intencionalidad ambiental en dicho ámbito.La tesis doctoral se organiza en seis capítulos. El capítulo 1 del trabajo, titulado "La fiscalidad como instrumento para el control de la contaminación" consta de tres partes. En primer lugar, se sitúa el problema de la contaminación desde la perspectiva económica y, en particular, desde dos enfoques interrelacionados: el de la teoría de las externalidades y un enfoque institucional basado en la teoría de los derechos de propiedad.En la segunda parte de este primer capítulo se repasan los argumentos teóricos que se utilizan para la comparación de los efectos previsibles de diversos mecanismos de intervención en el comportamiento de los contaminadores así como las principales conclusiones sobre sus ventajas e inconvenientes relativos. En concreto, se compara la utilización de los impuestos ambientales -como instrumentos económicos o de mercado- con la alternativa reguladora; la aplicación de impuestos frente a la opción de los subsidios; finalmente, se compara la actuación impositiva con, el establecimiento de un sistema de permisos negociables. El capítulo se completa con una revisión del papel que la fiscalidad ambiental juega actualmente en los países europeos.El capítulo 2, titulado "Aspectos de eficiencia y de equidad en el diseño de tributos ambientales", plantea la creación de impuestos con finalidad ambiental como un procedimiento que debe tener en cuenta las recomendaciones derivadas tanto del criterio de eficiencia como de equidad que habitualmente se utilizan para valorar un sistema impositivo. Se realiza, por tanto, en la primera y segunda parte de este capítulo, un análisis teórico de lo que cada uno de estos criterios supone en el diseño específico de tributos ambientales.Asimismo, también es importante considerar, a nivel teórico, el grado en que el argumento ambiental puede encajar en el sistema impositivo general. No hay que olvidar que los tributos ambientales se introducen en cada país, en un contexto fiscal concreto, con unas características de centralización/descentralización de tareas entre niveles de gobierno. La tercera parte del capítulo estudia la influencia de estas cuestiones sobre el diseño de los tributos ambientales.El capítulo 3, titulado "La tributación ambiental sobre el agua en España y en el resto de Europa", pretende mostrar cuál es la práctica de imposición ambiental en España y en otros países, en tomo al recurso agua. Se inicia el capítulo con una exposición de las particularidades del agua como objeto de gravamen, para continuar con una visión global de la experiencia española en cuanto a fiscalidad de las aguas. A continuación, se realiza un análisis exhaustivo del Tributo de Saneamiento sobre las aguas residuales aplicado en Cataluña, se revisa su estructura y se valora su intencionalidad ambiental. El análisis anterior se completa con el estudio comparativo de los cánones de saneamiento existentes en otras Comunidades Autónomas, poniendo el énfasis en las distintas formas de considerar las emisiones contaminantes en la estructura del tributo. Finalmente, se presentan las características de la fiscalidad ambiental sobre el agua en otros países europeos. El capítulo 4, titulado "Los tributos ambientales sobre el agua y su relación con la oferta y la tarificación del recurso", pretende ser un nexo entre el estudio de los impuestos ambientales sobre el agua y su relación con la tarifa exigida por el servicio de suministro, de competencia local. Ello es necesario ya que tanto los impuestos ambientales como la propia tarifa de suministro terminan formando parte de lo que podría denominarse "precio global del agua". En consecuencia, el diseño de estas figuras no debería ser completamente independiente. A menudo, el diseño de la política de tarifas sobre el agua se justifica a partir de los rasgos de monopolio natural que se atribuyen a la oferta del recurso. Por ello, se discuten las características del servicio de abastecimiento de agua como monopolio natural y se analizan las consecuencias sobre las pautas de fijación de precios del recurso. Finalmente se estudia la estructura de la oferta municipal de agua en España, a modo de ejemplo de los conceptos teóricos revisados en primer lugar. El capítulo 5, titulado "La demanda de agua de uso industrial: modelos empíricos", es un repaso de parte de la literatura que se ha dedicado al análisis empírico de la demanda de agua bajo distintos enfoques. En la selección de los modelos comentados, se ha seguido especialmente la línea de investigación desarrollada en los trabajos de De Rooy (1974), Renzetti (varios años), Rees (1969) y Williams y Suh (1986). Conocer los principales trabajos dedicados a este tema de estudio nos parece fundamental para plantear de un modo coherente el análisis empírico realizado en el capítulo siguiente. En el capítulo 6, titulado "Análisis empírico de los efectos del Tributo de Saneamiento de Cataluña sobre la industria", se desarrolla el trabajo aplicado de esta investigación que trata dos cuestiones diferenciadas. En primer lugar, se estima una función simple de demanda de agua a partir de una muestra de observaciones, a nivel de establecimiento industrial, referidas a 1997. La presentación de los resultados de la estimación permite aportar información sobre la elasticidad-precio de la demanda por sectores industriales y, en particular, la contribución del Tributo de Saneamiento a dicha elasticidad. En segundo lugar, se analiza el papel del Tributo de Saneamiento como incentivo a la reducción de la contaminación a través de dos aproximaciones. La primera plantea un análisis comparativo del comportamiento del sector industrial en cuanto a la contaminación en 1994 y 1999. La segunda analiza la correlación parcial entre la reducción de la contaminación y la magnitud del Tributo de Saneamiento, para los casos en los que esta reducción ha tenido lugar. Finalmente, se presenta un apartado de conclusiones en el que se incluyen las posibles líneas de mejora y extensión del trabajo realizado. ; [eng] This Thesis has a double aim: first, to analyse the taxes as a control instrument of water pollution and, second, to assess their effects on industrial sector. Initially, environmental pollution is set in the economic analysis. Special reference is made to externalities and the theory of property rights. Additionally, taxes are compared with alternative environmental policy instruments, such as traditional regulatory policies, subsidies o marketable permit systems. Moreover, the design of environmental taxes is described as a choice: emission taxes versus indirect taxes, earmarking versus "double dividend" and degree of green tax reform. Spanish water taxes are outlined. Specially, sewerage tax (emission tax) created by regional government of Catalonia is analysed and judged as an environmental tax. This is useful to the following empirical analysis of the Catalan sewerage tax. The Thesis contains a survey of water demand models, especially industrial water demands. Two kinds of models are identified depending on assumption about the water rates information (perfect o imperfect) and their consequences on consumer's behaviour analysed. A model of industrial water demand is estimated for the Catalan case. The estimation of water demand is based on a cross-sectional survey of establishment level observations on water prices, quantities and other complementary information referred to 1997. The estimation results indicate that industrial water use is sensitive to economic factors and the contribution of sewerage tax on global price is not irrelevant. On the other hand, incentive of sewerage tax to cut water industrial pollution is analysed. First, a description of pollution industrial behaviour is presented through comparing situation between 1994 and 1999. Second, a partial correlation analysis between reduction of pollution and the amount of sewerage tax is measured. Positive correlation is found for the following industries: chemical, food and beverage, paper and metallurgist-mechanic. These results provide an econometric support to emphasize the significance of water prices on industrial sector and the influence of environmental taxes design on these prices.
1International Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Provisional measures of protection — Circumstances in which Court will indicate provisional measures — Whether necessary to determine that prima facie basis for jurisdiction exists — Nature of provisional measures in case involving continuing armed conflictInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Procedure — Removal of case from list — Circumstances in which request for removal will be granted — Necessary that there must be no prima facie basis for jurisdictionInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Procedure — Intervention — Application by State to intervene to contest jurisdiction and admissibility — Whether any basis for such intervention in Statute — Whether appropriate to hold hearing — Refusal of request to intervene not a bar to intervention at merits phase of proceedingsInternational Court of Justice — Organization of the Court — Judges — Standards of behaviour — Press conference — Reference by State party to case to nationality of certain judges — Suggestion that secret information could not be disclosed to court containing judges from certain countriesInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Competence — Optional Clause — Declaration of acceptance — Declarations made under Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice — When transferred to International Court of Justice — Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 36(5) — Whether necessary for declaration to have been binding in respect of Permanent Court in order to be transferred under Article 36(5) — Declaration made by Nicaragua on signing Protocol of Signature to the Statute of the Permanent Court — Never completed by ratification — Whether possessing any legal effect — Whether constituting a binding acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court by virtue of Article 36(5)International Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Competence — Optional Clause — State listed in Court publications as having accepted compulsory jurisdiction — Whether inclusion in list legally significant — Conduct of States — Whether capable of curing defect in State's acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction — Whether conduct must be consistent and unequivocal — Whether State's conduct amounting to an estoppel2International Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Competence — Optional Clause — Withdrawal or amendment of declaration accepting compulsory jurisdiction — Declaration stating that notice required — Whether States within Optional Clause system possessing extra-statutory right to withdraw declarations with immediate effect — State practice under Optional Clause — Reciprocity — Whether applicable to notice provisions of declarationsInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Competence — Optional Clause — Reservations — Reservation excluding jurisdiction of the Court in relation to disputes arising under a multilateral treaty if the other parties to the treaty who would be affected by the decision not before the Court — Interpretation — Whether reservation capable of being applied in proceedings relating to jurisdiction — Whether more appropriate for application at merits phase — Reservation precluding Court from adjudicating upon claims based on treaty provisions on the use of force and intervention — Whether also precluding application of customary law principles with content similar or identical to treaty provisionsInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Competence — Under bilateral treaty — Nicaragua-United States Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 1956 — Disputes regarding interpretation and application of Treaty — Extent of jurisdiction conferred upon CourtInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Admissibility of application — Legal dispute — Definition — Whether excluding dispute involving continuing armed conflict — Whether such disputes reserved for Security Council — Whether State required to exhaust regional political machinery for settlement of disputes before referring matter to Court — Absence of other States involved in regional dispute — Whether international law includes indispensable parties rule — Whether admissibility to be considered at jurisdiction or merits phase of proceedingsInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Procedure — Fact-finding — Rules of evidence — Procedure for determining facts — Relevant period — Press information and matters of public knowledge — Statements by representatives of States — Oral evidence of witnesses — Material not presented in accordance with Rules of CourtInternational Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Procedure — Absence of respondent State from part of proceedings — Statute of the International Court, Article 533International Court of Justice — Contentious jurisdiction — Power to award damages — Whether including power to make interim award of damagesSources of international law — Treaties — Customary international law — Relationship between treaties and custom — Development of customary international law through the conclusion of treaties — Whether treaty completely supplants identical rules of customary international law as between parties to the treaty — United Nations Charter — Charter of the Organization of American States — Provisions relating to intervention and the use of force — Whether codificatory of existing customary law at the date of their conclusion — Whether customary law has subsequently developed to take the same form as Charter provisionsSources of international law — Customary international law — Constituent elements — Practice — Whether absolute consistency required — Opinio iuris — Evidence of — Treaties as evidence of opinio iuris — Resolutions of international organizations as evidence of opinio iuris — Significance of concordant views of parties to case as evidence of content of customary lawState responsibility — For acts of armed groups supported by State — Rebel groups operating in one State financed and equipped by other State — Whether acts of rebel groups imputable to the State which supports them — Degree of control necessary for acts to be imputable to StateWar and armed conflict — Use of force — Definition — Whether supplying rebel groups operating in another State a use of force against that State — Whether an armed attack — Provision of funds and supply of arms — Logistical and organizational support — Training — Covert operations — Sending armed bands — Whether an armed attack — United Nations Charter, Articles 2(4) and 51 — Customary international lawWar and armed conflict — Use of force — Self-defence — Limitations on the right of self-defence — Requirement of an armed attack — Necessity and proportionality — Motive of State using force in alleged self-defence — Collective self-defence — Requirements — Whether State which has been the victim of an armed attack must request assistance — Whether third State coming to assistance of victim State must itself be under threat — Duty to report measures taken to Security Council under United Nations 4Charter, Article 51 — Whether also a requirement of customary international law — Evidential significance of failure to report measuresWar and armed conflict — Use of force — Self-defence — Whether State entitled to use force in response to unlawful intervention not amounting to an armed attackWar and armed conflict — Humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict — Geneva Conventions, 1949 — Whether an expression or a development of fundamental principles of humanity — Common Article 3 — Fundamental principles applicable to non-international conflicts — Minimum yardstick also applicable to international conflicts — Conflict in Nicaragua — Whether international — Common Article 1 — Duty to ensure respect for Conventions in all circumstances — Publication of manual advocating the commission of acts contrary to humanitarian law — Whether publication a violation of humanitarian lawWar and armed conflict — Humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict — Naval warfare — Mines — Hague Convention No. VIII, Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, 1907 — Duty to notify international shipping of the existence and location of minefieldsStates — Sovereignty — Duty of non-intervention — Scope and extent of duty at customary international law — Support for rebel groups in another State — Right of each State to determine political system and foreign policy for itself — Whether this freedom curtailed by announcement to regional organization of political programme — Whether announcement constituting binding undertaking — Regional organization and some States within region recognizing new government on strength of undertakingStates — Sovereignty — Mining approaches to State's ports — Unauthorized intrusion into State's airspace — Whether violations of State's sovereigntyGovernments — Recognition — Conditions of recognition — Nicaragua — Junta for National Reconstruction offering certain undertakings about future direction of Nicaragua — Organization of American States withdrawing recognition from previous "Somoza" Government — Whether undertakings binding5Governments — Succession — Successful rebellion — New government responsible for acts of rebelsHuman rights — Enforcement — Whether States have a right to use force against State which is violating human rights — Alleged violations of human rights in Nicaragua — Whether justifying use of force by the United StatesAir — Airspace — Unauthorized intrusion into State's airspace — Whether a violation of State sovereigntySea — Territorial Sea — Internal waters — Freedom of passage — Mines — State laying mines in territorial sea and internal waters of other State — Access to other State's ports impeded — Whether a violation of freedom of navigationEconomics, trade and finance — Economic sanctions — Trade embargo — State blocking loans in international organizations — United States sanctions against Nicaragua — Whether contrary to general international law — Whether contrary to Nicaragua-United States Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 1956 — Whether defeating object and purpose of treatyDamages — Basis for award of damages — Reparation for unlawful use of force and intervention — Declaration that Respondent State under a duty to make reparation — Form and amount of reparation to be settled in later proceedingsTreaties — Form — Informal undertakings — Plan for political development of State issued by government in exile to regional organization — Whether intended to have legal effect
IMPORTANCE: Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is poorly understood compared with other anxiety disorders, and debates persist about the seriousness of this disorder. Few data exist on GAD outside a small number of affluent, industrialized nations. No population-based data exist on GAD as it is currently defined in DSM-5. OBJECTIVE: To provide the first epidemiologic data on DSM-5 GAD and explore cross-national differences in its prevalence, course, correlates, and impact. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: Data come from the World Health Organization World Mental Health Survey Initiative. Cross-sectional general population surveys were carried out in 26 countries using a consistent research protocol and assessment instrument. A total of 147 261 adults from representative household samples were interviewed face-to-face in the community. The surveys were conducted between 2001 and 2012. Data analysis was performed from July 22, 2015, to December 12, 2016. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: The Composite International Diagnostic Interview was used to assess GAD along with comorbid disorders, role impairment, and help seeking. RESULTS: Respondents were 147 261 adults aged 18 to 99 years. The surveys had a weighted mean response rate of 69.5%. Across surveys, DSM-5 GAD had a combined lifetime prevalence (SE) of 3.7% (0.1%), 12-month prevalence of 1.8% (0.1%), and 30-day prevalence of 0.8% (0). Prevalence estimates varied widely across countries, with lifetime prevalence highest in high-income countries (5.0% [0.1%]), lower in middle-income countries (2.8% [0.1%]), and lowest in low-income countries (1.6% [0.1%]). Generalized anxiety disorder typically begins in adulthood and persists over time, although onset is later and clinical course is more persistent in lower-income countries. Lifetime comorbidity is high (81.9% [0.7%]), particularly with mood (63.0% [0.9%]) and other anxiety (51.7% [0.9%]) disorders. Severe role impairment is common across life domains (50.6% [1.2%]), particularly in high-income countries. Treatment is sought by approximately half of affected individuals (49.2% [1.2%]), especially those with severe role impairment (59.4% [1.8%]) or comorbid disorders (55.8% [1.4%]) and those living in high-income countries (59.0% [1.3%]). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: The findings of this study show that DSM-5 GAD is more prevalent than DSM-IV GAD and is associated with substantial role impairment. The disorder is especially common and impairing in high-income countries despite a negative association between GAD and socioeconomic status within countries. These results underscore the public health significance of GAD across the globe while uncovering cross-national differences in prevalence, course, and impairment that require further investigation. ; The WHO WMH Survey Initiative is supported by National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) grant R01 MH070884; the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation; the Pfizer Foundation; US Public Health Service grants R13-MH066849, R01-MH069864, and R01 DA016558; Fogarty International Center grant FIRCA R03-TW006481; the Pan American Health Organization; Eli Lilly and Company; Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc; GlaxoSmithKline; and Bristol-Myers Squibb. The 2007 Australian National Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing is funded by the Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing. The São Paulo Megacity Mental Health Survey is supported by the State of São Paulo Research Foundation Thematic Project grant 03/00204-3. The Bulgarian Epidemiological Study of common mental disorders Epidemiology and Bulgaria is supported by the Ministry of Health and the National Center for Public Health Protection. The Chinese WMH Survey Initiative is supported by the Pfizer Foundation. The Shenzhen Mental Health Survey is supported by the Shenzhen Bureau of Health and the Shenzhen Bureau of Science, Technology, and Information. The Colombian National Study of Mental Health is supported by the Ministry of Social Protection. The Mental Health Study Medellín–Colombia was carried out and supported jointly by the Center for Excellence on Research in Mental Health (CES University) and the Secretary of Health of Medellín. The European Study of the Epidemiology of Mental Disorders project is funded by European Commission contracts QLG5-1999-01042, SANCO 2004123, and EAHC 20081308 (the Piedmont Region [Italy]); Fondo de Investigación Sanitaria; Instituto de Salud Carlos III, Spain grant FIS 00/0028; Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, Spain, grant SAF 2000-158-CE; Departament de Salut, Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain; Instituto de Salud Carlos III grants CIBER CB06/02/0046 and RETICS RD06/0011 REM-TAP; and other local agencies and by an unrestricted educational grant from GlaxoSmithKline. Implementation of the Iraq Mental Health Survey (IMHS) and data entry were carried out by the staff of the Iraqi Ministry of Health and Ministry of Planning with direct support from the Iraqi IMHS team, with funding from both the Japanese and European Funds through United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund. The Israel National Health Survey is funded by the Ministry of Health with support from the Israel National Institute for Health Policy and Health Services Research and the National Insurance Institute of Israel. The WMH Japan Survey is supported by grants H13-SHOGAI-023, H14-TOKUBETSU-026, and H16-KOKORO-013 for Research on Psychiatric and Neurological Diseases and Mental Health from the Japan Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. The Lebanese Evaluation of the Burden of Ailments and Needs of the Nation is supported by the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, the WHO (Lebanon), National Institute of Health/Fogarty International Center grant R03 TW006481-01, anonymous private donations to Institute for Development Research Advocacy and Applied Care, Lebanon, and unrestricted grants from Algorithm, AstraZeneca, Benta, Bella Pharma, Eli Lilly, GlaxoSmithKline, Lundbeck, Novartis, Servier, Phenicia, and Union Pharmaceutique d'Orient SAL. The Mexican National Comorbidity Survey is supported by The National Institute of Psychiatry Ramon de la Fuente grant INPRFMDIES 4280 and by the National Council on Science and Technology grant CONACyT-G30544-H, with supplemental support from the Pan American Health Organization. Te Rau Hinengaro: The New Zealand Mental Health Survey is supported by the New Zealand Ministry of Health, Alcohol Advisory Council, and the Health Research Council. The Nigerian Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing is supported by the WHO (Geneva), the WHO (Nigeria), and the Federal Ministry of Health, Abuja, Nigeria. The Northern Ireland Study of Mental Health was funded by the Health & Social Care Research & Development Division of the Public Health Agency. The Peruvian WMH Study was funded by the National Institute of Health of the Ministry of Health of Peru. The Polish project Epidemiology of Mental Health and Access to Care–EZOP Project grant PL 0256 was supported by Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway through funding from the European Economic Area Financial Mechanism and the Norwegian Financial Mechanism; the EZOP Project was cofinanced by the Polish Ministry of Health. The Portuguese Mental Health Study was carried out by the Department of Mental Health, Faculty of Medical Sciences, NOVA University of Lisbon, with collaboration of the Portuguese Catholic University, and was funded by Champalimaud Foundation, Gulbenkian Foundation, Foundation for Science and Technology and Ministry of Health. The Romania WMH Survey Initiative study projects Policies in Mental Health Area and National Study Regarding Mental Health and Services Use were carried out by the National School of Public Health & Health Services Management (formerly the National Institute for Research & Development in Health), with technical support of Metro Media Transilvania, the National Institute of Statistics–National Centre for Training in Statistics, Societatea Comerciala Cheyenne Services SRL, and Statistics Netherlands and were funded by the Ministry of Public Health (formerly the Ministry of Health) with supplemental support from Eli Lilly Romania SRL. The South Africa Stress and Health Study is supported by US NIMH grant R01-MH059575 and the National Institute of Drug Abuse, with supplemental funding from the South African Department of Health and the University of Michigan. The Psychiatric Enquiry to General Population in Southeast Spain–Murcia Project has been financed by the Regional Health Authorities of Murcia (Servicio Murciano de Salud and Consejería de Sanidad y Política Social) and Fundación para la Formación e Investigación Sanitarias of Murcia. The Ukraine Comorbid Mental Disorders During Periods of Social Disruption study is funded by US NIMH grant R01-MH61905. The US National Comorbidity Survey Replication is supported by NIMH grant U01-MH60220 with supplemental support from the National Institute of Drug Abuse, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant 044708, and the John W. Alden Trust. Preparation of this manuscript was supported by grant R01 MH094425 from the NIMH (Dr Ruscio).
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With President Milei's election in Argentina, dollarization is suddenly on the table. I'm for it. Here's why. Why not? A standard of valueStart with "why not?'' Dollarization, not a national currency, is actually a sensible default. The dollar is the US standard of value. We measure length in feet, weight in pounds, and the value of goods in dollars. Why should different countries use different measures of value? Wouldn't it make sense to use a common standard of value? Once upon a time every country, and often every city, had its own weights and measures. That made trade difficult, so we eventually converged on international weights and measures. (Feet and pounds are actually a US anachronism since everyone else uses meters and kilograms. Clearly if we had to start over we'd use SI units, as science and engineering already do.) Moreover, nobody thinks it's a good idea to periodically shorten the meter in order to stimulate the economy, say by making the sale of cloth more profitable. As soon as people figure out they need to buy more cloth to make the same jeans, the profit goes away. PrecommitmentPrecommitment is, I think, the most powerful argument for dollarization (as for euorization of, say, Greece): A country that dollarizes cannot print money to spend more than it receives in taxes. A country that dollarizes must also borrow entirely in dollars, and must endure costly default rather than relatively less costly inflation if it doesn't want to repay debts. Ex post inflation and devaluation is always tempting, to pay deficits, to avoid paying debt, to transfer money from savers to borrowers, to advantage exporters, or to goose the economy ahead of elections. If a government can precommit itself to eschew inflation and devaluation, then it can borrow a lot more money on better terms, and its economy will be far better off in the long run. An independent central bank is often advocated for precommitment value. Well, locating the central bank 5,000 miles away in a country that doesn't care about your economy is as independent as you can get!The Siren Vase. Greek 480-470 BC. Source: The Culture CriticPrecommitment is an old idea. See picture. It's hard. A country must set things up so that it cannot give in to temptation ex post, and it will regret and try to wriggle out of that commitment when the time comes. A lot of the structure of our laws and government amount to a set of precommitments. An independent central bank with a price-level mandate is a precommitment not to inflate. A constitution and property rights are precommitments not to expropriate electoral minorities. Especially in Argentina's case, precommitment is why full dollarization is better than an exchange rate peg or a currency board. A true exchange rate peg -- one dollar for one peso, as much as you like -- would seem to solve the temptation-to-inflate problem. But the country can always abrogate the peg, reinstitute currency controls, and inflate. An exchange rate peg is ultimately a fiscal promise; the country will raise enough taxes so that it can get the dollars necessary to back its currency. When that seems too hard, countries devalue the peg or abandon it altogether. A currency board is tougher. Under a currency board, every peso issued by the government is backed by a dollar. That seems to ensure adequate reserves to handle any conceivable run. But a strapped government eyes the great Uncle-Scrooge swimming pool full of dollars at the currency board, and is tempted to abrogate the board, grab the assets and spend them. That's exactly how Argentina's currency board ended. Dollarization is a burn the ships strategy. There is no return. Reserves are neither necessary nor sufficient for an exchange rate peg. The peg is a fiscal promise and stands and falls with fiscal policy. A currency board, to the governmentFull dollarization -- the country uses actual dollars, and abandons its currency -- cannot be so swiftly undone. The country would have to pass laws to reinstitute the peso, declare all dollar contracts to be Peso contracts, ban the use of dollars and try to confiscate them. Dollars pervading the country would make that hard. People who understand their wealth is being confiscated and replaced by monopoly money would make it harder -- harder than some technical change in the amount of backing at the central bank for the same peso notes and bank accounts underlying a devalued peg or even an abrogated currency board. The design of dollarization should make it harder to undo. The point is precommitment, to make it as costly as possible for a following government to de-dollarize, after all. It's hard to confiscate physical cash, but if domestic Argentine banks have dollar accounts and dollar assets, it is relatively easy to pronounce the accounts in pesos and grab the assets. It would be better if dollarization were accompanied by full financial, capital, and trade liberalization, including allowing foreign banks to operate freely and Argentinian banks to become subsidiaries of foreign banks. Absence of a central bank and domestic deposit insurance will make that even more desirable. Then Argentinian bank "accounts" could be claims to dollar assets held offshore, that remain intact no matter what a future Peronist government does. Governments in fiscal stress that print up money, like Argentina, also impose an array of economy-killing policies to try to prop up the value of their currency, so the money printing generates more revenue. They restrict imports with tariffs, quotas, and red tape; they can restrict exports to try to steer supply to home markets at lower prices; they restrict currency conversion and do so at manipulated rates; they restrict capital markets, stopping people from investing abroad or borrowing abroad; they force people to hold money in oligopolized bank accounts at artificially low interest rates. Dollarization is also a precommitment to avoid or at least reduce all these harmful policies, as generating a demand for a country's currency doesn't do any good to the government budget when there isn't a currency. Zimbabwe dollarized in 2009, giving up on its currency after the greatest hyperinflation ever seen. The argument for Argentina is similar. Ecuador dollarized successfully in much less trying circumstances. It's not a new idea, and unilateral dollarization is possible. In both cases there was a period in which both currencies circulated. (Sadly, Zimbabwe ended dollarization in 2019, with a re-introduction of the domestic currency and redenomination of dollar deposits at a very unfavorable exchange rate. It is possible to undo, and the security of dollar bank accounts in face of such appropriation is an important part of the dollarization precommitment.) The limits of precommitmentDollarization is no panacea. It will work if it is accompanied by fiscal and microeconomic reform. It will be of limited value otherwise. I'll declare a motto: All successful inflation stabilizations have come from a combination of fiscal, monetary and microeconomic reform. Dollarization does not magically solve intractable budget deficits. Under dollarization, if the government cannot repay debt or borrow, it must default. And Argentina has plenty of experience with sovereign default. Argentina already borrows abroad in dollars, because nobody abroad wants peso debt, and has repeatedly defaulted on dollar debt. The idea of dollar debt is that explicit default is more costly than inflation, so the country will work harder to repay debt. Bond purchasers, aware of the temptation to default, will put clauses in debt contracts that make default more costly still. For you to borrow, you have to give the bank the title to the house. Sovereign debt issued under foreign law, with rights to grab assets abroad works similarly. But sovereign default is not infinitely costly and countries like Argentina sometimes choose default anyway. Where inflation may represent simply hugging the mast and promising not to let go, default is a set of loose handcuffs that you can wriggle out of painfully. Countries are like corporations. Debt denominated in the country's own currency is like corporate equity (stock): If the government can't or won't pay it back the price can fall, via inflation and currency devaluation. Debt denominated in foreign currency is like debt: If the government can't or won't pay it back, it must default. (Most often, default is partial. You get back some of what is promised, or you are forced to convert maturing debt into new debt at a lower interest rate.) The standard ideas of corporate finance tell us who issues debt and who issues equity. Small businesses, new businesses, businesses that don't have easily valuable assets, businesses where it is too easy for the managers to hide cash, are forced to borrow, to issue debt. You have to borrow to start a restaurant. Businesses issue equity when they have good corporate governance, good accounting, and stockholders can be sure they're getting their share. These ideas apply to countries, and the choice between borrowing in their own currency and borrowing in foreign currency. Countries with poor governance, poor accounting, out of control fiscal policies, poor institutions for repayment, have to borrow in foreign currency if they are going to borrow at all, with intrusive conditions making default even more expensive. Issuing and borrowing in your own currency, with the option to inflate, is the privilege of countries with good institutions, and democracies where voters get really mad about inflation in particular. Of course, when things get really bad, the country can't borrow in either domestic or foreign currency. Then it prints money, forcing its citizens to take it. That's where Argentina is. In personal finance, you start with no credit at all; then you can borrow; finally you can issue equity. On the scale of healthier economies, dollarizing is the next step up for Argentina. Dollarization and foreign currency debt have another advantage. If a country inflates its way out of a fiscal mess, that benefits the government but also benefits all private borrowers at the expense of private savers. Private borrowing inherits the inflation premium of government borrowing, as the effective government default induces a widespread private default. Dollarization and sovereign default can allow the sovereign to default without messing up private contracts, and all prices and wages in the economy. It is possible for sovereigns to pay higher interest rates than good companies, and the sovereign to be more likely to default than those companies. It doesn't always happen, because sovereigns about to default usually grab all the wealth they can find on the way down, but the separation of sovereign default from inflationary chaos is also an advantage. Greece is a good example, and a bit Italy as well, both in the advantages and the cautionary tale about the limitations of dollarization. Greece and Italy used to have their own currencies. They also had borders, trade controls, and capital controls. They had regular inflation and devaluation. Every day seemed to be another "crisis" demanding another "just this once" splurge. As a result, they paid quite high interest rates to borrow, since savvy bondholders wanted insurance against another "just this once."They joined the EU and the eurozone. This step precommitted them to free trade, relatively free capital markets, and no national currency. Sovereign default was possible, but regarded as very costly. Having banks stuffed with sovereign debt made it more costly. Leaving the euro was possible, but even more costly. Deliberately having no plan to do so made it more costly still. The ropes tying hands to the mast were pretty strong. The result: borrowing costs plummeted. Governments, people and businesses were able to borrow at unheard of low rates. And they did so, with aplomb. The borrowing could have financed public and private investment to take advantage of the new business opportunities the EU allowed. Sadly it did not. Greece soon experienced the higher ex-post costs of default that the precommitment imposed. Dollarizaton -- euroization -- is a precommitment, not a panacea. Recommitments impose costs on yourself ex post. Those costs are real. A successful dollarization for Argentina has to be part of a joint monetary, fiscal, and microeconomic reform. (Did I say that already? :) ) If public finances aren't sorted out, a default will come eventually. And public finances don't need a sharp bout of "austerity" to please the IMF. They need decades of small primary surpluses, tax revenues slightly higher than spending, to credibly pay down any debt. To get decades of revenue, the best answer is growth. Tax revenue equals tax rate times income. More income is a lot easier than higher tax rate, which at least partially lowers income. Greece and Italy did not accomplish the microeconomic reform part. Fortunately, for Argentina, microeconomic reform is low-hanging fruit, especially for a Libertarian president. TransitionWell, so much for the Promised Land, they may have asked of Moses, how do we get there? And let's not spend 40 years wandering the Sinai on the way. Transition isn't necessarily hard. On 1 January 1999, Italy switched from Lira to Euro. Every price changed overnight, every bank account redenominated, every contract reinterpreted, all instantly and seamlessly. People turned in Lira banknotes for Euro banknotes. The biggest complaint is that stores might have rounded up converted prices. If only Argentina could have such problems. Why is Argentina not the same? Well, for a lot of reasons. Before getting to the euro, Italy had adopted the EU open market. Exchange rates had been successfully pegged at the conversion rate, and no funny business about multiple rates. The ECB (really the Italian central bank) could simply print up euros to hand out in exchange for lira. The assets of the Italian central bank and other national central banks were also redenominated in euro, so printing up euros to soak up national currencies was not inflationary -- assets still equal liabilities. Banks with lira deposits that convert to Euro also have lira assets that convert to euro. And there was no sovereign debt crisis, bank crisis, or big inflation going on. Italian government debt was trading freely on an open market. Italy would spend and receive taxes in euros, so if the debt was worth its current price in lira as the present value of surpluses, it was worth exactly the same price, at the conversion rate, in euro. None of this is true in Argentina. The central problem, of course, is that the government is broke. The government does not have dollars to exchange for Pesos. Normally, this would not be a problem. Reserves don't matter, the fiscal capacity to get reserves matters. The government could simply borrow dollars internationally, give the dollars out in exchange for pesos, and slowly pay off the resulting debt. If Argentina redenominated interest-bearing peso debt to dollars at a market exchange rate, that would have no effect on the value of the debt. Obviously, borrowing additional dollars would likely be difficult for Argentina right now. To the extent that its remaining debt is a claim to future inflationary seigniorage revenues, its debt is also worth less once converted to dollars, even at a free market rate, because without seigniorage or fiscal reforms, budget deficits will increase. And that leads to the primary argument against dollarization I hear these days. Yes it might be the promised land, but it's too hard to get there. I don't hear loudly enough, though, what is the alternative? One more muddle of currency boards, central bank rules, promises to the IMF and so forth? How do you suddenly create the kind of stable institutions that Argentina has lacked for a century to justify a respectable currency? One might say this is a problem of price, not of quantity. Pick the right exchange rate, and conversion is possible. But that is not even clearly true. If the state is truly broke, if pesos are only worth anything because of the legal restrictions forcing people to hold them, then pesos and peso debt are genuinely worthless. The only route to dollarization would be essentially a complete collapse of the currency and debt. They are worth nothing. We start over. You can use dollars, but you'll have to export something to the US -- either goods or capital, i.e. stock and bonds in private companies -- to get them. (Well, to get any more of them. Lots of dollars line Argentine mattresses already.) That is enough economic chaos to really put people off. In reality, I think the fear is not a completely worthless currency, but that a move to quick dollarization would make peso and peso claims worth very little, and people would rebel against seeing their money holdings and bank accounts even more suddenly worthless than they are now. Maybe, maybe not. Just who is left in Argentina counting on a robust value of pesos? But the state is not worth nothing. It may be worth little in mark to market, or current dollar borrowing capacity. But a reformed, growing Argentina, with tax, spending, and microeconomic reform, could be a great place for investment, and for tax revenue above costs. Once international lenders are convinced those reform efforts are locked in, and Argentina will grow to anything like its amazing potential, they'll be stumbling over themselves to lend. So a better dollarization plan redeems pesos at the new greater value of the post-reform Argentine state. The question is a bit of chicken and egg: Dollarization has to be part of the reform, but only reform allows dollarization with a decent value of peso exchange. So there is a genuine question of sequencing of reforms. This question reminds me of the totally fruitless discussion when the Soviet Union broke up. American economists amused themselves with clever optimal sequencing of liberalization schemes. But if competent benevolent dictators (sorry, "policy-makers") were running the show, the Soviet Union wouldn't have failed in the first place. The end of hyperinflation in Germany. Price level 1919-1924. Note left-axis scale. Source: Sargent (1982) "The ends of four big inflations." A better historical analogy is, I think, the ends of hyperinflation after WWI, so beautifully described by Tom Sargent in 1982. The inflations were stopped by a sudden, simultaneous, fiscal, monetary, and (to some extent) microeconomic reform. The fiscal problem was solved by renegotiating reparations under the Versailles treaty, along with severe cuts in domestic spending, for example firing a lot of government and (nationalized) railroad workers. There were monetary reforms, including an independent central bank forbidden to buy government debt. There were some microeconomic reforms as well. Stopping inflation took no monetary stringency or high interest rates: Interest rates fell, and the governments printed more money, as real money demand increased. There was no Phillips curve of high unemployment. Employment and the economies boomed. So I'm for almost-simultaneous and fast reforms. 1) Allow the use of dollars everywhere. Dollars and pesos can coexist. Yes, this will put downward pressure on the value of the peso, but that might be crucial to maintain interest in the other reforms, which will raise the value of the peso. 2) Instant unilateral free trade and capital opening. Argentina will have to export goods and capital to get dollars. Get out of the way. Freeing imports will lower their prices and make the economy more efficient. Capital will only come in, which it should do quickly, if it knows it can get out again. Float the peso. 3) Long list of growth - oriented microeconomic reforms. That's why you elected a Libertarian president. 4) Slash spending. Reform taxes. Low marginal rates, broad base. Subsidies in particular distort prices to transfer income. Eliminate. 5) Once reforms are in place, and Argentina has some borrowing capacity, redenominate debt to dollars, and borrow additional dollars to exchange pesos for dollars. All existing peso contracts including bank accounts change on the date. Basically, you want people to hold peso bills and peso debt in the interim as claims on the post-reform government. Peso holders have an incentive to push for reforms that will raise the eventual exchange value of the peso. 6) Find an interim lender. The central problem is who will lend to Argentina in mid stream in order to retire pesos. This is like debtor in possession financing but for a bankrupt country. This could be a job for the IMF. The IMF could lend Argentina dollars for the purpose of retiring pesos. One couldn't ask for much better "conditionality" than a robust Libertarian pro-growth program. Having the IMF along for the ride might also help to commit Argentina to the program. (The IMF can force conditionality better than private lenders.) When things have settled down, Argentina should be able to borrow dollars privately to pay back the IMF. The IMF might charge a decent interest rate to encourage that. How much borrowing is needed? Less than you think. Interest-paying debt can simply be redenominated in dollars once you pick a rate. That might be hard to pay off, but that's a problem for later. So Argentina really only needs to borrow enough dollars to retire cash pesos. I can't find numbers, but hyper inflationary countries typically don't have much real value of cash outstanding. The US has 8% of GDP in currency outstanding. If Argentina has half that, then it needs to borrow only 4% of GDP in dollars to buy back all its currency. That's not a lot. If the peso really collapses, borrowing a little bit more (against great future growth of the reform program) to give everyone $100, the sort of fresh start that Germany did after WWII and after unification, is worth considering. Most of the worry about Argentina's borrowing ability envisions continued primary deficits with slow fiscal adjustment. Make the fiscal adjustment tomorrow."You never want a serious crisis to go to waste," said Rahm Emanuel wisely. "Sequencing" reforms means that everything promised tomorrow is up for constant renegotiation. Especially when parts of the reform depend on other parts, I'm for doing it all as fast as possible, and then adding refinements later if need be. Roosevelt had his famous 100 days, not a 8 year sequenced program. The Argentine reform program is going to hurt a lot of people, or at least recognize losses that had long been papered over in the hope they would go away. Politically, one wants to make the case "We're all in this, we're all hurting. You give up your special deal, preferential exchange rate, special subsidy or whatever, but so will everyone else. Hang with me to make sure they don't get theirs, and in a year we'll all be better off." If reforms are in a long sequence, which means long renegotiation, it's much harder to get buy in from people who are hurt earlier on that the ones who come later will also do their part. The standard answersOne standard critique of dollarization is monetary policy and "optimal currency areas." By having a national currency, the country's wise central bankers can artfully inflate and devalue the currency on occasion to adapt to negative shocks, without the inconvenience and potential dislocation of everyone in the country lowering prices and wages. Suppose, say, the country produces beef, and exports it in order to import cars. If world demand for beef declines, the dollar price of beef declines. The country is going to have to import fewer cars. In a dollarized country, or with a pegged exchange rate, the internal price of beef and wages go down. With its own country and a floating rate, the value of the currency could go down, leaving beef and wages the same inside the country, but the price of imported cars goes up. If lowering prices and wages causes more recession and dislocation than raising import prices, then the artful devaluation is the better idea. (To think about this question more carefully you need traded and non-traded goods; beef, cars, and haircuts. The relative price of beef, cars, and haircuts along with demand for haircuts is also different under the two regimes). Similarly, suppose there is a "lack of demand'' recession and deflation. (90 years later, economists are still struggling to say exactly where that comes from.) With its own central bank and currency, the country can artfully inflate just enough to offset the recession. A country that dollarizes also has to import not-always-optimal US inflation. Switzerland did a lot better than the US and EU once again in the covid era. This line of thinking answers the question, "OK, if Argentina ($847 bn GDP, beef exports) should have its own currency in order to artfully offset shocks, why shouldn't Colorado ($484 bn GDP, beef exports)?'' Colorado is more dependent on trade with the rest of the US than is Argentina. But, the story goes, people can more easily move across states. A common federal government shoves "fiscal stimulus" to states in trouble. Most of all, "lack of demand" recessions seem to be national, in part because of the high integration of states, so recessions are fought by national policy and don't need state-specific monetary stimulus. This is the standard "optimal currency area" line of thinking, which recommends a common currency in an integrated free trade zone such as US, small Latin American countries that trade a lot with the US, and Europe. Standard thinking especially likes a common currency in a fiscal union. Some commenters felt Greece should keep or revert to the Drachma because the EU didn't have enough common countercyclical fiscal policy. It likes independent currencies elsewhere.I hope you're laughing out loud by now. A wise central bank, coupled with a thrifty national government, that artfully inflates and devalues just enough to technocratically exploit price stickiness and financial frictions, offsetting national "shocks" with minimum disruption, is a laughable description of Argentina's fiscal and monetary policies. Periodic inflation, hyperinflation and default, together with a wildly overregulated economy with far too much capital and trade controls is more like it. The lure of technocratic stabilization policy in the face of Argentina's fiscal and monetary chaos is like fantasizing whether you want the tan or black leather on your new Porsche while you're on the bus to Carmax to see if you can afford a 10-year old Toyota. Another reason people argue that even small countries should have their own currencies is to keep the seigniorage. Actual cash pays no interest. Thus, a government that issues cash earns the interest spread between government bonds and interest. Equivalently, if demand for cash is proportional to GDP, then as GDP grows, say 2% per year, then the government can let cash grow 2% per year as well, i.e. it can print up that much cash and spend it. But this sort of seigniorage is small for modern economies that don't have inflation. Without inflation, a well run economy might pay 2% for its debt, so save 2% by issuing currency. 2% interest times cash which is 10% of GDP is 0.2% of GDP. On the scale of Argentinian (or US) debt and deficits, that's couch change. When inflation is higher, interest rates are higher, and seigniorage or the "inflation tax" is higher. Argentina is living off that now. But the point is not to inflate forever and to forswear bigger inflation taxes. Keeping this small seigniorage is one reason for countries to keep their currency and peg to the dollar or run a currency board. The currency board holds interest-bearing dollar assets, and the government gets the interest. Nice. But as I judge above, the extra precommitment value of total dollarization is worth the small lost seigniorage. Facing Argentina's crisis, plus its catastrophic century of lost growth, lost seigniorage is a cost that I judge far below the benefit. Other countries dollarize, but agree with the US Fed to rebate them some money for the seigniorage. Indeed, if Argentina dollarizes and holds 10% of its GDP in non-interest-bearing US dollars, that's a nice little present to the US. A dollarization agreement with Argentina to give them back the seignorage would be the least we can do. But I don't think Argentina should hold off waiting for Jay Powell to answer the phone. The Fed has other fires to put out. If Argentina unilaterally dollarizes, they can work this sort of thing out later. Dollarization would obviously be a lot easier if it is worked out together with the US government and US banks. Getting cash sent to Argentina, getting banks to have easy payment systems in dollars and links to US banks would make it all easier. If Argentina gets rid of its central bank it still needs a payment system to settle claims in dollars. Accounts at, say, Chase could function as a central bank. But it would all be easier if the US cooperates. Updates:Some commenters point out that Argentina may be importing US monetary policy just as the US imports Argentine fiscal policy. That would lead to importing a big inflation. They suggest a Latin American Monetary Union, like the euro, or using a third country's currency. The Swiss franc is pretty good. Maybe the Swiss can set the world standard of value. Both are good theoretical ideas but a lot harder to achieve in the short run. Dollarization will be hard enough. Argentines have a lot of dollars already, most trade is invoiced in dollars so getting dollars via trade is relatively easy, the Swiss have not built out a banking infrastructure capable of being a global currency. The EMU lives on top of the EU, and has its own fiscal/monetary problems. Building a new currency before solving Argentina's problems sounds like a long road. The question asked was dollarization, so I stuck to that for now. I imagined here unilateral dollarization. But I didn't emphasize enough: The US should encourage dollarization! China has figured this out and desperately wants anyone to use its currency. Why should we not want more people to use our currency? Not just for the seigniorage revenue, but for the ease of trade and international linkages it promotes. The Treasury and Fed should have a "how to dollarize your economy" package ready to go for anyone who wants it. Full integration is not trivial, including access to currency, getting bank access to the Fed's clearing systems, instituting cyber and money laundering protocols, and so forth. Important update: Daniel Raisbeck and Gabriela Calderon de Burgos at CATO have a lovely essay on Argentinian dollarization, also debunking an earlier Economist article that proclaimed it impossible. They include facts and comparison with other dollarization experiences, not just theory as I did. (Thanks to the correspondent who pointed me to the essay.) Some quotes:At the end of 2022, Argentines held over $246 billion in foreign bank accounts, safe deposit boxes, and mostly undeclared cash, according to Argentina's National Institute of Statistics and Census. This amounts to over 50 percent of Argentina's GDP in current dollars for 2021 ($487 billion). Hence, the dollar scarcity pertains only to the Argentine state....The last two dollarization processes in Latin American countries prove that "purchasing" the entire monetary base with U.S. dollars from one moment to the next is not only impractical, but it is also unnecessary. In both Ecuador and El Salvador, which dollarized in 2000 and 2001 respectively, dollarization involved parallel processes. In both countries, the most straightforward process was the dollarization of all existing deposits, which can be converted into dollars at the determined exchange rate instantly.in both Ecuador and El Salvador, dollarization not only did not lead to bank runs; it led to a rapid and sharp increase in deposits, even amid economic and political turmoil in Ecuador's case....There is a general feature of ending hyperinflation: People hold more money. In this case, people hold more bank accounts once they know those accounts are safe. Short summary of the rest, all those dollar deposits (out of mattresses into the banking system) allowed the central bank to retire its local currency liabilities. Emilio Ocampo, the Argentine economist whom Milei has put in charge of plans for Argentina's dollarization should he win the presidency, summarizes Ecuador's experience thus:People exchanged their dollars through the banks and a large part of those dollars were deposited in the same banks. The central bank had virtually no need to disburse reserves. This was not by design but was a spontaneous result.In El Salvador also, Dollar deposits also increased spontaneously in El Salvador, a country that dollarized in 2001. By the end of 2022, the country's deposits amounted to 49.6 percent of GDP—in Panama, another dollarized peer, deposits stood at 117 percent of GDP.El Salvador's banking system was dollarized immediately, but the conversion of the circulating currency was voluntary, with citizens allowed to decide if and when to exchange their colones for dollars. Ocampo notes that, in both Ecuador and El Salvador, only 30 percent of the circulating currency had been exchanged for dollars four months after dollarization was announced so that both currencies circulated simultaneously. In the latter country, it took over two years for 90 percent of the monetary base to be dollar‐based.Cachanosky explains that, in an El Salvador‐type, voluntary dollarization scenario, the circulating national currency can be dollarized as it is deposited or used to pay taxes, in which case the sums are converted to dollars once they enter a state‐owned bank account. Hence, "there is no need for the central bank to buy the circulating currency" at a moment's notice.Dollarization starts with both currencies and a peg. As long as people trust that dollarization will happen at the peg, the conversion can take a while. You do not need dollars to soak up every peso on day 1. Dollarization is, above, a commitment that the peg will last for years, not a necessary commitment that the peg will last a day. I speculated about private borrowing at lower rates than the sovereign, once default rather than inflation is the only way out for the sovereign. This happened: ... as Manuel Hinds, a former finance minister in El Salvador, has explained, solvent Salvadorans in the private sector can borrow at rates of around 7 percent on their mortgages while international sovereign bond markets will only lend to the Salvadoran government at far higher rates. As Hinds writes, under dollarization, "the government cannot transfer its financial costs to the private sector by printing domestic money and devaluing it."A nice bottom line: Ask people in Ecuador, El Salvador, and Panama what they think:This is yet another lesson of dollarization's actual experience in Latin American countries. It is also a reason why the vast majority of the population in the dollarized nations has no desire for a return to a national currency. The monetary experiences of daily life have taught them that dollarization's palpable benefits far outweigh its theoretical drawbacks. Even more important update:From Nicolás Cachonosky How to Dollarize Argentina The central problem is non-money liabilities of the central bank. A detailed plan. Many other blog posts at the link. See his comment below. Tyler Cowen on dollarization in Bloomberg. Great quote: The question is not how to adopt a new currency, it is how to adopt a new currency and retain a reasonable value for the old one. Dollarization is easy. Hyperinflate the Peso to zero a la Zimbabwe. Repeat quote. Emilio Ocampo on dollarization as a commitment device. One of the main reasons to dollarize is to eliminate high, persistent, and volatile inflation. However, to be effective, dollarization must generate sufficient credibility, which in turn depends critically on whether its expected probability of reversal is low.... The evidence suggests that, in the long-run, the strongest insurance against reversal is the support of the electorate, but in the short-run, institutional design [dollarization] can play a critical role.Fifty years ago, in testimony to U.S. Congress, Milton Friedman argued that "the whole reason why it is an advantage for a developing country to tie to a major country is that, historically speaking, the internal policies of developing countries have been very bad. U.S. policy has been bad, but their policies have been far worse. ... (1973, p.127)."In this respect, not much has changed in Argentina since. Craig Richardson explains how dollarization failed in Zimbabwe, a wonderful cautionary tale. Deficits did not stop, the government issued "bonds" and forced banks to buy them, bank accounts became de linked from currency. Gresham's law prevailed, the government "bonds" circulating at half face value drove out cash dollars. With persistent government and trade deficits there was a "dollar shortage."
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Cass Sunstein has a lovely New York Times essay that tries to give us back the word "Liberal." I hope it works. "Liberal" from "Libertas" means, at bottom, freedom. In the 19th century, "liberals" were devoted to personal, economic, and increasing social freedom from government restraint. "Conservatives" wanted to maintain aristocratic privileges, and government interventions in the traditional way of doing things. The debate was not so obvious. Conservatives defended their view of aristocratic power in a noblesse-oblige concern for little people that the unfettered free market might leave behind, in a way quite reminiscent of today's elites who think they should run the government in the name of the downtrodden (or "nudge" them, if I can poke a little fun at Sunstein's earlier work). But by the 1970s, the labels had flipped. "Liberals" were advocates of big-state interventionism, in a big tent that included communists and marxists. It became a synonym of "left." "Conservatives" became a strange alliance of free market economics and social conservatism. The word "classical liberal" or "libertarian" started to be used to refer to heirs of the enlightenment "liberal" tradition, broadly emphasizing individual liberty and limited rule of law government in both economic and social spheres. But broadly, "liberal" came to mean more government intervention and Democrat, while "conservative" came to mean less state intervention and Republican, at least in rhetoric. But a new force has come to the fore. The heirs of the far-left marxists and communists are now, .. what shall we call them.. perhaps "censorious totalitarian progressives." Sunstein calls them "post liberals." The old alliance between center-left and far left is tearing apart, and Oct 7 was a wake up call for many who had skated over the division. Largely, then, I read Sunstein's article as a declaration of divorce. They are not us, they are not "liberals." And many of you who call yourselves "conservatives," "free marketers" or even "libertarians" should join us to fight the forces of illiberalism left and right, even if by now you probably completely gave up on the New York Times and read the Free Press instead. Rhetoric: Sunstein is brilliantly misleading. He writes what liberalism "is" or what liberals "believe," as if the word were already defined his way. It is not, and the second part of this post quotes another NYT essay with a quite different conception of "liberal." This is an essay about what liberal should mean. I salute that. It's interesting that Sunstein wants to rescue the traditional meaning of "liberal," rather than shade words in current use. "Classical liberal," is mostly the same thing, but currently shades a bit more free market than he'd like. "Neoliberal" is an insult but really describes most of his views. People have turned insults around to proud self-identifiers before. "Libertarian," probably has less room for the state and conservativism than Sunstein, and most people confuse "libertarian" with "anarchist." It's interesting he never mentions the word. Well, let's rescue "liberal." Here are some excerpts of Sunstein's 37 theses. I reorganized into topics. What is "liberalism"? 1. Liberals believe in six things: freedom, human rights, pluralism, security, the rule of law and democracy....6. The rule of law is central to liberalism. ...It calls for law that is prospective, allowing people to plan, rather than retroactive, defeating people's expectations. It requires conformity between law on the books and law in the world. It calls for rights to a hearing (due process of law)....Liberalism requires law evenly applied, not "show me the man, and I'll find the crime." It requires a legal system in which each of us is not guilty of "Three Felonies a Day," unprotected unless we are trouble to those in power. 10. Liberals believe that freedom of speech is essential to self-government....11. Liberals connect their opposition to censorship to their commitment to free and fair elections, which cannot exist if people are unable to speak as they wish. ...They agree with ... "the principle of free thought — not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate." It's freedom, individual dignity, equality before the law and the state. Economics On economic matters, "liberalism" starts with the basic values of the laissez-faire tradition, because the right to transact freely is one of the most basic freedoms there is:15. Liberals prize free markets, insisting that they provide an important means by which people exercise their agency. Liberals abhor monopolies, public or private, on the ground that they are highly likely to compromise freedom and reduce economic growth. At the same time, liberals know that unregulated markets can fail, such as when workers or consumers lack information or when consumption of energy produces environmental harm.On the latter point, Sunstein later acknowledges room for a variety of opinion on just how effective government remedies are for such "failures" of "unregulated markets." I'm a free marketer not because markets are perfect but because governments are usually worse. A point we can respectfully debate with fact and logic.16. Liberals believe in the right to private property. But nothing in liberalism forbids a progressive income tax or is inconsistent with large-scale redistribution from rich to poor. Liberals can and do disagree about the progressive income tax and on whether and when redistribution is a good idea. Many liberals admire Lyndon Johnson's Great Society; many liberals do not.I endorse this as well, which you may find surprising. Economics really has nothing to say about non-distorting transfers. Economists can only point out incentives, and disincentives. Redistribution tends to come with bad incentives. "Liberals" can and do argue about how bad the disincentives are, and if the purported benefits of redistribution are worth it. Cass allows liberals (formerly "conservatives") who "do not" admire extensive federal government social programs, because of their disincentives. Me.17. Many liberals are enthusiastic about the contemporary administrative state; many liberals reject itI also agree. I'm one of those who largely rejects it, but it's a matter of degree on disincentives, government competence, and the severity of the problems being addressed. "Liberals" can productively debate this matter of degree. Liberalism is a framework for debate, not an answer to these economic questions. Integrating ConservativismIntegrating "conservative" into "liberal" is one of Sunstein's charms, and I agree. He is also trying to find a common ground in the "center," that tussles gently on the size of government while respecting America's founding enlightenment values, and unites many across the current partisan divide. 2...Those who consider themselves to be leftists may or may not qualify as liberals. You can be, at once, a liberal, as understood here, and a conservative; you can be a leftist and illiberal. 22. A liberal might think that Ronald Reagan was a great president and that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was an abomination; a liberal might think that Roosevelt was a great president and that Reagan was an abomination. "Conserativism" properly means conserving many of the traditions of our society, rather than burning it down once a generation striving for utopia, and having it dissolve into tyranny. Sunstein's "liberalism" is conservative 24. Liberals favor and recognize the need for a robust civil society, including a wide range of private associations that may include people who do not embrace liberalism. They believe in the importance of social norms, including norms of civility, considerateness, charity and self-restraint. They do not want to censor any antiliberals or postliberals, even though some antiliberals or postliberals would not return the favor. On this count, they turn the other cheek. Liberals have antiliberal and postliberal friends.26. .. if people want the government to act in illiberal ways — by, for example, censoring speech, violating the rights of religious believers, preventing certain people from voting, entrenching racial inequality, taking private property without just compensation, mandating a particular kind of prayer in schools or endorsing a particular set of religious convictions — liberals will stand in opposition.The latter includes, finally, a bit of trends on the right that "liberals" do not approve of, and they don't. 28. Some people (mostly on the right) think that liberals oppose traditions or treat traditions cavalierly and that liberalism should be rejected for that reason. In their view, liberals are disrespectful of traditions and want to destroy them. Nothing could be further from the truth. Consider just a few inherited ideals, norms and concepts that liberals have defended, often successfully, in the face of focused attack for decades: republican self-government; checks and balances; freedom of speech; freedom of religion; freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; due process of law; equal protection; private property.29. Liberals do not think it adequate to say that an ideal has been in place for a long time. As Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. put it: "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." Still, liberals agree that if an ideal has been with us for a long time, there might be a lot to say in its favor.A lover of freedom can also admire rule of law, tradition, and custom. Why do we have private property? A illiberal, like many college students fresh to the world, might start from basic philosophical principles, and state that all of the earth's bounty should be shared equally, and head out to the ramparts to seize power. As a philosophical principle, it can sound reasonable. But our society and its laws, traditions, and customs, has thousands of years of experience built up. A village had common fields. People over-grazed them. Putting up fences and allocating rights led to a more prosperous village. The tradition of property rights, and their quite detailed specification and limitation that evolved in our common law, responding to this experience, along with well-educated citizens' conception of right and virtue, the moral sense of property right that they learn from their forebears, can summarize thousands of years of history, without us needing to remember each case. This thought is what led me in the past to characterize myself as an empirical, conservative, rule-of-law, constitutional and pax-Americana (save that one for later) libertarian, back when the word "liberal" meant something else. But, as Holmes points out, a vibrant society must see that some of this laws and traditions are wrong, or ineffective, and thoughtfully reform them. Property rights once extended to people, after all. Most of all, the 1970s "liberal" but now "illiberal" view has been that government defines the purpose and meaning of life and society, be it religious purity, socialist utopia, or now the vanguard of the elite ruling on behalf of the pyramid of intersectional victimization. The role of the government is to mold society to that quest. "Conservatives" have thought that the purpose of life and society is defined by individuals, families, churches, communities, scholars, arts, culture, private institutions of civil society, via lively reasoned debate; society can accommodate great variety in these views, and the government's purpose is just to enforce simple rules, and keep the debate peaceful, not to define and lead us to the promised land. I read Sunstein, correctly, to restore the word "liberal" to this later view, though it had largely drifted to the former. Who isn't liberal? The progressive leftWho isn't a "liberal," to Sunstein? If you've been around university campuses lately, you know how much today's "progressives" ("post-liberals") have turned politics into a tribal, warlike affair. This is who Sunstein is really unhappy with, and to whom this essay is a declaration of divorce: 5. ...liberals ... do not like tribalism. ... They are uncomfortable with discussions that start, "I am an X, and you are a Y,"... Skeptical of identity politics, liberals insist that each of us has many different identities and that it is usually best to focus on the merits of issues, not on one or another identity.I would add, liberals evaluate arguments by logic and evidence, not who makes the argument. Liberals accept an enlightenment idea that anything true can be discovered and understood by anyone. Truth is not just listening to "lived experience." 18. Liberals abhor the idea that life or politics is a conflict between friends and enemies.23. Liberals think that those on the left are illiberal if they are not (for example) committed to freedom of speech and viewpoint diversity. They do not like the idea of orthodoxy, including on university campuses or social media platforms. Ad of course, 30. Liberals like laughter. They are anti-anti-laughter.Old joke from my graduate school days: "How many Berkeley marxist progressives does it take to screw in a light bulb?" Answer: "I don't think that kind of humor is appropriate." ****In case you think everyone agrees on this new definition of "liberal," the essay has a link below it to another one by Pamela Paul, "Progressives aren't liberal." Paul's essay also covers some of the history of how the word was used, but in the end uses it in a quite different way from Sunstein. In the 1960s and 70s, the left proudly used the word in self-description. In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan, who often prefaced [liberal] with a damning "tax and spend," may have been the most effective of bashers. ...Newt Gingrich's political organization GOPAC sent out a memo, "Language: A Key Mechanism of Control," urging fellow Republicans to use the word as a slur.It worked. Even Democrats began avoiding the dread label. In a presidential primary debate in 2007, Hillary Clinton called herself instead a "modern progressive." She avoided the term "liberal" again in 2016.I think Clinton was trying to position herself to the right of what "liberal" had become by 2016. "Progressive" has come to mean something else. But I may be wrong. Never Trump conservatives tout their bona fides as liberals in the classical, 19th century sense of the word, in part to distinguish themselves from hard-right Trumpists. Others use "liberal" and "progressive" interchangeably, even as what progressivism means in practice today is often anything but liberal — or even progressive, for that matter.In the last sentence she is right. Sunstein is not, as he appears, describing a word as it is widely used today, but a word as it is slowly becoming used, and as he would like it to be used. liberal values, many of them products of the Enlightenment, include individual liberty, freedom of speech, scientific inquiry, separation of church and state, due process, racial equality, women's rights, human rights and democracy.Here you start to think she's got the same basic big tent as Sunstein. But not so -- this essay is testament to the enduring sense of the "liberal" word as describing the big-government left, just please not quite so insane as the campus progressives: Unlike "classical liberals" (i.e., usually conservatives), liberals do not see government as the problem, but rather as a means to help the people it serves. Liberals fiercely defend Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Obamacare, the Voting Rights Act and the National Labor Relations Act. They believe government has a duty to regulate commerce for the benefit of its citizens. They tend to be suspicious of large corporations and their tendency to thwart the interests of workers and consumers.Sunstein had room for disagreement on these "fierce" defenses, or at least room for reasoned argument rather than profession of essential belief before you can enter the debate. "Tout their bona fides" above also does not have quite the reach-across-the aisle non partisan flair of Sunstein's essay. I don't think Paul welcomes never-Trump classical liberals in her tent. For Paul, the divorce between "liberal" and "progressive" is real, as for many other "liberals" since the October 7 wake up: Whereas liberals hold to a vision of racial integration, progressives have increasingly supported forms of racial distinction and separation, and demanded equity in outcome rather than equality of opportunity. Whereas most liberals want to advance equality between the sexes, many progressives seem fixated on reframing gender stereotypes as "gender identity" and denying sex differences wherever they confer rights or protections expressly for women. And whereas liberals tend to aspire toward a universalist ideal, in which diverse people come together across shared interests, progressives seem increasingly wedded to an identitarian approach that emphasizes tribalism over the attainment of common ground.It is progressives — not liberals — who argue that "speech is violence" and that words cause harm. These values are the driving force behind progressive efforts to shut down public discourse, disrupt speeches, tear down posters, censor students and deplatform those with whom they disagree.Divisions became sharper after the Oct. 7 Hamas attack, when many progressives did not just express support for the Palestinian cause but, in some cases, even defended the attacks as a response to colonialism, and opposed retaliation as a form of genocide. This brings us to the most troubling characteristic of contemporary progressivism. Whereas liberals tend to pride themselves on acceptance, many progressives have applied various purity tests to others on the left, and according to one recent study on the schism between progressives and liberals, are more likely than liberals to apply public censure to divergent views. This intolerance manifests as a professed preference for avoiding others with different values, a stance entirely antithetical to liberal values.Yes. But no Republicans, please. Unlike Sunstein, Paul's "Liberalism" remains unabashedly partisan. I hope Sunstein's version of the word prevails. In any case, it is nice to see the division between the Woodstock Liberals, previously fellow travelers, from the extreme progressive left, and it is nice to see this word drift back to where it belongs. This is an optimistic post for the future of our country. Happy Thanksgiving. Update: I just ran across Tyler Cowen's Classical Liberals vs. The New Right. Excellent. And I forgot to plug my own "Understanding the Left," which I still think is a great essay though nobody seems to have read it.
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I've been thinking a bit lately about theories of the business cycle (a lot of time for reflection in these days of COVID-19). At least, the way some of these theories have evolved over my lifetime and from the perspective of my own training in the field. From my (admittedly narrow) perspective as a researcher and advisor at a central bank, the journey beginning c. 1960 seems like it's taken the following steps: (1) Phillips Curve and some Natural Rate Hypothesis; (2) Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory; (3) New Keynesian theory. It seems like we might be ready to take the next step. I'll offer some thoughts on this at the end, for whatever they're worth. There's no easy way to summarize the state of macroeconomic thinking, of course. But it seems clear that, at any given time, some voices and ways of thinking are more dominant than others. By the time the 1960s rolled around, there seemed to be a consensus that monetary and fiscal policy should be used to stabilize the business cycle. The main issue, in this regard, revolved over which set of instruments was better suited for the job. (See, for example, this classic debate between Milton Friedman and Walter Heller). Central to macroeconomic thinking at the time was a concept called the Phillips Curve (PC). There is a subtle, but important, distinction to make here between the PC as a statistical correlation and the PC as a theory of that statistical relationship. In 1958, Phillips noticed an interesting pattern in the data: nominal wage growth seemed negatively correlated with the unemployment rate in the U.K. over the period 1913-48 (see diagram to the right). How to interpret this correlation? One theory is that when the unemployment rate is high, workers are easy to find and their bargaining position is weak, leading to small nominal wage gains. Conversely, when unemployment is low, available workers are scarce and their bargaining position is strong, leading to large nominal wage gains. Then, in 1960, Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow wrote their classic piece "Problem of Achieving and Maintaining a Stable Price-Level: Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy." Then, as is the case still now, the authors lamented the lack of consensus on a theory of price inflation. Various cost-push and demand-pull hypotheses were reviewed, problems of identification noted, and calls for micro-data to help settle the issue were made. They also mentioned Phillips' article and noted how the same diagram for the U.S. looked like a shot-gun blast (little correlation, except for some sub-samples). Then they translated the Phillips curve using price inflation instead of wage inflation. No data was sacrificed in this exercise; their "theory" was summarized with the diagram to the left. I put "theory" in quotes in the passage above because the theory (explanation) was never clear to me. In particular, while I could see how an increase in the rate of unemployment might depress the level wage, I could not grasp how it could influence the rate of growth of wages for any prolonged period of time. This logical inconsistency was solved by the Phelps-Friedman natural rate hypothesis; see Farmer (2013) for a summary and critique. The TL;DR version of this hypothesis is that the PC is negatively sloped only in the short-run, but vertical in the long-run. So, while monetary policy (increasing the rate of inflation) could lower the unemployment rate below its natural rate, it could only do so temporarily. Eventually, the unemployment rate would move back to its natural rate at the higher rate of inflation. This hypothesis seemed to provide a compelling interpretation of the stagflation (high inflation and high unemployment) experienced in the 1970s. It also seemed to explain the success of Volcker's disinflation policy in the 1980s. Nevertheless, uneasiness in the state of the theory remained and a new (well, nothing is ever completely new) way of theorizing was on the horizon.By the time I got to grad school in the late 1980s, "real business cycle theory" was in vogue; see Charles Plosser's summary here and Bob King's lecture notes here. There was a lot going on with this program. A central thesis of RBC theory is that the phenomena of economic growth and business cycles are inextricably linked. This is, of course, is an old idea in economics going back at least to Dennis Robertson (see this review by Charles Goodhart) and explored extensively by a number of Austrian economists, like Joseph Schumpeter. The idea that "the business cycle" is to some extent a byproduct of the process of economic development is an attractive hypothesis. Economic growth is driven by technological innovation and diffusion, and perhaps regulatory policies. There is no a priori reason to expect these "real" processes to evolve in a "smooth" manner. In fact, these changes appear to arrive randomly and with little or no mean-reverting properties. It would truly be a marvel if the business cycle did not exist. The notion of "no mean-reverting properties" is important. It basically means that technology/policy shocks are largely permanent (or at least, highly persistent). If macroeconomic variables like the GDP inherit this property, then a "cycle"--the tendency for a variable to return to some long-run trend--does not even exist (and if you think you see it, it's only a figment of your imagination). For this reason, early proponents of RBC theory preferred the label "fluctuations" over "cycle." This view was supported by the fact that econometricians had a hard time rejecting the hypothesis that the real GDP followed a random walk (with drift). For example, here is Canadian GDP plotted against two realizations of a random walk with drift:This perspective fermented at a time when the cost of computing power was falling dramatically. This permitted economists to study models that were too complicated to analyze with conventional "pencil and paper" methods. Inspiration was provided by Lucas (1980), who wrote:Our task, as I see it…is to write a FORTRAN program that will accept specific economic policy rules as 'input' and will generate as 'output' statistics describing the operating characteristics of time series we care about, which are predicted to result from these policies."And so that's what people did. But what sort of statistics were model economies supposed to reproduce? Once again, it was Lucas (1976) who provided the needed guidance. The empirical business cycle regularities emphasized by Lucas were "co-movements" between different aggregate time-series. Employment, for example, is "pro-cyclical" (tends to move in the same direction as GDP) around "trend." These types of regularities can be captured by statistics like correlations. But these correlations (and standard deviations) only make sense for stationary time-series, and the data is mostly non-stationary. So, what to do? Transforming the data through first-differencing (i.e., looking at growth rates instead of levels) is one way to render (much of) the data stationary. Another approach was made popular by Prescott (1986), who advocated a method that most people employ: draw a smooth line through the data, label it "trend," and then examine the behavior of "deviations from trend." Something like this, It's important to note that Prescott viewed the trend line in the figure above as "statistical trend," not an "economic trend." To him, there was no deterministic trend, since the data was being generated by a random walk (so, the actual trend is stochastic). Nevertheless, drawing a smooth trend line was a useful way to render the data stationary. The idea was to apply the same de-trending procedure to actual data and simulated data, and then compare statistical properties across model and data.The point of mentioning this is that no one involved in this program was conditioned to interpret the economy as "overheating" or in "depression." Growing economies exhibited fluctuations--sometimes big and persistent fluctuations. The question was how much of these observed fluctuations could be attributed purely to the process of economic development (technological change), without reference to monetary or financial factors? I think it's fair to say that the answer turned out to be "not much, at least, not at business cycle frequencies." The important action seemed to occur at lower frequencies. Lucas (1988) once again provided the lead when he remarked "Once one starts to think about growth, it is hard to think about anything else." And so, the narrow RBC approach turned its attention to low-frequency dynamics; e.g., see my interview with Lee Ohanian here. Of course, many economists never bought into the idea that monetary and financial factors were unimportant for understanding business cycles. Allen and Gale, for example, schooled us on financial fragility; see here. But this branch of the literature never really made much headway in mainstream macro, at least, not before 2008. Financial crises were something that happened in history, or in other parts of the world. Instead, macroeconomists looked back on its roots in the 1960s and embedded a version of the PC into an RBC model to produce what is now known as the New Keynesian framework. Short-run money non-neutrality was achieved by assuming that nominal price-setting behavior was subject to frictions, rendering nominal prices "sticky." In this environment, shocks to the economy are not absorbed efficiently, at least, not in the absence of an appropriate monetary policy. And so, drawing inspiration from John Taylor and Michael Woodford, the framework added an interest rate policy rule now known as the Taylor rule. Today, the basic NK model consists of these three core elements:[1] An IS curve: Relates aggregate demand to the real interest rate and shocks.[2] An Phillips Curve: Relates the rate of inflation (around trend) to the output gap.[3] A Taylor Rule: Describes how interest rate policy reacts to output and inflation gaps.I have to be honest with you. I never took a liking to NK model. I'm more of an Old Keynesian, similar to Roger Farmer (we share the same supervisor, so perhaps this is no accident). In any case, the NK framework became (and continues to be) a core thought-organizing principle for central bank economists around the world. It has become a sort of lingua franca in academic macro circles. And if you don't know how to speak its language, you're going to have a hard time communicating with the orthodoxy. Of the three basic elements of the NK model, I think the NK Phillips Curve (which embeds the natural rate hypothesis) has resulted in the most mischief; at least, from the perspective of advising the conduct of monetary policy. The concept is firmly embedded in the minds of many macroeconomists and policymakers. Consider, for example, Greg Mankiw's recent piece "Yes, There is a Trade-Off Between Inflation and Unemployment."Today, most economists believe there is a trade-off between inflation and unemployment in the sense that actions taken by a central bank push these variables in opposite directions. As a corollary, they also believe there must be a minimum level of unemployment that the economy can sustain without inflation rising too high. But for various reasons, that level fluctuates and is difficult to determine. The Fed's job is to balance the competing risks of rising unemployment and rising inflation. Striking just the right balance is never easy. The first step, however, is to recognize that the Phillips curve is always out there lurking.The Phillips curve is always lurking. The message for a central banker is "sure, inflation and unemployment may be low for now, but if we keep monetary policy where it is and permit the unemployment rate to fall further, we will risk higher inflation in the future." I'm not sure if economists who write in this manner are aware that they're making it sound like workers are somehow responsible for inflation. Central banker to workers: "I'm sorry, but we need to keep some of you unemployed...it's the inflation, you see." There is evidence that this line of thinking influenced the FOMC in 2015 in its decision to "lift off" and return the policy rate to some historically normal level; see my post here explaining the pros and cons in the lift-off debate. By the start of 2014, there was considerable pressure on the Fed to begin "normalizing" its policy rate. By mid 2014, the expectation of "lift off" likely contributed to significant USD appreciation and the economic weakness that followed. If I recall correctly, Vice Chair Stan Fischer started off the year by announcing that four rate hikes for 2015 were in order (as it turned out, the Fed only raised rates once--in December). To some observers, this all seemed very strange. After all, the unemployment rate was still above its estimated "natural" rate (5%) and inflation continued to undershoot its 2% target. What was going on?What was going on was the Phillips curve. Here is Chair Yellen at the March 17-18, 2015 FOMC meeting (transcript available here):If we adopt alternative B, one criterion for an initial tightening is that we need to be reasonably confident that inflation will move back to 2 percent over the medium term. For the remainder of this year, my guess is that it will be hard to point to data demonstrating that inflation is actually moving up toward our objective. Measured on a 12-month basis, both core and headline inflation will very likely be running below 1½ percent all year. That means that if we decide to start tightening later this year, a development that I think is likely, we will have to justify our inflation forecasts using indirect evidence, historical experience, and economic theory.The argument from history and economic theory seems straightforward. Experience here and abroad teaches us that, as resource utilization tightens, eventually inflation will begin to rise. To me, this seems like a simple matter of demand and supply. So the more labor and product markets tighten, the more confident I'll become in the inflation outlook. Because of the lags in monetary policy, the current high degree of monetary accommodation, and the speed at which the unemployment rate is coming down, it would, to my mind, be imprudent to wait until inflation is much closer to 2 percent to begin to normalize policy. I consider this a strong argument for an initial tightening with inflation still at low levels, and it's one that I plan to make. But I also recognize and am concerned that, at least in recent years, the empirical relationship between slack and inflation has been quite weak.Now, I don't want to make too much of this particular episode. Personally, I don't think it had a major impact on the recovery dynamic. But I do think it had an impact; in particular, the pace of improvement in labor market conditions temporarily slowed. It was an unforced error (as I think other members of the Committee sensed as well). I think the lift-off episode has contributed to a general re-thinking of the Phillips curve and the natural rate hypothesis. The notion of an economy operating at "excess capacity" has always seemed a bit strange to me, let alone the idea that excess capacity as a cause of inflation (as opposed to a force operating on the price-level). Perhaps it is time to re-visit Milton Friedman's "plucking model." Instead of drawing a smooth line through the center of a time-series, Friedman drew a line that defined a ceiling (a capacity constraint). Shocks to the economy manifest themselves as "downward plucks" (as if plucking on an elastic band). The plucking model is consistent with the observed cyclical asymmetry in unemployment rate fluctuations. And labor market search models are a natural way to model that asymmetry. In case you're interested, I develop a super-simple (and dare I say, elegant) search model here to demonstrate (and test) the idea: Evidence and Theory on the Cyclical Asymmetry in Unemployment Rate Fluctuations, CJE 1997). See also my blog post here as well as some recent work by Ferraro (RED, 2018) and Dupraz, Nakamura and Steinsson (2019). I like where this is going! One attractive feature of search models, in my view, is that they model relationship formation. Relationships provide a very different mechanism for coordinating economic activity relative to the canonical economic view of anonymous spot exchange in centralized markets. In a relationship, spot prices do not matter as much as the dynamic path of these prices (and other important aspects) over the course of a relationship (see my critique of the sticky price hypothesis here). The observation that retailers, in the early days of C-19, voluntarily rationed goods instead of raising prices makes little sense in anonymous spot exchange, but makes perfect sense for a merchant concerned with maintaining a good relationship with his or her customers. And merchant-supplier relationships can handle shortages without price signals (we're out of toilet paper--please send more!). In financial markets too, the amount of time that is spent forming and maintaining credit relationships is hugely underappreciated in economic modeling. Search theory turns out to be useful for interpreting the way money and bond markets work too. These markets are not like the centralized markets we see modeled in textbooks--they operate as decentralized over-the-counter (OTC) markets, where relationships are key. One reason why economies sometimes take so long to recover after a shock is because the shock has destroyed an existing set of relationships. And it takes time to rebuild relationship capital.Notions of "overheating" in this context probably do not apply to labor market variables, although there is still the possibility of an overaccumulation of certain types of physical capital in a boom (what the Austrians label "malinvestment"). Any "overheating" is likely to manifest itself primarily in asset prices. And sudden crashes in asset prices (whether driven by fundamentals or not), can have significant consequences on real economic activity if asset valuations are used to support lines of credit. Finally, we need a good theory of inflation. The NKPC theory of inflation is not, in my view, a completely satisfactory theory in this regard. To begin, it simply assumes that the central bank can target a long-run rate of inflation (implicitly, with the support of a Ricardian fiscal policy, though this is rarely, if ever, mentioned). At best, it is a theory of how inflation can temporarily depart from its long-run target and how interest rate policy can be used to influence transition dynamics. But the really interesting questions, in my view, have to do with monetary and fiscal policy coordination and what this entails for the ability of an "independent" central bank even to determine the long-run rate of inflation (Sargent and Wallace, 1981). I know what I've described only scratches the surface of this amazingly deep and broad field. Most of you have no doubt lived through your own process of discovery and contemplation in the world of macroeconomic theorizing. Feel free to share your thoughts below.
El objetivo principal de esta investigación consiste en identificar y caracterizar las oportunidades comerciales que para el sector industrial del Valle del Cauca presenta la consolidación en el año 2005 del Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas – ALCA – especialmente con Estados Unidos y Canadá. Para lograr este objetivo se requirió, en primera instancia, revisar la situación de intercambio comercial entre Colombia y Canadá, y también Colombia y Estados Unidos a través de un mecanismo unilateral temporal como la Ley de Preferencias Arancelarias Andinas (Andean Trade Preference Act) – ATPA, para luego revisar el estado de las negociaciones según el capítulo de acceso a mercados del Borrador de Acuerdo ALCA. Además se hizo necesario evaluar la situación comercial del Valle del Cauca en el tema de comercio exterior para determinar la importancia de los productos o sectores productivos participantes. De este resultado se tomaron para análisis aquellos productos o sectores más representativos para los cuales se establecieron las posibles oportunidades comerciales que se perfilan si el Acuerdo se consolida y pone en marcha en la fecha propuesta. Este estudio se desarrolló en dos fases. La primera fase comprende la recolección de toda la información agrupada en dos grandes temas: Primero, la información existente sobre Colombia en el proceso de integración económica en América y sobre el Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas – ALCA – que incluye la revisión de la situación de intercambio comercial entre Colombia y Estados Unidos y Canadá a través de un mecanismo unilateral temporal como el ATPA, la búsqueda de antecedentes históricos, la evolución del proceso de integración hemisférica de acuerdo con los avances alcanzados en los Grupos de Negociación y, finalmente, la revisión del capítulo "Acceso a Mercados" del Borrador de Acuerdo ALCA. El segundo tema abarca la información existente en materia de intercambio comercial entre Colombia y el Valle del Cauca y los demás países de América donde se analizaron las estadísticas del comercio que han mantenido y se determinaron las expectativas que tiene el sector industrial del Valle del Cauca frente a la conformación del ALCA. En la segunda fase del estudio se hizo un análisis de la información obtenida en la primera fase para así realizar la caracterización de las oportunidades comerciales concretas identificando los productos o sectores más representativos de la industria vallecaucana en materia de exportaciones de la actualidad y seleccionando los que participan por lo menos con el 5% de la exportación vallecaucana identificando así el paretto en el tema. Igualmente se identificaron los sectores con potencial exportador según el Plan Estratégico Exportador Regional 2001 – 2010 del Valle del Cauca desarrollado por el CARCE. Al analizar los resultados obtenidos fruto de la investigación se identificaron ciertas conclusiones que resulta importante mencionar. Para que Colombia y el Valle del Cauca salgan airosos frente al gran reto que representa la consolidación del ALCA, es perentorio que el Gobierno, el sector privado, la Academia e incluso la sociedad civil estén concentrados en planes de trabajo compartidos y enfocados en estrategias bien definidas donde cada uno juegue su papel. Esfuerzos individuales aislados no garantizan el logro de los objetivos generales que busca la participación exitosa de Colombia en este proceso de integración, debe ser un esfuerzo coordinado. La obtención de ventajas comerciales competitivas y sostenibles en un mercado Americano ampliado por efecto del ALCA, depende del trabajo integrado y alineado bajo los mismos objetivos estratégicos de cada uno de estos actores en este nuevo escenario. Como complemento se identificaron unos factores que pueden considerarse como primordiales para alcanzar un desempeño satisfactorio ante la consolidación del ALCA por parte del Gobierno Nacional y el sector público, por parte del sector privado, por parte de la Academia y por parte de los Trabajadores como miembros de la sociedad civil. ; Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey ITESM;Corporación Universitaria Autónoma de Occidente ; INTRODUCCIÓN 1 1. AMÉRICA Y COLOMBIA FRENTE A LA GLOBALIZACIÓN 9 1.1. CAMBIOS EN EL ENTORNO MUNDIAL 9 1.1.1. Del modelo proteccionista al modelo aperturista. 12 1.1.2. Globalización y regionalización. 14 1.1.2.1. La Unión Europea. 15 1.1.2.2. El Asia Pacífico. 15 1.1.2.3. Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN o NAFTA). 16 1.1.3. Integración económica. 16 1.1.3.1. Modalidades. 16 1.2. REGIONALIZACIÓN EN BLOQUES ECONÓMICOS 18 1.2.1. Convenios o acuerdos regionales en el mundo. 19 1.2.1.1. América. 19 1.2.1.2. Europa. 21 1.2.1.3. Asia. 21 1.2.1.4. África. 22 1.2.2. Integración subregional en América. 22 1.3. LA INTEGRACIÓN ECONÓMICA DE COLOMBIA 25 1.3.1. Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas – ALCA. 26 1.3.2. Organización Mundial del Comercio – OMC. 26 1.3.3. Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración – ALADI. 36 1.3.4. Asociación de Estados del Caribe – AEC. 39 1.3.5. Comunidad Andina de Naciones – CAN. 40 1.3.5.1. Ordenamiento jurídico. 41 1.3.5.2. Beneficios de la integración andina. 42 1.3.6. Colombia – CAN – Argentina. 45 1.3.7. Colombia – CAN – Brasil. 46 1.3.7.1. Antecedentes de las relaciones comerciales Colombia – Brasil. 47 1.3.7.2. Resultados del Acuerdo para las exportaciones colombianas. 48 1.3.7.3. Contenido del Acuerdo de Complementación No 39. 49 1.3.7.4. Los principales aspectos normativos. 49 1.3.8. Colombia – Chile. 50 1.3.8.1. Acuerdo de Complementación económica No. 24 entre Colombia y Chile. 51 1.3.8.2. Acuerdo sobre Inversiones. 53 1.3.9. Colombia – Cuba. 54 1.3.10. Colombia – Guatemala. 56 1.3.11. Colombia – Honduras. 56 1.3.12. Colombia – Nicaragua. 57 1.3.13. Colombia – Costa Rica. 58 1.3.14. Colombia – El Salvador. 58 1.3.15. Colombia – Panamá 59 1.3.16. Colombia – Paraguay. 61 1.3.17. Colombia – Uruguay. 62 1.3.18. Tratado de Libre Comercio del Grupo de los Tres – G-3. 63 1.3.18.1. Programa de desgravación. 63 1.3.18.2. Acceso a mercados. 65 1.3.18.3. Sector automotor. 65 1.3.18.4. Sector agropecuario y medidas fitosanitarias y zoosanitarias. 65 1.3.18.5. Reglas de origen. 67 1.3.18.6. Salvaguardias. 67 1.3.18.7. Practicas desleales de comercio internacional. 68 1.3.18.8. Principios generales sobre el comercio de servicios. 68 1.3.18.9. Servicios financieros. 69 1.3.18.10. Entrada temporal de personas de negocios. 69 1.3.18.11. Normas técnicas. 70 1.3.18.12. Inversión. 70 1.3.18.13. Propiedad intelectual. 71 1.3.19. CARICOM – Colombia. 71 1.3.20. Mercosur – Comunidad Andina. 77 1.3.21. Colombia – Asia Pacífico. 79 1.3.21.1. Concejo de Cooperación Económica del Pacífico (PECC). 79 1.3.21.2. Concejo Económico de la Cuenca del Pacífico (PBEC). 81 1.3.21.3. Foro de Cooperación Económica del Asia Pacífico (APEC). 82 1.3.21.4. Conclusiones. 85 1.3.22. Colombia – Unión Europea. 87 1.3.22.1. Sistema de Preferencias Generalizadas – SPG. 87 1.3.22.2. SPG Andino. 87 1.3.22.3. Normas de Origen. 88 1.4. RELACIONES COMERCIALES ENTRE COLOMBIA Y ESTADOS UNIDOS 91 1.4.1. Perfil económico y comercial de Estados Unidos. 91 1.4.1.1. Información básica. 91 1.4.1.2. Indicadores sociales y económicos. 91 1.4.1.3. Comercio exterior. 93 1.4.1.4. Principales socios comerciales globales de E.U. 93 1.4.1.5. Estados Unidos: principal importador del mundo. 94 1.4.1.6. Origen de las importaciones de E.U. 96 1.4.1.7. Aranceles, regulaciones y normas. 97 1.4.2. Importancia de las relaciones comerciales con Estados Unidos 101 1.4.2.1. Origen de las importaciones de E.U. desde Latinoamérica. 102 1.4.2.2. Destino de las exportaciones de Estados Unidos. 103 1.4.2.3. Exportaciones de Estados Unidos hacia Latinoamérica. 103 1.4.2.4. Participación bilateral en el comercio mundial. 104 1.4.3. Situación actual del Sistema Generalizado de Preferencias – SGP. 105 1.4.4. Ley de Preferencias Arancelarias Andinas – ATPA. 107 1.4.4.1. Objetivos del ATPA. 109 1.4.4.2. Beneficios. 110 1.4.4.3. Exportaciones de Colombia a Estados Unidos (con ATPA). 111 1.4.4.4. Comercio bilateral entre países ATPA y Estados Unidos. 113 1.4.5. Nota del Arancel de Estados Unidos en relación con el ATPA. 114 1.4.6. Estado actual y futuro del ATPA. 116 1.4.6.1. Vencimiento del ATPA. 117 1.4.6.2. Nuevos productos del ATPA ampliado. 118 1.4.6.3. Iniciativas legislativas en el Congreso de Estados Unidos. 118 1.4.6.4. ¿Cómo exportar ahora bajo el ATPA? 121 1.4.7. Links. 125 1.5. RELACIONES COMERCIALES ENTRE COLOMBIA Y CANADÁ 126 1.5.1. Perfil económico y comercial de Canadá. 126 1.5.1.1. Información básica. 126 1.5.1.2. Indicadores sociales y económicos. 126 1.5.1.3. La economía de Canadá. 128 1.5.1.4. Comercio exterior. 131 1.5.1.5. Origen de las importaciones de Canadá. 133 1.5.1.6. Diez principales importaciones de Canadá. 134 1.5.1.7. Diez principales exportaciones de Canadá. 134 1.5.2. Reglamentación y procedimientos aduaneros en Canadá 135 1.5.2.1. Impuesto a las ventas. 136 1.5.2.2. Reglamentos específicos aplicables a determinados productos. 137 1.5.2.3. Importaciones controladas y prohibidas. 138 1.5.2.4. Cuotas y aranceles estacionales. 139 1.5.3. Logística. 140 1.5.3.1. Alternativas de transporte y puertos de entrada. 140 1.5.3.2. La relación contractual: Incoterms y otras garantías. 141 1.5.3.3. Documentos claves para importar en Canadá 146 1.5.4. Sugerencias para exportar exitosamente a Canadá. 149 1.5.4.1. Estrategia principal para aumentar la competitividad 150 1.5.4.2. La importación de los Precios. 153 1.5.4.3. El cumplimiento y la flexibilidad como ventajas competitivas. 153 1.5.5. Preferencias arancelarias. 154 1.5.5.1. Estructura de los aranceles. 154 1.5.5.2. Negociación de preferencias unilaterales. 156 1.5.5.3. Lista propuesta por la Comunidad Andina. 159 1.5.6. Links. 160 2. EL ÁREA DE LIBRE COMERCIO DE LAS AMÉRICAS – ALCA 161 2.1. ANTECEDENTES DEL ÁREA DE LIBRE COMERCIO DE LAS AMÉRICAS 161 2.1.1. Antecedentes remotos del ALCA. 161 2.1.2. Período de desintegración. 164 2.1.3. Primer antecedente directo del ALCA 166 2.1.4. Antecedentes recientes del ALCA. 170 2.2. EVOLUCIÓN DEL ACUERDO ALCA 171 2.2.1. Principios rectores de las negociaciones del ALCA. 173 2.2.2. Estructura y organización de las negociaciones del ALCA. 173 2.2.2.1. Presidencia de las Negociaciones. 174 2.2.2.2. Los Ministros Responsables del Área de Comercio. 174 2.2.2.3. Comité de Negociaciones Comerciales. 174 2.2.2.4. Grupos de Negociación y Comités. 175 2.2.2.5. Apoyos. 176 2.2.2.6. Declaración relacionada con los actos terroristas de finales del 2001. 177 2.2.3. Primera Reunión de Ministros de Comercio Exterior. 178 2.2.4. Segunda Reunión de Ministros de Comercio Exterior. 179 2.2.5. Tercera Reunión de Ministros de Comercio Exterior. 180 2.2.6. Cuarta Reunión de Ministros de Comercio Exterior. 182 2.2.7. Quinta Reunión de Ministros de Comercio Exterior. 184 2.2.8. Sexta Reunión de Ministros de Comercio Exterior. 185 2.2.9. La Cumbre de las Américas 2001 187 2.3. EL BORRADOR DEL ACUERDO ALCA 191 2.3.1. Consideraciones. 192 2.3.2. Grupo de Negociación sobre Agricultura. 192 2.3.2.1. Objetivos. 193 2.3.2.2. Reuniones. 194 2.3.2.3. Intereses de Colombia. 195 2.3.3. Grupo de Negociación sobre Compras del Sector Público 195 2.3.3.1. Objetivos. 195 2.3.3.2. Reuniones. 196 2.3.3.3. Intereses de Colombia. 197 2.3.4. Grupo de Negociación sobre Inversión. 197 2.3.4.1. Objetivos. 197 2.3.4.2. Reuniones. 197 2.3.4.3. Intereses para Colombia. 198 2.3.5. Grupo de Negociación sobre Acceso a Mercados. 198 2.3.5.1. Objetivos. 198 2.3.5.2. Reuniones. 199 2.3.5.3. Intereses de Colombia. 200 2.3.5.4. Texto oficial del Acuerdo. 200 2.3.6. Subsidios, Antidumping y Derechos Compensatorios. 200 2.3.6.1. Objetivos. 201 2.3.6.2. Reuniones. 201 2.3.6.3. Intereses de Colombia. 202 2.3.7. Grupo de Negociación sobre Solución de Controversias. 202 2.3.7.1. Objetivos. 202 2.3.7.2. Reuniones. 202 2.3.7.3. Intereses de Colombia. 203 2.3.8. Grupo de Negociación sobre Servicios. 203 2.3.8.1. Objetivos. 204 2.3.8.2. Reuniones. 204 2.3.8.3. Intereses de Colombia. 205 2.3.9. Grupo de Negociación sobre Derechos de Propiedad Intelectual. 205 2.3.9.1. Objetivos. 205 2.3.9.2. Reuniones. 205 2.3.9.3. Intereses de Colombia. 206 2.3.10. Grupo de Negociación sobre Política de Competencia. 206 2.3.10.1. Objetivos. 206 2.3.10.2. Reuniones. 207 2.3.10.3. Intereses de Colombia. 208 2.4. EL PROCESO DE NEGOCIACIÓN DEL ALCA 208 2.4.1. Estado actual de las negociaciones. 210 2.4.2. Futuro de las negociaciones. 211 2.4.3. Pautas y lineamientos acordados. 212 2.5. COLOMBIA FRENTE AL ALCA 214 2.5.1. El Plan Estratégico Exportador 1999 – 2009 de Colombia. 215 2.5.1.1. Objetivo Estratégico 1. 216 2.5.1.2. Objetivo Estratégico 2. 217 2.5.1.3. Objetivo Estratégico 3. 218 2.5.1.4. Objetivo Estratégico 4. 218 2.5.1.5. Objetivo Estratégico 5. 219 2.5.2. El Plan Estratégico Exportador 2001 – 2010 del Valle del Cauca. 219 2.5.2.1. Visión exportadora del Departamento. 219 2.5.2.2. Variables claves para el desarrollo del PEER. 220 2.5.2.3. Objetivos. 220 2.5.2.4. Proyectos prioritarios. 225 2.5.2.5. Entidades y empresas participantes. 229 2.5.3. Colombia y el ALCA en cifras. 231 2.5.3.1. Exportación de bienes. 232 2.5.3.2. Exportación de servicios comerciales 232 2.5.3.3. Inversión extranjera en Colombia 233 2.5.4. Objetivo e intereses de Colombia en el ALCA. 234 2.5.5. Rol de Colombia, los empresarios y la sociedad civil. 235 2.5.6. "Empresarios por el ALCA". 240 3. COMERCIO EXTERIOR DE COLOMBIA Y EL VALLE DEL CAUCA 243 3.1. INTERCAMBIO COMERCIAL DE COLOMBIA 243 3.1.1. Destino de las Exportaciones Colombianas. 244 3.1.2. Exportaciones Colombianas por Sector Económico. 246 3.1.3. Exportaciones por Sectores Económicos y Grupos de Destino. 249 3.1.4. Origen de las Importaciones Colombianas. 252 3.1.5. Importaciones de Colombia por Grupos Económicos de Origen. 253 3.1.6. Importaciones según Sectores de Origen 255 3.1.7. Balanza Comercial Según Grupos Económicos de Países. 258 3.1.8. Algunas Observaciones Preliminares. 260 3.1.9. Significado del ALCA para Colombia 262 3.2. EL VALLE DEL CAUCA Y SU POSICIÓN FRENTE AL ALCA 263 3.2.1. Importaciones del Valle del Cauca. 263 3.2.2. Origen de las importaciones del Valle del Cauca. 267 3.2.3. Exportaciones del Valle del Cauca. 268 3.2.4. Destino de las exportaciones del Valle. 273 3.2.5. Comportamiento histórico de las exportaciones vallecaucanas. 275 3.2.6. Exportaciones no tradicionales de Colombia y el Valle. 276 3.2.7. Balanza Comercial del Valle del Cauca. 278 3.2.8. El compromiso del empresario vallecaucano. 278 3.3. COMERCIO ENTRE COLOMBIA Y LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS 279 3.3.1. Balanza Comercial entre Colombia y los Estados Unidos. 279 3.3.2. Importaciones y Exportaciones por productos. 281 3.4. COMERCIO ENTRE COLOMBIA Y CANADÁ 282 3.4.1. Balanza Comercial. 282 3.4.2. Inversión extranjera. 283 3.4.3. Comercio bilateral. 284 3.4.3.1. Importaciones de Canadá a Colombia. 285 3.4.3.2. Exportaciones de Colombia a Canadá. 286 3.4.4. Perspectivas del mercado canadiense. 286 4. OPORTUNIDADES 289 4.1. OPORTUNIDADES FRENTE AL ATPA 289 4.2. OPORTUNIDADES EN EL MERCADO CANADIENSE 293 4.3. OPORTUNIDADES FRENTE AL ALCA 294 4.3.1. Papel del sector privado. 295 4.3.2. Oportunidades generales para el empresario. 296 4.3.3. Oportunidades para la industria del Valle del Cauca. 298 4.3.4. Sectores exportadores clave del Valle del Cauca. 300 4.3.4.1. Sectores representativos año 2001. 301 4.3.4.2. Sectores estratégicos del Valle del Cauca. 302 4.3.5. Análisis del sector exportador Vallecaucano 305 5. CONCLUSIONES 308 5.1. SOBRE LAS EXPORTACIONES DE COLOMBIA 308 5.2. SOBRE LAS IMPORTACIONES DE COLOMBIA 310 5.3. SOBRE EL VALLE DEL CAUCA 311 5.4. FACTORES CLAVE DEL ÉXITO 316 5.4.1. Por parte del Gobierno Nacional y el sector público. 317 5.4.2. Por parte del sector privado. 317 5.4.3. Por parte de la Academia. 318 5.4.4. Por parte de los Trabajadores. 318 6. RECOMENDACIONES 319 BIBLIOGRAFÍA 321 ANEXOS 324 ; Maestría ; The main objective of this research is to identify and characterize the commercial opportunities that the industrial sector of Valle del Cauca presents with the consolidation in 2005 of the Free Trade Area of the Americas - FTAA - especially with the United States and Canada. To achieve this objective, it was required, in the first instance, to review the commercial exchange situation between Colombia and Canada, and also Colombia and the United States through a temporary unilateral mechanism such as the Andean Trade Preference Act - ATPA , and then review the status of the negotiations according to the market access chapter of the Draft FTAA Agreement. In addition, it was necessary to evaluate the commercial situation of Valle del Cauca on the subject of foreign trade to determine the importance of the participating products or productive sectors. From this result, those most representative products or sectors were taken for analysis for which the possible commercial opportunities that are outlined if the Agreement is consolidated and put into operation on the proposed date were established. This study was carried out in two phases. The first phase includes the collection of all the information grouped into two main topics: First, the existing information on Colombia in the process of economic integration in America and on the Free Area. Commerce of the Americas - FTAA - which includes the review of the trade situation between Colombia and the United States and Canada through a temporary unilateral mechanism such as the ATPA, the search for historical antecedents, the evolution of the hemispheric integration process according to with the progress made in the Negotiating Groups and, finally, the revision of the chapter "Market Access" of the Draft FTAA Agreement. The second topic covers the existing information on commercial exchange between Colombia and Valle del Cauca and the other countries of America, where the trade statistics they have maintained were analyzed and the expectations that the industrial sector of Valle del Cauca has regarding to the formation of the FTAA. In the second phase of the study, an analysis was made of the information obtained in the first phase in order to characterize the specific commercial opportunities, identifying the most representative products or sectors of the Valle del Cauca industry in terms of current exports and selecting those that they participate with at least 5% of Valle del Cauca exports, thus identifying the paretto on the subject. Likewise, the sectors with export potential were identified according to the Regional Exporting Strategic Plan 2001 - 2010 of Valle del Cauca developed by CARCE. When analyzing the results obtained as a result of the investigation, certain conclusions were identified that it is important to mention. For Colombia and Valle del Cauca to succeed in the face of the great challenge represented by the consolidation of the FTAA, it is imperative that the Government, the private sector, the Academy and even civil society are focused on shared work plans and focused on well-defined strategies. defined where everyone plays their role. Isolated individual efforts do not guarantee the achievement of the general objectives sought by the successful participation of Colombia in this integration process, it must be a coordinated effort. Obtaining competitive and sustainable commercial advantages in an American market expanded as a result of the FTAA, depends on the integrated work and aligned under the same strategic objectives of each of these actors in this new scenario. As a complement, some factors were identified that can be considered as essential to achieve a satisfactory performance before the consolidation of the FTAA by the National Government and the public sector, by the private sector, by the Academy and by the Workers as members. of civil society.
Many duplications. ; Numerous newspaper (?) clippings of poems, sentiments, etc., pasted on random pages. ; Consists of various pamphlets and reprints bound into 7 volumes. ; --Military drill in the public schools--The sportsman.[dup]--The mournful story of the cost of decoration with dead birds and their plumage--Some medical opinions.[dup]--The Pasteur Institute.[dup]--The anti-toxin.[dup]--To junior members, wearing the badge of the International Kindness to Animals Society ; Reasons for the organization of the International Kindness to Animals Society--Importance of humane education--Vivisection in relation to politics--A letter to children.[dup] ; v.7. Protection of animals / G. Angell, 1874--The reality of human vivisection, 1901--A bill for the regulation of scientific experiments upon human beings in the District of Columbia : S.3424 / Mr. Gallinger, 1900--Vivisection in the District of Columbia / 55th Congress, 3d session, Senate, 1899--Human vivisection, a statement and an inquiry, 3rd ed. rev., 1900--Is science advanced by deceit? / A. Leffingwell, 1900--Scientific chicanery, does it pay?, 1900--Some mistakes of scientists / A. Leffingwell, 1900--Does science need secrecy? / A. Leffingwell, 1900--For pity's sake.[dup]--Vivisection and dissection in schools--Ten rules for the treatment of animals--A plain talk.[dup]--The International Kindness to Animals Society, general circular--Some medical opinions concerning vivisection--Vaccination is the curse of childhood [2 copies]--The principal props of vivisection / P. Peabody--Abstract.[dup]--Facts about vivisection which cannot be denied--Is vivisection painful?--An appeal to every woman--Confessions of a vivisector--Light to benefit.[dup]--The feast of Bacchus / A. Walton--Experimental research versus altruism / M. Lovell, 1893--Medical opinions on vivisection--Addresses by the Reverend Washington Gladden, D.D. and the Reverend John Henry Barrows, D.D. at the twenty-third annual meeting of the American Humane Association Columbus, Ohio, October 24-26, 1899--El zoofilo venezolano, año 2, num. 13, nov. 1898 / Sociedad Protectora de los Animales--Tuberculosis in cattle--Voci autorevoli contro la vivisezione / Società di anti-vivisezone--Pasteur or Buisson? [dup]--Cosmos-philosophy.[dup]--The sportsman.[dup]--The sin of cruelty--Hereditary.[dup; 2 copies]--Compulsory vaccination, 1899--Startling accusations / A. Leffingwell, 1899--A plea for animals / B. Underwood--The poor tramp cat / Mrs. Fairchild Allen, 1900--The real sportsmen's show / J. Greene--A law to help the boys / A. Bowles, 1892 ; v.6. Amos Hunt and the steel trap / Mrs. Fairchild Allen--Vivisection and the drug delusion, 7th ed. / comp. by J. Scott, 1893--A dangerous ideal / A. Leffingwell--Does vivisection need concealment? / A. Leffingwell--Abstract of the Report on vivisection adopted by the American Humane Association Sept. 26, 1895--Professor Frog's lecture / M. Lane--A physician on vivisection / T. Parvin, 1895--Abstract.[dup]--Vivisection and the drug.[dup]--Abstract.[dup]--The vivisector at the gates of Herat / E. Preston, 1896--Shall we teach cruelty as an art? / by a physician--A key to "St. Bernard's," entitled Dying scientifically [advertising flyer]--The brutalization of childhood--The tendencies of the turf / C. Crandall, 1894--Certain other duties / G. Trumbull--Shall we teach.[dup]--Professor Frog's.[dup]--For pity's sake--Infernal intellect / G. Angell--The London Institution for Lost & Starving Cats, 1898--The craze for killing, 1895--Abstract.[dup]--About poor puss [dup]--French and English vivisection, 1890--Shall we teach.[dup]--Paul Faber, surgeon [review]--Objects and methods ; rules for members ; council / Independent Anti-Vivisection League--Our humble associates / G. Walker, 1891--Home of Rest for Horses--The stealthy advance of vivisection / E.B.--A plea for mercy / J. Craigen--The check-rein / G. Angell--Shall we teach.[dup]--A dangerous ideal [dup]--The cruel vivisector [dup]--Do the interests.[dup]--Some fruits of vivisection / E. Berdoe--Our meanest.[dup]--A physician.[dup]--Vivisection and the drug.[dup] ; Pasteur's statistics [dup]--An institute of preventive medicine at work in France, 5th ed. / F. Cobbe, 1891--A bird's-eye view of a great question / S. Trist, 1894--Physiology in our.[dup]--Do the interests.[dup]--The proposed biological .[dup]--Vivisection / G. Hoggan, 1875--Anaesthetics and vivisection--Dr. Bell Taylor.[dup]--A pathetic incident.[dup]--Mrs. Fenwick Miller on vivisection, 1894--The worst thing in the world / M. Lovell, 1895--A letter from Prof. Lawson.[dup]--Concerning vivisection / A. Leffingwell--My doctor tells me that there is very little vivisection now in England / E. Bell--My doctor tells me that Koch discovered a cure for consumption by means of experiments on living animals--My doctor tells me that the most important discoveries in medicine have been made by means of vivisection--My doctor tells me that experiments in England are only performed on animals under anaesthetics--My doctor tells me nothing about curare--For pity's sake [dup]--The restriction of vivisection / A. Leffingwell--Mr. Lawson Tait on operating for cancer of the larynx, 1892--Reply to the Century / E. Berdoe, 1891--Strain at a gnat, swallow a camel / C. Spencer, 1892--Vivisection and personal rights / M. Caird--The savagery of vivisection--Vivisection / M. Caird--The savagery.[dup]--The anti-toxin treatment of diphtheria / M. Caird--Vivisection and personal.[dup]--The sanctuary of mercy / M. Caird--Sacrifice.[dup]--Vivisection as a test-question.[dup]--The savagery.[dup]--Vivisection, an appeal to the workers / M. Caird--Vivisection [letter] / M. Caird, 1895--The anti-toxin.[dup]--Is cruelty.[dup]--Vivisection [dup] ; v.5. A letter from Prof. Lawson Tait, F.R.C.S., respecting experiments on living animals, 1892--The skylarks in an East End market / R. Rudd--Do the interests of mankind require experiments on living animals? / A. Barry, 1892--The utility, cruelty & morality of experiments upon animals / by a hospital physician--Letter from surgeon-general.[dup]--Why the vivisection act is objected to / J. Clarke, 1885--Vivisection and anaesthetics--Vivisection useless and unjustifiable / A. Astley--Extracts from two letters from Dr. George Hoggan on vivisection--Five questions to working men about vivisection--The utility, cruelty.[dup]--Five questions.[dup]--Why the vivisection act.[dup]--Extracts from two letters.[dup]--Vivisection useless.[dup]--Vivisection and anaesthetics [dup]--Lawson Tait, F.R.C.S., etc. on the discussion on vivisection at the church congress, 1892--The Inspector's report.[dup]--Our meanest crime / J. Clarke, 1892--The discussion on vivisection at the church congress / L. Tait, 1892--Do the interests of humanity require experiments on living animals? / F. Arnold, 1892--Sacrifice, noble and ignoble / M. Caird--Is cruelty for a purpose justifiable? / M. Caird--The hospitals & vivisection--Extract from "Medical education." [dup]--Light to benefit mankind--What is vivisection [dup]--Concerning human.[dup]--Mixed plumes / E. Phillips--As in a mirror / H Greene, 1898--At the annual meeting of the Church of England Society for the Promotion of Kindness to Animals. / F. Lemon, 1897--A woman's question /B. Atkinson, 1896--An egret hunter's narrative / D. Bennett, 1896--Osprey, or, egrets and aigrettes / W. Hudson, 1896--The trade in birds' feathers, 1898--Legalised torture / M. Caird--An animals' friend [dup]--What I saw at the Pasteur Institute / T. Williams, 1894--Pasteur's statistics / E. Bell--Hydrophobia, the truth about M. Pasteur's prophylactic, 3rd ed. / B. Bryan, 1895--The Pasteur Institute.[dup]--The cruel vivisector.[dup]-- ; --Sacrifice / New York State Anti-Vivisection Society--An appeal from the horses.[dup]--The churches and vivisection.[dup]--The London Buisson Institute / F. Pirkis, 1896--Cancer experiments on human beings / F. Cobbe--About poor puss [dup]--Anti-vivisection, Nov. 1897--Pasteur or Buisson, cruelty, poison, uncleanness or the pure and kindly vapor bath, which shall we follow?--Vivisection and hospital.[dup]--Additional opinions concerning vivisection--Illinois Anti-Vivisection Society [membership flyer]--The truth concerning.[dup]--The Pasteur Institute.[dup]--American vivisections [dup]--Col. Ingersoll on vivisection ; Opposed to vivisection, additional opinions of physicians and surgeons, 1890--Opinions of leading physicians and surgeons concerning vivisection--Vivisection as a method of education in American colleges and universities--Where shall our boys be educated?--The interests of humanity in connection with vivisection / W.W. ; v.4. For pity's sake / C. Taylor, 1893--Letter from Surgeon-General C.A. Gordon.to the Secretary of the London Anti-Vivisection Society--The proposed biological laboratories in Chicago / F. Cobbe--What is vivisection / P. Peabody--The fairy tales of science / F. Cobbe, 1896--Society for the Protection of Birds prospectus, 1889--An unscientific view of vivisection / W. Paget--Bishop Barry and Canon Wilberforce on the morality of vivisection, 1891--Medical experiments on human beings / Dr. Koch, 1893--Sir R.T. Reid, Attorney-General, on vivisection, 1891--Some truths about vivisection / M. Caird, 1894--The Hon. B. Coleridge, M.P., on the Inspector's report and the Brown Institution, 1888--Rt. Hon. J. Stansfeld, M.P., on experimental institutes and the Vivisection act, 1894--The hope of the universe / G. MacDonald, 1893--The Right Rev. Dr. Ridding, Bishop of Southwell, on vivisection: its inutility, immorality, and cruelty, 1893--The proposed Pasteur Institute at Chelsea Bridge / M. Caird--The Bishop of Manchester on gambling, vivisection, and covetousness / J. Moorhouse, 1891--Flaws in the act / E. Bell, 1892--Physiology in our public schools / A. Leffingwell--The extermination of birds / C. Spencer, 1897--Strange but earnest.[dup]--The poor lobster / Mrs. Fairchild-Allen--To my dog.[dup]--An animals' friend [dup]--The birds' land of altruism / J. Chase--Humane leaflet no. 3 / G. Angell--Condensed information / Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals--Humane leaflet no. 7 / G. Angell--Anti-vivisection, various issues, 1895-1897; leaflets glued inside, mostly dup., including: Extract from a letter from J.H. Thornton.Deputy Surgeon General.to Mrs. Marion C. Jordan.1896--Vivisection as a test-question at elections / M. Caird--Anti-vivisection, Mar. 1895: leaflet: The cruel vivisector, Pasteur, of Paris / P. Peabody, 1893--Anti-vivisection, Apr. 1896: leaflet: The brutalization of childhood ; Cosmos-philosophy, a new book.by E.D. Buckner [adv. flyer]--The mournful story of the cost of decoration with dead birds and their plumage--The wearing of egret.[dup]--The great cat problem--The retribution of Spain--Facts for clergymen--For pity's sake, by Mrs. S.N Carter [adv. flyer]--Medical opinions concerning vivisection--Human vivi.[dup]--An appeal to teachers--Attention! letter to a medical scientist--Bird Day--Vivisection and hospital.[dup]--Dovetrot's.[dup--Is not kindness righteousness?--To my dog.[dup]--The anti-vivisection exhibit at the Paris Exposition--Woman's responsibility toward the animal creation / M. Lovell--Who are the ultimate victims?--The sportsman: let us go out and kill something--The retribution.[dup]--The sportsman.[dup]--The mournful story.[dup]--Cosmos-philosophy.[dup]--Mode of killing dogs by carbonous oxide gas--To thoughtful.[dup]--Protection of animals / G. Angell, 1891--The noble mission of the humane societies / D. Swing, 1886--Bands of mercy information / G. Angell, 1891--A wise fish--Is it nothing.[dup]--An appeal to teachers [2 dups]--Something for Christian.[2 dups]--Extract from "Medical education." [dup]--A neglected obligation [dup; bd. backwards]--Darkest science--The horse-clipper's.[dup]--Cruelty in stables [dup]--Which is best? [dup]--Facts for drivers [dup]--Hints on.cows [dup]--The noble mission.[dup]--An appeal to Christians on the subject of vivisection / H. Harris. ; --My lady's plumes / E. Hough--The wearing of egret plumes / M. Lovell--An appeal to every woman--Bands of mercy--Collections / J. Andrews--Vivisection / Mrs. M. Rouse--[Docking horses] ; Revising the work of God--Dovetrot's way / Mrs. Fairchild-Allen--To elevate morals: Bird Day, Animal Day / R. O'Hanlon ; Good citizens the object of schools--Expert opinion and public sentiment on check reins--The horse-clipper's costume ; The cruelty and danger of clipping horses--Which is best? Whips or brains? Cruelty or kindness?--Cruelty in stables--Facts for drivers--Vivisection of horses [dup]--Opinions of leading physicians and surgeons concerning vivisection--A few words to those.[dup]--Is it nothing to you?--Human vivi.[dup]--Concerning human vivisections / P. Peabody--Something for Christian endeavor people to think of--Extract from "Medical education." [dup]--Vivisection in the United Kingdom, 1893--The wearing of egret plumes [abr.] / M. Lovell--A ministerial oversight--Cruelties of seal killing / W. Gavitt--A neglect of ministers and Sunday school teachers--A neglected obligation--Hints on the care of cows--Early lessons in kindness or cruelty / A. Fogg--Kindness to animals Sundays--An appeal from the horses to their owners and drivers--Supplement to Anti-vivisection: an exposition of vivisection / S. Thomas--The reasons that have led to the demand for the total prohibition (instead of the restriction) of vivisection--The black art, 1892--The reasons that have led.[dup]--The black art [dup]--Cruelty in stables [dup]--Kindness to animals Sundays [dup]--An appeal to teachers--Nature study, Bird Day, Animal Day / R. O'Hanlon ; Good citizens the object of schools--A burning question--Vivisection and hospital.[dup]--Medical opinions on vivisection---Vivisection of horses [dup]--The New England Anti-Vivisection Society, 1898--Hereditary cruelty ; The degredation and retribution of Spain--Collections [dup]--Human vivisection [dup]-- ; Dates of the principal events connected with the anti-vivisection movement, [1883?]--Dr. Bilde.[dup]--The Rev. H.R. Haweis as an anti-vivisectionist, 1887--The lady of Greynton Grange / B. Channing, 1883--Commentary on the cruelty to animals act, 1876 / B. Coleridge, 1883--v.3. Cure for hydrophobia--An answer to Dr. Keen's address entitled Our recent debts to vivisection, 2nd ed. / C. White, 1886--Fairly cornered--The great value of birds ; Queries for sportsmen / C. Hamlin--Strange but earnest questions / S. Beard--An animals' friend / M.C.J.--To my dog Blanco / J. Holland ; Our dogs at home and astray / Mrs. Fairchild-Allen--The Illinois Branch of the American Anti-Vivisection Society / Mrs. Fairchild-Allen--The Illinois Branch of the American Anti Vivisection Society--Mr. Lawson Tait on vivisection, 1882--A letter to children / M. Lovell--How to treat cats / M. Lovell--About poor puss / A. Fisher--A few words to those who believe in the restriction of vivisection--Mollie White-Foot's vacation / A. Smith--Bird Day in the schools / T. Palmer, 1896--The truth concerning vivisection, as gathered from eye witnesses, 1896--The Pasteur Institute, 1894--American vivisections--The sixth annual report for the year ending Oct. 31st, 1896, of the Dept. of Mercy of the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union--To bicyclists, a humane appeal, 1895--Quotations from great thinkers concerning vivisection--Humane education the remedy for cruelty--Vivisection and hospital patients--Warm or cold?, 1897--To thoughtful teachers--The sister charities / Mrs. Fairchild-Allen, 1896--A plain talk in behalf of some of our best friends / Mrs. Fairchild-Allen--An animals' friend [dup]--The sister.[dup]--A few words to those.[dup]--Human vivisections / P. Peabody, 1896--Cure for hydro.[dup]--Vivisection of horses / P. Peabody--Professional laxity of morals / P. Peabody, 1896--American vivi.[dup]--Vivisection, its barbarity, its uselessness, its wickedness ; v.2. The curse of cruelty / D. Morris, 1886--Address of the Bishop of Oxford, at the annual meeting of the Victoria Street Society.1883--From the essay on vivisection / J. Macauley--Extract from "Medical education in America" / H. Bigelow, 1871--Two views of the true vivisector, by two who ought to know--Vivisection : how should Christians regard it? / H. Bernard--Two views.[dup]--The dog's appeal--Gambling in vivisection--Dr. Bell Taylor on vivisection--The hero and his dog--Two views.[dup]--Tender vivisection / F. Cobbe, 1881--Experimental pathology explained and exemplified / J. Clarke, 1886--Tender vivisection [dup]--What can we do?--A pathetic incident in a physiological laboratory / J. Clarke, 1884--Dr. Bell Taylor.[dup]--What can we do? [dup]--Vivisection / G. Hoggan--Extract from "Medical education." [dup]--Ferrieristic brain surgery--Address to the working class / R. Barlow-Kennett--Vivisection / G. Hoggan [dup]--Extract from "Medical education. [dup]--A pathetic incident.[dup]--Gambling.[dup]--The dog's appeal [dup]--The hero.[dup]--Dr. Bell Taylor.[dup]--Vivisection / G. Hoggan [dup]--A pathetic incident.[dup]--Gambling.[dup]--Extract from "Medical education." [dup]--Dr. Bell Taylor.[dup]--Address by W.R.D. Blackwood, M.D., 1888--Address by W.R.D. .[dup]--Extracts from an address by Canon Wilberforce, 1887--Address by W.R.D. .[dup]--Vivisection / A. Leffingwell, 1884--The curse of cruelty [dup]--Brain surgery and vivisection : three letters, 1884--The Bishop of Oxford and Prof. Ruskin on vivisection / J. Mackarness, J. Ruskin--The Lord Chief Justice of England on vivisection--Twelve years trial of the vivisection act (39-40 Vict., c77) / M.R.C.S.--The lower animals : God's ownership, man's vicegerency [sic] / D. Wright, 1888--Experimenters in check / B. Bryan--Specimen of physiological.[dup]--Scientific medicine [dup]--Cardinal Manning as an anti-vivisectionist, 1881--Vivisection : how.[dup] ; Vol.1. Vivisection, a sermon / H. Bernard, [1883?]--The scientist at the bedside, 1882--Professor Ferrier's experiments on monkeys' brains, 1885--Vivisection and the treatment of patients / S. Harris, 1885--Duty to man before duty to beast / Lord Bishop of Oxford [J. Mackarness], 1883--Breaches of the Vivisection Act / B. Bryan, 1888--The total prohibition of vivisection / Earl of Shaftesbury [A. Cooper], 1879--The torture chamber of science / E. v. Weber, [1879?]--Monkeys' brains once more / J. Clarke, [1888?]--English and American callousness--Report of proceedings at a meeting held at Southampton, October the 16th, 1878, by the Society for Protection of Animals from Vivisection--Anaesthetics and vivisection--Four reasons for supporting the bill for the total prohibition of vivisection--Vivisection endangers human life--The fallacy of restriction applied to vivisection / F. Cobbe, 1886--An independent opinion on vivisection / W. Lilly, 1885--Meeting at Stoke Bishop / F. Cobbe, [1883?]--Have pity, 1882--What is cruelty?, 1885--Half measures--M. Pasteur's researches / B. Coleridge, 1887--The scientist at the bedside [duplicate]--Specimen of physiological instruction : a vivisection lecture in Paris described by an eye-witness, 1886--Letters of head school-masters--Vivisection endangers human life [dup]--Half measures [dup]--M. Pasteur's reseaches [dup]--Scientific medicine--Pompey's peril / C. Hoey--The total prohibition .[dup]--Anaesthetics and vivisection [dup]--Letter from a lady student of vivisection / B. Lindsay, 1883--Dr. Bilde : a typical vivisector, 1887--The new benefactor of humanity / F. Cobbe, 1884--A pleasant proposal, 1884--Four reasons for supporting.[dup]--Have pity [dup]--M. Pasteur's researches [dup]--Fide et amore / C. Pirkis--Scientific medicine [dup]--An independent opinion.[dup]--Letters of head.[dup]--Pompey's peril [dup]--Janus the second / F. Cobbe--The inspector's report and return for 1887 / B. Bryan, [1888?] ; Mode of access: Internet.
Uganda's progress in reducing poverty from 1993 to 2006 is a remarkable story of success that has been well told. The narrative of Uganda's continued, albeit it slightly slower, progress in reducing poverty since 2006 is less familiar. This was a period in which growth slowed as the gains from reforms years earlier had been fully realized, and weak infrastructure and increasing corruption increasingly constrained private sector competitiveness (World Bank 2015). This report examines Uganda's progress in reducing poverty, with a specific focus on the period 2006 to 2013. The report shows that high growth from 2006 to 2010 benefited poverty reduction. Before turning in further detail to the key findings of the report, it is important to note that the analysis undertaken in this report is only possible because the Government of Uganda has invested in a high quality series of household surveys to document progress in wellbeing since 1993. The Uganda Bureau of Statistics has conducted high-quality household surveys that every three to four years that have provided a comparable series of data on poverty and other household characteristics for the last twenty years. Uganda is one of the few countries in the region to have achieved this level of comparable, frequent poverty monitoring over time. Without this, it would not be possible to document the lessons Uganda provides.
Ethiopia's remarkable socio-economic transformation over the last decade has been marked by: a reorientation of expenditure from recurrent to capital; a significant devolution of resources from Federal Government to Regions; and a clear prioritization of infrastructure spending, while protecting spending on education at four percent of GDP. The Government of Ethiopia has also leveraged external resources to boost spending in pro-poor sectors, particularly health and social protection. As a result, Ethiopia is home to the largest social safety net program in Africa, and has also achieved remarkable health outcomes using cost effective approaches. Recent investments have seen a significant build-up of capital stock, with capital spending at sector level pointing towards increased service capacity. The current public investment-led strategy requires to be complemented by increased budgetary provisions in operations and maintenance so that new investments translate into enhanced service coverage and delivery. As Ethiopia lays the foundation to become a middle income country, and the changing global environment implies declining external assistance, it is imperative that domestic taxation activity support this transition. The current tax-to-GDP ratio is low compared to peer countries, and the tax structure would benefit from increased contributions by direct tax sources. Therefore, there is an immediate need for advancing tax reforms and improve capacity and quality of tax administration. Broadening the tax bases, through review of exemptions, as well as review of tax rates might be venues to consider. Additional revenues will create the much-needed fiscal space to increase funding for operations and maintenance for service delivery, and support fiscal sustainability. As a follow-up to this Public Expenditure Review, the Government of Ethiopia has asked the World Bank to provide further analytical support, with a view to enhance domestic revenue mobilization through simpler and more efficient taxation, while retaining equity priorities in public finances.
Agriculture is the dominant sector of the economy, contributing a third of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) and about half of Rwanda's export earnings. The government of Rwanda has therefore made agricultural development a priority and allocated significant resources to improving productivity, expanding the livestock sector, promoting sustainable land management, and developing supply chains and value-added activities. At the same time, Rwanda's agriculture sector faces a series of challenges. Agriculture is dominated by small-scale, subsistence farming under traditional agricultural practices and rain-fed agriculture. As a result, average crop yields are low compared with potential yields, and exposed to risks such as weather related shocks and pest and disease outbreaks. The purpose of this report is to assess existing risks to the agriculture sector, prioritize them according to their frequency and impacts on the sector, and identify areas of risk management solutions that need deeper specialized attention. Three levels of risks are assessed: production risks, market risks, and enabling environment risks to selected supply chains. The report takes a quantitative and qualitative approach to risks. The report is structured as follows: chapter one gives introduction. Chapter two provides an overview of Rwanda's economy and the role and structure of the agriculture sector. Agriculture sector risks (production, market, and enabling environment risks) for the selected food crops, export crops, and livestock are analyzed in chapter three. Analysis of the adverse impacts of agricultural risks at aggregate and provincial levels, along with a stakeholder risk assessment and a discussion of particularly vulnerable groups, is presented in chapter four. Chapter five prioritizes identified risks, discusses potential solutions areas, summarizes feedback from consulted stakeholders, and recommends solutions areas for further assessment.