Suchergebnisse

[spa] La promoción de la autonomía personal, se establece como elemento clave para garantizar el envejecimiento activo. La familia es a menudo el sistema social encargado de atender a los adultos mayores cuando estos no pueden valerse por sí mismos; proporciona vínculos afectivos, relacionales y emocionales necesarios para garantizar el bienestar del adulto mayor. Para garantizar la calidad de vida en el adulto mayor, se deberán considerar tanto las atenciones a su salud, como las atenciones que faciliten el mantenimiento de la estabilidad familiar. Es por ello, por lo que este sistema, requerirá de habilidades relacionales y sociales que les permitan afrontar con éxito los cambios del envejecimiento; cambios que impactarán sobre la convivencia, las relaciones entre sus miembros y sobre cada uno de los miembros en sí. Para apoyar a las personas y familias a que mantengan un papel activo en la promoción de la autonomía y de la salud de sus miembros, se enfatizará en el empoderamiento, proceso por el cual se alienta a desarrollar las habilidades de cuidado individual, familiar y social. En este sentido, los estilos de afrontamiento adaptativo, han demostrado ser el motor de mejora de la adaptabilidad a los cambios del envejecimiento, posibilitar la adecuada gestión de conflictos y potenciar la resiliencia familiar. Los programas de competencias familiares basados en la evidencia han demostrado ser una estrategia eficaz y efectiva para desarrollar las habilidades de relación familiar promotoras de la resiliencia. No obstante, entre los principales puntos débiles para la eficacia de la implementación de este tipo de programas, se identifican las dificultades para mantener la implicación familiar a lo largo del proceso; se refiere tanto a las dificultades para la captación y retención familiar al inicio del proceso, para el mantenimiento del compromiso familiar a lo largo de las sesiones y de las dificultades para salvar las barreras para la participación. Esta tesis doctoral nace en el marco del Proyecto de Investigación "Validación del Programa de Competencia Familiar Universal 10-14 en España (EDU2016-79235-R - I+D relativa a las Ciencias Sociales financiada con FGU)". La presente tesis doctoral se dirigió, inicialmente a evaluar cuáles son las técnicas que dan mejores resultados de adherencia al programa, en respuesta al objetivo 4 del Proyecto de Investigación que se operativiza en "Evaluar la adherencia de las familias participantes, a lo largo de las sesiones que componen el programa". Dado que la evidencia indica que el trabajo sobre las habilidades de comunicación, habilidades sociales, las estrategias de afrontamiento familiar, las competencias en cuidadores y adultos mayores relacionadas con los cuidados eficaces, la autoestima u autoeficacia, entre otras destrezas sobre las que trabaja el Programa de Competencia Familiar, promueven la autonomía y ayudan a prevenir las situaciones de dependencia, se decidió realizar una adaptación de sus contenidos, pues el Programa de Competencia Familiar, se orienta a la intervención socioeducativa con y entre progenitores y menores de edad. Hasta el momento no se había definido una intervención socioeducativa que permitiera el trabajo preventivo de potenciales dinámicas familiares disfuncionales vinculadas a la aparición de situaciones de dependencia y cronicidad. Las versiones anteriores del Programa de Competencia Familiar han demostrado su eficacia a largo plazo en los principales factores que componen la dinámica familiar positiva (resiliencia, comunicación, organización y cohesión familiar, disciplina positiva y otros factores) (Orte et al., 2015) y dadas las variables sobre las que trabaja, las características - práctica basada en la evidencia- y las evidencias siguientes: 1. La relación entre la carencia de apoyo social y familiar, de relaciones sociales, problemas de comunicación y la influencia del entorno sobre los procesos de pérdida de autonomía y aceleración del adelanto hacia formas de dependencia severa. 2. La carencia de garantía del derecho recogido al artículo 1 de la Ley 39/2006, de disponer de recursos de promoción de autonomía y la carencia de atención a las recomendaciones nacionales e internacionales en cuanto al envejecimiento activo. Se procedió a adaptar el Programa de Competencia Familiar dados sus resultados probados en la mejora de las estrategias de afrontamiento familiar, la mejora de las dinámicas familiares y de los factores de protección tanto familiar como individual en cada uno de sus miembros. El Programa de Competencia Familiar Universal-Auto se diseñó en torno a las mismas herramientas y estructura que el Programa de Competencia Universal. Se tomó como referencia el mismo objetivo genérico - trabajar sobre las pautas de comunicación y de relación familiar-, aunque con un objetivo final diferente: lograr promover las dinámicas familiares que permitan un funcionamiento óptimo de cada uno de sus miembros, en su caso, para promover el envejecimiento activo. Mediante un conjunto de intervenciones socioeducativas aplicadas en el ámbito familiar, se promueve la permanencia de la persona en situación de dependencia en su entorno familiar bajo condiciones de bienestar y calidad de vida. Además, se refuerzan las medidas de prevención primaria y secundaria de las situaciones de dependencia al dirigirse a familias con adultos mayores sin dependencia o con síntomas incipientes de la misma. Se diseñó el programa y sus materiales, se formó a un conjunto de trabajadoras sociales del Plan Individual de Atención (PIA) de la Fundació d'Atenció i Suport a la Dependència i de Promoció de l'Autonomia Personal de la Direcció General de Dependència del Govern Balear, para su implementación y se aplicó, en 2019 sobre una muestra de 75 familias de diferentes espacios territoriales de Palma de Mallorca. Se inició un segundo pilotaje en 2020, nuevamente sobre una muestra de 75 familias, que tuvo que verse interrumpido a raíz de la declaración del estado de alarma por la COVID-19, el 14 de marzo de 2020. El estudio contó con un diseño cuasi-experimental con evaluaciones pre-post de los participantes en el programa. Los instrumentos de medición de los efectos del programa sobre las familias objeto de estudio e intervención, se realizó mediante cuestionarios validados para su aplicación sobre dicha población. Se adaptaron a las características de la población objeto de investigación y, previo al inicio del programa se informó a los participantes sobre sus derechos y se les facilitó una hoja de consentimiento informado. Específicamente los instrumentos fueron: el Cuestionario de Pfeiffer, para identificar los síntomas de demencia no diagnosticados en cribaje inicial, la Escala de Recursos Sociales (OARS), para evaluar los niveles de apoyo social, el Cuestionario de Función Familiar (APGAR) para evaluar la dinámica y funcionamiento familiar, el Cuestionario de Calidad de Vida en la Vejez en los Diferentes Contextos, para evaluar los niveles de calidad de vida de las personas mayores participantes, la Escala de Depresión Geriátrica – Test de Yesavage, para evaluar los niveles de depresión en adultos mayores, los Cuestionarios de satisfacción de participantes, para evaluar el nivel de satisfacción de las familias con los contenidos, formadores y resultados del programa y el Cuestionario de evaluación y seguimiento para que las formadoras pudieran evaluar la idoneidad de los contenidos del programa para su implementación y evolución de los participantes en cada una de las sesiones. Se rediseñaron los instrumentos de evaluación, preparando un único cuestionario con las principales informaciones y escalas de evaluación de resultados, adaptando las informaciones a sus destinatarios y con las medidas de evaluación pertinentes para cada colectivo de evaluación, formando un cuestionario para familiares, uno para adultos mayores, un cuestionario de evaluación de progreso de los participantes, un cuestionario de evaluación de las sesiones de las familias, un cuestionario para evaluar las sesiones de cuidadoras, otro para la evaluación de las sesiones de adultos mayores y un cuestionario de satisfacción. El análisis de los datos cuantitativos se centró en los resultados de los factores y escalas considerados para cada uno de los instrumentos, de acuerdo con las hipótesis de la investigación. El análisis se realizó con SPSS 25. Se realizó un análisis descriptivo de cada una de las escalas consideradas, de acuerdo con los protocolos establecidos por instrumento, estableciendo los resultados grupales y diferenciando los resultados por variable. Se realizó un análisis de diferencias de medias (t-test) y pruebas no paramétricas (U de Mann- Whitney), comprobando diferencias (pre-post, entre grupo cuasi-experimental y control y la variable sexo mediante comprobaciones basadas en el análisis de varianza: MANOVA), reproduciendo la secuencia de análisis para cada una de las etapas de toma de datos. Por otro lado, se analizaron los resultados de las estrategias de captación, identificadas en las revisiones sistemáticas y aplicadas en el primer pilotaje de PCF-Auto, el análisis de la adherencia, mediante el control de la asistencia y la participación, analizando el seguimiento de las indicaciones y recursos conductuales introducidos por el programa, mediante el seguimiento de las recomendaciones por parte de los participantes a corto y medio plazo, se analizó la fidelidad de las formadoras en la aplicación del programa, y se analizó la valoración del programa y la satisfacción participante. Se contrastaron las hipótesis iniciales por medio del estudio de las variables dependientes, según el resto de variables consideradas, realizando un estudio individual y relacional de las variables explicativas. Los resultados muestran la consecución adecuada de la validación del contenido del programa, aunque se requieren ciertas modificaciones identificadas en las evaluaciones. La evaluación de la eficacia del programa en la evitación o retraso de riesgos muestra ser positiva en las diferentes áreas de relación evaluadas, aunque estadísticamente significativa (p<0.05) en algunas de ellas. En relación a la eficacia del programa en el desarrollo de competencias familiares y de relación social, se identifica también una mejora estadísticamente significativa en las escalas APGAR y OARS relativas a la relación y apoyo social. Se observan mejoras en los resultados de la escala de cohesión familiar, aunque se requiere la ampliación de los tiempos en los que se imparten los contenidos de la sesión 3 para mejorar la asimilación de los contenidos relativos a la cohesión familiar. También se identifica una mejora de los recursos de afrontamiento familiar, fundamentales para mejorar la autonomía de sus miembros. Estos resultados son evaluados por la escala de resiliencia, la cual muestra cambios estadísticamente significativos (p<0.05). Los resultados de la adherencia no fueron positivos dado que se perdió aproximadamente el 50% de la muestra tras la primera sesión. Es probable que como se indican entre los cambios recomendados por los formadores, se requiera que las Trabajadoras Sociales citen a domicilio a los potenciales participantes para facilitar los cuestionarios previamente a dar inicio al programa. En la primera sesión los participantes mostraron síntomas de cansancio al tener que rellenar los cuestionarios de evaluación pre, requiriendo aproximadamente 1 hora para realizarlos. Muchos de ellos mostraban carencia de destrezas de lectura y escritura y requerían que los formadores dedicaran un tiempo exclusivo para cada uno de los participantes, lo que supuso problemas luego para poder dar exitosamente los contenidos necesarios a impartir en la sesión 0. Otro problema identificado en cuanto a la citación telefónica fue el hecho de cometer errores en la captación. En la sesión 0 se identificaron perfiles de personas que no cumplían con las características inicialmente previstas y necesarias para el adecuado aprovechamiento de los contenidos del programa (personas que habían desarrollado síntomas suficientemente importantes de demencia como para suponer una limitación en la adquisición de contenidos, personas con problemas de hipoacusia que requerían de un formador constantemente a su lado para captar las pautas del formador y que mostraban dificultades para interactuar con el resto de participantes…). Luego y como era de esperar, hubo un cierto volumen de bajas que se vincularon al empeoramiento de los síntomas de salud y/o a hospitalizaciones. La implicación y participación mostró ser positiva en los resultados de evaluación por participante. De facto, tras la sesión 0 se mantuvieron la casi totalidad de las familias participantes hasta el final de la aplicación del programa. La mayor parte de participantes pidieron una segunda versión de PCF-U-Auto por los resultados que identificaron en sus hogares y familias. Los centros residenciales pidieron adaptar el programa a las necesidades de las residencias para poder disponer del programa en un futuro. La evaluación de la adherencia, mostró la necesidad de implementar estrategias para incentivar la realización de las prácticas para casa, dado que constituyen una parte importante de la asimilación de contenidos del programa. Los resultados de satisfacción mostraron ser muy positivos. En esta tesis doctoral, se definieron las técnicas de implicación familiar aplicadas en intervenciones familiares de prevención de riesgos. Los resultados de las revisiones sistemáticas indicaron la necesidad de considerar técnicas de implicación relativas a las familias, al formador, al programa y a la organización, para garantizar la eficacia de los resultados de los programas familiares, en relación a la participación y mantenimiento de las familias a lo largo de las sesiones de los programas. Estos resultados se demuestran en las dos primeras revisiones sistemáticas publicadas en Octaedro y en Social Work and Social Sciences Review. Por otro lado, se adaptó el Programa de Competencia Familiar, en su versión universal, a las necesidades de las familias con adultos mayores, con el objetivo de promover su autonomía, envejecimiento activo y calidad de vida. Para la adaptación, se realizó, previamente, un estudio observacional descriptivo, dirigido a definir las variables sociodemográficas, de salud, de apoyo social, de dependencia y las relativas a la interacción entre cuidador-adulto mayor. Se aplicó el análisis de conglomerados para definir los perfiles de la población dependiente y adaptar el diseño del programa conforme a las necesidades definidas en el estudio. Paralelamente, se realizó un vaciado de planes, programas, protocolos, guías y documentos oficiales de las diferentes autonomías españolas y de los principales entes internacionales en materia de envejecimiento y dependencia, para identificar (1) las variables familiares que promueven la autonomía (2) medidas de promoción de autonomía implementadas. Una vez, definido (1) el perfil de adultos mayores con dependencia, (2) las variables familiares que inciden sobre la autonomía de los adultos mayores y (3) las medidas de promoción de autonomía implementadas, se diseño el Programa de Competencia Familiar-Auto y se procedió a realizar un primer pilotaje. En cuanto al procedimiento seguido para el pilotaje, un total de 16 trabajadoras sociales de la Fundació d'Atenció i Suport a la Dependència y de Promoció de l'Autonomia Personal de les Illes Balears - Direcció General de Dependència fueron formadas (10h.) por profesorado de la Universidad en los contenidos –fundamentación teórica y práctica- del PCF-U-Auto. Durante dos semanas, se seleccionaron un conjunto de personas beneficiarias de la Prestación Económica para Cuidados en el Entorno Familiar (PECEF) del Gobierno Balear, por parte de las Trabajadoras Sociales de referencia habilitadas para aplicar el PCF-U-Auto; el principal requisito de cribado fue que hubieran recibido la valoración de Grado I dentro de los 6 meses inmediatamente anteriores a la selección. El objetivo era evitar incluir en la muestra a personas cuyas valoraciones requirieran de actualización al haber contraído más síntomas de dependencia. La muestra por el pilotaje se constituyó de 5 grupos de ±15 familias por grupo: un grupo en Manacor, uno en Inca y tres en Palma –Santa Catalina/Son Espanyolet, Ciutat Antiga y Son Cladera- conformando una muestra inicial de 75 familias. Del análisis de un primer pilotaje, se identificó como determinados factores sociales y familiares incluyen, de manera significativa, (p ≤ 0.05) sobre las situaciones de dependencia, permitiendo delimitar propuestas de intervención para aplicar en el Programa de Competencia Familiar-Auto. Destacaron los cambios significativos en la dinámica familiar (funcionalidad familiar (APGAR), t = -2,426, p = 0,018*, d = 0,307; resiliencia familiar, t = -2,283, p = 0,026*, d = 1,007) y los cambios significativos en los adultos mayores (recursos sociales (OARS): t = - 2,032, p = 0,046*, d = 0,445; valoración situación social: p = 0,055*; valoración relaciones sociales: p ≤ 0,05 en relación con los nietos y con los vecinos). Conclusivamente, queda demostrada la efectividad del PCF-Auto en la respuesta a la necesidad de medidas de promoción de autonomía y de envejecimiento activo en adultos mayores, indicada por los principales entes nacionales e internacionales, leyes y estudios sobre envejecimiento y dependencia. El PCF-Auto confirma su validez como herramienta preventiva de situaciones de dependencia mediante el trabajo sobre el ámbito familiar. ; [cat] La promoció de l'autonomia personal, s'estableix com a element clau per a garantir l'envelliment actiu. La família és sovint el sistema social encarregat d'atendre als adults majors quan aquests no poden valer-se per si mateixos; proporciona vincles afectius, relacionals i emocionals necessaris per a garantir el benestar de l'adult major. Per a garantir la qualitat de vida en l'adult major, s'hauran de considerar tant les atencions a la seva salut, com les atencions que facilitin el manteniment de l'estabilitat familiar. És per això, per la qual cosa aquest sistema, requerirà d'habilitats relacionals i socials que els permetin afrontar amb èxit els canvis de l'envelliment; canvis que impactaran sobre la convivència, les relacions entre els seus membres i sobre cadascun dels membres en si. Per a fer costat a les persones i famílies al fet que mantinguin un paper actiu en la promoció de l'autonomia i de la salut dels seus membres, s'emfatitzarà en l'apoderament, procés pel qual s'encoratja a desenvolupar les habilitats de cura individual, familiar i social. En aquest sentit, els estils d'afrontament adaptatiu, han demostrat ser el motor de millora de l'adaptabilitat als canvis de l'envelliment, possibilitar l'adequada gestió de conflictes i potenciar la resiliència familiar. Els programes de competències familiars basats en l'evidència han demostrat ser una estratègia eficaç i efectiva per a desenvolupar les habilitats de relació familiar promotores de la resiliència. No obstant això, entre els principals punts febles per a l'eficàcia de la implementació d'aquesta mena de programes, s'identifiquen les dificultats per a mantenir la implicació familiar al llarg del procés; es refereix tant a les dificultats per a la captació i retenció familiar a l'inici del procés, per al manteniment del compromís familiar al llarg de les sessions i de les dificultats per a salvar les barreres per a la participació. Aquesta tesi doctoral neix en el marc del Projecte de Recerca "Validació del Programa de Competència Familiar Universal 10-14 a Espanya (EDU2016-79235-R - I+D relativa a les Ciències Socials finançada amb FGU)". La present tesi doctoral es va dirigir, inicialment a avaluar quines són les tècniques que donen millors resultats d'adherència al programa, en resposta a l'objectiu 4 del Projecte de Recerca que s'operativiza en "Avaluar l'adherència de les famílies participants, al llarg de les sessions que componen el programa". Atès que l'evidència indica que el treball sobre les habilitats de comunicació, habilitats socials, les estratègies d'afrontament familiar, les competències en cuidadors i adults majors relacionades amb les cures eficaces, l'autoestima o autoeficàcia, entre altres destreses sobre les quals treballa el Programa de Competència Familiar, promouen l'autonomia i ajuden a prevenir les situacions de dependència, es va decidir realitzar una adaptació dels seus continguts, perquè el Programa de Competència Familiar, s'orienta a la intervenció socioeducativa amb i entre progenitors i menors d'edat. Fins al moment no s'havia definit una intervenció socioeducativa que permetés el treball preventiu de potencials dinàmiques familiars disfuncionals vinculades a l'aparició de situacions de dependència i cronicitat. Les versions anteriors del Programa de Competència Familiar han demostrat la seva eficàcia a llarg termini en els principals factors que componen la dinàmica familiar positiva (resiliència, comunicació, organització i cohesió familiar, disciplina positiva i altres factors) (Orte et al., 2015) i donades les variables sobre les quals treballa, les característiques -pràctica basada en l'evidència- i les evidències següents: 1. La relació entre la manca de suport social i familiar, de relacions socials, problemes de comunicació i la influència de l'entorn sobre els processos de pèrdua d'autonomia i acceleració de l'avançament cap a formes de dependència severa. 2. La manca de garantia del dret recollit a l'article 1 de la Llei 39/2006, de disposar de recursos de promoció d'autonomia i la manca d'atenció a les recomanacions nacionals i internacionals quant a d'envelliment actiu. Es va procedir a adaptar el Programa de Competència Familiar donats els seus resultats provats en la millora de les estratègies d'afrontament familiar, la millora de les dinàmiques familiars i dels factors de protecció tant familiar com individual en cadascun dels seus membres. El Programa de Competència Familiar Universal-Auto es va dissenyar entorn de les mateixes eines i estructura que el Programa de Competència Universal. Es va prendre com a referència el mateix objectiu genèric - treballar sobre les pautes de comunicació i de relació familiar-, encara que amb un objectiu final diferent: aconseguir promoure les dinàmiques familiars que permetin un funcionament òptim de cadascun dels seus membres, en el seu cas, per a promoure l'envelliment actiu. Mitjançant un conjunt d'intervencions socioeducatives aplicades en l'àmbit familiar, es promou la permanència de la persona en situació de dependència en el seu entorn familiar baix condicions de benestar i qualitat de vida. A més, es reforcen les mesures de prevenció primària i secundària de les situacions de dependència en dirigir-se a famílies amb adults majors sense dependència o amb símptomes incipients d'aquesta. Es va dissenyar el programa i els seus materials, es va formar a un conjunt de treballadores socials del Pla Individual d'Atenció (PIA) de la Fundació d'Atenció i Suport a la Dependència i de Promoció de l'Autonomia Personal de la Direcció General de Dependència del Govern Balear, per a la seva implementació i es va aplicar, en 2019 sobre una mostra de 75 famílies de diferents espais territorials de Palma. Es va iniciar un segon pilotatge en 2020, novament sobre una mostra de 75 famílies, que va haver de veure's interromput arran de la declaració de l'estat d'alarma per la COVID-19, el 14 de març de 2020. L'estudi va comptar amb un disseny quasiexperimental amb avaluacions pre-post dels participants en el programa. Els instruments de mesurament dels efectes del programa sobre les famílies objecte d'estudi i intervenció, es va realitzar mitjançant qüestionaris validats per a la seva aplicació sobre aquesta població. Es van adaptar a les característiques de la població objecte de recerca i, previ a l'inici del programa es va informar els participants sobre els seus drets i se'ls va facilitar una fulla de consentiment informat. Específicament els instruments van ser: el Qüestionari de Pfeiffer, per a identificar els símptomes de demència no diagnosticats en cribratge inicial, l'Escala de Recursos Socials (OARS), per a avaluar els nivells de suport social, el Qüestionari de Funció Familiar (APGAR) per a avaluar la dinàmica i funcionament familiar, el Qüestionari de Qualitat de Vida en la Vellesa en els Diferents Contextos, per a avaluar els nivells de qualitat de vida de les persones majors participants, l'Escala de Depressió Geriàtrica – Test de Yesavage, per a avaluar els nivells de depressió en adults majors, els Qüestionaris de satisfacció de participants, per a avaluar el nivell de satisfacció de les famílies amb els continguts, formadors i resultats del programa i el Qüestionari d'avaluació i seguiment perquè les formadores poguessin avaluar la idoneïtat dels continguts del programa per a la seva implementació i evolució dels participants en cadascuna de les sessions. Es van redissenyar els instruments d'avaluació, preparant un únic qüestionari amb les principals informacions i escales d'avaluació de resultats, adaptant les informacions als seus destinataris i amb les mesures d'avaluació pertinents per a cada col·lectiu d'avaluació, formant un qüestionari per a familiars, un per a adults majors, un qüestionari d'avaluació de progrés dels participants, un qüestionari d'avaluació de les sessions de les famílies, un qüestionari per a avaluar les sessions de cuidadores, un altre per a l'avaluació de les sessions d'adults majors i un qüestionari de satisfacció. L'anàlisi de les dades quantitatives es va centrar en els resultats dels factors i escales considerats per a cadascun dels instruments, d'acord amb les hipòtesis de la recerca. L'anàlisi es va realitzar amb SPSS 25. Es va realitzar una anàlisi descriptiva de cadascuna de les escales considerades, d'acord amb els protocols establerts per instrument, establint els resultats grupals i diferenciant els resultats per variable. Es va realitzar una anàlisi de diferències de mitjanes (ttest) i proves no paramètriques (O de Mann- Whitney), comprovant diferències (pre-post, entre grup quasiexperimental i control i la variable sexe mitjançant comprovacions basades en l'anàlisi de variància: MANOVA), reproduint la seqüència d'anàlisi per a cadascuna de les etapes de presa de dades. D'altra banda, es van analitzar els resultats de les estratègies de captació, identificades en les revisions sistemàtiques i aplicades en el primer pilotatge de PCF-Auto, l'anàlisi de l'adherència, mitjançant el control de l'assistència i la participació, analitzant el seguiment de les indicacions i recursos conductuals introduïts pel programa, mitjançant el seguiment de les recomanacions per part dels participants a curt i mitjà termini, es va analitzar la fidelitat de les formadores en l'aplicació del programa, i es va analitzar la valoració del programa i la satisfacció participant. Es van contrastar les hipòtesis inicials per mitjà de l'estudi de les variables dependents, segons la resta de variables considerades, realitzant un estudi individual i relacional de les variables explicatives. Els resultats mostren la consecució adequada de la validació del contingut del programa, encara que es requereixen unes certes modificacions identificades en les avaluacions. L'avaluació de l'eficàcia del programa en l'evitació o retard de riscos mostra ser positiva en les diferents àrees de relació avaluades, encara que estadísticament significativa (p < 0.05) en algunes d'elles. En relació a l'eficàcia del programa en el desenvolupament de competències familiars i de relació social, s'identifica també una millora estadísticament significativa en les escales APGAR i OARS relatives a la relació i suport social. S'observen millores en els resultats de l'escala de cohesió familiar, encara que es requereix l'ampliació dels temps en els quals s'imparteixen els continguts de la sessió 3 per a millorar l'assimilació dels continguts relatius a la cohesió familiar. També s'identifica una millora dels recursos d'afrontament familiar, fonamentals per a millorar l'autonomia dels seus membres. Aquests resultats són avaluats per l'escala de resiliència, la qual mostra canvis estadísticament significatius (p < 0.05). Els resultats de l'adherència no van ser positius atès que es va perdre aproximadament el 50% de la mostra després de la primera sessió. És probable que com s'indiquen entre els canvis recomanats pels formadors, es requereixi que les Treballadores Socials citin a domicili als potencials participants per a facilitar els qüestionaris prèviament a donar inici al programa. En la primera sessió els participants van mostrar símptomes de cansament en haver d'emplenar els qüestionaris d'avaluació pre, requerint aproximadament 1 hora per a realitzar-los. Molts d'ells mostraven manca de destreses de lectura i escriptura i requerien que els formadors dediquessin un temps exclusiu per a cadascun dels participants, la qual cosa va suposar problemes després per a poder donar reeixidament els continguts necessaris a impartir en la sessió 0. Un altre problema identificat quant a la citació telefònica va ser el fet de cometre errors en la captació. En la sessió 0 es van identificar perfils de persones que no complien amb les característiques inicialment previstes i necessàries per a l'adequat aprofitament dels continguts del programa (persones que havien desenvolupat símptomes prou importants de demència com per a suposar una limitació en l'adquisició de continguts, persones amb problemes d'hipoacúsia que requerien d'un formador constantment al seu costat per a captar les pautes del formador i que mostraven dificultats per a interactuar amb la resta de participants…). Després, i com era d'esperar, va haver-hi un cert volum de baixes que es van vincular a l'empitjorament dels símptomes de salut i/o a hospitalitzacions. La implicació i participació va mostrar ser positiva en els resultats d'avaluació per participant. De fet, després de la sessió 0 es van mantenir la gairebé totalitat de les famílies participants fins al final de l'aplicació del programa. La major part de participants van demanar una segona versió de PCF-Auto pels resultats que van identificar en les seves llars i famílies. Els centres residencials van demanar adaptar el programa a les necessitats de les residències per a poder disposar del programa en un futur. L'avaluació de l'adherència, va mostrar la necessitat d'implementar estratègies per a incentivar la realització de les pràctiques per a casa, atès que constitueixen una part important de l'assimilació de continguts del programa. Els resultats de satisfacció van mostrar ser molt positius. En aquesta tesi doctoral, es van definir les tècniques d'implicació familiar aplicades en intervencions familiars de prevenció de riscos. Els resultats de les revisions sistemàtiques van indicar la necessitat de considerar tècniques d'implicació relatives a les famílies, al formador, al programa i a l'organització, per a garantir l'eficàcia dels resultats dels programes familiars, en relació a la participació i manteniment de les famílies al llarg de les sessions dels programes. Aquests resultats es demostren en les dues primeres revisions sistemàtiques publicades en Octaedro i en Social Work and Social Sciences Review. D'altra banda, es va adaptar el Programa de Competència Familiar, en la seva versió universal, a les necessitats de les famílies amb adults majors, amb l'objectiu de promoure la seva autonomia, envelliment actiu i qualitat de vida. Per a l'adaptació, es va realitzar, prèviament, un estudi observacional descriptiu, dirigit a definir les variables sociodemogràfiques, de salut, de suport social, de dependència i les relatives a la interacció entre cuidador-adult major. Es va aplicar l'anàlisi de conglomerats per a definir els perfils de la població dependent i adaptar el disseny del programa conforme a les necessitats definides en l'estudi. Paral·lelament, es va realitzar un buidatge de plans, programes, protocols, guies i documents oficials de les diferents autonomies espanyoles i dels principals ens internacionals en matèria d'envelliment i dependència, per a identificar (1) les variables familiars que promouen l'autonomia (2) mesures de promoció d'autonomia implementades. Una vegada, definit (1) el perfil d'adults majors amb dependència, (2) les variables familiars que incideixen sobre l'autonomia dels adults majors i (3) les mesures de promoció d'autonomia implementades, es dissenyo el Programa de Competència Familiar-Auto i es va procedir a realitzar un primer pilotatge. Quant al procediment seguit per al pilotatge, un total de 16 treballadores socials de la Fundació d'Atenció i Suport a la Dependència i de Promoció de l'Autonomia Personal dels Illes Balears - Direcció General de Dependència van ser formades (10h.) per professorat de la Universitat en els continguts –fonamentació teòrica i pràctica- del PCF-Auto. Durant dues setmanes, es van seleccionar un conjunt de persones beneficiàries de la Prestació Econòmica per a Cures en l'Entorn Familiar (PECEF) del Govern Balear, per part de les Treballadores Socials de referència habilitades per a aplicar el PCF-Auto; el principal requisit de garbellat va ser que haguessin rebut la valoració de Grau I dins dels 6 mesos immediatament anteriors a la selecció. L'objectiu era evitar incloure en la mostra a persones les valoracions de les quals requerissin d'actualització en haver contret més símptomes de dependència. La mostra pel pilotatge es va constituir de 5 grups de ±15 famílies per grup: un grup a Manacor, un a Inca i tres a Palma –Santa Catalina/Son Espanyolet, Ciutat Antiga i Son Cladera- conformant una mostra inicial de 75 famílies. De l'anàlisi d'un primer pilotatge, es va identificar com determinats factors socials i familiars inclouen, de manera significativa, (p ≤ 0.05) sobre les situacions de dependència, permetent delimitar propostes d'intervenció per a aplicar en el Programa de Competència Familiar-Auto. Van destacar els canvis significatius en la dinàmica familiar (funcionalitat familiar (APGAR), t = -2,426, p = 0,018*, d = ,307; resiliència familiar, t = -2,283, p = 0,026*, d = 1,007) i els canvis significatius en els adults majors (recursos socials (*OARS): t = -2,032, p = 0,046*, d = ,445; valoració situació social: p = 0,055*; valoració relacions socials: p ≤ 0,05 en relació amb els néts i amb els veïns). Conclusivament, queda demostrada l'efectivitat del PCF-Auto en la resposta a la necessitat de mesures de promoció d'autonomia i d'envelliment actiu en adults majors, indicada pels principals ens nacionals i internacionals, lleis i estudis sobre envelliment i dependència. El PCF-Auto confirma la seva validesa com a eina preventiva de situacions de dependència mitjançant el treball sobre l'àmbit familiar. ; [eng] The promotion of personal autonomy is established as a key element to guarantee active aging. The family is often the social system in charge of caring for older adults when they are unable to fend for themselves; provides affective, relational and emotional bonds necessary to guarantee the well-being of the elderly. To guarantee the quality of life in the elderly, both health care should be considered, as well as care that facilitates the maintenance of family stability. That is why this system will require relational and social skills that allow them to successfully face the changes of aging; changes that will impact on coexistence, the relationships between its members and on each of the members themselves. To support individuals and families to maintain an active role in promoting the autonomy and health of their members, emphasis will be placed on empowerment, a process by which individual, family and social care skills are encouraged. In this sense, adaptive coping styles have proven to be the engine for improving adaptability to aging changes, enabling proper conflict management and enhancing family resilience. Evidence-based family competencies programs have proven to be an efficient and effective strategy for developing resilience-promoting family relationship skills. However, among the main weaknesses for the effectiveness of the implementation of this type of programs, the difficulties to maintain family involvement throughout the process are identified; It refers both to the difficulties for family recruitment and retention at the beginning of the process, for the maintenance of family commitment throughout the sessions and the difficulties to overcome the barriers to participation. This doctoral thesis was born within the framework of the Research Project "Validation of the 10-14 Universal Family Competence Program in Spain (EDU2016-79235-R - R&D related to Social Sciences financed with FGU)". This doctoral thesis was initially aimed at evaluating which are the techniques that give the best results of adherence to the program, in response to objective 4 of the Research Project that is operationalized in "Evaluating the adherence of participating families, throughout the sessions that make up the program". Since the evidence indicates that the work on communication skills, social skills, family coping strategies, skills in caregivers and older adults related to effective care, self-esteem or self-efficacy, among other skills that the Program works on of Family Competence, promote autonomy and help prevent dependency situations, it was decided to adapt its contents, since the Family Competence Program is oriented towards socio-educational intervention with and between parents and minors. Until now, a socio-educational intervention had not been defined that would allow the preventive work of potential dysfunctional family dynamics linked to the appearance of situations of dependency and chronicity. Previous versions of the Family Competence Program have demonstrated its long-term effectiveness in the main factors that make up positive family dynamics (resilience, communication, family organization and cohesion, positive discipline and other factors) (Orte et al., 2015) and given the variables on which it works, the characteristics - evidence-based practice - and the following evidence: 1. The relationship between the lack of social and family support, social relationships, communication problems and the influence of the environment on the processes of loss of autonomy and acceleration of progress towards forms of severe dependency. 2. The lack of guarantee of the right included in article 1 of Law 39/2006, to have resources to promote autonomy and the lack of attention to national and international recommendations regarding active aging. We proceeded to adapt the Family Competence Program given its proven results in improving family coping strategies, improving family dynamics and both family and individual protection factors in each of its members. The Universal-Auto Family Competence Program was designed around the same tools and structure as the Universal Competence Program. The same generic objective was taken as a reference - to work on communication and family relationship patterns - although with a different final objective: to promote family dynamics that allow an optimal functioning of each of its members, where appropriate, to promote active aging. Through a set of socio-educational interventions applied in the family environment, the permanence of the person in a situation of dependency in their family environment is promoted under conditions of well-being and quality of life. In addition, primary and secondary prevention measures for dependency situations are reinforced by targeting families with older adults without dependency or with incipient symptoms of it. The program and its materials were designed, a group of social workers from the Individual Care Plan (PIA) of the Fundació d'Atenció i Suport a Dependencia i de Promoció de l'Autonomia Personal of the General Directorate of Dependency of the Govern Balear, for its implementation and it was applied, in 2019 on a sample of 75 families from different territorial areas of Palma de Mallorca. A second pilot was started in 2020, again on a sample of 75 families, which had to be interrupted as a result of the declaration of the state of alarm by COVID-19, on March 14, 2020. The study had a quasi-experimental design with pre-post evaluations of the participants in the program. The tools for measuring the effects of the program on the families under intervention were carried out using validated questionnaires for their application on said population. They were adapted to the characteristics of the population under investigation and, prior to the start, participants were informed about their rights and provided with an informed consent form. Specifically, the instruments were: the Pfeiffer Questionnaire, to identify the symptoms of dementia not diagnosed in the initial screening, the Social Resources Scale (OARS), to evaluate the levels of social support, the Family Function Questionnaire (APGAR) to evaluate the dynamics and family functioning, the Questionnaire of Quality of Life in Old Age in Different Contexts, to evaluate the levels of quality of life of the elderly participants, the Geriatric Depression Scale - Yesavage Test, to evaluate the levels of depression in older adults, the participant satisfaction questionnaires, to evaluate the level of satisfaction of families with the contents, trainers and results of the program and the evaluation and follow-up questionnaire so that the trainers could evaluate the suitability of the contents of the program for their implementation and evolution of the participants in each of the sessions. The evaluation of the tools were redesigned, preparing a single questionnaire with the main information and results evaluation scales, adapting the information to its recipients and with the pertinent evaluation measures for each evaluation group, forming a questionnaire for relatives, one for adults, a questionnaire for evaluating the progress of the participants, a questionnaire for evaluating the family sessions, a questionnaire for evaluating the caregiver sessions, another for evaluating the sessions for the elderly, and a satisfaction questionnaire. The analysis of the quantitative data focused on the results of the factors and scales considered for each of the instruments, in accordance with the research hypotheses. The analysis was carried out with SPSS 25. A descriptive analysis of each of the scales considered was carried out, according to the protocols established by instrument, establishing the group results and differentiating the results by variable. A mean difference analysis (t-test) and nonparametric tests (Mann-Whitney U) were performed, checking differences (pre-post, between quasi-experimental group and control and the sex variable by means of checks based on the analysis of variance: MANOVA), reproducing the analysis sequence for each of the data collection stages. The results of the recruitment strategies, identified in the systematic reviews and applied in the first piloting of PCF-Auto, the analysis of adherence, through the control of attendance and participation, analyzing the follow-up of the indications and behavioral resources introduced by the program, by following the recommendations by the participants in the short and medium term, the fidelity of the trainers in the application of the program was analyzed, and the evaluation of the program and satisfaction were analyzed competitor. The initial hypotheses were contrasted by means of the study of the dependent variables, according to the rest of the variables considered, carrying out an individual and relational study of the explanatory variables. The results show the adequate achievement of the validation of the content of the program, although certain modifications identified in the evaluations are required. The evaluation of the adherence, showed the need to implement strategies to encourage the realization of practices at home, since they constitute an important part of the assimilation of program content. The satisfaction results proved to be very positive. In this doctoral thesis, family involvement techniques applied in family risk prevention interventions were defined. The results of the systematic reviews indicated the need to consider involvement techniques related to the families, the trainer, the program and the organization, to guarantee the effectiveness of the results of the family programs, in relation to the participation and maintenance of families throughout the program sessions. These results are demonstrated in the first two systematic reviews published in Octaedro and in Social Work and Social Sciences Review. On the other hand, the Family Competence Program, in its universal version, was adapted to the needs of families with older adults, with the aim of promoting their autonomy, active aging and quality of life. For the adaptation, a descriptive observational study was previously carried out, aimed at defining the sociodemographic, health, social support, dependency variables and those relating to the interaction between the caregiver and the elderly. Cluster analysis was applied to define the profiles of the dependent population and adapt the program design according to the needs defined in the study. At the same time, a drafting of plans, programs, protocols, guides and official documents of the different Spanish autonomies and of the main international entities on aging and dependency was carried out, to identify (1) the family variables that promote autonomy (2) measures to promote autonomy implemented. After defining (1) the profile of dependent older adults, (2) the family variables that affect the autonomy of older adults, and (3) the implemented measures to promote autonomy, the Family Competency Program was designed. The first piloting was carried out. Regarding the procedure followed for the piloting, a total of 16 social workers from the Fundació d'Atenció i Suport a la Dependencia y de Promoció de l'Autonomia Personal de les Illes Balears - Direcció General de Dependencia were trained (10h.) By University professors in the contents –theoretical and practical foundation- of the PCF-U-Auto. During two weeks, a group of beneficiaries of the Economic Benefit for Care in the Family Environment (PECEF) of the Balearic Government were selected by the reference Social Workers authorized to apply the PCF-U-Auto; the main screening requirement was that they had received the Grade I assessment within the 6 months immediately prior to selection. The goal was to avoid including in the sample people whose assessments required updating due to having contracted more symptoms of dependence. The pilot sample consisted of 5 groups of ± 15 families per group: one group in Manacor, one in Inca and three in Palma – Santa Catalina / Son Espanyolet, Ciutat Antiga and Son Cladera- forming an initial sample of 75 families. From the analysis of a first piloting, it was identified how certain social and family factors include, in a significant way, (p ≤ 0.05) on dependency situations, allowing to define intervention proposals to apply in the Family-Auto Competence Program. Significant changes in family dynamics (family functionality (APGAR), t = -2.426, p = 0.018 *, d = 0.307; family resilience, t = -2.283, p = 0.026 *, d = 1.007) and significant changes in older adults (social resources (OARS): t = -2.032, p = 0.046 *, d = 0.445; assessment of social situation: p = 0.055 *; assessment of social relationships: p ≤ 0.05 in relation to grandchildren and with the neighbors). Conclusively, the effectiveness of PCF-Auto in responding to the need for measures to promote autonomy and active aging in older adults is demonstrated, indicated by the main national and international entities, laws and studies on aging and dependency. The PCF-Auto confirms its validity as a preventive tool for situations of dependency through work on the family environment.

Background Improving survival and extending the longevity of life for all populations requires timely, robust evidence on local mortality levels and trends. The Global Burden of Disease 2015 Study (GBD 2015) provides a comprehensive assessment of all-cause and cause-specific mortality for 249 causes in 195 countries and territories from 1980 to 2015. These results informed an in-depth investigation of observed and expected mortality patterns based on sociodemographic measures. Methods We estimated all-cause mortality by age, sex, geography, and year using an improved analytical approach originally developed for GBD 2013 and GBD 2010. Improvements included refinements to the estimation of child and adult mortality and corresponding uncertainty, parameter selection for under-5 mortality synthesis by spatiotemporal Gaussian process regression, and sibling history data processing. We also expanded the database of vital registration, survey, and census data to 14 294 geography–year datapoints. For GBD 2015, eight causes, including Ebola virus disease, were added to the previous GBD cause list for mortality. We used six modelling approaches to assess cause-specific mortality, with the Cause of Death Ensemble Model (CODEm) generating estimates for most causes. We used a series of novel analyses to systematically quantify the drivers of trends in mortality across geographies. First, we assessed observed and expected levels and trends of cause-specific mortality as they relate to the Socio-demographic Index (SDI), a summary indicator derived from measures of income per capita, educational attainment, and fertility. Second, we examined factors affecting total mortality patterns through a series of counterfactual scenarios, testing the magnitude by which population growth, population age structures, and epidemiological changes contributed to shifts in mortality. Finally, we attributed changes in life expectancy to changes in cause of death. We documented each step of the GBD 2015 estimation processes, as well as data sources, in accordance with Guidelines for Accurate and Transparent Health Estimates Reporting (GATHER). Findings Globally, life expectancy from birth increased from 61·7 years (95% uncertainty interval 61·4–61·9) in 1980 to 71·8 years (71·5–72·2) in 2015. Several countries in sub-Saharan Africa had very large gains in life expectancy from 2005 to 2015, rebounding from an era of exceedingly high loss of life due to HIV/AIDS. At the same time, many geographies saw life expectancy stagnate or decline, particularly for men and in countries with rising mortality from war or interpersonal violence. From 2005 to 2015, male life expectancy in Syria dropped by 11·3 years (3·7–17·4), to 62·6 years (56·5–70·2). Total deaths increased by 4·1% (2·6–5·6) from 2005 to 2015, rising to 55·8 million (54·9 million to 56·6 million) in 2015, but age-standardised death rates fell by 17·0% (15·8–18·1) during this time, underscoring changes in population growth and shifts in global age structures. The result was similar for non-communicable diseases (NCDs), with total deaths from these causes increasing by 14·1% (12·6–16·0) to 39·8 million (39·2 million to 40·5 million) in 2015, whereas age-standardised rates decreased by 13·1% (11·9–14·3). Globally, this mortality pattern emerged for several NCDs, including several types of cancer, ischaemic heart disease, cirrhosis, and Alzheimer's disease and other dementias. By contrast, both total deaths and age-standardised death rates due to communicable, maternal, neonatal, and nutritional conditions significantly declined from 2005 to 2015, gains largely attributable to decreases in mortality rates due to HIV/AIDS (42·1%, 39·1–44·6), malaria (43·1%, 34·7–51·8), neonatal preterm birth complications (29·8%, 24·8–34·9), and maternal disorders (29·1%, 19·3–37·1). Progress was slower for several causes, such as lower respiratory infections and nutritional deficiencies, whereas deaths increased for others, including dengue and drug use disorders. Age-standardised death rates due to injuries significantly declined from 2005 to 2015, yet interpersonal violence and war claimed increasingly more lives in some regions, particularly in the Middle East. In 2015, rotaviral enteritis (rotavirus) was the leading cause of under-5 deaths due to diarrhoea (146 000 deaths, 118 000–183 000) and pneumococcal pneumonia was the leading cause of under-5 deaths due to lower respiratory infections (393 000 deaths, 228 000–532 000), although pathogen-specific mortality varied by region. Globally, the effects of population growth, ageing, and changes in age-standardised death rates substantially differed by cause. Our analyses on the expected associations between cause-specific mortality and SDI show the regular shifts in cause of death composition and population age structure with rising SDI. Country patterns of premature mortality (measured as years of life lost [YLLs]) and how they differ from the level expected on the basis of SDI alone revealed distinct but highly heterogeneous patterns by region and country or territory. Ischaemic heart disease, stroke, and diabetes were among the leading causes of YLLs in most regions, but in many cases, intraregional results sharply diverged for ratios of observed and expected YLLs based on SDI. Communicable, maternal, neonatal, and nutritional diseases caused the most YLLs throughout sub-Saharan Africa, with observed YLLs far exceeding expected YLLs for countries in which malaria or HIV/AIDS remained the leading causes of early death. Interpretation At the global scale, age-specific mortality has steadily improved over the past 35 years; this pattern of general progress continued in the past decade. Progress has been faster in most countries than expected on the basis of development measured by the SDI. Against this background of progress, some countries have seen falls in life expectancy, and age-standardised death rates for some causes are increasing. Despite progress in reducing age-standardised death rates, population growth and ageing mean that the number of deaths from most non-communicable causes are increasing in most countries, putting increased demands on health systems. Funding Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. ; We thank the countless individuals who have contributed to the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015 in various capacities. The data reported here have been supplied by the United States Renal Data System (USRDS). Data for this research was provided by MEASURE Evaluation, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Collection of these data was made possible by USAID under the terms of cooperative agreement GPO-A-00-08-000_D3-00. Views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of USAID, the US Government, or MEASURE Evaluation. Parts of this material are based on data and information provided by the Canadian institute for Health Information. However, the analyses, conclusions, opinions and statements expressed herein are those of the author and not those of the Canadian Institute for Health information. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics granted the researchers access to relevant data in accordance with licence number SLN2014-3-170, after subjecting data to processing aiming to preserve the confidentiality of individual data in accordance with the General Statistics Law–2000. The researchers are solely responsible for the conclusions and inferences drawn upon available data. The following individuals acknowledge various forms of institutional support. Simon I Hay is funded by a Senior Research Fellowship from the Wellcome Trust (#095066), and grants from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (OPP1119467, OPP1093011, OPP1106023 and OPP1132415). Panniyammakal Jeemon is supported by a Clinical and Public Health Intermediate Fellowship from the Wellcome Trust-DBT India Alliance (2015–20). Luciano A Sposato is partly supported by the Edward and Alma Saraydar Neurosciences Fund, London Health Sciences Foundation, London, ON, Canada. George A Mensah notes that the views expressed in this Article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, National Institutes of Health, or the United States Department of Health and Human Services. Boris Bikbov acknowledges that work related to this paper has been done on the behalf of the GBD Genitourinary Disease Expert Group supported by the International Society of Nephrology (ISN). Ana Maria Nogales Vasconcelos acknowledges that her team in Brazil received funding from Ministry of Health (process number 25000192049/2014-14). Rodrigo Sarmiento-Suarez receives institutional support from Universidad de Ciencias Aplicadas y Ambientales, UDCA, Bogotá, Colombia. Ulrich O Mueller and Andrea Werdecker gratefully acknowledge funding by the German National Cohort BMBF (grant number OIER 1301/22). Peter James was supported by the National Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of Health (Award K99CA201542). Brett M Kissela would like to acknowledge NIH/NINDS R-01 30678. Louisa Degenhardt is supported by an Australian National Health and Medical Research Council Principal Research fellowship. Daisy M X Abreu received institutional support from the Brazilian Ministry of Health (Proc number 25000192049/2014-14). Jennifer H MacLachlan receives funding support from the Australian Government Department of Health and Royal Melbourne Hospital Research Funding Program. Miriam Levi acknowledges institutional support received from CeRIMP, Regional Centre for Occupational Diseases and Injuries, Tuscany Region, Florence, Italy. Tea Lallukka reports funding from The Academy of Finland (grant 287488). No individuals acknowledged received additional compensation for their efforts. ; Peer-reviewed ; Publisher Version

Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova.  2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security.The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once.







1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.







3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.







In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.







A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.







And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "transitioning away from" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.







Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.







CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova.  2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security. The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once. 1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "leave behind" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers.DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

Texto finalizado el 15 de diciembre de 2023. Esta Nota Internacional es el resultado de la reflexión colectiva del equipo de investigación de CIDOB. Coordinada y editada por Carme Colomina, en el proceso de redacción ha contado con aportaciones de Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal, Pere Vilanova.  2024 será un año de urnas y armas. Las elecciones celebradas en más de 70 países, que actuarán como un test de estrés para el sistema democrático, y el impacto de la multiplicidad de conflictos que alimenta la inestabilidad global definirán un mundo en plena transición de poder y en claro retroceso humanitario y de derechos fundamentales.Se acentúa la erosión de las normas internacionales vigentes y aumenta la imprevisibilidad. 2024 empieza totalmente abierto, marcado por un mundo cada vez más diverso y (des)ordenado, definido por alianzas e intereses cambiantes en cuestiones como la competición geopolítica, las transiciones verde y digital o la seguridad internacional.Las consecuencias económicas de las sucesivas crisis serán más visibles que en años anteriores: el crecimiento económico será débil y el frenazo chino reverberará en las economías emergentes, cada vez más tensionadas por el endurecimiento de las condiciones financieras y la fortaleza del dólar.2024 será un año de urnas y armas. Un test de estrés tanto para el sistema democrático como para la multiplicidad de conflictos que alimenta la inestabilidad global. Seguimos ante un mundo desordenado, convulso y contestado, pero, esta vez, cualquier análisis pende del gran interrogante que supone el intenso ciclo electoral que marcará el próximo año. Con guerras abiertas en Ucrania, Palestina, Sudán o Yemen, el mundo concentra la mayor cantidad de conflictos activos desde el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Por eso, la agenda geopolítica de los próximos meses se entreteje a partir del impacto mutuo entre los distintos conflictos bélicos y el veredicto que lanzarán los más de 70 procesos electorales marcados en el calendario.Hay elecciones que pueden definir guerras. Las consecuencias políticas de la brutal ofensiva israelí en Gaza o el estancamiento del frente de guerra ucraniano también dependen de la carrera presidencial en Estados Unidos. Las grietas en la unidad transatlántica y las cada vez más categóricas acusaciones de doble rasero en las lealtades de Occidente no son ajenas a lo que ocurra el 5 de noviembre de 2024 en las urnas estadounidenses. Un retorno de Donald Trump a la Casa Blanca modificaría por completo las relaciones de fuerza y la posición de Washington en cada uno de estos conflictos, desde el suministro de armamento al Gobierno ucraniano, al apoyo a Israel, o en la confrontación con Rusia o China.Pero no se trata solo del futuro de la democracia en Estados Unidos: más de 4.000 millones de personas irán a las urnas en más de 70 países. La Unión Europea (UE), India, Pakistán, Indonesia, México, Taiwán, Venezuela o Senegal… grandes actores con peso demográfico e influencia geopolítica protagonizarán un año de una intensidad electoral sin precedentes, que definirá un mundo en plena transición global del poder y en claro retroceso humanitario y de derechos fundamentales. Sin embargo, tanta concentración de elecciones no significa más democracia. Estamos en tiempos de inteligencia artificial (IA) y de sofisticación extrema de la manipulación que amenazan la fiabilidad de las urnas. Los sistemas híbridos ganan terreno, y está por ver si el ciclo electoral de 2024 acaba siendo un momento de profundización de la degradación o de resistencia democrática. La sensación de desorden no es nueva, ni siquiera su aceleración. Pero cada año se acentúa la erosión de las normas internacionales vigentes y aumenta la imprevisibilidad. El mundo es cada vez más descentralizado, diversificado y multidimensional. Se consolida este «orden múltiplex» –como Amitav Acharya lo describió ya en 2017– porque todo ocurre simultáneamente. Y, sin embargo, seguimos ante un rediseño del mundo todavía abierto porque esta simultaneidad de cambios concentra distintas pugnas en liza. 1. Más conflictividad, más impunidad2023 ha sido uno de los años más conflictivos en el mundo desde el fin de la Segunda Guerra mundial. En solo doce meses, la violencia política ha aumentado un 27%. Crece en intensidad y en frecuencia. La guerra en Gaza ha marcado el final de 2023, con sus más de 17.000 víctimas mortales contabilizadas hasta el momento, las advertencias por parte de Naciones Unidas del riesgo de colapso humanitario y de genocidio de la población palestina atrapada en la Franja, así como el pulso entre el primer ministro Benyamín Netanyahu y el secretario general de la Naciones Unidas, António Guterres, para intentar lograr un alto el fuego. En esta crisis continuada del orden liberal y en plena discusión sobre la validez del derecho internacional, Israel ha asestado un golpe profundo a la credibilidad de Naciones Unidas. El Consejo de Seguridad se ha convertido en un instrumento para la parálisis; una tenaza al servicio de los intereses de viejas potencias que han llevado a Guterres a admitir públicamente la frustración de la impotencia. Unas Naciones Unidas que, debilitadas políticamente, se aferran a su acción humanitaria sobre el terreno para intentar marcar la diferencia entre la vida y la muerte. Más de 130 trabajadores humanitarios de Naciones Unidas han perdido la vida en Gaza desde el 7 de octubre, el mayor número de fallecidos entre su personal en un conflicto de su historia. 2023 ha sido un año violento. Se estima que 1 de cada 6 personas en el mundo ha estado expuesta a un conflicto en los últimos doce meses. La sensación de impunidad y de menosprecio por la legislación internacional se ha agravado. No solo en Gaza. El enquistamiento de la guerra en Ucrania; la expulsión de la población de origen armenio de Nagorno Karabaj; o la sucesión de golpes de estados vividos en seis países africanos en los últimos 36 meses dan buena cuenta de este momento de «desregulación del uso de la fuerza», que se ha ido fraguando durante años de erosión de las normas internacionales. Y si a finales de 2023 asistimos a la retirada de las tropas internacionales del G-5 Sahel desplegadas en Burkina Faso y Níger, como ya ocurrió un año antes con la expulsión de los soldados franceses de Mali, en 2024 será la misión de Naciones Unidas en Sudán (UNITAMS) la que tendrá que abandonar el país antes del 29 de febrero. Una retirada que Human Rights Watch ha calificado de «abdicación catastrófica» porque aumenta el riesgo de atrocidades y abusos a gran escala en un escenario de guerra civil, limpieza étnica y hambruna que ya ha provocado más de siete millones de desplazados internos, convirtiendo Sudán en el país con un mayor número de desplazados internos de todo el planeta.Y, sin embargo, el combate internacional por poner límites a la impunidad se dotará de nuevos instrumentos en 2024. A partir del 1 de enero, la Convención Liubliana-La Haya en cooperación internacional para la investigación y persecución del crimen de genocidio, lesa humanidad, crímenes de guerra y otros crímenes internacionales podrá ser firmado (y ratificado) por los estados miembros de Naciones Unidas que deseen adherirse. Se trata del mayor tratado para la lucha contra la impunidad internacional, que facilita la cooperación interestatal en la investigación judicial de estos crímenes, garantiza la reparación para las víctimas y agiliza la extradición. En paralelo, Naciones Unidas también está elaborando una Convención contra los crímenes contra la humanidad con el objetivo de crear un tratado vinculante de derecho internacional, especialmente en un contexto marcado por el aumento de estos crímenes en países como Myanmar, Ucrania, Sudán o Etiopía. En otoño de 2024, la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas tendrá que valorar el progreso de las negociaciones. Todo ello ocurrirá coincidiendo con los 30 años del genocidio de Rwanda.En marzo de 2023, la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) emitió una orden de arresto contra el presidente ruso Vladímir Putin por crímenes de guerra en Ucrania, hasta ahora sin consecuencias. Sin embargo, si en noviembre de 2024 Putin decidiera asistir a la próxima cumbre del G-20 en Brasil, eso supondría un desafío para el país anfitrión ya que, a diferencia de India, Brasil sí es parte del Estatuto de Roma de 1998, el tratado internacional que condujo a la creación de la CPI. Si en un principio el presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva aseguró que Putin no sería detenido en caso de acudir a la cumbre, después matizó que la decisión recaería sobre la justicia brasileña y no en el Gobierno. A pesar del pesimismo que pueda generar la eficacia de estos tratados, en los últimos meses hemos visto como, tras la ofensiva militar azerí en Nagorno Karabaj, Armenia ratificó en noviembre el Estatuto de Roma de la CPI, adquiriendo el estatus de país miembro a partir de febrero de 2024. Además, a finales de 2023, Sudáfrica, Bangladesh, Bolivia, las Comores y Djibouti reclamaron una investigación de la Corte Penal Internacional por crímenes de guerra, crímenes de lesa humanidad y genocidio en Palestina. Asimismo, en noviembre de 2023, las autoridades judiciales francesas emitían una orden de detención internacional contra el presidente sirio Bashar al-Assad –rehabilitado este mismo año con su retorno a la Liga Árabe, más de una década después de su expulsión– y varios generales sirios por el uso de armas químicas contra su población civil en 2013.2. La democracia, a examenMás de 4.000 millones de personas están llamadas a las urnas en 76 países, casi el 51% de la población mundial. Mientras la mayoría de la ciudadanía de estos países votará en democracias plenas o con imperfecciones, uno de cada cuatro votantes participará en comicios en regímenes híbridos y/o autoritarios. Países como Rusia, Túnez, Argelia, Bielorrusia, Rwanda o Irán instrumentalizarán estos procesos electorales para tratar de fortalecer a los liderazgos en el poder y ganar legitimidad ante sus ciudadanos, mientras que casi la otra mitad del electorado ejercerá su derecho a voto en países que, en los últimos años, han mostrado una erosión democrática o tentaciones iliberales, como en Estados Unidos o India.2023 se cierra con la toma de posesión del «anarcocapitalista» Javier Milei a la presidencia argentina, que confirma la profunda crisis de los partidos tradicionales y el auge de las agendas radicales: desde el agresivo punitivismo penal de Nayib Bukele en El Salvador ―que aspira a la reelección en 2024―, a la irrupción electoral de Renovación Popular en Perú, refundada por el hoy alcalde de Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. Respuestas extremas a los distintos escenarios de crisis político-económicas y de seguridad. En Europa, las urnas europeas dieron una de cal y otra de arena, con la victoria de la oposición polaca, por un lado, y los buenos resultados del islamófobo Geert Wilders en los Países Bajos, por el otro. Pero el intenso ciclo electoral de 2024 será decisivo para saber si se consolida la contestación, la fragmentación y el auge del extremismo político que han transformado las democracias a nivel global, o bien si el sistema resiste.En este test democrático, el voto de las mujeres y los jóvenes será clave. Lo fueron en Polonia, como castigo a las políticas reaccionarias del Partido Ley y Justicia (PIS). En Brasil o Austria, por ejemplo, el apoyo de los hombres a fuerzas de extrema derecha es 16 puntos superior al de las mujeres. En México, las presidenciales de junio de 2024 elegirán, por primera vez a en su historia, a una mujer como presidenta del país. Las dos candidatas son Claudia Sheinbaum, exalcaldesa de la capital y representante del gubernamental partido de izquierdas, Morena, y Xóchitl Gálvez, en nombre de una coalición opositora de Frente Amplio por México, que agrupa, entre otros, al derechista Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN) y al Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). En Estados Unidos, la movilización de las juventudes de origen latino será especialmente relevante. En los últimos años, más de 4,7 millones de jóvenes hispanos han obtenido el derecho a voto y su papel va a ser significativo en estados claves como Nevada o Arizona. Si bien esta cohorte tiende a mostrar una actitud e inclinación progresista, su perspectiva sobre los partidos dominantes es complicada: cuestiones identitarias, de discriminación o racismo suelen marcar su relación tanto con los Demócratas como con los Republicanos, y rechazan la identificación política, lo que refuerza la idea de que la polarización en Estados Unidos es más evidente entre los políticos que entre sus votantes. A pesar de ello, el miedo a unas elecciones injustas ha aumentado dramáticamente (del 49% en 2021 al 61% en 2023). Aunque la desigualdad económica sigue siendo la principal amenaza percibida (69%) entre los votantes estadounidenses, el mayor desafío en esta carrera electoral es, probablemente, la presencia de Donald Trump, no solo porque su futuro inmediato está en manos de los tribunales, sino también porque si su candidatura llegara a materializarse significaría que el Partido Republicano habría decidido entregar su futuro al hombre que intentó revertir los resultados electorales de hace cuatro años y que el propio comité del Congreso, que investigó la toma del Capitolio del 6 de enero de 2020, acusó de «insurrección». A partir de enero empezarán las elecciones primarias y los caucus estatales; sin embargo, a falta de concretarse los candidatos definitivos, el imaginario de un posible duelo electoral entre octogenarios se resuelve, de momento según las encuestas, a favor de Trump. Mientras tanto, la fecha del juicio al expresidente se acerca peligrosamente al supermartes del 5 de marzo, el día en que 13 estados votan en las primarias republicanas.Una investigación de The Guardian con la Universidad de Chicago afirma que un 5,5% de los estadounidenses, es decir, 14 millones de personas, creen que el uso de la fuerza está justificado para restaurar a Donald Trump en la presidencia, mientras que otro 8,9%, unos 23 millones de estadounidenses, creen que la fuerza está justificada para impedirlo. No se trata de una tendencia aislada. El riesgo de inestabilidad política y de violencia vinculada a procesos electorales va al alza, así lo confirma la Fundación Kofi-Annan.También el futuro de una Unión Europea, que afronta este invierno con dos guerras en su vecindario, se decidirá en las urnas. Además de las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo, que se celebrarán entre el 6 y el 9 de junio de 2024, 12 estados miembros también tienen comicios. Las elecciones generales en Bélgica, Portugal o Austria serán un buen termómetro para medir la fuerza de la extrema derecha, que aspira a salir reforzada de las elecciones a la Eurocámara. Si los comicios de 2019 determinaron el fin de la gran coalición que, desde los orígenes del Parlamento Europeo, había garantizado a socialdemócratas y democristianos una mayoría de escaños en el pleno de Estrasburgo, ahora el gran interrogante está en saber dónde quedarán los límites de la derechización de la UE. Las últimas proyecciones en intención de voto muestran resultados importantes para el grupo Identidad y Democracia (ID) –hogar de partidos de extrema derecha como el Reagrupamiento Nacional (RN) de Marine Le Pen o Alternativa para Alemania (AfD)– que llegaría hasta los 87 escaños y superaría a la otra familia de derecha radical, los Conservadores y Reformistas Europeos (ECR), que preside la primera ministra italiana Giorgia Meloni, que pasaría de los 66 eurodiputados actuales a 83. Sin embargo, y a pesar de la pérdida de escaños que sufrirían las fuerzas tradicionales, el Partido Popular Europeo (PPE) seguiría como la principal familia política de la Unión. Por eso, unos de los interrogantes de este 2024 es saber si ¿estaría dispuesto el PPE, que preside el bávaro Manfred Weber, a buscar una posible mayoría con la derecha radical?Las nuevas mayorías en la UE serán cruciales para decidir el futuro de los compromisos climáticos, la continuidad de la ayuda a Ucrania y las urgentes reformas institucionales que deben facilitar la entrada de futuros miembros. La ampliación tiene que pasar de ser una promesa a una realidad, pero la UE está cada vez menos preparada para llevarla a cabo. En 2024, cuatro países candidatos a la Unión celebrarán elecciones: Bosnia y Herzegovina, Moldova, Macedonia del Norte y Georgia, además de la incógnita que pende sobre la convocatoria de elecciones en Ucrania. Según su Constitución, Ucrania debería celebrar comicios en marzo de 2024. Pero, bajo la ley marcial, impuesta tras la invasión de Rusia en 2022, con una parte del electorado reticente a ir a las urnas en plena excepcionalidad, y con ocho millones de refugiados ucranianos fuera del país, Volodímir Zelenski ya apuntó en noviembre que no era «el momento adecuado».También un Reino Unido en plena crisis política y social podría avanzar elecciones generales, previstas para enero de 2025. Con un escenario desafiante para los conservadores frente al Partido Laborista encabezado por Keir Starmer, el actual primer ministro, Rishi Sunak, tiene discreción para elegir la fecha de los comicios. Otro de los interrogantes es Libia que, tras quedar pospuesto indefinidamente en 2021 el plan de Naciones Unidas de celebrar elecciones, la incapacidad de alcanzar un acuerdo entre los miembros de los dos gobiernos en el este y el oeste del país ha vuelto a mover la fecha de una posible celebración de comicios a 2024.En África, se celebrarán 16 elecciones, aunque solo seis de ellas tendrán lugar en países considerados como democracias. Treinta años después de las elecciones de 1994 en Sudáfrica, que marcaron el inicio de un viaje democrático dominado desde entonces por el Congreso Nacional Africano (CNA), el panorama político empieza a cambiar. Las elecciones generales de 2024 pueden confirmar el debilitamiento del poder y de los apoyos al CNA, mientras los principales partidos de la oposición buscan alianzas para presentar una alternativa. Además, la complicada situación económica, unida a otros factores como la corrupción, ha hecho que crezcan en popularidad partidos extremistas.También en India la oposición se presenta más unida que nunca ante un Narendra Modi que aspira a renovar un tercer mandato en primavera. Aupado en el nacionalismo, la polarización y la desinformación, Modi exhibirá los logros económicos y geopolíticos del país que en 2023 superó a China como el más poblado del mundo.Finalmente, está por ver qué grado de participación podrá tener la oposición venezolana en las elecciones presidenciales pactadas por Nicolás Maduro para la segunda mitad del año. De momento, el panorama interno se ha enrarecido todavía más con la intensificación del conflicto territorial con Guyana y la movilización del ejército. 3. De la saturación informativa a la desconexión social Nos encontramos ante unas sociedades cada vez más cansadas. Abrumadas por la saturación de contenidos y exhaustas por la velocidad de los cambios que deben digerir. La incertidumbre política y electoral, así como la multiplicidad de conflictos que marcarán el 2024 alimentarán todavía más el desfase entre sociedad, instituciones y partidos políticos. La cantidad de personas que declara «evitar» ver las noticias permanece cerca de máximos históricos, y es especialmente visible en Grecia (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) o el Reino Unido (41%). ¿Las razones principales? La repetición excesiva de algunas informaciones y el peso emocional que pueden comportar para la salud mental de la población. En concreto, esta fatiga apunta, según el Reuters Institute, a cuestiones como la guerra en Ucrania (39%), la política nacional (38%) y a acontecimientos relacionados con la justicia social (31%) con altos niveles de politización y polarización. Los ecos de la pandemia de la COVID-19, las imágenes de la violencia bélica y su impacto económico sobre unas condiciones de vida cada vez más adversas para la población han amplificado esta tendencia a la desconexión social, agravada por el sentimiento de soledad y la polarización. No obstante, esta reducción del consumo periodístico se ha dado en paralelo a un mayor uso de redes sociales: las nuevas generaciones, por ejemplo, cada vez prestan más atención a influencers que a periodistas. A su vez, crece la fragmentación de las redes sociales. La migración de usuarios hacia Instagram o TikTok también ha alterado la forma de consumir la actualidad, con una priorización del contenido de ocio en lugar del informativo. No se trata solo de una renuncia voluntaria a la información, sino que esta tendencia de desconexión también ha llevado a una reducción en la participación social y en los debates en redes tal como se vivieron durante las primaveras árabes en 2011, en la movilización del MeToo o en el Black Lives Matter. Casi la mitad de los usuarios de redes sociales abiertas (47%) ya no participa ni reacciona a las noticias. Pero, además, la desconexión informativa también está vinculada a la desconexión política y a las transformaciones sociales que han alterado claramente los comportamientos electorales. Los cambios demográficos relacionados con el uso de la tecnología y el contexto de volatilidad permanente también se han traducido en una menor fidelización del voto, lo que ha contribuido a la crisis de los partidos tradicionales. El elemento identitario de pertenencia a un partido ha mutado entre los más jóvenes. La identificación se construye desde el posicionamiento en cuestiones como el cambio climático, la inmigración, el racismo, los derechos de las mujeres o el colectivo LGTBI+, o incluso el conflicto de Israel y Palestina. El 65% de los adultos estadounidenses declara que se siente agotado, siempre o con frecuencia, cuando piensa en política. Según el Pew Research Center, 6 de cada 10 estadounidenses en edad de votar admite tener muy poca o ninguna confianza en el futuro del sistema político de su país. Y este descontento se extiende a las tres ramas del gobierno, a los actuales líderes políticos, y a los candidatos a cargos públicos. Cuando se les pide que resuman sus sentimientos sobre la política en una sola palabra, el 79% se muestra negativo o crítico. Las más repetidas son los adjetivos «divisiva», «corrupta», «caótica» o «polarizada», y lamentan la sobreexposición mediática de los conflictos entre republicanos y demócratas, y la poca atención prestada «a los problemas importantes que enfrenta el país». La paradoja, sin embargo, es que este descontento ha coincidido, en estos últimos años, con niveles históricamente altos de participación electoral. La duda es si se repetirán en las presidenciales del próximo noviembre, especialmente cuando coinciden con otro elemento de desafección generacional como es la gerontocracia. En 2023, la media de edad de los líderes mundiales ha sido de 62 años. Para los jóvenes, los partidos políticos tradicionales han sido incapaces de articular una forma de comunicación directa, aumentando la sensación de desconexión entre sociedad, políticos e instituciones. En este contexto, una reedición de la confrontación Biden-Trump en 2024 enfatizaría la extrema polarización entre republicanos y demócratas en un ciclo electoral considerado de riesgo. El derecho al aborto y la seguridad siguen siendo puntos fuertes de movilización para los votantes.Por otra parte, la desconexión también puede ser forzada y, en ese caso, el bloqueo informativo se convierte en un arma de represión y censura de la libertad de expresión. Irán, India y Pakistán fueron los tres países con más restricciones al acceso de Internet en la primera mitad de 2023, y los tres celebrarán elecciones en 2024. Con el auge y la consolidación de la IA, la desinformación será uno de los retos adicionales de este superaño electoral, ya que su rápido progreso, especialmente en el ámbito generativo, puede proyectar una sombra todavía mayor sobre la confianza en la información y en los procesos electorales. El perfeccionamiento de los deepfakes, la rápida y sencilla creación de imágenes, textos, audios o propaganda por IA, así como la creciente dependencia de las redes sociales para consultar e informarse de la realidad, representan un caldo de cultivo para la desinformación en un momento en el que aún no existe un control efectivo de estas tecnologías. Quizás por eso la palabra del año de 2023 para el diccionario Merriam-Webster ha sido «auténtico». Con el preludio de aquella «posverdad» de 2016, la capacidad tecnológica de manipular hoy la realidad no tiene precedentes, desde la autenticidad de una imagen a la redacción de un trabajo académico. Por eso, más de la mitad de los usuarios de redes sociales (56%) dudan sobre su propia capacidad de poder discernir aquello que es falso de la realidad en las noticias de Internet. 4. Inteligencia artificial: explosión y regulación 2023 fue el año de la irrupción de la IA generativa; el año de la presentación en sociedad de ChatGPT que, en enero, solo dos meses después de su lanzamiento, ya contaba con 100 millones de usuarios y, en agosto, llegó a los 180 millones. Pero, la revolución también trajo consigo una nueva consciencia de los riesgos, aceleración y transformación que supone una tecnología que aspira a compararse con la inteligencia humana, o incluso a mejorarla o superarla. Por eso, 2024 será un año fundamental para la regulación de la IA. Las bases ya están puestas y solo hay que repasar las distintas iniciativas en marcha. La más ambiciosa es la de la UE, que está decidida a convertirse en la primera región del mundo que se dota de una ley integral para regular la inteligencia artificial y liderar el salto adelante que hay en ciernes. La Unión ha optado por categorizar los riesgos (inaceptables, elevados, limitados o mínimos) que supone el uso de sistemas de IA y obligará a realizar una «evaluación de impacto en los derechos fundamentales» antes de que un sistema de IA de «alto riesgo» pueda ser sacado al mercado. El acuerdo alcanzado el 7 de diciembre se ratificará en el primer trimestre de 2024 y dará paso a un período de dos años hasta su implementación total en 2026.Casi también en tiempo de descuento, el G-7 adoptó el 1 de diciembre de 2023 una guía internacional para desarrolladores y usuarios de la inteligencia artificial, especialmente para la IA generativa, que menciona la necesidad de introducir medidas para gestionar la desinformación, considerada uno de los principales riesgos para los líderes del G-7 por su impacto en la manipulación de la opinión pública a las puertas de un año de sobreexcitación electoral global.Pero el debate de la gobernanza va de la mano de la carrera geopolítica por liderar la innovación tecnológica y, a diferencia de la UE, en el caso de Estados Unidos y China eso significa, además, el desarrollo de su aplicación militar. Ambos países buscan afianzar su liderazgo, y la primera cumbre mundial sobre seguridad de la IA, convocada por el primer ministro británico, Rishi Sunak, se convirtió en el punto de encuentro de los grandes poderes globales –públicos y privados; tecnoautoritarios o abiertos– intentando regular o influir en los debates sobre regularización en curso. La cumbre tendrá una segunda edición en Seúl y una tercera en París, ambas en 2024. De momento, deja sobre la mesa la «Declaración Bletchley», firmada por 28 países, que recoge un compromiso para abordar las principales amenazas de la IA, un acuerdo para examinar los modelos de IA de empresas tecnológicas antes de su lanzamiento, así como un pacto para establecer un panel global de expertos sobre inteligencia artificial, inspirado en el Panel Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático (IPCC) de Naciones Unidas. Además, en la embajada de Estados Unidos en Londres, 31 países firmaron, en paralelo, una declaración (no vinculante) para establecer límites al uso militar de la IA. Por su parte, China continúa avanzando hacia su objetivo de alcanzar un 70% de autosuficiencia en tecnología crítica para 2025, mientras va aumentando claramente su presencia en los principales organismos internacionales de estandarización relacionados con la tecnología.A toda esta hiperactividad normativa, se sumará la adopción, en septiembre de 2024, de un Pacto Digital Mundial, durante la Cumbre del Futuro que organizará Naciones Unidas. Este pacto supondrá la creación de un marco de cooperación multiactor y multisectorial entre gobiernos, empresas privadas y sociedad civil, que debería establecer unas reglas comunes que guíen el desarrollo digital en el futuro. La aplicación de los derechos humanos en Internet, la regulación de la IA y la inclusión digital serán algunos de los temas principales a discutir.Esta necesidad de regular la IA se verá acentuada también, en los próximos meses, por una creciente democratización de las herramientas de IA, lo que comportará una mayor integración en distintos sectores profesionales. El foco en una IA responsable se intensificará a escala local (más ciudades desplegando estrategias o marcos regulatorios de la IA), nacional y transnacional. Y es que, a medida que la IA adquiere un papel más importante en la toma de decisiones en toda la sociedad, la seguridad, la confiabilidad, la equidad y la responsabilidad son fundamentales. El informe anual de McKinsey sobre el uso de herramientas de IA generativa señala que un tercio de las empresas encuestadas han empezado a utilizar este tipo de programas. El sector tecnológico y de comunicaciones (40%), así como el financiero (38%) y el legal (36%), se encuentran a la cabeza en su uso y aplicación. Sin embargo, este mismo estudio también señala que justamente los sectores laborales que dependen en mayor medida del conocimiento de sus empleados serán los que verán un impacto más disruptivo de estas tecnologías –si este impacto es positivo o negativo es aún incierto–. A diferencia de otras revoluciones que han transformado el mercado laboral, son los llamados «trabajadores de cuello blanco» los que pueden sentirse más vulnerables ante la IA generativa. En cambio, un estudio del Banco Central Europeo asegura que la IA no está suplantando a los trabajadores, pero sí está reduciendo ligeramente sus sueldos, especialmente en empleos considerados como poco o medio cualificados, más expuestos a las herramientas de automatización, y entre las mujeres.En el marco de esta aceleración reguladora de la revolución digital, 2024 también será el año en que la UE desplegará, con todo su potencial, la nueva legislación de servicios y mercados digitales para fijar límites y obligaciones al poder monopolístico de las grandes plataformas y a su responsabilidad en la propagación algorítmica de desinformación y contenido dañino. A partir del 1 de enero, las Big Tech se enfrentan al imperativo de cumplir con estas regulaciones, con multas potenciales por incumplimiento que alcanzan hasta el 6% de la facturación global, según la DSA (Digital Services Act), y entre el 10% y el 20% de la facturación mundial según la DMA (Digital Markets Act). También aumentará en 2024 el flujo de datos internacionales, en particular las transferencias entre la UE y Estados Unidos, en virtud del nuevo Marco de privacidad de datos aprobado en julio de 2023. Veremos también un nuevo escrutinio por parte de ONG y grupos de defensa de los derechos digitales para determinar la legalidad y el respeto a la privacidad individual en estos intercambios.5. Resaca económica y sostenibilidad de la deudaEn 2024 serán más visibles las consecuencias económicas de la sucesión de crisis experimentadas en los últimos años, especialmente el impacto del aumento de los tipos de interés para hacer frente al mayor repunte de la inflación en cuarenta años tras la crisis energética de 2022. Asimismo, el endurecimiento de las condiciones de financiación limitará la política fiscal, tras el rápido aumento del endeudamiento para hacer frente a los impactos de la COVID-19 y la guerra en Ucrania.En este contexto, el crecimiento será débil. El Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) no espera que la inflación se sitúe en el objetivo de la mayoría de bancos centrales hasta 2025, lo que augura tipos de interés elevados durante un largo período de tiempo, sobre todo si se vuelve a tensionar el precio del petróleo en un contexto de elevada incertidumbre geopolítica. La previsión de crecimiento del FMI para 2024 es del 2,9%, una tasa muy similar a la estimada para 2023 e inferior a las tasas de crecimiento prepandemia.Sin embargo, el enfriamiento será dispar por economías. Estados Unidos parece haber evitado la recesión gracias a la fortaleza de su mercado laboral y a los estímulos fiscales, por lo que se enfrentaría a un aterrizaje suave. En ese país, las políticas de relocalización industrial, como la Inflation Reduction Act, los beneficios empresariales récord poscovid, así como la extraordinaria pérdida de poder adquisitivo causada por la inflación han sido algunos de los ingredientes que explican el renacer del movimiento sindical estadounidense, sin precedentes desde los años setenta del siglo pasado. Su éxito puede ser contagioso a otros sectores y economías con mercados laborales tensionados. Así, en 2024, el descenso de la inflación y el alza de los salarios podría proveer de cierto alivio económico.En la UE habrá un mayor escrutinio sobre las cuentas públicas, especialmente de países con un menor margen financiero como Italia, tras el rápido aumento del endeudamiento para hacer frente a la pandemia y el impacto de la guerra en Ucrania, debido a las condiciones de financiación y la entrada en vigor de la reforma de las reglas fiscales. La «disciplina fiscal» estará también muy presente en la negociación del nuevo marco presupuestario de la UE (MFF, por sus siglas en inglés), donde la UE confrontará sus mayores deseos (apoyo a Ucrania, respaldo a la política industrial, la transición verde y aumento de las partidas para defensa, migración o el Global Gateway) con la realidad (falta de recursos y acuerdo para ampliarlos). La adopción de la Estrategia Europea de Seguridad Económica y el resultado de la investigación antidumping contra las subvenciones chinas al vehículo eléctrico determinarán en buena medida si en el frente económico la UE opta por alinearse con Estados Unidos en su competición estratégica con China o intenta mostrarse como paladín de una globalización reformada.También habrá que seguir de cerca la evolución de una China que se enfrenta a su menor crecimiento económico en 35 años, exceptuando los años de la COVID-19, lastrado por sus desequilibrios, especialmente en lo que concierne a una excesiva acumulación de deuda y a su dependencia del sector inmobiliario. El cambio de las reglas de la globalización impulsadas por la competencia estratégica de Estados Unidos lastrará también sus exportaciones y capacidad de atraer capital en un contexto en el que el liderazgo chino prioriza la seguridad económica al crecimiento. Con una demografía adversa, el país aún no ha conseguido erigir el consumo interno como motor de crecimiento.Por su parte, los países emergentes sentirán con fuerza el frenazo chino, especialmente aquellos con una mayor dependencia comercial y financiera. El éxito en términos de volumen de inversión de la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta se ha visto ensombrecido por los problemas en la devolución de hasta el 60% de los préstamos, lo que ha llevado a Xi Jinping a anunciar una nueva etapa de inversiones con proyectos más pequeños. En 2024, el nuevo papel de China como prestamista de última instancia y su participación en los procesos de reestructuración de deuda de países en dificultades tendrán una creciente importancia en cómo es percibida y en su influencia geoeconómica sobre el Sur Global.Y es que un elevado número de países emergentes se encuentran en una delicada situación fiscal que, en un contexto de rápido tensionamiento de las condiciones financieras y de fortaleza del dólar, agrava también su vulnerabilidad externa. Aunque algunos de ellos, como México, Vietnam o Marruecos se están aprovechando de la reconfiguración del comercio y de las cadenas de valor (nearshoring), la mayoría de países emergentes pueden verse perjudicados por un escenario de mayor fragmentación económica. Según la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC), el comercio de bienes entre dos bloques geopolíticos hipotéticos –basados en los patrones de votación en Naciones Unidas– ha crecido entre un 4% y un 6% más lento que el comercio dentro de estos bloques desde la invasión de Ucrania.En este contexto de escaso margen monetario y fiscal, el colchón para amortiguar otra crisis es muy reducido, lo que puede exacerbar la volatilidad y el nerviosismo de los mercados ante episodios de incertidumbre. El principal foco de atención puede pasar de Ucrania a Oriente Medio, ya que los shocks de petróleo se transmiten a la economía de manera más amplia que los del gas natural. Esto podría afectar, directamente, a la UE y a España, especialmente dependientes porque importan más del 90% del petróleo que consumen. Además, las reservas estratégicas de petróleo en Estados Unidos se encuentran en mínimos equivalentes a los de 1983, y los pocos países con margen para incrementar su producción de crudo (Arabia Saudí, Emiratos Árabes Unidos y Rusia) puede que no estén por la labor de hacerlo sin concesiones políticas significativas.6. Sur(es) y Norte(s)tSi en nuestro ejercicio para 2023 anunciábamos la consolidación del Sur Global como espacio de confrontación y liderazgo, y apuntábamos a la presencia estratégica de India, Turquía, Arabia Saudí o Brasil, en 2024 esta reconfiguración dará una vuelta de tuerca más. Las contradicciones y fragmentaciones de esta lógica dicotómica Norte-Sur quedarán más expuestas que nunca. El Sur Global se ha consolidado como un actor clave en la contestación a Occidente bajo lógicas antiimperialistas o de doble rasero. La imagen más simbólica de este momento de expansión geopolítica la veremos en octubre de 2024, cuando los BRICS se reúnan en Rusia para formalizar su ampliación. Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica suman a su club a Arabia Saudí, Egipto, Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Etiopía e Irán. Juntos suponen el 46% de la población mundial, un 29% del PIB global, e incluyen a dos de los tres mayores productores de petróleo del mundo. De esta forma, los BRICS ganarán una voz todavía más potente, aunque inevitablemente también es posible que integren más contradicciones internas y agendas propias. No obstante, la elección de Javier Milei como presidente de Argentina, que ha confirmado su decisión de no unirse a los BRICS, también alimenta la idea de este choque de agendas e intereses en el Sur Global: Arabia Saudí e Irán son competidores por la influencia estratégica en el Golfo Pérsico, e India y China tienen sus propias disputas fronterizas en el Himalaya. El Sur Global seguirá ganando influencia, pero también heterogeneidad. Más allá de una retórica poscolonial compartida, su acción es muy diversa. El Sur Global es multirregional y multidimensional y está compuesto por regímenes políticos diferentes. Pero también es el espacio geográfico donde se consolidan los flujos comerciales globales como consecuencia de la reglobalización. El último informe anual de la OMC confirma que, a pesar de que las economías avanzadas siguen siendo actores clave del comercio mundial, ya no son dominantes. Sin embargo, si en 2023 hablábamos de la aceleración geopolítica de los «otros» con India como símbolo de este potencial liderazgo del Sur Global, en 2024 será América Latina quien tratará de adoptar un papel protagonista. Brasil será el país anfitrión del G-20, mientras que Perú acogerá la Cumbre de Cooperación Económica en Asia Pacífico (APEC).Y en esta superación de dicotomías, también el Norte Global puede sufrir una fractura interna profunda si se confirma el retorno de Donald Trump a la Casa Blanca. La distancia transatlántica se ha impuesto como el nuevo marco de unas relaciones con más carga transaccional que de alianza tradicional. El desencuentro entre Washington y Bruselas se agravará en 2024 cuando Estados Unidos pida a la UE aumentar su contribución al Gobierno de Volodímir Zelensky y la propia lógica de divisiones internas entre socios comunitarios lo impida. Especialmente tenso será el segundo semestre de 2024, cuando Hungría –el país más reticente de la UE sobre la ayuda militar y la futura adhesión de Ucrania– asuma la presidencia rotatoria de la Unión. Será también paradójico que esta brecha en el Norte Global se ensanche por la guerra de Ucrania. Precisamente, en 2023, la invasión rusa fue el mortero que cimentó la unidad transatlántica y confrontó a la UE y a Estados Unidos con los límites de su capacidad de influencia ante un Sur Global que cuestionaba el doble rasero de Occidente. En 2024, en cambio, la guerra en Ucrania puede aumentar la distancia entre Washington y Bruselas.A pesar de esta lógica de confrontación, la miopía geopolítica del binarismo está cada vez más fuera de lugar. Y, sin embargo, cuesta de superar. El hecho de que Estados Unidos y la UE sigan planteándose su relación con América Latina solo como espacio de explotación de recursos y de disputa geopolítica con China es parte de esa miopía. De momento, el fracaso reiterado de las negociaciones para un acuerdo UE-Mercosur alejan una vez más el sueño suramericano de poder reforzar su presencia comercial en el mercado único europeo. Las negociaciones se retomarán en el primer semestre de 2024, después de que Paraguay tome el relevo de Brasil en la presidencia de Mercosur.7. Retroceso en los compromisos internacionales2023 deja la cooperación internacional en la cuerda floja. Con un lenguaje cada vez más contundente, António Guterres declaraba que el mundo está «lamentablemente fuera de rumbo» en la consecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS), que en 2023 llegaron al ecuador de su implementación. 2024 tiene que demostrar si la comunidad internacional todavía es capaz y quiere consensuar respuestas coordinadas a problemas globales compartidos, a través de órganos de gobernanza colectiva. No será fácil. Estamos ante una aceleración de la crisis ecológica, ante un récord de migraciones y desplazamientos forzosos, así como ante una clara involución de la agenda para la igualdad de género.Por primera vez, la Agencia Internacional de la Energía (AIE) proyecta que la demanda mundial de petróleo, carbón y gas natural alcanzará su punto máximo en esta década basándose únicamente en la configuración de políticas actuales, según World Energy Outlook 2023. A corto plazo, los países productores de combustibles fósiles ignoran las alertas climáticas y planean aumentar la extracción de carbón, petróleo y gas. La elección de un Estado petrolero, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, como anfitrión de una cumbre climática y el nombramiento de un ejecutivo de combustibles fósiles para presidirla, ya era, como mínimo, un mal augurio. Y, sin embargo, la COP28 de Dubái ha sido la primera que ha conseguido sacar un texto que reconoce explícitamente la necesidad de «dejar atrás» los combustibles fósiles: el petróleo, el carbón y el gas, como principales responsables de la crisis climática. Si bien el acuerdo final ha sido celebrado como histórico por hacer referencia a esta necesidad de iniciar una transición (transitioning away from) para garantizar unas emisiones cero netas en 2050, el grado de ambición demostrado no es suficiente para cumplir con los objetivos del Acuerdo de París. Asimismo, si bien la creación de un Fondo para Pérdidas y Daños para compensar a los países más afectados por el cambio climático también es un paso positivo, la recaudación inicial de 700 millones de dólares queda muy por debajo de lo necesario. Cada año, los países en desarrollo hacen frente a 400.000 millones de dólares de pérdidas vinculadas a la acción climática. En este contexto, no solo se corre el riesgo de empeorar los impactos climáticos, sino que también veremos emerger, todavía con más fuerza, tensiones sociales y políticas entre gobiernos y sociedades por la explotación de los recursos. En Europa hay una creciente insatisfacción con las políticas de transición climática de la Unión, y el previsible ascenso de las fuerzas euroescépticas y de derecha radical en las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo de junio de 2024 puede aumentar todavía más esta presión. La hiperactividad regulatoria en cuestiones climáticas e industriales está aumentando la politización de este tema, avivando el malestar social en ciertos estados miembros. Italia, Polonia, los Países Bajos y ciertos sectores de Alemania, en especial del partido de extrema derecha Alternativa para Alemania (AfD), están tratando de limitar las ambiciones de la UE en materia climática. La llegada del nuevo Gobierno sueco, apoyado por la derecha radical, ha frenado de golpe los compromisos climáticos que lideraba uno de los países de la UE que más ha contribuido a las políticas medioambientales comunitarias. Un retorno de Donald Trump a la Casa Blanca también haría tambalear de nuevo algunos de los limitados avances domésticos e internacionales en este ámbito.Según una encuesta realizada por Ipsos, mientras una gran parte de los hogares europeos continúan dando prioridad al medio ambiente frente al crecimiento económico, esta proporción está en declive: si en 2019 un 53% de los hogares preferían la protección del medio ambiente, en 2022 esta cifra se había reducido cinco puntos, pese al impacto evidente de los fenómenos climáticos. Sin embargo, esta tendencia de «no en mi patio trasero» no se limita a Europa. A finales de 2023, hemos visto la resistencia de los panameños contra la ampliación de contratos de minería. Algunos expertos hablan de «choque de ambientalismos» para referirse a la confrontación que surge entre aquellos que quieren proteger los recursos naturales de su país y el deterioro de los ecosistemas, y los intereses de gobiernos que buscan recursos para alimentar su transición energética. Lo mismo puede ocurrir en la UE. A principios de 2024, entrará en vigor la Ley de Materias Primas Críticas que quiere garantizar el suministro de níquel, litio, magnesio y otros materiales esenciales para la transición verde y las industrias estratégicas, vitales para los coches eléctricos y las energías renovables, los equipos militares y los sistemas aeroespaciales, así como para los ordenadores y los teléfonos móviles. Y, en este contexto, la UE prevé revivir la minería en el continente. Una decisión que puede movilizar protestas ecologistas en la Unión en los próximos meses.También en 2024 se espera que los estados miembros de Naciones Unidas lleguen a un acuerdo global para acabar con la contaminación por plásticos. Será un tratado internacional, jurídicamente vinculante, considerado como el pacto medioambiental multilateral más importante desde el Acuerdo de París, y que fijará un plan de actuación hasta 2040.Sin embargo, son las políticas de género y las políticas migratorias las que están más expuestas a esta ola radical que ha transformado las agendas gubernamentales, sobre todo, en la UE y en América Latina. Si bien es verdad que la igualdad de género durante 2023 se ha recuperado a niveles previos a la pandemia, el ritmo de progreso se ha desacelerado. A este paso, se necesitarán 131 años para alcanzar la plena paridad. Aunque la proporción de mujeres contratadas para puestos de liderazgo ha aumentado de manera constante en aproximadamente un 1% anual a nivel mundial durante los últimos ocho años, esta tendencia se revirtió en 2023, retrocediendo a los niveles de 2021. Las emergentes políticas exteriores feministas, que definían aquellos países con un claro compromiso de promover la igualdad de género en las relaciones internacionales, han sumado cuatro bajas importantes en los últimos meses: Suecia, Luxemburgo, los Países Bajos y Argentina. Los cambios de Gobierno, junto con la creciente politización y polarización de las cuestiones percibidas como «feministas», han demostrado el fácil abandono de estas iniciativas, dependientes de las orientaciones progresistas de los gobiernos en el poder. México, otro de los países que ha adoptado estas políticas, se enfrentará a unos comicios en junio que también marcarán la continuidad o el abandono de su compromiso con la igualdad de género en la acción exterior. Y, pese a no tener una política exterior feminista, el retorno de Trump a la Casa Blanca podría llevar al restablecimiento de políticas restrictivas sobre el aborto y de recortes de financiación contra las ONG internacionales que promueven los derechos sexuales y reproductivos.Además, el Instituto Internacional para la Democracia y la Asistencia Electoral (IDEA) denuncia el resurgimiento de tendencias antifeministas en países como Croacia e Italia, destacando discursos sexistas y homófobos por parte de líderes europeos como Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda o Giorgia Meloni, que justifican ataques a los derechos de las mujeres y de las personas LGBTQIA+ y socavan años de esfuerzos para lograr avances en la ruptura de los estereotipos de género. Si bien el Plan de Acción en materia de Género III de la UE tiene vigencia hasta 2025, un cambio de orientación política en Bruselas también diluiría los compromisos de uno de los actores más implicados en este ámbito. En una nota más positiva, será interesante seguir en 2024 los avances de Naciones Unidas respecto a la Convención contra los crímenes contra la humanidad, ya que movimientos feministas y de la sociedad civil de todo el mundo aprovecharán esta oportunidad para tratar de codificar el apartheid de género como crimen contra la humanidad –especialmente debido a la continua discriminación y opresión del régimen talibán hacia las mujeres afganas y a la situación de las mujeres iraníes.También las políticas migratorias europeas han formalizado un retroceso importante. El Pacto Europeo de Migración y Asilo, que está previsto que salga adelante antes de las elecciones europeas de 2024, supone una legitimación de las políticas antiinmigración de la UE. Dicho pacto permite retrasar el registro de los solicitantes de asilo, instaurar procedimientos de asilo fronterizos de segunda categoría y ampliar el tiempo de detención en frontera; es decir, rebaja estándares y legaliza lo que hasta ahora era directamente ilegal. Este acuerdo en ciernes refleja los niveles de polarización y politización que marcan el paso de la respuesta europea a las migraciones. Y, en plena precampaña electoral, la utilización política del debate migratorio será todavía más evidente en los próximos meses. Ello forma parte, además, de otro proceso más de fondo: las políticas de externalización de la migración de la UE, que han alimentado también la estigmatización de los inmigrantes y refugiados en la región de Oriente Medio y Norte de Africa (MENA por sus siglas en inglés). 8. Desbordamiento humanitarioLas guerras y la violencia impulsaron el desplazamiento forzado a escala mundial hasta una cifra récord estimada de 114 millones de personas a finales de septiembre de 2023, según ACNUR. Los principales generadores de estos desplazamientos forzados fueron la guerra en Ucrania y los conflictos en Sudán, la República Democrática del Congo y Myanmar; además de la sequía, las inundaciones y la inseguridad que azota Somalia; así como una prolongada crisis humanitaria en Afganistán.Solo en los primeros seis meses de 2023, se presentaron 1,6 millones de nuevas solicitudes individuales de asilo a nivel mundial, la cifra más alta jamás registrada. No se trata de una situación excepcional. La reactivación de conflictos olvidados ha aumentado los niveles de volatilidad y violencia. En octubre de 2023, más de 100.500 personas –más del 80% de los 120.000 habitantes estimados de Nagorno Karabaj– huyeron a Armenia tras la toma de control del enclave por parte de Azerbaiyán. También hubo miles de desplazados en el norte de Shan, por la escalada de combates entre las Fuerzas Armadas de Myanmar y varios grupos armados. A finales de octubre de 2023, casi dos millones de personas se encuentran desplazadas internamente en Myanmar, en condiciones precarias y necesitadas de asistencia vital. Y las imágenes de más de un millón de palestinos huyendo de sus hogares por los bombardeos israelíes, que se iniciaron tras el brutal ataque de Hamás del 7 de octubre, reflejan la crisis humanitaria que azota Gaza.Sin embargo, este incremento en el número de refugiados y desplazados no ha ido acompañado de un refuerzo de la ayuda internacional necesaria para cubrir sus necesidades. Más de un millón de refugiados rohingya en Bangladesh deberán hacer frente al menguante compromiso internacional. En 2023, Naciones Unidas redujo un tercio la asistencia alimentaria y la ayuda humanitaria a este colectivo. La falta de financiación internacional disminuyó considerablemente los niveles de asistencia en 2023, y el Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA) se vio obligado a recortar entre un 30% y un 50% el tamaño y el alcance de la asistencia alimentaria, monetaria y nutricional que ofrece. 2.300 millones de personas, casi un 30% de la población mundial, hoy están al límite de una situación de inseguridad alimentaria moderada o grave. El alza continuada del precio de los alimentos en 2024 y el impacto de las condiciones meteorológicas adversas en la producción agrícola pueden empeorar todavía más esta situación. La Oficina para la Coordinación de Asuntos Humanitarios (OCHA) de Naciones Unidas prevé que entre 105 y 110 millones de personas necesitarán asistencia alimentaria al menos hasta principios de 2024, con un aumento de las necesidades en las regiones de África Austral y América Latina y el Caribe, y una disminución neta en África Oriental.De momento, los expertos alertan sobre el riesgo de una nueva crisis del arroz en 2024, como consecuencia de la restricción en las exportaciones que impuso India para intentar contener los efectos del descenso de producción interna. La ola expansiva de esta prohibición ha provocado también el encarecimiento de los precios del arroz en Tailandia y Vietnam, segundo y tercer mayor exportador de arroz después de India, que han visto aumentar los precios un 14% y un 22%, respectivamente. A ello se suman los efectos del fenómeno climático de El Niño, asociado con el calor y la sequía en todo el Océano Pacífico, que puede dañar la producción de 2024. Por todo ello, los expertos advierten que, si India mantiene las restricciones actuales, el mundo va camino de repetir la crisis del arroz de 2008. El fenómeno de El Niño, que no se disipará hasta mediados de 2024, suele estar asociado, por una parte, a un incremento de las precipitaciones en algunas zonas meridionales de América del Sur, del sur de los Estados Unidos, el Cuerno de África y Asia central; pero, por la otra, también puede provocar graves sequías en Australia, Indonesia y partes del sureste asiático. El último episodio de este fenómeno, en 2016, significó el año más cálido jamás registrado, con unos récords globales de calor que todavía no se han superado.Los gobiernos donantes y las agencias humanitarias deben prepararse para un 2024 de grandes necesidades de asistencia en múltiples regiones. 2023 ya nos ha dejado varias muestras de ello: sequía extrema en el Amazonas y restricciones del tráfico marítimo en el canal de Panamá; incendios forestales en Bolivia y cortes de luz diarios en Ecuador debido a la baja producción de electricidad que proviene en más del 80% de centrales hidroeléctricas; las peores inundaciones registradas en el noroeste de Argentina, que provocaron además deslizamientos de tierra que afectaron a más de 6.000 personas; y un devastador huracán de categoría 5 en México que sorprendió a autoridades y científicos, los cuales no pudieron prever la intensidad del fenómeno. 9. Securitización versus derechosEl conflicto entre seguridad y derechos fundamentales ha sido una constante en 2023, y la incertidumbre electoral de los próximos meses fomentará, todavía más, la tentación de las políticas de control y mano dura. El debate público en toda América Latina, sin excepción, ha quedado copado por la seguridad, con efectos directos sobre otras crisis como la migratoria, que desde hace una década afecta a todo el continente, y que en 2024 se prevé todavía más intensa. El bukelismo gana adeptos. El nuevo presidente argentino, Javier Milei, ha declarado su admiración por las políticas de mano dura del presidente salvadoreño, Nayib Bukele. También la campaña electoral en Ecuador estuvo muy marcada por el debate de la seguridad. El continente lucha contra una nueva ola de criminalidad que se ha extendido a países tradicionalmente más estables, que ahora forman parte de rutas rentables del narcotráfico, como son los casos de Paraguay y Argentina. El tráfico de personas, sobre todo la explotación criminal de la crisis migratoria venezolana, también ha crecido en toda América Latina. En este contexto, Naciones Unidas y la Interpol han puesto en marcha una iniciativa conjunta contra la trata de seres humanos. Está por ver el impacto que las elecciones venezolanas puedan tener en esta crisis migratoria, que ya ha provocado la salida de más de siete millones de personas desde 2014.Asimismo, con el aumento de la impunidad, también ha crecido el riesgo de la tentación autoritaria por parte de los gobiernos de la región latinoamericana, con la militarización de la seguridad pública y el debilitamiento democrático en todo el continente. También en la UE. La sensación de vulnerabilidad se ha convertido, desde hace tiempo, en un revulsivo político para determinadas fuerzas en Europa. Desde el inicio de la guerra en Gaza, algunos países europeos han extremado la seguridad por miedo a atentados, hasta el punto de prohibir manifestaciones de apoyo a la población palestina, como fue el caso en Francia. En este sentido, la securitización de los movimientos sociales también emerge como una estrategia que seguirá ganando peso en 2024. Cada vez más, los gobiernos democráticos están extremando la presión sobre los movimientos de protesta: multas, prohibiciones de la libertad de expresión o persecución judicial están empequeñeciendo el espacio de la protesta civil. En este contexto, la UE ha llegado a un acuerdo en 2023 para legislar contra las demandas estratégicas que pretenden desincentivar la participación pública o silenciar a medios independientes (las llamadas SLAP, en sus siglas en inglés) que debería ratificarse antes del final de mandato.Finalmente, el debate de la seguridad y su efecto sobre los derechos individuales marcará también los meses previos a los Juegos Olímpicos de 2024 en París. Grupos de derechos humanos han denunciado los planes del Gobierno francés para la utilización de cámaras de reconocimiento con IA para detectar en tiempo real actividades sospechosas en las calles de la capital durante los juegos. La tecnología es un elemento crucial de la transformación que vive el binomio seguridad y conflicto. Los drones se han convertido en un arma clave para la resistencia en Ucrania, como también lo fue en el arsenal de Hamás utilizado en su ataque del 7 de octubre contra Israel. Precisamente unos Estados Unidos en pleno recorte presupuestario han asignado, en cambio, una inyección de dinero extra, en 2024, al Pentágono para el desarrollo de la llamada «guerra electrónica». 10. Desacoplamiento entre intereses y valoresHay un hilo conductor en muchos de los puntos anteriores que hilvana un mundo cada vez más diverso y (des)ordenado a través de intereses y alianzas cambiantes. En su informe de prospectiva estratégica de 2023, la Comisión Europea reconoce que la «batalla de narrativas» que durante tanto tiempo utilizó como argumento de la confrontación geopolítica entre democracia y autoritarismo está quedando obsoleta. Ello va más allá de la constatación de que Occidente ha perdido la batalla por el relato de la guerra de Ucrania y de que su doble rasero ante los conflictos del mundo empequeñece la capacidad de influencia de la UE. El caso de Sudán es el ejemplo más claro de cómo Occidente puede comprometerse con guerras que considera existenciales para la supervivencia de sus propios valores, como la de Ucrania, mientras ignora el genocidio que se está cometiendo, con asesinatos casa por casa, en los campos de refugiados de Darfur.El mundo se ha transformado en una «batalla de ofertas» que configura tanto la opinión pública como la acción de los gobiernos. Crece la diversidad de opciones y de alianzas. Las narrativas hasta hace poco hegemónicas o están contestadas o ya no sirven para explicar la realidad. En esta «multipolaridad desequilibrada» (unbalanced multipolarity), con potencias medianas marcando agendas regionales, los grandes actores tradicionales están obligados a buscar su propio espacio. La competición global por los recursos que deben alimentar las transiciones verde y digital acentúa, todavía más, esta geometría variable de acuerdos y alianzas. Y los resultados del ciclo electoral de 2024 pueden acabar reforzando está transformación. La tentación aislacionista de Estados Unidos es una realidad. Vladímir Putin revalidará en las urnas su capacidad de resistencia, después de haber sorteado los efectos de las sanciones internacionales y de haber construido un andamio económico para resistir una guerra larga en Ucrania. En India, la popularidad de Narendra Modi permanece intacta y alimenta el dominio de su partido. El interrogante electoral dibuja un 2024 que empieza totalmente abierto. La crisis del orden liberal, agudizada por la reacción internacional a los últimos conflictos, y la erosión del multilateralismo –con el desafío explícito a Naciones Unidas– alimentan todavía más esta sensación de dispersión del poder global hacia una variedad de potencias medianas dinámicas, capaces de ayudar a moldear el entorno internacional en las próximas décadas.Arranca un año clave para evaluar la capacidad de resistencia de unos sistemas democráticos sometidos, desde hace tiempo, a una profunda erosión. Estaremos pendientes del resultado de las urnas, así como de los límites de la impunidad con que actúan, cada vez más desacomplejadamente, las armas.Calendario CIDOB 2024: 75 fechas para marcar en la agenda1 de enero – Renovación Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas. Argelia, Guyana, la República de Corea, Sierra Leona y Eslovenia empezarán a formar parte del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU como miembros no permanentes en sustitución de Albania, Brasil, Gabón, Ghana y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos que finalizan membresía. 1 de enero – Disolución de la República de Artsaj. La autoproclamada república de Nagorno Karabaj dejará de existir a comienzos de año, después de más de tres décadas de control del territorio. En septiembre de 2023, Azerbaiyán emprendió una ofensiva militar con el objetivo de reintegrar este enclave de población mayoritariamente armenia. Esta ofensiva llevó a la autoproclamada república a anunciar su disolución. 1 de enero – Ampliación de los BRICS. Arabia Saudita, Egipto, Etiopía, Emiratos Árabes Unidos e Irán se unirán como miembros de pleno derecho en los BRICS (Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica). Finalmente, el nuevo presidente de Argentina, Javier Milei, ha descartado el ingreso de su país. 1 de enero – Presidencia belga del Consejo de la UE. Bélgica asumirá la presidencia rotatoria de la UE en substitución de España y hasta el 30 de junio. El semestre belga marcará el fin de este ciclo institucional en la Unión Europea. 7 de enero – Elecciones parlamentarias en Bangladesh. Estos comicios tendrán lugar en un contexto de una profunda división política del país. Esta división ha llevado a manifestaciones multitudinarias por parte de la oposición a finales de 2023 para reclamar un gobierno interino que supervise las elecciones. La actual primera ministra, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, aspira a renovar su mandato tras 15 años en el poder, mientras su principal contendiente, la líder del Partido Nacional de Bangladesh, Khaleda Zia, se encuentra actualmente en arresto domiciliario por cargos de corrupción. 13 de enero – Elecciones generales en Taiwán. Por primera vez desde la democratización de Taiwán, tres candidatos compiten por la presidencia tras el fracaso de la oposición para establecer un frente común: el actual vicepresidente, Lai Ching-te del gobernante Partido Democrático Progresista; Hou You-yi del Kuomintang; y Ko Wen-je, exalcalde de Taipéi y líder del Partido Popular Taiwanés. El resultado de estas elecciones marcará el curso de la política de Taiwán respecto a China, con la mirada puesta en Estados Unidos, en un momento de crecientes tensiones entre Taipéi y Beijing. 14 de enero – Toma de posesión de Bernardo Arévalo como presidente de Guatemala. La victoria del candidato del Movimiento Semilla en las elecciones de 2023 supuso una sorpresa general. Desde la celebración de los comicios, la tensión política y social se ha intensificado en el país debido a los esfuerzos de la fiscalía guatemalteca por impugnar los resultados electorales y evitar que Arévalo asuma el cargo. 15 – 19 de enero – Foro de Davos. Cita anual que reúne a los principales líderes políticos, altos ejecutivos de las compañías más importantes del mundo, líderes de organizaciones internacionales y ONGs, así como personalidades culturales y sociales destacadas. Esta edición se enfocará principalmente en examinar las oportunidades proporcionadas por el desarrollo de las tecnologías emergentes y sus repercusiones en la toma de decisiones y la cooperación internacional. 15 – 20 de enero – 19ª Cumbre del Movimiento de los Países No Alineados. Uganda será la sede de la próxima Cumbre formada por los 120 países pertenecientes a esta agrupación de estados. El lema de esta edición es «Profundizar la cooperación para una riqueza global compartida» y está previsto que se aborden múltiples retos globales actuales con el objetivo de fomentar la cooperación entre los estados miembros. 21 – 23 de enero – Tercera Cumbre del Sur del G-77 + China. Uganda será la anfitriona de este foro que, bajo el lema «No dejar a nadie atrás» busca promover la cooperación Sur-Sur. Los 134 países miembros de Asia, África, América Latina y el Caribe se focalizarán en ámbitos como el comercio, la inversión, el desarrollo sostenible, el cambio climático y la eliminación de la pobreza. 4 de febrero – Elecciones presidenciales en El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, quien encabeza el partido Nuevas Ideas y ocupa actualmente la presidencia de El Salvador, se perfila como el claro favorito para su reelección. Desde marzo de 2022, el país se encuentra en estado de excepción, como respuesta a los desafíos de seguridad que afectaban a la nación. 8 de febrero – Elecciones generales en Pakistán. Desde la destitución de Imran Khan como primer ministro en abril de 2022, Pakistán se encuentra en una situación de inestabilidad política, una profunda crisis económica y un aumento de la violencia por grupos armados. Los comicios serán supervisados por un gobierno interino creado tras la disolución del Parlamento pakistaní en agosto de 2023. 14 de febrero – Elecciones presidenciales y legislativas en Indonesia. Tres aspirantes compiten por suceder al actual presidente, Joko Widodo, que, después de dos mandatos, no puede presentarse a la reelección. El próximo líder se enfrentará al desafío de impulsar el crecimiento en una economía dependiente del consumo interno, impulsar el desarrollo de la industria tecnológica y gestionar las presiones de China y Estados Unidos para proteger sus intereses nacionales. 16 – 18 de febrero – 60ª Conferencia de Seguridad de Múnich. Con carácter anual, es el mayor foro independiente sobre políticas de seguridad internacional que reúne a figuras de más de setenta países con cargos de alto nivel. El fortalecimiento de un orden internacional basado en reglas, el impacto de las guerras en Ucrania y Gaza, la resistencia frente a tendencias revisionistas o las implicaciones del cambio climático para la seguridad serán algunos de los temas principales en la agenda de este año. 17 – 18 de febrero – Cumbre de la Unión Africana. Etiopía, quien ostenta la presidencia de la Unión Africana, será la organizadora de la cumbre. Este año se examinarán algunos de los numerosos frentes abiertos en el continente. Estos ejemplos incluyen: la situación de inestabilidad en el Sahel, la creciente inseguridad alimentaria mundial, los desastres naturales en el continente o el retroceso democrático. Además, las tensiones entre Marruecos y Argelia serán centrales ya que ambos países aspiran a la presidencia. 25 de febrero – Elecciones presidenciales en Senegal. Tras múltiples olas de protestas, el actual presidente senegalés, Macky Sall, anunció su decisión de no presentarse a un tercer mandato. Ha sido la primera vez en la historia democrática del país que un presidente incumbente no se presenta a la reelección. La necesidad de garantizar puestos de trabajo para la población joven del país será una de las cuestiones centrales en la campaña electoral. 26 – 29 de febrero – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona acoge el mayor evento de telefonía móvil del mundo donde reúne a las principales empresas tecnológicas y de comunicación internacionales. Esta edición estará dedicada a la tecnología 5G, la conectividad, la promoción de una inteligencia artificial humanista, o la transformación digital, entre otros temas. 1 de marzo – Elecciones parlamentarias en Irán. Con la mirada puesta en la sucesión del ayatolá Ali Jamenei por cuestiones de edad, los iraníes elegirán a los representantes de la Asamblea Consultiva Islámica y la Asamblea de Expertos; esta última encargada de elegir al nuevo líder supremo en los próximos años. No obstante, estos comicios se encontrarán marcados por la escalada de tensiones en Oriente Medio, y la profunda crisis económica y social que ha aumentado la desafección popular con el régimen. 8 de marzo – Día internacional de la mujer. Se ha convertido en una fecha clave en la agenda política y social de muchos países, como lo demuestran las movilizaciones masivas que han tomado impulso en los últimos años especialmente en América Latina, Estados Unidos y Europa. El objetivo común es la lucha por los derechos de la mujer y la igualdad de género en todo el mundo. 10 de marzo – Elecciones parlamentarias en Portugal. El país afronta elecciones anticipadas después de la crisis institucional abierta por la dimisión del primer ministro socialista António Costa. El exjefe de gobierno portugués fue objeto de una investigación judicial por presuntos delitos de corrupción que afectaron directamente a varios miembros de su gabinete. 17 de marzo – Elecciones presidenciales en Rusia. Aunque se presume que Vladímir Putin logrará la reelección manteniéndose en el poder hasta 2030, Rusia acude a las urnas en un contexto marcado por múltiples desafíos de seguridad interna. La retirada rusa de la región ucraniana de Járkov, el impacto de la guerra en Ucrania, el fallido levantamiento por parte de Wagner el pasado junio y los disturbios antisemitas en el Cáucaso Norte en octubre de 2023, podrían forzar a Putin a realizar profundas remodelaciones de la cúpula política y militar aprovechando el calendario electoral. 18 de marzo – Décimo aniversario de la anexión rusa de Crimea. La anexión de Crimea por parte de Rusia, país que había invadido la región semanas antes, fue formalizada mediante un referéndum sobre el estatus político de Crimea que sucedió sin reconocimiento internacional. La anexión se produjo tras la caída del entonces presidente ucraniano, Víktor Yanukóvich, de orientación prorrusa, tras una serie de protestas que exigían una mayor integración europea. 21 – 22 de marzo – Cumbre sobre Energía Nuclear. La Agencia Internacional de la Energía Atómica junto al Gobierno belga reunirá en Bruselas a más de 30 jefes de Estado y de gobierno de todo el mundo, así como a representantes de la industria energética y de la sociedad civil. La cumbre busca potenciar la energía nuclear frente a los desafíos que suponen la reducción del uso de combustibles fósiles, la mejora de la seguridad energética y el desarrollo económico sostenible. 31 de marzo – Elecciones presidenciales en Ucrania. Según la Constitución ucraniana, las elecciones presidenciales deben celebrarse en el último domingo de marzo durante el quinto año del mandato presidencial. Sin embargo, no es seguro que se acaben convocando ya que la ley marcial, impuesta desde el inicio de la invasión rusa del país en 2022, no permite su celebración. La falta de fondos y la oposición popular de los ucranianos a la celebración de los comicios en tiempo de guerra son factores a destacar. 31 de marzo – Elecciones locales en Turquía. El Partido Republicano del Pueblo (CHP), principal partido de la oposición, aspira a conservar el control de los municipios clave que obtuvo en 2019. Entre ellos, la capital, Ankara, Estambul, y otras ciudades significativas. La reelección de Recep Tayyip Erdoğan y la retención de la mayoría parlamentaria en las elecciones de 2023 han motivado a su formación, el Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo (AKP), a tratar de recuperar terreno a nivel municipal. 7 de abril – 30 aniversario del inicio del genocidio en Rwanda. Tras la muerte de los presidentes de Burundi y Rwanda al estrellarse el avión en el que viajaban, se inició una campaña de exterminio sistemático organizada por el gobierno hutu contra la población tutsi que duraría 100 días. El 15 de julio de 1994, el Frente Patriótico Rwandés estableció un gobierno interino de unidad nacional en Kigali que pondrían fin al genocidio. Se estima que entre 500.000 y 1.000.000 de personas fueron asesinadas. Abril – Mayo – Elecciones generales en la India. Pese a las crecientes tendencias iliberales, la «mayor democracia del mundo» acude a las urnas entre abril y mayo. El actual primer ministro indio, Narendra Modi, aspira a un tercer mandato frente a una oposición más unida que nunca bajo la Alianza Inclusiva de Desarrollo Nacional de la India (INDIA por sus siglas en inglés). 2 de mayo – Elecciones locales en Reino Unido. Las elecciones para renovar los consejos locales y alcaldías en Inglaterra, incluyendo Londres y el condado de Gran Manchester, serán un indicador del nivel de apoyo tanto para el Partido Laborista como para los Conservadores, anticipando las elecciones generales previstas para enero de 2025. 5 de mayo – Elecciones generales en Panamá. La sociedad civil panameña elegirá nuevos representantes para la presidencia, Asamblea Nacional, alcaldía y otros representantes locales. Este proceso electoral tiene lugar en un contexto de marcada polarización y creciente tensión social, acentuadas por temas relacionados con la seguridad interna, disputas políticas y la gestión de los recursos naturales. 19 de mayo – Elecciones presidenciales y legislativas en la República Dominicana. El actual presidente, Luis Abinader, líder del Partido Revolucionario Moderno, busca la reelección en unas elecciones en las que la mayoría de los partidos de la oposición se unirán bajo la Alianza Opositora Rescate, RD. Las tensiones territoriales, migratorias y económicas con la vecina Haití serán temas centrales durante la campaña electoral. Junio – Elecciones presidenciales en Mauritania. El actual presidente, Mohammed Ould Ghazouani, buscará la reelección después de cuatro años de un gobierno continuista que comenzó tras la salida del expresidente Mohammed Ould Abdelaziz en 2019, quien hoy enfrenta acusaciones de múltiples delitos de corrupción. El ganador de las elecciones deberá afrontar crecientes tensiones sociales, así como conflictos geopolíticos en toda la región. 2 de junio – Elecciones generales y federales en México. Claudia Sheinbaum, precandidata a la presidencia de México por el Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (Morena), parte como clara favorita frente a la principal candidatura opositora del Frente Amplio por México, integrado por los partidos Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Acción Nacional (PAN) y de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). En estas elecciones no solo se elige a la presidencia y el gobierno, sino también a senadurías y diputaciones federales, así como miles cargos estatales y/o municipales en 30 de las 32 entidades federativas. 6 – 9 de junio – Elecciones al Parlamento Europeo. Las elecciones se llevarán a cabo de manera simultánea en los 27 países que conforman la Unión Europea. Una de las mayores incógnitas será conocer el avance de los partidos populistas y de extrema derecha, el peso de las familias tradicionales socialdemócrata y conservadora, y las posibles alianzas que puedan surgir para la elección posterior de los principales cargos europeos. 9 de junio – Elecciones federales en Bélgica. Coincidiendo con la presidencia belga de la Unión Europea, el país celebrará elecciones federales, europeas y regionales el mismo día. Una de las incógnitas más significativas será el resultado del partido de ultraderecha Vlaams Belang, que aspira a aumentar considerablemente su apoyo hasta poner a prueba la resistencia del cordón sanitario que los ha mantenido hasta ahora apartados del poder. 13 – 15 de junio – 50ª Cumbre del G-7 en Italia. Savelletri, un pequeño pueblo en la región italiana de Apulia será el escenario de una nueva edición del G-7. En esta reunión, se abordarán los principales desafíos geopolíticos a nivel mundial y su impacto en la economía internacional, junto con otros temas fundamentales para la agenda italiana, como la inmigración y las relaciones con África. 20 de junio – Día Mundial del Refugiado. El número de personas desplazadas por la fuerza en 2023 ha alcanzado cifras récord. Los impactos de la guerra en Ucrania, los numerosos conflictos en Oriente Medio y en el continente africano, así como las catástrofes naturales vinculadas al cambio climático, han llevado a un mayor número de desplazados internos y refugiados. Durante esta semana de junio, se dará a conocer el informe anual de ACNUR de tendencias de desplazamientos forzados en todo el mundo. Primer semestre – Despliegue de la Misión Internacional en Haití. Kenia liderará el despliegue de un contingente de seguridad en el cual participarán diferentes países. El objetivo es hacer frente a la violencia de las pandillas haitianas que han provocado una importante crisis de seguridad y de gobernabilidad. El Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, previa solicitud del secretario general y del primer ministro haitiano, autorizó una misión multinacional de seguridad con un año de duración, en octubre de 2023. Primer semestre – Cumbre del Diálogo de Seguridad Cuadrilateral (QUAD). India acogerá una nueva edición de este foro estratégico del Indo-Pacífico del que forman parte Australia, India, Japón y Estados Unidos para abordar cuestiones comunes en materia de comercio, tecnologías críticas, derechos humanos o cambio climático.Julio – 24ª Cumbre de la Organización de Cooperación de Shanghai. Kazajistán asume la presidencia anual del principal foro regional de Asia Central en materia de seguridad, economía y política, compuesto por China, India, Irán, Kazajistán, Kirguistán, Pakistán, Rusia, Tayikistán y Uzbekistán. Los ejes de la presidencia kazaja estarán centrados en cuestiones de seguridad y unidad regional, así como en el desarrollo económico y el comercio regional. Además, se espera que Bielorrusia ingrese en la organización este año. 1 de julio – Hungría asume la presidencia rotatoria del Consejo de la UE. Durante el segundo semestre del año, Hungría asumirá la presidencia rotatoria del Consejo de la Unión Europea, en plenas tensiones con la Comisión Europea y el Parlamento Europeo por sus incumplimientos de la legislación comunitaria. 8 – 18 de julio – Foro Político de Alto Nivel sobre Desarrollo Sostenible. Líderes y representantes mundiales se reunirán en Nueva York para realizar el seguimiento y monitoreo de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS), además de presentar Informes Nacionales Voluntarios de los ODS. El lema de esta edición será «Reforzar la Agenda 2030 y erradicar la pobreza en tiempos de múltiples crisis: la adopción eficaz de soluciones sostenibles, resilientes e innovadoras». 09 – 11 de julio – Cumbre de la OTAN. Washington será la sede de la cumbre de la Alianza Atlántica donde se prevé la presentación de una estrategia de seguridad para el flanco sur en respuesta al mandato surgido de la cumbre de Vilna de 2023. Además, en 2024 se cumple el 75 aniversario de la fundación de la OTAN. 26 de julio – 11 de agosto – Juegos Olímpicos de Verano en París. Francia acoge la XXXIII edición del principal acontecimiento deportivo mundial que se realiza cada cuatro años; una buena oportunidad para el país anfitrión de dinamizar una economía estancada en los últimos años. Agosto – Elecciones presidenciales y parlamentarias en Ruanda. El actual presidente de Ruanda, Paul Kagame, en el cargo desde 2000, opta a la reelección tras sucesivas elecciones en las que ha obtenido más del 90% de los votos. Septiembre – Elecciones parlamentarias en Austria. La mayor incógnita radica en si la actual coalición gobernante de los conservadores (ÖVP) y los verdes (Die Grünen) podrá revalidar su gobierno o si los resultados de la extrema derecha del Partido de la Libertad de Austria (FPÖ), y de los socialdemócratas del SPÖ podrían generar otras mayorías. 22 – 23 de septiembre – Cumbre del Futuro de Naciones Unidas. Basándose en el informe «Nuestra Agenda Común» presentado por el secretario general, António Guterres, en 2021 sobre multilateralismo y cooperación internacional, este evento de alto nivel tiene como objetivo acelerar el cumplimiento de compromisos internacionales existentes, y abordar desafíos y oportunidades emergentes. La culminación de este esfuerzo será la creación de un Pacto para el Futuro, que será negociado y respaldado por los países participantes. 24 de septiembre – 79ª Sesión de Debate General de la Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas. Una cita anual que reúne a todos los líderes mundiales para evaluar el actual estado de sus políticas nacionales y su visión del mundo. 26 –27 de septiembre – 10º aniversario del caso Ayotzinapa. México conmemora el décimo aniversario del caso Ayotzinapa (o caso Iguala), uno de los mayores escándalos de derechos humanos en la historia reciente del país. Aún sin resolver, este caso supuso la desaparición forzosa de 43 estudiantes de la Escuela Normal Rural de Ayotzinapa, estado de Guerrero. Octubre – XVI Cumbre de los BRICS. Kazán será la sede de una nueva edición de los BRICS en Rusia, ahora ampliados a 11 países, lo que representa un impulso en los esfuerzos de Moscú por demostrar que el país no está aislado a pesar de la invasión a gran escala de Ucrania. 1 de octubre – 75º aniversario de la fundación de la República Popular de China. Se cumplen 75 años de la fundación de la República Popular China por Mao Zedong, que puso fin a la guerra civil entre el Partido Comunista Chino y el Kuomintang, que estalló inmediatamente tras la rendición de Japón y la disolución del Segundo Frente Unido entre ambas fuerzas políticas durante la segunda guerra sino-japonesa. 6 de octubre – Elecciones municipales en Brasil. Estas elecciones serán un buen termómetro para evaluar el grado de apoyo al Partido de los Trabajadores y al resto de partidos que respaldan al presidente Lula, así como el avance o retroceso de candidatos vinculados al bolsonarismo. En las ciudades donde se requiera una segunda vuelta, esta se llevará a cabo el 27 de octubre. 9 de octubre – Elecciones generales y regionales en Mozambique. El presidente, Filipe Nyusi, concluye su segundo y último mandato presidencial y, según la Constitución, no puede presentarse nuevamente. Su partido, el Frente de Liberación de Mozambique (FRELIMO), en el poder desde hace décadas, deberá encontrar otro candidato. El próximo gobierno tendrá que hacer frente a diversos desafíos, incluyendo tensiones políticas, un aumento del terrorismo yihadista, y una pronunciada exclusión social. 24 de octubre – Día Internacional contra el Cambio Climático. Tiene como objetivo movilizar y sensibilizar a las sociedades y gobiernos de todo el mundo acerca de los efectos del cambio climático. Se trata de un buen momento para analizar las diferentes agendas de lucha contra la emergencia climática y los avances que se están dando desde los principales países contaminantes. 27 de octubre – Elecciones generales en Uruguay. El Frente Amplio (FA), un partido de centroizquierda, con fuertes vínculos con los sindicatos y otras organizaciones sociales, competirá por la victoria frente a la Coalición Multicolor de centroderecha, actualmente en el gobierno, y que ha enfrentado diversos casos de corrupción en los últimos meses. Noviembre – Cumbre de la APEC. Perú acogerá una nueva edición del foro de Cooperación Económica de Asia-Pacífico, que reúne a 21 países y que se celebrará bajo el lema «Personas, Negocios, Prosperidad». Noviembre – Cumbre sobre el Cambio Climático, COP29. Azerbaiyán acogerá esta nueva edición de la mayor cumbre internacional dedicada al cambio climático. Por segundo año consecutivo, se celebrará en un país cuya economía depende de la producción de combustibles fósiles. Noviembre – XXIX Cumbre Iberoamericana. Ecuador acoge la Cumbre Iberoamericana de jefes de Estado y de Gobierno bajo el lema «Innovación, Inclusión y Sostenibilidad». De forma paralela las principales ciudades de América Latina, España y Portugal celebrarán un «Encuentro de Ciudades Iberoamericanas» cuyas conclusiones serán presentadas durante la Cumbre. 4 – 8 de noviembre – XII Foro Urbano Mundial. El Cairo acogerá la reunión más importante en materia de urbanismo y asentamientos humanos organizada por ONU-Hábitat. 5 de noviembre – Elecciones presidenciales en Estados Unidos. El actual presidente Joe Biden aspira a la reelección y, a falta de confirmarse la candidatura del expresidente Donald Trump, la campaña electoral se prevé muy polarizada. El calendario electoral condicionará las decisiones de Washington en política exterior. 5 de noviembre – Elecciones generales en Georgia. La coalición gobernante Sueño Georgiano aspira a revalidar mandato. La guerra en Ucrania ha vuelto a dividir al país entre aquellos que buscan una integración más profunda con Occidente y aspiran a un futuro ingreso en la Unión Europea, y los que abogan por normalizar las relaciones con Rusia. 11 de noviembre – 20 aniversario muerte de Yasir Arafat. El histórico líder palestino y presidente de la Autoridad Nacional Palestina falleció hace 20 años en París. Su papel fue fundamental en el proceso de paz en Oriente Próximo, lo que, junto a los dirigentes israelíes Isaac Rabin y Shimon Peres, les valió el premio Nobel de la Paz en 1994. 18 – 19 de noviembre – Cumbre del G-20 en Brasil. Bajo el lema «Construir un mundo justo y un planeta sostenible», los ejes de discusión y de debate de esta edición incluirán las políticas de transición energética y desarrollo, la reforma de las instituciones de gobernanza global, así como la lucha contra la desigualdad, el hambre y la pobreza. Diciembre – Elecciones presidenciales en Argelia. El presidente, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, previsiblemente optará a la reelección. El país afronta varios desafíos de seguridad debido a la inestabilidad en el Sahel y las crecientes tensiones con Marruecos respecto al Sáhara Occidental. Además, desempeña un papel crucial como proveedor de gas para Europa, en medio de la crisis energética generada por la guerra en Ucrania. Diciembre – Elecciones generales en Sudán del Sur. Los acuerdos de paz de 2018, que pusieron fin al conflicto armado interno que duró cinco años, establecieron la formación de un Gobierno de Unidad Nacional liderado por el actual presidente, Salva Kiir. y su rival, el vicepresidente Riek Machar. Kiir ha propuesto la celebración de elecciones presidenciales libres para finales de 2024. 7 de diciembre – Elecciones presidenciales en Ghana. Se espera que las elecciones sean una carrera de dos entre Mahamudu Bawumia, actual vicepresidente del gobernante Nuevo Partido Patriótico (NPP), y el expresidente John Dramani Mahama, candidato del principal partido opositor, Congreso Nacional Demócrata (NDC). El país se enfrenta a su peor crisis económica en las últimas décadas, y a importantes desafíos de seguridad por el contexto geopolítico en el Sahel. Segundo Semestre – Elecciones presidenciales en Venezuela. El chavismo y la oposición, agrupada bajo el paraguas de la Plataforma Unitaria, acordaron en Barbados la celebración de elecciones presidenciales, a las que se podrá invitar a misiones técnicas electorales de organismos regionales e internacionales. Esta decisión se tomó de forma paralela al anuncio de Estados Unidos del levantamiento de sanciones al gas y al petróleo venezolanos en octubre de 2023. Pendiente – 53º Foro de las Islas del Pacífico. Tonga acogerá una nueva edición del principal foro de discusión panregional de Oceanía, que agrupa los intereses de 18 estados y territorios en materia de cambio climático, uso sostenible de los recursos marítimos, seguridad y cooperación regional. Un espacio geográfico de creciente interés por parte de China y Estados Unidos, que han iniciado una carrera diplomática para atraer a sus esferas de influencia a algunos de estos países y territorios. Pendiente – 44ª Cumbre de la ASEAN. Laos acogerá una nueva edición del principal foro regional del sudeste asiático que agrupa a 10 países, bajo el lema «Mejorar la conectividad y la resiliencia». Pendiente – Cumbre sobre la Seguridad de la Inteligencia Artificial. Francia acogerá la segunda edición de esta cumbre internacional que tiene como objetivo poner en marcha trabajos e iniciativas para abordar los riesgos tecnológicos que plantea la Inteligencia Artificial. La primera edición, celebrada en Londres en 2023, resultó en la Declaración Bletchley, que abogó por una mayor cooperación internacional para abordar los desafíos y riesgos asociados con la inteligencia artificial. Pendiente – XXXIII Cumbre de la Liga Árabe. Bahréin acogerá una nueva edición de la principal organización política que agrupa países de Oriente Medio y del Norte de África. El conflicto palestino-israelí, las cuestiones de seguridad alimentaria y energética, y los impactos regionales de la guerra en Ucrania, serán algunos de los temas principales de discusión y debate. Pendiente – Elecciones presidenciales y parlamentarias en Sri Lanka. La tensión social en el país, inmerso en una profunda crisis económica que ha llevado a un rescate por parte del Fondo Monetario Internacional, ha aumentado en los últimos meses y se espera que se intensifique durante todo el proceso electoral. Pendiente – Elecciones generales en Chad. El presidente interino de Chad, Mahamat Idriss Déby, que asumió el poder en abril de 2021 tras la muerte de su padre, Idriss Déby, mediante la instauración de una junta militar, prometió la celebración de elecciones libres a finales de 2024. El país se encuentra en una profunda crisis alimentaria y de seguridad. Pendiente – III Cumbre para la Democracia. Corea del Sur será la anfitriona de esta cumbre, impulsada por Estados Unidos, que desde 2021 reúne a líderes de gobiernos, la sociedad civil y el sector privado. Tiene como objetivo abordar los desafíos y oportunidades que enfrentan las democracias en el siglo XXI, relacionados con la gobernanza, la protección de los derechos humanos, y la lucha contra la corrupción. Pendiente – Elecciones generales y regionales en Sudáfrica. El Congreso Nacional Africano (ANC), en el poder desde las primeras elecciones libres y generales de 1994, aspira a revalidar el poder, aunque el principal partido opositor, la Alianza Democrática, podría dar una sorpresa. El país enfrenta innumerables desafíos, especialmente en materia de seguridad con altas tasas de criminalidad, una importante crisis energética, y niveles elevados de desempleo. Pendiente – Elecciones presidenciales en Túnez. Serán los primeros comicios tras el autogolpe de Estado del presidente tunecino, Kaïs Saied, en 2021, y el retorno al autoritarismo del único país que parecía haber consolidado la democracia tras las primaveras árabes de 2010-11. Saied ya ha anunciado que no permitirá la presencia de misiones de supervisión electoral extranjeras.

Issue 8.6 of the Review for Religious, 1949. ; ¯ A.M. D~G. Reviewfor Relig°ions NOVEMBER 15, 1949 Roman Con.grecjations :. ¯ ¯ ¯ . JosephCreusen How Often Must We Pray? . Gerald Kelly Acjes of the Interior Life .". G. Augustine Ellard "We Are His Members!" . M. Raymond Questions Answered Books' Reviewed Annual Index :h VOLUME VIII NUMBEk 6 REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS VOLUME VIII NOVEMBER, 1949 NUMBER 6 CONTENTS THE ROMAN CONGREGATIONS-~3oseph Creusen, 8.3. . . . 281 HOW OFTEN MUST WE PRAY?--Gerald Kelly, S.J . 289 THE THREE AGES OF T'HE INTERIOR LIFE-- G. Augustine Ellard, S.J . 297 "WE ARE HIS MEMBERS!"--M. Raymond, O.C.S.O . 317 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS-- 40. "Reform" of Cloistered Communities . 323 41. Religious Wears Graduation Pin . 324 42. Sister as Organist in Parish Church ." . 325 43. "Class Money" for Personal Needs . ' . 325 BOOK REVIEWS-- The Day with Jesus and Mary; She Who Lived Her name; The Happi-ness of Heaven . 326 BOOK NOTICES . : . . 328 BOOK ANNOUNCEMENTS . 331 OUR CONTRIBUTORS . 332 ANNUAL INDEX . . . ." . " . 333 REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS, .November 1949, Vol. VIII, No. 6. Published bi-monthly: January, March, May, July. September, and November at the College Press, 606 Harrison Street. Topeka, Kansas,. by St. Mary's College, St. Marys, Kansas, with ecclesiastical approbation. Entered as second class matter January 15, 1942, at the Post Office, Topeka, Kansas, under the act of March 3, 1879. Editorial Board: Adam C. Ellis, S.J., G. Augustine Ellard, S.J., Gerald Kelly, S.J. Editorial Secretary: Alfred F. Schneider, S.J. Copyright, 1949, by Adam C. Ellis. Permission is hereby granted for quotations of reasonable length, provided due credit be given this review and the author. Subscription price: 2 dollars a year. Printed in U. S. A. Before writing to us, please consult notice on inside back cover. The Roman Congregat:ions Joseph Creusen, S.J. gO,~ religious who, have not made a study of canon law the terms Roman Curia' and "Sacred Congregation" will not suggest a clear picture or ide~. Superiors, of course, know that recourse "to Rome" is necessary in order to obtain certain permissions or dispensations and that their petition will be forwarded to the Sacred Congregation of Religious by their local ordinary o~. by the Apostolic Delegate. Eventually an answer will arrive from the Sacred Con-gregation through the same channel, signed by a cardinal prefect or by the secretary, and there will be a fee to pay. And that is about the extent of their knowledge. Hence the purpose of the following pages is to introduce our readers to this ancient and important institution. Name and Oflfce of Cardinals The early popes like other bishops had their particular clergy, consisting of clerics of both lower and higher rank, among whom priests and deacons held a special place. They were attached to the principal churches of the diocese of Rome, and therefore to the "title" of the church, being attached to it as :it were by a "'cardo'" or hinge. Hence, they were said to be "'intitulati'" or "'incardinatL'" On account of their higher rank the deacons and priests of the Roman diocese so connected with a special church were called "'cardinales'" (cardinal priest, cardinal deacon). Little by little the term "'card[nalis'" (cardinal) was restricted to designate the first priest or deacon of the main churches of Rome. When freedom was granted to the Church by the conversion of the Emperor Constantine, the popes began to call the bishops of the " neighboring dioceses to assist them in certain solemn ceremonies and to ask their advice in more important matters. This was done par-ticularly in provincial Roman councils. Thus it happened that the bishops of the nearby dioceses, who were summoned more frequently to assist the pope, were also called cardinals, or "cardinal bishops." The evolution of this institution of ca~rdinals took a long time. By the end of the fifth century the city of Rome had been divided into seven districts each under the authority of'a "cardinal deacon" 281 JOSHPH CRHUSHN Reeiew ~or Religious who cared for the economic condition of that district and especially for the welfare of the poor. The "cardinal priests" were at the head of the great basilicas and the other principal churches of Rome. From the twelfth century on the "cardinal bishops," called "'suburbicadi'" or "suburban" .(of the cities adjacent to Rome), numbered six. Plus V. (Const. Feb. 17, 1568) for the first time reserved the tide "cardinals" to" his councillors. During the early centuries of the Church the right to choose the new pope was exercised exclusively, or at least partially, by the clergy of Rome, by the citizens of that city, by the noble families, and by the Emperor. Finally, when it became possibIe for the popes to reserve this important right to the cardinals, their dignity and influence were much increased. They were then entrusted with the most important offices of the Roman curia. Those who resided in Rome were more or less frequently gathered in a "consistoriurn'" and became, as it were, the senate of the pope. The legates sent to vari-ous parts of the world by the Holy Father were chosen from among the resident cardinals. With greater centralization of Church government, the number and the difficulty of matters submitted to the Holy See became con-siderably increased. In imitation of civil governments, the pope was obliged to establish "offices" (boards of cardinals, councillors, and clerks) to assist in making new laws and in governing the extensive organization which was required to handle the great volume of business relating to such things as financial affairs, faculties of bishops and their relation to regulars, the struggle against heresy, the interpretation and the introduction of the decrees of the Council of Trent--~to m~ntion only the more important ones. Sixtus V is regarded as the real founder of the Roman congrega-tions. He fixed the number of cardinals at seventy--six cardinal bishops, fifty cardinal priests, and fourteen cardinal deacons1. He also reorganized the sacred congregations, incre.asing their number to fifteen (January 22, 1588). Reform of Pius X From the very beginning of his reign Dius X determined to revise the law of the Church. He made a start with the constitution 1A cardinal deacon is, of course, at least a priest, but his "title" is a church which in early ages belonged to a deacon. Many. of the cardinal priests are bishops, but they have a °'presbyteral ~itle." 282 Nouember, 1949 THE ROMAN CONGREGATIONS Sapienti consilio, dated June 29, 1908, by which he reformed the Roman Curia. This legislation was incorporated latei: on, almost without change, into the new Code of Canon Lau), which was promulgated in 1917. According to the. reform of Plus X the Roman Curia now consists of fifteen sacred congregations, three papal tribunals or courts, and five offices, such as that of the secretarg of state.In this article, however, we shall confine ourselves to the sacred congregations and make practical applications of what is said to the Sacred Congregation of Religious. Roman Congregations A Roman congregation is a board of ~ardinals who have a very accurately defined part in the government of the Church. They are assisted by a group of major and minor officers, and by a body of councillors called consultors. At the head of every congregation we find a cardinal prefect, except in the cases of the Holy Office, the Congregation for the F~astern Church, and the Consistorial Congre-gation. The pope himself is the head of these three congregations, and the cardinal who would otherwise be the prefect takes the place of the secretary and is called assessor. All the other congregations have a secretary and a subsecretary. The secretary of a congregation plays a very important part in transacting its business. Consultors To assist in the study of difficult questions proposed to the con-gregations, each one of them has a board of councillors who are called consultors. They are chosen from among the diocesan clergy and from among religious, are specialists in their field, come from various countries of the world, and most of them reside in Rome where they are engaged as professors or hold a post in.the curia of their order or congregation. Some of these consultors are Roman prelates. Minor Ot~cials To help the secretary and the subsecretary in the solution of the ordinary problems and cases which are presented to a congregation, we find a group of monsignori and priests who are called "'aiutanti di studio." These are internal councillors as contrasted with the consultors mentioned above, who may be termed external councillors since they do not ordinarily meet for consultation in the congrega-tion. Then another group called "'minutanti'" are in charge of 283 JOSEPH CREUSEN Review for Religious summing up the petition.s, while the "'protocolist'" (one or more~ takes care of the documents and puts them in order. Finally, each congregation.has a bursar, an archivist, and a group of lay helpers who are called ushers. The Sacred Congregation of Religious Let us now pay a visit to the Sacred Congregation of Religious. This will be the best way of explaining what a Roman congregation is and what it does. Pius XI built a modern office building to house the Sacred Con-gregations. It is called the Palazzo delle Congregazioni (palazzo meaning any large, ornate building),, and it is situated in the Piazza San Callisto near the old church of S. Maria Trasteoere (across the Tiber). Nearly all the congregations have their quarters in this modern building, and the two upper floors afford lodging for many officers of the congregations. Entering a courtyard we have an immediate view of this imposing edifice. On the right, as we pass along we see a beautiful fountain flanked by a statue of Plus XI, a memorial to the founder of this new home of the congregations. In the driveway immedi-ately in front of the building, we may see several autos with the legend "S C V" (Servizio Cittd Vaticano) in lieu of license plates. This indicates that one or more cardinals are already in their offices. We enter the building at a door marked "Congregation of Religious'" and find ourselves in a long corridor with high windows and ceilings. Going to the end of this corridor, on the left we find a large assembly room where various committees and consultors meet under the chairmanship of the cardinal prefect or the secretary of the con-gregation; then comes a series of smaller waiting rooms for visitors. On the right we find a waiting room and the office of the cardinal prefect and that of the secretary of the congregation. Smaller offices house the roinutanti, protocolist, bursar, and archivist. This latter is the antechamber to a very large room which has a balcony all around, and is used to keep all the documents of the Sacred Congre-gation. These are contained in steel files, in alphabetical order of the diocese in wh.ich the mother house of an institute is situated. To the right of the entrance we find another series of offices-- subsecretary, various business offices for religious men, for teaching and nursing sisters, and for the past two years an office for the secretary and committee in charge of secular institutes. 284 Nooember, 1949 THE ROMAN CONGREGATIONS The offices of the congregation are open to the public for business from 9:00 A.i~, to 1:00 P.M. During these hours the waiting rooms are filled'with religious priests, Brothers, and Sisters, who wear various habits, some ~f which would appear strange to us. Some are dressed in civilian clothes and have no religious habit. These are members of the recently established secular institutes. During office hours the officers and employees are kept very busy, and during an interview with the secretary one will ordinarily be interrupted two or three times in twenty minutes by an usher who brings a document to be signed. The Congregation of Religious is competent to handle almost any matter which concerns religious. When necessary, the secretary will send a petition to another congre-gation or ask for special faculties from the Holy Father. The subject matter of petitions sent to the Sacred Congregation of Religious covers a great variety of things of greater or less importance. For ordinary dispensations the cardinal prefect or the secretary have habitual faculties, and they will grant directly the dispensation requested. Thus, by way of example, we may mention: permission to change a last will and testament, to remain outside the religious house for more than six months, to leave papal cloister in order ~o undergo a surgical operation. For all petitions which require some discussion, a meeting called a congresso is held at least once a week. At this meeting the car-dinal prefect, the secretary, and the subsecretary are present. Som~- times one or more consultors are asked to be present to give their opinions or to discuss the report ("ootum") they have written on the subject. According to an ancient practice all questions of some importance were submitted to the "congregation," that is, to the cardinals who form the Congregation of Religious; but Pius XII has enlarged the competence of the "'cor~gresso pieno'" (full meetings)', that is, when some consultors are called to discuss questions with the cardinal prefect, the secretary, and the subsecretary, and sometimes one or other members of the congregation. The cardinals who are members of the Congregation of Religious gather in the Vatican Palace every Friday for a meeting which is called "'plenaria.'" There are twenty-three cardinals who are mem-bers of the Congregation of Religious at present, but only eleven of them reside in Rome. The others may sit in at a meeting when they happen to be in Rome for their "'ad limina'" visit, or on some other occasion. The cardinals who live in Rome are called "Cardinals in 285 ¯ .JOSEPH CREUSEN Revieto [or Religious Curia." A week before the meeting, each one receives a copy of printed documents regarding the case or cases to be ~.iscussed. These will ordinarily consist of a copy of the petition to be heard, the ,doubt to be solved, and the report (called "'votum") of one or more consultors. One of the cardinals is designated to explain the case to the assembly. He is called the Cardinal Ponens. Instructions or decrees to be issued by the Sacred Congregation, the approval of new religious institutes, difficult juridical questions, are examples of mat-ters discussed in the plenary session of the congregation. Every second and fourth Monday of the month, the cardinal prefect is received in private audience by the Holy Father who makes the final decision-~either approving the results of the plenary session or requesting a further study of the question. In the Congregation of Religious there are five boards or "com-missions" made up of various consultors according to their special competence. Among the more difficult tasks of the congregation is the preparation of instructions and decrees. These require long and arduous study on the part of the higher officials and of certain con-suitors. Our readers may be familiar with some of th~ more recent ones such as the following: the decree on military service for religious (January 1, 1911) ; the instruction on the second year of novitiate (Noyember 5, 1921); on the papal cloister 6f nuns (February 5, 1924); on secular institutes (March 19, 1948). Only canonists can. appreciate how much time and work are consumed in the preparation of such documents. Usually the preparatory work is entrusted to a board of consultors tinder the direction.of the secretary or subsecretary. The final meetings will be presided over by the cardinal pre.fect himself. Ordinarily one or two consultors prepare a draft which will then be discussed by the entire board. Being canonists themselves, many of the consultors realize how accurately terms must be chosen to avoid criticisms of the text and doubts which might arise as to the meaning of this or that word. Even the,non-canonists contribute useful suggestions. Since the consultors come from various 'countries, they look at the matter in the light of the special conditions in their own countries. Hence no one will be surprised to learn that some instructions are discussed for one, or two, or even three years before they are ready for publication. 286 Nouember, 1949 THE ROMAN CONGREGATIONS Procedure in the Congregation A simple example will give us an idea of how ordinary routine business is conducted by the Congregation of Religious. A superior general with the approval of his council decides to ask the Sacred Congregation for permission to contract a debt of $100,000 to enlarge or to equip a school or hospital. The petition must be writ-ten in Latin, Italian, or French. The petition is usually addressed to The Holy Father according tO a well-known form: "Most Holy Father: The undersigned N.N., superior general of the congregation of N.N. (mother house in the diocese of X), pros-trate at the feet of Your Holiness, sets forth the following." ' Then come~ the petition itself: "With the approval of my gen-eral council I ask for permission to contract a debt of :;100,000 to equip on a more modern scale, a hospital, school . . ." ~ Then the need for the improvement will be briefly and clearly exposed. If the congregation has other debts the superior is obliged to mention them also. It is very important to assure the Sacred Congregation that the religious institute will be able to pay the interest regularly fiom ordinary income and, after not too long a time, to retire the capital debt. The petition ends with the form: "And may God, etc." without finishing the clause. Then a final "Your Holiness' most humble servant in Christ," followed by the signatures of the superior gen-eral and his general councillors. If the approval of the general coun-cil is not required, the councillors do not sign the petition. If the congregation has a cardinal protector, the petition may be sent to him, and he will forward it to the congregation with his recommendation. For less important matters it will be sufficient to have the document signed and sealed by the local ordinary and by tbe religious major superior. It should be addressed directly to: ."His Eminence, Cardinal Lavitrano, Prefect of the S. Congregation of Religious, Piazza S. Calli~to, Rome, Italy." According to the importance of the matter, the favor will be granted immediately by the cardinal prefect or by the secretary, with or without having been examined by a consuhor. Certain matters are frequently discussed in the congresso; and if it be something still more important or difficult, it will go through a "plenary session" of the cardinals and will finally be submitted to the pope in private 287 ,JOSEPH CREUSEN audience by the cardinal prefect. For many indults a printed form is used, and the clerk has only to fill in the name of the petitioner and perhaps add a brief remark. If the petition was not presented by the cardinal protector, the indult will have to be claimed at the treasurer's office by an agent. Small religious congregations which have no agent of their own in Rome usually send in their petitions through the diocesan chancery of the mother house, and then the local ordinary's agent will take care of them. In such cases the favor is frequently not granted directly but faculties are given to the local ordinary of the mother house (general or provincial) to grant the favor "if he finds the motives and the circumstances alleged to be true." On the back of the indult are.indicated the various fees to be paid. The first is an alms to be given the Sacred Congregation on the occasion of the granting of the favors; the second is a tax in compensation for the expenses involved (work of the clerks, report of the consultor, and so forth); the third is an alms for whoever executes the indult; the fourth fixes the sum the agent may ask for his work and expenses. Conclusion Perhaps one of my readers will ask me in a low voice, "Why does it occasionally take such a long time to get an answer back from the congregation?" I could igive many reasons. It is not always the fault of the officers of the congregation. Let me remind my readers of what I said above, that the Sacred Congregation has general com-petency for practically all matters concerning religious. Now, according to very incotnplete statistics, published in 1942, the reli-gious congregations with papal approval number about 111,000 religious men and 587,000 religious women. These figures do not include the numerous members of diocesan congregations, nor the r~ligious orders; hence, no mention at all of the hundreds of monas-teries of religious nuns. To give but one small example of the num-bers of diocesan religious, a Belgian bishop once told me that he had ii/:ty (yes, I mean i/fry) smaller or larger mother houses in his dio-cese. This being so, it will not be useless to have a friend in Rome who can go to the Sacred Congregation and inquire of some employee about your business. 288 l-low Orq:en Must We Pray? Gerald Kelly, S.J. DURING the years I have.been teaching religious, particularly Sisters, I have often been presented with this problem: "Exam-inations of conscience sometimes contain the.question, 'Did I miss my morning and even!ng prayers, and my grace before and after meals?' Does this question mean that such daily prayers are obliga-tory? And if they are not obligatory, how are we to explain the question to children?" The problem, be it noted, concerns obligation. It pertains there-fore to moral, not to ascetical, theology; and it is as a moral problem that I intend to treat it. But before I touch upon the actual ques-tion, I should like to make some preliminary observations that may prevent misuntterstandings. Preliminary Observations I lay claim to no special knowledge, acquired or infused, natural or supernatural, concerning the teaching of catechism to children. In fact, I may state quite frankly that at the end of the one year of my Jesuit life in which I had the duty (or privilege) of teaching cate-chism to third-graders I was thoroughly convinced that I had not reached their minds with a single idea. As a fellow Jesuit once put it to me when we were returning home after a catechism session, "Every time I leave that class, it's with a feeling of having been thwarted." Despite that year of frustration, I still retain certain notions concerning what ought and what ought not to be taught to children. For one thing, I believe it is much better to show children (and per-haps adults, too) the fittingness, the loveliness, and the beauty of the various acts of prayer than to try to make precise distinctions con-cerning their obligation to pray) If they love prayer, they will pray; and thus they will fulfill these obligations even though they cannot define them. This seems to be in keeping with the common opinion of theologians to th~ effect that Catholics who lead a devout lFor material on the fittingness and beauty of some of the acts of prayer mentioned in this article confer, among other things, these articles in REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS: Moral Beautg in Our Duties toward God (I, 244-52) ; The Life of Faith (II, 41- 51); and Are You Sorrg for Your Sins? (III, 335-48). 289 GERALD KELLY Reoiew /~or Religious life need never worry about failing to fulfill their various duties to pray. Nevertheless, it is not right, merely in order to encourage children to do good, to foster an erroneous notion concerning their obliga-tions. Consequently, when any book or statement gives them the impression that they have a strict obligation though in reality they do not, that impression should be tactfully corrected. As regards daily prayers in particular, I might observe before discussing the main question that, even if there should be an obliga-tion to pray every day, there is certainly no duty to pray at definite times of the day, for example, in the morning or evening. Evidently these are fitting times. Yet pious Catholics who humbly confess that they did not say (heir morning prayers but said them later in the day surely have a false conscience if they think that in so acting they sin. Moreover, even if there should be an obligation to pray daily, there is clearly no obligation to say the prayers in some definite posi-tion. Some people seem to think that if they do not kneel when they pray they are doing wrong. A notion of this kind should be ~orrected--or, better still, prevented. Now for the question: is it obligatory, at least under pain of venial sin, to pray every day? Official pronouncements of the Churcl'i do not answer this question. A casual reading of Sacred Scripture seems to answer it in the affirmative. For instance, we are told: "Pray without ceasing" (I Thess. 5:17); "We ought always to pray" (Lk. 18 : 1) ; and "Be instant in prayer" (Col. 4:2). Texts like these appear to demand at least daily prayer; yet we know, from the traditional teaching of approved theologians, that such texts need not be taken in their full literal force. In part, at least, they express a counsel, not a command. To know the extent of the Obligation we have to turn to the writings of the moral theologians. Meaning of Prayer What do theologians mean by prayer? In general they distin-guish between prayer in the strict sense and prayer in the wide sense. In the strict sense prayer refers to petition, and it is defined as the "asking for becoming things from God." In the wide sense itmeans "any lifting of the soul to God," or any attual "communion with God." In this latter sense prayer includes acts. of faith, hope, love, adoration, petition, thanksgiving, praise, contrition, and so forth. It seems unquestionable that when we consider the problem of 290 November, 1949 HOW OFTEN MUST WE PRAY? daily prayers we are referring not merely to the prayer of petition but to prayer in the wide sense. To determine the exact obligation of praying, therefore, we ought to study what theologians have to say about the necessity of each of the acts mentioned in the previous paragraph. As a matter of fact, with reference to the necessity of prayer, moralists do not treat all these acts; but they do treat the principal ones: faith, hope, charity, contrition, and petition. These five acts, as treated by theologians, are primarily considered as inter-nal acts; though at times, of course, as when we speak of the neces-sity of certain acts with reference to confession, some external expres-sion is understood. Besides these various internal acts, theologians also treat of the necessity of social worship, which might include in some way many of the prayers not specifically treated elsewhere. A brief survey of these various sections of moral theology will give us all the background we need for a correct answer to th~ question: are daily prayers of obligation? Various Acts The Catholic life is a supernatural life: and faith is the founda-tion of supernatural living. It is evident, therefore, that faith must play an important part in the Catholic life. In fact, a truly devout life undoubtedly includes many acts of faith, at least implicitly, every day. But the fervent life is not the measure of obligation. Obligation refers to the minimum. And. when tbey speak of the obligation of making acts of faith, theologians are very conservative in estimating the required frequency. Treating of the necessity of making acts of faith, moralists first consider the nature of faith itself and its importance in the Christian life. From this consideration they conclude that every Catholic must make an act of faith at the beginning of his conscious moral life when he first realizes ~hat God has revealed certain truths to be believed. Another occasion that calls for an act of faith is had when the Church solemnly defines a certain doctrine and thus imposes upon us the duty of accepting it as divinely revealed. Besides specifying these two occasions, the most that theologians can say about the precept of faith in itself is that we must make acts of faith "at times" during life. Some have tried to define this obligation more accur-ately in terms of years, months, or weeks. These opinions are der-tainly worth reading; but they are merely opinions, not binding on anyone. 291 GERALD KELLY Review for Religious In the preceding paragraph I have indicated duties imposed on all Catholics by the precept of faith itself. Besides these, there are certain occasions when some other precept or special circumstance includes at least implicitly the necessity of making an act of faith. For instance, the duties of making acts of hope, charity, and contri-tion include the duty of making implicit acts of faith because such acts are impossible without faith. So, too, the duty of making a good confession or a good Communion. But in all these cases faith is not necessarily a separate act. Also, if one is facing a strong temptation which he cannot overcome without an act of faith, this act is obligatory. And if one has denied his faith by the sin of heresy or by apostasy from the true religion, he must, in reparation, make a new act of acceptance of the revealed truths he bad denied. The theol6gy on the necessity of acts of hope follows much the same pattern as I have outlined with regard to faith. From the dog-matic and ascetical points of view it would be difficult to e~aggerate the importance of hope. It must be present in the repentance of the sinner, in the heroism of the saint, and in the salutary perseverance of all the just. But concerning its prescribed frequency one must be cautious. Like faith, an act of hope is required at the beginning of one's moral life and "at times" during life. And like faith., it is at least implicitly required in certain other acts, for example, in an act of contrition, in a good confession, and in any effective prayer for grace. Also, an act of hope is required in reparation for a sin. of desperation. We next consider the best of all prayers, the act of love of God. That there are certain special occasions when an act of charity is imperative, is evident. For example, if a man is dying in the state of mortal sin and cannot receive a ~acrament, he can save his soul only by making an act of perfect contrition, which includes an act of charity. Also, if a person is in the state of mortal sin and must receive one of the sacraments of the living but cannot go to confes-sion, he is bound to regain the state of grace by means of perfect contrition. Even apart from these special occasions, one must at least occa-sionally during life make explicit acts of charity. This is the con-stant and universal teaching of eminent theologians, and the only teaching that the Church wilI'tolerat~. Absurd opinions such as these: it is enough to make an act of charity once in a life time, or once every five years--have been condemned. How anyone cc~uld* 292 Nooember, .I 9 4 9 HOW OFTEN MUST WE PRAY? hold opinions of this nature in view of the facts that the very ~ssence of the New Law is ~harity and that Sacred Scripture. urges us again and again to love God is somewhat of a mystery. Yet it is one thing to say that we must make acts of charity occa-sionally or even frequently; it is quite another to say how often they must be made. There is nothing defined on this point; and the theologians cannot determine it. All that can be said with certainty is that acts of charity should be made occasionally, or perhaps rather often, during life. In the preceding paragraphs I have made some references to the act of contrition. These were merely passing references. A sum-mary of the approved teaching concerning the necessity of this par-ticular act would run somewhat as follows. It is a conditional obli-gation; it depends on the fact that one has sinned. The Blessed" Virgin, for instance, could not make an act of contrition--and therefore could have no obligation to do so--because she never sinned. But for one who has sinned, contrition of some kind is an absolute requirement for forgiveness. For one who has committed a mortal sin, this clearly means that he has a serious obligation to make an act of contrition (perfect or imperfect, according to circum-stances) on the following occasions: when he is in danger of death; when he makes his yearly confession; when he is 'obliged for some special reason to 'acquire the state of grace (for example, when he receives a sacrament of the living). Venial sin does not require con-fession and is not an obstacle to the fruitful reception of the sacra-ments of the living; hence it seems that there is no definite occasion when contrition for venial sin is absolutely called for. Confession. of course, would make it conditionally necessary: that is, if one who has only venial sins wishes to go to confession, he is obliged to make an act of contrition. We come now to prayer in its strictest theological meaning, peti-tion. This kind of prayer may be considered under a twofold aspect: it is an act of worship of God, and it is a means of helping ourselves. As an act of worship, petition expresses our reverence for and dependence on God. Understood in this sense, prayer is certainly of obligation for all men, independently of their personal sanctity and of their special personal needs. Yet, if we limit our consideration of prayer to this sense, we can say no more about the frequency of the obligation than we said about the necessity of making acts of" faith. hope, and charity. We can simply say that every man, even the least 293 GERALD KELLY Review ?or Religious tempted, even the most perfect, even one confirmed in grace must pray occasionally. His very nature demands that he express his dependence on God in this way; but neither reason nor revelation tells clearly just how often he must so express himself. Prayer, however, is not merely a means of honoring God; it is also a personal necessity. In the providence of God, humble petition is the ordinary means of obtaining His blessings, particularly His grace, and grace is a necessity both for salvation and ~anctification. Since man is obliged to do at least what is required for his salvation, he is certainly obliged to pray. But how often must we direct our petitions to God? Must it be every day, or every time we need help? Theologians, having care-fully considered the data afforded by Scripture and Tradition, do not feel justified in giving an unqualified "yes" to such questions. The most that they can give as a general rule is that we must pray "very often." Beyond this, the answer is~ relative; some need to pray more frequently than others. As regards the prayers we have considered in the preceding para-graphs, one difficulty in estimating the obligations is that this must be done almost entirely without the help of definite statements by the Church. The case is different with reference to social worship; hence we need but mention this ~opic very briefly. The Mass is our principal form of social worship; and the Church.has stated quite definitely that we must assist at Mass on all Sundays and on clearly determined feasts of obligation. Conclusions I suppose that up to this point my discussion sounds m?re mathematical than religious. If it does, it is unintentional; I have not been inspired by any love of mathematics. I have no desire to urge people to count their prayers or their obligations. And I earnestly recommend for the comfort of all the common opinion of theologians to which I referred earlier in this article: namely, that those who lead a good Catholic life need not be concerned about any possible failure to fulfill their various duties to pray. Nevertheless, mathematics has its place; and one place is right here, in this conclusion. We have to ask ourselves whether all the duties to pray that have been outlined in this article add up to an obligation to say daily prayers. The answer is negative. If we prescind for a moment from the relative duty of praying for the 294 November, 1949 HOW OFTEN MUST WE PRAY ? graces we need, it seems that all the other duties can generally be fulfilled by the devout attendance at Mass at the prescribed times. The necessity of prayer for personal needs might increase this some-what, but there is no evidence that it is a daily duty for everyone. Do all moral theologians agree with the conclusion that daily prayer is not of strict obligation? The answer seems to be "yes, and no." They agree with,the conclusion ir~ theor~t; but many prefer to give a qualified answer for practice. These moralists would answer the questi6n concerning the duty of saying daily prayers somewhat as follows: "Theoretically, there is no obligation to pray every day. But in practice there is usually a sin in the omission of these prayers, because when daily prayers are omitted without a sufficient reason this is often due to a small fault of laziness, sensuality, or human respect." This formula, or one somewhat similar, is sponsored by eminent theologians; and catechists who wish to follow it in explaining the duty of praying are certainly justified in doing so. But I would not recommend it. I find it confusing. It says, on the one hand, that daily prayers are not of obligation; yet, on the other, it demands a sufficient reason under pain of sin for omitting them. This seems to beg the entire question. For if there is no obligation to say daily prayers, why should a reason be required under pain of sit~ for omitting them? As for the statement that failure to say these prayers could be a sin of laziness, this seems to ignore completely the distinction between imperfection and venial sin.2 For laziness is not a sin in the strict sense; it is an inordinate disposition or tendency, and it becomes sinful only when it leads to the neglect of some duty binding under pain of sin. In other words, laziness is an imperfec-tion when it induces one to'act against a counsel (e.g., to break a rule which does not bind under pain of sin), and it is a sin when it leads one to violate a precept (e.g., to miss Sunday Mass in whole or in part).8 And what I have said of laziness is similarly true of such things as sensuality and human respect. 2Some authors hold that a positive imperfection is a venial sin. These men might logically defend.the formula I am here criticizing. But many moralists who pro-pose this kind of formula also hold firmly to the distinction between positive imperfections and venial sins. aEven here, when we speak of the "sin of laziness," it is not a specific kind of sin, but merely the source of sin. This is obvious from the fact that when ones misses Mass through laziness, all that he is obliged to confess is the fact that he missed Mass. 295 GERALD KELLY Because of these difficulties, I would not personally recommend the formula. I prefer the practical explanation given by Father Tan-querey m his moral theology, which may be roughly translated as follows: "The faithful are to be urged to pray daily, especially in the morning to ask the graces they need for the day, and in the evening to thank God for benefits received, to make .an act of contrition for their sins, and to commend their souls to God before going to sleep. Those who omit their morning and evening prayers do not sin directly by this omission; but experience proves that, all other things being equal, those who do not say these prayers fall into sin more frequently than those who. do.TM One final point. In view of all that has been said, what is a catechism teacher to do when the examination of conscience for children includes the question: ':Did I miss my morning and evening prayers, and my grace before and after meals?" Before I answer, let me recall my own experience in teaching third-graders. With this experience in mind, I have not the temerity to suggest the precise method of illuminating young minds. All that I dare suggest is that the teacher try in some way to convey the following ideas to the children : "This question does not mean that you would commit a sin every time you omit these prayers. The question is put there to remind you that all of us must often p~ay and that those times are especially fitting times for prayer. If you do not pray at these times, there is a good chance that you won't pray at other times, either; and this would mean that you do not pray even when you really need it, and that would be a sin. So, keep the habit of saying these daily prayers, and when you go to confession check up on yourselves to see whether you have been saying them. If you find that you often miss your daily prayers, you will know that you are getting a bad habit, and you ought to correct it." 4Cf. A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Tbeologiae Moralis et Pastoraiis, II (1936), n. 861. 296 The Three Ages of the Interior Life G. Augustine Ellard, S.J. WITH the publication of the second volume of T~e Three Ages of the Interior Life1 the work is now. complete in English. The first volume was considered in this REVIEW, VI (July, 1947), 249. In what follows the work as a whole is discussed. I. Content As the title suggests, spiritual development is conceived and pre-sented after the analogy of organic growth. Corresponding to the periods of childhood, adolescence, and maturity in natural human life, there are in the supernatural life also three stages of spiritual evolution, namely, progress along the purgative, illuminative, and unitive ways. Moreover in both the natural and the supernatural orders each of the three periods is ushered in by a crisis. Of these the first is birth for one's physical life; corresponding to it there is justifi-cation, or the beginning of one's interior life. Adolescence is intro-duced by the second crisis, puberty; and, analogously to it, with "the night of sense" a person enters upon the illuminative way. Finally, the third natural crisis consists in attaining one's majority or reaching maturity; the spiritual correlate is "the night of the spirit," which is followed by the transforming union, the state of full super-natural maturation. It will be noticed that two of the three ages are mystical. In case one should fail to make sufficient progress, or grow up, one would become a dwarf or midget. In an elaborate arrange-ment, summarized diagrammatically on page 245 of volume I, degrees of the virtues, the functions of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, various purifications, and the grades of prayer are assigned to each of the three ages. So much for the general idea indicated by the title. The second volume covers the second and third ages, that is, the illuminative way of proficients and the unitive way Of the perfect. Treatment of the illuminative way is introduced with a discus-sion of "the second conversion" and the necessity for it. Here, 1THE THREE AGES OF THE INTERIOR LIFE, Prelude of Eternal Life. B~ The Rev. R. Gattigou-Lagrartge, O.P. Translated by Sister M. Timothea Doyle, O.P., Rosary College, River Forest, Illinois. Volume Two. Pp. xiv -b 668. B. Herder Book Co., St. Louis 2, Missouri, 1948. $7.50. 297 G. AUGUSTINE ELLARD Review for Religious besides Father Lallemant, who originated the expression, St. Cath-erine of Siena, Suso, and Tauler are drawn upon. Then the passive purification of the senses is handled; for this the great authority is St. John of the Cross. The principal characteristics of proficients are pointed out. After a chapter in which with the aid of a drawing the virtues and gifts of persons in this stage are fitted together into an imposing "spiritual edifice," the virtues, both moral and theo-logical, are taken up separately. There follows a section on docility to the Holy Spirit, ohe of the supernatural traits peculiarly empha-sized in this' work. Next the discernment of spirits, the Sacrifice of the Mass, Holy Communion, and devotion to Mary are dealt with inasmuch as they pertain specifically to this second age. After some pages on "the universal accessibility of the mysticism of The Imita-tion," we come to what in all this matter seems to be the author's leading preoccupation, namely, a series of chapters on contemplation. The author professes-to describe the passage from acquired prayer to initial infused contemplation in accordance with the teaching of St. Francis de Sales, St. Thomas, St. Teresa, and St. John ot: the Cross. In the official condemnation by the Church of the errors of the Quietists Father Garrigou-Lagrange finds a confirmation of his doctrine on the beginnings of infused prayer. Then there follows a more cbntroversial discussion of certain questions ~elative to infused contemplation; how, for instance, it should be defined, what its intimate nature is, what forms its progress takes, what it does not require, what the call to it is, and so on. Finally, the treatment of the illuminative way and of the third part of The Three Ages is concluded with a consideration of the agreements and disagreements between St. Teresa and St. John. The one is not a theologian and the other is. Part Four is concerned with the mature age and the unitive way of the perfect. In particular, it describes the passive purification .of the spirit, the habitual union of perfect souls with God, "the way of spiritual childhood" constituting a special form of the perfect life, the heroic degree of the virtues, and lastly different forms and degrees of the unitive life. Under this general heading come the perfect apostolic life, advanced reparation, the influence of the Holy Spirit in those who have reached this period, arid mystical union and ecstatic union according to St. Teresa, and then at last the trans-forming union, prelude to the union of heaven. At this point by way of appendix the author does a most unusual thing: he inserts a whole article by another writer who shares the same opinions on the 298 Not~ember, 1949 AGES OF THE INTERIOR LIFE mystical problems that have been much debated in recent years. The fifth part deals briefly with extraordinary graces, that is, those miraculous favors which sometimes accompany high sanctity. The differences between facts of divine origin and morbid phenomena are pointed out. The diabolical manifestations of possession and obsession are also considered. The "Epilogue" returns again tb controversy. The first part is on "the axis of the spiritual life and its unity," the axis being faith, hope, and charity, and is made up mostly of a discussion about the distinction between ascetical and mystical theology. The second part deals with "the beatific vision and its normal prelude." One might think that this prelude, mentioned so often, would be a high degree of purity or virtue. Rather it is infused contemplation, especially as it occurs in the transforming union. The great raison d'etre of this whole large work, treating the spiritual life from beginning to end, seems to be to propound the thesis that infused contemplation comes within the normal develop-ment of the interior life and is morally necessary for the full perfec-tion of Christian life. Everything appears to be centered around that thesis. Over and over again it is indefatigably reiterated. On this more than on anything else will probably depend the permanent value and importance of the work. According to the author beginners meditate, that is, practice a discursive method of prayer, though their meditation may become simplified. Of course they receive help from the gifts of the Holy Spirit, present in all just souls, but this influence is latent and is not characteristic of their kind of prayer. If they advance as they should and if no special obstacles intervene, they will be given the grace of. infused contemplation. All contemplation practically, or at least contemplation as "the great masters" understood it, is infused. It is so called because it is due to a special inspiration coming through the gifts and is not at our disposal, like, for example, the ability to meditate, It proceeds from living faith illumined by the gifts of wisdom and understanding. Ordinarily the first form of infused contemplation granted by , the Holy Spirit is that described by St. dohn of the Cross as "the night of sense.". Then, if one be faithful and continue to make sufficient progress, one will also go through all the mystic ascensions as set forth by St. Teresa and St. 3ohn and finally come to rest in the transforming union or mystic marriage. Here the full perfection both of contemplation and of the Christian life are attained. More- 299 G.AUGUSTINE F~LLARD for Religious over, to this happy state all are called. As a matterof fact it is rare, but that is only because men are not generous enough in accepting the graces that would bring them to it. Thus a magnificent prospect is opened out before one who undertakes to pursue the spiritual life in earnest. I[. Merits Among the special values of The Three Ages would be included, I should say, these points: it is the latest and best expression of a very eminent theologian's doctrine; it is an excellent presentation of the spirituality of the present-day Dominican School; one can learn a considerable amount of theology from it; and, most of all, it has great inspirational power and force. Father Garrigou-Lagrange has long been a theologian of great distinction. In the Thomist school he has been among the first and foremost for a generation. To his credit there stands a long list of learned works in philosophy and dogmatic theology. For a number of years he has also taken a very keen interest in ascetical and mysti-cal theology and here too he has written very much. Altogether he is said to have published more than two hundred articles or books. His influence, in spiritual matters and ideas is very great, and any-thing that he proposes is apt to be taken up and propagated by numerous lesser authorities. The Three Ages sums up, completes, and puts in convenient form most of the ideas which be has pre-viously taught in his other spiritual writings. Hence it is now, and very probably will remain, the definitive expression of his thought in ascetical and mystical matters. It is also an admirable presentation of the general spiritual doc-trine of a group of Dominican Fathers, and in varying degrees also of others who agree with them. In other words, it gives the teaching of a certain school of spirituality within the Church, and one, too, which in our time enjoys special favor and exerts great influence. The simplest way now to indicate the substance of their doctrine is to say that it is just that which is set forth in The Three Ages. No other work synthesizes it so well. One could also say that it is that sys-tem of spirituality which is proposed in France by La Vie Spirituelle, in Spain by La Vida Sobrenatural, and now in this country by the new Cross and Crown. Now that several of Father Garrigou- Lagrange's spiritual books have been translated into English, he is by all means the chief representative of this school in our language as well as in his own. 3OO November, 1949 AGES OF THE INTERIOR LIFE From what has been said it will surprise nobody that from n careful reading of The Three Ages one could learn much theology. The author is nothing if not a theologian; not, for instance, a psy-chologist. But one would have to remember carefully that it is the-ology of the Thomist school, not always simply Catholic theology. Throughout this work, from the first page to the last, St. Thomas is quoted over and over again; consequently one can learn much of the Saint's doctrine from it. An example of how theology enters into this second volume: the first chapter is concerned mostly with the language of spiritual writers as compared with that of the theo-logians. It is concluded that the language of the mystics, expressing infused contemplation, is the loftier of the two. Naturally those parts of theology are drawn upon most which relate to the practical living and development of the supernatural life: ~he inhabitation of the Blessed Trinity, sanctifying grace, the virtues, both moral and theological, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the nature ot? Christian perfection, the Sacrifice of the Mass, Holy Com-munion, prayer, and contemplation. There is a chapter on the errors of the Quietists about contemplation and pure love. On this latter Father Garrigou-Lagrange wrote at great length in L'Amour de Dieu et la Croix de des.us. Of all the excellences of this work, the principal one, I should say, is its inspirational value. Eminent theologian that he is, the author keeps reminding his readers of the grand dogmas of Chris-tianity, their "infinite elevation," their implications for our affective and practical lives, and the supreme motive power that they could and should have for our wills. One who is looking for something on a favorite minor devotion will not find it in The Three Ages; but one will be treated therein to a wealth o1: dogmatic material that makes an unsurpassed background for the spiritual life and subject matter for ennobling reflection and mental prayer. From the way and manner in which Father Garrigou-Lagrange handles such important doctrines as the inhabitation of the Blessed Trinity, the worth of sanctifying grace, the superiority of the infused virtues, the humility and magnanimity of Christ, the values of faith, hope, and charity, the Sacrifice of the Mass, reception of the Holy Eucharist, the fruits of devotion to the Blessed Virgin, and so on, a reader feels his heart warmed and his enthusiasm enkindled for these great truths. III. Demerits On the debit side some deficiences are observable in The Three 301 G. AUGUSTINE ELLARD Reoieto for Religious Ages. It is all the more necessary and important to point them out-- and this is the reason for these criticisms--inasmuch as the work will most likely be read very widely and exert a very great influence. To many readers, less conversant with modern mystical controversies or less critical in accepting what a noted theologian writes, the book could easily be misleading in certain matters. The greater an author's reputation and the more excellent his work, the worse may be the consequences of its defects. The Three Ages is theoretical rather than practical; it is one-sided and narrow; an essential part of it, namely, its doctrine on the gifts of the hoIy Spirit, is uncertain; and its main thesis is not after all really so significant. 1. For a work that is directed to interior souls generally and has the professed aim of inviting them "to become more interior and to tend to union with God" (II, p. 8), The Three Ages has overmuch that is speculative and controversial. It inclines rather to stress the-ory than practice, metaphysics than psychology, contemplation than life, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit rather than the virtues. From the practical point of view, there are some surprising omissions. The particular examination of conscience seems not even to be mentioned, although surely it is one of the major techniques in modern Catholic asceticism. For the general examination no precise method is sug-gested. What is more strange, for all those who do not as yet enjoy infused contemplation--and surely, they would, be-numerous-- only 19 of the 1162 pages are given to mental prayer. Those who" struggle with the difficulties of meditation will not find much help or consolation. No definite method of: meditation or of any other form of mental prayer is offered. The well-known methods used in the Church are not even named. Of the little written on method a con-siderable part is rather in disparagement of it or against the abuses of it. A beginner might well ask what he is to do until.the time comes --and that may be in the distant future--when he is favored with mystical contemplation. In another and more general way The Three Ages does not seem to be as practical a work on spirituality as most people could rightly desire. Throughout, the emphasis is on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in contrast to the virtues. The "special inspirations" of the gifts are quite beyond our reach, except that indirectly by co-operating with previous graces we can dispose ourselves to receive .them. A practical-minded person bent on applying what he reads to his life might ask: "What can I do about the gifts that I am not doing anyway in culti- 302 November, 1949 AGES OF THE INTERIOR LIFE vating the virtues? Wait for their, inspirations? Then, when they come, how shall I recognize them?" It would appear, both on theoretical and practical grounds, much better to emphasize the vir-tues, at least the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity. The gifts are supposed to be subordinated to these latter. In general it is true of the whole work that it does not get down, except by way of inspiration and motivation, to the everyday details of actually living the good life. 2. The Three Ages is a very splendid exposition of one concep-tion of the spiritual life, but it is only one, and not simply the Cath-olic view. Nor does it make this fact sufficiently clear in its text. Consider, for example, the division of three ways, fundamental in this work. A leading contemporary spiritual author, whose doc-trine is on the whole very much like that of Father Garrigou- Lagrange and to whom this latter seems to be much indebted, is Msgr. Saudreau, the author of The Degrees of the Spiritual Life and other books. Saudreau, who also makes much use of St. John of the Cross, assigns infused contemplation to the unitive way (see the whole second volume of The Degrees) ; Garrlgou-Lagrange assigns it to both the illuminative and unitive ways--a great difference indeed. The manual now most widely used in ascetical and mystical matters is the Sulpician Tanquerey's The Spiritual Life. He has the three ways without any necessary inclusion of infused contemplation at all; it may or may not come within the unitive way (pp. 301, 461, 606, 736). The last Carmelite to write a full systematic treatise on ascetical and mystical theology is Crisogono del Jesus Sacramentado, Compendio de Ascetica ~1 Mistica (1933). He provides for a double set of three ways: one without infused contemplation, the other with it (pp. 53, 156). So does Naval, of the Missionary Sons of the Immaculate Heart, in Tbeologiae Asceticae et M~tsticae Cursus (p. 32). On contemplation also there is a difference. Among all the schools of spirituality in the Church, the one which has, so to speak, specialized most on contemplation is that of the Carmelites, and of course they glory in presenting the teaching of St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross. Their doctrine, or at least the expression of it, is not the same as what we find in The Three Ages. The leading representative now of the Carmelites is Father Gabriel of St. Mary Magdalen, professor of spiritual theology in the International Col-lege of-St. Teresa, Rome. He has written much on acquired contem-plation. Half of his work, St. John of the Cross, recently published 303 G. AUGUSTINE ELLARD Review for Religious in English, is devoted to it. Besides, in Ecole Teresiene et Problems M~lstiques Contemporains, he writes: "By their doctrine on the con-templation that belongs to beginners, the Carmelite authors of the first generation gave the first indication of the doctrine of acquired contemplation that soon became one of the characteristics of the Carmelite School. They teach in fact the existence of a contempla-tion that follows meditation, that proceeds from it, though one may easily find in it some infusion of celestial light. Does not a con-templation which is the fruit of our activity in meditation merit the name 'acquired'? (p. 79) . It is certain . . . that this teaching on acquired contemplation is one of the characteristics of the Carmelite School" (p. 86). Very recently, at the end of a study on Thomas of Jesus and acquired contemplation, Father Gabriel writes: "Nothing that we have found contradicts, rather on the contrary everything favors, the traditional teaching of the Teresian school which sees in the doctrine of St. John of the Cross on the transition from meditation to contemplation the origin of the doctrine of acquired contempla-tion, and we need not fear to give to him whom that school names its Mystical Doctor the title also, more humble indeed but still impor-tant, of 'the Master of active contemplation' " (Revue d'Ascetique et Mystique, 1949, 17). In Father Garrigou-Lagrange's view of how mental prayer develops there is hardly any place for acquired contemplation. Con-templation, as "the great spiritual writers, especially St. John of the Cross and St. Teresa" understood it, is infused, and "ordinarily" (II, p. 337) it follows meditation. Quite fundamental to The Three Ages is the general interpreta-tion which it takes of the whole system of St. John of the Cross. According to one of the foremost contemporary Benedictine authori-ties on mysticism, it is not at all the right one. In commenting upon Garrigou-Lagrange's previous book, Christian Perfection and Con-templation, identical in this matter with the present work, and after saying that he presents in an incomparable way the doctrine of St. Thomas on Christian perfection, he adds: "but the conception that St. John of the Cross had of mysticism and contemplation entirely escaped him" (Mayer, M~stik als Lehre und Leben, p. 225). Other scholars also who have specialized in mystical studies take a very different view of St. John; for example, Marechal (Etudes sur la Ps~lcbologie des Mttstiques, v. II, especially pp. 321-359), and 304 November, 1949 AGES OF THE INTERIOR LIFE Crisogono del ,)esus Sacramentado, San Juan de Ia Cruz, su Obra Cientitica g Literaria. 3. Next we come to the gravest defect that I find in The Three Ages, namely the uncertaintg of much of it, and the fact that this uncertainty is not sufficiently acknowledged by the author. Making a clear-cut distinction between recognized Catholic dogma or doc-trine and the conclusions or theological speculations that he shares is surely not one of Father Garrigou-Lagrange's excellences. This has been true of his writings in general. The whole vast construction presented in these two large volumes stands or falls with the special doctrine on the gifts of the Holy Spirit which forms as it were the supporting framework of it. How fully it enters into the whol~ system can be seen at a glance by consulting the diagrammatic outline on page 245 of volume I. And still this particular theory is proposed without any adequate indidation of its speculative and uncertain character. As a matter of fact there is very little in the theology of the gifts that is certain and commonly acknowledged as such. After quoting Leo XIII, Father Garrigou-Lagrange himself thus summarizes the papal teaching: "Encyclical Divinum illud munus (May 9, 1897), circa iinem. This text shows: (1) the necessity of the gifts ('has need of') ; (2) their nature: they make us docile to the Holy Ghost; (3) their effects: they can lead us to the summit of sanctity." (Vol. I, p. 70.) There is a great difference between these three simple points and the whole theory that forms the skeleton, so to speak, of The Three Ages. There never has been and is not now any consensus among theo-logians as to how the gifts of the Holy Spirit are to be conceived." Scotus denied the very existence of the gifts as distinct entities. Apparently his whole school, especially the Franciscan theologians, still does. From a recent Franciscan publication: "The doctrine of the Franciscan school and especially that of Scotus, tends to a simpli-fication of the spiritual life. The supereminence of charity and its effectiveness in the Christian life as stressed by our school show the unity of that life very clearly. This same trait in the teaching of Scotus is seen in his doctrine on the nature of the gifts of the Holy Spirit . Here again Scotus insist~ that entities must not be multi-plied without necessity. And once more we are impressed with the marvelous synthesis and unity in these various phases of the spiritual life as explained by the Subtle Doctor .Scotus maintains that the 305 G. AUGUSTINE ELLARD Reoieto for Religious gifts are not distinct from the virtues. He points out that there is no necessity for distinct habits, since the three theological virtues and the four cardinal virtues perfect man sufficiently for even the most heroic and very highest action." (The Virtues according to Franciscan School, Franciscan Clerics, Old Mission Santa Barbara, 1946.) In this denial Scotus was followed by the great doctor of the Church and master in spirituality, St.' Francis de Sales, who also is one of Father Garrigou-Lagrange!s preferred authorities. On the gifts St. Francis says: "Now they are not only inseparable from charity, but, all things well considered, and speaking precisely, they are the principal virtues, properties and qualities of charity. For (1) Wisdom is in fact no other thing than the love which relishes, tastes and experiences, how sweet and delicious God is; (2) Under-standing is nothing else than love attentive to consider and penetrate the beauty of the truths of faith, to know thereby.God in Himself, and then descending from this to consider Him in creatures; (3) Science, on the other hand, is but the same love, keeping us attentive to the knowledge of ourselves and creatures, to make us reascend to a more perfect knowledge of the service which we owe to God"; and so on, through the other four gifts. (The Lot~e ot: God, XI, 15.) Again, in a later chapter: "So that, Theotimus, most holy charity is a virtue, a gift [in the context clearly a gift of the Holy Spirit], a fruit and a beatitude . As being a gift, charity makes us docile and tractable to interior inspirations, which are, as it were, God's secret commandments and counsels, in the execution of which the.seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are employed, so that charity is the gift of gifts." (XI, 19.) One of the few works in English on dogmatic theology has the following to say on the gifts: "Thesis III: The seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are also infused with sanctifying grace. This proposi-tion may be qualified as "probabilis' . . . . Are these seven gifts (or some of them) really distinct from the infused moral virtues? Are they habits or habitual dispositions, or merely transient~ impulses or inspirations? What are their mutual relations and how can they be divided off from one another? These and similar questions are in dispute among theologians." (Pohle-Preuss, Grace, Actual and Habitual, p. 369.) In the Catholic Encyclopedia, over the signature of Forget, pro-fessor of dogmatic theolqgy in the University of Louvain, we find: 306 November, 1949 AGES OF THE INTERIOR LIFE "As to the inner nature of these gifts of the Holy Ghost, theologians consider them to be supernatural and .perinanent qualities, which make us attenti,~e to the voice of God, which render us susceptible to the workings of actual grace, which make us love the things of God, and, consequently, render us more obedient and docile to the inspira-tions of the Holy Ghost. But holy do they differ from the virtues? Some writers think they are not really distinct from them, that they are the virtues inasmuch as the latter are free gifts of God, and that they are identified essentially with grace, charity, and the virtues. That opinion has the particular merit of avoiding a multiplication of the entities infused into the soul. Other writers look upon the gifts as perfections of a higher order than the virtues; the latter, the.y say, dispose us to follow the impulse and guidance of rehson; the former are functionally intended to render the will obedient and docile to the inspirations of the Holy Ghost." (Vol. vii, p. 413.) Among contemporary dogmatic theologians who propose the basic doctrine on the gifts as only probable or more probable one could cite the following: Van der Meersch, De Gratia, p. 215; Parente, De Gratia, pp. 26.7, 283: Diekamp-Hoffmann, O.P., Tbeologiae Dogmaticae Manuate III, 19, 155; Van Noort, De Gratia, (brd ed.), p. 155. Father De Guibert gave much attention to a stu~iy.of the gifts, and in particular he made a special effort to determine what is certain and what probable concerning them. His conclusion was that we could hold with certainty, or at least very great probability, that there exist in the souls of the just habitual infused dispositions of docility toward the inspirations of the Holy Spirit. This appears to him to be the basis upon which rest the speculative conclusions of theologians about the gifts (Revue d'Ascetique et Mgstique, 1933, 1-26). Father De Guibert's finding is indeed a long.~ay from Father Garrigou-Lagrange's coflception of the gifts. Among the best and most important studies on the gifts pub-lished in recent years seems to be a long article by Father De Blic, Pour l'Historie de la Tbeotogie des Dons. He judges that Father De Guibert went too far and that still less even can be said in favor of the prevailing theory of the gifts (Revue d'Ascetique et Mystique, 1946, 117-179). Of the theologians of this century who are special authorities on the gifts the outstanding one by far is the Dominican Father A. Gardeil. In the Dictionnaire de Theologie Catbolique he writes: 307 G. AUGUSTINE ELLARD Reoieto for Religious "In our days the debate still goes on among theologians over the dis-tinction between the infused virtues and the g!fts. If the distinction is debated, much more are other and" lesser points in the doctrines" (IV-2, 1778.) The Dominican Joret, in a good-sized work on the mystical theology of St. Thomas, points .out that it was .not until the thir-teenth century that the distinction between the gifts and the infused virtues was well worked out. "St, Thomas seems to have made .pre-cise and definitive the theory of the gifts of the Holy Spirit." Then, after a brief passage in which he gives St: Thomas's general idea of the gifts (divine inspirations as opposed to human, reflections), he writes: "In speaking thus we leave altogether the domain of faith to enter theological speculation. And we are going to remain there in the course of the following'paragraphs which will only set forth the teaching of St. Thomas." (La Contemplation M~tstique d'a~r~s Saint Thomas d'Aquin, 1927, p. 39,) ~ Among the most eminent Dominican theologians of the twen= tieth century is Hugon. On the gifts he writes: "There is a dispute as to whether the gifts differ from the infused virtues objectively and essentially or only after a fashion (secundum quid). This last is defended by a number of theologians, following the leadership of Scotus; but the Angelic ,Doctor and the Thomists teach that the gifts are specifically distinguished from the virtues as perfections of a superi-or and higher order by which a man is easily moved by, the Holy Spir-it." (Italics in the original: Tractatus Dogmatici, Ed. 10, II, 4~8.) Father Garrigou~Lagrange himself, in the, epil~gue to his French work,2 Perfection Cbretienne et Contemplgtion (Vol.II, [89]), after discussing "the minimizing conceptions of the gifts of the Holy, Spirit and the oscillations of theological eclecticism" and then "the superiority of the doctrine of St. Thomas o'n the gifts," concludes: "Thus there are four notably different theories of the gifts. Two are manifestly minimizing, but opposed to each other; one is eclectic and tends to rise higher; and finally the one which seems to us to be at the culminating point of truth. These four theories can be summed up as follows [italics as in the original French] : "The gifts, distinct from the virtues, are something normal and eminent and grow With charity. 2This epilogue does not appear in the English Christian Perfection and Contemplation. 308 Not~ember, 1949 AGES OF: THE INTERIOR LIFE "The acts of the gifts take place sometimes according to an ordinary human mbde; sometimes they are extraordinary. "'The gifts are distinct from the virtues and are principles of extraQrdinary acts. "'The gifts are not distinct from the oirtues.'" In The Three Ages there is little indication of any,other "the-ory" of the gifts than the one which the author himself adopts. So much for the existence and distinction of the gifts. . If now one should inquire into the number of them. there is much .less cer-tainty. To quote the Dominican Joret again: "The Septuagint version followed by the Vulgate gave seven characteristics to the Spirit of God resting upon the Messias: the spirit of wisdom . Thus one obtained seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, just as there are seven virtues, theological and moral¯ But neither in the one case nor the'other should we regard this number as limitative. For the sacred writers, as we know,.it rather designates the pleriitude of the divine operations. The single light of the sun divides into seven principal colors which can then have an infinite variety of shades. So it is with the Holy Spirit and His gifts." (Op. cir., p. 36.) Less certain than the number is the general function of the gifts, that is, the kind of work that they perform in the process of sancti-fying a person. A glance at the relevant places in different theo- .logians would readily convince one of this fact¯ Much less certain still are the functions of~, the particular gifts. Consider for a moment the case of St. Thomas. In a recent scholarly work devoted entirely to his mystical theology and wholebeartedly in sympathy with it, the author points out four ways in which at successive times St. Thomas endeavored to classify the workings of the different gifts, and then he conclude~: "The question, taken up four times, has resulted in four different constructions; once even with an explicit disavowal of what St. Thomas bad previously estab-lished. Who will assure us that the last is perfect?" (L. Roy, Lumiere et Sagesse. La Gra~e Mystique dans la Theologie de Saint Tho'mas d'Aquin, p. 185.) Father Garrigou-Lagrange's.conception of the various function~ of the gifts seems to have been developed from a combination of elements in three of St. Thomas's ways (The Three ~Ages, I, 76; III, 68, 4 and II II, 8, 4; 3 D. 34 q. 1 a. 2) His correlation of the virtues and gifts (I, pp. 51, 76) is ¯ 309 G. AUGUSTINE ELLARD Retffew for Religious criticized by De Guibert as not being quite in accord with St. Thom- ¯ as's (Theologia Spiritualis, 1937, p. 135). Of all these ways, and others too which could be cited, of assigning specific functions to each of the gifts, not one seems to agree :with the exegetes when they comment on and explain the original Scripture text (Isaias 11:2-3) that is the first foundation for all the doctrine on the gifts. Moreover there are two different forms of the modern Thomistic theory of the gifts. Besides the one which Father Garrigou- Lagrange espouses (that with the virtues one acts in a human way and with the gifts in a superhuman way), there is another one, defended in our time especially by Cardinal Billot. "The gifts have two modes, that is, an ordinary and an extraordinary one according to the differences in the many operations of the Holy Spirit, who freely breathes where He wills and apportions to all as He wishes . There is another way and one that is quite extraordinary; although it is not td be said to be at all necessary, even for high sanctity, it is'nevertheless as a rule found in those whom the grace of God calls to the supreme heights of perfection. Moreover this mode i~ concerned mostly with extraordinary contemplation, that is, with the prayer of quietude, simple union, ecstatic union, and consummate union." (De Virtutibus Infusis, Ed. 4, pp. 169, 173.) A contemporary mystical theologian in whose system this idea of two modes, ordinary and extraordinary, is most important is the Carmelite Father Crisogono. de Jesus Sacramentado. For him this is the true thought of St. Thomas himself, and also of some at least of his best commentators (La Perfection et La Mystique selon Led Prin-cipes de Saint Thomas, p. 44). Another point about the present-day Thomistic hypothesis of the gifts that will make many people pause is this: it appears to be indissolubly bound up with the contention that grace is intrinsi-cally efficacious. "We do not find anything in his system [Suarez's] corresponding to the idea, dear to St. Thomas, of actual operating grace, understood in the sense of instrumental prevenient and pre-determining motion, by which the Angelic .Doctor characterized the special nature of the gifts of the Holy Spirit" (Dictionnaire de The-ologie Catholique, in thd article Dons du Saint Esprit, A. Gardeil, 1778). "This interpretation [the doctrine of St. Thomas on grace and the gifts as understood by the great interpreters Cajetan, Bannez, John ~f St. Thomas, and the Carmelites of Salamanca] is for us the 310 November, 1949 AGES OF THE INTERIOR LIFE only true one, the only one which safeguards the two great, prin-ciples of the intrinsic efficacy of grace and the specification of habitus by their formal object" (Garrigou-Lagrange, Perfection Chretienne etContemplation, II, [99]; see also [54], [59-62], [95]). From ail that has been said, especially in the form of quotations from leading Thomist theologians, on the uncertainties attaching to our knowledge of the gifts ot: the Holy Spirit, it would seem abun-dantly clear that no elaborate, doctrine about them should be pro-. posed as more than a theory or hypothesis. Nor should any major practical norm based on such a doctrine be set up as more than prob-able. I have made a special effort to find indications of these uncer-tainties in The Three Ages, I found very little indeed. The princi-pal' one seems to be implicit in this sentence: "The great majority of theologians hold with St. Thomas that the gifts are really and spe-cifically distinct from the infused virtues" (I, p. 73). Therefore it ¯ .is admitted that not all theologians agree on this particular funda-mental point. On the other hand a reader might expect that he is being treated to something that is especially reliable. Under the heading, "The Aim of This Work," the author announces that he will try to avoid the danger of "many pious books that lack a solid doctrinal foun-dation" (I, p. 9). In the Preface he writes: "We insist far more on the principles ge.nerall~ accepted in. theology!, by showing their value and their radiation, than on the variety of opinions on one particular point or another proposed by often quite secondary authors . The complexity of certain questions ought not to make us lose sight of tb~ certitude of the great directive principles that illuminate all spirituality" (I, p. xi; italics inserted). "For a clear understanding of the nature of the mystical union, we must treat of the influence of the Holy Ghost in the perfect, soul by recalling the most indisputable and lofty principles commonly taught on this subject" (II, p. 511) ,, The fact remai.ns, unfortunately, that much of The Three Ages is uncertain and questioned by perfectly orthodox Catholic authori- .ties. 4. To come now to the great central thesis of The Three Ages, namely, that infused contemplation comes within the normal devel-opment of the supernatural life. It is after all much less significant than one might at first think. (1) It embodies no great new dis-covery nor corrects any old error; (2) the attenuated-infused con- 311 G. AUGUSTINE ELLARD Review for Religious templa.tlon which it holds out in prospect for all whose supernatural life evolves normally is not, considered as a form of human action or experience, very different from mental prayer that is acquirable; (3) the thesis suffers from being so closely associated with a ques-tionable theory of the gifts; and lastly, (4) various e~ceptions to it are admitted. (1) Father Garrigou-Lagrange writes: "In contradistinction to acquired prayer, infused contemplation is generally defined as a simple and loving knowledge of God and His works, whicFi is the fruit, not of human activity aided by grace, but of a special inspiration of the Holy Ghost" (p. 310). Contemplation "proceeds . . . from living faith enlightened by the gifts of the Holy Ghost, especially by those of understanding and wisdom, which render faith penetrating and sweet. "Supernatural contemplation thus conceived, supposes the special inspiration of the Holy Ghost, which His gifts dispose us to receive with promptness and docility, as the widespread sails on a boat receive the impulsion of a favorable wind; then the boat advances more easily than by the labor of the rowers, a symbol of discursive meditation united to the practice of the virtues. From this point of view, contemplation, because of the special inspiration which it supposes, deserves to be called, not acquired but infused, although at the beginning it may quite frequently be prepared for. by reading, affective meditation, and the" prayer of petition. The soul thus actively prepares itself to receive the special inspiration of the Holy Spirit, which will at times be strong enough so that discursive medi-tation will no longer be necessary . These acts of love and 6f penetrating .and sweet faith are said to be infused not only because they proceed from infused virtues, in this case from the theological virtues, but because they suppose a special inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and because we cannot move ourselves to them with the help of common actual grace. In this case God mov.es us, not by inclining us to deliberate, but to acts above all discursive deliberation." (II, 281--2.) If this is all that is meant by infused contemplation, wh~ would deny the thesis, and what has all the argument been about?. Some. would quegtion what is said about the gifts, but hardly anybody would directly and categorically contradict the thesis itself. Since all acknowledge some sort of doctrine, at least as probable, about the gifts, who would not admit that in accordance with the providence and designs of God the mental prayer of all should be enlightened 312 No~emb~r, 1949 AGES OF THE INTERIOR LIFE and enhanced as much as possible by special inspirations coming from the Holy Spirit through the gifts? Certainly this is not the essential analysis which certain theo-logians have had in mind in denying that infused contemplation comes within the regular development of the interior life. For Father Poulain mystical contemplation consists essentially in an experimental perception of God's presence (The Graces of Interior Pra~ter, chapters V and VI) ;and for Farges, in "an experimental sen-sation of the divine, that is, in an immediate intuition by the con-sciousness, more or less clear o~ obscure, of the presence in our souls of' God or a supernaturai object, the essence whereof remains unknown, which produces a sentiment of admiration and love, suspending more or less the powers of the soul" (Mgstical Pheno-mena, p. 57). According to Father Crisogono del Jesus Sacramen-tado, "infused contemplation is an affective intuition of divine things, resulting from a special influence of God in the soul . This actual grace is received in the habits of the gifts of understanding, knowledge and wisddm, which, at receiving it, are actuated according to their extraordinary operation . This operation of the gifts, which takes place in a superhuman way, is the act itself of infused ¯ contemplation." (Compendio de Ascetica g Mistica, pp. 164-5.) Father Crisogono holds that all are called to the perfection of the gifts working in their ordinary, but not in their extraordinary, mode. The two great doctors of the Church, St. Francis de Sales and St. Alphonsus de' Liguori, specialists also in spirituality, and, one would presume, cognizant of tradition, surely would have advocated for all a form of mental prayer that is full of inspirations from the Holy Spirit. If highly developed gifts and the resulting graces had been sufficient in their opinion to entail infused contemplation, they could hardly have written as they did. Thus St. Francis wrote: "Blessed are they who live a superhuman and ecstatic life, raised above themselves, though they may not be ravished above themselves in prayer. There are many saints in heaven who were never in ecstasy or rapture of contemplation. For how many martyrs and great saints do we see in history never to have had any other privi-lege in prayer than that of devotion and fervor." (The Love of God, VII, 7.) And St. Alphonsus: "The aim of the soul here ought to be single, namely, union with God; but that the soul should attain to perfection, there is no necessity of passive union. It is sufficient for 313 G. AUGUSTINE ELLARD Reuiew for Religious it to arrive at active union . Active union is perfect conformity with the divine will, and in this certainly the whole perfection of divine love consists. 'Perfection,' St. Teresa says, 'does not consist in ecstasy; on the contrary, true union of soul with God is union of will with the divine will.' This union is necessary, but not the pas-sive; and those souls that have only the active, the same saint says, 'can have far greater merit; because they suffer greater toil, and the Lord directs them like strong men, and the consolations which they do not have in this life are reserved for them by God and will be given by Him in the next life.' Cardinal Petrucci says that without infused contemplation the soul can indeed well arrive, with the benefit ¯ of ordinary grace, at a~nnihilation of its own will and at transforming it into God's, willing nothing else than the will of God . Whence he adds that since in this is the whole of sanctity, nobody ought to desire and seek from God anything else than to be directed by Him and with His help to accomplish His will."(Praxis Confessarii, Num. 136 ; italics as in the original.) , .Similarly, Pope Benedict XIV in writing his famous standard work De Servorum Dei Beati~icatione attributes infused contempla-tion to "a special favor of God" (XXVI, 7). Moreover he observes that a number of perfect persons have been canonized although in their processes nothing was said about infused contemplation (Op. cir., XXVI, 8). From the foregoing we may safely conclude that besides infused contemplation understood as prayer characterized by the gifts of the Holy Spirit there has also evidently been another concept of it in quite orthodox Catholic authorities. If in interpreting the thesis it be added also that prayer consti-tuted by the influence of the gifts (II, 313) is essentially just what the mystics and in particular what Saints Teresa and John describe, a critical reader might interpose: "Do you propose this analysis of fact and this theory of the gifts as certain or as probable? If prob-able, .very well; no objection. But if certain, on what grounds? What is the evidence?" (2) The infused contemplation proposed as coming within the normal development of the spiritual life is not, in terms of what is humanly noticeable, very different from the highest form of acquired prayer. Neither at its inception nor in the course of its progress nor at its culmination does it appear to be a strikingly different phenome-non in consciousness. Whatever is to be said metaphysically about 314 November, 1949 AGES OF THE INTERIOR LIFE the nature, formal objects, and so forth of the virtues, the gifts, the various kinds of mental prayer, and so on, psychologically and morally and practically there may be no observable difference oetween this infused contemplation and the prayer which just pre-cedes it. Into the two forms both the virtues and the gifts enter. If it be (according to the theory) the influence of the gifts which "constitutes" (II, 313) infused contemplation, the change need not be great enough to be discernible in consciousness. The author fully admits "that the transition from the last acquired prayer to initial infused prayer is not so clearly distinguished" (II, 328-330). Repeatedly he suggests that it may take "an experienced director" to notice that the one has succeeded the other. "A simple and loving.attention to God . . . cannot, in fact, be prolonged without a rather manifest intervention of the gifts" (Christian Perfection and Contemplation, 329). In this case it would seem that nothing but the prolongation calls for infusion. This quotation is taken from a context in which "the nature of the mystical state" is being explained. Moreover even in the course of the acquired prayer of recollec-tion the~e will be isolated acts of infused contemplation (I, 245). So much for the beginning of infused contemplation considered as a conscious experience. If now in the ulterior stages of it, espe-cially as they are described by St. Teresa, one separate the accidentals from the essential, surprisingly little will be left. "The degrees of contemplative prayer are chiefly those of the growing intensity of living faith, of charity, and of the gifts of the Holy Ghost which correspond to them" (II, 299). It seems that nothing is essential~ beyond "only an infused light: the special illumination of the gifts of understanding and wisdom" (II, 317). It even appears that ecstasy is not essential t(~ the stage called "ecstatic union" (II, 344). By what criterion the distinction between essence and accidents is made does not stand out very clearly. Not even the supreme and rare state of the mystical marriage is very marvelous as an experience. "According to St. John of the Cross, the essential basis of this wholly eminent state is in no way miraculous; it is, says the Saint, 'the perfect state of the spiritual life,' being here on earth the culminating point of the development of the life of grace and of the love of God . In the transforming union the higher faculties are drawn to the innermost center of the soul where the Blessed Trinity dwells." (II, 529.) The gift of 315 AGES OF THE INTERIOR LIFE Review for Religious wisdom, which exists also in the most stupid soul possessing grace, is, when fully developed, sufficient to account for it. One might well wonder whether the great mystics who vehe-mently lamented their utter inability to describe (heir absolutely ineffable experiences would recognize them in the results of Father Garrigou-Lagrange's analysis. (3) Nor are the force and significance of the central thesis 'increased by having it lean so heavily for support upon the author's uncertain theory of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. In itself the thesis is quite independent of that particular doctrine and need not stand or fall with it. But as a matter of fact it is proposed as in part a consequence of the theory and from this point of view it cannot lay claim to greater probability than the theory upon which it is based. (4) Lastly, the doctrine that infused contemplation comes within the normal development of the spiritual life is rendered still less significant by a rather liberal admission of exceptions: "Infused contemplation is,. in principle or in theory, in the normal way of sanctity, although there are exceptions arising from the individual temperament or from absorbing occupations or from less favorable surroundings, and so on" (I, x). If, therefore, to return again to the general import of the central thesis of The Three Ages, it be taken to mean merely that contempla-tion marked or constituted by the "special inspirations" of the gifts comes within the evolution of the supernatural life, hardly anybody will simply deny it, but some careful thinkers will have doubts about the theory of the gifts, and some may ask: "But what does it mean in terms of human experience or action? What noteworthy difference does it make in one's substantive kn6wledge and love of God?" If the thesis be interpreted also to signify that these effects of the gifts and what is essential in the experiences, say, of St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross are one and the same reality, then there is the problem of determining what in empirical terms that essential is (the conclusions of others differ very widely from Father Garrigou- Lagrange's), of adequately accounting for it with the uncertain theory of the gifts, and thirdly of showing that it is in store for everyone whose spiritual life evolves as it should. The thesis is not that St. Weresa's or St. John's experiences in their integrity are part of the regular spiritual growth. Whether the principal contention of the work be true or not, 316 November, 1949 "WE ARE HIS MEMBERS !" it will, I think, because of the way in which it is presented, be mis-understood by many devout people and lead to much disillusionment and discouragement. Thus it seems, to conclude very briefly, that The Three Ages of the Interior Life is a great work, great in its faults as well as in its excellences. "We His Members!" M. Raymond, O.C.S.O. When men shall say to you: "'Lo, Christ is bete! Lo, Christ is there!'" Belieue them! And know that thou art seer When all thy crging clear Is but: "'Lo, here! Lo, tberet. Ah, me. Lo, everywheret."" --- ~RANCIS THOMPSON. IWANT every priest of God and every religious vowed to Him to be unalterably happy.I i know that they can be so if they will become rightly self-conscious and consequently acutely Christ-conscious. There is the ~vord that spells beatitude here as well as hereafter; for there is the ~vord that means sanctity. It was the great St. Francis de Sales, I believe, who said that one motto lived is enough to make a saint.IrvMay I suggest as a life-line and as a saint-making motto the thrilling truth that "We are His members!" To see any baptized person sad has always given me pain, but when that person wears the livery of Jesus Christ that pain becomes acutely agonizing; for it is so simple a matter to develop a Christ-consciousness that will preclude forever all possibility of real sadness entering the center of our souls! Now do understand me. I am not saying that there is a short cut to sanctity. There isn't. The road winds up hill all the way. But there are means of simplifying life, of unifying our efforts, of integrating our personalities ,~0 that the uphill climb is less difficult, our complex existences become intelligible wholes, and our every act or omission conspires to our grand objective. One such means is that 3!7 M. RAYMOND Review [or Religious offered in our day by Divine Providence--the doctrine of the Mysti-cal Body; or, as I put it above: living conscious of the fact that "We are His members." What happiness does not this consciousness bring to self! It tells you your dignity as an individual in a d;iy when individual dig-nity in every sphere of life from the economic and political to the military and social is utterly denied. It tells you, you are a member of Him who is Might and Majesty, Meekness and Marvel,' true God and true man. It tells you that you have been lifted from the insig-nificant to a position wherein you mean much to the all-independent Divinity. It tells you that you have a work to do for the Almighty, which, if not done by you, will remain undone forever. In letters that shine like gold against black velvet Plus XII made this truth real in his Mgstici Corport's when he wrote: "The Head needs His members." How can you be unhappy when you realize you mean so much to God and have so important a work to do for Him? The Cur~ of Ars once said: "Even if there were no hereafter, ' it is Heaven enough to work for God on earth." No religious, conscious of his calling, will question the Cur~'s statement. But that does not mean that you will not know difficulty. That does not mean that humiliations will not come your way; that you will not fail in many an enterprise; know shame, ignominy, defeat. That does not mean that you will not suffer both physically and mentally. It does mean that you will know what to do with all these things when they do come your way. It means that you will be happy not only in the midst of sufferings but precisely because you are suffering. For you will ever live conscious of the fact that you are to "fill up what is wanting to His Passion," as St. Paul so joyously states it; conscious of the fact that you can now "rejoice that you, in some slight degree, resemble your Lord and Master," as St. Ignatius so pointedly puts it; conscious of the fact that it ill becomes you to be a "weak member under a Thorn-crowned Head," as St. Bernard so boldly and beautifully expressed it. Let the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune" batter and pierce you through and through, you can't be unhappy so long as you are con-scious of the fact that you are His member. And oh! how your attitudes toward all others change once you have this truth in your blood and being. How you love every human being just because he or she is an actual or a potential member of 318 Nooember, 1949 "WE ARE HIS MEMBERS !" your Christ; has a part to play in the Great Drama of the Redeem-ing; can complete the Passion of your Savior; has a work to do that no one but be or she can do; is dear to your Father, God; beloved of your.Mother, Mary; is, further, part of the same Body as you! How can jealousy, envy, bitterness, enmit3~, antipathy enter your soul? "The eye cannot say to the hand: I need not thy help; nor again the head to the feet'" (I Cot. 12:21). Your hand does not envy your eye because it caffnot see. Your. ear is not jealous of your tongue because it cannot taste. Then why should you be jealous or envious of some other member of Christ because he or she can do things you cannot do? You won't be. You can't be. Rather you will rejoice if this one has ten talents and you only one. You will exult over such a one's ability to do so much more for your Head than you are capable of doing. Yes, all smallness leaves your life as soon as you live the truth that "We are His members." And how kind you become! The great Flemish mystic, Ruysbroeck, once said: "Be kind. Be kind. Be kind. And you'll be a saint." Here's a motto that makes kindness not only easy but an urge. In times past, some of us have been unhappy because of the work assigned us. Had we been living the doctrine of the Mystical Body we should never have known anything but blessed content-ment, even exul~ant joy; for we would have realized that our every act done "through Him, and with Him, and in Him" was powerful beyond all expression! "Actions," philosophers tell us, "belong to the person," not to the members. We pay the typist, not the typist's fingers. We honor the hero, not his eyes, hands, or feet. For we know actions belong to the person, not to his members. Think, then, of your every act when you act as a member of Christ's Mysti-cal Body. Think of your tiniest deed: sweeping a floor, making a bed, washing a dish, dusting a chair--they are acts of.the Mystical Christ! Can any assignment, then, be a cause of unhappiness? Do you see how this doctrine covers everything: Yourself, others, your works, your sufferings, your triumphs and defeats. Will you allow me one short example of how it works? Last 2anuary I was out of my monastery for the first time in thirteen years. 2ust what such a strange experience would mean to others, I do not know, but I do know that for me it was something in the nature of a "vision." I saw Christ. For over a month I saw Him suffer, agonize, and die in a hospital called St. Joseph's Infirmary. 319 M. RAYMOND "Review t:or Religious I saw Christ in old Brother Hugh whose sight was dim, hearing gone, and power of speech paralyzed. In him I saw Christ agonize as cancer gnawed his vitals away. I saw Jesus even more clearly in an infant of two months whose rapidly growing brain tumor would soon bow that head in death, and Innocence would once again have "given up the ghost" because of sin. I saw our suffering, sacrificing Savior in two nurses, one just about to graduate, the other a gradu-ate of two years, who, standing star-eyed and eager, ready for life, learned that they had better make ready for death, since creeping paralysis had made its first appearance in one and cancer of the lymph had doomed the other. From dawn to dusk and from dusk to dawn that hospital breathed for me, and it was the breath of Jesus Christ. For over a month I was witness to the Great Drama of the Redeeming as I saw Christ paying for sin in bodies that were His by right of baptism. I saw Salvation being won for the world; for that hospital appeared to me as a chalice and every pang of pain as so much blood being poured into it. How could I view it otherwise when I know that we are the "pIeroma of Christ" who are to fill up what is wanting to His Passion? (Cf. Col. ~:24.) . How could I or anyone else fail to see the crucifixion when I stood staring at bap-tized human beings on the cross? Yes, I saw Christ; for "we are His members'!" Do you see how easy it is? Do you see what a different outlook it gives, on life and all things in lif~, The late Archbishop Goodier, S.J., gave a formula for happiness in his brochure A More Excellent Wa~1. It is to "crawl in through the wound on Christ's side, go down deep into His Heart, then look out on the world and all things in the world with His eyes." Had we not the doctrine of the Mystical Body that formula might se~m impossible of fulfill-ment. How does Jesus look upon human beings? Does He not see them as either actual or potential members of His Body? Can't we see them in the same light? How does Christ see the "feeble" and "less honorable members"? St. Paul tells us. "Those that seem to be the more feeble members of the body, are more necessary" (I Cor. 12:22). Don't you see the utter impossibility of ever looking dgwn on anyone? of ever despising a single human being? of ever having a low or mean opinion of anyone who breathes? So long as I am Christ-conscious, I love; so long as I love, I am like God. The Archbishop's formula is possible of fulfillment, else God the 320 November, 1949 "WE ARE Ills MEMBERS !" Holy Ghost would never have commanded us through St. Paul: "Put ye on the Lord, Jesus Christ" (Rom. 13:14). Nor would He have told us to "Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus" (Phil. 2:5). Hilaire Belloc has rightly said, "A man is his mind." If we would be what God made us to be and our deepest instinct craves to be, we will acquire the mind of Jesus; for Dietrich yon Hildebrand stated truth truthfully when he said, "The essence of sanctity is transformation into Christ." Sanctity is made relatively easy, then, by the development of Christ-consciousness: for nothing is better calculated to work this transfo.rmation than the constant appreciation of the fact that "We are His members." There is not a true religious who does not long to "radiate Christ" pedectt~l. But that longing will be like the barren fig tree--a thing Of beautiful foliage but bare of fruit--until the Light of the World glows in the very core of our beings, until the last feature of.the Face iaf Christ is sealed into our souls, until every beat of our hearts synchronizes with the pulse of His great Heart. Baptism sufficed for incorporation in Christ, but it does not suffice for transformation into Him. No. For that we need to be im-mersed, absorbed, lost in Christ Jesus. All of which is possible by living the truth of the Mystical Body. But by living I mean living. Look!. There is not one of us who does not know that the life of Christ pulsates in the person of every-one who is in the state of grace; that down in the depths of those souls the Holy Trinity dwells; that thelight in their eyes tells the same tremendous truth as does the flickering flame of the Sanctuary Lamp: God is here. Yes, we all know that. .But how many of us live conscious of those facts? Which of us does not know that the Holy Ghost is the soul of the Mystical Body? that, being the soul, He is present "'totus in toto, et totus in qualibet parte'" ("entire in the whole, and entire in every part of the whole")? Who does not know that the soul elevates, unifies, identifies, and vivifies? But bow many of us make the appli-cations and draw the consequences? My fellow priest, my brother or sister in religion has been elevated to a dignity that astounds. He or she can not only be defined as a "creature composed of body and soul," but also may be described as "body, soul, and Holy Ghost!" He or she is more than human; has been made so by God the Holy Ghost. What respect, reverence, awe, and admiration I should have 321 M. RAYMOND ~evieu~ [or Religious for my fellow! But besides elevating, the soul identifies and unifies. The Holy Ghost unites all the cells of the Mystical Body to the Person whose Body it is. How close my fellow is to God! How close he or she is to me!. We know these mind-staggering truths. We even teach these marvels and mysteries to others. But how often do we live conscious of these facts? The rod of Aaron is in our hands. It is in beautiful flower. But we . May I suggest a plan whereby you can become wide awake to these joy-filled and joy-producing realities? Why not integrate your life by-means of this marvelous doctrine? Let your meditations for an entire year be on nothing but this wondrous truth. You know, M. Anger has proved in a masterly thesis that this doctrine is the white heart of the Kohinoor which is Dogmatic Theology. He shows that every light that leaps from those mahy facets has its origin in Christ who is the Light of the World. Our meditations should be on nothing that is not ioundly dogmatic. - But to make these meditations fruitful we needs must read. Thanks be to God, whole shelves can now be devoted to literature on the Mystical Body. After Anger-Burke one could read Emile Mersch, S.2., then John Gruden, and Edward Leen, C.S.Sp. Fol-low'these with Fulton Sheen, Raoul Plus, S.J., Daniel Lord, S.d., Carl Adam, and William McGarry, S.d.,--to name but a few. There is more than a year's reading matter for any religious, and reading that will make meditations throb. To integrate our lives we must add examen to our readings and meditations. Couldn't we spend a year--or even two--with this doctrine as our particular examen? The development of this Christ-consciousness would be a main objective. We could practice it in so many different ways: conscious of my own membership; of my neighbors; of all men; conscious of the soul of the Mystical Body throbbing in me--in others; conscious of the dignity and worth of my actions when done "through, with, and in Hfm." Variety would not be wanting and unity would be assured. If reading, meditation, and examen go together for a year promise a consciousness that will have you "looking out on the world and all things in the world with the eyes of Christ." I promise you an integration that will effect a transformation. I promise a happiness the world canfiot give"or take away. I am sure that most of you will see how this simplifies the spit- 322 Noaernber, 1949 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS itual life since it is a system that includes all other systems. In it abandonment, trust, detachment, purity of intention, presence of God, union with the Divine Will are all contained. I cannot be Christ-conscious without being or having all the others. It is a system that will unify one's entire existence; for there is nothing that I can think, do, or say legitimately that cannot be thought, done, and said "through Him, with Him, and in Him." It is a system from which all movements derive and to which they'all lead; for what is the Liturgical Movement if it is not centered in the Mass; and what is the Mass if not the Sacrifice of the Mystical Body, as Pius XII has so insistently proved in his Mediator Dei. What is Catholic Action if not begun, continued, and ended through, with, and in Christ 3esus? That is why I have dared to offer the motto and to say: "Try it and see if it doesn't simplify, unify, integrate your life, and make you what God made you to be and what I long for you to be--verd happy!'" The rod is in your hand. It is flowerin!! Ques Jons and Answers What is to be thought about the followlncj statement which appeared in the pubffe press last August: "Plans for a profound reform . . . likely the most drastic the cloistered monasteries and nunneries have undergone since the Council of Trent ended in 1563 . . . are in an advanced stage ¯ . . and are planned for promulgation in 19S0. The reform is designed in large part to make inmates of cloistered convents more effective as agents of the Church in its current world-wide struggle." Lik~ so many newspaper reports concerning religious events, this one, while having a foundation in fact, is grossly exaggerated. For-tunately an answer to the above statement was given by Father Arcadio Larraona, undersecretary of the Sacred Congregation of Reli-gious, on August 22, 1949. He explained that there is no question of a vast reform of cloistered orders, but of certain mitigations, required by the ~xigencies of modern times. He mentions two such mitigations. Modern conditions require that a mitigation in. the rule of cloister be made to allow nuns to leave the enclosure for medical and dental treatment, and for similar purposes. Again,.in the after- 323 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS Revieu~ [or Religious math of the war, some monasteries of nuns are literally starving because they can no longer support themselves aft they did before the war. In such cases the Holy See has advised a modification of the rule of enclosure to permit the nuns to engage in activities providing an income for the communities, such as conducting schools, orphan-ages, and the like. However, in such cases, the essentials of the con-templative life must always be maintained. Father Larraona also indicated that there exists a tendency toward confederating cloistered communities of religious women in countries where economic reasons or a reduction in the number of cloistered nuns indicate the need for such a trend. There is however, no ques-tion of any imposed reform, but the spirit of the autonomous insti-tutions is always considered and preserved. Such federations are on a purely voluntary and very limited basis. In conclusion Father Larraona explained that papal directives to religious institutes, urging them to organize their activities in accord-ance with the changes in the social conditions of the world, do not signify any impending reforms to be imposed by the Holy Father. May a Sister on nursing duty in a hospital wear a gold and silver graduation pin on the religious habit? Is this contrary fo article 67 of the Normae of 1901 which forbids ornaments of gold or silver to be included in the rel~glous dress? Let us first quote article 67 of the Normae in full before answer-ing our question. It reads as follows: "With the possible exception of a small and simple cross or medal of silver, no gold or silver orna-ments should be worn. In those ornaments which are allowed new images or inscriptions not as yet approved by the Church are not to be tolerated. Silk garments are not allowed, nor silk ornaments or others which betray vanity and cause complaints or laughter." Generally speaking, graduation pins are not to be worn by reli-gious women except on special Occasions such as alumnae reunions and the like, provided superiors think it well to let the Sisters iden-tify themselves as alumnae. It can happen in a hospital that graduate nurses are required to carry on their person some sign of identification. In that case the superior could allow the Sisters to wear their graduation pins. But no Sister should take it upon herself to wear such a pin without the permission of her superior. What was forbidden by the Norroae was 324 Nooember, 1949 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS the wearing of ornaments as sucli, f~)r vanity's sake. The wearingof a graduation pin for purposes of identificationwould not come under that head. It may not be out of place Norrnae of 1901 were not laws a set of ideal constitutions for Sacred Congregation set up for constitutions submitted to it for article 67 of the Norrnae found tions during the course of the article 67 of the Norrnae, but as approved by the Holy See. here to remind our readers that the binding religious directly, but rather a religious congregation which the itself as a guide in approving new the approval of the Holy See. Thus its way into many sets of constitu-years. It obliges religious, not as an article of their own constitutions ~2-- Is there any ecclesiastical regulation that prohibits Sisters from holding the position of organist in parish choirs that have both men and women members.'; While there is no express prohibition to be found in the Code ot? Canon Law nor in the Councils of Baltimore, still anumber of diocesan statutes forbid Sisters to function as .organists in parish churches. To give but one example, Statute 184 of the Fourth Pro-vincial Council of Portland in Oregon (1934) reads as follows: "We forbid religious women to act as organists or choir directors, except in the case in which boys and girls still attending school make up the choir." Moreover, we think it is not in conformity with the general spirit of the religious life for a Sister to act as organist for a mixed adult choir and it may be a source of disedification to the faithful. In practice, no Sister should undertake to play the organ for a mixed choir of men and women without theexpress permission of the local ordinary and of her own higher superior. ---43-- May a religious teacher who has "class money" in his keeping, or extra-curricular funds, use these in whole or in part for personal reasons? Is his superior at liberty to give him such a permission? Or must such funds be used for the purpose for which they were collected, or for things to be used by the students for their betterment, such as charts, reference-books, and the I~ke? If we understand this question correctly, the "class money" 325 BOOK REVIEWS Review for Religious referred to is money that actually belongs to the class: not to the school as such, nor to the religious community. In o~her words, it is a common fund to which individual students have contributed with the understanding that the money be used for certain specific pur-poses. A religious superior has no power to give.permission to use such money for personal reasons; and neither the superior nor the teacher should use the money for any but the specified purposes unless the class freely consents to this. 1 oo1 Reviews THE DAY WITH JESUS AND MARY. By the Dominican Sisfers. Pp. 143. The Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1949. $2.50. This book seeks to help one develop a consciousness of God's presence during the day through recalling the fifteen mysteries of the Rosary. The hour from five to six is dedicated to the Annunciation, from six to seven to the Visitation, and so forth. At the beginning of each hour one offers his own work bf that hour in union with the work of Jesus and Mary suggested by the mystery of that hour. And with the discussion of each mystery, this book gives'a few biographi-cal facts about two saints (one Dominican and one other) who were outstanding in the virtue suggested by this mystery. For instance, upon awakening in the morning, one recalls the Annunciation and offers the coming hour in union with the joy of all the saints, espe-cially St. Dominic or St. Philip Neri, in the blessings of the Incarna-tion. The moral reflections are the standard ones, the saints chosen are appropriate enough, the style of writing very plain. The value of the book will lie in the appeal of the idea of dedicating each hour of the day to a mystery of the Rosary. For those to whom it does appeal it has a double advantage; it makes the Rosary a living thing, and it gives one a clear center or focus for his spiritual thought~ of that hour. For how many would such a plan work? The Holy Spirit has many ways of aiding our growth; one way of finding out whether any plan will suit me is to give it an honest trial. That God wishes us to recall His presence habitually, that He wishes us to model our lives upon the mysteries of the Incarnation, that the hourly recollec-tion method has worked for some--all this is clear. It: the number 326 Not~ember, 1949 BOOK REVIEWS is comparatively small, I think the chief reason is that the number of those who have made persevering effort to live in God's presence is also comparatively small. God certainly wishes all religious to have a spirit of recollection through the day; theref6re He wishes us to use what natural means we find at hand to develop this spirit. The end is valuable enough to urge us to try various means until we find one suitable to us. This book could help many in this searching. --2T. N. JORGENSEN, S.d. SHE WHO LIVED HER NAME. By Marie Rene-Bazln. Pp. 208. The Newman Press, Wesfm~nsfer, Maryland, 1949. $3.00. "The ways of Providence are, as a rule, of a marvelous sim-plicity, but they are made intricate by man's timidity and blindness. When, however, God finds a soul childlike enough to trust Him unflinchingly and eager to follow wherever He leads, He enfolds it in the unity of His plan and mirrors in its depths something of His unique simplicity." Thus opens the biography of the Foundress of the Helpers of the Holy Souls. Mary of Providence, or as she was known in the world, Eugenie Marie Joseph Smet, was born on March 25, 1825, at Lille, France. Reared in a good Catholic home, she was struck by two important teachings of the Church: Divine Providence and purgatory. A woman of action, an enthusiast and organizer, she was driven by a spiritual life dominated by these two truths to found a congregation which by prayer and suffering would make its principal aim the release of the suffering souls from purgatory. Fearful of illusion on her part, Eugenie set up several "signs" by which she would know that her plan was pleasing to God. Among them was that the Holy Father would send her his blessing on the venture, prior to the sanction of the bishop of the diocese. All the "signs" were fulfilled. The Cur~ of Ars, when asked his advice, told her to found the order whenever she pleased. On July 1, 1856, the Helpers of the Holy Souls had their motto, "Pray, Suffer, Labor" (for the souls in purgatory), their name, their motherhouse, and not much else. By" 1867, they .were landing in China to establish the Seng-Mou-Yeu house near Shang-hai. At the same time in Paris, Mary of Providence was suffering much. The Helper of the Holy Souls felt that she was being con-sumed by fire herself. While Prussian shells whistled over the house-tops during the siege of Paris, she lay dying of malignant cancer. ,327 BOOK NOTICES She had always had a dread of five things: leaving her family, founding a community, seeing her daughters in want, getting into debt, having cancer. "Well, by the grace of God," she said, "all five happened to me." The heroic foundress died February 7, 1871, at the age of 46. The author of the biography, daughter of the late novelist Ren~ Francois Bazin, has written the work carefully enough, quoting heavily from the d, iary and writings of Mary of Providence. One could wish, however, for the personality traits, the telling touches which make a holy person flesh and blood.-~R. A. RUDOLF, S.J. THE HAPPINESS OF HEAVEN. By a Father of the Soclefy of Jesus. Pp. 372. The Newman Press, Westminster, Maryland, 1949. $2.50. After. having been hidden aw~y nearly eighty years in convents, monasteries, and novitiates, this gem is now dusted off and presented once more for the enjoyment of the Catholic reader. The author, Father Isidore Boudreaux, was a master of novices in the Jesuit novitiate at Florissant, Missouri, but his name was withheld from most of the early editions. The present edition is planographed and is presented without revision of the original. Besides. discussing the essence of heavenly happiness, namely, the beatific vision, Father Boudreaux also answers many little questions of interest to the earthbound. Is there a social life in heaven? What will our bodies be like? Will all be equally happy? Answering these and many other queries, the author has covered practically all that we can know about the next life. The subject matter, due to the its very sublimity, is quite diffi-cult. Father Boudreaux witl~out abandoning sound theology has treated heaven in.a way that should make The Happiness of Heaveb required reading for all priests and religious, and a source of great comfort and courage to Catholic laymen.--M. HAGhN, S.J. BOOK NOTICES Fatima is truly of great importance to us today. The passage of the "Pilgrim Virgin" through our country has led many hundreds o.f thousands to a deeper consideration and understanding of this importance. Wherever the statue went, great crowds flocked to venerate it and to fulfill Mary's desires by confessions, Communions, Masses, and rosaries., One of the highlights of the trip was the. week at St. Meinrad's Abbey, Indiana. A detailed history of the careful 328 Noeember, 1949 BOOK NOTICES preparation for the week and of the complete success of the celebra-tion is given in the book FATIMA WEEK SERMONS. A sixteen page introduction by. the Abbot (Rt. Rev. Ignatius Esser, O.S.B.) tells of the pre!barations, of the handling of the crowd of 125,000 that attended, and of that crowd's devout spirit. The thirty-eight sermons given in the book are the Marian talks delivered during the week. They treat of Fatima and of the Marian virtues most closely associated with the Fatima message. These talks were given by thirty-eight different priests and naturally vary in value, but a judicious assigning of topics to the speakers kept repetition of thought to a minimum. This is a valuable book for one studying the history of the Fatima devotion and for one who plans any big Marian celebration. (St. Meinrad, Indiana: The Grail, 1949. Pp. 170. $1.00 [paper].) THE MYSTICAL ROSE, by Father Hubert, O.F.M.Cap., is a small book of scarcely more than pamphlet size treating of Mary's hidden beai~ty and love through a discussion of her fullness of grace, her virginity, and her divine maternity. The style is fluent and poetic, but the book is often repetitious and verbose with a wordi-ness that hinders rather than heightens clarity. Despite this fault of style, the book has merits which lead one to a meditative reading and rereading of many passages which tease one to further thought. (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Bookshop, 1948. Pp. 79. $1.75.) FAITH AND A FISHHOOK, by Sr. M. Charitas, S.S.N.D., is a book of thirteen chapters presenting in chatty style selected anecdotes from the lives of our Lgrd, eleven saints, and the Archangel Raphael. "It is unfortunate that the author attempts to attract youthful readers to the religious life by telling them that this life "asks far less sacrifices than any other state"! In fact, the religious life is so easy that "it takes huge courage not to become a religious" (p. 122). Not only are such statements false, but they are apt to dissuade, rather than to encourage prospective postulants. (Milwaukee: ~Fhe Bruce Pub-lishing Company, 1949. Pp: ix q- 164. $2.50.) HOT EMBERS, by Sister M. Charitas, I.H.M., devotes most of its short twenty-eight chapters to narrating and devoutly commenting on various episodes of our Lord's Infancy, Passion, and Resurrection. A special section makes observations on the lives of St. Theresa of .329 Book NOTICES Review for Religious Lisieux, St. Theresa of Avila, St. John of the Cross, St. Angelus, Simon Stock, Elias. The remaining chapters treat of the Scapular Feast, the Good Shepherd, the Blessed Sacrament, the Sacred Heart, and the Feast of the Immaculate Hea.rt of Mary. (New York: The Scapular Press, 1948. Pp. 205. $2.75.) LITURGICAL ~VIEDITATIONS (Volume I: From Advent to the Ascension; Volume II: From Ascension to Advent), by the Sisters of Saint Dominic, Adrian, Michigan, provides daily meditations for an entire year. Each is in some way connected with the liturgy of the day. Three short points tie Scripture, meditations, and Mass together. The Sanctoral Cycle is naturally devoted to the Saints and. Blessed of the Order of Preachers, as. the work was originally intended by the anonymous writers for the members of their own Order. (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Company, 1949. Pp. viii + 533: 479. $10.00 [set].) THE CURE D'ARS, by Abb~ Francis Trochu, is a reprint of the "standard" life of the great Cur~. The author drew upon the volu-minous records of the process of canonization for his. material. The life was done into English by Dora Ernest Gra.f, O.S.B., and was first published in 1927. As hagiography it is in the older analytical style with the saint's every virtue described in its own chapter. This is "bad" for the plot--but the wh6le plot here is the boundless love of God. (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1949. Pp. xxiii -ff 586. $5.50.) TRANSFORMATION IN CHRIST, by Dietrich yon Hildebrand, will give many a new self-knowledge, a new surehess, and some "know-how" in their efforts at Christlikeness. The book has a solid, earnest, inspiring message for all who admit that "before all else, it is necessary for us to grasp the 'height, breadth, and depth' of our vocation, and fully to comprehend the message of the" Gospel which invites us not merely to become disciples of Chris't and children of God, but to enter into a.process of transformation in Christ." The somewhat technical vocabulary of the book will at times make heavy reading for those who have not enjoyed the opportunity of a classicaI education or philosopical training; but