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In a terminally polarized America, it can sometimes seem like there's nothing that diehards of both major parties can agree on. Yet at both the party conventions this year there were signs that Americans are ready for a new U.S. foreign policy — even if they had very different ideas of what that change should be. Speaking to delegates and attendees at the Republican National Convention (RNC), again and again I heard the sentiment that the United States is too involved overseas, and that the treasure being invested in foreign wars should be reinvested back home. "America is overstretched. We're trying to do too much all over the world," Michigan Trump delegate and sheet-metal union worker Ken Crider told me. His friend, James Hooper, agreed about the folly of foreign intervention. "You can't predict what will happen when you involve yourself that way," he said. Shalira Taylor-Jackson, a disillusioned Barack Obama volunteer and an alternate delegate from Cleveland, complained to me about the massive military aid bill passed earlier this year for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. "You sent $100 billion over there," she said. "If you just gave some of that to the inner cities." It was the same thing I heard from another attendee, a convention volunteer who had also once voted for Obama, who felt too much money was being given away to foreign governments."What about our people, our veterans, our health care?" she said. Attendees consistently expressed favorable opinions about the idea of speaking with adversarial states. "You have to talk," said Don Hammell from Dallas, whose daughter-in-law is Ukrainian. When I asked him how he felt about Ukraine potentially having to give up territory as part of a peace deal, he said "that's between them." Stopping by the Turning Point USA stage, Rep. Marjorie Taylor-Greene (R-GA) spread baseless conspiracy theories about Trump's near-assassination, but also expressed skepticism about reports of an Iranian plot on his life. "Is this the next country the Deep State wants to bomb?" she said. "We are not going to accept the weapons of mass destruction explanation fed to us."Later in the week, Sen. Ron Johnson (R-WI) stopped by a "Serbs for Trump" event, receiving a good reception for an anti-war, anti-foreign entanglement message, warning against the "demonization" of foreign people, and urging people to read Dwight Eisenhower's famous farewell address denouncing the growing military-industrial complex. The event's organizer, Sasha Jovicic, said that such messaging resonated with the Serbian-American crowd because conscription had killed so many men in the old country. It was not always a coherent anti-interventionist sentiment. Those who expressed caution about foreign entanglements also praised former President Donald Trump's reckless assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. There was universal disdain for President Joe Biden's withdrawal from Afghanistan. Israel's war in Gaza and U.S. support for it got widespread, enthusiastic support, with Israeli flags rife throughout the convention. Much of this was reflected in the televised programming, with speeches — like those from Trump and J.D. Vance, or Tucker Carlson and David Sacks — that tended to express skepticism about continuing U.S. involvement in Ukraine and praising Trump as a peacemaker. Others, however, consistently emphasized Trump's purported toughness, his support for pouring more money into the military, and making hawkish noises about Iran. It was a different scene at the Democratic National Convention (DNC) this week, where there was far less enthusiasm for Israel's war, but commitment to Ukraine was ironclad. The view that Trump was beholden to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and concern that his win would mean handing Ukraine over to Russia, was widespread throughout the convention. Putin was bent on reconstituting the Soviet Union, Michigan delegate Barry Lepler told me, and the world was in a World War II-like moment that couldn't afford appeasement. "There's always been people in rural areas who are more isolationist," said talk radio host Joel Heitkamp, who had earlier that week appeared on a panel focused on winning back rural Americans. When I asked about the widespread resentment in rural and other parts of the country toward military aid that wasn't being invested in communities back home, he questioned whether it was a necessarily organic view. People opposed further aid to Ukraine because of Trump, he said, not the other way around. This was all consistent with the four nights' speeches, which tended to stress the same themes on foreign policy that Biden had come to lean into the past few years, and which have become familiar Democratic rhetoric now: enthusiasm for NATO, commitment to Ukraine, and a foreign policy based on the idea of defending democracy. At one point, the packed arena waved flags and sang joyfully along to Bruce Springsteen's "Born in the USA," entirely missing the point of the famously bitter anti-war anthem. This reached its apogee with Vice President Kamala Harris' acceptance speech closing out the convention, where she vowed to "ensure America always has the strongest, most lethal fighting force in the world," promised to "take whatever action is necessary" against Iran, assured people she would "stand strong with Ukraine and our NATO allies," and "always stand up for Israel's right to defend itself," while expressing sympathy for the devastation suffered by Gazans as a result of that Israel policy. Coupled with a party platform that expresses remarkably hawkish views on the Middle East, including attacking Trump for being insufficiently hawkish on Iran, the weeks' proceedings were, as Responsible Statecraft's Blaise Malley has pointed out, a major leap backward from the 2020 Biden campaign's denunciation of "forever wars" and promise to craft a "foreign policy for the middle class." But that's not to say there were no signs of change. The biggest foreign policy story of the DNC was the ongoing rift over the Gaza war, and over the Biden administration's policy of unconditional support for Israel to carry out what a growing cohort of experts and informed observers are calling a genocide. But its significance lay not so much in the presence at the convention of 30 "uncommitted" delegates seeking an end to arms transfers to Israel to bring the war to a close, but in the fact that they had widespread support within the party establishment for their goal. Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA) told me that the movement's efforts were having an effect inside the party, and said Harris "should pivot [on the war] like Hubert Humphrey in 1968."Uncommitted delegates, pro-Palestinian activists, and even anti-war protesters consistently told me that they received a friendly reception from Harris delegates and other attendees, and often got words of explicit support to keep up the pressure. They succeeded in getting 300 Harris delegates to sign a petition calling for an arms embargo, in what one of the movement's leaders called "some of the easiest organizing they've had to do." References to a ceasefire were some of the biggest applause lines of the event, with Harris' pro-Palestinian statement getting a raucous ovation. All of this should make undeniably clear, to both Democratic politicians and viewers at home, how mainstream a position ending this war is. "Israel is our partner," Florida delegate William Aristide told me. But 40,000 people had been killed, he said, many of them children. "What did they do to deserve that?" He asked me what the difference was between Israel's actions and what Russia was doing in Ukraine. "We need to cut them off," he concluded. Both parties' views on foreign policy continue to exist along a partisan gulf. But there are signs, as halting and contradictory as they are, that each is looking for a major shift from business as usual in its own particular way.

The existing trajectory of U.S. policy risks sacrificing Western Europe for the sake of Ukraine, and U.S. policymakers need to wake up to this risk. If this were to happen, it would be one of the worst bargains in the entire history of U.S. strategy. Western and Central Europe, and not Ukraine, are and have been for more than a century the area of truly vital U.S. interests on the European continent. Moreover, the crippling of Western Europe and the European Union would destroy Ukraine's own real chances of future democratic prosperity and stability; for these depend chiefly on links to the E.U., not the United States. All the evidence at present suggests that the Ukrainian counter-offensive has failed, with only very small gains and enormous losses. Nor is there any evidence-based reason to hope for greater Ukrainian success next year, given the balance of military and economic forces between Ukraine and Russia. Faced with this reality, there is increasing official and unofficial talk of arming and supporting Ukraine for an indefinite struggle (though of course this cannot in fact be guaranteed given the opposition of one faction of the Republican Party). An analogy has been made to the case of Israel, which developed as a prosperous and secure quasi-democracy while remaining in a state of frozen conflict and unresolved territorial disputes with its neighbors.Quite apart from the dreadful events of recent days, there are many reasons why this idea is profoundly foolish. They include the fact that if Syria were Russia, Israel would not be Israel. In other words, if Israel had bordered not on a shambolic and impoverished country with a fraction of its GDP and technological capacity, but a nuclear armed power with fourteen times its GDP, Israel would most certainly not have developed as a successful and prosperous democracy. There is no way that the U.S. can secure Ukraine permanently in an open-ended war with Russia.Perhaps most important of all however is the way in which this vision totally ignores the effects on Europe, and U.S. interests in Europe. This would not matter much if European countries were economically successful and politically stable, but this is rapidly ceasing to be the case.In the old heartland of the EU, liberal democratic politics are crumbling. Italy is ruled by a radical conservative government. Opinion polls in France suggest that if elections were held today, Marine Le Pen would win by a wide margin. In Sweden — almost unbelievably for someone who lived through the long dull summer of Abbaesque Swedish social democracy — the army is being called on for help in combating violence by immigrant drug gangs, and the radical nationalist Sweden Democrats are the second largest party. Above all, there is Germany, without which no stable and successful European Union is possible. As German historian Tarik Cyrul Amar has written: "Germany's perfect adherence to Western policy on Russia and China has an ominous price…We have assumed that the first country to buckle under the economic strain of the war over Ukraine would be Russia. But what if it is Germany that stumbles first? Germans stressed about their economy, distrusting their elites as favoring foreign interests, and disenchanted with centrist values and methods— a picture too familiar for comfort." The state elections in Bavaria and Hesse this month showed a surge in support for the right-wing nationalist Alternative fuer Deutschland (AfD) and Freie Waehler (Free Voter) parties. According to opinion polls, AfD now has the second largest support nationwide, behind the Christian Democrats but pushing the Social Democrats into third place, and far ahead of the Greens and the Liberals.Up to now, all the traditional mainstream parties have been united in their refusal to form coalitions with the AfD. If continued, the rise in the party's support will however make this approach increasingly unworkable. Either the CDU will have to form governing coalitions with the AfD (as the CDU's sister party, the Christian Social Union, has already done with the Freie Waehler in Bavaria), or all the mainstream parties will have to form permanent coalitions to keep them out of office.The latter course would recall the last years of the Weimar Republic, and would almost certainly strengthen the radical parties still further, since critics of government policies would have nowhere else to go. The most radical proposal is to dub AfD a neo-Nazi party and ban it, but this would lead to massive protests and drive its supporters towards violence. Whatever happens, Germany seems set for a prolonged period of deep political instability and polarization.The original roots of support for AfD and similar parties in Europe lie in fear of mass migration and hostility to the centralizing (and sometimes dictatorial) tendencies of the European Union. Their support has however been greatly increased by the deepening economic recession into which Germany has been plunged by the rise in energy prices consequent on the war in Ukraine. German economic success in recent decades was largely built on cheap, plentiful and reliable Russian gas.This factor helped mask worsening structural defects in the German economy, which the present crisis is exposing. Coupled with the end of the Chinese boom and U.S.-driven economic warfare against China, the result is that there is now serious talk in Germany of "de-industrialization." Should this in fact occur, the political, social, cultural and psychological results could be catastrophic; for the rebuilding of the German national identity after 1945 took place largely on the basis of the "economic miracle," and the belief that this reflected a superior German model of cooperation between capital and labor, and a strong industry-based middle class (the so called Mittelstand). If belief in these collapses, we could be looking at something akin to a national nervous breakdown.An unending semi-frozen war in Ukraine would drastically worsen Germany's — and Europe's – economic decline and consequent political disorder. Especially if coupled with repeated crises in the Middle East, it would make the restoration of stability in energy prices impossible. Such a conflict would inevitably break out periodically into major battles, possibly leading to new Russian victories. There would be the perpetual risk that an unintended collision between Russia and NATO could escalate towards nuclear war. It should not be hard to imagine what this would do to business confidence in Europe.There is a tendency now for Americans to congratulate themselves on the submission of Europe to American strategy as a result of the war in Ukraine. This underestimates the threat to Europe and of U.S. interests there. The threat, as described, is overwhelmingly an internal one, resulting from a deadly cocktail of economic stagnation, uncontrolled migration, and political extremism, worsened by the war in Ukraine. If present patterns continue, the result will be to cripple Europe both economically and politically.Economic prosperity and liberal democracy in Europe form a key pillar of America's own power in the world and therefore a vital U.S. national interest. Without them, America's own economic power will be gravely weakened, and the prestige of democracy in the world shattered. There will be little point in the U.S. presenting itself as the leader of democracy in Asia if it has collapsed in Europe.Moreover, the United States waged two world wars and a Cold War in Europe to prevent the great economies of Western Europe from falling under the control of a hostile great power. Until a decade or so ago, no American ever dreamed of seeing Ukraine in this way. If therefore the U.S. analysis is that Ukraine cannot win, for the sake of Europe and U.S. vital interests there, Washington should lend all its efforts to bring about an early peace.Sophia Ampgkarian contributed to the research for this article.

Woodlard (1998: 16) states: "The equation of language and nation is not a natural fact but rather a historical, ideological construct". Based on that, this study serves to point out how the change of political, social and cultural ideologies of the January generation led to a similar change in their language ideology and consequently a remarkable change in their use of written Arabic. The attempt is to answer the following questions: How do new language ideologies reflect on the practices of written Arabic, and how to map these to certain genres or social contexts? How can the power of changing language ideologies help in revitalizing Arabic and connecting it to the international community? To achieve this, the study depends on a qualitative approach of analyzing and discussing written practices introduced in the years following January 2011. The study falls in four sections: the first is an introduction to the concept of language ideology and its role in shaping the linguistic practices and features that get selected for cultural attention and social marking (Schieffelin & Doucet 1998). Section two presents the literature on the history of standardizing Arabic and a description of the crucial issue of diglossia (Ferguson 1959, 1996; Eisele 2002) in Egypt and the Arab world. Section three discusses the relationship between language and politics as well as language ideologies behind the different conflicting language varieties. Section four investigates the changes that took place in the language ideologies held by the Egyptian youth after the January 2011 by the means of analyzing and discussing data extracted from written practices of variable genres of media. Finally, the study suggests some approaches to revitalize the Arabic language by deploying different ideologies in the sense of using this diversity for the benefit of the language. ; Assiut University, Egypt ; Walaa Hassan is an Associate Professor of Linguistics at the English Department, Faculty of Arts, Assiut University, Egypt. She received her PhD in Linguistics from Assiut University, Egypt, and Michigan State University, USA (a collaborative program administered jointly by both Assiut University and Michigan State University). She has also been a researcher and a language consultant for 6 months at MSU, USA. Her research is in the area of comparative Arabic-English analysis, particularly the syntax-semantics interface, comparative syntax, and the lexicalization of loanwords into Arabic. She is also interested in investigating language acquisition, specifically accent acquisition and the effect of variable linguistic input on the development of one's native language. ; whassan@aun.edu.eg ; 4 ; 32 (1/2021) ; 15 ; Aboelezz, M. 2014. Deconstructing Diglossia: Language Ideology and Change in Revolutionary Egypt (2010-2014). [Unpublished PhD Thesis]. Lancaster University. ; Aboelezz, M. 2018. Language as proxy in identity politics: The case of revived Egyptian nationalism in Egypt. In: A. Alnajjar & Y. Mendel (eds.), Language, Politics and Society in the Middle East, 126-147. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. ; Anderson, B. 2006. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso Books. ; Bartsch, R. 1989. A normtheoretical approach to functional and status types of language. In: U. Ammon (ed.), Status and Function of Languages and Language Varieties, 197-215. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter. ; Bassiouney, R. 2009. Arabic Sociolinguistics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. ; Bassiouney, R. 2012. Politicizing identity: Code choice and stance-taking during the Egyptian revolution. Discourse and Society 23 (2): 107-126. ; Bassiouney, R. 2013. Language and revolution in Egypt. Telos. 85-110. ; Bassiouney, R. 2014. Language and Identity in Modern Egypt. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. ; Borg, G. 2007. How to be KOOL in Arabic writing: Linguistic observations from the sideline. In: E. Ditters & H. Motzki (eds.), Approaches to Arabic Linguistics, 527-542. Leiden: Brill. ; Bourdieu, P.1991. Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Polity Press. ; Brustad, K. 2011. Standard language ideology and the construction of modern standard Arabic. In: Workshop on Language, Literacy and the Social Construction of Authority, March 3-5, 2011. Stanford University. ; Brustad, K. 2017. Diglossia as ideology. In: J. Høigilt & G. Mejdell (eds.), The Politics of Written Language in the Arab World, 41-67. Leiden: Brill. ; Carter, M.G., 1983. Language control as people control in medieval Islam: The aims of the grammarians in their cultural context. In: R. Baalbaki (ed.), Arab Language and Culture, 76-84. Beirut: American University of Beirut. ; Chejne, A.G. 1969. The Arabic Language: its Role in History. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ; De Silva, S. 1982. Some consequences of diglossia. In: W. Haas (ed.), Standard Languages, Spoken and Written, 94-122. Manchester: Manchester University Press. ; Eisele, J.C. 2002. Approaching diglossia: Authorities, values and representations. In: A. Rouchdy (ed.), Language Contact and Language Conflict in Arabic: Variations on a Sociolinguistic Theme, 3-23. London/New York: Routledge. ; Ferguson, C. 1959. Diglossia. Word 15: 325-40. ; Ferguson, C. 1996. Sociolinguistic Perspectives: Papers on Language in Society, 1959-1994. New York: Oxford University Press. ; Ferguson, C. 1997 [1959]. Myths about Arabic. In: K.R. Belnap & N. Haeri (eds.), Structuralist Studies in Arabic Linguistics: Charles A. Ferguson's Papers, 1954–1994, 250-256. Leiden: Brill. ; Gal, S. 1998. Multiplicity and contention among language ideologies: A commentary. In: B.B. Schieffelin, K.A. Woolard & P.V. Kroskrity (eds.), Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory, 445-449. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ; Gumperz, J. J., 1982. Discourse Strategies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ; Hachimi, A. 2013. The Maghreb-Mashreq language ideology and the politics of identity in a globalized Arab world. Journal of Sociolinguistics 17 (3): 269-296. ; Hachimi, A. 2015. "Good Arabic, bad Arabic". Mapping language ideologies in the Arabic-speaking world. Zeitschrift für arabische Linguistik 61: 35-70. ; Haeri, N. 2003. Sacred Language, Ordinary People. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ; Ibrahim, Z. 2010. Cases of written code-switching in Egyptian opposition newspapers. In: R. Bassiouney (ed.), Arabic and the Media: Linguistic Analyses and Applications, 23-46. Leiden: Brill. ; Lippi-Green, R.1994. Accent, standard language ideology, and discriminatory pretext in the courts. Language in Society 23: 163-198. ; Neely, A.A. & Palmer Jr, G. 2009. Which way is the Kiowa way? Orthography choices, ideologies and language renewal. In P.V. Kroskrity & M.C. Field (eds.), Native American Language Ideologies: Beliefs, Practices, and Struggles in Indian Country, 271-298. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press. ; Schieffelin, B. B. & Doucet, R. 1998. The 'real' Haitian creole: Ideology, metalinguistics, and orthographic choice. In: B.B. Schieffelin, K.A. Woolard & P.V. Kroskrity (eds.), Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory, 285-316. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ; Schulthies, B. 2015. Do you speak Arabic? Managing axes of adequation and difference in pan-Arab talent programs. Language and Communication 44: 59-71. ; S'hiri, S. 2002. Speak Arabic please! Tunisian Arabic speakers' linguistic accommodation to Middle Easterners. In: A. Rouchdy (ed.), Language Contact and Language Conflict in Arabic: Variations on a Sociolinguistic Theme, 149-176. London: Routledge Curzon. ; Silverstein, M. 1979. Language structure and linguistic ideology. In: P.R. Clyne, W.F. Hanks & C.L. Hofbauer (eds.), The Elements: a Parasession on Linguistic Units and Levels, 193-247. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society. ; Spolsky, B. 2004. Language Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ; Suleiman, Y. 2003. The Arabic Language and National Identity: a Study in Ideology. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. ; Suleiman, Y. 2013. Arabic in the Fray: Language Ideology and Cultural Politics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. ; Theodoropoulou, I. & Tyler, J. 2014. Perceptual dialectology of the Arab World: a principal analysis. Al-ʿArabiyya: Journal of the American Association of Teachers of Arabic 47 (1): 21-39. ; Walters, K. 2008. Language attitudes. In: K. Versteegh, M. Eid, A. Elgibali, M. Woidich & A. Zaborski (eds.), Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics, 842-886. Leiden: Brill VI. ; Woolard, K. A. 1998. Introduction: Language ideology as a field of inquiry. In: B.B. Schieffelin, K.A. Woolard & P. Kroskrity (eds.), Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory, 285-316. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ; Wright, S. 2004. Language Policy and Language Planning: From Nationalism to Globalisation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

'Der Zerfall oder das Scheitern von Staaten ist längst kein lokal begrenzbares, humanitäres Problem mehr, sondern hat gravierende regionale und globale Auswirkungen. Der Umgang mit fragilen Staaten ist daher ein Schlüsselthema für die internationale Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik. Dabei geht es nicht allein um die bekannten 'failed states' von Somalia bis Afghanistan, sondern die eigentliche Herausforderung besteht darin, stattfindende oder drohende Zerfallsprozesse in einer Reihe von schwachen bzw. versagenden Staaten zu verhindern. Diese fragilen Staaten stehen daher im Zentrum der Studie. Exemplarisch wurden acht Fälle schwacher bzw. versagender Staatlichkeit vergleichend untersucht: Jemen, Jordanien, Georgien, Kenia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkmenistan und Venezuela. Analysiert wurden jeweils drei Funktionsbereiche des Staates (Sicherheit, Wohlfahrt, Legitimität/ Rechtsstaatlichkeit), die jeweiligen Ursachen von Instabilität sowie die Möglichkeiten externer Akteure, zur Stärkung staatlicher Strukturen beizutragen. Darüber hinaus formuliert die Studie allgemeine Empfehlungen und Prioritäten für die deutsche Außen-, Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik. Die Autoren plädieren für einen ressortübergreifenden 'state-building'-Ansatz, in den verschiedene Aktivitäten der auswärtigen Politik integriert werden. Unter 'state-building' werden sowohl Maßnahmen zum (Wieder-)Aufbau als auch zur Reform und Stabilisierung von staatlichen Strukturen verstanden. Schwerpunkte sollten dabei sein: Reform des Sicherheitssektors, Reformen in der Steuer-, Zoll-, Finanz- und Budgetverwaltung, Reformen im Gesundheits- und Bildungsbereich, Verbesserung von rechtsstaatlichen Standards sowie die Bekämpfung von Korruption.' (Autorenreferat). Inhaltsverzeichnis: States at Risk - zur Analyse fragiler Staatlichkeit (5-27); Muriel Asseburg: Jordanien: Stabilitätsanker in der Krisenregion? (28-44); Stefan Mair: Kenia: schwacher Staat auf dem Pfad der Stabilisierung? (45-66); Andrea Schmitz: Turkmenistan: der privatisierte Staat (67-83); Susanne Gratius: Venezuela: Staatszerfall in einem polarisierten Land (84-104); Uwe Halbach: Georgien: Staatsversagen als Folge von Korruption und territorialer Desintegration (105-121); Iris Glosemeyer: Jemen: Staatsbildung mit Hindernissen (122-139); Boris Wilke: Pakistan: scheiternder oder 'überentwickelter' Staat? (140-156); Christian Wagner: Sri Lanka: zwischen Versagen und Scheitern? (157-170); Ulrich Schneckener: Der Umgang mit fragilen Staaten - Ergebnisse und Empfehlungen (171-194).

Malaysia's new government under Pakatan Harapan (Coalition of Hope) has unveiled its second budget since it won the May 2018 general election. Its first budget for 2019 navigated the trillion ringgit debts left by the previous government's financial scandals, the gaping fiscal hole caused by huge tax refunds owed by the previous administration, and the scrapping of the unpopular Goods and Services Tax (GST) as promised in its election manifesto. Tabled in Parliament on 11 October 2019, its second budget had to contend with a slowing global economy and an economic landscape fraught with uncertainties wrought by the US China trade war, Brexit and other geo-political as well as recession risks in 2020. Domestically, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad recently launched the Shared Prosperity Vision 2030 that will succeed his unfulfilled Vision 2020. This article focuses on the extent to which Budget 2020, in balancing the need for an expansionary budget and belt tightening to ensure fiscal sustainability, can be a catalyst for the country's new Shared Prosperity Vision 2030, and sustain the growth momentum while effecting the necessary transformation into a digital economy and helping the low and middle income groups cope with depressed wages and high cost of living.

The Caddo Parish sheriff's contest looms as the
highest-profile this election cycle among the chief law enforcement officers
and tax collectors of Louisiana, while also serving as a barometer of political
change.

All but Orleans Parish will vote on these offices
this fall, although the new terms won't begin until the middle of 2024. The most
populous, East Baton Rouge, finds Democrat long-tine Sheriff Sid Gautreaux at
this point without competition, as occurred last time. But the next highest-populated,
Caddo will welcome a newcomer with the deferral of Republican even longer-time Sheriff
Steve Prator to attempt a seventh term.

At
the beginning of June, Prator was all ready to go for that, but by
the end of the month opted out after he evaluated his health as more
tenuous than he had realized and decided to retire. Not long after he had
announced he would run for reelection, Democrat Henry
Whitehorn said he would entering the race, although claiming it wasn't as a
mission to oppose Prator. Republican Eric Hatfield, a perennial candidate with
an extremely checkered past of legal problems and controversy
over a stint as a constable that led to his defeat also has said he will
run.

Who will not be the guy area Republicans want to
try to retain the office. Prator has said he will return all donations to his
campaign but also said he would steer donors towards candidates he finds
acceptable. He has named none as yet.

Gautreaux and Prator remain anachronisms in that
both are white yet serve majority-minority populations (Caddo barely, East Baton
Rouge a little more so). In terms of the Caddo
electorate, whites actually have a bare plurality although census data
suggest there may be more registrants with some black ancestry than white. But,
given their lengthy times in office, both first elected when their electorates
had white majorities, good reviews by constituents have led to their continued
reelections against no or token opposition.

Without a candidate of Prator's record of incumbency
around, this suggests that Whitehorn, who not only would benefit from a
Democrat label as most blacks vote for Democrats but also is black, may have an
edge over any white Republican. Buttressing this view is that the same electorate
in 2015, then with a white majority, elected black Democrat James Stewart as First District Attorney
with a comfortable 55 percent of the vote.

Then again, even as Whitehorn has a lengthy career
in law enforcement capped with a couple of years as Shreveport's chief
administrative officer under Democrat former Mayor Adrian Perkins, it hasn't
been all skittles and beer. Long ago head of the Louisiana State Police, that
agency continues to take a public relations beating, then and now, for questionable
trooper actions. His term as Shreveport police chief was unremarkable, but
weighing most heavily on his candidacy is that most recent stint as CAO, where
he took arrows for a number of controversial, if not unpopular or even smacking
of insider politics, decisions made by Perkins (for
example, a change in health plans for city employees and retirees attenuating
choices if not increasing costs) that ultimately led to his defeat months ago
that sent Whitehorn into retirement.

Still, given the electoral environment Republicans
would have to come up with a pretty good candidate whose chances would be
maximized by having some law enforcement background to offset Whitehorn's. Time
is running out to find such a competitor with qualifying just about a month
away for a contest soliciting from over 150,000 voters that just can't be thrown
together overnight to be effective.

The article examines the international legal aspect of the legal activities of the Frankish kings of the Merovingian dynasty. Particular attention is paid to the descendants of King Clovis – Theodorich, Theodbert, Theodebald. Their rule collectively covers the period from 511 to 555 AD and is characterized by increasing power of the Frankish kingdom. In particular, the Franks conquered the tribes of alemans, Thuringians, Burgundians, successfully opposed the Saxons. However, from a historical and legal point of view, the most important aspect of Frankish history has always been the participation of the Frankish tribe in Italian political life. During the 511-555 AD, the Franks actively intervened in the domestic politics of the Ostrogothic kingdom, which functioned in the territories of Italy, Provence and Dalmatia with the permission of the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium). The author made an interdisciplinary analysis of primary sources (annals, chronicles, codes), which allows to conclude the formal recognition by the Frankish kings of supreme power of the Byzantine emperors during the first half of VI century AD. Thus, on the material of the international legal activity of the Merovingians, one can clearly trace the difference between the legal and political state of affairs in the early Middle Ages. From a legal point of view, the Frankish kingdom was always (up to 800 AD) the property of the Eastern Roman Empire, since the Byzantine emperor, after the dramatic events of 476-480, remained the only Roman emperor in the world. Frankish kings were forced to follow this formality, given the predominance of Latin-speaking populations among their subjects. From a political point of view, the Frankish kingdom was formed and developed as a completely independent state formation, which during the reign of the Merovingian dynasty, under the influence of the transfer of Roman public law, transformed from a primitive "chiefdom" into a "monarchy". The article demonstrates the political and legal maneuvers of the Merovingians that they were forced to follow in order to strike a balance between the legal form and the political content of their relations with Byzantium. ; У статті досліджено міжнародно-правовий аспект юридичної діяльності франкських королів із династії Меровінгів. Особливу увагу присвячено нащадкам короля Хлодвіга – Теодоріху, Теодеберту, Теодебальду. Їхнє правління сукупно охоплює період з 511 по 555 рр. і характеризується зростанням могутності Франкського королівства. Зокрема, франки підкорили племена алеманнів, тюрингів, бургундів, успішно протистояли саксам. Однак, з історико-юридичної точки зору, найважливішим аспектом франкської історії завжди була участь франкського племені в італійському політичному житті. Протягом 511-555 рр. франки активно втручалися у внутрішню політику Остготського королівства, що функціонувало на теренах Італії, Провансу та Далмації з дозволу Східної Римської імперії (Візантії). Автором здійснено міждисциплінарний аналіз першоджерел (анналів, хронік, літописів, кодексів), що дозволяє зробити висновок про формальне визнання франкськими королями верховної влади візантійських імператорів протягом першої половини VI століття. Відтак, на матеріалі міжнародно-правової діяльності Меровінгів можна чітко прослідкувати різницю між юридичним і політичним станом справ у ранньому середньовіччі. З юридичної точки зору, Франкське королівство завжди виступало (до 800 року включно) власністю Східної Римської імперії, оскільки візантійський імператор, після дра- матичних подій 476-480 рр., зали- шився єдиним римським імператором у світі. Франкські королі були вимушені дотримуватись цієї формальності, з огляду на переважання латиномовного населення серед своїх підданих. З політичної точки зору, Франкське королівство сформувалось і розвивалось як цілком самостійне державне утворення, що протягом правління династії Меровінгів, під впливом трансферту римського публічного права, перетворилось із примітивного «вождества» в розвинену «монархію». Стаття демонструє політичні та юридичні маневри Меровінгів, яких вони були змушені дотримуватись для того, щоб забезпечити баланс між юридичною формою і політичним змістом відносин із Візантією.

The author studied the peculiarities of the foreign policy of Poland in relation to Ukraine in the period of term of office of Leh Kachinski. As never before support of Poland, which was a member of the European Union and NATO was measurable while Ukraine which was in post-revolutionary state was only striving for the Euro-Atlantic integration. These two factors stipulated a special interest of Poland in Ukraine and vise versa as such a vector of the foreign policy orientation could significantly strengthen positions of the both countries. Republic of Poland initiates creation of the program «European policy of neighborhood» within the framework of which Eastern direction of the policy of RP in relation of Ukraine was realized. However, middle ground of the Ukrainian politicians concerning democratization of the society, The article examines the foreign policy orientations of the Republic of Poland concerning Ukraine during the period of the presidential term L. Kachinsky (2005–2010). On the basis of the worked out materials and documents it was established that the Eastern policy vector of the foreign policy of the Republic of Poland was based on the program «European Policy of Neighborhood», in which Ukraine was given priority. The main directions of cooperation that are mutually beneficial for the countries of the Euro-Atlantic area and Ukraine are outlined. It is revealed that the «European Neighborhood Policy» program is aimed at developing bilateral relations between the EU partner countries and its members and contributes to the possible gradual accession to European policies and programs. moderate steps on the way to implementation of the reforms and a number of the loud statements resulted in the cooling in relations with the Republic of Poland. And after the tragic events of 2010 not far from Smolensk and change of the head of Ukraine world community categorically announced that the era of advocating of the Ukrainian interests by the Polish presidents was over when L. Kachinski died. ; Досліджено особливості зовнішньої політики Польщі щодо України в період каденції Л. Качинського (2005–2010 рр.). Як ніколи, відчувалася підтримка Республіки Польща, яка вже була членом Європейського Союзу та НАТО, а Україна, що перебувала в постреволюційному стані, лише прагнула до євроатлантичної інтеграції. Ці два факти сформували особливий інтерес Польщі до України та навпаки, оскільки такий вектор зовнішньополітичної орієнтації міг значно зміцнити позиції обох держав. За основу в зовнішньополітичних орієнтирах Польщі в східному напрямі в період президентської каденції Л. Качинського (2005–2010 рр.) взято програму «Європейська політика сусідства» На базі опрацьованих матеріалів та документів установлено, що східному вектору зовнішньої політики Республіки Польща в Україні надавали пріоритетного значення. Окреслено основні напрями співпраці, які є взаємновигідними для країн Євроатлантичного простору й України. З'ясовано, що програма «Європейська політика сусідства» спрямована на розвиток двосторонніх відносин між країнами-партнерами ЄС і її членами й сприяє можливому поступовому приєднанню до європейської політики та програм. Республіка Польща ініціює створення програми «Європейська політика сусідства», у рамках якої й здійснювалася реалізація східного напряму зовнішньої політики РП щодо України. Однак половинчасті дії українського політикуму стосовно демократизації суспільства, помірковані кроки на шляху до впровадження реформ та низка гучних заяв сприяли охолодженню відносин із Республікою Польща. А після трагічних подій 2010 р. під Смоленськом та зміною очільника України світова спільнота однозначно констатувала, що ера адвокатування українських інтересів польськими президентами закінчилась зі смертю Л. Качинського. Установлено, що зовнішня політика Республіки Польща щодо України у 2005–2010 рр. продовжила загальні тенденції, закладені у двосторонніх відносинах у попередні роки, відтак напряму залежала від рішень і дій президентів, чим і надалі підтримувала особливий простір польсько-українського співробітництва – прези­дентський вимір.

HUBUNGAN ANTARA MASA KERJA DAN ARAH ANGIN DENGAN KADAR KOLINESTERASE DARAH PADA PETANI PADI PENGGUNA PESTISIDA DI DESA PANGIAN TENGAH KECAMATAN PASSI TIMUR KABUPATEN BOLAANG MONGONDOW Ais Regi Osang1) , Benedictus S. Lampus1), Audy D. Wuntu1) 1)Fakultas Kesehatan Masyarakat Universitas Sam Ratulangi Manado E-mail : regiosang14@gmail.com ABSTRACT The society growth which is growing year to year needs more and more food necessity, so the government increases the cultivation technique which covers irrigation, fertilization, and plant disease control are activated continuously, more farmers use pesticide to control plant disease to keep the plat from disease, pesticide which is often used are Isuch as curacron, based on the data taken from East Passi Public Health Center during January 2015- April 2015 there is complaint from the society who come to get the medication with some health disorder such as headache, muscle pain, another general symptoms and indications including queasy, vomit, whirling, which is suspected has correlations with pesticide poisoning. This study aims to determine the correlation between the working period and cardinal direction with blood cholinesterase level on rice farmer who use pesticide in Middle Pangian village, East Passi district, Bolaang Mangondow Regency. This is an analytic survey with cross sectional study design. The number of sample is 35 people which regularly use pesticide during the last 2 months, the working period and cardinal direction is obtained by using questionnaires through interviews. The cholinesterase level is measured by using tintometer kit, it's tested by spearman rank correlation test with CI 95 % and α= 0.05. The study shows that the cholinesterase level has a significant correlation with the working period (p=0.000), and has significant correlation with cardinal direction (p=0.04). It's suggested to the farmer who had contacted with the pesticide should take a rest and start to do spraying at least in 2 weeks. It needs to be studied continuously in a large number of samples. Keywords: Cholinesterase level, working period, cardinal direction, rice farmer ABSTRAK Pertumbuhan penduduk yang terus meningkat dari tahun ke tahun membutuhkan kebutuhan pangan yang semakin besar, sehingga pemerintah meningkatkan teknik budidaya yang meliputi pengairan, pemupukan, dan pengendalian hama penyakit terus diaktifkan, petani banyak menggunakan pestisida untuk mengendalikan hama penyakit, di Desa Pangian Tengah petani menggunakan pestisida untuk menjaga tanaman dari serangan hama penyakit, pestisida yang sering digunakan adalah golongan organofosfat seperti curacron, berdasarkan data yang diambil di Puskesmas Passi Timur sepanjang bulan Januari 2015 – April 2015 terdapat keluhan masyarakat yang datang berobat dengan gangguan kesehatan seperti sakit kepala, nyeri otot, gejala dan tanda umum lainnya termasuk mual, muntah, pusing, yang diduga ada hubungannya dengan keracunan pestisida. Penelitian ini ada lah untuk mengetahui Hubungan antara Masa kerja dan Arah Angin Dengan Kadar Kolinesterase Darah Pada Petani Padi Pengguna Pestisida di Desa Pangian Tengah, Kecamatan Passi Timur, Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow. Penelitian ini merupakan survei analitik dengan disain cross sectional. Jumlah sampel sebanyak 35 orang yang rutin menyemprot pestisida selama 2 bulan terakhir, masa kerja dan arah angin diperoleh menggunakan kuesioner melalui wawancara, kadar kolinesterase diukur menggunakan alat tintometer kit, dengan diuji menggunakan uji korelasi spearman rank dengan CI 95% dan α = 0,05. Penelitian menunjukan bahwa kadar kolineterase berhubungan signifikan dengan masa kerja (p=0,000), dan berhubungan signifikan dengan arah angin (p=0,004). Saran diberikan adalah sebaiknya petani padi yang sudah terpapar pestisida harus melakukan tindakan istirahat dan tidak melakukan tindakan penyemprotan dalam jangka waktu sekurang-kurangnya 2 minggu. perlu dilakukan penelitian lebih lanjut pada sampel yang lebih besar. Kata Kunci: Kadar kolinesterase, masa kerja, arah angin, petani sayur