How a nineteenth-century lawsuit over the estate of a wealthy Tunisian Jew shines new light on the history of belongingIn the winter of 1873, Nissim Shamama, a wealthy Jew from Tunisia, died suddenly in his palazzo in Livorno, Italy. His passing initiated a fierce lawsuit over his large estate. Before Shamama's riches could be disbursed among his aspiring heirs, Italian courts had to decide which law to apply to his estate-a matter that depended on his nationality. Was he an Italian citizen? A subject of the Bey of Tunis? Had he become stateless? Or was his Jewishness also his nationality? Tracing a decade-long legal battle involving Jews, Muslims, and Christians from both sides of the Mediterranean, The Shamama Case offers a riveting history of citizenship across regional, cultural, and political borders.On its face, the crux of the lawsuit seemed simple: To which state did Shamama belong when he died? But the case produced hundreds of pages in legal briefs and thousands of dollars in lawyers' fees before the man's estate could be distributed among his quarrelsome heirs. Jessica Marglin follows the unfolding of events, from Shamama's rise to power in Tunis and his self-imposed exile in France, to his untimely death in Livorno and the clashing visions of nationality advanced during the lawsuit. Marglin brings to life a Dickensian array of individuals involved in the case: family members who hoped to inherit the estate; Tunisian government officials; an Algerian Jewish fixer; rabbis in Palestine, Tunisia, and Livorno; and some of Italy's most famous legal minds.Drawing from a wealth of correspondence, legal briefs, rabbinic opinions, and court rulings, The Shamama Case reimagines how we think about Jews, the Mediterranean, and belonging in the nineteenth century
Zugriffsoptionen:
Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
One can note that the issue of children rights has always been topical and while there is still plenty of complex topics to be studied, the author yet invites to return to the basics of the child's rights, and in particularly, to the need to protect the child's identity as a legal value. The purpose of the article, therefore, is to clarify the meaning of the child's right to identity enshrined in the international, and in particularly, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and according Latvian legislation. With the assistance of a descriptive method in conjunction with a historical method the article marks the historical events of the last quarter of the 20th century leading to formation and contemporary understanding of the right to identity. Historical remarks are followed with a smooth transition into the analysis of the international and Latvian legal framework. The used sources among others include a number of international, European and Latvian legal acts, as well as accessible interpretative manuals, monographs, comments, transcripts and other sources for a better understanding of the contents of the legislation. The named analysis has been performed with the use of legal comparative, systemic and analytical research methods. ; anastasija.jumakova@gmail.com ; Latvijas Universitāte (University of Latvia, Latvia) ; Besson S., Enforcing the Child's Right to Know her Origins: Contrasting Approaches under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention on Human Rights, "International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family" 2007, No. 21. ; Blair D.M.B., The Impact of Family Paradigms, Domestic Constitutions, and International Conventions on Disclosure of an Adopted Person's Identities and Heritage: A Comparative Examination, "Michigan Journal of International Law" 2001, Vol. 22. ; Blauwhoff R.J., Foundational facts, relative truths: A comparative law study on children's right to know their genetic origins, Antwerp 2009. ; Cerda J.S., The Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child: New Rights, "Human Rights Quarterly" 1990, vol. 12. ; Cohen C.P., Elasticity of Obligation and the Drafting of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, "Connecticut Journal of International Law" 1987, No. 71. ; Cohen C.P., Introductory Note to the United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child. "International Legal Materials" 1989. ; Danovskis E., Ruķers M., Lībiņa-Egner I., 96. Ikvienam ir tiesības uz privātās dzīves, mājokļa un korespondences neaizskaramību, [in:]: Latvijas Republikas Satversmes komentāri: VIII nodaļa Cilvēka pamattiesības, ed. R. Balodis, A. Endziņš, T. Jundzis et al, Rīga Latvijas Vēstnesis 2011. ; Heimerle N., International Law and Identity Rights for Adopted Children, "Adoption Quarterly" 2003, Vol. 7 (2). ; Hodgson D., The International Legal Protection of the Child's Right to a Legal Identity and the Problems of Statelessness, "International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family" 1993, Vol. 7 (2). ; Kovaļevska A., Personas tiesības uz savu attēlu, Valsts Cilvēktiesību birojs, 2005: http://providus.lv/article_files/1583/original/attel_tiesib.pdf?1332251075 (25.07.2020). ; Marshall J., Concealed Births, Adoption and Human Rights: Being Wary of Seeking to Open Windows into People's Soul, "Cambridge Law Journal" 2012, Vol. 71 (2). ; Marshall J., Personal freedom throughout Human Rights Law: Autonomy, Identity and Integrity under the European Convention on Human rights. International Studies in Human Rights, 2009. ; McCombs T., Gonzalez J. S., Right to Identity, International Human Rights Law Clinic, University of California, Berkeley School of Law 2007: http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2007/CP19277.PDF (26.07.2020). ; O'Donovan K., "Real" mothers for Abandoned Children, "Law and Society Review" 2002, Vol. 36, No.2. ; Parra-Aranguren G., Explanatory Report on the 1993 Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention: https://www.hcch.net/en/publications-and-studies/details4/?pid=2279 (25.07.2020). ; Ronen Y., Redefining the Child's Right to Identity, "International Journal of Law and the Family" 2004, Vol. 18. ; Sants H.J., Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents, "British Journal of Medical Psychology" 1964, Vol. 37. ; Scolnicov A., The Child's Right to Religious Freedom and Formation of Identity, "International Journal of Children's Rights" 2007, Vol. 15. ; Stewart G.A., Interpreting the Child's Right to Identity in the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, "Family Law Quarterly" 1992-1993, Vol.26. ; van Bueren G., The International Law on the Rights of the Child, 1998. ; Wellisch E., Children Without Genealogy – A Problem of Adoption, "Mental Health" 1952, Vol. 13. ; Implementation Handbook For The Convention On The Rights Of The Child, United Nations Children's Fund 2007. ; Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, edited by P. van Dijk, F. van Hoof, A. van Rijn, L. Zwaak and others, Antwerpen – Oxford Intersentia 2006. ; Judgement of ECHR of 29 April 2002 (Application no. 2346/02) in the case of Pretty v. United Kingdom. ; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine: https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/090000168007cf98 (access: 26.07.2020). ; Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption: https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=69 (access: 25.07.2020). ; Convention on the Rights of the Child: https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx (access: 25.07.2020). ; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx (access: 25.07.2020). ; Declaration of the Rights of the Child: http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/humanrights/resources/child.asp (access: 25.07.2020). ; Universal Declaration of Human Rights: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf (access: 25.07.2020). ; The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Official Journal of the European Union, C 83/289, 30.3.2010. ; European Convention on the Adoption of Children (Revised): https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680084823 (access: 26.07.2020). ; Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted. OJ L 304, 30.9.2004. ; Latvijas Republikas Satversme : LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1993. 1.jūlijs, Nr. 43. English translation: The Constitution of the Republic of Latvia: https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/57980-the-constitution-of-the-republic-of-latvia (access: 26.07.2020). ; Bērnu tiesību aizsardzības likums : LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1998. 19. jūlijs, Nr.199/200. English translation: Law on the Protection of the Children's Rights: https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/49096-law-on-the-protection-of-the-childrens-rights (access: 26.07.2020). ; Biometrijas datu apstrādes sistēmas likums : LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2009. 10. jūnijs, Nr.90/4076. English translation: Biometric Data Processing System Law: https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/193111-biometric-data-processing-system-law (access: 26.07.2020). ; Grozījumi Bērnu tiesību aizsardzības likumā : LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2000. 28. marts, Nr.11/112. English translation: Amendments to the Law on the Protection of the Children's Rights. ; Latvijas Republikas Civillikums : LR likums. Valdības Vēstnesis, 1937. gada 20. februāris, Nr. 41; Ziņotājs, 1993. 10. jūnijs, Nr. 22. English translation: The Civil law of the Republic of Latvia: https://likumi.lv/ta/id/90223-civillikums-pirma-dala-gimenes-tiesibas (access: 26.07.2020). ; Likuma "Grozījumi Bērnu tiesību aizsardzības likumā" 1. lasījums. Latvijas Republikas 7. Saeimas rudens sesijas vienpadsmitā sēde. Saeimas arhīvs: http://www.saeima.lv/steno/1999/st2810.html (access: 26.07.2020). English translation: The first of review of the law "Amendments to the Law on the Protection of the Children's Rights". Eleventh sitting of the autumn session of the 7th Parliament of the Republic of Latvia; ; Likuma "Grozījumi Bērnu tiesību aizsardzības likumā" 2. lasījums. Latvijas Republikas 7. Saeimas rudens sesijas deviņpadsmitā sēde. Saeimas arhīvs: http://www.saeima.lv/steno/1999/st1612.html (access: 26.07.2020). English translation: The second of review of the law "Amendments to the Law on the Protection of the Children's Rights". Nineteenth sitting of the autumn session of the 7th Saeima of the Republic of Latvia. ; Likuma "Grozījumi Bērnu tiesību aizsardzības likumā" 3. lasījums. Latvijas Republikas 7. Saeimas ziemas sesijas vienpadsmitā sēde. Saeimas arhīvs: http://www.saeima.lv/steno/2000/st0903.html (access: 26.07.2020). English translation: The third of review of the law "Amendments to the Law on the Protection of the Children's Rights". Eleventh Session of the 7th Saeima of the Republic of Latvia ; Saeimas Cilvēktiesību un sabiedrisko lietu komisijas 1999.gada 30. novembra projekts 2. lasījumam "Priekšlikumi likumprojektam "Grozījumi Bērnu tiesību aizsardzības likumā"": http://helios-web.saeima.lv/bin/lasa?LP0381_2 (access: 12.06.2019). English translation: Draft of the Human Rights and Public Affairs Commission of the Parliament of November 30, 1999 for the Second Review "Proposals for the draft law "Amendments to the Law on the Protection of the Rights of the Child"". ; Explanatory Report on European Convention on the Adoption of Children, Treaty Office of Council of Europe: http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/058.htm (access: 26.07.2020). ; History of Argentina: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Argentina (access: 25.07.2020). ; Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Disappearances/Pages/DisappearancesIndex.aspx (access: 25.07.2020). ; 19 ; 1 ; 223 ; 244
'It is a lesson which all history teaches wise men, to put trust in ideas, and not in circumstances'.Ralph Waldo Emerson'It is precisely in times of national emergencies that civil liberties must be defended and protected most forcefully. If not, then governments will be given incentives to constantly create crises, or perceptions of crises, and declaring "official states of emergency" in order to grab more and more power and money and destroy more and more liberty and prosperity'.United States Supreme Court (Ex Parte Milligan. 1866)IntroductionSince the September 11 attacks, the notion of state of exception has been used in order to coin the legal and political repercussions of the 'War on Terror'. These, by being labeled within the state of emergency's legal -or extralegal- framework, have been able to be constitutionally justified and, also, ethically criticized. Proponents of draconian measures consider that, in certain circumstances, necessity dictates policies aimed at protecting the State from terrorist attacks. They deem terrorism an imminent and serious threat capable of destroying the institutions that give political cohesion to society. Denying, suspending and limiting certain individual rights amount to a lesser evil; compared to the, apparently, almost certain greater evil that terrorists embody. On the other hand, advocates of the inviolability of the rule of law believe that under any situation a democratic government should allow urgency and peril prevail over the constitutionally recognized political and human rights. For them, counterterrorism should not rely on extralegal actions 'legitimized' by the state of exception. The State already has the legal and adequate tools, provided by the police and criminal justice, to persecute terrorists. Democracies that recur to lesser evil arguments to fight terrorism always end up committing more damage that the one they were trying to prevent.This essay will analyze the state of exception by studying the legal and the political-social natures of it. Various arguments, in favor and against the exception, will be showcased by continuously referring to the War on Terror and its effects on the legal system and democracy. Lastly, a conclusion will address the importance of this debate in current politics and society. The State of ExceptionThe state of exception or emergency can be studied under two different kinds of views: the legal and the political-social ones. The former defines the state of emergency, within the various constitutional frameworks of current modern democracies, as a temporary measure that limits or suspends certain individual freedoms within the territory of the State . It is prompted by a critical and imminent, domestic or foreign, threat to the State's existence. Under this scenario, necessity overcomes the 'normal' rule of law. Consequentially, individual freedoms are limited while police, security and military agencies' powers are enhanced. The debate regarding the state of exception's legal aspect circles around the constitutionality of its enactment, the variety of faculties attributed to the State's security forces and, more importantly, the personal rights suspension's lawfulness. Politically and socially, the state of emergency is conceived either as the pivotal attribute that defines the sovereign body as such; or, either as the transitional step required for -'legitimately'- transforming a democracy into a dictatorship. The former perception links the state of exception with the concept of sovereigntyunderstood as the State's existence as an organized polity . The latter one considers any type of restriction to individual freedoms as a permanent damage to the fabrics of democracy . The Legal Nature of the State of Exception The legal, and political, origin of the state of emergency is to be found in ancient Roman law. According to the lex de dictatore creando, whenever the Roman Republic was in grave danger, the Senate designated an extraordinary magistrate that was invested with absolute and total authority over the Republic . Subsequently, a provisional dictatorship was instituted that lasted for six months or until the threat passed. The republican and the dictatorship authorities, to the Romans, were complementary; quite the opposite of how democracies and authoritarian regimes are understood today. However, Roman dictators quickly learned how to indefinitely prolong their authority by perpetuating foreign wars through the creation of an Empire.The institution of the Roman provisional dictatorship is the historical legal inception of the various types of state of emergency that are currently present within modern constitutions. Broadly speaking, in every constitution the state of exception is declared by the head of the executive power whenever the normal functions of the State's institutions are no longer guaranteed because of foreign attack or domestic unrest. Fundamental liberties and rights -such as habeas corpus, freedom of movement and public gathering among others- are suspended or severely restricted. In most cases, the executive is entitled to order the arrest of individuals and to set military commissions for their trials. The security forces' faculties are enhanced and the military is allowed to take on police activities. Depending on the country, the state of emergency could be declared to last for days, months or years and it can even be extended indefinitely number of times . The debate concerning the state of exception's legal aspect comprises three main issues: its constitutionality; the amount of power given to the security forces; and, the limits set on fundamental freedoms, individual rights and constitutional guarantees. The state of emergency's constitutional validity considers under which cases it can be declared. As stated before, it is necessity that calls for the establishment of exception. It is necessary to give to the executive branch of government extraordinary powers and authority in order to prevent the State's breakdown from an imminent and grave danger. This peril can be prompted by a domestic or foreign threat. The latter are not sufficiently, and narrowly, defined by modern constitutions. Normally, they invoke a military invasion by a foreign country or an internal insurrection; but both of them are broad cases and can be loosely interpreted. Taking the U.S. Constitution, for example, the state of emergency is only referred to in Article I, Section 9 where it states: 'The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.'Therefore, only in the cases of rebellion –domestic threat- and invasion –foreign threat- the state of exception can be enacted. Regrettably, the Constitution does not define what constitutes a rebellion or an invasion. The task was left for legal experts and the Judiciary to tackle; but, it has not been easy or even coherent.The Supreme Court had the opportunity to take on the constitutionality of the state of emergency after President Lincoln had declared it in 1861 . In Ex Parte Milligan, it was decided that the suspension of the habeas corpus and the setting of military tribunals for citizens was unconstitutional because, even if a rebellion was in course, civilian courts were still operating. Additionally, the Supreme Court went even further by declaring that the theory of necessity, which justifies the state of exception, was false. It was argued that under the rule of law, guaranteed by the Constitution, the powers needed to protect the State's institutions are already set in place. Lastly, the Justices regarded the state of exception as a dangerous instrument that could only lead to despotism . Nevertheless, the Court did not pronounce itself about the issue of defining what constitutes a rebellion or invasion. Interestingly, even if it was deemed –correctly- that necessity never justifies the suspension of the rule of law, by not defining what constitutes an emergency, the Court considered the issue a political, and not a legal, matter . Rebellion and invasion remain broad, undefined, cases open to interpretation and to malleability by politics. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court refrained itself from approaching the issue .The question of the security forces' enhanced powers, during the state of emergency, is a thornier one when compared to the former. Moreover, it is also deeply intertwined with the problem regarding limitations to fundamental liberties. During the state of exception the police and other security agencies are given extraordinary faculties aimed at facilitating the expedient resolution of the crisis. Therefore, they are allowed to search within premises without warrants, to arrest suspects without a court order, to hold individuals for a long period of time with no access to a lawyer or judge, to carry out aggressive interrogations, to set up wiretapping and close surveillance with no Judiciary control. Furthermore, it could also be the case that intelligence agencies and the military would be empowered to perform police and judicial activities. Since the declaration of the state of emergency by President George W. Bush, following 9/11, numerous enhanced and new attributes have been granted to the United States' security forces and agencies. Their faculties were augmented by several executive decrees and the three Patriot Acts. These pieces of legislation were said to be justified by the imminent and severe danger that terrorism embodied. But, are these prerogatives really needed to prevent future terrorist attacks? This is, of course, an endless debate; and one that again points out to the relationship between law and politics. As implied by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Milligan, terrorists can be persecuted without declaring the state of emergency, by applying 'plain' criminal law and by letting the F.B.I -not the military- take the lead. To sum up, the 'normal' rule of law is perfectly suited for the task. However, depending on how terrorism is considered, as a war act or as a criminal one, is still a political issue.Just like in both the question of the constitutionality of the state of exception and the empowerment of security agencies, the concern regarding the suspension or restriction of fundamental liberties is one that is ascribed within the lesser evil debate. Legally, the selection between continuing the 'normal' rule of law or enacting the state of exception weights the possible damage that not acting would cause against the harm that limiting individual freedoms would produce . It is here where the legal concept of necessity comes into play. It is necessary to inflict or withstand a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater evil. This is the pragmatic view of constitutional freedoms: the risk of harming individual freedoms is a lesser one when compared to the possibility of not having any State that protects those liberties . The moral point of view argues that, by restricting constitutional freedoms, the State is causing an irreversible damage that may, quite possibly, be greater than the one that necessity is trying to avoid . When a state of exception is enacted the fundamental liberties that are suspended are, normally, the right to habeas corpus; freedom of movement; the right to public and private gathering; and the right to due process among others. The United States Government, during both the Bush and the Obama Administrations, restricted and suspended several individual freedoms and constitutionally guaranteed rights in order to effectively and speedily fight terrorism and avert further attacks. The rights to habeas corpus, to due process, to unnecessary cruel punishment and to trial by jury have been gravely and irreversibly hampered by the legalization of indefinite detention, targeted killing, aggressive interrogation and military tribunals respectively. In nearly all these cases, there is no chance of contradictory or revisionary procedures that would allow the dismissal of their establishment by proving their unfairness or unconstitutionality . The issue, maybe, is that they are not only unfair, but that they are unnecessary and cause permanent damage. Targeted killing and aggressive interrogation, which would be better labeled as targeted assassination and torture, are completely detrimental to the rule of law and set up dangerous precedents for the future. Since both measures have to be sanctioned, in each case, by the President and there is no possibility of revision, it could be argued that the executive is taking on the exclusive attributes of the other two branches of government. The check and balances system, designed to avoid despotic power, is totally disregarded in these cases . Here, the effects of necessity are clearly the greater evil.Depending on the country, the state of emergency or exception is labeled as martial law or state of siege (état de siège or estado de sitio). Both, however, share the same objectives and are justified by necessity. See Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 25-28. Schmitt, Carl; Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty; Chicago University Press; Chicago; 2005; pp. 5-6. See, Arendt, Hannah; 'Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship'; in Responsibility and Judgment; Kohn, Jerome (Ed.); Schocken Books; New York; 2003.Lintott, Andrew; The Constitution of the Roman Republic; Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1999; pp. 110.For example, in France l' état de siège can only last for 12 days, although the President is allowed to extend it for more time with the Parliament's confirmation. In the United States, the National Emergency Acts can only last for no more than two years, but the President is entitled to extend it for one more years indefinitely number of times by only notifying Congress of his decision. For the French case see Article 16 of the Constitution, available at http://www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-institutions/institutions/approfondissements/pouvoirs-exceptionnels-du-president.html ; for the American case see the U.S. Code, Title 50, Chapter 34, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sup_01_50_10_34.html .See the United States Constitution, available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=138See Neely, Mark; The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties; Oxford University Press; New York; 1991; pp. 179-184. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/71/2/case.htmlSee, Roche, John; Executive Power and Domestic Emergency: The Quest for Prerogative'; Western Political Quarterly; Vol. 5; N. 4; December 1952. See Ex Parte Quirin , 317 U.S. 1 (1942), which declared constitutional the military trials of German saboteurs during the Second World War in U.S. soil, available at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=317&invol=1 ; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which determined constitutional the Japanese Americans internment camps, available athttp://supreme.justia.com/us/323/214/case.html ; and, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), where it was decided that all Guantanamo detainees had the right of habeas corpus, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-1195.pdf The national emergency was declared through Proclamation 7463 available athttp://ra.defense.gov/documents/mobil/pdf/proclamation.pdfSee Ignatieff, Michael; The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror; Princeton University Press; New York; 2004; pp. 40-44.See, Posner, Richard; Law, Pragmatism and Democracy; Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 2003. It is also interesting to consider here Margaret Somers' Arendtian view of political rights versus human rights because the former are recognized and protected by the State. See Somers, Margaret; Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights; Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 2008.See Dworkin, Ronald; Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the Constitution; Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 1996.Only regarding the cases of the restriction of habeas corpus and the setting up of military tribunals has the Supreme Court been able to declare their unconstitutionality and illegality. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); both available athttp://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=000&invol=03-6696&friend andhttp://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-184.pdf respectively.For a better and more detailed analysis of the legality or illegality of targeted killings and torture see Banks, William; 'Targeted Killing and Assassination: the U.S. Legal Framework'; University of Richmond Law Review; Vol. 37; N. 667; 2002-2003; Dershowitz, Alan; 'When All Else Fails, Why not Torture?'; American Legion Magazine; July 2002; Blum, Gabriella, and Heymann, Philip; 'Law and Policy of Targeted Killing'; The Harvard National Security Journal; Vol. 2, Issue 2; 2010; and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.
The present report provides an overview of the main developments and debates in relation to migration and asylum in Luxembourg in 2017. The number of people applying for international protection remained high in 2017 (2.322 applications) compared to the levels registered pre- 'migration crisis' (1.091 in 2014). However, the number of registrations remained relatively stable if compared to the two preceding years (2.447 in 2015 and 2.035 in 2016). This relative stability in numbers also reflected on the general public and policy debate in the field of migration and asylum. Since 2016, its focus has continuously shifted from an 'emergency' discourse axed on the implementation of reception measures and conditions towards discussions on longer-term integration measures and policies. In this regard, the newly introduced Guided Integration Trail (parcours d'intégration accompagné - PIA) can be considered a flagship project of OLAI, the national agency responsible for the reception and integration of foreigners. This multidisciplinary package of measures aims to empower applicants and beneficiaries of international protection and to support them in developing their life project. The trail, compulsory for all adult applicants for international protection, consists of a linguistic component and a civic component and is split into three phases. Although increasing housing capacities for the reception of applicants for international protection was high on national authorities' agenda, housing remained a challenging aspect of the asylum system and triggered debate on a national scale. Alongside access to training, problems related to housing were among the issues most frequently raised by applicants for international protection in 2017. The lack of affordable housing on the private market, an increasing number of family reunifications as well as the increasing number of beneficiaries and persons who have been issued a return decision who remain housed in structures of OLAI were all identified as interplaying barriers for finding available accommodation for applicants for international protection. The difficulties with the construction of modular housing structures also persisted in 2017. A certain reticence of the population towards the construction of these so-called 'container villages, planned in response to the increasing influx that started in August 2015, was visible in the appeals introduced into Luxembourg's First Instance Administrative Courts to annul the land-use plans related to the projects. Living conditions in the various reception facilities were also one of the subjects of discussion in 2017. This included a debate on the (lack of) kitchen infrastructure in reception facilities and the varying systems for provision of food, the types of food available, as well as the availability of internet. As an answer to the resurgence of an increased influx of applicants of international protection from the Western Balkans in early 2017, a new 'ultra-accelerated procedure' was put in place for applicants of international protection stemming from the Western Balkans. According to the state authorities, the ultra-accelerated procedure was set up to take pressure off the reception facilities, but also as a deterrent to avoid creating false hopes for long-term stay. In April 2017, a 'semi-open return structure' (Structure d'hébergement d'urgence au Kirchberg – SHUK) was put in place, from which people are transferred to states applying the Dublin regulation. Due to home custody (assignation à résidence), the SHUK is considered to be an alternative to detention by national authorities. The newly created structure as well as the related conditions for assignment, were nevertheless criticised by civil society. The outcry among civil society was equally high during and after the adoption the Law of 8 March 2017, which endorses the extension of the permitted period of detention of adults or families with children from 72 hours to 7 days, in order to improve the organisation of the return and ensures that it is carried out successfully. A commission in charge of determining the best interests of unaccompanied minors applying for international protection was decided at the end of 2017. The commission is in charge of carrying out individual assessments regarding the best interest of the child with the aim of delivering an authorisation of stay or a return decision. Among the elements taken into consideration when the best interest of the child is evaluated in the context of a potential return decision is information provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The latter made an agreement with the Directorate of Immigration in 2017 to search for the parents of UAMs in the country of origin. With the focus of debates having slowly shifted towards long-term integration issues, the Council of Government also approved the elaboration of a new multiannual national action plan on integration. The plan will be based on two axes: (1) the reception and follow-up of applicants for international protection and (2) the integration of Luxembourg's non-Luxembourgish residents. Luxembourg's National Employment Agency (ADEM) set up a "cellule BPI" (beneficiaries of international protection cell) in its Employer Service in early 2017. This cell provides employers with information regarding job applications and evaluations of the competences of beneficiaries of international protection. A new law on the Luxembourgish nationality entered into force on 1 April 2017. Given the particular demographic situation of Luxembourg characterised by a significant increase in the total population and a decrease in the proportion of Luxembourgers in the total population, the reform intends to promote the societal and political integration of non-Luxembourgish citizens and to strengthen cohesion within the national community. The main changes introduced by the law include a decreased length of residence requirement for naturalisation (from 7 to 5 years), the right of birthplace (jus soli) of the first generation, a simplified way of acquiring Luxembourgish nationality by 'option', as well as new scenarios to avoid cases of statelessness. The law maintains previous linguistic requirements but makes some adjustments in order to prevent the language condition from becoming an insurmountable obstacle. Ahead of the local elections held on 8 October 2017, the Ministry of Family, Integration and the Greater Region launched a national information and awareness-raising campaign titled "Je peux voter" (I can vote) in January 2017. This campaign aimed to motivate Luxembourg's foreign population to register on the electoral roll for the local elections. The government's intention to legislate face concealment was arguably one of the most debated topics in the field related to community life and integration in the broader sense, both in parliament as well as in the media and public sphere. Bill n°7179 aims to modify article 563 of the Penal Code and to create the prohibition of face concealment in certain public spaces. The bill defines face concealment as the action of covering part of or all of the face in a way of rendering the identification of the person impossible and provides a wide variety of examples, such as the wearing of a motor cycle helmet, a balaclava or a full-face veil. Opposing views among stakeholders, whether political parties, public institutions, civil society or the media, emerged with regard to the necessity to legislate in the matter and if so, on the basis of which grounds and to what extent. The phenomenon of migration has also led to a more heterogeneous population in Luxembourg's schools. To face this situation, the education authorities continued to diversify Luxembourg's offer in education and training, creating for instance a bigger offer for youngsters and adults who do not master any of Luxembourg's vehicular languages, offering more alphabetisation courses or basic instruction courses. The Minister for National Education continued to develop and adapt the school offer to the increased heterogeneity by increasing the international and European school offer, introducing of a new mediation service and putting in place a plurilingual education programme. In the area of legal migration, the most significant changes concerned admission policies of specific categories of third-country nationals. In this respect, bill n°7188 mainly aims to transpose Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing. The directive aims to make the European Union a world centre of excellence for studies and training, while favouring contacts between people and favouring their mobility, these two being important elements of the European Union's external policy. Bill N°7188 intends to facilitate and simplify the procedures for intra-European mobility of TCN researchers and students. Moreover, the proposed changes include incentive mechanisms to retain students and researchers. To this end, it proposes that students and researchers, once they have completed their studies/research, can be issued a residence permit for "private reasons" for a duration of 9 months at most in view of finding employment or creating a business. Finally, bill n°7188 also foresees provisions to regulate the family reunification of a researcher staying in Luxembourg in the context of short- and long-term mobility with his/her nuclear family. The legislator furthermore transposed Directive 2014/36 on seasonal workers and Directive 2014/66 on temporary intragroup transfer into national law, and adapted Luxembourg's immigration law to the needs to the economy, by introducing, amongst other things, and authorisation of stay for investors. Organising the admission of stay and the issuance of authorisations of stay was also a key component within the agreement between Luxembourg and Cape Verde on the concerted management of migratory flows and solidary development. Other objectives of the agreement include the promotion of the movement of people, detailing readmission procedures, fighting against irregular migration, strengthening the legal establishment and integration of the concerned nationals, as well as the mobilisation of skills and resources of migrants in favour of solidary development. ; Le présent rapport fait la synthèse des principaux débats et des évolutions majeures concernant les migrations et l'asile au Luxembourg en 2017. Le nombre de personnes demandant une protection internationale est resté élevé en 2017 (2 322 demandes) par rapport aux niveaux enregistrés avant la « crise migratoire » (1 091 en 2014). Toutefois, ce nombre est resté relativement stable par rapport aux deux années précédentes (2 447 en 2015 et 2 035 en 2016). Cette stabilité relative s'est également reflétée dans le débat public et politique dans le domaine des migrations et de l'asile. Depuis 2016, l'accent n'a cessé de se déplacer d'un discours « d'urgence » axé sur la mise en œuvre de mesures et de conditions d'accueil vers des discussions sur des mesures et des politiques d'intégration à plus long terme. À cet égard, le nouveau parcours d'intégration accompagné (PIA) peut être considéré comme un projet phare de l'OLAI, l'Office luxembourgeois de l'accueil et de l'intégration des étrangers. Le PIA vise à autonomiser les demandeurs et les bénéficiaires d'une protection internationale et à les soutenir dans le développement de leur projet de vie. Le parcours, obligatoire pour tous les demandeurs adultes de protection internationale, se compose d'une composante linguistique et d'une composante civique, et il est divisé en trois phases. Bien que l'augmentation des capacités d'hébergement des demandeurs de protection internationale (DPI) figure parmi les priorités des autorités nationales, le logement des DPI reste très problématique et a déclenché un débat à l'échelle nationale. Outre l'accès à la formation, les problèmes liés au logement des DPI ont été parmi les questions les plus fréquemment soulevées en 2017. La pression sur le logement des DPI et des bénéficiaires de protection internationale (BPI) est importante : le manque de logements abordables sur le marché privé, le nombre croissant de réunifications familiales et la progression du nombre de BPI et de personnes qui ont fait l'objet d'une décision de retour mais qui restent hébergées dans les structures de l'OLAI ont été identifiés comme facteurs de pression. Les difficultés liées à la construction de structures modulaires d'hébergement ont également persisté en 2017. Une certaine réticence de la population à l'égard de la construction de ces « villages conteneurs », prévue en réponse à l'afflux croissant qui a commencé en août 2015, était visible dans les recours introduits devant les tribunaux administratifs pour annuler les plans d'occupation des sols liés aux projets. Les conditions de vie au sein des structures d'accueil ont également fait l'objet de discussions. Elles portaient notamment sur l'absence d'équipement en cuisines de plusieurs lieux d'accueil, les différents systèmes d'approvisionnement en nourriture et les types de nourriture disponibles. Afin de répondre au nombre toujours important de DPI en provenance des pays des Balkans occidentaux, une procédure ultra-accélérée a été mise en place. Cette procédure a été instaurée pour diminuer les pressions sur les structures d'accueil et pour éviter de créer de faux espoirs pour les séjours de longue durée. En avril 2017, la structure d'hébergement d'urgence au Kirchberg (SHUK) a été mise en place, afin d'héberger les DPI pour lesquels le Luxembourg n'est pas compétent pour examiner les demandes en vertu de l'application du règlement de Dublin. Ce nombre a fortement progressé. Le placement à la SHUK correspond à une assignation à résidence, donc à une alternative à la rétention. La structure nouvellement créée ainsi que les conditions d'affectation ont néanmoins été critiquées par la société civile. Plusieurs acteurs de la société civile ont manifesté leur opposition face à une disposition de la loi du 8 mars 2017 qui a étendu la période de rétention des adultes ou familles avec enfants de 72 heures à 7 jours afin de rendre plus efficiente l'organisation du retour. Un premier bilan du fonctionnement du Centre de rétention a été publié en 2017. Une commission chargée d'évaluer l'intérêt des mineurs non accompagnés dans le cadre d'une décision de retour a été créé fin 2017. La commission est chargée de mener à bien des évaluations individuelles concernant l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant dans le but de prendre une décision de retour ou d'accorder une autorisation de séjour. Parmi les éléments pris en considération lors de cette évaluation et dans le contexte d'une éventuelle décision de retour figurent également les informations fournies par l'Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM). Cette dernière a conclu un accord avec la Direction de l'immigration pour rechercher les parents de mineurs non accompagnés dans le pays d'origine. Comme les débats s'orientent lentement vers l'intégration à long terme, le Conseil de gouvernement a également approuvé l'élaboration d'un nouveau plan d'action national sur l'intégration. Le plan sera basé sur deux axes : l'accueil et le suivi des demandeurs de protection internationale et l'intégration des résidents non luxembourgeois au Luxembourg. L'Agence pour le Développement de l'Emploi (ADEM) a créé une cellule BPI au sein de son Service employeurs. Cette cellule fournit aux employeurs des renseignements sur les demandes d'emploi et les évaluations des compétences des BPI. Une nouvelle loi sur la nationalité luxembourgeoise est entrée en vigueur le 1er avril 2017. Cette loi s'inscrit dans le contexte démographique particulier du Luxembourg, caractérisé par une augmentation continue de la population totale avec, en parallèle, une diminution de la part des Luxembourgeois dans la population totale. A travers cette loi, le législateur veut favoriser l'intégration sociétale et politique des citoyens non luxembourgeois et renforcer la cohésion au sein de la communauté nationale. Les principaux changements introduits par la loi consistent en la réduction de la durée de résidence pour la naturalisation (de 7 à 5 ans), l'introduction du droit du sol de la première génération, la réinstauration de voies simplifiées d'acquisition de la nationalité luxembourgeoise par « option », ainsi que de nouveaux scénarios pour éviter les cas d'apatridie. La loi maintient les exigences linguistiques antérieures tout en procédant à quelques ajustements afin d'empêcher que les exigences linguistiques ne deviennent un obstacle insurmontable. En vue des élections communales du 8 octobre 2017, le ministère de la Famille, de l'Intégration et à la Grande Région a lancé une campagne d'information et de sensibilisation intitulée « Je peux voter » en janvier 2017. Cette campagne avait pour but d'inciter la population étrangère du Luxembourg à s'inscrire sur les listes électorales pour les élections communales. L'intention du Gouvernement de légiférer sur la dissimulation du visage était sans doute l'un des sujets les plus débattus dans le domaine lié à la vie au sein de la société au Luxembourg et l'intégration au sens large du terme, tant à la Chambre des députés que dans les médias et la sphère publique. Le projet de loi n° 7179 vise à modifier l'article 563 du Code pénal et à créer l'interdiction de dissimuler le visage dans certains espaces publics. Il définit la dissimulation du visage comme le fait de couvrir une partie ou la totalité du visage de façon à rendre l'identification de la personne impossible. Des vues opposées entre les parties prenantes – les partis politiques, les institutions publiques, la société civile ou les médias – se sont exprimées au sujet de la nécessité de légiférer en la matière et dans l'affirmative, sur les motifs et l'étendue de l'interdiction de la dissimulation du visage. Le phénomène des migrations a eu aussi comme conséquence de renforcer l'hétérogénéité de la population scolaire. Pour faire face à cette situation, les autorités scolaires ont continué à diversifier l'offre en matière d'éducation et de formation. Parmi les mesures mises en place, on peut signaler notamment l'élargissement des offres de cours d'alphabétisation et de formation de base, l'extension de l'offre au niveau des écoles internationales et européennes et la mise en place d'un programme d'éducation plurilingue au niveau de la petite enfance. Dans le domaine de l'immigration, les changements les plus importants concernent la politique d'admission de certaines catégories de ressortissants de pays tiers. À cet égard, le projet de loi n° 7188 vise principalement à transposer la Directive européenne 2016/801 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 11 mai 2016 sur les conditions d'entrée et de séjour des ressortissants de pays tiers à des fins de recherche, d'études, de formation, de volontariat, de programmes d'échanges d'élèves ou de projets éducatifs et de travail au pair. La directive vise à faire de l'Union européenne un centre mondial d'excellence en matière d'études et de formation, tout en favorisant les contacts entre les personnes et leur mobilité, deux éléments importants de la politique extérieure de l'Union européenne. Le projet de loi vise à faciliter et à simplifier les procédures de mobilité intraeuropéenne des chercheurs et des étudiants qui sont des ressortissants de pays tiers. De plus, certaines modifications comprennent des mécanismes incitatifs pour retenir les étudiants et les chercheurs. À cette fin, il propose que les étudiants et les chercheurs, une fois leurs études ou recherches terminées, puissent se voir délivrer un titre de séjour pour « raisons privées » pour une durée maximum de 9 mois en vue de trouver un emploi ou de créer une entreprise. Enfin, le projet de loi entend réglementer le regroupement familial d'un chercheur séjournant au Luxembourg dans le cadre d'une mobilité à court et à long terme. Le législateur a par ailleurs transposé la Directive 2014/36 sur les travailleurs saisonniers et la Directive 2014/66 sur le transfert temporaire intragroupe en droit national, et a adapté le dispositif de l'immigration aux besoins de l'économie en introduisant entre autres, une autorisation de séjour pour les investisseurs. L'organisation de l'admission du séjour et de la délivrance des autorisations de séjour était également un élément clé de l'Accord entre le Luxembourg et le Cap-Vert relatif à la gestion concertée des flux migratoires et au développement solidaire. L'accord approuvé par la loi du 20 juillet 2017 poursuit en outre les objectifs suivant : promouvoir la mobilité des personnes, lutter contre l'immigration irrégulière, préciser les procédures de réadmission, renforcer l'intégration légale des ressortissants concernés, ainsi que mobiliser les compétences et les ressources des migrants en faveur d'un développement solidaire.
The present report provides an overview of the main developments and debates in relation to migration and asylum in Luxembourg in 2017. The number of people applying for international protection remained high in 2017 (2.322 applications) compared to the levels registered pre- 'migration crisis' (1.091 in 2014). However, the number of registrations remained relatively stable if compared to the two preceding years (2.447 in 2015 and 2.035 in 2016). This relative stability in numbers also reflected on the general public and policy debate in the field of migration and asylum. Since 2016, its focus has continuously shifted from an 'emergency' discourse axed on the implementation of reception measures and conditions towards discussions on longer-term integration measures and policies. In this regard, the newly introduced Guided Integration Trail (parcours d'intégration accompagné - PIA) can be considered a flagship project of OLAI, the national agency responsible for the reception and integration of foreigners. This multidisciplinary package of measures aims to empower applicants and beneficiaries of international protection and to support them in developing their life project. The trail, compulsory for all adult applicants for international protection, consists of a linguistic component and a civic component and is split into three phases. Although increasing housing capacities for the reception of applicants for international protection was high on national authorities' agenda, housing remained a challenging aspect of the asylum system and triggered debate on a national scale. Alongside access to training, problems related to housing were among the issues most frequently raised by applicants for international protection in 2017. The lack of affordable housing on the private market, an increasing number of family reunifications as well as the increasing number of beneficiaries and persons who have been issued a return decision who remain housed in structures of OLAI were all identified as interplaying barriers for finding available accommodation for applicants for international protection. The difficulties with the construction of modular housing structures also persisted in 2017. A certain reticence of the population towards the construction of these so-called 'container villages, planned in response to the increasing influx that started in August 2015, was visible in the appeals introduced into Luxembourg's First Instance Administrative Courts to annul the land-use plans related to the projects. Living conditions in the various reception facilities were also one of the subjects of discussion in 2017. This included a debate on the (lack of) kitchen infrastructure in reception facilities and the varying systems for provision of food, the types of food available, as well as the availability of internet. As an answer to the resurgence of an increased influx of applicants of international protection from the Western Balkans in early 2017, a new 'ultra-accelerated procedure' was put in place for applicants of international protection stemming from the Western Balkans. According to the state authorities, the ultra-accelerated procedure was set up to take pressure off the reception facilities, but also as a deterrent to avoid creating false hopes for long-term stay. In April 2017, a 'semi-open return structure' (Structure d'hébergement d'urgence au Kirchberg – SHUK) was put in place, from which people are transferred to states applying the Dublin regulation. Due to home custody (assignation à résidence), the SHUK is considered to be an alternative to detention by national authorities. The newly created structure as well as the related conditions for assignment, were nevertheless criticised by civil society. The outcry among civil society was equally high during and after the adoption the Law of 8 March 2017, which endorses the extension of the permitted period of detention of adults or families with children from 72 hours to 7 days, in order to improve the organisation of the return and ensures that it is carried out successfully. A commission in charge of determining the best interests of unaccompanied minors applying for international protection was decided at the end of 2017. The commission is in charge of carrying out individual assessments regarding the best interest of the child with the aim of delivering an authorisation of stay or a return decision. Among the elements taken into consideration when the best interest of the child is evaluated in the context of a potential return decision is information provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The latter made an agreement with the Directorate of Immigration in 2017 to search for the parents of UAMs in the country of origin. With the focus of debates having slowly shifted towards long-term integration issues, the Council of Government also approved the elaboration of a new multiannual national action plan on integration. The plan will be based on two axes: (1) the reception and follow-up of applicants for international protection and (2) the integration of Luxembourg's non-Luxembourgish residents. Luxembourg's National Employment Agency (ADEM) set up a "cellule BPI" (beneficiaries of international protection cell) in its Employer Service in early 2017. This cell provides employers with information regarding job applications and evaluations of the competences of beneficiaries of international protection. A new law on the Luxembourgish nationality entered into force on 1 April 2017. Given the particular demographic situation of Luxembourg characterised by a significant increase in the total population and a decrease in the proportion of Luxembourgers in the total population, the reform intends to promote the societal and political integration of non-Luxembourgish citizens and to strengthen cohesion within the national community. The main changes introduced by the law include a decreased length of residence requirement for naturalisation (from 7 to 5 years), the right of birthplace (jus soli) of the first generation, a simplified way of acquiring Luxembourgish nationality by 'option', as well as new scenarios to avoid cases of statelessness. The law maintains previous linguistic requirements but makes some adjustments in order to prevent the language condition from becoming an insurmountable obstacle. Ahead of the local elections held on 8 October 2017, the Ministry of Family, Integration and the Greater Region launched a national information and awareness-raising campaign titled "Je peux voter" (I can vote) in January 2017. This campaign aimed to motivate Luxembourg's foreign population to register on the electoral roll for the local elections. The government's intention to legislate face concealment was arguably one of the most debated topics in the field related to community life and integration in the broader sense, both in parliament as well as in the media and public sphere. Bill n°7179 aims to modify article 563 of the Penal Code and to create the prohibition of face concealment in certain public spaces. The bill defines face concealment as the action of covering part of or all of the face in a way of rendering the identification of the person impossible and provides a wide variety of examples, such as the wearing of a motor cycle helmet, a balaclava or a full-face veil. Opposing views among stakeholders, whether political parties, public institutions, civil society or the media, emerged with regard to the necessity to legislate in the matter and if so, on the basis of which grounds and to what extent. The phenomenon of migration has also led to a more heterogeneous population in Luxembourg's schools. To face this situation, the education authorities continued to diversify Luxembourg's offer in education and training, creating for instance a bigger offer for youngsters and adults who do not master any of Luxembourg's vehicular languages, offering more alphabetisation courses or basic instruction courses. The Minister for National Education continued to develop and adapt the school offer to the increased heterogeneity by increasing the international and European school offer, introducing of a new mediation service and putting in place a plurilingual education programme. In the area of legal migration, the most significant changes concerned admission policies of specific categories of third-country nationals. In this respect, bill n°7188 mainly aims to transpose Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing. The directive aims to make the European Union a world centre of excellence for studies and training, while favouring contacts between people and favouring their mobility, these two being important elements of the European Union's external policy. Bill N°7188 intends to facilitate and simplify the procedures for intra-European mobility of TCN researchers and students. Moreover, the proposed changes include incentive mechanisms to retain students and researchers. To this end, it proposes that students and researchers, once they have completed their studies/research, can be issued a residence permit for "private reasons" for a duration of 9 months at most in view of finding employment or creating a business. Finally, bill n°7188 also foresees provisions to regulate the family reunification of a researcher staying in Luxembourg in the context of short- and long-term mobility with his/her nuclear family. The legislator furthermore transposed Directive 2014/36 on seasonal workers and Directive 2014/66 on temporary intragroup transfer into national law, and adapted Luxembourg's immigration law to the needs to the economy, by introducing, amongst other things, and authorisation of stay for investors. Organising the admission of stay and the issuance of authorisations of stay was also a key component within the agreement between Luxembourg and Cape Verde on the concerted management of migratory flows and solidary development. Other objectives of the agreement include the promotion of the movement of people, detailing readmission procedures, fighting against irregular migration, strengthening the legal establishment and integration of the concerned nationals, as well as the mobilisation of skills and resources of migrants in favour of solidary development. ; Le présent rapport fait la synthèse des principaux débats et des évolutions majeures concernant les migrations et l'asile au Luxembourg en 2017. Le nombre de personnes demandant une protection internationale est resté élevé en 2017 (2 322 demandes) par rapport aux niveaux enregistrés avant la « crise migratoire » (1 091 en 2014). Toutefois, ce nombre est resté relativement stable par rapport aux deux années précédentes (2 447 en 2015 et 2 035 en 2016). Cette stabilité relative s'est également reflétée dans le débat public et politique dans le domaine des migrations et de l'asile. Depuis 2016, l'accent n'a cessé de se déplacer d'un discours « d'urgence » axé sur la mise en œuvre de mesures et de conditions d'accueil vers des discussions sur des mesures et des politiques d'intégration à plus long terme. À cet égard, le nouveau parcours d'intégration accompagné (PIA) peut être considéré comme un projet phare de l'OLAI, l'Office luxembourgeois de l'accueil et de l'intégration des étrangers. Le PIA vise à autonomiser les demandeurs et les bénéficiaires d'une protection internationale et à les soutenir dans le développement de leur projet de vie. Le parcours, obligatoire pour tous les demandeurs adultes de protection internationale, se compose d'une composante linguistique et d'une composante civique, et il est divisé en trois phases. Bien que l'augmentation des capacités d'hébergement des demandeurs de protection internationale (DPI) figure parmi les priorités des autorités nationales, le logement des DPI reste très problématique et a déclenché un débat à l'échelle nationale. Outre l'accès à la formation, les problèmes liés au logement des DPI ont été parmi les questions les plus fréquemment soulevées en 2017. La pression sur le logement des DPI et des bénéficiaires de protection internationale (BPI) est importante : le manque de logements abordables sur le marché privé, le nombre croissant de réunifications familiales et la progression du nombre de BPI et de personnes qui ont fait l'objet d'une décision de retour mais qui restent hébergées dans les structures de l'OLAI ont été identifiés comme facteurs de pression. Les difficultés liées à la construction de structures modulaires d'hébergement ont également persisté en 2017. Une certaine réticence de la population à l'égard de la construction de ces « villages conteneurs », prévue en réponse à l'afflux croissant qui a commencé en août 2015, était visible dans les recours introduits devant les tribunaux administratifs pour annuler les plans d'occupation des sols liés aux projets. Les conditions de vie au sein des structures d'accueil ont également fait l'objet de discussions. Elles portaient notamment sur l'absence d'équipement en cuisines de plusieurs lieux d'accueil, les différents systèmes d'approvisionnement en nourriture et les types de nourriture disponibles. Afin de répondre au nombre toujours important de DPI en provenance des pays des Balkans occidentaux, une procédure ultra-accélérée a été mise en place. Cette procédure a été instaurée pour diminuer les pressions sur les structures d'accueil et pour éviter de créer de faux espoirs pour les séjours de longue durée. En avril 2017, la structure d'hébergement d'urgence au Kirchberg (SHUK) a été mise en place, afin d'héberger les DPI pour lesquels le Luxembourg n'est pas compétent pour examiner les demandes en vertu de l'application du règlement de Dublin. Ce nombre a fortement progressé. Le placement à la SHUK correspond à une assignation à résidence, donc à une alternative à la rétention. La structure nouvellement créée ainsi que les conditions d'affectation ont néanmoins été critiquées par la société civile. Plusieurs acteurs de la société civile ont manifesté leur opposition face à une disposition de la loi du 8 mars 2017 qui a étendu la période de rétention des adultes ou familles avec enfants de 72 heures à 7 jours afin de rendre plus efficiente l'organisation du retour. Un premier bilan du fonctionnement du Centre de rétention a été publié en 2017. Une commission chargée d'évaluer l'intérêt des mineurs non accompagnés dans le cadre d'une décision de retour a été créé fin 2017. La commission est chargée de mener à bien des évaluations individuelles concernant l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant dans le but de prendre une décision de retour ou d'accorder une autorisation de séjour. Parmi les éléments pris en considération lors de cette évaluation et dans le contexte d'une éventuelle décision de retour figurent également les informations fournies par l'Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM). Cette dernière a conclu un accord avec la Direction de l'immigration pour rechercher les parents de mineurs non accompagnés dans le pays d'origine. Comme les débats s'orientent lentement vers l'intégration à long terme, le Conseil de gouvernement a également approuvé l'élaboration d'un nouveau plan d'action national sur l'intégration. Le plan sera basé sur deux axes : l'accueil et le suivi des demandeurs de protection internationale et l'intégration des résidents non luxembourgeois au Luxembourg. L'Agence pour le Développement de l'Emploi (ADEM) a créé une cellule BPI au sein de son Service employeurs. Cette cellule fournit aux employeurs des renseignements sur les demandes d'emploi et les évaluations des compétences des BPI. Une nouvelle loi sur la nationalité luxembourgeoise est entrée en vigueur le 1er avril 2017. Cette loi s'inscrit dans le contexte démographique particulier du Luxembourg, caractérisé par une augmentation continue de la population totale avec, en parallèle, une diminution de la part des Luxembourgeois dans la population totale. A travers cette loi, le législateur veut favoriser l'intégration sociétale et politique des citoyens non luxembourgeois et renforcer la cohésion au sein de la communauté nationale. Les principaux changements introduits par la loi consistent en la réduction de la durée de résidence pour la naturalisation (de 7 à 5 ans), l'introduction du droit du sol de la première génération, la réinstauration de voies simplifiées d'acquisition de la nationalité luxembourgeoise par « option », ainsi que de nouveaux scénarios pour éviter les cas d'apatridie. La loi maintient les exigences linguistiques antérieures tout en procédant à quelques ajustements afin d'empêcher que les exigences linguistiques ne deviennent un obstacle insurmontable. En vue des élections communales du 8 octobre 2017, le ministère de la Famille, de l'Intégration et à la Grande Région a lancé une campagne d'information et de sensibilisation intitulée « Je peux voter » en janvier 2017. Cette campagne avait pour but d'inciter la population étrangère du Luxembourg à s'inscrire sur les listes électorales pour les élections communales. L'intention du Gouvernement de légiférer sur la dissimulation du visage était sans doute l'un des sujets les plus débattus dans le domaine lié à la vie au sein de la société au Luxembourg et l'intégration au sens large du terme, tant à la Chambre des députés que dans les médias et la sphère publique. Le projet de loi n° 7179 vise à modifier l'article 563 du Code pénal et à créer l'interdiction de dissimuler le visage dans certains espaces publics. Il définit la dissimulation du visage comme le fait de couvrir une partie ou la totalité du visage de façon à rendre l'identification de la personne impossible. Des vues opposées entre les parties prenantes – les partis politiques, les institutions publiques, la société civile ou les médias – se sont exprimées au sujet de la nécessité de légiférer en la matière et dans l'affirmative, sur les motifs et l'étendue de l'interdiction de la dissimulation du visage. Le phénomène des migrations a eu aussi comme conséquence de renforcer l'hétérogénéité de la population scolaire. Pour faire face à cette situation, les autorités scolaires ont continué à diversifier l'offre en matière d'éducation et de formation. Parmi les mesures mises en place, on peut signaler notamment l'élargissement des offres de cours d'alphabétisation et de formation de base, l'extension de l'offre au niveau des écoles internationales et européennes et la mise en place d'un programme d'éducation plurilingue au niveau de la petite enfance. Dans le domaine de l'immigration, les changements les plus importants concernent la politique d'admission de certaines catégories de ressortissants de pays tiers. À cet égard, le projet de loi n° 7188 vise principalement à transposer la Directive européenne 2016/801 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 11 mai 2016 sur les conditions d'entrée et de séjour des ressortissants de pays tiers à des fins de recherche, d'études, de formation, de volontariat, de programmes d'échanges d'élèves ou de projets éducatifs et de travail au pair. La directive vise à faire de l'Union européenne un centre mondial d'excellence en matière d'études et de formation, tout en favorisant les contacts entre les personnes et leur mobilité, deux éléments importants de la politique extérieure de l'Union européenne. Le projet de loi vise à faciliter et à simplifier les procédures de mobilité intraeuropéenne des chercheurs et des étudiants qui sont des ressortissants de pays tiers. De plus, certaines modifications comprennent des mécanismes incitatifs pour retenir les étudiants et les chercheurs. À cette fin, il propose que les étudiants et les chercheurs, une fois leurs études ou recherches terminées, puissent se voir délivrer un titre de séjour pour « raisons privées » pour une durée maximum de 9 mois en vue de trouver un emploi ou de créer une entreprise. Enfin, le projet de loi entend réglementer le regroupement familial d'un chercheur séjournant au Luxembourg dans le cadre d'une mobilité à court et à long terme. Le législateur a par ailleurs transposé la Directive 2014/36 sur les travailleurs saisonniers et la Directive 2014/66 sur le transfert temporaire intragroupe en droit national, et a adapté le dispositif de l'immigration aux besoins de l'économie en introduisant entre autres, une autorisation de séjour pour les investisseurs. L'organisation de l'admission du séjour et de la délivrance des autorisations de séjour était également un élément clé de l'Accord entre le Luxembourg et le Cap-Vert relatif à la gestion concertée des flux migratoires et au développement solidaire. L'accord approuvé par la loi du 20 juillet 2017 poursuit en outre les objectifs suivant : promouvoir la mobilité des personnes, lutter contre l'immigration irrégulière, préciser les procédures de réadmission, renforcer l'intégration légale des ressortissants concernés, ainsi que mobiliser les compétences et les ressources des migrants en faveur d'un développement solidaire.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
Daniel Levine on Hidden Hands, Vocation and Sustainable Critique in International Relations
Daniel Levine is part of a new generation of IR scholars that takes a more pluralist approach to addressing the hard and important questions generated by international politics. While many of those interviewed here display a fairly consistent commitment to a certain position within what is often referred to as 'the debate' in IR, Levine straddles the boundaries of a diverse range of positions and understandings. Time to ask for elaboration.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current IR? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?
The question I'd like us to be asking more clearly than we are is, 'are we a vocation and, if so, what kind of vocation are we'? This points to a varied set of questions that we, as scholars, gesture to but spend relatively little theoretical time developing or unpacking. There's an assumption that the knowledge we produce is supposed to be put good for something, practical in light of some praiseworthy purpose. Even theorists who perceive themselves to be epistemologically value-free hope, I think, at least on an intuitive level, that some practical good will emerge from what they do. They hope that they are doing 'good work' in the sense that some Christians use this term. But, there is not really a sustained project of thinking through how those works work: how our notions of vocation might be different or even mutually exclusive, and how the differences in our notions of vocation might be bound up in non-obvious ways to our epistemological, methodological, and theoretical choices.
Moreover, except for a few very important and quite heroic (and minoritarian) efforts, we don't really have a way to think systematically about the structure of the profession: how it influences or intervenes or otherwise acts on particular ideas as they percolate through it, and how those ideas get 'taken up' into policy. Brian Schmidt has done work like that, so has Inanna Hamati-Ataya, Ole Waever, Ido Oren, Oded Löwenheim, Elizabeth Dauphinee, Naeem Inayatullah, and Piki Ish-Shalom; and it's good work, but they are doing what they are doing with limited resources, and I think without due appreciation from a big chunk of the field as to why that work is important and what it means.
When I started writing Recovering International Relations, I had wanted to recover the 'view from nowhere' that many social scientists idealize. You know, that methodological conceit where we imagine we are standing on Mars, watching the earth through a telescope, or we're Archimedes standing outside of the world, leveraging it with distance and dispassion. I had worked on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for a long time, was living in Tel Aviv, working for a think tank, and was—am—an Israeli citizen and an American citizen. I had this somewhat shocking discovery right after the Second Intifada broke out. Most of my senior colleagues were deploying their expertise in what seemed to me to be a very tendentious way: to show why the second Intifada was Yassar Arafat's fault or the Palestinian Authority's fault—or, in a few cases, the Israelis' fault. There were some very simplistic political agendas that were driving this research. People were watching the evening news, coming into work the next morning, and then running Ehud Yaari's commentary through their respective fact-values-methods mill. Or if they were well-connected, they were talking to their friends on the 'inside', and doing the same thing.
It was hard to admit this for a long time, but I was very naïve. I found that very unsettling and quite disillusioning. That's why the view from nowhere was so appealing. I wanted to be able to talk about Israel and Palestine without taking a position on Israel and Palestine—but without eschewing the expertise I had acquired along the way, in part because I was a party to this conflict, and cared about its outcome. I was young, inexperienced, and slightly arrogant to boot—neither yet a scholar, nor an 'expert,' nor really aware of the game I was playing. So my objections were not well received, nor did I pose them especially coherently. To their credit, my senior colleagues did recognize something worthwhile in my diatribes, and they did their best to help me get into graduate school.
As the project developed, and as I started engaging with my mentors in grad school, it appeared that the view from nowhere was essentially impossible to recover. With Hegel and with the poststructuralists, we can't really think from nowhere; the idea of it is this kind of intellectual optical illusion, as though thinking simply happens, without a mind that is conditioned by being in the world. Therefore, there needs to be a process by which we give account of ourselves.
There are a variety of different ways to consider how one might do that. There's what we might call the agentic approach, in which we think through the structure of thought itself: its limitations, our dependence on a certain image of thinking notwithstanding those limits—thought's work on us, on our minds. This is closest to what I do, drawing on Adorno and Kant, and Adorno's account of how concepts work in the mind; how they pull us away from the things we mean to understand even as they give us the words to understand them. And drawing on Jane Bennett, William Connolly, Hannah Arendt, Cornel West, JoanTronto, and JudithButler to think through how one conditions oneself to accept those limitations from a space of love, humility and service. Patrick Jackson's (TheoryTalk #44) Conduct of Research in IR is quite similar to this approach; and so is Colin Wight's Agents, Structures and International Relations; though they use more philosophy of science than I do.
One could also do this more 'structurally.' One could say 'this is how the academy works and this is how the academy interconnects with the larger political community' and then try to trace out those links: I mentioned Hamati-Ataya, Oren, and Ish-Shalom, or you could think of Isaac Kamola, Helen Kinsella, or Srdjan Vucetic.
Any of those approaches—or really, some admixture of them—would be pieces of that project. I would like us to be doing more of that—alongside, not instead of, all the other things we are already doing, from historical institutionalism to formal modeling, to large-N and quantitative approaches, and normative, feminist and critical ones. I would like such self-accounting to be one of the things scholars do, that they take it as seriously as they take methods, epistemology, data, etc. Driving that claim home in our field, as it's presently constituted, is our biggest challenge.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in IR?
I'm 42, so the Cold War was a big deal. I'm American-born, and I was raised in a pretty typical suburb. John Stewart from the Daily Show is probably the most famous product of my hometown, though I didn't know him. My view of history was a liberal and progressive in the Michael Waltzer/Ulrich Beck/Anthony Giddens, vein, but I was definitely influenced by the global circumstances of the time, and by the 'End of History' discourse that was in the air. I thought that the US was a force of good in the world. I was a nice Jewish boy from New Jersey. I really wanted to live in Israel for personal reasons, and the moral challenge of living in Israel after the Intifada seemed to go away with the peace process. So, it seemed to me that it was a kind of golden moment: you could 'render unto Caesar what was due to Caesar', and do the same for the Lord. I could actually be a Jewish-Israeli national and also a political progressive. (That phrase is, of course, drawn from the Gospels, and that may give you some sense of how my stated religious affiliations might have differed from the conceptual and theological structures upon which they actually rested—score one for the necessity of reflexivity. But in any case, those events were important.)
I moved to Israel when I was 22 and was drafted into the military after I took citizenship there. In the IDF, I was a low-level functionary/general laborer—a 'jobnik', someone who probably produces less in utility than they consume in rations. Our job was to provide support for the combatants that patrolled a certain chunk of the West Bank near Nablus—Shechem, as we called it, after the biblical name. I was not a particularly distinguished soldier. But we were cogs in a very large military occupation, and being inside a machine like that, you can see how the gears and pieces of it meshed together, and I started taking notice of this. Sometimes I'd help keep the diary in the operations room. You saw how it all worked, or didn't work; or rather, for whom it worked and for whom it didn't. All that was very sobering and quite fascinating.
I once attended a lecture given by the African politics scholar Scott Straus, and he said the thing about being present right after genocide is that you come across these pits full of dead bodies. It's really shocking and horrific—there they are, just as plain as day. Nothing I saw in the sheer level of violence compares to that in any way—I should stress this. But that sense of it all just being out there, as plain as day, and being shocked by this—that resonated with me. Everyone who cared to look could understand how the occupation worked, or at least how chunks of it worked. So I would say in terms of events, those things were the big pieces that structured my thinking.
Here's two anecdotal examples. Since I was a grade of soldier with very limited skills, I was on guard duty a lot. We had a radio. I could hear the Prime Minister on the radio saying we are going to strike so-and-so in response to an attack on such-and-such, and then I could see helicopters pass overhead to Nablus, and then I could see smoke. Then I could see soldiers come back from going out to do whatever it was the helicopter had provided air support for. I'd see ambulances with red crescents or red Stars of David rush down the main road. It began to occur to me that there was a certain economy of violence in speech and performance. I didn't think about it in specifically theoretical terms before I went back to graduate school, but Israelis had been killed, political outrage had been generated. There was a kind of affective deficit in Israeli politics that demanded a response, and some amount of suffering had to be returned—so the government could say it was doing its job. I found this very depressing. My odd way of experiencing this—neither fully inside nor outside—is certainly not the most important or authentic, and I'm not trying to set myself up as an expert on this basis. I'm only trying to account for how it made me think at the time and how that shows up in what and how I write now.
Later, when I was in the reserves, I was in the same unit with the same guys every year. One year, we were lacing our boots and getting our equipment for our three weeks of duty in a sector of the West Bank near Hebron, I think it was. I remember one guy, one of the more hawkish guys, said 'we'll show 'em this time, we'll show them what's what'. Three weeks later, that same guy said 'Jeez, it's like we're like a thorn in their backside; no wonder they hate us so much.' (He actually used some colorful imagery that I can't share with you.) I remember thinking, 'well, ok, he'll go home and he'll tell his family and his friends; some good will come of this.' The next year, I saw the same guy saying the same thing at the start, 'we'll show those SOBs.' And then three weeks later, 'oh my God, this is so pointless, no wonder they hate us…' So after a few years of this I finally said to him, 'tagid, ma yihiyeh itcha?'—Like, dude, what's your deal? 'We've had this conversation every year! What happens to you in the 48 weeks that you're not here that you forget this?' And I think he looked at me like, 'what are you talking about?'
I thought about that afterwards: we have these moments of experience when we're out of our everyday environment and discourse, the diet of news and fear, PR and political nonsense—that's when these insights become possible. So, when this guy comes in and says 'ok, we'll get those SOBs,' he's carrying with him this discourse that he has from home, from the news and TV, from his 'parliament' with his friends where they get together and talk about politics and war and economics and whatever else—and then a few weeks of occupation duty disrupts all that, makes him see it in a different light, and he has these kinds of fugitive experiences which give him a weirdly acute critical insight. Suddenly, he's this mini-Foucault.
In a few weeks, though, he goes back to his life, there's no space or niche into which that uncomfortable, fugitive insight can really grow, so it just sort of disappears or withers on the vine, its power is dissipated. This is a very real, direct experience of violence and it's covered over by all of this jibber-jabber. So there's a moment where you start to wonder: what exactly happens there? What happens in those 48 weeks? What happens to me during those weeks? You can see how a kind of ongoing critical self-interrogation would evolve out of that. Again, none of those things are exactly what my book's about, but it gives you a sense of how you might find Adorno's kind of critical relentlessness and negativity vital and important and really useful and necessary. You can see how that might inform my thinking.
In terms of books, as an undergraduate, I had read, not very attentively, Said and Foucault, and all of the stuff at the University of Chicago we had to take in what they called the 'Scosh Sequence,' from sociologists like Elijah Anderson and William Julius Wilson to Charles Lindblom and Mancur Olsen: texts from the positive and the interpretive to the post-structural. I had courses with some very smart Israeli and Palestinian profs—Ephraim Yaar, Salim Tamari, Ariela Finkelstein. And of course Rashid Khalidi was there at that time. Once I was in the military, the Foucault and Said suddenly started popping around in my head. Suddenly, this sort of lived experience of being on guard duty made the Panopticon and the notion of discipline go from being a rather complicated, obscure concept to something concrete. 'Oh! That's what discipline is!'
When I went back to graduate school, I was given a pretty steady diet of Waltz, rational deterrence theory, Barry Posen, Stephen Walt (Theory Talk #33), and Robert Jervis (Theory Talk #12). Shai Feldman was a remarkable teacher, so were Ilai Alon in philosophy, Shlomo Shoham in sociology and Aharon Shai in History. Additionally I had colleagues at work who were PhD students at the Hebrew University working with Emanuel Adler; they gave me Wendt (Theory Talk #3), Katzenstein's (TheoryTalk # 15) Culture of National Security, Adler and Barnett, and Jutta Weldes' early article on 'Constructing National Interests' in the EJIR (PDF here). My job was to help them publish their monographs, so I got really into the guts of their arguments, which were fascinating. I am not really an agency-centered theory guy anymore and I am not really a constructivist anymore, but that stuff was fantastic. I saw that one could write from a wholly different viewpoint, perspective, and voice. This is all very mainstream in IR now, but at the time, it felt quite edgy, very novel. Part of the reason why the middle chapters of Recovering IR has these long discussions about different kinds of constructivism is that I wouldn't have had two thoughts to rub together if it was not for those books. I do disagree with them now and strongly, but they were very important to me all the same.
What would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
I'd be more comfortable answering that question as someone who was, until relatively recently, a grad student. I've not been productive long enough to say 'Well, here's how to succeed in this business and be a theorist of enduring substance or importance' with any authority. But I can say, 'here's how I'm trying to be one.' There's a famous article by Albert O. Hirschman called 'The Principle of the Hiding Hand,' (PDF here) and in it he says that frequently, the only way one can get through really large or complicated projects is to delude oneself as to how hard the project is actually going to be. He takes as an example these ambitious, massively complicated post-colonial economic projects of the Aswan High Dam variety. The only way such enormous projects ever get off the ground, he says, is if one either denies their true complexity or deludes oneself. Otherwise you despair and you never get it done. From the first day of seminar to dissertation proposal to job—thank God I had no idea what I was in for, or I might have quit.
Also, the job market being what it was, we had to be very, very passionate scholars who wrote and argued for the sheer intellectual rush and love of writing. And yet, we also had to be very practical and almost cynical about the way in which the academic market builds on the prestige of publications and the way in which prestige becomes shorthand for your commodity value. At least in the US, the decline of tenure and the emergence of a kind of new class of academics whose realm of responsibility is specifically to engage in uncomfortable kinds of political and moral critique—but without tenure, and at the mercy of a sometimes feckless dean, an overburdened department chair or fickle colleagues—that's very scary. If you're doing 'normal science', it's a different game and the challenges are different. But if your job is to do critique, in the last ten years, it's a very big deal. Very difficult. I'm very fortunate in that regard; at Alabama I've had great support from my department, my chair, and my college.
I was a Johns Hopkins PhD, and my department was fantastic in terms of giving me support, encouragement, getting out of my way while throwing interesting books at me, reading drafts that were bad and helping me make them good—or at least telling me why they were bad. We did not get particularly good professional training, because I think they did not want us to get professionalized before we found our own voice. I'm really grateful for that, truly. But then there's this period in which you have to figure out how to make your voice into a commodity. That's really tough, it's a little bit disheartening—even to discover that you must be a commodity is dismaying; didn't we go into the academy to avoid this sort of logic? But just like Marx says, commodities have a double life, and so do you. The use-value of your scholarship and its exchange-value do not interlock automatically and without friction. So you spend all this time on the use-value of it—writing a cool, smart, interesting dissertation—thinking that will translate into exchange-value, and it turns out that it sort of does, but a lot of other things translate into exchange-value too that aren't really about how good your work is necessarily. And many of your colleagues, if what you're doing is original, won't really understand what you're doing; the value or the creativity of it won't be apparent to them unless they spend a lot of time sifting through your bad drafts of it, which only a few—but God bless those—will do. So how you create exchange-value for yourself is important. So is finding people who will care about you, your project, your future—and learning when to take their advice, when to ignore it, and how to do so tactfully.
If all that's hard, you're probably doing it right. It's unfortunate that that's how it is, but at all events, that's how it was for me.
Would you elaborate on the concept of vocation and why this is so important to the view from nowhere? It is important to say that the view from nowhere is perhaps difficult. So is vocation, or a kind of Weberian approach, a way to articulate that for you?
There's a quote in a book from a Brazilian novelist named Machado de Assis. His protagonist is this fellow Bras Cubas, who's writing a posthumous memoir of his own life. He's writing from beyond the grave. From there, he can view his whole life and his entire society from outside; he's finally achieved positivism's view from nowhere. But the thing about this view—and the book means to be a sendup of the Comtean positivism that was fashionable in Brazil in those days—is that it gives him no comfort. He now knows why he lived his life the way he did; how he failed and what was—and what was not—his fault. The absurdity of it all makes sense. But it changes nothing: he has died unfulfilled, unloved, and essentially alone: a minor poet and back-bench politician who was ultimately of little use to anyone nor of much to himself. All he knows is how that happened.
In the end, if we're all playing a role in how a world comes into being and it's in some sense our job simply to accept this, and our job as scholars merely to explain it, this gives us no comfort in the face of suffering, in the face of violence and evil. To some extent as scholars, and to some extent as a discipline, we exist as a response to evil, to suffering, to foolishness, to folly; it's not a coincidence that the first professorship of IR is created in Britain in the wake of WWI, and that it's given to someone like E. H. Carr.
If we don't have a view from nowhere because we've given up anything like a moral sense that can't be reduced to fractional, material, or ideological sensibilities, and if we know that sometimes those 'views from somewhere' can provide cover for terrible kinds of evil or justify awful kinds of suffering, then the notion of vocation seems to come in at that point and say well, 'here's what I hope I'm doing', or 'here's what I wish to be doing', or 'here's what I'd like to think I'm doing', and then allowing others to weigh in and give their two cents. Vocation, in the sense of Weber's lectures, comes out of that. It's Kant for social scientists: What can I know? What should I do? For what may I hope? In other words, what the necessity and obligation of thinking is on the one hand, and on the other what its limitations are.
This is a way to save International Relations from two things: one, from relativism and perspectivism, and the other, from a descent into the technocratic or the managerial. I am trying to stand between the two. My own intellectual background was in security studies at Tel Aviv University in the 1990s: the period immediately after Maastricht, in the period of the Oslo Process, the end of Apartheid. My hope back in the days when the peace process seemed to me to be going well was that I'd be able to have a kind of technocratic job in Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Defense. Counting tanks, or something similar. I thought that would be a pretty good job. I would be doing my part to maintain a society that had constructed a stable, long-term deterrent by which to meaningfully address the problem of Jewish statelessness and vulnerability, but without the disenfranchisement of another people. I could sit down and count my tanks with a clear conscience, because the specter of evil was being removed from that work. The problem of the occupation was being be solved. Again, it's somewhat embarrassing to admit this now.
I would say in the US academy, there is definitely a balance in favor of the technocrats. We have enormous machines for the production and consumption of PhDs in this country. The defense establishment is an enormous player. Groups like the Institute for Defense Analysis need a lot of PhDs, the NSF funds a lot of PhDs (for now, at least), and that tips the balance of the profession in a certain way. My ability to use ideas compellingly at ISA won't change that fact all by itself, there's a base-superstructure issue in play there.
In Europe, it's a different story, for a bunch of reasons. The defense establishments of the EU member states aren't as onerous a presence. And, there are more of them; so there's a kind of diversity there and a need to think culturally about how these various institutions interlock and how people learn to talk to each other: the Martha Finnemore-to-Vincent Pouliot-to-Iver Neumann (Theory Talk #52) study of ideas and institutions and officials. Plus, you have universities like the EUI and the CEU, which are not reducible to any particular national interest or education system; creating knowledge, but for a political/state form that's still emergent. No one knows exactly what it is, what its institutions and interests will ultimately be. Because of that, it's hard to imagine the EUI producing scholars with obviously nationally-inflected research programs, like Halford Mackinder, Mahan, Ratzel from a century ago. There will still be reifications and ideologies, but there's more 'give' since the institutions are still in play. And there's fantastically interesting stuff happening in Australia, and in Singapore—think of people like Janice Bialley-Mattern, Tony Burke and Roland Bleiker.
Critique has a long and controversial history in our discipline. Could you perhaps elaborate, as a kind of background or setting, how critique can be used in IR and why you've placed it at the center of your approach to IR theory?
Critique as term of art comes into the profession through Robert Cox (Theory Talk #37) and through the folks that were writing after him in the '90s, including Neufeld, Booth, Wyn-Jones, Rengger, Linklater and Ashley—though pieces of the reflexive practice of critique are present in the field well before. For Cox, the famous line is that theory is always 'for something and for someone.' The question is, if that's true how far down does that problem go? Is it a problem of epistemology and method, or is it a problem of being as such, a problem of ontology? Is it fundamental to the nature of politics?
If the set of processes to which we refer when we speak of 'thinking' is inherently for someone and for something, and that problem harkens back to the idea that all thinking is grounded in one's interests and perspectives, i.e., that all practical or systematic attempts to understand politics are 'virtuous' in the Machiavellian sense (they serve princely interests) but not necessarily in the Christian sense (deriving from transcendent values), then we have a real problem in keeping those two things separate in our minds. Think of Linklater's book Men and Citizens in International Relations as a key node in that argument, though Linklater ultimately believes (at least in that book) that a reconciliation between the two is possible. I'm less convinced.
Now recall the vocation point we discussed before. IR as a discipline has a deep sense of moral calling which goes beyond princely interest. And the traditions on which it draws are as much transcendently normative as anything else. So encoded in our ostensibly practical-Machiavellian analyses is going to be something like a sense of Christian virtue; we'll believe we're not merely correct in our analyses, but really and truly right in some otherworldly, transcendent way. True or not, that sense of conviction will attach itself to our thinking, to the political forces and agendas that we're serving. We'll come to believe that we are citing Machiavelli in the service of something greater: whether that's 'scientific truth' or the national interest, or what have you. Nothing could be more dangerous than that. Critique, as an intervention, comes here: to dispel or chasten those beliefs. Harry Gould, Brent Steele, and especially Ned Lebow (Theory Talk #53) write about prudence and a sense of finitude: these are the close cousins of this kind of critique.
If we take seriously the notion that people sometimes fight and kill in the service of really awful causes while believing they are doing right, and that scholars sometimes help them sustain those convictions rather than disabuse them of them—even if they do not intend this—then critique becomes an awfully big problem and it really threatens to undermine the profession as such. It opens up a whole new level of obligation and responsibility, and it magnifies what might otherwise be staid 'inside baseball'—Intramural scholarly or methodological debates. Part of the reason why the 'great debates' were so great—so hotly fought—had to do with this: our scholarly debates were, in fact, ideological ones.
It undermines the field in another way as well. If we take critique seriously, there's got to be a lot of moral reflection by scholars. That will make it hard to produce scholarship quickly, to be an all-purpose intellectual that can quickly produce thought-product in a policy-appropriate way, because I will want to be thinking from another space, and of course precisely what policy-makers want is that you don't think from some other space; that you present them with 'shovel ready' policy that solves problems without creating new ones.
So you now have not just a kind of theoretical or methodological interruption in the discussion of, say, absolute or relative gains. You now have to give an account of yourself. And for me, that's what critique in IR means. To unpack the definition I gave above, it's the attempt to give an account of what the duties and limits of one's thinking are in the context of politics, given the nature of politics as we understand it. Because IR comes out of the Second World War, we're bound to take the most capacious notions of what political evil and contingency can be; if we are not always in the midst of genocide and ruin, then we are at least potentially so. And so contingency and complexity and all the stuff that we're talking about must face that. I want to hold out that Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau might be right—in ways which neither they, nor I, can completely fathom. Then I have to give accounts of thinking that take a level of responsibility commensurate with that possibility.
In that vein, when I look at accounts of thinking in the context of the political, when I look at what concepts are and how they work and how they do work on the world so that it can be rendered tractable to thought, I realize that what we come up with when we're done doesn't look very much like politics anymore. We have tools which, when applied to politics, change it quite dramatically; they reify or denature it. To be critical in the face of that, you're going to be obliged to an extensive degree of self-interrogation and self-checking, which I call chastening.
That process of chastening reason, is, in effect, what remains of the enlightenment obligation to use practical reason to improve what Bacon called the human estate. What's left of that obligation is to think in terms of the betterment of other human beings as best as you can, knowing you can't do that very well, but that you may still be obliged to try.
That's really hard to do and it's an odd form of silence and non-silence. After all, if I were to look at the Shoah while it was happening, or look at what happened in Rwanda, and say 'well, I don't really have a foundational position on which to stand so I can't analyze or condemn that'—that would not be a morally acceptable position. Price and Reus-Smit (TheoryTalk #27) say this in their 1998 article and they are absolutely right. But then there's the fact that I don't quite know what to say beyond 'stop murdering people!' The world is so easy to break with words, and so hard to put back together with them—assuming anyone cares at all about anything we say. So I am obliged to respond to those kinds of events when I see them, and I am also obliged to acknowledge that I can't respond to them well, because my authority comes from the conceptual tools I have, and they aren't really very good. Essentially, what I'm doing as scholar of IR is the equivalent is using the heel of my shoe to hammer in a nail. (That's a nice line, no? I wish it was mine, but it's Hannah Arendt.) It will probably work, but it will take a while, and the nail won't go in so straight. To chasten one's thinking is to remind oneself that the heel of one's shoe is not yet a hammer; that all we're doing is muddling through—even when we do our work with absolute seriousness and strict attention to detail, context and method—as of course we should.
You discuss IR theory in terms of different reifications. In which was does that also lead you to take a stand against a Weberian understanding of IR?
I think where I depart from Weber is that he has more faith than I do that, at some point, disenchantment produces something better. There is faith or hope on their part that the iron cage that we experience as a result of disenchantment and as a result of the transformation from earlier forms of charismatic and traditional authority to contemporary rational ones won't always be oppressive, not forever. New forms and ways of being will emerge, in which those disenchanted modes actually will fulfill their promise for a kind of improvement in the human estate. If it's a long, complicated process—hence the image of slow boring into hard wood—but faith is still justified, good things can still happen.
For me, the question is how would you manage a society that is liable to go insane or to descend into moments of madness because of the side-effects or intervening effects of disenchantment and modernization, while holding fast to the notion that at some point, this is going to get better for most people? I'm a bit less certain about that than I read Patrick and Weber being. I think that even if they're right, it makes sense morally as scholars, not necessarily as citizens or individuals or people, to dwell in the loss of those who fall along the way.
I find myself thinking about the people who are gone a lot. My ex-wife teaches on slavery, and I think a lot about this terrible thing she once told me. On slave ships, when there was not enough food they would throw the people overboard because ship masters got insurance money if their property went overboard, but not if human beings succumbed on-ship. There's a scene depicting this in Spielberg's film Amistad and it haunts me. I find myself thinking about those people, dragged under with their chains. I wonder what they looked like, what they had to say. I wonder what they might have created or how their great-great grandchildren children would have played with my child. I wonder if my best friend or true love was never born because her or his ancestor died in this way. An enormous number of people perished. I can't quite believe this, even if I know it's true.
Yoram Kaniuk, the recently deceased Israeli novelist, wrote that the Israeli state was built on the ground-up bones of the Jews who couldn't get there because it was founded too late. I wonder about them too. And when I taught course modules on Cambodia, I would find myself looking at the photographs made of the people in Tuol Sleng before they were killed, the photo archives which the prison kept for itself. There is a mother, daughter, father, brother, son, and I find myself drawn into their eyes and faces. I don't want those people to disappear into zeros or statistics. I want somehow to give them some of their dignity back, and I want to dwell in the tragic nature my own feeling because it bears remembering that I cannot ever really do that. If I remember that, I will have some sense of what life's worth is, and I won't speak crassly about interventions or bombings or wars—wherever I might come down on them. I would say that it's almost a religious obligation to attend to the memory of those people. My desire to abide with them makes me very, very suspicious of hope or progress. I want this practice of a kind of mourning or grief to chasten such hope.
There's a problem with that position. Some will point out to me that this will turn into its own kind of Manichean counter-movement, a kind of Nietzschean ressentiment. Or else that dwelling in mourning has a self-congratulatory quality to it. And there are certainly problems with this position at the level of popular or mass politics. We do see a lot of ressentiment in our politics. On the left, there's a lot of angry, self-aggrandizing moral superiority. And you can think about someone like Sarah Palin in the US as a kind of populist rejection of guilt and responsibility from the right.
But as social scientists, we might have space to be the voice for that kind of grief, to take it on and disseminate the ethics that follow from it; to give that grief a voice. That kind of relentless self-chastening is what I'm all about. I think it opens you up to new agendas and possibilities. I think it's a much deeper way to be 'policy relevant' than most of my colleagues understand this term. If we are relentlessly self-critical as scholars, and if we relentlessly resist the appropriation of scholarly narratives to simplistic moral or political ends and if we, as a society, help to build an intolerance of that and a sense of the mourning that comes out of that, we also open our society up to say things like, 'ok, well what's left?'
And then, well, maybe a lot of things are left, and some of them are not so bad. Maybe we start to imagine something better. That's where I'd rejoin Jackson and Weber; after that set of ethical/emotional/spiritual moves. I think, by the way, that Patrick mostly agrees with me; it's only a question of what his work emphasizes and what mine has emphasized. On this point, consider Ned Lebow's notion of tragedy. He and I disagree on some of the details of that notion. But on top of his remarkable erudition, he's a survivor of the Shoah. I suspect he has thought very deeply about grief and mourning, and in ways that might not be open to me.
The final question I want to pose to you is a substantive one: Your understanding of critique somehow does relate to sustaining progress, in a way. Perhaps on the one hand, you are not so optimistic as Weber was, but on the other hand, your work conveys the sense that it is possible to bridge the gap between concepts and things. I'm not sure if it's possible, but perhaps you can relate it to the substantive example of how your work relates to concrete political situations. I think the example of Israel-Palestine comes to mind best.
Again, I don't think I am as optimistic as that. In my heart of hearts, I desperately wish this to be the case. To think of the people who were most influential on my intellectual development—my cohort of fellow grad students at Johns Hopkins and our teachers, to whom as a group I owe, really, everything in intellectual terms—I was certainly in the minority view. Most of them were, I think, working in the Deleuzian vein of making 'theory worthy of the event.' I just don't believe that's possible; or anyway I think it's really, really, really hard, the work of a generation to tell that story well and have it percolate out into our discipline and our culture. In the meantime, we must muddle through. I hope I'm wrong and I hope they're right. I'm rooting for them, even as I try to give them a hard time—just as I give Keohane (Theory Talk #9) and Waltz and Wendt and everyone else I write about a hard time. But I'd be happy, very happy, to be wrong.
What I do think can be done is that you can sustain an awareness of the space between things-in-themselves and concepts, and by extension some sense of the fragility and the tenuousness of the things that you think and their links to the things that you do. Out of this emerges a kind of chastened political praxis.
You mentioned Israel and Palestine, which I care a great deal about and am trying to address more squarely in the work I'm doing now, partly on my own and partly in pieces I've worked on with my colleague Daniel Monk. What we observe is that though the diplomatic negotiations failed pretty badly twelve and a half years ago, we're still looking at the same people running the show: the same principal advisers and discussants and interlocutors: in the US and Israel and in the Palestinian Authority. The same concepts and assumptions too. Just a few days ago, Dennis Ross published a long op-ed about how we get the peace process back on track, and you might think that you're reading something from another time—as though the conflict were a technical challenge rather than a political one. You know that Prince song about 'partying like it's 1999'?
I don't know what a peaceful, enriching, meaningful Israeli-Jewish-Arab-Palestinian-Muslim-Christian collective co-existence or sharing of space or world looks like, but I know that this pseudo-politics ain't that. When I see something that's just a re-hashing, I can say, 'come on guys, that is not thinking, that's recycling the old stuff and swapping out dates, proper nouns and a few of the verbs.' Nor is it listening to other voices who might inspire us in different ways, or might help us rethink our interests, categories and beliefs. Lately, I've been listening to a band called System Ali, hip-hop guys from Jaffa's Ajami quarter, who sing in four languages. What they say matters less to me than the fact that they really seem to like another, they trust each other, they let each voice sing its song and use its words. They have something to teach me about listening, thinking, acting and feeling—because it's music after all—and that can produce its own political openings.
Of course, there are pressure groups, from industry and AIPAC to whatever else in the US, and those groups merit discussion and debate, but I'm also wary of the counter-assumption which follows from folks who talk about this too reductively: that there actually is an American interest, or a European or Arab or Israeli one, which somehow transcends partisan interest—one that can be recovered once the diaspora Jews, the oil moguls, the arms dealers or the Christian 'Left Behind' people are taken out of the picture. That feels like the same heady brew that Treitschke and Meinecke and the German realpolitik scholars poured and drank: that the national state has some transcendent purpose to which we gain access by rising above or tuning out the voices of the polity or its chattering classes. Only with a light liberal-internationalist gloss: Meinecke meets David Lake (Theory Talk # 46), Anne-Marie Slaughter or John Ikenberry.
I can also go meet starry-eyed idealists who want to hold hands and sing John Lennon, I can say to them yes, I want to hold your hand and sing John Lennon, but I am also enough of a social scientist to know that if a policy does not respond to real and pressing problems—water, land, borders etc.—that any approach that does not respond to those things will be hopelessly idealist. It will be what my granny called luftmentsch-nachess—the silly imaginings of men with their heads in the clouds, like the parable about Thales and the Thracian maiden. I am not interested in being either a luftmentsch nor a technocrat. So what does that leave with you with? You need to balance.
You can look at groups at the margins of political culture to see what they can tell you. In Israel and Palestine, it's groups like Ta'ayush, Breaking the Silence and Zochrot, and this settler leader who recently died, Rabbi Frohman, who was going out and meeting every Palestinian leader he could because for him, being a Jew in the land was not, in the first instance about his Israeli passport. There were and are possibilities for discussion that feel really pregnant and feel very different from the conversation we are sustaining now; which reveal its shallowness and its limitations and its pretentiousness. These other voices are of course not ideal either, they are going to have their own problems and limitations, their own descent into power and exclusion and so on, but they reveal some of the lie of what we're doing now.
I guess in the end, social scientists make a living imagining the future on the basis of the past. I also spend a lot of time reading novels and watching books and films. Partly because I am lazy and I like them. Partly because I'm looking for those novels and films to help me imagine other possibilities of being that aren't drawn from the past. Art, Dewey tells us in The Public and its Problems, is the real bearer of newness. Maybe then, I get to grab onto those things and say ok, what if we made those them responsive to an expansive materialist analysis of what an Israeli-Palestinian peace would need to survive? What if we held the luftmentsch's feet to the materialist/pragmatic fire, even as we held the wonk's feet to the luftmentsch's fire? Let them both squeal for a while. There's possibility there.
Daniel J. Levine is assistant professor at the University of Alabama. Among his recent publications (see below) stands out his book Recovering International Relations.
0 0 1 7019 40009 School of Global Studies/University of Gothenburg 333 93 46935 14.0
Faculty Profile at U-Alabama Read the first chapter of Levine's Recovering IR (2012) here (pdf) Read Barder and Levine's The World is Too Much (Millennium, 2012) here (pdf) Read Levine's Why Morgenthau was not a Critical Theorist (International Relations, 2013) here (pdf) Read Monk and Levine's The Resounding Silence here (pdf)