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Highlights: What explains variation in the energy-related climate policies that nations implement? In this paper we present a theory of energy-related climate policy in democratic countries, emphasizing the distributional effects of policies on important energy-related industries, public sentiment, and the institutional capacity of governments, in determining energy-related climate policies implemented cross-nationally. As to the form of the policy, we expect the government to favor regulatory instruments over fiscal policies (taxes, subsidies) when it has enough institutional capacity in the relevant public agencies. For empirical evidence, we analyze national climate policies in four industrialized democracies: Australia, Germany, Japan, and the United States.

Lobbies are active participants in international co-operation. In a repeated game, this article allows domestic lobbies to offer contingent rewards to influence their government to make pro-co-operation policy adjustments. The effect of lobbies depends on the type and intensity of their preferences. If the lobbies are 'internationally benefiting' - that is, they are interested in whether the foreign government reciprocates with adjustments of its own, they unambiguously improve co-operation. However, if the lobbies are 'domestically benefiting' - that is, they are interested in their own government's policy, they are less beneficial for co-operation. A domestically benefiting lobby that is willing to compensate its government even without foreign reciprocity undermines the credibility of punishing free riders. This article demonstrates this argument in the context of trade and environmental co-operation. Adapted from the source document.

Why do international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) 'name and shame' the countries that they do? Do they target states that provide domestic groups with political opportunities to collaborate with INGOs, or do they target states that repress domestic activism? Focusing on the case of the environment, we test the empirical validity of these competing hypotheses. We find that environmental INGOs target countries as a substitute for national political institutions that encourage domestic activism or a lack of environmental institutions. This is in contrast to a 'strategic complementarity' approach, where INGOs would target 'easy' countries in which domestic institutions would bolster the effectiveness of international shaming. Using a novel data set of environmental INGO shaming by over 2,000 organizations, we find support for the strategic substitution approach: INGOs shame autocratic regimes and those countries that lack environmental ministries. This article offers insight into the strategies that INGOs use to shape state behavior. Adapted from the source document.

International organizations can promote democratization, but how exactly do they achieve this goal? The authors argue that to evaluate the effect of international organizations on democratization, one must distinguish between the prevention of autocratic reversals and the promotion of democratic consolidation. While international organizations cannot directly prevent autocratic reversals in nonconsolidated democracies, they can, through capacity building, increase the likelihood that a transitional democracy consolidates. An empirical analysis of democratic transitions from 1965 to 2001 supports the hypothesis that international organizations promote democratic consolidation without deterring authoritarian reversals in nonconsolidated democracies. Moreover, the authors find that international organizations are most important for consolidating transitional democracies in the difficult circumstances created by a history of military dictatorship. Adapted from the source document.

Democratization in the developing world is, according to Samuel Huntington, "an important—perhaps the most important—global political development of the late twentieth century." While scholars of comparative politics have explored the domestic political economy of democratic transitions, they, along with scholars of international relations, also recognize that international actors, particularly international organizations (IOs), are crucial for successful political transformation.

How can governments manage transnational problems when other governments refuse to cooperate? We examine the conditions under which regulation in one jurisdiction can induce other jurisdictions to regulate. The analysis emphasizes the relationship between public policy, private actors, and technological change. We find that ambitious regulations in large markets can induce private actors to make technological changes that lower the cost of regulation for less ambitious jurisdictions. Our model specifies the conditions under which such transboundary effects are possible, qualifying the received wisdom on global collective action by outlining conditions under which unilateral regulatory leadership can be effective. Case studies of wind turbines and photovoltaic cells provide empirical support.