Out of sight out of mind? Voter attitudes about cooperation with radical parties in Europe*
In: Journal of European public policy, S. 1-24
ISSN: 1466-4429
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In: Journal of European public policy, S. 1-24
ISSN: 1466-4429
These files contain all the materials necessary for complete replication of the analyses found in Slapin et al. (forthcoming) "Ideology, Grandstanding, and Strategic Party Disloyalty in British Parliament" American Political Science Review.
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In: Reform Processes and Policy Change; Studies in Public Choice, S. 69-95
In: Political science research and methods: PSRM, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 301-317
ISSN: 2049-8489
AbstractCitizens often support politicians who vote against their parties in parliament. They view rebels as offering better representation, appreciate expressive acts, take rebellion as a signal of standing up for constituents, or see rebels as defending their moral convictions. Each explanation has different implications for representation, but they have not yet been tested systematically against one another. We implement survey experiments on nationally representative samples in the UK, Germany, France, and Italy to assess whether voters treat rebellion as a cue for better representation or infer positive character traits implying a valence advantage. Policy congruence does not drive voters' preference for rebels. However, voters do associate positive traits with rebel MPs, even if they do not feel better represented by them.
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 85, Heft 1, S. 76-91
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: American political science review, Band 112, Heft 1, S. 15-30
ISSN: 1537-5943
Strong party discipline is a core feature of Westminster parliamentary systems. Parties typically compel members of Parliament (MPs) to support the party regardless of MPs' individual preferences. Rebellion, however, does occur. Using an original dataset of MP votes and speeches in the British House of Commons from 1992 to 2015, coupled with new estimations of MPs' ideological positions within their party, we find evidence that MPs use rebellion strategically to differentiate themselves from their party. The strategy that MPs employ is contingent upon an interaction of ideological extremity with party control of government. Extremists are loyal when their party is in the opposition, but these same extremists become more likely to rebel when their party controls government. Additionally, they emphasize their rebellion through speeches. Existing models of rebellion and party discipline do not account for government agenda control and do not explain these patterns.