Suchergebnisse

SummaryUsing a large representative data set for Germany, this study contrasts absenteeism of self‐employed individuals and paid employees by estimating hurdle models. We find that absence from work is clearly less prevalent among the self‐employed than among paid employees. Only to a small extent, this difference can be traced back to differences in health status and job satisfaction. Furthermore, the gap in absenteeism does not seem to be driven by different behaviour in case of sickness as we find no clear difference in the prevalence of presenteeism between the two groups. We suspect that different behaviour in case of healthiness plays a role, highlighting potential shirking and moral hazard problems in paid employment.

Since there is scant evidence on the role of industrial relations in wage cyclicality, this paper analyzes the effect of collective wage contracts and of works councils on real wage growth. Using linked employer-employee data for western Germany, we find that works councils affect wage growth only in combination with collective bargaining. Wage adjustments to positive and negative economic shocks are not always symmetric. Only under sectoral bargaining there is a (nearly symmetric) reaction to rising and falling unemployment. In contrast, wage growth in establishments without collective bargaining adjusts only to falling unemployment and is unaffected by rising unemployment.

Since there is scant evidence on the role of industrial relations in wage cyclicality, this paper analyzes the effect of collective wage contracts and of works councils on real wage growth. Using linked employer-employee data for western Germany, we find that works councils affect wage growth only in combination with collective bargaining. Wage adjustments to positive and negative economic shocks are not always symmetric. Only under sectoral bargaining there is a (nearly symmetric) reaction to rising and falling unemployment. In contrast, wage growth in establishments without collective bargaining adjusts only to falling unemployment and is unaffected by rising unemployment.

Since there is scant evidence on the role of industrial relations in wage cyclicality, this paper analyzes the effect of collective wage contracts and of works councils on real wage growth. Using linked employer-employee data for western Germany, we find that works councils affect wage growth only in combination with collective bargaining. Wage adjustments to positive and negative economic shocks are not always symmetric. Only under sectoral bargaining there is a (nearly symmetric) reaction to rising and falling unemployment. In contrast, wage growth in establishments without collective bargaining adjusts only to falling unemployment and is unaffected by rising unemployment.

Since there is scant evidence on the role of industrial relations in wage cyclicality, this paper analyzes the effect of collective wage contracts and of works councils on real wage growth. Using linked employer-employee data for western Germany, we find that works councils affect wage growth only in combination with collective bargaining. Wage adjustments to positive and negative economic shocks are not always symmetric. Only under sectoral bargaining there is a (nearly symmetric) reaction to rising and falling unemployment. In contrast, wage growth in establishments without collective bargaining adjusts only to falling unemployment and is unaffected by rising unemployment.

While it is a stylized fact that exporting firms pay higher wages than non-exporting firms, the direction of the link between exporting and wages is less clear. Using a rich set of German linked employer-employee panel data we follow over time plants that start to export. We show that the exporter wage premium does already exist in the years before firms start to export, and that it does not increase in the following years. Higher wages in exporting firms are thus due to self-selection of more productive, better paying firms into export markets; they are not caused by export activities.

According to the German Works Constitution Act, establishments whose workforces exceed certain thresholds have to release a certain number of members of their works councils from their regular work and enable them to work full time as works councillors. Using a full sample of all establishments affected, we analyse whether making provision for the first full-time works councillor dampens employment growth. We also investigate whether the change in the threshold value from 300 to 200 employees that came into effect in July 2001 had any impact on employment growth at these thresholds. Both descriptive and econometric analyses suggest that neither the old nor the new threshold value has affected establishments' employment growth. The same holds for the legal reform of this threshold value.

In der öffentlichen Diskussion in Deutschland wird häufig die These vertreten, dass Arbeitsplätze vorwiegend in kleinen und mittleren Firmen geschaffen werden, während die großen Firmen vor allem Arbeitsplätze abbauen. Eine empirische Überprüfung für den Zeitraum 1999 bis 2005 mit Daten aller west- und ostdeutschen Betriebe, die mindestens einen sozialversicherungspflichtig Beschäftigten haben, zeigt, dass die These vom alleinigen "Jobmotor Mittelstand" viel zu undifferenziert ist. In mittelständischen Unternehmen werden zwar überproportional viele Arbeitsplätze geschaffen, aber auch überproportional viele abgebaut. Großbetriebe mit 250 und mehr Beschäftigten weisen dagegen sowohl bei der Schaffung als auch beim Abbau von Arbeitsplätzen geringere Werte auf als es ihrem Beschäftigungsanteil entspräche. Wirtschaftspolitische Maßnahmen, die sich an der Zuordnung eines Unternehmens zu einer Größenklasse orientieren, lassen sich somit nicht mit einem besonders ausgeprägten Beitrag der Firmen aus dieser Größenklasse zum Beschäftigungswachstum rechtfertigen. ; In public discussion in Germany it is often argued that jobs are mainly created in small and medium-sized firms (i.e. the "Mittelstand"), whereas large firms tend to reduce their number of jobs. An empirical analysis for the period 1999 to 2005 with data of all western and eastern German firms that have at least one employee covered by social insurance shows that the "job engine Mittelstand" hypothesis is too undifferenciated. While small and medium-sized firms contribute more than proportionally to job growth, they are also heavily involved in job losses. In contrast, large firms with 250 employees and more record shares of job growth and destruction which are lower than their share in employment. This implies that economic policy measures which focus on certain size classes of firms cannot be justified by superior employment growth in these size classes.

Viele Regelungen im deutschen Arbeitsrecht gelten nur für Betriebe ab einer bestimmten Größe, wobei derartige Schwellen meist anhand der Beschäftigtenzahl bestimmt werden. Die bestehenden 160 Schwellenwerte sind komplex und inkonsistent definiert, was ihre Beachtung durch die Firmen erschwert. Darüber hinaus kann das Überschreiten einer Schwelle zu zusätzlichen Kosten für die Firma führen, wie z.B. die Errichtung eines Betriebsrates oder die Zahlung einer Abgabe für die Nichtbeschäftigung von Schwerbehinderten. Obwohl die empirische Evidenz nicht eindeutig ist, deuten einige Studien darauf hin, dass Firmen das Überschreiten von Schwellenwerten bewusst vermeiden und der Beschäftigungsaufbau dadurch gedämpft wird. Um diese Transaktionskosten und Nebenwirkungen zu vermeiden, machen wir verschiedene Vorschläge zur Vereinfachung und Vereinheitlichung der Schwellenwertregelungen. ; In Germany, many labour laws and regulations apply only in establishments above a critical size, and usually these thresholds are defined by the number of employees. The existing 160 thresholds are complex and defined inconsistently, making it difficult for firms to obey the law. Moreover, exceeding a threshold may result in costs for the firm such as establishing a works council or paying a penalty for not employing disabled persons. Although the empirical evidence is mixed, some studies suggest that employment growth is dampened by firms avoiding to exceed thresholds. In order to minimize these transaction costs and side effects, we make several suggestions to simplify and unify the threshold regulations.

In public discussion in Germany it is often argued that jobs are mainly created in small and medium-sized firms (i.e. the "Mittelstand"), whereas large firms tend to reduce their number of jobs. An empirical analysis for the period 1999 to 2005 with data of all western and eastern German firms that have at least one employee covered by social insurance shows that the "job engine Mittelstand" hypothesis is too undifferenciated. While small and medium-sized firms contribute more than proportionally to job growth, they are also heavily involved in job losses. In contrast, large firms with 250 employees and more record shares of job growth and destruction which are lower than their share in employment. This implies that economic policy measures which focus on certain size classes of firms cannot be justified by superior employment growth in these size classes. ; In der öffentlichen Diskussion in Deutschland wird häufig die These vertreten, dass Arbeitsplätze vorwiegend in kleinen und mittleren Firmen geschaffen werden, während die großen Firmen vor allem Arbeitsplätze abbauen. Eine empirische Überprüfung für den Zeitraum 1999 bis 2005 mit Daten aller west- und ostdeutschen Betriebe, die mindestens einen sozialversicherungspflichtig Beschäftigten haben, zeigt, dass die These vom alleinigen "Jobmotor Mittelstand" viel zu undifferenziert ist. In mittelständischen Unternehmen werden zwar überproportional viele Arbeitsplätze geschaffen, aber auch überproportional viele abgebaut. Großbetriebe mit 250 und mehr Beschäftigten weisen dagegen sowohl bei der Schaffung als auch beim Abbau von Arbeitsplätzen geringere Werte auf als es ihrem Beschäftigungsanteil entspräche. Wirtschaftspolitische Maßnahmen, die sich an der Zuordnung eines Unternehmens zu einer Größenklasse orientieren, lassen sich somit nicht mit einem besonders ausgeprägten Beitrag der Firmen aus dieser Größenklasse zum Beschäftigungswachstum rechtfertigen.