Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Parliamentary votes on foreign and security policy have often been demonstrations of patriotism and unity. This resonates with the notion that external relations are exempted from party politics, or that politics stops at the water's edge. Its supranational character makes the European Parliament (EP) a particularly interesting laboratory for subjecting this thesis to empirical scrutiny. Analyzing roll-call votes from 1979 to 2014, this article shows that group cohesion and coalition patterns are no different in external relations votes than in other issue areas. Members of the EP (MEPs) do not rally around a European Union flag, nor do MEPs vote as national blocs in votes on foreign and security policy, trade, and development aid. Based on statistical analyses and interviews with parliamentary civil servants, it concludes that the EP stands out by having party politics dominate all business, including external relations.

Tässä numerossa Politiikka haluaa erityisesti muistaa professori Olavi Borgia (1935–2020) julkaisemalla kahden kollegan ja entisen opiskelijan yhteisen muistikirjoituksen.

The positions of political parties in various foreign policy questions and how such ideological stances matter in foreign and security policy decision-making remain largely unexplored beyond the specific case of the United States. Reviewing the 'state of the art' in foreign policy analysis and comparative politics, this introductory article discusses the changing nature of both international politics and party systems and cleavages in Europe and beyond. It puts forward reasons why we should see different patterns of coalitions and party behaviour in security policy, on the one hand, and in international trade and foreign aid, on the other. The articles in this Special Issue have been deliberately chosen to capture different elements of 'partyness', from analysing party positions to actual behaviour by legislatures and governments to transnational party networks. Our main argument is that there are genuine ideological differences between political parties and that the impact of these competing ideologies is also discernible in foreign policy decisionmaking.

Parliamentary votes on foreign and security policy have often been demonstrations of patriotism and unity. This resonates with the notion that external relations are exempted from party politics, or that politics stops at the water's edge. Its supranational character makes the European Parliament (EP) a particularly interesting laboratory for subjecting this thesis to empirical scrutiny. Analyzing roll-call votes from 1979 to 2014, this article shows that group cohesion and coalition patterns are no different in external relations votes than in other issue areas. Members of the EP (MEPs) do not rally around a European Union flag, nor do MEPs vote as national blocs in votes on foreign and security policy, trade, and development aid. Based on statistical analyses and interviews with parliamentary civil servants, it concludes that the EP stands out by having party politics dominate all business, including external relations.

Parliamentary votes on foreign and security policy have often been demonstrations of patriotism and unity. This resonates with the notion that external relations are exempted from party politics, or that politics stops at the water's edge. Its supranational character makes the European Parliament (EP) a particularly interesting laboratory for subjecting this thesis to empirical scrutiny. Analyzing roll-call votes from 1979 to 2014, this article shows that group cohesion and coalition patterns are no different in external relations votes than in other issue areas. Members of the EP (MEPs) do not rally around a European Union flag, nor do MEPs vote as national blocs in votes on foreign and security policy, trade, and development aid. Based on statistical analyses and interviews with parliamentary civil servants, it concludes that the EP stands out by having party politics dominate all business, including external relations. ; publishedVersion ; Peer reviewed

The positions of political parties in various foreign policy questions and how such ideological stances matter in foreign and security policy decision-making remain largely unexplored beyond the specific case of the United States. Reviewing the "state of the art" in foreign policy analysis and comparative politics, this introductory article discusses the changing nature of both international politics and party systems and cleavages in Europe and beyond. It puts forward reasons why we should see different patterns of coalitions and party behavior in security policy, on the one hand, and in international trade and foreign aid, on the other hand. The articles in this Special Issue have been deliberately chosen to capture different elements of "partyness," from analyzing party positions to actual behavior by legislatures and governments to transnational party networks. Our main argument is that there are genuine ideological differences between political parties and that the impact of these competing ideologies is also discernible in foreign policy decision-making. ; publishedVersion ; Peer reviewed

A key factor of semi-presidential regimes is power-sharing mechanisms between president and government. Influenced by Shugart and Carey's seminal work on premier-presidential regimes, this article addresses intra-executive dynamics in light of recent scholarship on the risks and consequences associated with conflict and cooperation between the president and the cabinet. Through an in-depth comparison of three premier-presidential systems with broadly similar constitutional designs, Finland, Lithuania and Romania, it forces us to reconsider how coordination mechanisms and political context shape presidential influence. Absent of a working constitutional division of labour and established modes of intra-executive coordination, presidents are more likely to use alternative channels of influence – such as the strategy of 'going public' or direct contacts with political parties, the legislature or civil society stakeholders – and to intervene in questions falling under the competence of the government. Lack of institutionalized coordination also benefits the presidents as they hold the initiative regarding cooperation between the two executives.

Despite more than two decades of research on semi-presidential regimes, we still know very little about the actual coordination between the president and the prime minister. Through an in-depth analysis of Lithuanian semi-presidentialism, this article underscores the importance of institutional design on intra-executive balance of power. Drawing primarily on interviews with top-level civil servants and office-holders, it argues that in the absence of written rules or other strong norms guiding intra-executive coordination, presidents enjoy more discretion in designing their own modes of operation. Coordination depends on the initiative of the president, with ad hoc practices further weakening the position of the prime minister. While Lithuanian semi-presidentialism has functioned smoothly, the personality-centred politics commonly found in Central and East European countries create favourable conditions for presidential activism.

Eines der Schlüsselargumente der Brexit-Befürworter bei dem Referendum vom Juni 2016 war, dass 60 bis 75 Prozent der britischen Gesetzgebung ihren Ursprung in Brüssel hat und nicht in London. Eine Untersuchung des Einflusses der Europäischen Union auf die nationale finnische Gesetzgebung zeigt, dass im Gegensatz zu dem weithin akzeptierten "Delors Mythos" nur 17,8 Prozent der verabschiedeten nationalen Gesetze zwischen 1995 und 2015 einen Bezug zur EU hatten. Hinweise aus anderen europäischen Ländern bestätigen unsere Forschungsergebnisse: der Anteil inländischer Gesetzgebung mit einem EU-Impuls ist in manchen Ländern zwar höher, reicht aber niemals, auch nicht annähernd, an die 80 Prozent Schwelle heran, wie dies durch den "Delors Mythos" suggeriert worden ist.