Suchergebnisse

Critical comparison of rationalistic and reflective views; based on address.

IntroduzioneGli studiosi moderni di politica internazionale hanno cercato di individuare le cause della guerra e le condizioni della pace: essi si sono chiesti in che modo gli interessi di Stati sovrani in competizione reciproca e non soggetti ad alcun potere comune possano essere conciliati gli uni con gli altri. I più importanti tentativi di comprensione delle problematiche della pace e della guerra, da parte di studiosi occidentali, sono partiti da tre premesse comuni, che definiscono ciò che Holsti chiama «la tradizione classica» nello studio delle relazioni internazionali: 1) l'oggetto di analisi più appropriato è costituito, appunto, dalle cause della guerra e dalle condizioni della pace/sicurezza/ordine; 2) le principali unità d'analisi sono i comportamenti diplomatici e militari degli unici attori essenziali, gli Stati nazionali; 3) gli Stati operano in un sistema caratterizzato dall'anarchia, ovvero dalla mancanza di una autorità centrale.

In den internationalen Beziehungen sollte eine Unterscheidung zwischen der spezifischen und diffusen Reziprozität gemacht werden. Spezifische Reziprozität bezieht sich auf den Austausch gleicher Werte zwischen bestimmten Partnern oder genau definierten Abkommen. Diffuse Reziprozität stellt die Gruppe von Partnern gegenüber dem einzelnen Akteur in den Vordergrund. Normen und Pflichten sind als Regularien wichtig. Weder spezifische noch diffuse Reziprozität liefern ein perfektes Konzept für eine gegenseitige, vorteilhafte Kooperation. Institutionelle Innovationen, z.B. im internationalen Handel, können jedem beteiligten Akteur einige Vorteile nehmen, schützen jedoch vor den spezifischen Belastungen. (SWP-Bmt)

World politics is commonly referred to as anarchic, meaning that it lacks a common government. Yet a Hobbesian "war of all against all" does not usually ensue: even sovereign governments that recognize no common authority may engage in limited cooperation. The anarchic structure of world politics does mean, however, that the achievement of cooperation can depend neither on deference to hierarchical authority nor on centralized enforcement. On the contrary, if cooperation is to emerge, whatever produces it must be consistent with the principles of sovereignty and self-help.

IN RECOMMENDING POLICIES TO BE FOLLOWED BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, POLICY ANALYSTS NEED TO BE AWARE OF THE CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THESE ENTITIES. WHAT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE EXPECTED TO DO DEPENDS NOT MERELY ON THEIR LEGAL AUTHORITY, BUT ON THE CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THEIR MEMBERS AND BY THEIR OWN CHARACTERISTIC OPERATING STYLES.

International regimes can be understood as results of rational behavior by the actors—principally states—that create them. Regimes are demanded in part because they facilitate the making of agreements, by providing information and reducing transactions costs in world politics. Increased interdependence among issues—greater 'issue density'—will lead to increased demand for regimes. Insofar as regimes succeed in providing high quality information, through such processes as the construction of generally accepted norms or the development of transgovernmental relations, they create demand for their own continuance, even if the structural conditions (such as hegemony) under which they were first supplied, change. Analysis of the demand for international regimes thus helps us to understand lags between structural change and regime change, as well as to assess the significance of transgovernmental policy networks. Several assertions of structural theory seem problematic in light of this analysis. Hegemony may not be a necessary condition for stable international regimes; past patterns of institutionalized cooperation may be able to compensate, to some extent, for increasing fragmentation of power.

A recent report commissioned by the OECD,Towards Full Employment and Price Stability, represents an attempt by mainstream economists to account for world capitalism's economic difficulties during the 1970's, and to prescribe solutions. Although the report identifies the key sources of inflation and recession as political and social, it carefully analyzes only economic processes. Yet it makes a political argument: that democratic states must discipline their citizens more effectively in order to conform to the requirements of capitalism. This conclusion rests on unexamined normative assumptions, and fails to consider questions of political feasibility. The report is deficient both as explanatory theory (due to its political and sociological naivete) and as policy science (due to its pervasive ideological bias). Its weaknesses indicate the need for better political and sociological analysis to complement economic theories of inflation and recession.