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The type of comprehensive conceptual scheme presented by Professor Smith in the foregoing paper is, in the writer's opinion, the most useful framework currently available for studying the relationship between opinions and personality. The paper draws upon a major work by Smith and his colleagues, Opinions and Personality, which has not only been greeted as a "pattern-setter for a new phase of attitude research" but is already having an important impact on political behavior studies.That political scientists should find the pluralistic theory proposed by Smith congenial, cannot be explained merely by the fact that it is accompanied by an emphatic rejection of the type of simplistic theorizing about personality and opinion already in disfavor with most of them. Rather, its appeal is solidly intellectual, deriving from the fact that it stems from a general (and long awaited!) movement of convergence within the field of psychology.

During WWII a group of content analysts in the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) made inferences about Nazi propaganda strategy & its underlying policy calculations from a close inspection of German radio & press communications. After the war the writer matched the FCC inferences against historical data & attempted to reconstruct & codify methods of inference which had been successfully applied. AA.-IPSA.

The Korean War represented the first American experience with the problem of meeting local Communist aggression by means of limited, if costly, warfare. But despite the revulsion with that experience, and the "new look" at military strategy and foreign policy, it may not be the last. The character of recent weapons developments and the passing of our thermonuclear monopoly make it probable that in the future, as in the past, American policy-makers will be forced to consider the alternative of local conflict, with all its problems and risks, in determining how to respond to the threat or actuality of Communist moves in the peripheral areas.In these circumstances, analyses of American policy-making immediately before and during the Korean War may well illuminate the perspectives and considerations relevant to this difficult and dangerous type of operation. Here, no more can be done than toexamine the effect of strategic planning and estimates of Communist intentions and behavior on the decision to commit American forces to the defense of South Korea. This decision, and even the crucial decision to commit ground forces to eventual offensive operations against the aggressor, was made within afew days of the North Korean attack. Attention, accordingly, is focused on American policy reactions to the war in the first week or ten days following June 25, 1950.

The two studies under review were issued in the series of the Library of Policy Sciences, edited by Harold D. Lasswell and Saul K. Padover, and are concerned with different areas of knowledge about communications. Sykewar presents the first detailed description of the activities and operations of the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF. The evaluations may not be definitive, but Dr. Lerner, a former intelligence officer in PWD, has made an important contribution toward codifying the lessons learned in this policy field.