Suchergebnisse

The majority of European Union (EU) studies tend to be critical of the Early Warning System (EWS) for subsidiarity control, deeming it as ineffective in blocking unwanted EU legislation. Against this background, the aim of this paper is to identify and discuss several transformative effects of the EWS connected with the quality and democratic character of the EU governance, beyond the tool's legislative veto power. A critical review of the EWS' interpretations as an accountability mechanism, Europeanization engine, parliamentary autonomy enhancing tool, platform of politicization of Europe, as well as an instrument improving the Commission's regulatory culture reveals that —although flawed by design— the modus operandi of the EWS has in fact contributed to reinforcing the input legitimacy of the EU. The argument is also made that the EWS should be viewed as a sort of 'reality-check' for the EU's legislative moderation, thus enhancing the 'perceived output legitimacy' of the EU policy-making. The paper, however, concludes that although the positive effects of the EWS ought to be recognized and valued, the mechanism in its current form has exhausted its democratic potential and needs to be complemented with new forms of representative politics in EU affairs.

The majority of European Union (EU) studies tend to be critical of the Early Warning System (EWS) for subsidiarity control, deeming it as ineffective in blocking unwanted EU legislation. Against this background, the aim of this paper is to identify and discuss several transformative effects of the EWS connected with the quality and democratic character of the EU governance, beyond the tool's legislative veto power. A critical review of the EWS' interpretations as an accountability mechanism, Europeanization engine, parliamentary autonomy enhancing tool, platform of politicization of Europe, as well as an instrument improving the Commission's regulatory culture reveals that —although flawed by design— the modus operandi of the EWS has in fact contributed to reinforcing the input legitimacy of the EU. The argument is also made that the EWS should be viewed as a sort of 'reality-check' for the EU's legislative moderation, thus enhancing the 'perceived output legitimacy' of the EU policy-making. The paper, however, concludes that although the positive effects of the EWS ought to be recognized and valued, the mechanism in its current form has exhausted its democratic potential and needs to be complemented with new forms of representative politics in EU affairs. ; Los estudios de la Unión Europea (UE) tienden mayoritariamente a ser críticos con el mecanismo de alerta temprana para el control de subsidiaridad, desechándolo por su ineficacia para bloquear la legislación de la UE indeseada. Teniendo en cuenta estos antecedentes, el objetivo de este artículo es identificar y discutir varios efectos transformadores de este mecanismo conectados con la calidad democrática de la gobernanza de la UE, más allá del poder de veto legislativo de la herramienta. Una revisión crítica de las interpretaciones de la alerta temprana como instrumento de rendición de cuentas, motor de Europeización, herramienta para el fortalecimiento de la autonomía parlamentaria, plataforma de politización de Europa, así como instrumento de mejora de la cultura regulativa de la Comisión revela que, aunque con defectos en su diseño, su funcionamiento ha contribuido en la práctica a reforzar la legitimidad de origen de la UE. También se argumenta que el sistema de alerta temprana debe ser visto como una especie de prueba de realidad para la moderación legislativa de la UE, que como tal fortalece la legitimidad de origen percibida de la elaboración de políticas de la UE. El artículo concluye, sin embargo, que, aunque los efectos positivos de la alerta temprana deben ser reconocidos y valorados, el mecanismo en su forma actual ha agotado su potencial democrático y precisa ser complementado con nuevas modalidades de política representativa en asuntos de la UE.

Why do member states with veto power usually support policy change proposed by a Commission initiative when their own position is located closer to the status quo? Why do we frequently witness consensus in the Council and rarely observe a rejection of Commission initiatives even after additional veto players, such as new member states or the European Parliament, have increased the constraints on policy change by legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU)? To answer these questions, this study investigates the voting preferences and logrolling opportunities of the member states on 48 Commission proposals. We find that models that derive the voting preferences from each Commission initiative are scarcely able to explain the consensus in the Council. One reason is that the Commission attempts to avoid a divided Council by initiating proposals for which member states favour a policy change in the same direction. When member states still dispute the size of policy change, we show that they can find a solution by mutually benefiting from logrolling across proposals that either belong to the same policy domain or are negotiated during the same period. Hence, intertemporal and domain-specific logrolling can provide a powerful explanation for consensus even in a contested Council. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

On Thursday last week, Lithuanian president Dalia Grybauskaitė vetoed amendments to the 'Law on Fisheries' enumerating several legal problems with the regulations on how to assign and transfer fishing quotas. A strong involvement of the presidents in legislation as well as executive decisions is nothing in semi-presidential Lithuania. Nevertheless, as Dalia Grybauskaitė's first term in office is coming to an end in May this year, this post will use it as an opportunity to give a brief overview of her veto activity and explain the regulations on presidential vetoes in Lithuania.

Why do member states with veto power usually support policy change proposed by a Commission initiative when their own position is located closer to the status quo? Why do we frequently witness consensus in the Council and rarely observe a rejection of Commission initiatives even after additional veto players, such as new member states or the European Parliament, have increased the constraints on policy change by legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU)? To answer these questions, this study investigates the voting preferences and logrolling opportunities of the member states on 48 Commission proposals. We find that models that derive the voting preferences from each Commission initiative are scarcely able to explain the consensus in the Council. One reason is that the Commission attempts to avoid a divided Council by initiating proposals for which member states favour a policy change in the same direction. When member states still dispute the size of policy change, we show that they can find a solution by mutually benefiting from logrolling across proposals that either belong to the same policy domain or are negotiated during the same period. Hence, intertemporal and domain-specific logrolling can provide a powerful explanation for consensus even in a contested Council.