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Utilizing a model drawn from both transaction cost economics and social exchange theory, we analyze determinants of strategic flexibility in a sample of strategic alliances involved in joint development agreements or joint research pacts. Findings indicate that, in general, determinants suggested by transaction cost economics provided flexibility in modification and inflexibility in exit. From social exchange theory, trust was found to be positively related to both types of flexibility while another component of social exchange theory, dependence, was found to be negatively related to the strategic flexibility of the alliance. Results also found that factors suggested by both transaction cost economic theory and social exchange theory were related to the concept of trust. Economic constraints as suggested by transaction cost economics were positively related to trust between the alliance partners while dependence was negatively related to trust. Additionally, the quality of communication and the existence of shared values were positively related to trust between the exchange partners. Results provide support for the role of determinants from both transaction cost economics and social exchange theory in the flexibility of strategic alliances.

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We propose transaction cost economics theory as a tool for exploring when school administrators rely on information from two types of sources: internal sources like their own colleagues, and external sources like researchers and government agencies. The theory's application is illustrated in a comparative case study of two public school districts in Michigan. Consistent with the theory's predictions, the smaller, homogeneous, high-performing district used more external sources of information, while the larger, diverse, low-performing district used internal sources of information. We conclude by identifying some strengths and limitations of the theory, which can serve as starting points for debate.

We propose transaction cost economics theory as a tool for exploring when school administrators rely on information from two types of sources: internal sources like their own colleagues, and external sources like researchers and government agencies. The theory's application is illustrated in a comparative case study of two public school districts in Michigan. Consistent with the theory's predictions, the smaller, homogeneous, high-performing district used more external sources of information, while the larger, diverse, low-performing district used internal sources of information. We conclude by identifying some strengths and limitations of the theory, which can serve as starting points for debate.

1. Is Transaction Cost Economics Behavioral? -- 2. Clarifying Key Terms and Philosophical Foundations of Transaction Cost Economics -- 3. Opportunism and Bounded Rationality in Transaction Cost Economics: Values, Attitudes, or Behaviors? -- 4. Modeling Bounded Rationality: Mediation or Moderation—or Bounded Rationalizing? -- 5. Toward Behavioral Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond -- 6. An Empirical Application to the Study of MNC Subsidiary Ownership -- 7. Implications, Future Directions, and Conclusion.

Abstract:This article aims to address the lack of transaction costs economics (TCE) studies in health economics. It provides a content analysis of ObamaCare and 25 lawsuits that challenge the 2010 reform. It shows that the cultural environment determines the strength of features of governance structures and in line with this the strength of their instruments. Following Williamson's TCE model of governance structures, the zero transaction costs criterion is supplanted by the remediableness criterion. Assuming that ObamaCare might be ruled to be constitutional, the regulation of healthcare is found to be a comparative efficient governance structure in addressing adverse selection. However, the TCE analysis also reveals that ObamaCare itself is subject to some flaws in efficiency and effectiveness, namely: unbalanced adaptation mechanisms, unbalanced incentives and weak enforcement devices.

PurposeBusiness process outsourcing (BPO) has become so prevalent that a new term, the extended enterprise, has arisen to describe this approach to structuring an organization. The purpose of this paper is to integrate the information systems and the interfirm governance literatures to develop a framework for the role of trust in the governance of extended enterprises.Design/methodology/approachThis paper uses transaction cost economics (TCE) to identify the elements and stages of BPO relationships. This paper then integrates those elements with the types of trust identified in the information systems (IS) literature to develop a framework.FindingsTCE identifies three elements that influence the design and function of interfirm relationships: the transaction, the transaction environment and the parties (the client and the vendors). TCE also recognizes three stages in the transaction: contact, contract, and control. The IS literature identifies three types of trust: trusted systems, trusted institutions, and trusted partners. The paper links the two literatures into a framework identifying the type of trust related to each of the TCE elements; it then uses these linkages to identify the types of trust appropriate for each stage of the BPO relationship.Originality/valueThis paper integrates the IS and interfirm governance literatures concerning trust in interorganizational relationships in an effort to offer a framework for building and sustaining trust between BPO vendors and clients and to identify potential directions for future research.

AbstractIn this essay, we honour the memory of Oliver Williamson by reflecting on Chiles and McMackin's 1996Academy of Management Reviewarticle 'Integrating variable risk preferences, trust, and transaction cost economics'. The article, which built on Williamson's work in transaction cost economics (TCE), went on to attract attention not only from the authors' home discipline of management and organisation studies, but also from other business disciplines, the professions and the social sciences. After revisiting the article's origins and core arguments, we turn to selectively (re)view TCE's development since 1996 through the lens of this article, focusing on trust, risk and subjective costs. We cover conceptual and empirical developments in each of these areas and reflect on how our review contributes to previous debates concerning trade-offs implicit in relaxing TCE's behavioural assumptions. We conclude by reflecting on key points of learning from our review and possible implications for future research.