Suchergebnisse

Recent developments in the EU have given renewed impetus to the prospect of European‐level collective bargaining. Greater divergence within national systems of industrial relations alongside the emergence of European‐level structures is reflected in the emergence of nascent forms of European collective bargaining at three levels: interprofessional, sector and Euro‐company. Best described as 'virtual collective bargaining', these embrace two processes: the conclusion of 'framework agreements' or 'joint opinions' which establish bargaining parameters for national‐level actors; and 'arms length' bargaining, where the parties do not negotiate directly, but where bargaining outcomes are increasingly anticipated and co‐ordinated across countries. EMU is likely to accelerate these processes.

The chief result of collective bargaining (CB), has been to favor strong unions at the expense of weak ones, to strengthen the monopoly positions of highly organized industries, & in consequence to affect the structure of wages but not their level (comparative shares). A simpler mechanism than CB for raising the standard of living of low-income groups, or maintaining purchasing power during recessions, or creating relative equity between diff groups of wage workers, is Gov fiscal policy. The only revolutionary step that US unions can now take to give workers a legitimate place in society is to seek a true annual wage. Such a move would the most important means unions could find for reducing the status barrier between blue-collar & white-collar work-the very barrier in the way of organizing the white-collar workers. Without organizing the white-collar workers, US unionism, in the long run, cannot survive. J. A. Fishman.