Suchergebnisse

On Tuesday 28 November 2023, the Institute welcomed inaugural AIIA/China Matters Fellow Yun Jiang to speak about future challenges and opportunities in the Australia-China relationship. Yun made a series of first-hand observations from a recent trip to China supported by the AIIA and China Matters. With the lifting of Covid-19 border restrictions, many Chinese-Australians have […]

Empirical research suggests that the existence of territorial disputes makes armed conflict more likely to occur. Yet, there are many states that have engaged in militarized interstate disputes that not only maintain normalized bilateral relations, but cooperate with one another on an increasing number of bilateral issues. How can disputing states like Argentina and the UK so frequently cooperate with each other on bilateral issues when there remains a significant amount of tension regarding their territorial dispute over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands? Our theory suggests that challengers involved in territorial disputes are willing to engage in bilateral cooperation with their adversaries in order to influence upcoming territorial settlement attempts. Bilateral cooperation is purposively and strategically used by the challengers as a form of confidence building measure (CBM) with the goal of reducing the negative impact of the territorial dispute. Empirical analyses of monthly data (1978—2003) on Argentina—UK relations, as well as qualitative evidence from the case, support our theoretical expectations by showing that challengers deliberately link cooperation on bilateral issues to territorial dispute settlement attempts as a form of bargaining incentive to increase the likelihood of peaceful resolution.

Intro -- Vorwort -- Inhaltsverzeichnis -- Abkürzungsverzeichnis -- 1. Kapitel: Einführung in das Forschungsvorhaben -- A. Notwendigkeit einer Subventionskontrolle durch bilaterale Abkommen -- B. Erläuterung des Forschungsvorhabens -- I. Rechtliche Fragestellungen -- II. Stand der Forschung und Forschungsbeitrag der Arbeit -- III. Zentrale Fragestellung und Eingrenzung der Analyse -- C. Gang der Untersuchung -- 2. Kapitel: Europäisierung des internationalen Subventionsrechts -- A. Subventionen als Kernstück der neuen europäischen Außenhandelsstrategie -- I. Das Verhältnis zwischen Freihandel und Subventionen -- 1. Subventionen als ein Element nationaler Wirtschaftsförderung -- 2. Abbau nationaler Handelsschranken durch den Freihandel -- 3. Ziele einer internationalen Subventionsrechtsordnung -- II. Die erneuerte Außenhandelsstrategie der EU -- 1. Rechtsquellen und Akteure der gemeinsamen Handelspolitik -- 2. Chronologie des Reformkurses -- 3. Ursachen des Strategiewechsels -- 4. Das Neue an der europäischen Außenhandelsstrategie -- III. Zusammenfassung der Erkenntnisse -- B. EU-Beihilfenrecht und internationales Subventionsrecht im Vergleich -- I. Ungleiche internationale Standards im Subventionsrecht? -- 1. Nationales Subventionsrecht der fokussierten Handelspartner -- 2. Bilaterale Abkommen der alten Generation -- 3. Subventionsvorschriften innerhalb des IWF, der OECD und der Weltbank -- 4. WTO-Subventionsrecht und europäisches Beihilfenrecht im Vergleich -- 5. Zusammenfassung der Erkenntnisse -- II. Exkurs - Erfolglose europäische Reform des WTO-Subventionsrechts -- 1. Chronologie und Stand der Verhandlungen im Rahmen der Doha-Runde -- 2. Erneuerungsansätze der Europäischen Union -- 3. Ursachen der stagnierenden Reform des WTO-Subventionsrechts -- 4. Zusammenfassung der Erkenntnisse.

"Nationalisms in International Conflict" published on by Oxford University Press.

Since January 2014 China and the European Union (EU) have been negotiating a comprehensive bilateral investment agreement. In contrast to the EU-US negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the ongoing negotiations between China and the EU have received little public attention so far. Still, a successful conclusion of these negotiations may be of great importance even beyond the EU-China investment relations. This holds in at least two respects. Firstly, a successfully concluded bilateral investment agreement may pave the way for a future EU-China free trade agreement. And secondly, looking beyond the bilateral relationship, the negotiations between the EU and China may make an important contribution to the establishment of a more liberal global investment framework. Currently, China is also negotiating an investment agreement with the US which is likely to take a similar form as that between China and the EU. In addition, provisions for the future liberalisation of bilateral investment flows are also an important part of the TTIP negotiations between the US and Europe. Rules and provisions, e.g., regarding market access, the prohibition of performance requirements or the transparency with respect to state-owned enterprises, that are part of all three agreements will "be elevated to a de facto global standard" (Berger 2014). Against this background, the present Kiel Policy Brief analyses the key barriers investors from China and the EU currently face in the EU and China, respectively and provides a brief assessment of whether and how these key barriers can be dealt with in the comprehensive EU-China investment agreement currently negotiated.

IN THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS ITALY GIVES PRIORITY TO NATIONAL INTERESTS IN PURSUING ITS BILATERAL POLICY EVEN IF DESIRING NOT TO EXCLUDE COLLECTIVE MEANS. THE ITALITAN GOVERNMENT IN FACT SEEMS TO BE LED BY GIVEN BUSINESS ICRCLES. THIS WOULD EXPLAIN THE ACTIVE BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES INCLUDING IRAN. SIMULTANEOOSLY ITALY TRIES TO NEGOTIATE FOR A REASONABLE SOLUTION.

Grundlagen der Europäisierung des internationalen Subventionsrechts -- Die subventionsrechtlichen Vorschriften in den Präferenzabkommen der neuen Generation -- Grenzen des Rechtsexports -- Das bilaterale europäische Subventionsrecht und seine Auswirkungen auf die multilaterale Handelsordnung