"It all began when the world's first business school, the European School of Commerce Paris (ESCP), was established in 1819. Criticism notwithstanding, business schools have since continued their path in higher education without facing existential metamorphoses. Covid-19, however, has accelerated business schools' digital transformation, calling into question the concept of business school itself. Business schools are in a new competitive landscape and profound structural changes seem inevitable. This concise text offers insights into how business schools should rethink their approach to management education, differentiate themselves from new players in the higher education market, and find innovative ways of doing things. The book is a survival toolkit for leadership teams across the world. It examines the rationale of business school and how it has evolved. The purpose of research is explained, and the teaching of management is explored. Kaplan analyses the current business model in the digital environment. He looks at the business of accreditations and rankings and branding and community-building as strategies to address competition. The book concludes by looking at change leadership at business schools. It will interest both leaders of established academic institutions and alternative educational providers from edtech and bigtech planning to enter the management education market"--
The article attempts to identify and systematize trends and risks in the development of the alternative lending market in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Alternative lending as a segment of financial technology market (Fintech) in Asia has significantly increased its share in the global market over the past 5 years. During the period from 2017 to 2018, the share of Asia-Pacific countries increased in all 4 key Fintech segments. The research methodology is based on the methods of statistical data analysis, comparative analysis and correlation analysis. As a result of the analysis, the author identifies three main trends: an increase in the level of internationalization of alternative lending, an increase in the role of large technology companies (BigTech) in providing financial services to the population, and outsourcing of storage and client data processing to third parties. Along with these trends, new emerging risks may have an impact on financial stability in Asian countries: the risk of spillover onto other participants in the financial sector, procyclicality and the risk of moral hazard for systemically important organizations, etc. The author comes to the conclusion that in order to minimize the effects of fraud risk as well as other key risks, it is worth introducing a special regime regulating alternative lending in the country.
Artículo de revista ; As has happened with other industries, large technology companies are increasingly present in the financial services sector. In addition to being providers of digital tools and solutions, these firms can also act as a distribution channel for goods and services that are traditionally produced by financial institutions. Further, in certain business niches, BigTech firms are also emerging as new, direct competitors to banks. Without prejudice to the potential benefits that this new situation could present, the significant disruptions caused to industries by the increasing consolidation of digital platforms' activity have prompted European institutions to instigate various actions aimed at nurturing the fairest functioning of the markets in which they act. One of the most recent examples is the Regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services, in addition to other competition and general regulatory initiatives for European digital services markets. Despite their broad scope, these measures enable some of the challenges that major digital actors pose to the financial sector to be addressed. However, they do not give a satisfactory response to another series of more specific and equally relevant matters, such as credit procyclicality, adverse selection and interdependencies. For these matters, more specific approaches are needed that help trace parallels between the activity of these platforms and of those that are already regulated, as a first step in the process to adapt the current regulatory and supervisory framework.
AbstractAlthough FinTechs and incumbents are applying artificial intelligence (AI) differently, they both expect that the status‐quo will likely be maintained through collaboration rather than competition. Both perceive BigTechs as a strategic threat given their AI capabilities and their entrance into financial services. Incumbents are experimenting with more different kinds of AI than FinTechs: FinTechs use the technologies for new products and services while incumbents are using them for incremental innovations to existing products and services. The incumbents expect that adopting AI will lead to a loss in jobs of 9% over the next 10 years and, because these companies represent a large percentage of the workforce (median company size surveyed has more than 10,000 employees), this loss in jobs cannot be compensated by the 19% increase in jobs provided by existing FinTechs (median company size surveyed has less than 50 employees). AI can reduce and increase risk, and most incumbents and FinTechs agree that there will be no effect on risk at the organizational level but that there will be an increase in risk at the societal level. While both FinTechs and incumbents agree on the relative importance of legal and human hurdles and consider the biggest hurdle is related to data and regulations concerning data, FinTechs perceive these hurdles to be greater than do incumbents.
Data has taken immense importance in the last years. Consider the amount of data that is being collected worldwide every day, industries are reshaping their activities into a data-driven business. The digital transformation of all industries, portent of the fourth industrial revolution, is creating a new kind of economy based on the datafication of almost any aspect of human social, political and economic activity as a result of the information generated by the numerous daily routines of digitally connected individuals and technology. The financial services industry is part of this trend. Embracing the digital revolution and creating the right foundations allow incumbent financial institutions to disrupt their own business model. Hence, financial institutions are creating new businesses within their existing structures that adapt and collaborate to meet the challenges of digital transformation and make better use, faster, of their enduring source of competitive advantage – their own customer insight. Open banking and banking as a service (BaaS) are emerging as new forms of intermediation in the financial system that portraits positive and negative externalities for the financial system. Both concepts – open banking and BaaS – refer to the use of open Application Programming Interfaces that enable third parties to build applications and services around a financial institution that exposes its data and/or its infrastructure. The use of these schemes represents a new form of intersection between data and finance, which is changing the way traditional products, services and customer experience traditionally work in the financial sector. This paper explains the open banking and BaaS foundations and what they exactly entail. It also explores the benefits and risks that this interaction between financial institutions and third parties portrait for the financial services industry and analyses from a comparative perspective the different approaches financial, data privacy and competition regulators have implemented to boost open banking phenom. This paper argues that the compulsory approach to open banking is not in all cases the best approach for capitalizing the benefits of open banking and managing its risks. Indeed, some regulators have proposed a compulsory approach to open banking regulations to increase competition in retail banking or in the payment systems. In opposition, this paper argues that open banking and BaaS models in the financial industry might lead to more concentration and these risks have been understated by financial regulators and competition authorities. Finally, we provide some policy recommendations regarding open banking regulations, such as: the same regulatory approach should not apply to all jurisdictions, regulators should encourage reciprocity, especially when choosing the compulsory approach, coordination among different regulatory authorities is needed on a national and international levels, risk-based regulation is a correct type of approach, and monetization of data should not be restricted for incumbents.
The currently deployed contact-tracing mobile apps have failed as an efficient solution in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. None of them have managed to attract the number of active users required to achieve efficient operation. This urges the research community to re-open the debate and explore new avenues to lead to efficient contact-tracing solutions. In this paper, we contribute to this debate with an alternative contact-tracing solution that leverages the already available geolocation information owned by BigTech companies that have large penetration rates in most of the countries adopting contact-tracing mobile apps. Our solution provides sufficient privacy guarantees to protect the identity of infected users as well as to preclude Health Authorities from obtaining the contact graph from individuals. ; The research leading to these results received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 innovation action programme under the grant agreement No 871370 (PIMCITY project); the Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Spain, and the European Social Fund(EU), under the Ramón y Cajal programme (Grant RyC-2015-17732); the Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, Spain, through the FPU programme (Grant FPU16/05852); the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación under the project ACHILLES (Grant PID2019-104207RB-I00); the Community of Madrid synergic project EMPATIA-CM (Grant Y2018/TCS-5046); and the Fundación BBVA under the project AERIS; and the NSERC Discovery Grant 2016-04521.
Intro -- Contents -- About the Author -- Abbreviations -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction: Banks and Non-Banks in the European Market for Payments -- 1.1 General Introduction -- 1.2 The Rise of FinTechs and BigTechs -- 1.3 The Importance of Having a Level Playing Field Between Banks and Non-Banks -- 1.3.1 The Main Policy Objectives of the European Legislature -- 1.3.2 A Level Playing Field Between Banks and Non-Banks -- Secondary Sources -- 2 Payments -- 2.1 Background -- 2.1.1 The Product Layer -- 2.1.2 The Payment Scheme Layer -- 2.1.3 The Clearing Layer -- 2.1.4 The Settlement Layer -- 2.2 Credit Transfers -- 2.2.1 Fast Payments -- 2.3 Direct Debit Collections -- 2.4 Card Payments -- 2.4.1 Background -- 2.4.2 Three-Party Card Scheme -- 2.4.3 Four-Party Card Scheme -- 2.5 Payments Connected to E-money Transactions -- Secondary Sources -- 3 Key Legislative Initiatives on the Establishment of an Internal Market for Payments -- 3.1 Background -- 3.2 EU Rules on Cross-Border Payments -- 3.2.1 Directive 97/5/EC on Cross-Border Credit Transfers -- 3.2.1.1 Execution Time Limit for Cross-Border Credit Transfers -- 3.2.1.2 Charging Fees for Cross-Border Credit Transfers -- 3.2.2 Regulation 2560/2001 on Cross-Border Payments in Euro -- 3.2.3 Regulation 924/2009/EC on Cross-Border Payments -- 3.2.3.1 Regulation 2019/518 Amending Regulation 924/2009 -- 3.2.3.2 Regulation 2021/1230 on Cross-Border Payments in the Union -- 3.3 EU Rules on E-money -- 3.3.1 Commission Recommendation on E-money Instruments -- 3.3.2 The E-Money Directive (EMD) -- 3.3.3 The Revised E-money Directive (EMD2) -- 3.4 EU Rules on Payment Services -- 3.4.1 The Payment Services Directive (PSD) -- 3.4.1.1 Introduction of Payment Services -- 3.4.1.2 Scope of Applicability -- 3.4.1.3 Introduction of a Licensing Regime for Non-Banks.
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This book offers an updated primer on the valuation of digital intangibles, a trending class of immaterial assets. Startups like successful unicorns, as well as consolidated firms desperately working to re-engineer their business models, are now trying to go digital and to reap higher returns by exploiting new intangibles. This book is innovative in its design and concept since it tackles a frontier topic with an original methodology, combining academic rigor with practical insights. Evaluation issues are increasingly based on an analytical comprehension of augmented business models and virtual function analysis, nurtured by real-time big data. The impact of digitalization on scalable business models is the main competitive advantage factor of the BigTechs and other Unicorns, representing a target for startups and the reengineering of traditional firms. The transition from the Internet to the metaverse represents the last frontier, showing how 3D virtual and augmented reality impacts social networking. The second edition of this book updates the contents of the first edition while comprehensively introduces these innovative topics--such as the metaverse, cloud storage, multi-sided digital platforms, ESG-compliance, and value co-creation patterns of digitized stakeholders--and demonstrates how best practices can be applied to specific asset appraisals, making it of interest to researchers, students, and practitioners alike. Roberto Moro-Visconti is professor of Corporate Finance at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan, Italy, and is the director of studio Moro Visconti chartered accountants and financial consultants. Dr. Moro-Visconti manages a consolidated financial boutique that derives from a deep-rooted tradition of professional consultants in Milan.
Der Einsatz von Künstliche Intelligenz (KI) – Technologien eröffnet viele Chancen, birgt aber auch viele Risiken – insbesondere in der Finanzbranche. Dieses Whitepaper gibt einen Überblick über den aktuellen Stand der Anwendung und Regulierung von KI-Technologien in der Finanzbranche, und diskutiert Chancen und Risiken von KI. KI findet in der Finanzbranche zahlreiche Anwendungsgebiete. Dazu gehören Chatbots, intelligente Assistenten für Kunden, automatischer Hochfrequenzhandel, automatisierte Betrugserkennung, Überwachung der Compliance, Gesichtserkennungssoftware zur Kundenidentifikation u. v. m. Auch Finanzaufsichtsbehörden setzen zunehmend KI-Anwendungen ein, um große und komplexe Datenmengen (Big Data) automatisiert und skalierbar auf Muster zu untersuchen und ihren Aufsichtspflichten nachzukommen. Die Regulierung von KI in der Finanzbranche ist ein Balanceakt. Auf der einen Seite gibt es eine Notwendigkeit Flexibilität zu gewährleisten, um Innovationen nicht einzudämmen und im internationalen Wettbewerb nicht abgehängt zu werden. Strenge Auflagen können in diesem Zusammenhang als Barriere für die erfolgreiche Weiter-)Entwicklung von KI-Applikationen in der Finanzbranche wirken. Auf der anderen Seite müssen Persönlichkeitsrechte geschützt und Entscheidungsprozesse nachvollziehbar bleiben. Die fehlende Erklärbarkeit und Interpretierbarkeit von KI-Modellen entsteht in erster Linie durch Intransparenz bei einem Großteil heutiger KI-Anwendungen, bei welchen zwar die Natur der Ein- und Ausgaben beobachtbar und verständlich ist, nicht jedoch die genauen Verarbeitungsschritte dazwischen (Blackbox Prinzip). Dieses Spannungsfeld zeigt sich auch im aktuellen regulatorischen Ansatz verschiedener Behörden. So werden einerseits die positiven Seiten von KI betont, wie Effizienz- und Effektivitätsgewinne sowie Rentabilitäts- und Qualitätssteigerungen (Bundesregierung, 2019) oder neue Methoden der Gefahrenanalyse in der Finanzmarktregulierung (BaFin, 2018a). Andererseits, wird darauf verwiesen, dass durch KI getroffene Entscheidungen immer von Menschen verantwortet werden müssen (EU Art. 22 DSGVO) und demokratische Rahmenbedingungen des Rechtsstaats zu wahren seien (FinTechRat, 2017). Für die Zukunft sehen wir die Notwendigkeit internationale Regularien prinzipienbasiert, vereinheitlicht und technologieneutral weiterzuentwickeln, ohne dabei die Entwicklung neuer KIbasierter Geschäftsmodelle zu bremsen. Im globalen Wettstreit sollte Europa bei der Regulierung des KI-Einsatzes eine Vorreiterrolle einnehmen und damit seine demokratischen Werte der digitalen Freiheit, Selbstbestimmung und das Recht auf Information weltweit exportieren. Förderprogramme sollten einen stärkeren Fokus auf die Entwicklung nachhaltiger und verantwortungsvoller KI in Banken legen. Dazu zählt insbesondere die (Weiter-)Entwicklung breit einsetzbarer Methoden, die es erlauben, menschen-interpretierbare Erklärungen für erzeugte Ausgaben bereitzustellen und Problemen wie dem Blackbox Prinzip entgegenzuwirken. Aus Sicht der Unternehmen in der Finanzbranche könnte eine Kooperation mit BigTech-Unternehmen sinnvoll sein, um gemeinsam das Potential der Technologie bestmöglich ausschöpfen zu können. Nützlich wäre auch ein gemeinsames semantisches Metadatenmodell zur Beschreibung der in der Finanzbranche anfallenden Daten. In Zukunft könnten künstliche Intelligenzen Daten aus sozialen Netzwerken berücksichtigen oder Smart Contracts aushandeln. Eine der größten Herausforderungen der Zukunft wird das Anwerben geeigneten Personals darstellen.
[EN] The informational turn has radically modified our way of life due to the extensive and intensive application of information and communication technologies to intimate, social and political aspects. Currently, understanding the networks of power, politics and mechanisms of (inter) subjectivation involves the understanding of technology, information and their practices associated. In this sense, the political philosofy today ust be philosofy of information.This work focuses on the mercantilization and fetishization of communication in social nerworks and its effects on intimacy, freedom and the capacity for social action. The research provides a conceptual system of reference to understand how the device of transparency configures subjectivities that, far from embodying the emancipating ideology of the cyborg, adopt a symbiotic existence inside the infosphere´s empire of Big Tech compañies. ; [ES] El giro informacional ha modificado radicalmente nuestra forma de vida debido a la aplicación extensiva e intensiva de las tecnologías de la información y la comunicación a aspectos íntimos, sociales y políticos. Comprender las redes de poder, la política y los mecanismos de (inter)subjetivación hoy pasa por entender la tecnología, la información, y las prácticas asociadas a las mismas. En este sentido, la filosofía política hoy debe ser filosofía de la información. Este trabajo se centra en el estudio de los efectos que la mercantilización y fetichización de la comunicación en las redes sociales tiene sobre la intimidad, la libertad y la capacidad de acción social, aportando un sistema conceptual de referencia para comprender cómo el dispositivo de la transparencia configura sujetos que, lejos de encarnar el ideario emancipador del ciborg, adoptan una existencia simbiótica en una infoesfera que es imperio de las BigTech. ; Peer reviewed
Nas últimas décadas, a indústria de Venture Capital (VC) vem ganhando cada vez mais protagonismo no cenário mundial e tem provocado alterações nos mercados globais de capitais, principalmente depois da ascensão das Bigtechs, que em apenas dez anos desbancaram as indústrias tradicionais, de uso intensivo de capital que figuravam há décadas como as empresas mais valiosas do globo. Esse protagonismo foi empreendido à custa de geração de inovação tecnológica, combinada com modelos escaláveis, replicáveis, que permitem crescimento exponencial. Essas empresas disputaram seus mercados resolvendo grandes problemas do cotidiano. Todas têm em comum o fato de terem sido financiadas por VC nos seus primórdios, quando ainda eram empresas de garagem. Essa revolução não ficou restrita aos EUA e se espalhou por todo o Globo, liderados principalmente por Europa e China, na Ásia. No Brasil, com um certo atraso em relação ao mercado americano, a indústria de VC vem quebrando seguidos recordes em volumes de investimento, o que tem atraído cada vez mais a atenção de grandes investidores globais. É inegável que grande parte desse sucesso pode ser atribuído à aquisição da 99 pela Didi, em 2019, que configurou o primeiro unicórnio brasileiro e colocou o país definitivamente no mapa das gestoras de VC globais. Apesar de todo esse desenvolvimento, nota-se que as gestoras domésticas são responsáveis pela maior parte dos investimentos na indústria, no entanto, possuem uma tímida participação nos investimentos em empreendimentos mais maduros. Portanto, o objeto desta pesquisa foi explorar por meio de pesquisa qualitativa as principais barreiras encontradas pelas VC domésticas para avançarem sua participação nos empreendimentos late stage. Dentre os pontos analisados, está a maturidade do mercado brasileiro que compromete a velocidade de maturação das VCs, fato que parece explicar a razão de ainda não temos fundos domésticos atuando nas Séries C em diante. Felizmente, essa ausência de participação nos estágios mais maduros não representa uma ameaça ao ecossistema brasileiro, ao contrário, é parte da sua evolução.
Biopower is a form of power that regulates social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it. Power can achieve an effective command over the entire life of the population only when it becomes an integral, vital function that every individual embraces and reactivates of his or her own accord. Biopower points out the moment when human life explicitly became part of the political calculations. Beyond the regime of sovereignty, oriented by a logic of repression, emerges a new regime, oriented by a logic of production and control, that is, a power "to make live" or "to let die". For Negri and Hardt biopower constitutes social relations, inserting individuals and populations in a circuit of value, obedience, and utility. In cognitive capitalism capital presents itself as biopower. The point is that capitalism is not only an economic mode of production, but also a mode of life production, a mode of subjectivation. Therefore, it is not only about the reproduction of capital, but also about the reproduction of subjects, the effective producers of economic value. We are facing with the tendency of capital's invasion of bios, the becomingof-capital-biopower, to introduce the concept of biocapitalism. However, it is in this context that biopower and biopolitics must be seen as working together with other technologies of power - repressive and disciplinary power - which operate more directly on the body and on subjectivity. To the new forms of conflict are linked with new forms of power: from cognitive warfare to sharp power. Through cognitive conflict and sharp power strategies, we are witnessing an epochal change, an IT revolution that brings political conflict into a digital dimension, which acts on the ground of public opinion, politics and economics, control and conditioning of knowledge, of our world view and of facts. Zuboff introduces the concept of surveillance-based capitalism implemented via sophisticated algorithms of BigTech companies (Google, Apple, Amazon, Meta, and others). Digital networks do not only collect data on users, but they "cluster" these users with the help of algorithms and encourage specific desired behaviors. Then, the patterns of these behaviors are stored (as raw material of a kind) in Big Data and sold further as commodity (behavioral surplus) on the market. A persons "digital behavior" thus becomes a market subject in various ways. It is ubiquitous, sensate, computational, and global and it is designed so that all human activity, from the most banal to the boldest, can be monitored, measured, and modified for the purposes of surveillance capitalism This capacity to "shape human behavior", gives rise to what Zuboff calls "instrumentarian power" This is not dissimilar to forms of governmentality described by Foucault, because its goal is not just the "conduct of conduct" rather it is to turn people themselves into highly predictable instruments of political or material consumption. As a new form of subtle and sophisticated despotism, data are used by agencies as predictive products about our future behaviors, information that allows to control a market, but also the space for political decision-making and legitimacy, and, therefore become a huge power. Predictive behavioral surplus sources are increased and enhanced to guide, advise and lead people to behaviors, which they believe free, which actually aim for the greater profit of surveillance capitalists.