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I. The Danube: Its Role and Significance -- Geographical Setting -- Benefits and Deprivations -- Economic Interests Prior to 1945: Some Facts and Figures -- Struggles for Control Prior to World War I -- World War I and Its Aftermath -- II. Goals and Interests: American and Soviet -- Objectives of American Foreign Policy -- Objectives of Soviet Foreign Policy -- III. The Background: Nazi Germany vs. Soviet Russia -- Russia's Acquisition of Bessarabia, A Gateway to the Danube -- Liquidation of the International and European Commissions -- IV. Encounters and Methods: American and Soviet -- The Armistice Agreements -- Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Austria -- From Potsdam to Paris -- The Peace Treaties of 1947 -- Preparations for Belgrade -- V. Further Encounters and Methods: American and Soviet -- The Question of the Danube Barges Before the Economic and Social Council -- The Interpretation of "German Assets" as a Tool of Soviet Diplomacy -- The Device of "Joint Companies" -- Showdown at Belgrade -- VI. Changed Setting: Law and Politics of the New Danube Commission -- Dissension -- Rapprochement -- Cooperation -- Retrospect and Prospect -- A Selective List of Works on the Danube -- Name Index.

Under cover of night, on 18 June 1953, South Korean President Syngman Rhee released nearly 25,000 "non-repatriate" North Korean prisoners of war (pows). The event occurred just as United Nations Command (unc), Chinese, and North Korean negotiators were preparing to sign a hard-fought armistice agreement at P'anmunjŏm that long had been delayed on the question of voluntary repatriation of pows. unc officials articulated an enduring tale of surprise and betrayal, one that persists in Korean War histories to this day. However, this article, after an examination of unc pow camp records, is able to look beyond their outrage to discover that the u.s. Army, in fact, formulated a deliberate strategy of restraint for a likely prisoner release. This plan grew out of unc Commander General Mark W. Clark's sympathy for anti-Communist pows and a sense of anxiety regarding the future of u.s. relations with the Republic of Korea (rok). Although no evidence exists to support a claim that u.s. officials formally colluded with the rok government, the u.s. military played a complicit role in Rhee's pow release.

Though the United Nations has succeeded to only a limited extent in bringing about the actual settlement or adjustment of disputes and threatening situations that have been brought to its attention, it has achieved a considerable measure of success in its efforts to bring fighting to an end and to assist the parties in maintaining the cessation of hostilities to which they have agreed. In Indonesia, the United Nations was able to follow up its success in inducing the parties to agree to a cease-fire with a valuable assist in the negotiation of a final political settlement. In Palestine, however, the United Nations contribution has been largely limited to getting the states directly involved in the fighting to agree to a cease-fire, and then to armistice agreements. The political issues involved seem as far from resolution as ever. In dealing with the dispute between India and Pakistan over the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the United Nations has likewise found itself unable to get the parties to agree on a political settlement. Nevertheless, fighting has been brought to an end, and the United; Nations has played an important part in achieving that result.

This study investigates South Korea's security behaviour vis-a-vis the United States and that of the U.S. towards Korea. The significance of this study lies in its emphasis upon relations between South Korea and the United States during the 1953- 1960 period from the perspective of the patron-client state relationship. This study analyses the issues and historical events in order to trace the development of each nation's strategy, leverages, and tactics towards the other. Each chapter is related to the U.S. security commitment policy to South Korea, and South Korea's response in the frame work of the big power and small state relationship. The Introduction explains the purpose and importance of the research and the analytical framework. Chapter 1 analyses U.S. -South Korean diplomatic seesawing and Korean President Rhee's bargaining position during the Korean armistice negotiations. Chapter 2 traces the post-armistice period and the Korean Political Conference at Geneva during 1953-1954. As the Korean Armistice Agreement was a temporary measure to secure a complete cessation of hostilities, the Geneva Conference of 1954, intended to establish a political settlement, was a significant issue in the post-armistice period. Chapter 3 analyses U.S. security and military policy following the Korean War. The question of the proposed reduction of ROK forces and the redeployment of U.S. forces in Korea in connection with the 'New Look' policy were troublesome issues between Seoul and Washington, over which the two governments exerted their bargaining power. Chapter 4 deals with Rhee's conflicts with the U.S. concerning the normalisation of South Korea-Japan relations, U.S. economic policy towards Korea and its negative effects on Rhee's Government, and Rhee's undemocratic rule and dispute with the U.S. concerning Korean political affairs. Chapter 5, the conclusion of this study, summarises the research findings. As power and administration in South Korea were highly centralised under Rhee, it is important to ask to what extent did he, as the leader of the weaker state, manage and manipulate a bargaining position in Korea's relations with the United States.

The evolution of Anglo-American war aims, 1917-1918 -- From the pre-armistice agreement to the opening of the peace conference -- The opening of the peace conference -- The covenant of the League of Nations: an Anglo-American document -- Anglo-American policy and the Russian revolution, 1919 -- Anglo-American issues arising from the "preliminary peace," the military clauses, and the disposition of German sea power -- The principle of self-determination in Anglo-American policy: French security and the territorial settlement of western Europe -- The principle of self-determination in Anglo-American policy: territorial problems of eastern Europe and the Middle East -- The conflict of British and American policies in the reparations settlement -- Problems of immediate and long-range economic cooperation -- The revision of the covenant and Anglo-American naval rivalry; the birth of the international labor organization; the trial of the Kaiser -- American principles versus British treaty obligations: the territorial claims of Italy and Japan -- The Anglo-American reaction against the draft treaty and Lloyd George's proposals for revision, May 7-June 28 -- The breakdown of Anglo-American cooperation in the final stages of the peace conference: problems of Asia Minor, the Adriatic, and eastern Europe

Abstract
Despite the unending nuclear crises and economic sanctions characterizing U.S.-North Korean relations, North Korea has adopted non-aggressive measures to establish bilateral relations with the United States and bypass U.S.-imposed sanctions without committing to denuclearization since 1990. The repatriation of the remains of U.S. soldiers who died in North Korea during the Korean War became a convenient tool for P'yŏngyang to achieve these two strategic aims, as well as the sole arena in where the two countries displayed meaningful cooperation. This article traces the return of each batch of U.S. bodies between 1991 and 2018 to analyze North Korea's evolving prerequisites for releasing them. North Korea's demands included ranking U.S. officials making visits, replacing the Korean War Armistice Agreement with new peace treaties, financial aid, and avoidance of any pressure to denuclearize, all of which served the regime's goal of surviving in the post-Cold War world. Disagreement over reimbursing North Korea for its support in excavation and the inevitable connection between remains repatriation and denuclearization were major blocks to further cooperation in retrieving remains. This study analyzes the benefits and caveats of a low-risk approach to deescalating tensions in East Asia.

In 1940, the Portuguese diplomat Sousa Mendes, then consul in Bordeaux, decides to rebel against decisions of his government, and to give visas to all those who asked him and so begins his action of rescuing them. The number of those who escaped the clutches of the Nazis is estimated at 30,000 people. At the same time, such as Sousa Mendes, a young American journalist Varian Fry is sent to Marseille. His mission: to release artists, intellectuals and political activists, often Jews, threatened by the Gestapo. The modest organization that he sets in motion opposes Article 19 of the Armistice Agreement between France and Germany: "The French government is required to deliver on demand all citizens appointed by the Reich government. "For thirteen months, before the Vichy police expels Varian Fry - with the approval of the United States - the American relief Center, by legal or illegal means, saves many thousands of people. These rescue actions were stemmed from what has been called "the resistance before the Resistance", and from what appears today as an international solidarity movement. We propose to understand two singular historical moments, at the same time we pay tribute to the heroism of the ordinary individual against the State unreasoning.

With the current conflict in Gaza going full tilt, the usual questions have popped up: Who is to blame, what is everyone's motivation and strategy, how to stop the bloodshed, how to end the conflict. And as usual, the two-state solution, i.e. two separate, sovereign states within the borders of the 1949 armistice agreement, keeps popping up as a purported solution. This is especially prominent in the statements of politicians in countries not directly involved in the conflict. Countries that at least claim to want to help end the conflict, be it through mediation or other diplomatic measures. But for those countries, the two-state solution has become an idea to hide behind. It does not help solve the conflict, neither in the short- nor mid-term. Clinging to the idea merely prolongs the status quo. However, it does allow the rest of the world to avoid facing the facts, which would force them to reevaluate their position on who to support and actually do something about the conflict as it currently is. But it's high time we face the music and admit it: The two-state solution is no longer a viable option when it comes to mediating this conflict.

The Council of the Arab League, meeting in Cairo on October I, sent congratulations to Premier Nasser of Egypt on his armaments purchase agreement with Czechoslovakia. The period subsequent to the announcement of the agreement was regarded as one of heightened tension between the Arab states and Israel. On November 9, Prime Minister Anthony Eden (United Kingdom) declared that his government would like to assist Israel and the Arab states toreach a settlement of their differences. If those nations wanted to attain peace, he stated, they would have tomake some compromise on their positions; the Arab states based their claims on the 1947 and other UN resolutions, while the Israel position was founded on the Armistice Agreement of 1949 and on the territory they currently occupied. In the view of the Prime Minister, it would be possible to bridge the gap between the two positions through negotiations, and he stated that if a mutually acceptable boundary arrangement were reached, the United Kingdom and perhaps other powers would be prepared to give a formal guarantee to both sides. The Arab League Political Committee on November 13 considered the Eden proposals, and although no conclusive information as to its view of the proposals was made public, it was reported that Egyptian Premier Nasser welcomed them. The reaction in Israel, however, was reported to be highly unfavorable, the Israel view being that the territorial changes proposed by the Prime Minister included cession to Egypt of a large part of the Negev and of the port of Elath on the Gulf of Akaba.

The Korean War never actually ended. Although largescale hostilities have been suspended for decades under an armistice agreement, a peace agreement was never signed, and there remains a tense posture in which the United States, North Korea, and South Korea continue to prepare themselves for resumed hostilities at any time. The Trump administration indicated a willingness to enter into a peace agreement with North Korea to formally end the war and but did not follow through, and other prior American presidents had also failed to secure normalized relations with North Korea. South Korean President Moon Jae-in continues to advocate fiercely for a formal peace agreement between the warring parties, and given the recent change of political leadership within the United States, the issue is sure to arise again.But if a U.S. president were to one day succeed in concluding a binding international peace agreement to formally end the Korean War, what should be the role of Congress? Just as the proper division of war powers between the executive and legislative branches of government are hotly contested, so too do the powers to end war and declare peace remain a subject of debate. As a matter of policy, it may be preferable to utilize the most solemn procedure available under U.S. law, the Article II treaty process, for a peace agreement to end the Korean War. Short of that, a congressional-executive agreement could also be used to signal that each of these branches of the American government are committed to forging a new relationship with North Korea and recognizing an end of the war. Nonetheless, there are many reasons that a President may determine that it is more strategic, expedient, or otherwise preferable to act unilaterally. For example, there may be complex political dynamics in Congress that threaten to slow, hamper, or outright impede peace efforts. If that is the case, this Article argues that there is nothing in the text, case law, or past practice under the Constitution that would prohibit the President from ending the Korean War through a sole executive agreement.

Peacekeeping, conceptually, was designed to be traditionally defensive
in nature with a neutral, unarmed, multinational force maintaining or
monitoring peace. The first major example of a United Nations peacekeeping
force dates to the initial Arab-Israeli conflict with the UN Truce
Supervision Organization (UNSTO), established in May 1948. The peacekeepers
were there to observe and maintain the ceasefire and assist in any terms of
the armistice agreements following the initial fighting with the partition
of the British Mandate in Palestine and the later declaration of the State
of Israel. The Security Council Resolution
"Instruct[ed] the
United Nations Mediator in Palestine, in concert with the Truce Commission,
to supervise the observance of the above provisions, and decide[d] that they
shall be provided with a sufficient number of military observers." UNTSO was
followed by a variation, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India
and Pakistan, which was to observe and report violations of the ceasefire
along the contested border. Both of these original UN peacekeeping
operations are still in existence after seventy years. This original concept
of peacekeeping was based upon the United Nation's principle that the
organization would act to prevent conflict between states following the
atrocities committed during World War II through its neutrality. However,
the term "peacekeeping" is not found anywhere within the United Nations
Charter. It is instead inferred under both Chapter VI and Chapter VII powers
to resolve disputes.

AbstractSince December 1997, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States have met in a series of talks aimed at promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region. According to a November 1998 U.S. Department of Defense report, the discussions have created a "diplomatic venue for reducing tensions and ultimately replacing the Armistice Agreement with a permanent peace settlement."1 Amidst the tragic human suffering which has occurred in North Korea, there have been some encouraging developments on the peninsula. The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea placed international controls on North Korea's atomic energy program and cautiously anticipated the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations. Since assuming power in early 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has vigorously pursued a policy of engagement with P'yo¨ngyang, known as the "sunshine policy." Over the past decade, North Korea has also reoriented its foreign policy. In the early 1990s, the regime's social and economic crisis led to a rethinking of its autarkic economic system. By early 1994, the state had created new free trade zones and relatively open foreign investment laws.2 By complying with the Agreed Framework, the DPRK has also shown a willingness to work with the international community on sensitive issues affecting its internal sovereignty and ability to project power beyond its borders.