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AbstractEthical concerns on autonomous weapon systems (AWS) call for a process of human oversight to ensure accountability over targeting decisions and the use of force. To align the behavior of autonomous systems with human values and norms, the Design for Values approach can be used to consciously embody values in the deployment of AWS. One instrument for the elicitation of values during the design is participative deliberation. In this paper, we describe a participative deliberation method and results of a value elicitation by means of the value deliberation process for which we organized two panels each consisting of a mixture of experts in the field of AWS working in military operations, foreign policy, NGO's and industry. The results of our qualitative study indicate not only that value discussion leads to changes in perception of the acceptability of alternatives, or options, in a scenario of AWS deployment, it also gives insight in to which values are deemed important and highlights that trust in the decision-making of an AWS is crucial.

The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) has been discussing autonomous weapons systems (AWS) in the UN arms control context since 2017. Russia boycotted the latest round of talks in Geneva in March, in connection with its 24 February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Regulation of AWS is an increasingly remote prospect, and some representatives even admit privately that the talks may have failed. The new German gov­ern­­ment's commitment to work to outlaw AWS is increasingly looking like a labour of Sisyphus. Given that the GGE requires unanimity, but constructive cooperation with Russia is off the table for the foreseeable, other forums will need to be found for the international debate on AWS control. Germany must prepare for options within NATO, the European Union and the United Nations. It is clear that any meaningful process presupposes coherent coordination with the NATO partners on all levels. In order to achieve that, Germany must first develop a clear national position on AWS. (author's abstract)

Technologische Fortschritte, die in den letzten Jahren in den Bereichen Robotik und künstliche Intelligenz erzielt wurden, haben Waffensysteme, die ohne menschliches Zutun Ziele auswählen und bekämpfen können, an die Schwelle zur konkreten Umsetzung gerückt. Automatisierung und Autonomie werden bereits heute für eine breite Palette an Funktio­nen bei Waffensystemen genutzt (u. a. Suche und Identifizierung potenzieller Ziele mithilfe von Sensordaten, Zielverfolgung, Priorisierung und Bestimmung des Zeitpunkts für den Angriff auf diese Ziele). Die Erweiterung autonomer Funktionen von Waffensystemen steht daher in allen technologisch fortgeschrittenen Ländern auf der Agenda. Der Bericht verfolgt einen breiten Analyseansatz und deckt eine Vielzahl von Facetten des Themas ab. Zunächst erfolgt eine Darstellung des technologischen Reifegrads und der Entwicklungsperspektiven von AWS. Anhand einer Bestandsaufnahme von existierenden und in der Entwicklung befindlichen Systemen wird illustriert, welche Funktionen moderne Waffensysteme bereits heute und in absehbarer Zukunft autonom ausüben können. Auf Grundlage dieser militärischen Fähigkeiten werden mögliche Einsatzszenarien für AWS diskutiert und sich daraus ergebende sicherheitspolitische Implikationen analysiert. Hier stehen die Fragen im Mittelpunkt, ob der mögliche Einsatz von AWS zu mehr oder weniger kriegerischer Gewalt führen würde, welche Auswirkungen auf die regionale Stabilität und das strategische Gleichgewicht zu erwarten wären und ob neue Rüstungswettläufe ausgelöst werden könnten. Ob und ggf. inwiefern die Anwendung tödlicher Gewalt durch autonom agierende Maschinen moralisch zulässig ist, ist die Kernfrage der ethischen Debatte um AWS, die im Bericht ausführlich dargestellt wird. Inhalt Zusammenfassung 9 1 Einleitung 29 2 Abgrenzung des Untersuchungsgegenstands 33 2.1 Definitorische Ansätze 34 2.2 Autonom, semiautonom oder automatisiert? 35 2.3 Die Definition des US-Verteidigungsministeriums 39 2.4 Die Qualität menschlicher Kontrolle über AWS 40 3 ...

PurposeAs the warehouse is increasingly viewed as a strategic component, retailers' willingness to invest in automated warehouse systems (AWS) has increased. These investment decisions are influenced by well-known operational factors, but strategic factors, which have received limited attention in warehousing literature, also play a pivotal role. Addressing this gap, this study investigates how strategic factors influence AWS investment decisions in retail.Design/methodology/approachBased on a theoretical foundation of technology adoption, strategic intent, and automation strategy, an abductive multiple case study is conducted with eight purposefully selected retailers that had implemented or were in the process of implementing a large AWS.FindingsThe study ranks 10 competitive priorities and 21 AWS evaluation aspects and shows how the firm's strategic intent and the AWS investment decisions can be connected via the formulation of a warehouse automation strategy. The findings reveal the content for such a strategy – including 7 categories and 17 considerations – related to, for example, technology innovativeness, efficiency versus adaptiveness, technology-supplier relationships, control and ownership, and risk exposure. The study empirically shows how manager characteristics and owner strategies influence retailers' AWS investment decisions. Four strategic intent profiles are abductively developed: reliability and delivery service; profitable deliveries; scalable logistics for volume growth; and platform building for logistics services. The study also provides evidence of a reciprocal relationship between strategic intent and AWS investment decisions.Research limitations/implicationsThe study is conducted with a limited number of Swedish retailers, indicating a need for additional studies to test the findings across different contexts.Practical implicationsThe study offers a framework for formulating a warehouse automation strategy. As a foundation for developing the framework, the study shares empirical insights from retailers in the forefront of AWS implementation.Originality/valueThe study contributes as a conversation changer by showing the importance of shifting from a tactical-operational focus to a strategic perspective on warehouse configuration in general and on AWS investment decisions in retail in particular.

Abstract In this article, we focus on the scholarly and policy debate on autonomous weapon systems (AWS) and particularly on the objections to the use of these weapons which rest on jus ad bellum principles of proportionality and last resort. Both objections rest on the idea that AWS may increase the incidence of war by reducing the costs for going to war (proportionality) or by providing a propagandistic value (last resort). We argue that whilst these objections offer pressing concerns in their own right, they suffer from important limitations: they overlook the difficulties of calculating ad bellum proportionality; confuse the concept of proportionality of effects with the precision of weapon systems; disregard the ever-changing nature of war and of its ethical implications; mistake the moral obligation imposed by the principle of last resort with the impact that AWS may have on political decision to resort to war. Our analysis does not entail that AWS are acceptable or justifiable, but it shows that ad bellum principles are not the best set of ethical principles for tackling the ethical problems raised by AWS; and that developing adequate understanding of the transformations that the use of AWS poses to the nature of war itself is a necessary, preliminary requirement to any ethical analysis of the use of these weapons.

The emergence of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) is increasingly in the academic and public focus. Research largely focuses on the legal and ethical implications of AWS as a new weapons category set to revolutionize the use of force. However, the debate on AWS neglects the question of what introducing these weapons systems could mean for how decisions are made. Pursuing this from a theoretical-conceptual perspective, the article critically analyzes what impact AWS can have on norms as standards of appropriate action. The article draws on the Foucauldian "apparatus of security" to develop a concept that accommodates the role of security technologies for the conceptualization of norms guiding the use of force. It discusses to what extent a technologically mediated construction of a normal reality emerges in the interplay of machinic and human agency and how this leads to the development of norms. The article argues that AWS provide a specific construction of reality in their operation and thereby define procedural norms that tend to replace the deliberative, normative-political decision on when, how, and why to use force. The article is a theoretical-conceptual contribution to the question of why AWS matter and why we should further consider the implications of new arrangements of human-machine interactions in IR.

Abstract
The emergence of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) is increasingly in the academic and public focus. Research largely focuses on the legal and ethical implications of AWS as a new weapons category set to revolutionize the use of force. However, the debate on AWS neglects the question of what introducing these weapons systems could mean for how decisions are made. Pursuing this from a theoretical-conceptual perspective, the article critically analyzes what impact AWS can have on norms as standards of appropriate action. The article draws on the Foucauldian "apparatus of security" to develop a concept that accommodates the role of security technologies for the conceptualization of norms guiding the use of force. It discusses to what extent a technologically mediated construction of a normal reality emerges in the interplay of machinic and human agency and how this leads to the development of norms. The article argues that AWS provide a specific construction of reality in their operation and thereby define procedural norms that tend to replace the deliberative, normative-political decision on when, how, and why to use force. The article is a theoretical-conceptual contribution to the question of why AWS matter and why we should further consider the implications of new arrangements of human-machine interactions in IR.

Do Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) qualify as moral or rational agents? This paper argues that combatants on the battlefield are required by the demands of behavior interpretation to approach a sophisticated AWS with the "Combatant's Stance"—the ascription of mental states required to understand the system's strategic behavior on the battlefield. However, the fact that an AWS must be engaged with the combatant's stance does not entail that other persons are relieved of criminal or moral responsibility for war crimes committed by autonomous weapons. This article argues that military commanders can and should be held responsible for perpetrating war crimes through an AWS regardless of the moral status of the AWS as a culpable or non-culpable agent. In other words, a military commander can be liable for the acts of the machine independent of what conclusions we draw from the fact that combatants—even artificial ones—must approach each other with the combatant's stance. This article argues that the basic framework for this liability was established at Nuremberg and subsequent tribunals—both of which focused on how a criminal defendant can be responsible for allowing a metaphorical "machine"—such as a concentration camp—to commit an international crime. The novelty in this technological development is that the law must shift from dealing with the metaphor of the "cog in the machine" to a literal machine. Nonetheless, this article also concludes that there is one area where international criminal law is ill suited to dealing with a military commander's responsibility for unleashing an AWS that commits a war crime. Many of these cases will be based on the commander's recklessness and unfortunately international criminal law has struggled to develop a coherent theoretical and practical program for prosecuting crimes of recklessness.

This paper relates the results of deliberation of youth juries about the use of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). The discourse that emerged from the juries centered on several key issues. The jurors expressed the importance of keeping the humans in the decision-making process when it comes to militarizing artificial intelligence, and that only humans are capable of moral agency. They discussed the perennial issue of control over AWS and possibility of something going wrong, either with software or hardware. Concerns over proliferation of AWS and possible arms race also entered the discussion and the jurors were skeptical about the possibility of regulation and compliance once AWS enter military arsenals. We conclude that the juries were very apprehensive and hostile to the introduction of autonomous weapons systems into military conflicts.

This book reviews whether the existing framework in place can effectively address breaches in the context of Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS). The work endeavors to map out the main gaps and some possible approaches to address them. Part I sets the ground. First, it provides a concept of AWS. Next, it discusses the accountability gap AWS generate and shows how the international community has put far more emphasis on individual responsibility rather than state responsibility. Part II analyzes the challenges AWS pose to the regime governing state responsibility under international law, as codified in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility (ARSIWA). In this regard, it discusses attribution, breach of an international obligation, tempus comissi delicti, multiple states involved in a breach, force majeure, assurance of non-repetition, issues related to damage, the human-machine interaction and its impacts on state´s responsibility, responsibility for not using AWS, weapons review and the duty of due diligence. Part III summarizes the challenges discussed in part II in thirteen issues of concern and presents possible paths de lege ferenda to address each of those issues, mainly a paradigm shift in attribution and strict liability, among seven other more specific proposals. The conclusion reached is that the current regime on the international responsibility of states is insufficient to deal with the new challenges AWS pose. De lege ferenda, the book argues for following the paths suggested in part III. It also reflects on parts II and III's findings and how many of AWS's challenges to state's responsibility apply to other autonomous devices. Therefore, through the case study of AWS, this work also opens the broader discussion of the gaps in the international responsibility of states regarding autonomous device misdoings.

It is the day after the UK general election in May 2015. No one single party has 'won' outright.1 The alternative governing teams look very different. Labour sees the party leader Ed Miliband sit at the head of a parity cabinet and government. Yvette Cooper and Harriet Harman will be his foremost 'wing women'; at least 40 percent of his backbenchers will likely be female; as will more than two thirds of his newly elected MPs. A Conservative government would, for sure, see Cameron appoint Theresa May, the current Home Secretary, to one of the four big Offices of State – she's too experienced and too much of a leadership challenger otherwise.2 He will also pepper his team with a good few women too, belatedly meeting his 2015 30 percent target. His summer 2014 government reshuffle showed that he could find women to sit in his Cabinet, if only to see off commentariat 'backlash'.3 But when you look beyond the 'doughnut' of women Cameron places on his Frontbench,4 the Conservative backbenches will likely remain women 'lite'. At least the worst case scenario – of fewer Conservative women MPs in the UK Parliament in 2015 - looks, 100 days out from the election, to have been avoided.

This article evaluates the role of the authoritarian welfare state (AWS) in upholding regime stability in Vladimir Putin's Russia. The AWS has contributed to sociopolitical stability over the past 20 years by (1) maintaining frequent interactions between the state and the population, (2) providing a way for the regime to uphold a reputation for not cheating the population out of the proceeds of growth, and (3) generating significant benefits for the rulers and the ruled. The pension reform enacted in 2018 undermined the three pillars of the AWS and, therefore, increased the chances of future political instability.

From an international security perspective, Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) are defined as robotic weapons that can sense and act unilaterally, and depending on how they are programmed, have enormous potential. However, their use poses challenges to human rights – in particular, AWS threaten the fundamental right to life and principle of human dignity. AWS, which can make their own decisions, pose some legal and moral questions. Autonomy in these weapons means no human intervention. The problem stems from this feature. What if autonomous weapons not only destroy enemy weapons but also kill civilians?

Abstract
The obligation to legally review weapons, means and methods of warfare has been identified by the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems as one of its Guiding Principles. Despite calls to share practical measures and processes to undertake this review, national practice remains opaque and fragmented. This article describes the traditional weapons review process and explains why this process may need to be modified to adequately evaluate autonomous weapon systems (AWS). It uses three case studies of fictional AWS in various stages of development and acquisition to demonstrate how existing review processes can be adapted for the review of AWS. This article shows the utility of these reviews for ensuring compliance of AWS with existing legal requirements, thereby also demonstrating the suitability of existing law to regulate the use of this novel technology in warfare.