Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe European Commission proposal on the liberalization of energy markets has been widely debated in policy, stakeholder and academic circles both for its content and the potential consequences for the structure of the EU gas and electricity markets. However, little has been said about the empirical evidence produced by the European Commission to support this legislative package. Since the Impact Assessment (IA) system has been in place, there have been concerns regarding quality and adequateness, especially when quantifying costs, benefits and risks, selecting policy options and considering stakeholder opinions. This article examines how these crucial issues were factored into the IA on the liberalization of EU energy markets. It is concluded that the selected policy option reflects the position of some stakeholders at the expense of the available evidence on its impacts on markets, society and the environment.

International audience ; Coherence, a fundamental principle of European Union (EU) foreign policy remains a challenge for the EU. For example, the development of an EU Arctic policy raises both internal and external challenges as two non-Arctic member states, France and Germany, move to establish their own Arctic policies. Internally, EU inter-institutional coherence has also been difficult to achieve as shown by the first effort to draft an EU Arctic policy and by the EU regulation on trade in seal products. However, internal coherence has significantly improved since 2008, and the Parliament, Commission, and Council now maintain similar positions, yet the EU is still waiting for its admission to the Arctic Council. External coherence between EU member states on Arctic issues has proven to be more elusive. France is using high-level diplomacy to define its Arctic agenda, and is clearly challenging the EU consensus on cooperation as an unambitious policy. Germany is pointing at inefficiencies regarding the coordination of EU member states while taking a more collaborative approach with Arctic countries and maintaining close ties with the EU. Although EU Arctic policy is now entering a new phase of maturity, the EU will require better coordination and a clearer vision of its role in order to position itself as an effective foreign-policy stakeholder in the Arctic, in particular when new powerful actors like Asian states enter the geopolitics and geo-economics of the Arctic.

International audience ; Coherence, a fundamental principle of European Union (EU) foreign policy remains a challenge for the EU. For example, the development of an EU Arctic policy raises both internal and external challenges as two non-Arctic member states, France and Germany, move to establish their own Arctic policies. Internally, EU inter-institutional coherence has also been difficult to achieve as shown by the first effort to draft an EU Arctic policy and by the EU regulation on trade in seal products. However, internal coherence has significantly improved since 2008, and the Parliament, Commission, and Council now maintain similar positions, yet the EU is still waiting for its admission to the Arctic Council. External coherence between EU member states on Arctic issues has proven to be more elusive. France is using high-level diplomacy to define its Arctic agenda, and is clearly challenging the EU consensus on cooperation as an unambitious policy. Germany is pointing at inefficiencies regarding the coordination of EU member states while taking a more collaborative approach with Arctic countries and maintaining close ties with the EU. Although EU Arctic policy is now entering a new phase of maturity, the EU will require better coordination and a clearer vision of its role in order to position itself as an effective foreign-policy stakeholder in the Arctic, in particular when new powerful actors like Asian states enter the geopolitics and geo-economics of the Arctic.

The iTaukei, or Indigenous people of Fiji, own 91 per cent of the land and makeup 57 per cent of the country's multiracial population. Although critical in development discourses, these figures do not appear to translate into the development outcomes for the biggest landowners in the country. As it is, the 2019-2020 Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) revealed that 75 per cent of those living below the Basic Needs Poverty Line were iTaukei, the highest of all the ethnic groups living in Fiji (Fiji Bureau of Statistics, 2021). This statistic challenges the previous government's rhetoric: 'We are leaving no one behind.' In 2010, the Bainimarama government amended the Leases and Licenses Regulations of the Native Land Act (1961) to ensure equal distribution of lease money to members of landowning units (LOUs) who lease their lands. There were claims of social, economic, and cultural benefits made by the Bainimarama government that were endorsed by the iTaukei Native Land Trust Board (TLTB) to validate the amendments. This article critically examines the government's claims concerning EDIP to protect customary practices. The discussions are based on empirical evidence from a case study that examines the implications of land law literacy on village governance, political affiliations and the well-being of iTaukei in Narewa, western Viti Levu.

In theory, democratisation, which has proceeded unevenly across Africa during the past two decades, should encourage pro‐poor agricultural policy, as the majority of voters in many countries remain rural and poor. This article draws on case studies of recent policy change in six African countries, plus a review of the literature on political competition and voting behaviour, to explore the evolving role of competitive electoral politics in agricultural policy‐making. It finds that democratic pressures for pro‐poor agricultural policy remain weak, which may help explain the limited delivery thus far on commitments to the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). However, exogenous factors – most strikingly, sustained threats to regime survival – can create positive incentives for agricultural investment. The implications for participants in agricultural policy processes are explored.

"Mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs) are designed to prevent the transmission of mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) diseases from mother to child. While MRTs, if effective, could satisfy a desire of women seeking to have a genetically related child without the risk of passing on mtDNA disease, the technique raises significant ethical and social issues. It would create offspring who have genetic material from two women, something never sanctioned in humans, and would create mitochondrial changes that could be heritable (in female offspring), and therefore passed on in perpetuity. The manipulation would be performed on eggs or embryos, would affect every cell of the resulting individual, and once carried out this genetic manipulation is not reversible. Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques considers the implications of manipulating mitochondrial content both in children born to women as a result of participating in these studies and in descendants of any female offspring. This study examines the ethical and social issues related to MRTs, outlines principles that would provide a framework and foundation for oversight of MRTs, and develops recommendations to inform the Food and Drug Administration's consideration of investigational new drug applications"--Publisher's description

Following the crises of the late 1990s and the subsequent slowdown in the world economy, many countries in the developed and developing world are at the crossroads in their trade strategy, uncertain whether to advance with trade reforms, to stand still or increase protection. While the case for liberalisation has been widely accepted as a long-term goal for economic policy, the gains from trade have not always been forthcoming and macroeconomic crises have exacerbated the situation. The delayed and uncertain benefits of reform, plus the costs of adjustment, the need to offset tariff revenue losses, and the possible benefits of some degree of intervention to foster industrialisation have all contributed to this indecision. Support for the WTO multilateral negotiations now appears half-hearted, and there are calls for increased protection. Following the slow progress of multilateral negotiations, attention has inevitably turned to regional and bilateral agreements. Indonesia provides an interesting case study of the potential benefits and costs of alternative trade strategies that are under active consideration in many developing countries. The ASEAN region has recently announced a deepening of its commitments and is considering widening the agreement to include countries such as China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. A bilateral agreement with the United States is also a possibility. Against this background, Indonesia's options on trade policy range from increasing protection to actively pursuing bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives. The results of a global general equilibrium analysis point to several interesting implications for policy makers. The results from the model show that increasing protection results in economic losses while a stand-still and more liberalisation produce economic gains. After undergoing full adjustment, estimated annual gains to Indonesia from a conservative Uruguay Round-style outcome within the WTO system total an estimated US$380 million (0.22 per cent of GDP). However, annual gains from a completely liberalised ASEAN plus China, Japan and Republic of Korea regional trade agreement are estimated at US$2.3 billion, again after adjustment. Indonesia could capture half of these benefits by liberalising unilaterally. The major source of the gains from unilateral, regional and multilateral liberalisation is improved efficiency following removal of tariffs on politically sensitive sectors such as motor vehicles. This improves productivity in many downstream sectors. There are significant trade diversion effects from regional integration, with non-members worse off as a result.

Following the crises of the late 1990s and the subsequent slowdown in the world economy, many countries in the developed and developing world are at the crossroads in their trade strategy, uncertain whether to advance with trade reforms, to stand still or increase protection. While the case for liberalisation has been widely accepted as a long-term goal for economic policy, the gains from trade have not always been forthcoming and macroeconomic crises have exacerbated the situation. The delayed and uncertain benefits of reform, plus the costs of adjustment, the need to offset tariff revenue losses, and the possible benefits of some degree of intervention to foster industrialisation have all contributed to this indecision. Support for the WTO multilateral negotiations now appears half-hearted, and there are calls for increased protection. Following the slow progress of multilateral negotiations, attention has inevitably turned to regional and bilateral agreements. Indonesia provides an interesting case study of the potential benefits and costs of alternative trade strategies that are under active consideration in many developing countries. The ASEAN region has recently announced a deepening of its commitments and is considering widening the agreement to include countries such as China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. A bilateral agreement with the United States is also a possibility. Against this background, Indonesia's options on trade policy range from increasing protection to actively pursuing bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives. The results of a global general equilibrium analysis point to several interesting implications for policy makers. The results from the model show that increasing protection results in economic losses while a stand-still and more liberalisation produce economic gains. After undergoing full adjustment, estimated annual gains to Indonesia from a conservative Uruguay Round-style outcome within the WTO system total an estimated US$380 million (0.22 per cent of GDP). However, annual gains from a completely liberalised ASEAN plus China, Japan and Republic of Korea regional trade agreement are estimated at US$2.3 billion, again after adjustment. Indonesia could capture half of these benefits by liberalising unilaterally. The major source of the gains from unilateral, regional and multilateral liberalisation is improved efficiency following removal of tariffs on politically sensitive sectors such as motor vehicles. This improves productivity in many downstream sectors. There are significant trade diversion effects from regional integration, with non-members worse off as a result.