Suchergebnisse

2010/2011 ; La tesi è uno studio interdisciplinare e comparativo sul regime di protezione delle minoranze autoctone in Slovenia e Svezia. L'ipotesi di ricerca è che i due paesi abbiano scelto dei regimi di protezione molto efficaci ed avanzati che sperimentano un grado relativamente basso di tensione interetnica. Grazie ai loro sistemi fortemente sociali, hanno sviluppato un sistema di protezione delle minoranze nazionali che si spinge, per certi versi, oltre agli standard esistenti all'interno della UE. Ad esempio, il diritto all'istruzione ed all'informazione nella madre lingua – che nella maggior parte dei paesi difettano di base legale – risultano ben assicurati. Inoltre, entrambi includono i Rom tra le minoranze territoriali, creando così dei prerequisiti per un'effettiva non discriminazione. La bontà del regime di protezione viene valutata, da un lato, attraverso l'analisi dei vari campi di tutela, prendendo in considerazione sia le fonti legali che le politiche pubbliche volte ad implementarle; dall'altro, attraverso la rilevazione delle opinioni dei membri delle minoranze stesse. L'analisi degli standard esistenti mostra che entrambi i paesi possiedono un sistema di protezione relativamente completo, sebbene vengano sottolineate notevoli differenze tra un settore e l'altro. A tal riguardo, sono stati utilizzate varie fonti – legislazione esistente, report ufficiali, discussioni con esperti – al fine di redigere un tabella di valutazione riassuntiva per ogni singolo campo di protezione. L'affermazione viene poi ridimensionata alla luce dei risultati della ricerca empirica, condotta tramite questionari strutturati: le minoranze nazionali esprimono un giudizio positivo limitatamente a certi campi di tutela, ma danno, nel complesso, valutazioni poco generose sul sistema generale di protezione, tanto che emergono chiaramente sentimenti di esclusione. Le fonti dell'opera comprendono: analisi della letteratura rilevante, analisi della legislazione, analisi delle statistiche nazionali, visione di progetti e studi settoriali in corso, discussioni informali con ricercatori e interviste con 'testimoni qualificati', essenziali nel ricostruire un quadro sintetico della situazione data la carenza di letteratura in materia. La tesi si articola in 3 parti distinte. La prima intende fornire una cornice teorica sul tema della protezione delle minoranze nazionali, attraverso la presentazione delle definizioni più illustri elaborate dalla letteratura internazionale e di alcuni concetti chiave nel dibattito, come origine, natura, manifestazione esterna del fenomeno, differenze nel concetto di ethnos tra nord e centro Europa, etc… Nel secondo capitolo viene brevemente analizzata la storia della protezione delle minoranze per soffermarsi poi sui principali documenti elaborati all'interno della UE, dell'OSCE e del Consiglio d'Europa al fine di individuare alcuni standard universalmente riconosciuti da tutti i membri UE. La seconda parte si concentra sulla protezione delle minoranze territoriali in Slovenia (capitolo terzo) e Svezia (capitolo quarto): vengono analizzate la struttura etnica del paese, le caratteristiche delle varie minoranze e le politiche governative adottate, prendendo in considerazione anche l'evoluzione storica di queste ultime. I campi di tutela analizzati nel dettaglio sono: istruzione, uso della lingua, partecipazione e rappresentanza politica, vita culturale, informazione e media, cooperazione transfrontaliera. Di seguito vengono sottolineati i punti forti e quelli deboli dei rispettivi sistemi. La terza parte presenta le caratteristiche fondamentali dei due regimi in chiave comparativa (capitolo quinto) ed i risultati della ricerca sul campo (capitolo sesto), che è stata limitata a due minoranze per paese al fine di rendere più agevoli delle considerazioni comparative: una minoranza tipo transnazionale, i Rom, e due minoranze di confine, gli ungheresi in Slovenia e i finlandesi tornedaliani in Svezia. Il questionario, somministrato attraverso un metodo di campionamento di tipo snowball, o meglio, respondent driven, indaga sulle seguenti tematiche: percezione della tutela nel campo del linguaggio; percezione della tutela nel campo dell'istruzione; percezione della tutela percepita nel campo della partecipazione politica e della rappresentanza; percezione della tutela nel settore della vita culturale; percezione della tutela nel settore dei media e dell'informazione; percezione della tutela nel campo della cooperazione transfrontaliera; percezione della tutela globale; percezione dello status della minoranza rispetto alla maggioranza; percezione dell'uguaglianza dei diritti in confronto alla maggioranza e alle altre minoranze. Non è stato possibile raccogliere un numero sufficiente di risposte da parte di tutte le minoranze nazionali presenti nei due paesi a causa sia delle grandi difficoltà incontrate nel reperire soggetti disposti a collaborare che a causa dei tassi di risposta molto bassi. L' indagine svolta tra le suddette minoranze sembra suggerire che l'affermazione secondo la quale entrambi i paesi hanno un buon sistema di protezione deve essere circoscritta: anche se la protezione globale appare sufficiente, le minoranze nazionali non sembrano essere soddisfatte dell'implementazione dei loro diritti, se i risultati vengono comparati con quelli della tabella riassuntiva teorica. I Rom, paradossalmente, pur avendo un punteggio più basso sia a livello empirico che teorico, sembrano essere relativamente più soddisfatti dei loro diritti. Questo può essere dovuto al fatto che essi considerano effettivamente la recente introduzione di leggi ed atti in favore della loro minoranza come un importante progresso. Se le minoranze prese in considerazione danno valutazioni piuttosto positive per quanto riguarda alcuni settori di tutela, la sensazione di essere tutelati non sembra essere data semplicemente dalla somma di tali valutazioni ma ne include altre che hanno ha che fare con la dimensione sociale, in particolare il rapporto con la maggioranza, lo status all'interno della società, l'attenzione data alla minoranza da parte delle politiche di Stato. L'ipotesi di ricerca iniziale è quindi solamente in parte confermata: dall'analisi emerge un modello gerarchico nel trattamento delle minoranze nazionali, suscettibile di creare nuovi confini e tensioni tra a) le varie minoranze nazionali, b) le minoranze nazionali e altre minoranze, c) diversi sottogruppi della stessa minoranza. ; The dissertation is a comparative and interdisciplinary study dealing with the protection systems of autochthonous minorities in Slovenia and Sweden in a comparative key. Slovenia and Sweden were chosen as a focus of the research because of some similarities which may be found in relation with minority issues. In spite of their experience of recent migrations, they can be considered as two historically relatively homogeneous states both of which experience a low degree of interethnic tensions (even though it has not always been so). Thanks to their strongly social systems, they in fact developed a system of minority protection which, in some aspects, at least on the paper, goes even beyond E.U. existing standards; among them, the right to information and the right to public education in the mother tongue of minorities- which in most of countries lack legal basis or are simply not applied- are well assured. Moreover, their national minorities have intense relations with the neighbouring mother state. And last but not least, they both include the Roma among their territorial minorities, creating also for them legal prerequisites for the non- discrimination of the members and formal equality for all the legal aspects. Both countries chose a model of integration of their minorities which has resulted quite effective, especially after the latest improvements. Nevertheless, in both countries, even though in different manners, it is still possible to notice a hierarchy of treatment of different kind of minorities, where some fall behind the others in spite of their demands (and recognition) of autochthony. Sweden, for example, did that by excluding ethnic groups that were already present in the country and by denying substantial language rights to those national minorities whose languages were deemed to be non territorial ones, whilst Slovenia did that by introducing a difference between those groups who enjoy single or dual political subjectivity and by breaking the in- group unity of Roma. The thesis can be roughly divided into three main parts. The first part aims to provide a theoretical framework on minority issues and their protection. I first illustrate some definitions of ethnic minority and national minority taken from the literature and international fora as well as some related key arguments present in debates, such as the origin, the nature and the different manifestation of this phenomenon. The difference of perception of the concept ethnos in Central European and Western - North European world will be mentioned. The aim of the first chapter is to provide an almost legal definition to be used as a guide line in the analysis. It will be underlined that minority protection is only an empty concept in absence of a clear and universally or regionally accepted definition. In the second chapter the focus will be on the protection of minorities in Europe in historical perspective, taking into an account four main phases of development: from the peace of Augsburg until World War I; the period between the wars; after World War II until 1989; after 1990. The main documents elaborated within the Council of Europe, the OCSE and the European Union will be analysed, in order to get to point out some existing standards generally recognized by E.U. members even though differently applied. The second part deals with the protection of territorial minorities in Slovenia and Sweden, giving an overview on the ethnic structure of the country, on the main features of the minorities and on the governmental policies pursued since the last century. The content of the chapters will be enriched by the contribute of some minorities' representatives who accepted to be interviewed. In the third and last part, the main characteristics of these two systems will be analysed in a comparative key. Later on, the results of a small field research dealing with the practice of minority protection in the two countries will be presented. The main research hypothesis is that Slovenia and Sweden chose a successful and effective model of minority protection. This statement had to be assessed, on one hand, through the analysis of specific minority policies and, on the other hand, through the collection of opinions and feeling by behalf of minorities' members. The first and second part of the research aim in fact to assess minority protection in Slovenia and Sweden on the paper, analyzing field by field and underlining similarities and differences, strong and weak points of the two models and applicability. We have therefore tried to assess the level of protection for each minority within the two countries, giving an evaluation for each single field with a score ranging from 0 (poor) to 5 (excellent). The evaluation was drawn on the basis of existing laws, degree of application, State reports, relevant literature and discussions with experts. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the in depth analysis, it does not demand to have scientific accuracy due to the too many variables to take into consideration for every single field, but constitutes only a general orientation with regard to the interpretation of minority protection. The analysis of existing standard show that both countries actually have a relatively good protection system, although significant differences can be noted amongst different fields. The third present the results of a small scale survey conducted through questionnaires. The survey has been limited to two minorities for each country: one minority which enjoys the status of autochthonous in both countries, i.e. the Roma; and two minorities, the Tornedalian - Finnish one in Sweden and the Hungarian one in Slovenia, which present some common characteristics – first of all being a border minority - and appear therefore comparable. The aim is to identify the perception of protection by submitting some structured questionnaires to the members of these minorities through a kind of snowball method (in particular, a respondent – driven sampling), in order to find out any discrepancy between the policy goals and the everyday life level and compare the level of protection not only on theoretical but also on practical base. In particular, the questionnaire investigates opinions about the following topics: perceived protection in the field of use of language; perceived protection in the field of education; perceived protection in the field of political participation and representation; perceived protection in the field of cultural life; perceived protection in the field of media and information; perceived protection in the field of cross – border cooperation with the mother state (or with the communities in other states in the case of Roma); overall perceived protection; perceived position of the minority in comparison to the majority; perceived inequality of rights in comparison to the majority and the other minorities. It was not possible to collect a sufficient number of answers from all the protected minorities present in the countries due to the serious difficulties encountered in order to establish initial subjects who may be willing to cooperate and to the very low response rate. Some difficulties have been encountered also with regard to above mentioned minorities, i.e. the Roma, the Hungarians in Slovenia and the Tornedalian- Finnish in Sweden; however, they have shown a more collaborative spirit with regard to the present research. The survey carried out among the above mentioned minorities seems to suggest that the statement according to which both countries have a relatively good protection system has to be circumscribed: even though the overall protection appears as sufficient, the analysed national minorities seem not to be quite satisfied of the implementation of their minority rights. By contrast, Roma in both countries, in spite of having lower scores both at the theoretical and at the empirical level, seem to be relatively more satisfied about their rights. This may be due to the fact that national minorities are more conscious about the rights they should enjoy as historical minorities; whilst the Roma, although not being very satisfied about their condition either, consider the newly introduced laws and acts in their favour as an important progress. If the minorities taken into consideration give positive evaluation regarding certain fields of protection, the overall feeling of protection is not purely given by the sum of such fields but obviously include discretional elements which are more closely linked with a social dimension including the relationship with the majority, the status within the society, the perceived attention and importance given the minority issues by behalf of State policies. The research hypothesis has to be in the end further specified: all analysed minorities evaluate positively certain fields of protection, but surprisingly (of course with many differences among the various groups), when asked explicitly how much protected they feel as a minority, answers are less flattering: in certain sectors they feel indeed excluded from the majority society. The initial research hypothesis appears therefore to be only partly confirmed: from the analysis results the emergence of a hierarchic model with regard to the treatment of national minorities, which is likely to create new boundaries and tensions among the various national minorities, the national minorities and other minorities which did not receive recognition and different subgroups within the same minority. ; XXIV Ciclo

Tucked between Moldova and southwestern Ukraine is Transnistria, a Russian-backed separatist entity. Officially known as the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic, many describe this statelet as a Soviet time capsule. Transnistria's capital, Tiraspol, is filled with Lenin statues, Soviet era architecture, and streets named after Karl Marx and famous Soviets while the Transnistrian flag features a hammer and sickle. Existing within Moldova's internationally recognized borders, no U.N. member-state recognizes this breakaway republic's independence — not even Russia.Amid the USSR's implosion in the early 1990s, Russian-speaking separatists in Transnistria feared growing Moldovan nationalism and the possibility of Moldova, which had just declared independence, reunifying with Romania. Russian troops and Cossack fighters helped Transnistrian paramilitary groups fight Moldovan forces in the Transnistria War (1990-92), which killed up to 700 people.To this day the conflict remains frozen. Since 1992, officials in Moldova's capital, Chișinău, and Tiraspol have prevented military clashes. Over the past three decades, the Moldova-Transnistria file has not concerned Washington too much. That is until recently.

Peter Hermes Furian via shutterstock.comRussia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 raised concerns about this frozen conflict unfreezing. Given that 1,500 Russian soldiers have been present in Transnistria as "peacekeepers" and as part of the Operative Group of the Russian Troops since the 1990-92 war, some analysts warned of Transnistria opening a second front against Kyiv while intensifying pressure on Chișinău. Such a scenario would risk Romania, which is linguistically, ethnically, historically, and culturally tied to Moldova, clashing with Russia — a high-stakes confrontation considering Romania's NATO membership.In April 2022, the acting commander of Russia's Central Military District announced that Moscow sought to form a land bridge linking the Donbass to Transnistria. Doing so would have expanded the Ukraine war into Moldova's internationally recognized borders and cut the Kyiv government off from access to the Black Sea, landlocking Ukraine.Yet, Ukrainian forces prevented Russia from seizing Odessa and other parts of the would-be Donbass-Transnistria land bridge. Consequently, concerns in the West about Transnistria vis-à-vis the Ukraine war eased.Last month, however, Tiraspol asked Russia for protection from the perceived threat posed by Moldova's pro-EU government. In response to this call for Moscow's protection, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Chișinău was "following in the footsteps of the Kyiv regime" by "canceling everything Russian" and "discriminating against the Russian language."On March 17, a drone hit a military site in Transnistria, destroying a helicopter, which according to Moldova's Bureau for Reintegration Policies "has not worked for several years," and ignited a fire. Authorities in Tiraspol claimed that the Ukrainians waged this attack from Odessa. Both Kyiv and Chișinău denied any involvement in the military site explosion. The Ukrainian government accused Moscow of being behind this "provocation in Transnistria with a kamikaze drone attack on a military base."Adding to this tension is the fact that on that same day a man threw two Molotov cocktails at the Russian embassy in Chișinău. At the time, Russian citizens in Moldova were at this diplomatic mission voting in their country's presidential election. Moldovan authorities detained the individual, who was identified as a dual Moldovan-Russian citizen.As of writing, the public has not been provided with any evidence to substantiate Tiraspol's claims about Kyiv being behind the attack on the helicopter. If Ukraine carried it out, perhaps it was Kyiv's warning to Moscow about the dangers of making any bold moves vis-à-vis Moldova-Transnistria in response to Tiraspol's request for Russian protection from the U.S.- and EU- backed government in Chișinău. However, it is important to again stress that Ukraine's responsibility for this episode has not been proven.Meanwhile, some experts maintain that if Russia prevails in Ukraine, Moldova would be the next Eastern European country that Moscow attacks. "[Russia] has long used Transnistria and the separatists there, just like the ones in Donbass, as instruments to keep Moldova off balance and there are many other ways that Russia has destabilized, or tried to destabilize, Moldova," Matthew Bryza, the former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia, told RS."But Russia has no ability now to invade Moldova. Yes, it has a military base there. But I think Russia has enough on its plate right now in Ukraine and…unless it prevails Ukraine, it won't do something similar in Moldova. But if it does succeed in Ukraine, I fear Moldova would be next," added Bryza. However, the former U.S. diplomat emphasized that he does not expect Moscow to prevail in Ukraine.A Russian invasion of Moldova-Transnistria does not currently seem to be an option for the Kremlin. Transnistria, unlike Ukraine and Georgia, does not border Russia and Moscow lacks the manpower to take control of the Ukrainian regions of Mykolaiv and Odessa. Nikola Mikovic, a Belgrade-based political analyst, does not believe that Russia could do in Moldova-Transnistria what it did in Ukraine beginning in 2014."Under the current circumstances, when Russia has a hard time capturing villages around Avdiivka in the Donbass, seizing Odessa is extremely unlikely to happen. Therefore, Russia does not have capacity to turn Moldova-Transnistria into its 'next target,' while Chișinău, firmly backed by the West, can destabilize the breakaway region at any time," Mikovic told RS.Although difficult to predict how a second Donald Trump administration would respond to Russian moves on Moldova-Transnistria, it can probably be taken for granted that the Biden White House would strongly back Chișinău under such circumstances. "It's simply not possible with any degree of accuracy to predict now how the Biden administration would react if Russia invaded Moldova…other than the obvious which is there'd be strong U.S. support for Moldova and probably military assistance," said Bryza."Moldova occupies an important geopolitical location on the borders of NATO and the EU, and NATO is very concerned about checking any potential Russian expansion westward. Also, it would not bode well for Ukraine if it were suddenly to face even a small number of Russian troops attacking it from the west," John Feffer, the director of Foreign Policy in Focus, told RS."So, Moldova might become like Quemoy and Matsu, the tiny islands that Beijing tried to seize in the Taiwan Strait in 1958. Taiwan, like Ukraine, was the ultimate prize, but the islands were steppingstones, and the U.S. was determined to defend the little islands at all costs," added Feffer.Geography limits Russia's means to maneuver vis-à-vis Transnistria. Thus, keeping the Chișinău-Tiraspol conflict frozen best serves Russia's interests. Leveraging groups in Moldova with pro-Moscow sentiments such as the Gagauz minority to possibly change the government in Chișinău is a card which the Kremlin might possibly try to play. Either option could help Moscow further its agenda of preventing Moldova, which became an EU candidate in June 2022, from integrating into Western institutions, chiefly NATO."Russia wants to secure the perimeter of the 'Russian world.' But that doesn't have to be a firm border. It will be content to establish a zone of fragmentation that encompasses Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova and that serves as a kind of moat to protect fortress Russia. This is not a reconstruction of the Soviet Union. It's not a bid to confront NATO directly. But it nevertheless exacts enormous costs on the people of those fragmented countries," offered Feffer.To preserve the status quo in Moldova-Transnistria, "the Kremlin will almost certainly have to continue making behind-the-scenes concessions to the West and Ukraine," commented Mikovic. "For instance, it's entirely possible that Moscow provided 'security guarantees' to Kyiv that it will not strike the so-called decision-making centers in the Ukrainian capital, in exchange for Ukraine's passive approach regarding Transnistria."The Serbian expert on Russian foreign policy noted that at any time NATO could coordinate with Kyiv to enable Moldova to bring Transnistria under Chișinău's control through force. "For me, it's a big mystery why Western policy makers and strategic planners have still not taken such an action," Mikovic told RS.A major win for Washington would be an unfreezing of the Moldova-Transnistria conflict with a potential joint Ukrainian-Moldovan operation defeating the Moscow-backed separatists. Yet, even if the West would back Kyiv and Chișinău in pursuit of such an outcome, there are no indicators that Moldova is considering such a military solution to this frozen conflict."For the foreseeable future, Chișinău will likely continue putting economic pressure on Tiraspol, aiming to weaken the breakaway region's de facto independence, and force it to reintegrate into Moldova," said Mikovic. "In the long-term, though, a military conflict should not be ruled out."

The swift approval of Ukraine and Moldova's candidate country status revived the question of EU accession for the Western Balkans. It has been 20 years since the Thessaloniki declaration promised an EU perspective for the region, with limited progress—the latest being Bosnia and Herzegovina's candidate status in December 2022. In the past months, the region has received significant high-level attention. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited the Western Balkans in October; last week, EU leaders met for another summit with their Western Balkan counterparts. These are all symbolic acts to show commitment to the region's future in the EU. However, the latest enlargement progress reports from the European Commission show little progress by these aspirant countries on much-needed reforms. While the European Council gives the green light to accession negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova, the EU continues to struggle to find ways to keep the accession momentum going in the Western Balkans.All Quiet on the Western Balkans FrontIn November, the European Commission released its latest enlargement "package"— individual reports assessing the progress of EU candidate countries. The six Western Balkan countries are all at different stages of the (pre-)accession process. What they have in common is rather slow progress on reforms. The most "advanced" in the process, Montenegro and Serbia, have failed to provisionally close new chapters for several years now. The accusations of electoral fraud in Serbia's snap elections on December 17–the second such elections since April 2022–show concerning developments for its path to EU membership. Similarly, Montenegro's several years of domestic political instability has made progress difficult. However, the newly formed government has put EU accession at the forefront of its foreign policy priorities, returning some optimism for Montenegro to continue, as President von der Leyen stated, being "the most advanced Western Balkan country on the EU accession path."When it comes to Albania and North Macedonia—again borrowing the European Commission's assessment scale—"limited to some progress" best describes the situation. Both countries recently concluded screening meetings, a step forward on their accession paths. However, the next stage, opening and closing chapters, is a very technical and arduous process, often affected by internal European Council dynamics. Case in point: North Macedonia needs to once again amend its constitution to recognize the Bulgarian minority in order to continue to the next phase of negotiations.The Commission's apparent membership boost for Bosnia and Herzegovina was seen as a success. But the devil is in the details. Opening negotiations is conditioned upon the fulfillment of 14 key priorities from 2019 with limited progress shown in the latest report. The Friends of the Western Balkans group has argued the recommendation and the stamp of approval by the European Council, to open negotiations would be a much-needed political signal to Bosnia's future in the EU. However, at its December summit, the European Council endorsed the position of the Commission—another revision of Bosnia's progress is scheduled for March 2024. Significant progress in such a short time is unfortunately wishful thinking, especially considering the current domestic political polarization. Kosovo remains an aspiring candidate country and in the most precarious position, as it is still not recognized by five EU member states. While it has passed some meaningful electoral and judicial reforms, the recent tensions in the north of Kosovo that culminated in the Banjska attack on September 24, 2023 have stalled progress in normalizing relations with Serbia—essential for moving further down the EU path. How the EU Plans to Bring the Process Back to Life?Lack of progress in bringing the Western Balkans closer to the EU have increased calls for a different, more proactive approach. In her speech at the GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum in May 2023, President von der Leyen stated that the EU has finally realized "it is not enough to wait for countries to move closer to the EU, the EU also needs to take responsibility to bring these countries closer". She announced a new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, on top of the already existing Economic and Investment Plan from 2020. At October's meeting of the Berlin Process in Tirana, Albania, von der Leyen further delineated the structure and purpose of the plan. The four-pillar plan envisages boosting integration into the Single Market and within a common regional market, as well as further incentivizing fundamental reforms through increased financial assistance (2 million euros in grants and 4 million euros in loans).President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen at the GLOBSEC 2023 Bratislava Forum, May 31, 2023.Image CreditAlthough currently only a proposal, the Commission argues the Growth Plan is the way to push forward the enlargement momentum in the Western Balkans. The foreseen progressive integration into the Single Market and the establishment of a fully functional regional market would be key drivers of growth, as well as fundamental reforms. This would translate to concrete deliverables of EU integration for the people—much needed, as EU membership is becoming less and less feasible in the eyes of many in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, "by incentivizing countries to accelerate the adoption and implementation of the acquis", this would also accelerate the accession process itself.While a welcome additional tool, the Growth Plan alone cannot be a changemaker. The four pillars are all intertwined, meaning Single Market access is dependent on implementing fundamental reforms, as well as the common regional market (CRM). In theory, such conditionality makes sense, as it encourages regional cooperation and an increased pace of EU-related reforms. However, after years of ambiguity and unfulfilled commitments, it is not surprising regional leaders did not greet more conditionality with open arms. The Prime Minister of North Macedonia, Bujar Osmani, stated that 6 billion euros for 6 countries is not enough to address the core issue of integration—the ever-growing socio-economic convergence gap. The rather lukewarm responses to the plan therefore raise questions about its potential to incentivize reforms and re-energize the accession process in the region.The EU Wants YouOn December 13, the eve before the European Council Summit, EU leaders met their Western Balkan counterparts. The meeting tried to reassure the leaders that the enlargement momentum is alive and kicking in the Western Balkans, while trying to fend off claims of 'favoritism' towards Eastern partners–Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. After Bosnia and Herzegovina failed to receive a straightforward Commission recommendation on opening accession talks, Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg warned that the EU cannot "glance at some candidates with rose-colored glasses while examining others thoroughly with a magnifying glass". This is part of an ongoing debate on the perceived unequal treatment of Western Balkan candidate countries compared to Ukraine and Moldova. According to Schallenberg, if the EU favors Ukraine over the Western Balkans, this could end in a "geostrategic disaster".The EU-Western Balkans Summit happened with little fanfare or media attention, compared to the later meeting of the European Council that saw the announcement of major progress for Ukraine and Moldova's EU journey. The same goes for the adopted Brussels Declaration, with several parts of the text being almost a carbon copy of last year's Tirana Declaration. Its significance, however, is that it anchors the role of gradual integration to bring the region closer to the EU—later also confirmed in the Council conclusions. All eggs for gradual integration of Western Balkans are currently in one basket—the Growth Plan. However, the declaration also calls for the EU "to explore additional measures aimed at further advancing gradual integration". With the Commission's mandate ending in June 2024, it is difficult to see meaningful progress coming from its side any time soon. However, member states, such as France, Germany, Portugal, and the Friends of the Western Balkans group, have all put forth proposals on ways to advance gradual integration. This puts the ball in the Belgium Presidency's court to keep this political momentum going.The EU has often blamed lack of progress on the stringent merit-based process and lack of "strong political determination" from Western Balkan leaders to adopt tough reforms. Oftentimes, however, enlargement progress has been stalled due to the EU's lack of willingness to move forward. There is no doubt that Western Balkan countries need to do their part in advancing reforms, which some may not do. There is no fast-track option for EU membership. But years of enlargement fatigue have left their mark on the credibility of the enlargement process. The EU therefore needs to work on mitigating the effects of its internal disunity, as much as advancing gradual integration. Only by doing so will the EU be able to rebuild the necessary credibility of the process, where reform progress is rewarded, and hopefully inject some much needed energy into integrating the Western Balkans into the EU.

The swift approval of Ukraine and Moldova's candidate country status revived the question of EU accession for the Western Balkans. It has been 20 years since the Thessaloniki declaration promised an EU perspective for the region, with limited progress—the latest being Bosnia and Herzegovina's candidate status in December 2022. In the past months, the region has received significant high-level attention. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited the Western Balkans in October; last week, EU leaders met for another summit with their Western Balkan counterparts. These are all symbolic acts to show commitment to the region's future in the EU. However, the latest enlargement progress reports from the European Commission show little progress by these aspirant countries on much-needed reforms. While the European Council gives the green light to accession negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova, the EU continues to struggle to find ways to keep the accession momentum going in the Western Balkans.All Quiet on the Western Balkans FrontIn November, the European Commission released its latest enlargement "package"— individual reports assessing the progress of EU candidate countries. The six Western Balkan countries are all at different stages of the (pre-)accession process. What they have in common is rather slow progress on reforms. The most "advanced" in the process, Montenegro and Serbia, have failed to provisionally close new chapters for several years now. The accusations of electoral fraud in Serbia's snap elections on December 17–the second such elections since April 2022–show concerning developments for its path to EU membership. Similarly, Montenegro's several years of domestic political instability has made progress difficult. However, the newly formed government has put EU accession at the forefront of its foreign policy priorities, returning some optimism for Montenegro to continue, as President von der Leyen stated, being "the most advanced Western Balkan country on the EU accession path."When it comes to Albania and North Macedonia—again borrowing the European Commission's assessment scale—"limited to some progress" best describes the situation. Both countries recently concluded screening meetings, a step forward on their accession paths. However, the next stage, opening and closing chapters, is a very technical and arduous process, often affected by internal European Council dynamics. Case in point: North Macedonia needs to once again amend its constitution to recognize the Bulgarian minority in order to continue to the next phase of negotiations.The Commission's apparent membership boost for Bosnia and Herzegovina was seen as a success. But the devil is in the details. Opening negotiations is conditioned upon the fulfillment of 14 key priorities from 2019 with limited progress shown in the latest report. The Friends of the Western Balkans group has argued the recommendation and the stamp of approval by the European Council, to open negotiations would be a much-needed political signal to Bosnia's future in the EU. However, at its December summit, the European Council endorsed the position of the Commission—another revision of Bosnia's progress is scheduled for March 2024. Significant progress in such a short time is unfortunately wishful thinking, especially considering the current domestic political polarization. Kosovo remains an aspiring candidate country and in the most precarious position, as it is still not recognized by five EU member states. While it has passed some meaningful electoral and judicial reforms, the recent tensions in the north of Kosovo that culminated in the Banjska attack on September 24, 2023 have stalled progress in normalizing relations with Serbia—essential for moving further down the EU path. How the EU Plans to Bring the Process Back to Life?Lack of progress in bringing the Western Balkans closer to the EU have increased calls for a different, more proactive approach. In her speech at the GLOBSEC Bratislava Forum in May 2023, President von der Leyen stated that the EU has finally realized "it is not enough to wait for countries to move closer to the EU, the EU also needs to take responsibility to bring these countries closer". She announced a new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, on top of the already existing Economic and Investment Plan from 2020. At October's meeting of the Berlin Process in Tirana, Albania, von der Leyen further delineated the structure and purpose of the plan. The four-pillar plan envisages boosting integration into the Single Market and within a common regional market, as well as further incentivizing fundamental reforms through increased financial assistance (2 million euros in grants and 4 million euros in loans).President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen at the GLOBSEC 2023 Bratislava Forum, May 31, 2023.Image CreditAlthough currently only a proposal, the Commission argues the Growth Plan is the way to push forward the enlargement momentum in the Western Balkans. The foreseen progressive integration into the Single Market and the establishment of a fully functional regional market would be key drivers of growth, as well as fundamental reforms. This would translate to concrete deliverables of EU integration for the people—much needed, as EU membership is becoming less and less feasible in the eyes of many in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, "by incentivizing countries to accelerate the adoption and implementation of the acquis", this would also accelerate the accession process itself.While a welcome additional tool, the Growth Plan alone cannot be a changemaker. The four pillars are all intertwined, meaning Single Market access is dependent on implementing fundamental reforms, as well as the common regional market (CRM). In theory, such conditionality makes sense, as it encourages regional cooperation and an increased pace of EU-related reforms. However, after years of ambiguity and unfulfilled commitments, it is not surprising regional leaders did not greet more conditionality with open arms. The Prime Minister of North Macedonia, Bujar Osmani, stated that 6 billion euros for 6 countries is not enough to address the core issue of integration—the ever-growing socio-economic convergence gap. The rather lukewarm responses to the plan therefore raise questions about its potential to incentivize reforms and re-energize the accession process in the region.The EU Wants YouOn December 13, the eve before the European Council Summit, EU leaders met their Western Balkan counterparts. The meeting tried to reassure the leaders that the enlargement momentum is alive and kicking in the Western Balkans, while trying to fend off claims of 'favoritism' towards Eastern partners–Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. After Bosnia and Herzegovina failed to receive a straightforward Commission recommendation on opening accession talks, Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg warned that the EU cannot "glance at some candidates with rose-colored glasses while examining others thoroughly with a magnifying glass". This is part of an ongoing debate on the perceived unequal treatment of Western Balkan candidate countries compared to Ukraine and Moldova. According to Schallenberg, if the EU favors Ukraine over the Western Balkans, this could end in a "geostrategic disaster".The EU-Western Balkans Summit happened with little fanfare or media attention, compared to the later meeting of the European Council that saw the announcement of major progress for Ukraine and Moldova's EU journey. The same goes for the adopted Brussels Declaration, with several parts of the text being almost a carbon copy of last year's Tirana Declaration. Its significance, however, is that it anchors the role of gradual integration to bring the region closer to the EU—later also confirmed in the Council conclusions. All eggs for gradual integration of Western Balkans are currently in one basket—the Growth Plan. However, the declaration also calls for the EU "to explore additional measures aimed at further advancing gradual integration". With the Commission's mandate ending in June 2024, it is difficult to see meaningful progress coming from its side any time soon. However, member states, such as France, Germany, Portugal, and the Friends of the Western Balkans group, have all put forth proposals on ways to advance gradual integration. This puts the ball in the Belgium Presidency's court to keep this political momentum going.The EU has often blamed lack of progress on the stringent merit-based process and lack of "strong political determination" from Western Balkan leaders to adopt tough reforms. Oftentimes, however, enlargement progress has been stalled due to the EU's lack of willingness to move forward. There is no doubt that Western Balkan countries need to do their part in advancing reforms, which some may not do. There is no fast-track option for EU membership. But years of enlargement fatigue have left their mark on the credibility of the enlargement process. The EU therefore needs to work on mitigating the effects of its internal disunity, as much as advancing gradual integration. Only by doing so will the EU be able to rebuild the necessary credibility of the process, where reform progress is rewarded, and hopefully inject some much needed energy into integrating the Western Balkans into the EU.

In telecommunication sector, the term Access Control (AC) was defined in the standard from 1997 and included multiple meanings, one of which is used in this context: Access Control is the function performed by the resource controller that allocates system resources in order to satisfy (user) requests. In this context, the resources are: (i) Internet Protocol (IP) (RFC0791) connectivity from a Fifth Generation Wireless (5G) Core Network and (ii) communication to dynamically spawned Machine to Machine (M2M) Applications server instances. At a functional level, the mobile networks communication stratum can be separated into three distinct planes and the associated type of components, as defined by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in the Technical Report from 2004: (i) Data Plane - components which transfer the data between the different entities, (ii) Control Plane - components which control the operation of the specific layer entities and the support components and (iii) Management Plane - components used to manage the specific layer entities and the support components. Following the Next Generation Mobile Networks (NGMN) list of 5G system requirements, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) is in the process of standardizing the 5G system core network architecture. In more details, the resulting 5G system architecture is the first mobile core network architecture having the Control Plane and Data Plane handled by different components. The management plane resides in multiple components that handle policies for access control or detect malfunctions. In the architecture the component interfacing with the applications was already included in the core network of Long Term Evolution (LTE), called Evolved Packet Core (EPC), and is now transcending an increase of exposed capabilities. Application Area: Machine to Machine Applications One of the application areas supported by 5G is Machine to Machine (M2M) communication. In recent years the M2M technologies have reached a certain level of acceptance due to sensors, actuators and other smart devices communication flexibility increase and affordability, making the M2M deployment attractive in several domains like eHealth, Environmental monitoring, Smart metering, Automotive and transport, Agriculture, Manufacturing. Research Issue: Limited M2M specific Access Control At the same time, the concepts of (i) Network Function Virtualization (NFV), in which network components become software based and dynamically spawned by NFV Management and Orchestration (NFV MANO) components, and (ii) Software Defined Networking (SDN), introducing the concepts of controller and switch for separating the control plane from data plane, have revolutionized the networking by introducing flexibility and complexity. As these concepts are adopted by standards like 3rd Generation Partnership Project and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the interest is to make use of the full power of the technology and scale the infrastructures dynamically according to the needs and keeping the communication across the devices, the network and service instances reliable. Solutions using IP pools for service instance allocation are only suitable for communication paradigms like request-response, thus not suitable for state-full services using sessions. The Access Control between M2M device and Server across multiple Server instances and multiple 5G Core Network instances (also known as Slices) requires a higher level approach for enabling trustworthy and dynamic coupling of M2M communication peers. Own Approach: M2M Device Management deeply linked to 5G Slice Components There are several protocols defined for Device Management, e.g. Open Mobile Alliance Lightweight M2M and Broadband Forum (BF) Technical Report 069 (TR-069), in which a device management server can monitor the registered devices status (battery lifetime, logs, connectivity). The solution proposed here extends such a protocol for enabling access control of M2M infrastructures. The solution has three types of access control. The first one is related to service instance information allocation with the device management server making use of knowledge on the dynamically deployed instances of M2M Application Servers and sending recommendations to the M2M device on the available instances. The second one is the trustful bootstrap of M2M devices so that the devices are managed by new management servers when they are performing handover between 5G slices. The third one refers to connectivity management and consists of increasing the flexibility of the core network subscriber information server in order to enable dynamically allocated subscriber information on devices that join the M2M infrastructure. Scientific Contributions The main contribution of this work is the specification of a Cross-Layer Access Control Framework for M2M Infrastructures using 5G Core Networks by interconnecting the Management Plane of the M2M Communication and the one of the Mobile Core Networks for Trustful Handover of the M2M devices between Security Domains that are running on Core Network Slices. The concept and design of the prototype implementation address common requirements from different M2M vertical domains and are general enough to be further used in other ones. The performance evaluation of the associated components and comparison with other academic, open-source and industry-owned solutions provides a perspective of the future suitability. Validation and Outlook The work has been validated and evaluated within several European Union granted projects as well as one industry funded project. The interoperability and performance have been evaluated. The implementation is part of the Fraunhofer FOKUS Open5GMTC toolkit, an extension for M2M application domain of the Open5GCore toolkit, and acts as basis for future research and development projects. ; In der Telekommunikation Bereich wurde der Begriff Zugangskontrolle (AC) in der Norm von 1997 definiert und umfasste mehrere Bedeutungen, von denen eine im vorliegenden Kontext verwendet wird: Zugangskontrolle ist die Funktion ausgeführt vom Ressourcenkontrolleur, der teilt die Systemressourcen zur Befriedigung von (Nutzer-)Anfragen. In vorliegenden Kontext sind die Ressourcen: (i) die Internetprotokoll(IP) -konnektivität, bereitgestellt von einem drahtlosen Kernnetz der fünften Generation (5G Fifth Generation Wireless Core Network) und (ii) die Kommunikation mit dynamisch erzeugten Maschine-Maschine(M2M)-Anwendungsserverinstanzen. In funktionaler Hinsicht kann die Schicht der mobilen Kommunikationsnetze in drei klar voneinander abgegrenzte Ebenen einschließlich der dazugehörigen funktionalen Komponenten gemäß Definition durch die Internationale Fernmeldeunion (ITU) unterteilt werden: (i) die Datenebene - Komponenten, die die Daten zwischen den verschiedenen Einheiten übertragen, (ii) die Steuerungsebene - Komponenten, die den Betrieb der Einheiten der einzelnen Schichten und der unterstützenden Komponenten steuern und (iii) die Verwaltungsebene - Komponenten, die zur Verwaltung der Einheiten der einzelnen Schichten und der unterstützenden Komponenten verwendet werden. Ausgehend von der vom Verband Next Generation Mobile Networks (NGMN) aufgestellten Liste der Anforderungen an ein 5G-System arbeitet das 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) daran, die Architektur des 5G-Kernnetzes zu standardisieren. Genauer gesagt ist die sich ergebende 5G-Systemarchitektur die erste Architektur für Kernnetze der mobilen Kommunikation, bei der die Steuerungsebene und die Datenebene in unterschiedlichen Komponenten angesiedelt sind. Die Verwaltungsebene ist auf verschiedene Komponenten verteilt, die für Zugangskontrolle verantwortlich sind oder Fehlfunktionen feststellen. In der Architektur war die Komponente, die über Schnittstellen mit den Anwendungen verfügte, schon unter der Bezeichnung Evolved Packet Core (EPC) im Kernnetz des Long-Term-Evolution (LTE)-Netzes angelegt und zeigt jetzt eine Zunahme an Fähigkeiten. Anwendungsbereich: Maschine-Maschine-Anwendungen Einer der Anwendungsbereiche von 5G ist die Kommunikation Maschine-Maschine (M2M). In jüngster Zeit haben M2M-Technologien eine gewisse Akzeptanz erlangt, da die Kommunikation von Sensoren, Betätigungselementen und anderen smarten Geräten flexibler und erschwinglicher wurde, so dass die Nutzung von M2M in verschiedenen Bereichen wie dem Gesundheitswesen, Umweltmonitoring, Smarte Verbrauchszähler, Autoverkehr und Transportwesen, Landwirtschaft, Fertigungsindustrie immer attraktiver wird. Forschungsthema: Beschränkte spezifische M2M-Zugangskontrolle Gleichzeitig haben die Konzepte der (i) Virtualisierung von Netzfunktionen (NFV), bei der Netzwerkbestandteile auf Software beruhen und dynamisch von NFV-Verwaltungs- und Steuerungskomponenten (NFV-MANO-Komponenten)erzeugt werden, sowie (ii) software-basierten Netzwerken (Software Defined Networking (SDN)), bei denen die Konzepte von Steuerung und Schalter für die Trennung der Steuerungsebene von der Datenebene eingeführt wurden, die Netzkommunikation revolutioniert, indem sie Flexibilität und Komplexität in sie einführten. Aufgrund der Übernahme dieser Konzepte durch Standardisierungsorganisationen wie 3GPP und das Europäische Institut für Telekommunikationsnormen (ETSI) besteht Interesse daran, diese Technologien in vollem Umfang nutzen zu können und die Infrastruktur entsprechend der Bedarfsentwicklung dynamisch auszubauen sowie für eine zuverlässige Kommunikation zwischen den Geräten, dem Netz und den Dienstinstanzen zu sorgen. Lösungen, bei denen IP-Pools für die Zuweisung von Dienstinstanzen genutzt werden, sind nur bei Gültigkeit von Kommunikationsparadigmen wie Anfrage-Antwort geeignet und können daher nicht für statusbetonte Dienste, die mittels Sessions abgewickelt werden, angewandt werden. Die Zugangskontrolle zwischen M2M-Gerät und Server über mehrere Server-Instanzen und 5G-Kernnetzinstanzen (auch als Slices bezeichnet) erfordern einen Ansatz auf einem höheren Niveau, um eine vertrauenswürdige und dynamische Kopplung von M2M-Kommunikationsteilnehmern zu ermöglichen. Eigener Ansatz: M2M-Geräteverwaltung eng verknüpft mit 5G-Slice-Komponenten Es gibt mehrere Protokolle für Geräteverwaltung, z.B. Offen Mobile Allianz (OMA) Lightweight M2M und Breitband Forum (BF) Technicher Berichrt 069 (TR-069), bei denen ein Geräteverwaltungsserver den Status der registrierten Geräte (Batterielebensdauer, Logs, Konnektivität) überwachen kann. Die hier vorgeschlagene Lösung erweitert ein solches Protokoll in der Art, dass eine Zugangskontrolle von M2M-Infrastrukturkomponenten ermöglicht wird. Die Lösung bietet drei Arten von Zugangskontrolle. Die erste bezieht sich auf die Zuweisung von Dienstinstanz-Informationen, wobei der Geräteverwaltungsserver das in den dynamisch eingesetzten Instanzen der M2M-Anwendungsserver vorhandene Wissen nutzt und Empfehlungen über die vorhandenen Instanzen an der M2M-Geräte sendet. Die zweite ist das vertrauensvolle Bootstrapping der M2M-Geräte, so dass die Geräte von neuen Verwaltungsservern verwaltet werden, wenn sie eine Übergabe zwischen 5G-Slices ausführen. Die dritte bezieht sich auf das Konnektivitätsmanagement und besteht darin, dass die Flexibilität des Kernnetz-Teilnehmerinformationsservers erhöht wird, um eine dynamische Zuweisung von Teilnehmerinformationen auf Geräte, die in die M2M-Infrastruktur einbezogen werden, zu ermöglichen. Wissenschaftliche Beiträge Der Hauptbeitrag dieser Arbeit besteht in der Spezifizierung eines schichtenübergreifenden Zugangskontrollrahmens für M2M-Infrastrukturen mittels 5G-Kernnetze durch verbinden der Verwaltungsebene der M2M-Kommunikation mit der des mobilen Kernnetzes für die geschützte Übergabe der M2M-Geräte zwischen den Sicherheitsdomänen, die innerhalb der Kernnetz-Slices betrieben werden. Konzept und Auslegung der Prototyp-Umsetzung behandeln gemeinsame Anforderungen unterschiedlicher vertikaler M2M-Domänen und sind allgemein genug gehalten, um auch für andere verwendet werden zu können. Die Beurteilung der Leistung der eingebundenen Komponenten und ein Vergleich mit anderen Lösungen, die von wissenschaftlichen Einrichtungen, Open-Source-Anbietern und der Industrie angeboten werden, liefert eine Vorstellung von ihrer Zukunftsfähigkeit. Validierung und Ausblick Die Arbeit wurde im Rahmen mehrerer von der Europäischen Union geförderter Projekte sowie einem von der Industrie finanzierten Projekt validiert und bewertet. Es fand eine Auswertung der Interoperabilität und Leistung statt. Die Umsetzung ist Teil des Fraunhofer-FOKUS-Open5GMTC-Toolkits, der entwickelt als Erweiterung des Open5GCore-Toolkits für die M2M-Anwendungsdomäne würde und dient als Grundlage für künftige Forschungs- und Entwicklungsprojekte.

Hunger ist nach wie vor ein weit verbreitetes Problem. Nach der jüngsten Schätzung der FAO hungern weltweit noch immer über 800 Mio. Menschen. Prognosen gehen davon aus, dass die Agrarproduktion bis 2050 verdoppelt werden muss, um der steigenden Nachfrage nach Agrarprodukten durch Bevölkerungswachstum, Bioenergieproduktion und sich verändernde Ernährungsgewohnheiten zu begegnen. Unter vielen Möglichkeiten, das Welternährungsproblem zu beschreiben, wird in dieser Dissertation das Konzept der Ernährungssicherheit nach der Definition der FAO herangezogen. Ernährungssicherheit umfasst als wichtigste Aspekte die Verfügbarkeit von Nahrungsmitteln und den ökonomischen Zugang zu Nahrungsmitteln. Nahrungsmittelverfügbarkeit ist in erster Linie von einer global ausreichenden Produktion abhängig, der Zugang zu Nahrung von der Kaufkraft der Haushalte. Die Kaufkraft wird sowohl durch das Einkommen wie auch die Agrarpreise beeinflusst. Die Nahrungsmittelverfügbarkeit kann vor allem durch Ertragssteigerungen erhöht werden. Sollen die Ertragssteigerungen ressourcenschonend erfolgen, muss die Produktivität der Agrarproduktion bezogen auf alle Produktionsfaktoren inkl. Umweltgütern steigen. Nur durch technische und organisatorische Innovation kann dies realisiert werden. Ertragssteigerungen in Entwicklungsländern erhöhen gleichzeitig die Einkommen von potenziell von Hunger Betroffenen. Eine Begrenzung der Nachfrage nach Agrargütern kann global in erster Linie in den Bereichen Bioenergie und Konsum tierischer Produkte erfolgen. Simulationen können helfen, den Einfluss einzelner Faktoren der globalen Nachfrage und des Angebots nach Agrarrohstoffen und -produkten auf die Welternährungslage genauer abzuschätzen. Ein Großteil der Simulationen in der Literatur kommt mithilfe von partiellen oder allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodellen zu Aussagen über gehandelte Mengen und Preise oder Wohlfahrtseffekte. In dieser Arbeit wird ein einfaches partielles Gleichgewichtsmodell für den Weltmarkt für Biotreibstoffe, Fleisch und Getreide entwickelt und mit der Methode der FAO zur Schätzung der Zahl der Hungernden gekoppelt. Dies ermöglicht die Abschätzung des Einflusses verschiedener Szenarien auf die Zahl der Hungernden. Für das Referenzjahr 2011 werden Szenarien alternativer Nachfrage nach Fleisch und Biotreibstoffen simuliert, ebenso wie ein Szenario alternativer landwirtschaftlicher Produktivität in der Europäischen Union. Die Schätzungen ergeben einen signifikanten Einfluss der simulierten Nachfrage- und Angebotsverschiebungen. Im Vergleich mit dem Status Quo führt eine Reduktion des Fleischkonsums in den OECD-Ländern um 50% zu einer Reduktion der Zahl der Hungernden um 5%. Eine ii Flächenproduktivität im Getreideanbau in der EU auf dem Niveau von 1980 steigert die Zahl der Hungernden um mehr als 5%, ein Anstieg der Biotreibstoffquote in der OECD auf 10% erhöht die Zahl der Hungernden gar um 10%. Die Durchsetzung geeigneter politischer Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Welternährungslage kann durch eine breite öffentliche Unterstützung beschleunigt oder erst ermöglicht werden. Über die öffentliche Meinung zu Fragen der Welternährung in Deutschland existieren bisher keine expliziten Studien. In den Themenbereichen landwirtschaftliche Produktion und Nahrungsmittelkonsum stellt das Thema Welternährung nur einen Aspekt dar, der neben Fragen nach z.B. der Lebensmittelsicherheit und Gesundheit sowie den Auswirkungen von Agrarproduktion auf Landschaft und Umwelt steht. Hier werden Ergebnisse einer Online-Befragung zum Thema Welternährung präsentiert, die im März 2012 mit einer repräsentativen Stichprobe 1.200 deutscher Internetnutzer durchgeführt wurde. Die Befragung beinhaltete im Wesentlichen die Bewertung der Wirkung verschiedener potenzieller Ursachen der weltweiten Unterernährung, sowie Maßnahmen und Entwicklungen zu ihrer Lösung. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass das Thema Welthunger in erster Linie mit Merkmalen akuter (Hunger-) Krisen in Verbindung gebracht wird. Die vielversprechendsten Lösungsmaßnahmen sind in den Augen der Befragten der Ausbau des Fairen Handels, Absatzmärkte für Kleinbauern sowie ein Lebensmittelspekulationsverbot. Der intensiven Landwirtschaft in der Welt wie auch in Europa sowie insbesondere der Grünen Gentechnik wird kein Potenzial zur Lösung des Problems zugesprochen. Die Antwortmuster lassen auf die Präsenz eines Halo-Effekts mit einer Übertragung unterstellter negativer Umweltwirkungen auf das Thema Welternährung schließen. Die Grüne Gentechnik ist eine Agrartechnologie, die potenziell zur Angebotsausweitung von Agrarprodukten genauso beitragen kann wie zu einer ressourcenschonenderen Landwirtschaft. Bisherige Anwendungen, hauptsächlich Herbizidtoleranz sowie Insektenresistenz, haben u.a. zu einer Steigerung der effektiven Erträge, einer Einsparung von Insektiziden und einer Steigerung der Profite vor allem im Baumwollanbau beigetragen. Trotz zahlreicher Belege besteht über die Auswirkungen von gentechnisch veränderten (GV) Nutzpflanzen eine anhaltende Kontroverse. Ein Großteil der europäischen Bevölkerung lehnt den Anbau ebenso ab wie einen Verzehr von Produkten aus GV-Pflanzen. Unterstellte sozio-ökonomische Auswirkungen oder Auswirkungen auf die Welternährung sind nur zwei Determinanten von vielen, die zu den Einstellungen zur Grünen Gentechnik beitragen. Zur Konsolidierung des Wissens im Bereich agronomischer sowie sozio-ökonomischer Auswirkungen von GV-Pflanzen wurde eine Meta-Analyse durchgeführt. In wissenschaftlichen Datenbanken wurden iii 147 Primärstudien identifiziert, die für die Meta-Analyse verwendet wurden. Die Analyse beschränkt sich auf gentechnisch veränderte Sojabohnen, Mais und Baumwolle. Als mittlere Effekte des Anbaus von GV-Pflanzen ergibt die Meta-Analyse eine Steigerung des Ertrages um 22%, eine Reduktion der Menge der angewendeten Pflanzenschutzmittel um 37% und eine Steigerung der Profite der Bauern um 68%. Die Höhe der Effekte hängt stark von verschiedenen Faktoren ab. Die Effekte sind für alle drei genannten Variablen in Entwicklungsländern betragsmäßig größer als in Industrieländern. Auch sind die Effekte des Anbaus von GV-Pflanzen bei Erträgen und beim Pflanzenschutzmitteleinsatz betragsmäßig höher für insektenresistente Pflanzen als bei solchen mit Herbizidtoleranz. Aus den in der Arbeit gewonnenen Erkenntnissen kann geschlussfolgert werden, dass sowohl das Nahrungsmittelangebot gesteigert als auch die Nachfrage begrenzt werden sollte. Dies verlangt eine standortangepasste Ausnutzung vorhandener und die Entwicklung neuer Technologien. Auch die Gentechnik kann einen Beitrag leisten. Der Kleinbauernsektor muss vordringlich gefördert werden. Zur Begrenzung der Nachfrage können neben der Politik, welche vor allem die Biotreibstoffnachfrage beeinflussen kann, auch Konsumenten durch Verzicht auf tierische Produkte beitragen. Dies wie auch die Durchführung effektiver politischer Maßnahmen sind auf eine unverzerrte Sichtweise der Öffentlichkeit auf das Thema Welternährung angewiesen. Dazu muss das Thema in Wissenschaftskommunikation und Bildung stärker thematisiert werden. ; Hunger is still a widespread problem. According to newest estimates of the FAO, more than 800 million people are not able to fulfil their basic dietary needs. Projections estimate that the global agricultural production will have to be doubled by 2050 to meet the growing demand driven by population growth, bioenergy, and changing dietary habits. Among many possible ways to describe the world hunger problem we choose the concept of food security according to the FAO. Food security is comprised of four pillars, the two first of which are food availability and the economic access to food. Food availability is mainly dependent on a sufficient global agricultural production; the access to food depends on the purchasing power of the households. The main determinants of purchasing power, in turn, are the household income as well as agricultural prices. Food availability can mainly be increased through an increase in agricultural yields. In order for the yield increases to be resource conserving, the productivity of all production factors including environmental resources must be enhanced. This can only be achieved through technical and organizational innovation. Yield gains in developing countries simultaneously increase the incomes of small scale farmers who are potentially in danger of undernutrition. A limitation to global demand for agricultural commodities can foremost be achieved in the domain of bioenergy and animal products. Simulations are a valid tool to assess the influence of certain factors of global demand and supply of agricultural commodities. In large parts, simulations use computer generated total or partial equilibrium models to assess shifts in quantities traded, prices, or welfare. In this dissertation, we develop a simple partial equilibrium model for the world market for biofuels, meat, and grains. This model is then connected to the FAO method for the estimation of the prevalence of undernutrition. This enables us to estimate the impact of different scenarios on the number of undernourished people in the world. For the year 2011, several scenarios with an alternative demand for meat or biofuels are simulated as well as one scenario with an alternative agricultural productivity in the European Union. The estimations show a significant effect of the simulated shifts in demand and supply. In comparison with the status quo, an OECD-wide reduction in meat consumption leads to a reduction in the number of undernourished people by 5%. A simulated land productivity in grain production in the EU at the level of 1980 leads to an increase in the number of undernourished people by 10%. In order for appropriate policies concerning the world food situation to be put in place, wide public support will be necessary. So far there exists no evidence about the public opinion concerning the problem of world hunger. In the areas of agriculture and food consumption, the issue of world food v security is only one side aspect within an array of issues as food safety and health, as well as the impacts of agriculture on landscapes and the environment. In this dissertation we present the results of an online survey concerning the issue of world hunger. The survey was carried out with a representative sample of 1,200 German internet users in March 2012. In the main parts of the survey, respondents were asked to rate different potential causes and remedies of the world hunger problem. The results show that the world hunger is mainly associated with attributes of famines and acute crises. In the view of the respondents, the most promising remedies to world hunger are an increase of Fair Trade, the creation of market outlets for smallholder farmers in developing countries, and the interdiction of speculation on agricultural commodities. Intensive agriculture in the world and also in Europe is not rated having any potential to improve world food security; the same holds true for GM (Genetically Modified) crops. The patterns of the responses suggest that there might be a halo effect whereby assumed negative consequences of intensive agriculture and genetic engineering are transmitted to the evaluation with respect to the issue of world hunger. Genetic engineering in agriculture is a technology that can potentially help increase agricultural production and also have resource-conserving effects. Current applications, mainly insect resistance and herbicide tolerance have, among others, led to an increase in effective yields, a reduction in the application of insecticides, and an increase in farmers' profits. Despite evidence from numerous studies there is still a high level of controversy regarding the impacts of GM crops. Large parts of the European public oppose both the cultivation of GM crops and consumption of GM food. Assumed socio-economic impacts or impacts on food security are only two minor aspects of many determinants of the attitude towards this technology. To consolidate the evidence on agronomic and economic impacts for farmers, we conducted a meta-analysis. Through keyword search in scientific databases, 147 studies were identified and used in the analysis. The meta-study is limited to results on the most widespread GM crops worldwide: soybeans, maize, and cotton. We estimate mean effect sizes of GM crop cultivation which are an increase in yield by 22%, a reduction in pesticide quantity by 37% on average, and an increase in farmer profits by 68%. The magnitude of the effects is determined by various factors. For all three variables named above, the impact of GM crop cultivation is larger in developing than in developed countries. Yield effects as well as impacts of GM crops on pesticide quantity are relatively larger for insect resistant crops than for herbicide tolerant crops.

The purpose of the study is: 1) to analyse the narratives of young people who have experienced a war, fled to Sweden and been taken care of and placed in institutions, 2) to analyse the narratives of institution personnel about the day-to-day work of taking care of young people who have experienced war. The material used in the study has been gathered by means of interviews with young people in care with experiences of war, and interviews with personnel at HVB homes who work with these young people. The previous research shows that the social pedagogic perspective is one of the perspectives in social sciences that stresses the importance of including the individual in the community. The individual is given confirmation of his or her identity by participating in the community, and successful interaction between individuals is a fundamental prerequisite for the successful integration of unaccompanied children and young people in Sweden. The researchers highlight the importance of interaction between those already established in the community and the individual who is on its margin. One of the most important dimensions from a social pedagogical perspective is to analytically investigate relationships between individuals needing help and the professional participants tasked with helping these individuals as part of their professional role. A social pedagogue works in a variety of social contexts in which individuals need professional help with integration and success in those contexts. This can involve students in school; inmates at youth institutions and prisons; children, young people and adults who are the subjects of intervention by social services; patients undergoing psychiatric treatment; and other individual categories where people find themselves in critical life situations and need professional help to overcome them. The writings of for example Lisbeth Eriksson, Juha Hämäläinen and Xavier Ucar provide insights into some expectations that come into play in the various social contexts of the role of a "social pedagogue." A social pedagogue is portrayed as an expert who works with a specific and defined goal. The goal is to help/guide the client to overcome obstacles that hamper integration and success in the context. In order to do this, social pedagogues are expected to possess specific professional qualifications in order to support and motivate their clients in overcoming obstacles and meeting their goals. A social pedagogue works in a socially oriented way and plays an educational fostering role. It is anticipated that this will help the client develop an understanding of how to act in accordance with desired expectations, norms and values and to resist peer pressure and involvement in anti-social activities. A social pedagogue is also expected to supervise other professional categories in the context of the various issues related to the client's living conditions. In addition, the social pedagogue is expected to act as a link between different professions with the goal of facilitating collaboration that supports the client's social and educational development (when the client is a child or young person, the social pedagogue is expected to also collaborate with parents). The social pedagogue sometimes has a limited scope for action; the role has low status and standing in relation to other professional categories involved. The role of the social pedagogue is portrayed as diffuse, unspoken and full of contradictions in relation to other professional categories in the organizational hierarchy. The role of social pedagogue tends to assume a controlling and repressive function as support for other professional categories in the context. In conclusion, there are major variations in what is expected of a social pedagogue. A common denominator is that the mission of a social pedagogue and the context in which the social pedagogue operates appears to be sufficiently flexible to enable an individual to play the role in a wide variety of ways. It is only when the individual social pedagogue adopts an active, assertive, independent, personal and relatively strong posture that he or she has a chance to be of importance to other professional categories and for the client. This means in practice that it is only when the individual social pedagogue transcends the expectations of the role presented above that he or she has a chance to be appreciated by other collaborators. Lisbeth Eriksson and Juha Hämäläinen illustrate four important dimensions of the social pedagogical perspective. The first of these focusses on goals in the context to be achieved by means of social pedagogy. In this dimension, the importance of the participants' socialisation is brought to the fore in the context by, among other things, integration and mobilisation of all forces in the community with the aim of helping the individual who is on the margin of the community. The second dimension focusses on the correct social pedagogic approach, especially in the relationship between the professional participants and the individual in need of help. The professional participants working in accordance with the social pedagogic perspective are empathic towards the individual requiring help, while also being aware of the specific expectations of the professional role. The third dimension focusses on appropriate social pedagogic methods in the work with the individual who is in need of help. Methods considered to be appropriate are the dynamic methods based on the individual as part of the group and part of a wider social context (such as environmental therapy). The fourth dimension focusses on social pedagogy as a resource for professional work with the individual who is on the margin of the community and in need of help. In this dimension, there is emphasis on the importance of the correct approach by the professional participants, with the goal of creating progress in the relationship with the individual in need of help by means of well thought-out dialogue and action. If we borrow analytical glasses from Hämäläinen and Eriksson, we can read the following from this study: 1) social pedagogic target groups - as represented by a) young people in care who have experiences of war and who were subsequently placed in HVB homes in Sweden, b) personnel at HVB homes who work with these young people; 2) social pedagogical arenas - as represented by various contexts that are brought to the fore in the study's empirical material (war context, migration context while fleeing to Sweden, migration context during integration into Sweden, institution context, school context etc.; 3) social pedagogical roles - as represented by various roles that are brought to the fore in the study's empirical material (victim of war, student, homosexual, empathic personnel, competent personnel, incompetent personnel etc.). Analysis of the study's empirical material shows that the lives of young people in Sweden are characterised by uncertainty; they do not know if they will be allowed to stay in Sweden, whether they will have the opportunity to keep attending school or whether they will ever get to see their parents again. The material provides a picture of a waiting period that involves a considerable adjustment for these young people, regardless of whether or not they are given leave to remain in Sweden. The time after first arriving in Sweden can seem like a prelude to starting a new life, a prelude which is sometimes characterised by a continuing flight. The war goes on and is present in stories. Interviews with personnel at HVB homes and young people in this study are sometimes extremely emotionally charged. There may be painful stories about, for example, someone's entire family and everyone living in the village fleeing from a Taliban attack, about how their best friend was killed in a suicide attack, about how Russian and government forces in Syria harass women ("sisters"). The stories are also about friends and relatives who are taken away and never return, a father who was executed, a difficult journey to Sweden, as well as about personnel at HVB homes who are empathic, who understand and try to help young people, but also about others who belittle and abuse young people and even contribute to the risk of worse mental health in young people. Analysis of empirical material has crystallised out the following themes in interviews with young people: a) war as a permanent social condition; b) school in the home country becomes demonstration, demonstration becomes school; c) learning war (war as pedagogical practice); d) normalising/ neutralising the condition of war ("playing football", "as normal"); e) flight from war is also war – or part of the war (deprivation of liberty/abduction, slave labour); f) the future in Sweden (struggle for social recognition/recognition of identity – for example as student, employee, person, breadwinner and homosexual). In interviews with institution personnel, the following themes have crystallised out: a) previous chaos in reception centres in Sweden, now more orderly; b) young people singled out and stigmatised by society; c) importance of empathic attitudes and humanity; d) no treatment is offered or given in the institution; e) main task: to help young people to integrate in society; f) there is collaboration with other professional categories, but it is limited (no more than what is essential); g) young people's age as a problem; h) young people are described as greedy (reason for coming to Sweden); i) maltreatment in institutions; j) (in)competence of personnel.

Inhaltsangabe: Introduction: The master thesis 'Worldwide Development of Nuclear Energy and the Strategic Deployment of German Consultancies on the Arabian Peninsula' is chiefly targeted at German consultancy companies so that they can assess their status of strategic deployment and prioritize their activities to enter a new business sector in a foreign market. This publication could also be of relevance for policy makers, investors, suppliers as well as nuclear energy and governmental agencies to identify their need for external advisers to safely operate a nuclear power program; provides a guideline for how to enter a new market. Hence this thesis should be considered as an aid to identify hurdles and obstacles that have to be foreseen and so overcome. Potential business fields are also noted as well as important factors that have to be considered to minimize the chance of failure in the new market. Nevertheless, this huge market with its continuously changing constraints and conditions could throw up a lot more obstacles than could be covered in this thesis. Also the internal organizations of individual companies may differ from the one described in the thesis. The objective of this master thesis is thus to set out a set of guidelines for possible approaches. The first two chapters present an overview of the current geographical, political, cultural and economic conditions to familiarize the reader with the background information and constraints needed for the subsequent chapters. The third chapter deals more specifically with the energy market on the Arabian Peninsula, particular in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This chapter provides information on types of energy, pending developments, country-specific organizations and institutions, as well as means of financing such huge projects. The fourth chapter is devoted exclusively to nuclear energy, starting with the current status and the motivation of the two countries to launch such a development. This is followed by a description of the legal requirements and other commitments as decreed by the countries' governments. These specific legal conditions do not just apply within the countries concerned, but companies which do business there are likewise obliged to follow these regulations. Challenges for countries are opportunities for consultants, and identification of these represents is the core content of this chapter. The content of the fifth chapter is the preparatory measures that are essential prior to entering a foreign market. A company's vision and mission as well as various analyses are needed to provide a sound basis for taking a decision to proceed. In this context, SWOT analysis is noted as well as an evaluation of M.E. Porter's 'Five Forces' to describe the market and internal organizations. After the preparatory measures, the implementation phase follows. This and its various stages are described in Chapter 6. It is inevitable that, to ensure success, many measures will have to implemented and subsequently adjusted. This starts with deployment and steering of business units and proceeds to overcoming difficulties with external parties. Recruitment on a permanent basis of employees is also a prerequisite for sustained business success, together with a staff feedback, incentive and salary system. Chapter 7 sets out methods for evaluating previous years' activities in the new business. The first couple of years after 'start-up' are over and the situation in which the company is now has to be assessed. It is frequently necessary to undertake organizational upgrades, that could amount to a complete reorganization of the business, aided by change management provisions. The final Chapter 8 summarizes the key information and content, and sets forth the need and reasons for strategic deployment. Changes in the market means that companies will have to re-adjust for economic survival. Because the nuclear program of the United Arab Emirates is more advanced than that of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and information is less available in the latter country, the main focus of this thesis is on the UAE. Nevertheless, the KSA is an emerging nuclear market with great ambitious for a nuclear program and so is worthy of mention when discussing constraints and conditions that these countries have in common. Other countries that are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) do share an interest in nuclear energy but are not yet at the same stage of development as the UAE and KSA. These serve from time to time to support arguments and figures. A sufficient and reliable energy supply is essential for continuous economic development, contributing also to poverty reduction and health care improvement. If these developments are restricted or lacking, often the result is social conflict that could even lead to civil strife. Examples are rural arid areas in the world where there is no access to potable water. A minor local conflict affects the economic development and population of specific countries and often results in regional instability and interventions from outside. The global energy imbalance has been steadily growing over the past couple of decades. Roughly 1.6 billion people live without electricity, and almost 2.4 billion people rely on traditional biomass to cook their daily meals . Modern fuels are not available or are restricted to the upper social strata. There is an almost equal share of the world's population with no access to potable water, so in the struggle for survival the consequences will be social unrest and riots. In some poor countries of the world, the per capita electricity consumption is as low as 50 kWh per annum, compared to developed countries with 8,600 kWh. Worldwide, the provision of energy is dominated by three major challenges. 1. Energy consumption has tripled in the past half century. If this continues, humankind will consume more energy in the 21st century than in the entire past history. This represents an increase of 53% in global energy consumption by 2030. 2. The main energy resources are now scarce, so to ensure economic development, countries will compete with each other to acquire their own supplies. Each country seeks to protect its existing sources and open up new ones. This will not result in a fair distribution of resources, as poor countries are not able to compete with their developed neighbors and lose out, as has often happened in history. 3. To an increasing extent attention is focusing on environmental impacts. Because of the greenhouse effect, carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels bring about a rise in global temperatures. The consequences are long-lasting drought, sea level rise, submerging coastal regions and more destructive storms. For these reasons, many governments are reviewing their present energy mixes and are considering alternatives to avert the consequences of energy scarcity, including the renewal of interest in nuclear energy that has been noted in recent decades. Adoption or resumption of nuclear energy is at least one solution for some countries faced with a threat to the security of their energy supplies. Among others, one benefit of nuclear energy is zero emissions of greenhouse gases during their operating phase and the ability of huge plants to provide electricity reliably and on a large scale. Much engineering effort has been devoted to significantly improving nuclear plant safety in recent decades. Furthermore, although they are finite, there are ample reserves of uranium and, unlike petrochemicals, they are not put to any other use apart from as an energy source. Prospecting is under way for new deposits, as currently in Yemen. The cost of electricity generated by nuclear power is now competitive, but a major concern that has still to be resolved is final storage of down burned nuclear fuel rods. An overview of the economics is provided by a cost comparison of the various electricity generation technologies, as shown in Figure 1-1 below. This survey is ongoing in a couple of countries to seek a basis for taking decisions on their energy strategies. The quoted figures are ballpark estimates, with actual values depending very much on local conditions and the current market situation, but they do serve to provide a rough comparison. The outcome of these calculations is that electricity generation from nuclear fuel is, at 91.0 US Dollar/MWh, much more competitive than firing crude oil at 133.4 US Dollar/MWh. However, a major consideration is the distinction that has to be made between supplying base and peak/cycling load. To meet the demand for base-load electricity, large-scale power plants, like nuclear and those fired with coal and crude oil are more favorable. These need an extended start-up period – ranging from a couple of hours to two or three days – before they can feed power into the grid. Smaller scale plant, like diesel-fired simple-cycle gas turbines and solar power plants are able to rapidly ramp their power output up and down to cover daily consumption peaks. For this reason, nuclear power plants almost exclusively operate continuously at or near peak output to supply base load, together with natural gas-fired combined cycle gas turbine plants and coal-fired power plants. Diesel-fired gas turbines and solar power plants find application for peak and cycling duty. The key factors are listed in the following table, with firstly the operating parameters, which are attributes specific to the various power plant technologies that are taken as basic assumptions for the further calculations. The second sub-heading is key financial constraints, which fix the technology that is more economical. These comprise the capital cost for construction and development as well as long-term costs that are highly cyclical and cannot be so readily predicted as the other costs. The third main distinction is the direct electricity generation costs. These are running costs incurred only during power plant operation and are directly related to the rated power output in MWe. This calculation serves as well to identify companies and utility suppliers for nuclear power generation as well as to broaden the mix of energy supply technologies and reduce dependency on specific primary resources.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: List of Figures4 List of Abbreviations6 1.Introduction and Objective8 1.1Objective of this Master Thesis8 1.2Introduction9 2.Geographical, Political, Cultural and Economic Conditions13 2.1Geography and Culture13 2.2Economy and Politics14 2.3Political and Social Stability in the UAE18 2.4Relations between the UAE and Germany18 2.5Relationship between the KSA and Germany19 3.Energy Sectors of the Leading Countries on the Arabian Peninsula20 3.1Electricity Generation and Consumption in KSA and UAE20 3.2Water Production and Consumption in the KSA and UAE24 3.3Renewable Energy in the UAE and KSA25 3.4Pending Developments25 3.5Country-specific Organizations and Authorities26 3.6Financing of Power Projects in Arabian Countries27 3.7Summary of Chapter 327 4.Nuclear Energy on the Arabian Peninsula28 4.1Status in the UAE and KSA28 4.2Reasons for Launching a Nuclear Program29 4.3Obligations to Launch a Nuclear Program30 4.4Commitments of the UAE31 4.5Challenges and Potentials of the Nuclear Path33 4.6Global Outlook35 5.Preparations for Market Penetration37 5.1Vision and Mission38 5.2Market Analysis39 5.3Strategic SWOT Analysis41 5.3.1Strengths41 5.3.2Weaknesses45 5.3.3Opportunities46 5.3.4Threats47 5.4Five Elements of Realization Strategy49 5.4.1Arenas (market conditions and valuable segments)49 5.4.2Staging and pacing53 5.4.3Differentiators55 5.4.4Vehicles (course of action)55 5.4.5Economic logic58 5.4.6Summary and checklist of foundation59 6.Execution of the Initial Phase60 6.1Centralization versus Decentralization of Business Units60 6.2Acquisition of New Permanent Employees61 6.2.1Recruitment strategy for employees without experience61 6.2.2Recruitment strategy for experienced employees62 6.2.3Selection of potential candidates63 6.2.4Recruitment process63 6.3Internal Deployment and Organization66 6.3.1Feedback systems66 6.3.2Development of competencies66 6.3.3Incentives and salary systems68 6.3.4Difficulties with external parties69 7.Assessment of Business after 'Start-up Phase'70 7.1Reassessment of Recent Years70 7.2Organizational Improvement Measures72 7.3Change Management and the Reorganization of Business and Markets73 7.3.1Strengthen the position in the existing market74 7.3.2Entering new global markets75 8.Summary76 List of Literature78Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 3.3, Renewable Energy in the UAE and KSA: Utility companies in the GCC states are under enormous pressure due to the global scarcity of fossil fuels, which are running out much faster than expected, consequently they are boosting also renewable energies. Governmental agencies have been instructed to review energy consumption in the Middle East and are seeking alternatives to meet the rising demand, which is also in line with the global environmental movement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The long shoreline and high insolation throughout the year are optimal for generating wind, water and photovoltaic power. The following illustrate the efforts made by government agencies for the upcoming year: Abu Dhabi's Masdar City is spending US Dollar 2 billion on promoting solar technology. Saudi Arabia is looking to position itself as a centre for solar energy research and so become a net exporter of energy sourced from renewables. Abu Dhabi is to build the world's largest hydrogen power plant at a cost of US Dollar 15 billion. 'Glance over the borders": Jordan is assessing plans for constructing a wind farm while Qatar is considering solar power. 3.4, Pending Developments: Regarding upcoming developments, the two countries, UAE and KSA, have to be considered separately due to the primary resources that are available. Crude oil and natural gas reserves in Saudi Arabia will last decades more than the resources in the UAE. A further reason is that the quality and composition of the mineral resources are much less favorable in the KSA than in the UAE. This means that their firing for power generation is, for economic reasons, the only reasonable option for their exploitation. In the UAE the situation is different, as there the mineral resources are of much higher quality and are too valuable to fire in power plants. The price obtainable on the world petrochemicals market is much higher than the benefit derived from electricity generation. The UAE therefore has a greater incentive to diversify its power generation and to invest in technologies other than fossil fuels much earlier. Based on the financial and economic crisis, the 'Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie' expects a smoother growth of GDP in 2008 and 2009. This means that ongoing projects with a total CAPEX of US Dollar 378 billion will be postponed or abandoned. Despite these figures, the UAE will remain the most important project market for German companies in the Arabian region. Over the near term, between 2009 and 2011, the UAE expects investments of about US Dollar 540 billion. Showing high potential for investments of about US Dollar 24 billion is expansion of water production and power plant capacities. To participate in this development, frequent consultations and top-level meetings are held to strengthen the relationship between German industry and local agencies like DEWA (Dubai Electrical and Water Authority) and ADWEA (Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority). These authorities organize and guide all water and electricity projects, starting with planning and tendering through to commissioning. Over the past four years, energy consumption in the Emirate of Dubai has increased by around 10,000 GWh. As a consequence, the projection for 2010 is for a new electricity generation capacity of 9 GWe provided by power plants. Likewise electricity transmission has potential for growth. DEWA intends to award contracts annually for more than 6,000 km of HVDC (high voltage direct current) transmission lines. DEWA has an estimated annual budget of US Dollar 2 billion.

In the past few years, International Relations scholars have reflected about change in global order in three main streams of thought. The realist stream has pointed out that the world is increasingly multipolar,[1] focusing on major powers: the US, China, the EU and Russia. Liberal/constructivist scholars have explored the crisis and challenges of and within the liberal international order.[2] In this vein, John Ikenberry has recently delineated a scenario of three worlds: that is, the "Global North" (led by the US and, to some degree, the EU), the "Global East" (led by China and Russia) and the "Global South".[3] The latter, Ikenberry argues, is without a big power leadership and appears somewhat more passive, whilst the other two "Globals" are engaged in a competition for the "Global South". In this competition, he argues, the liberal international order has a comparative advantage. Finally, the Global IR stream, and Amitav Acharya in particular, have proposed the concept of a multiplex world: a more plural and de-centred world where we, instead, observe an increase in the interaction capacity of middle and small powers as well. By interaction capacity, Acharya et al. mean "the relative ability of nations to organize cooperation".[4]
What all these streams agree upon is that the international order is in transformation. This transformation will be significantly shaped by how a variety of actors negotiate the basic principles, rules and institutions that govern their interactions and relations. Central in such negotiations are international crises. As Ikenberry has pointed out, the "Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked a global debate on world order". This is clearly the case when looking at world order from the viewpoint of the US, EU and Russia. The Global South has also intervened in the debate over the Russia-Ukraine war, calling for food security and largely supporting international law in votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), whilst seeing it as a "war over the European security order".[5]
Looking at the global order from the postcolonial world, a much more important crisis for order negotiation and restructuring is the Israel-Palestine war.[6] Here, the global dynamic is completely different: the Global South has enacted its presence in the normative ordering of the international, whilst the West is divided, and Russia, as well as China, are rather passive. So, on the Israel-Palestine war, a central negotiation is taking place, mainly between the Global South and the West, that will have an impact on the global normative ordering as profound as the negotiations surrounding the Russia-Ukraine war.'Land for peace' and the retreat from international law
This negotiation is, of course, not entirely new. In the context of the decolonisation process, from the 1960s to the 1980s, the non-aligned movement was central in establishing in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that, just like Israelis, also Palestinians have inalienable individual and collective rights, including an unconditional right to statehood. In 1988, UNGA Resolution 43/177 acknowledged the proclamation of the State of Palestine and affirmed the need to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their sovereignty over their territory occupied since 1967. UNGA so contested the US-led peace process which, instead, was guided by the 'land for peace' paradigm that had emerged in 1967. Unlike the Suez Crisis in 1956, when the US and the USSR had forced France, the UK and Israel to retreat from the Sinai in line with international law and the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, after 1967, the US conditioned such a retreat on peace, so sidelining international law.
Whilst this approach was contested by UNGA, the Arab League and, to some degree, also the European Community in the 1980s,[7] in the 1990s, in the so-called unipolar moment of the liberal international order, the idea of liberal peace-building as a precondition for Palestinian statehood became dominant. Due to the lack of accountability to international law within the peace process, however, as the years went by, the land-for-peace formula looked increasingly obsolete: the occupied Palestinian territory was fractured by Israeli settlements in the West Bank including East Jerusalem – where the settlement population now stands at more than 700,000 –,[8] as well as by the barrier/wall and the separation from Gaza, under full Israeli land, air and sea blockade from 2007 onwards. Amidst this context, the Palestinian leadership decided to take their struggle back to the UN and the mechanisms and institutions of international law.
Whilst the West could previously unite under the land-for-peace paradigm, it now had a hard time uniting under the principles and institutions of international law. The division thus set on in 2012, when Palestine applied for non-membership status at the UN (Figure 1).

Figure 1 | UNGA votes Palestine "non-member observer state", 2012



Source: United Nations, General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine 'Non-Member Observer State' Status in United Nations, 29 November 2012, https://press.un.org/en/2012/ga11317.doc.htm.

Following this, the EU Foreign Affairs Council sought to dissuade Palestine from signing the Rome Statute.[9] Palestine, nonetheless, moved the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which in 2021 asserted its jurisdiction. In response, Germany publicly positioned itself against the ICC claiming it had no jurisdiction,[10] undermining not only the authority of the Court but effectively also seeking to deny Palestinians their right to have their case assessed through a major institution of international law. In 2022, again, the West voted divided (Figure 2) on the UNGA resolution requesting an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the "Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem".[11]

Figure 2 | UNGA votes "Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem", 2022



Source: United Nations, Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem, Voting Summary, 30 December 2022, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3999158.

This division that runs through the West effectively blocks a position more in line with international law. This became even more evident after the attack on 7 October where Hamas took 250 Israeli hostages and killed 766 civilians, as well as 373 security forces.[12] In response, Israel started an invasion, killing within October alone more than 9,000 Palestinians, of which more than 3,700 children, displacing hundreds of thousands.[13] Besides the large-scale destruction of housing, health and educational infrastructure, the Israeli government also announced the impeding of relief supplies, using starvation of civilians as collective punishment and method of warfare. In the only EU Council Conclusions on which the member states could so far agree upon, on 23 October 2023, the EU condemned Hamas "for its brutal and indiscriminate terrorist attacks across Israel" but did not condemn Israel for its brutal and indiscriminate bombing of Gaza, only stating generically that the response should be in line with international law.[14] It also failed to call unequivocally for a ceasefire despite the massive death toll and destruction.
Only in mid-February, with more than 30,000 Palestinians in Gaza killed, 12,300 of which children,[15] and most of the Israeli hostages, including two children, still being held by Hamas,[16] and amidst mounting fears of forcible displacement of 1.5 million Palestinians sheltering in Rafah into the Sinai,[17] did 26 EU member states (without Hungary) ask Israel to halt its military action in Rafah. They did, however, not outline what impact a military action would have on EU-Israel relations,[18] and similarly failed to pressure Israel into allowing humanitarian aid via land crossings into Gaza, where the World Health Organization has warned of catastrophic famine.[19]
The normative vacuum that has been created by the US and the EU has, it should be noted, not been used by Russia or China, which have remained rather passive. Instead, it has been the Global South that has moved into this normative vacuum.The Global South takes action
Whilst Global South countries had been rather cohesive in their votes in favour of supporting the application of mechanisms of international law to Israel/Palestine before 7 October (see Figures 1 and 2), these voting patterns became more robust afterwards (see Figures 3 and 4). Furthermore, rather than simply backing Palestinian initiatives in international institutions, various Global South countries now began to take initiatives within these institutions themselves.

Figure 3 | UNGA votes ceasefire resolutions, 26 October 2023



Source: United Nations, UN General Assembly Adopts Gaza Resolution Calling for Immediate and Sustained 'Humanitarian Truce', 26 October 2023, https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142847.

Figure 4 | UNGA votes ceasefire resolutions, 12 December 2023



Source: United Nations, UN General Assembly Votes by Large Majority for Immediate Humanitarian Ceasefire during Emergency Session, 12 December 2023, https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1144717.

Algeria as an elected UNSC member became active in drafting resolutions, and filed a complaint at the ICC (together with Colombia). Qatar appeared as a key mediator at a time when the US and the EU had largely lost this status, and hence their interaction capacity or relative ability to exercise political leadership and organise cooperation. Saudi Arabia published a clear rebuttal of the US in a statement where it insisted on the recognition of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital before proceeding with normalisation. Most importantly, however, South Africa instituted – with broad support from a large majority of states in the Global South (but notably from neither China nor Russia) – proceedings against Israel at the ICJ concerning alleged violations by Israel of its obligations under the Genocide Convention in relation to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Whilst some EU member states were positive (Belgium, Ireland) or neutral (France, Spain), Germany announced its intention to intervene in the South Africa versus Israel case at the ICJ on Israel's behalf, issuing a statement which implicitly accused South Africa of an instrumentalisation of the Convention. This triggered a diplomatic incident where late Namibian President Hage Geingob strongly criticised "the shocking decision communicated by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany".[20] In its order on 24 January 2024, the Court concluded that "at least some of the acts and omissions alleged by South Africa to have been committed by Israel in Gaza appear to be capable of falling within the provisions of the Convention".[21] Shortly afterwards, Nicaragua instituted proceedings against Germany before the ICJ for alleged violations by Berlin of its obligations deriving from the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions and other norms of international law.[22]The indefensible West
In light of this "crisis of humanity",[23] Western players must be aware of what their position means for a larger transforming global order. Two conclusions are pertinent in this respect. First, it is evident that a multiplex world is in the making where actors other than the big powers are enacting their normative presence in the international arena. South Africa has shown an impressive leadership in this respect, and might have paved the way for others to follow suit. It also holds normative power with its model of post-Apartheid co-existence (similar to the normative power which the EU once held with its model of co-existence in Europe). Second, the idea that the "Global North" has an advantage today in the international competition on visions of order must be strongly qualified. The normative power that the liberal international order as a vision can hold in a multiplex world depends on the West's consistent adherence to the postwar edifice of principles, rules and institutions of international law that does not only embody significant lessons learnt from European history, but without which the West loses its interaction capacity. Europe is – to quote Aimé Césaire –, once again, indefensible.[24]Daniela Huber is Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department of Roma Tre University. She is scientific advisor of the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), which she led from 2019 to 2022, and co-editor of The International Spectator.[1] John J. Mearsheimer, "Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order", in International Security, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Spring 2019), p. 7-50, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342.[2] David A. Lake, Lisa L. Martin and Thomas Risse, "Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization", in International Organization, Vol. 75, No. 2 (Spring 2021), p. 225-257, DOI 10.1017/S0020818320000636.[3] G. John Ikenberry, "Three Worlds: The West, East and South and the Competition to Shape Global Order", in International Affairs, Vol. 100, No. 1 (January 2024), p. 121-138, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad284. These terms are somewhat essentialising historically diverse and socially, economically and politically complex geographies. This commentary uses the term the "West" that includes countries located in areas of the world which are not in the North (such as Australia). It uses the term "Global South" to describe the postcolonial world, whilst it also discusses particular positions by postcolonial countries (China and South Africa). Stewart Patrick and Alexandra Huggins, "The Term 'Global South' Is Surging. It Should Be Retired", in Carnegie Commentaries, 15 August 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/90376.[4] Amitav Acharya, Antoni Estevadeordal and Louis W Goodman, "Multipolar or Multiplex? Interaction Capacity, Global Cooperation and World Order", in International Affairs, Vol. 99, No. 6 (November 2023), p. 2339-2365, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad242.[5] Lorenzo Kamel, "Has the Russo-Ukraine War Really Changed the Global Order?", in The Buzz, 14 April 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/node/201835.[6] It should be noted that this war is not confined to Gaza. In the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, Amnesty International has noted a "spike in use of unlawful lethal force by Israeli forces", and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) reported a surge in detentions of Palestinians, and inherent practices of "forced disappearances, torture, and severe violations of human rights". Furthermore, the war also takes place in Israel and Southern Lebanon with rocket attacks and air strikes. Amnesty International, Shocking Spike in Use of Unlawful Lethal Force by Israeli Forces against Palestinians in Occupied West Bank, 5 February 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/?p=206744; PHR, Systematic Violation of Human Rights: The Incarceration Conditions of Palestinians in Israel Since October 7, February 2024, https://www.phr.org.il/en/?p=17797.[7] See the Venice Declaration of 1980 that insists on de-occupation and international law. European Council, Venice Declaration, 13 June 1980, https://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf.[8] European Union Representative to West Bank and Gaza Strip, UNRWA, 2021 Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Reporting period -January-December 2021, 20 July 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/416884_en.[9] Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process, 10 December 2012, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/foraff/134140.pdf.[10] Stefan Talmon, "Germany Publicly Objects to the International Criminal Court's Ruling on Jurisdiction in Palestine", in GPIL blog, 11 February 2021, https://gpil.jura.uni-bonn.de/?p=2824.[11] International Court of Justice, Case 186: Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Request for Advisory Opinion), 19 January 2023, https://www.icj-cij.org/case/186.[12] "Israel Social Security Data Reveals True Picture of Oct 7 Deaths", in France 24, 15 December 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231215-israel-social-security-data-reveals-true-picture-of-oct-7-deaths.[13] Euro-Med Monitor [@EuroMedHR], "Statistics on the Israeli Attack on the Gaza Strip", in Twitter, 31 October 2023, https://twitter.com/EuroMedHR/status/1719406267620270215.[14] European Council, European Council Conclusions on Middle East, 26 October 2023, https://europa.eu/!jjTCT7.[15] Philippe Lazzarini [@UNLazzarini], "Staggering. The Number of Children Reported Killed in Just over 4 Months in #Gaza Is Higher than the Number of Children Killed in 4 Years of Wars around the World Combined", in Twitter, 12 March 2024, https://twitter.com/UNLazzarini/status/1767618985397272831.[16] Website of the Hostages and Missing Families Forum, https://stories.bringthemhomenow.net.[17] Jonathan Adler, "South into the Sinai: Will Israel Force Palestinians Out of Gaza?", in Sada, 31 October 2023, https://carnegie-mec.org/sada/90869.[18] European Union External Action Service, Israel/Palestine: Statement by the High Representative on a Planned Israeli Military Operation in Rafah, 16 February 2024, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/438359_en.[19] World Health Organization, Famine in Gaza Is Imminent, with Immediate and Long-Term Health Consequences, 18 March 2024, https://www.who.int/news/item/18-03-2024-famine-in-gaza-is-imminent--with-immediate-and-long-term-health-consequences.[20] Stefan Talmon, "Germany Rushes to Declare Intention to Intervene in the Genocide Case Brought by South Africa against Israel before the International Court of Justice", in GPIL blog, 15 January 2024, https://gpil.jura.uni-bonn.de/?p=4062.[21] International Court of Justice, Case 192: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel). Summary of the Order of 26 January 2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203454.[22] International Court of Justice, Case 193: Proceedings Instituted by the Republic of Nicaragua against the Federal Republic of Germany. Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1 March 2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/index.php/node/203820.[23] United Nations, Press Conference by Secretary-General António Guterres at United Nations Headquarters, 6 November 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2023/sgsm22021.doc.htm.[24] Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, New York, Monthly Review Press, 2000, p. 32.

February 2024 marked the tenth anniversary of Russia's invasion and occupation of Crimea. In the eight years before the full-scale invasion, Crimea receded from most people's radar. Today, however, it has regained prominence—as a base for attacks on Ukraine, a region Ukrainian forces are focused on liberating, and a big piece of the puzzle in securing peace for Ukraine. But Russia has devoted considerable technologies, both infrastructural and visual, to trying to persuade the world that Russian control of the peninsula is henceforth permanent. Colonial InfrastructureThe most effective way for colonial powers to claim a territory is to build on it. Since the eighteenth century, when Russia first conquered Crimea, it has used infrastructure to secure and immortalize its hold on the territory. An example of this is the dacha, a land plot awarded to Russian settlers as an incentive to move to Crimea and a hallmark of Russian imperial rule. It allowed thousands of well-to-do Russians to resettle in Crimea and reimagine it as a Russian riviera, a splendid outpost for the middle and upper classes to sojourn during the summer months. During the Soviet era, while the image of a Crimean riviera was carefully preserved for mass consumption, the Soviet Union poured massive resources into military infrastructure on the peninsula. The Black Sea Fleet accounted for 140,000 military personnel in the 1980s, and Crimea became a foremost site for military research, production, and storage. In addition to its military equipment factories and shipyards, Crimea had ten military airfields, control system for weapons, air defense system facilities, and nuclear warheads storage facilities.Since the most recent Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russia has continued to invest in infrastructural projects as a means of cementing Russia's grip on the peninsula, securing loyalty from the population through improvement projects, and generally recasting the space as Russian. Perhaps the most famous infrastructure projects are the Crimean Bridge and Tavrida Highway. In 2018, Russia completed the construction of bridge that connected Crimea to Russia with two parallel four-lane roads and a railway track between the Taman peninsula in Krasnodar Krai and the city of Kerch. The construction of this twelve-mile-long bridge cost $3.7 billion. Two years later the four-lane Tavrida Highway, 1,606 miles long, was constructed, connecting the bridge with critical Crimean cities such as Simferopol, Sevastopol, and Yevpatoria.Both the bridge and highway, while exemplifying Russia's efforts to control and absorb Crimea into its space, also serve the specific military function of enabling the transport of troops and military. This vital logistical function explains Putin's presence at the grand opening of both projects and Ukrainian forces' intense focus on putting them out of commission since 2022. Social Colonization through InfrastructureTo compensate for the consequences of the international sanctions that have plunged Crimea into an economic abyss, Russia has invested heavily in social infrastructure: kindergartens, schools, and hospitals. Crimea is allegedly the most subsidized region under Russian control, accounting for 65–70 percent of direct subsidies from the Russian federal budget. Investment in social infrastructure, while aimed at winning the hearts and minds of Crimea's population, has simultaneously created sites for surveillance and dissemination of Russian propaganda. Especially through schools and control of curricula, Russia strives to integrate children and their parents into the "Russian world." When I visited Crimea in 2020 for research, it was apparent that even the most outspoken opponents of Russian occupation regarded these infrastructure projects with approval. Visual ColonizationMost of my interlocutors in 2020 were convinced that war against Ukraine was coming. The feeling of approaching war was palpable not only because of the growing military infrastructure but also from changes in the visual landscape. The Crimean public space had been visually reorganized around Soviet and war nostalgia themes. Already in January, four months before Russia's Victory Day on May 9, which celebrates success and valor in World War II, a huge banner was hanging in Sevastopol: "75 years of the victory (1945–2020)! Victory in the Great Patriotic War was, is, and always will be the fulcrum of Russia's people and its sustainable development!" Nearby you could see a random restaurant sign, "Heroes of a Great Country," and a poster featuring a Soviet soldier. Visual materials in all public spaces remind Crimeans of their privilege of belonging to the greatest country in the world that, if necessary, "can do it again," a slogan promising to win in a crusade against the West just as happened in 1945, according to current revisionist history. The war propaganda follows you everywhere, in the names of streets, monuments, and exhibitions scattered around the cities. One such monument is a tall stele with statues of soldiers on three sides. One statue is of a soldier of the Crimean War (1853–1856), the second is of a Soviet soldier of World War II, and the third is of a Russian soldier who participated in the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This monument is a pinnacle of Russian propaganda tailored to a Crimean audience. All these visual materials have made Crimea a Disneyland of Soviet/Russian nostalgia. Everything that could remind one of Ukraine has been removed or painted over. It is prohibited to display remembrances of the peninsula's history between 1991 and 2014. The same goes for the Crimean Tatar heritage. The Bakhchisaray Palace—the only testament to Crimean Tatar statehood—is under permanent "construction," or, more accurately, destruction. Any Crimean Tatar initiative to preserve their identity is under the strict control of the occupying authorities. Russia's Normalization Efforts Meet Ukrainians' TenacityThe longer Russia's occupation of Crimea lasts, the more permanent it seems. Russia has normalized war and a Russian presence. Memories of the "before times" fade, or those with intact memories have left. But Russia's colonization of space and memory obscures one vital point: the eventual return of the Crimean Peninsula to Ukrainian control and Ukrainian society when Russia's bellicosity crumples.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute

February 2024 marked the tenth anniversary of Russia's invasion and occupation of Crimea. In the eight years before the full-scale invasion, Crimea receded from most people's radar. Today, however, it has regained prominence—as a base for attacks on Ukraine, a region Ukrainian forces are focused on liberating, and a big piece of the puzzle in securing peace for Ukraine. But Russia has devoted considerable technologies, both infrastructural and visual, to trying to persuade the world that Russian control of the peninsula is henceforth permanent. Colonial InfrastructureThe most effective way for colonial powers to claim a territory is to build on it. Since the eighteenth century, when Russia first conquered Crimea, it has used infrastructure to secure and immortalize its hold on the territory. An example of this is the dacha, a land plot awarded to Russian settlers as an incentive to move to Crimea and a hallmark of Russian imperial rule. It allowed thousands of well-to-do Russians to resettle in Crimea and reimagine it as a Russian riviera, a splendid outpost for the middle and upper classes to sojourn during the summer months. During the Soviet era, while the image of a Crimean riviera was carefully preserved for mass consumption, the Soviet Union poured massive resources into military infrastructure on the peninsula. The Black Sea Fleet accounted for 140,000 military personnel in the 1980s, and Crimea became a foremost site for military research, production, and storage. In addition to its military equipment factories and shipyards, Crimea had ten military airfields, control system for weapons, air defense system facilities, and nuclear warheads storage facilities.Since the most recent Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russia has continued to invest in infrastructural projects as a means of cementing Russia's grip on the peninsula, securing loyalty from the population through improvement projects, and generally recasting the space as Russian. Perhaps the most famous infrastructure projects are the Crimean Bridge and Tavrida Highway. In 2018, Russia completed the construction of bridge that connected Crimea to Russia with two parallel four-lane roads and a railway track between the Taman peninsula in Krasnodar Krai and the city of Kerch. The construction of this twelve-mile-long bridge cost $3.7 billion. Two years later the four-lane Tavrida Highway, 1,606 miles long, was constructed, connecting the bridge with critical Crimean cities such as Simferopol, Sevastopol, and Yevpatoria.Both the bridge and highway, while exemplifying Russia's efforts to control and absorb Crimea into its space, also serve the specific military function of enabling the transport of troops and military. This vital logistical function explains Putin's presence at the grand opening of both projects and Ukrainian forces' intense focus on putting them out of commission since 2022. Social Colonization through InfrastructureTo compensate for the consequences of the international sanctions that have plunged Crimea into an economic abyss, Russia has invested heavily in social infrastructure: kindergartens, schools, and hospitals. Crimea is allegedly the most subsidized region under Russian control, accounting for 65–70 percent of direct subsidies from the Russian federal budget. Investment in social infrastructure, while aimed at winning the hearts and minds of Crimea's population, has simultaneously created sites for surveillance and dissemination of Russian propaganda. Especially through schools and control of curricula, Russia strives to integrate children and their parents into the "Russian world." When I visited Crimea in 2020 for research, it was apparent that even the most outspoken opponents of Russian occupation regarded these infrastructure projects with approval. Visual ColonizationMost of my interlocutors in 2020 were convinced that war against Ukraine was coming. The feeling of approaching war was palpable not only because of the growing military infrastructure but also from changes in the visual landscape. The Crimean public space had been visually reorganized around Soviet and war nostalgia themes. Already in January, four months before Russia's Victory Day on May 9, which celebrates success and valor in World War II, a huge banner was hanging in Sevastopol: "75 years of the victory (1945–2020)! Victory in the Great Patriotic War was, is, and always will be the fulcrum of Russia's people and its sustainable development!" Nearby you could see a random restaurant sign, "Heroes of a Great Country," and a poster featuring a Soviet soldier. Visual materials in all public spaces remind Crimeans of their privilege of belonging to the greatest country in the world that, if necessary, "can do it again," a slogan promising to win in a crusade against the West just as happened in 1945, according to current revisionist history. The war propaganda follows you everywhere, in the names of streets, monuments, and exhibitions scattered around the cities. One such monument is a tall stele with statues of soldiers on three sides. One statue is of a soldier of the Crimean War (1853–1856), the second is of a Soviet soldier of World War II, and the third is of a Russian soldier who participated in the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This monument is a pinnacle of Russian propaganda tailored to a Crimean audience. All these visual materials have made Crimea a Disneyland of Soviet/Russian nostalgia. Everything that could remind one of Ukraine has been removed or painted over. It is prohibited to display remembrances of the peninsula's history between 1991 and 2014. The same goes for the Crimean Tatar heritage. The Bakhchisaray Palace—the only testament to Crimean Tatar statehood—is under permanent "construction," or, more accurately, destruction. Any Crimean Tatar initiative to preserve their identity is under the strict control of the occupying authorities. Russia's Normalization Efforts Meet Ukrainians' TenacityThe longer Russia's occupation of Crimea lasts, the more permanent it seems. Russia has normalized war and a Russian presence. Memories of the "before times" fade, or those with intact memories have left. But Russia's colonization of space and memory obscures one vital point: the eventual return of the Crimean Peninsula to Ukrainian control and Ukrainian society when Russia's bellicosity crumples.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute

Розглянуто проблеми функціонування та розвитку наднаціональних інституцій Європейського Союзу (далі – ЄС) у сфері безпеки та оборони на фоні змін військово-політичної ситуації у світі. Проаналізовано діяльність безпекових структур, визначено їх організаційно-правовий статус та обсяг завдань із забезпечення обороноздатності ЄС. Охарактеризовано їх повноваження стосовно національних систем безпеки та оборони. Розкрито основні напрямки забезпечення інституціональної стійкості оборонних структур у контексті зміни позиції Сполучених Штатів Америки (далі – США) як основи військової могутності Північноатлантичного альянсу (далі – НАТО) та охарактеризовано можливості створення Європейського оборонного союзу. Доведено, що ЄС необхідно кардинально переглянути свої підходи до забезпечення безпеки передусім у сфері взаємодії збройних сил країн-членів при проведенні спільних операцій і їх ресурсного забезпечення. Встановлено, що для України розвиток автономних наднаціональних європейських оборонних структур відкриває можливість для додаткового поглиблення співпраці із ЄС і паралельного посилення обороноздатності. ; Problem setting. Ukraine's implementation of the strategy of integration into the European Union necessitates taking into account the experience of countries that have already transformed security institutions in accordance with the European democratic tradition, as well as their adaptation to the nature of threats to EU member states. Ukraine's security is based on strengthening the Ñommon European security in all its dimensions. In the conditions of Russian armed aggression and "hybrid war", Ukraine faces the task of creating a modern and effective system of state defense and integrating into international systems. Solving this problem, the successful implementation of defense reform require examining foreign experience in the organization of the EU defense system, peculiarities of development of the security and defense sector in the context of expanding democracy. Ukraine is not a member of NATO and, under the current conditions of counteracting Russia's armed aggression is forced to develop national defense forces which are necessary to restore territorial integrity.Recent research and publications analysis. Due to Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, the study of experience of the leading EU and NATO member states in the field of defense has recently received more and more attention. Thus, a significant contribution into the study of the evolution of European security and defense policy was made by such foreign scholars as R. Gardner, K. Gill, M. Craig, S. Morsch, D. Navarette, M. Smith, B. Tonra, and others. The analysis of the processes of creation and formation of the common foreign security policy of the EU were covered in the works of such domestic scientists as S. Voloshchuk, O. Vonsovych, M. Hladysh, V. Govorukha, Y. Gonchar, A. Grubinko, V. Rud, O. Snigir, V. Streltsov, O. Turchenko, L. Falaleyev, N. Fesenko, V. Shatun, A. Sheludchenkova and others. O. Bodruk, M. Yezheev, V. Gorbulin, O. Litvinenko, V. Gorovenko, M. Lobko, O. Izhak, A. Lobanov, V. Grubov, F. Saganyuk, I. Romanov, V. Trotsko, I. Veshchytsky, M. Sungurovsky and other authors dedicated their works to the development of the defense sectors in the conditions of expansion and deepening of democracy.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. The variability of the political situation, new challenges and threats lead to a constant search for new approaches to addressing security issues. This is what actualizes the problematics of the article.Paper main body. The purpose and the task of the article is to study the system of public management of the EU defense sphere and identify opportunities and areas of cooperation between Ukraine and EU defense structures at the supranational level.The activity of security structures is analyzed, their organizational and legal status and the scope of tasks to ensure the defense capabilities of the union are determined, their powers in relation to national security and defense systems are characterized. The main directions of ensuring the institutional stability of defense structures in the context of changing the position of the United States as the basis of NATO's military power are described and the possibilities of creating a European Defense Alliance are described. It is proved that the EU needs to radically reconsider its approaches to security, first of all, in the field of cooperation of the armed forces of the member states while conducting joint operations and their resource provision. It is established that for Ukraine the development of autonomous supranational European defense structures opens the possibility for further deepening of cooperation with the EU and parallel strengthening its defense capabilities.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. For Ukraine, the development of autonomous supranational European defense structures opens a possibility for further deepening of cooperation with the EU and parallel strengthening of defense capabilities. Such cooperation is a mutually beneficial process, during which Ukraine contributes to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region, and on the other hand, gains the necessary experience in the process of training and exercises.The partnership approach to the further development of Ukraine's cooperation with the EU in the field of foreign policy and security demonstrates three directions:– cooperation between Ukraine and the EU in the international and regional dimensions for the sake of common security;– EU assistance in strengthening the stability and security of Ukraine;– Ukraine's contribution to the security of Europe.It is obvious that in the future the international and regional dimensions of cooperation between Ukraine and the EU will be based on the full support of Ukraine by the European Union in matters relating to sovereignty, territorial integrity, protection of national interests, state and human security. In return, Ukraine must support EU policy, adhere to European values and become their proponent in the regional dimension. Ukraine's main contribution to Europe's security is to strengthen its own defense capabilities and deter Russian aggression on its eastern borders.EU-Ukraine cooperation can be developed both on a large scale and through individual initiatives. The EU Global Strategy provides an opportunity to develop proactive cooperation, for example between the Visegrad Group and Ukraine, or the countries of the Black Sea region in a wide range of issues related to security, crime prevention, terrorism, exchange of information on security issues.

Розглянуто проблеми функціонування та розвитку наднаціональних інституцій Європейського Союзу (далі – ЄС) у сфері безпеки та оборони на фоні змін військово-політичної ситуації у світі. Проаналізовано діяльність безпекових структур, визначено їх організаційно-правовий статус та обсяг завдань із забезпечення обороноздатності ЄС. Охарактеризовано їх повноваження стосовно національних систем безпеки та оборони. Розкрито основні напрямки забезпечення інституціональної стійкості оборонних структур у контексті зміни позиції Сполучених Штатів Америки (далі – США) як основи військової могутності Північноатлантичного альянсу (далі – НАТО) та охарактеризовано можливості створення Європейського оборонного союзу. Доведено, що ЄС необхідно кардинально переглянути свої підходи до забезпечення безпеки передусім у сфері взаємодії збройних сил країн-членів при проведенні спільних операцій і їх ресурсного забезпечення. Встановлено, що для України розвиток автономних наднаціональних європейських оборонних структур відкриває можливість для додаткового поглиблення співпраці із ЄС і паралельного посилення обороноздатності. ; Problem setting. Ukraine's implementation of the strategy of integration into the European Union necessitates taking into account the experience of countries that have already transformed security institutions in accordance with the European democratic tradition, as well as their adaptation to the nature of threats to EU member states. Ukraine's security is based on strengthening the Ñommon European security in all its dimensions. In the conditions of Russian armed aggression and "hybrid war", Ukraine faces the task of creating a modern and effective system of state defense and integrating into international systems. Solving this problem, the successful implementation of defense reform require examining foreign experience in the organization of the EU defense system, peculiarities of development of the security and defense sector in the context of expanding democracy. Ukraine is not a member of NATO and, under the current conditions of counteracting Russia's armed aggression is forced to develop national defense forces which are necessary to restore territorial integrity.Recent research and publications analysis. Due to Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, the study of experience of the leading EU and NATO member states in the field of defense has recently received more and more attention. Thus, a significant contribution into the study of the evolution of European security and defense policy was made by such foreign scholars as R. Gardner, K. Gill, M. Craig, S. Morsch, D. Navarette, M. Smith, B. Tonra, and others. The analysis of the processes of creation and formation of the common foreign security policy of the EU were covered in the works of such domestic scientists as S. Voloshchuk, O. Vonsovych, M. Hladysh, V. Govorukha, Y. Gonchar, A. Grubinko, V. Rud, O. Snigir, V. Streltsov, O. Turchenko, L. Falaleyev, N. Fesenko, V. Shatun, A. Sheludchenkova and others. O. Bodruk, M. Yezheev, V. Gorbulin, O. Litvinenko, V. Gorovenko, M. Lobko, O. Izhak, A. Lobanov, V. Grubov, F. Saganyuk, I. Romanov, V. Trotsko, I. Veshchytsky, M. Sungurovsky and other authors dedicated their works to the development of the defense sectors in the conditions of expansion and deepening of democracy.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. The variability of the political situation, new challenges and threats lead to a constant search for new approaches to addressing security issues. This is what actualizes the problematics of the article.Paper main body. The purpose and the task of the article is to study the system of public management of the EU defense sphere and identify opportunities and areas of cooperation between Ukraine and EU defense structures at the supranational level.The activity of security structures is analyzed, their organizational and legal status and the scope of tasks to ensure the defense capabilities of the union are determined, their powers in relation to national security and defense systems are characterized. The main directions of ensuring the institutional stability of defense structures in the context of changing the position of the United States as the basis of NATO's military power are described and the possibilities of creating a European Defense Alliance are described. It is proved that the EU needs to radically reconsider its approaches to security, first of all, in the field of cooperation of the armed forces of the member states while conducting joint operations and their resource provision. It is established that for Ukraine the development of autonomous supranational European defense structures opens the possibility for further deepening of cooperation with the EU and parallel strengthening its defense capabilities.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. For Ukraine, the development of autonomous supranational European defense structures opens a possibility for further deepening of cooperation with the EU and parallel strengthening of defense capabilities. Such cooperation is a mutually beneficial process, during which Ukraine contributes to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region, and on the other hand, gains the necessary experience in the process of training and exercises.The partnership approach to the further development of Ukraine's cooperation with the EU in the field of foreign policy and security demonstrates three directions:– cooperation between Ukraine and the EU in the international and regional dimensions for the sake of common security;– EU assistance in strengthening the stability and security of Ukraine;– Ukraine's contribution to the security of Europe.It is obvious that in the future the international and regional dimensions of cooperation between Ukraine and the EU will be based on the full support of Ukraine by the European Union in matters relating to sovereignty, territorial integrity, protection of national interests, state and human security. In return, Ukraine must support EU policy, adhere to European values and become their proponent in the regional dimension. Ukraine's main contribution to Europe's security is to strengthen its own defense capabilities and deter Russian aggression on its eastern borders.EU-Ukraine cooperation can be developed both on a large scale and through individual initiatives. The EU Global Strategy provides an opportunity to develop proactive cooperation, for example between the Visegrad Group and Ukraine, or the countries of the Black Sea region in a wide range of issues related to security, crime prevention, terrorism, exchange of information on security issues.

This dissertation has illuminated how Danish universities have developed as organizations over decades. The days when largely self-reliant professors dominated the universities numerically and practically have long passed. Universities have been transforming into more fully-fledged organizations with a more diverse staffing model. While the literature agrees on the characteristics of the traditional university model, it disagrees on the character, pace, and drivers of the new model's emergence. This dissertation has addressed the need for empirical research into the organizational consequences of long-term pressure on universities, the lack of which stands in contrast to the magnitude of change that has occurred. It provides a new empirical basis for grounding conceptual claims of university transformation. Important contours of the new model become visible when the spotlight is thoroughly turned from the professors to the totality of university employees. This dissertation has shed light on the obvious but oft-forgotten fact that Danish universities consist of a wide variety of employees. The variety of university jobs extends far beyond what most people imagine—hundreds of distinct job titles. This dissertation has holistically examined staff changes at very different levels of resolution over a significant period, embracing the longitudinal and multi-level nature of university transformation. The used staff data has been processed at the most disaggregated level available with the aim of comprehending and harmonizing staff categories across time, universities, and countries. For the Danish case, a multi-tiered categorization was created, allowing higher-level categories to be transparently understood as aggregations of lower-level categories and specific job titles and work conditions. The scale, resolution, and consistency in which staff changes have been analyzed make this dissertation stand out. Contrary to notions of resilience and change-resistance, the empirical analyses have revealed in new detail how two overarching staff categories have steadily grown in importance: Temporary academic staff and professionalized administrative/managerial staff. These developments have made the academic and non-academic workforce resemble the classic organizational pyramid-shape of low- and high-status employees. Numerous newly appointed mid-level line managers increasingly tie separate departments and units together via the empowered upper management. New professional capacities have emerged around the various line managers and around crosscutting service functions, which all together complement each other in an increasingly fine-grained and formalized system of designated offices. Hence, Danish universities have come to increasingly resemble other hierarchically managed organizations—at least from a distance. This shift reflects efforts to formalize and delegate tasks previously conducted informally as integrated elements in academic culture: On the one hand, a process of moving tasks out of a fragmented academic arena into an administrative and managerial sphere, which is expected to be more consistent and accountable. On the other hand, a process of spreading academic tasks among a more diversified academic workforce, which is expected to be more productive, flexible, and responsive to society. While the Danish staff data in itself provided few clues about the drivers behind the organizational transformation, it was well-suited to be combined with other data types that could help explain the development. The multi-tiered staff categorization made it possible to break down staff categories, so they closely complement manager interviews, funding figures, policy documents, and foreign staff data. This combination provided fresh insights into the long-term drivers and consequences of university transformation. It was particularly apt to illuminate how various changes have slowly but steadily built up over two decades, resulting in significant organizational restructuring. It showed that drivers at different levels (e.g., local managers, national policy reforms, and global models) have interacted but mainly strengthened one another's effects. The organizational transformation is an adaptation to both specific external pressures (e.g., national policy reforms) and to a general situation with increased external pressures (e.g., from external stakeholders). National policy reforms have clearly prompted the new organizational university model in Denmark, but the development cannot be understood in distinctively national terms. The reforms have clear ties to global pressures that have simultaneously impinged on the Danish universities directly. Global pressures empowered the impact of national policy reforms on Danish universities, which again empowered their hierarchical structures, which in turn further empowered the impact of policy reforms and global pressures. National policy reforms clearly gave the development a certain direction, momentum, and legitimacy, which in turn shaped the influence of other concurrent and more generic drivers. This dissertation has cast light on developments that the traditional university model cannot explain. The traditional model owes its origin to the time when self-reliant professors dominated universities numerically and practically. To a growing extent, a new organizational model is required to understand the coexistence of multiple, important staff categories in universities. The formalization and delegation have potentially offset parts of the traditional model. However, scholars continue to argue that (senior?) academics are very loosely coupled, limiting universities' formalization and delegation to rather superficial matters. Hence, the growing weight of the new model does not necessarily reduce the traditional one correspondingly. The two somewhat conflicting models can co-exist and only partially mix. However, accounts of historical stability "naturally" over-focus on the centuries-old practices of professors, because the historical record of other staff categories first gained real weight in recent years. A rather narrow and static view on the core missions of the university is common and easily but mistakenly equated with the work of professors. A balanced understanding of the competing traditional and new model requires a fine-grained approach to core and non-core practices, which takes the diversified workforce and the stretched university missions into account. This dissertation has taken the first steps toward a holistic understanding of Danish universities as huge, multi-purpose organizations by analyzing staff changes at very different levels of resolution. Despite a notorious reputation for being reluctant to change, today's Danish universities are different entities than what they were a few decades ago.

Public spaces and institutions have often been linked when it comes to art practice in Bangalore. Whether it was the large-scale earthworks or the appropriation of heritage spaces taken on by artists, the spaces occupied by the public and the public art institutions have had a strong impact on the ways art gets produced in the city. There is also an additional element of reclaiming public spaces that is the struggle of most cities today. Since February this year, the artist community of Bangalore has protested against the move made by the government to 'hand over' the Venkatappa Art Gallery to a private entity. This has spurred a lot of conversations about public spaces and public resources in the city, specifically, in relation to art. Art history and the 'teaching of art' have often been celebrated as an achievement of European scholarship. It is true that a number of institutions set up to teach art in India are a colonial legacy, but what emerged post-independence is a culture of rejecting European aesthetics and trying to form a national one if it were. And in our era of post-modern/post-colonial awareness, there is a fluidity in the conduct of the institutions and in the understanding of public spaces that have contributed to the aesthetic of the contemporary artist. In the light of the recent events, this paper will examine the ways in which the art gallery and later the freeform collectives serve as educational spaces for students and subsequently, explore the implications of the lack of such spaces in the practice of art in contemporary times. Art Education in post-independence India reflected the uniquely Indianized, modern art-making. However, this modernist or 'formal' concept of art teaching and learning, prevalent during the prior era, still prevails in the majority of art schools in the country. Here, Modernist and formal are terms used with reference to the way art is made. A formal approach to painting would be in pure painting techniques that used oil/watercolour/acrylic paint on Canvas/paper. It also refers to form in the painting where there may be an abstract or figurative subject painted but it remains in the form of a painting, unlike contemporary art where the work of art is no longer restricted to a medium. It is important for us to note at this juncture that while the city that is now known as a font of conceptual and performance-based work, still retains institutions, such as the art schools that teach a modernist aesthetic. Therefore, one could safely assume that the spaces that exist outside of the art school feed into the art teaching-learning for students. That is to say, the culture that developed since the establishment of the early art schools, fostered an environment of experimentation. This kind of art practice led to the dematerialized artworks and research-led initiatives that have become a part of contemporary art in Bangalore. The art school, the way we know it is a product of a colonial legacy and a nationalist need to 'encourage' all forms of education. But is there a school that can exist without an idea, or an inheritance? An ethics of knowledge is the foundation of any school in its essential definition as a gathering place but the complexity of what that knowledge should be, how its production is configured and unfolds, who translates it across the bridges of generations and time, whether its structure is rigid or limpid in its willingness to change, whether it is resistant to external mandates or longs for the imprimatur of an outside authority, and what status and success signify for its teachers and graduates—all of these define the place of gathering, its ethical complexion, its reasons for being, and what learning means there (Madoff, 2009). It would also be good to note here that the 20th century saw significant changes in terms of artistic practice. One significant change in the these years is a 'flattening' of genres/styles/discipline. Keeping this in mind, then one can ask, how do the art schools qualify teaching the traditional practices of painting, sculpture, print-making and such as 'visual art' and nothing else? How has it become, that the residencies and collectives that spring out of art school or exist outside of the art school have become incubators of what is contemporary? In Bangalore, there has been no dearth of alternative institutional and art making spaces. Of these, the contemporary art galleries set up in the 50's and 60's were important to the construction of the contemporary aesthetic that is a signature of Bangalore-based artists and students. This aesthetic is seen in the large number of performance works as well as the collaborations and collective formations that produce art. The Venkatappa Art Gallery, due to its eminence as an art space for young artists as well as a museum commemorating a modern Master, becomes a nodal point in the construction of contemporary art history of Bangalore. The Gallery, as seen by the artist community, is an inclusive and democratic space which can be hired at low costs by young artists and those from the provinces, and also excellent for non-commercial and experimental art projects, festivals, workshops, seminars, talks and meetings. Most of the artists who are part of the Venkatappa Art Gallery forum have had their first solo shows in the gallery. Through the years, there have been group shows, collective projects, eight state Kala Melas, retrospective of RM Hadpad, The Khoj International Artists Residency, The International Live Art Festival, Co-Lab and Ananya Drishya artist talks, and in more recent times, the IFA Public Art presentations, to name a few activities. These events have been open to the public and have been well attended. Students from local art schools, as well as those from other cities in the State, have been known to present/display here following the completion of their studies. Presenting one's artwork in the gallery is almost like a rite of passage and therefore has evidenced work of a number of prominent artists.