Suchergebnisse

It is time to retire the phrase "military-industrial complex."President Dwight Eisenhower coined this immortal phrase during his January 17, 1961 farewell address to warn Americans against the "acquisition of unwarranted influence" by the conjunction of "an immense military establishment and a large arms industry."As a five-star general, Ike knew, perhaps better than anyone, the self-serving and mutually beneficial relationship between the defense industry and the military. But he neglected to mention Congress's role in the arrangement, nor could he necessarily have foreseen the ways in which corporate interests would intertwine themselves with the various bureaucracies that keep the Pentagon's coffers flowing.While the phrase "military-industrial-congressional-information complex" would be more accurate, it doesn't exactly roll off the tongue. And like Eisenhower's snappier appellation, it still suggests an element of conspiracy. But, of course, none of this is theoretical. The Pentagon, Congress, the defense industry, think tanks, lobbyists, and industry-sponsored media outlets are all very real. When combined, they make up what is better termed the "National Security Establishment," which Americans see in action all the time.We see it when a retired general goes on television to explain exactly how the Ukrainian army can defeat the Russians — but only if Congress passes the latest billion-dollar aid package. No mention is made of the rather relevant fact that the general's think tank is funded by defense contractors who stand to benefit from the aid package he is calling for.We see it when another general retires from his post as the head of his service branch and turns up six months later on the board of a major defense contractor. Coincidentally, it's the same defense contractor that celebrated a year earlier when that general announced the company had won the $21.4 billion contract to build a fleet of bombers.We see it when a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee proposes the U.S. spend 5% of the gross domestic product every year on the military — a $55 billion increase to the current Pentagon budget. Predictably, he fails to mention that the majority of this money would go to defense contracts awarded to the same organizations that have given him more than $530,000 in campaign money since 2019. He fails to acknowledge how flush Pentagon budgets over the past 25 years created the sorry state of the military today.We even see it when we least expect to, as when the country's largest defense contractor runs advertisements during the Oscars and posts an interactive map on the company's website touting the economic benefits of a weapon program. The company wants everyone to know how many jobs could be lost if Congress votes to disrupt the program in any way.The American people also see the impact of these actions by the National Security Establishment.We see tens of billions spent on a fighter jet that can only be reliably ready for combat a third of the time. We also see more than $60 billion spent designing and building warships that were so flawed Navy officials apparently can't get rid of them fast enough. The Navy decommissioned one of these ships less than 5 years after its commissioning ceremony, roughly two decades ahead of the ship's planned lifespan. Starting in 2003, the Army spent at least $8 billion, and some sources say the better part of $20 billion, developing the Future Combat System, a family of armored vehicles to replace Cold War-era tanks, personnel carriers, and artillery vehicles. The Pentagon then canceled the program in 2009 with little to show for the effort and expense.There are plenty of other examples of failed acquisition efforts from the past 25 years which partially explain why annual defense spending is now a whopping 48% higher than it was in 2000. Compounding these efforts is the Pentagon's reliance on contractors to perform many roles once performed by uniformed service members at a much lower financial rate. The Department of Defense itself analyzed one case where hiring a group of contractors cost 316% more than the government employees tasked with similar work.In a city where partisanship and political rancor impacts nearly every debate, wasteful and ineffective defense policies are a conspicuous exception. That is because the National Security Establishment is party-agnostic. Military contractors donate money to candidates and lobbyists on both sides of the aisle, those candidates vote for Pentagon budget increases and fund weapons programs long after their failures are widely known, and lobbyists and corporate-sponsored media groups generate public support for those programs. Without massive structural changes, this pattern is all but certain to continue into future generations. Today's National Security Establishment has launched several major weapons programs in recent years that, if allowed to continue on their current trajectories, will drive the annual Pentagon budget to truly unprecedented levels.As programs like the B-21, Constellation-class frigate, Next Generation Air Dominance fighter jet, Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, several ground vehicle programs, the Sentinel nuclear missile, and myriad space and cyber systems mature and enter full-rate production in the coming decades, the Pentagon budget will expand to cover the costs. But this doesn't have to be the case, if Congress actually does its oversight job. Several of these programs are already behind schedule and over budget. Costs for the Sentinel missile program have increased 81% to $140.9 billion from the original $77.7 billion estimate and it will still be several years before the first missile is installed in its silo. Yet, given the massive financial influence, even these egregious failures are all but glossed over, a simple footnote for most, and then prepared for a rubber stamp.The services and their bureaucracies, the defense industry, members of Congress, and the paid mouthpieces promoting their interests in the media and during lobbying visits all comprise the all-too-real National Security Establishment. Identifying this network is the first step to avoid saddling future generations with the crushing debt associated with unsustainable U.S. military policies today.While it is long-past time to update the name, Eisenhower's warning is still more real than ever. Americans must remain vigilant and guard against the self-serving nature of this apparatus that is more intent on lining its own pockets than it is actually keeping Americans and our allies safe.-

This dissertation comprises three chapters on the economics of financing and integrating renewable energies and on designing associated support policies. The transition toward carbon-neutral economies requires large-scale investments into renewable energy. The integration of these intermittent renewable energies poses new challenges to power systems designed around dispatchable thermal power plants. As, for example, more and more wind power is generated in high wind, it is increasingly important to provide incentives that encourage project developers to choose alternative wind power technologies that supply power also under mediocre wind conditions. Another challenge are the investments' financing costs, as they, to a large extent, define overall investment costs and are affected by the design of support policies. The question arises which policies lead to higher financing costs. Further, in order to facilitate large investment volumes, it is crucial to design policies such that they constitute credible commitments on the basis of which investments can be made. Chapter 1 analyzes the integration of wind power into energy systems with increasing shares of renewable energies. In energy systems with large shares of variable renewable energies, electricity generation is lower during unfavorable weather conditions. System-friendly wind turbines rectify this by producing a larger share of their electricity at low wind speeds. The chapter analyzes to what extent the benefits of system-friendly wind turbines out-weigh their additional costs and how to incentivize investments into them. A wind power investment model for Germany shows that system-friendly wind turbines indeed deliver benefits for the energy system that overcompensate for their cost premium. Sliding feed-in premia incentivize their deployment only where investors bear significant price risks and possess sufficient foresight. Alternatively, a new production value-based benchmark triggers investors to install turbines that meet the requirements of power systems with increasing shares of variable renewable energies, without inducing additional investment risks. Chapter 2 provides novel evidence that some support policies lead to higher financing and overall deployment costs than others. Power systems with increasing shares of wind and solar power generation have higher capital and lower operational costs than power systems based on fossil fuels. This increases the importance of the cost of financing for total system cost. We quantify how renewable policy design can influence the cost of financing by addressing regulatory risk and facilitating hedging. First, we use interview data on wind power financing costs from the EU and derive effects on project developers' financing costs. Second, we model how long-term contracts signed between project developers and energy suppliers impact financing costs in the context of green certificate schemes. The costs of renewable energies increase by about 30 percent in comparison to policies that provide implicit long-term contracts between project developers and electricity consumers. Chapter 3 shows that time-inconsistency issues can arise for renewable energy investments, deterring investments, and how these issues can be addressed by policy-makers. Investments into renewable energies are commonly enabled by support policies. Yet, governments can have incentives -- and the ability -- to deviate from previously-announced support once investments are made, which can deter investments. In the first step, we analyze a renewable energy regulation game and apply a model of time-inconsistency to renewable energy policies. Based on the model, we derive under what conditions governments have incentives to deviate from their commitments, analyzing the potentially mitigating effects of various policy designs and targets. In the second step, we provide a numerical example of our theoretical model and explain why Spain conducted retrospective changes in 2010-2013 whereas Germany stuck to its commitments. The model suggests that, on the one hand, the extra costs of renewable energies were considerably lower in Spain due to the higher wholesale electricity price, rendering compliance more attractive in Spain. However, on the other hand, this is outweighed by the dirtier German conventional power plant fleet and especially by the larger myopia of the Spanish regulator, caused by high discounting during the financial crisis of future benefits of sustained renewable energy deployment. ; Diese Dissertation umfasst drei Kapitel über die volkswirtschaftlichen Effekte der Finanzierung und Integration erneuerbarer Energien und das Design entsprechender Förderinstrumente. Die Umstellung hin zu einer CO2-neutralen Wirtschaft bedingt groß angelegte Investitionen in erneuerbare Energien. Die Integration wetterabhängiger erneuerbarer Energien stellt neue Herausforderungen dar für Energiesysteme, die für regelbare thermische Kraftwerke ausgelegt wurden. Beispielsweise wird bei starkem Wind mehr und mehr Windenergie erzeugt. Deshalb ist es zunehmend wichtig, Anreize zu schaffen, die Projektentwickler dazu ermutigen, alternative Windkrafttechnologien zu wählen, welche Strom auch unter mittelmäßigen Windbedingungen liefern. Eine weitere Herausforderung sind die Finanzierungskosten der Investitionen, da sie die Gesamtinvestitionskosten weitgehend bestimmen und von der Gestaltung der Förderpolitik beeinflusst werden. Es stellt sich die Frage, welche Politikinstrumente mit höheren Finanzierungskosten einhergehen. Außerdem ist es, um große Investitionsvolumina zu ermöglichen, essentiell, Politikinstrumente so zu gestalten, dass sie glaubwürdige Zusagen darstellen, auf deren Grundlage Investitionen getätigt werden können. Kapitel 1 analysiert die Integration von Windenergie in Energiesysteme mit steigenden Anteilen erneuerbarer Energien. In solchen Energiesystemen ist die Stromerzeugung bei ungünstigen Wetterbedingungen geringer. Systemfreundliche Windenergieanlagen korrigieren dies, indem sie einen größeren Anteil ihres Stroms bereits bei niedrigen Windgeschwindigkeiten produzieren. In diesem Beitrag wird analysiert, inwieweit die Vorteile systemfreundlicher Windenergieanlagen ihre zusätzlichen Kosten übersteigen und wie man Anreize für Investitionen in solche Anlagen geben kann. Ein Windkraft-Investitionsmodell für Deutschland zeigt, dass systemfreundliche Windenergieanlagen tatsächlich Vorteile für das Energiesystem bieten, die ihre zusätzlichen Kosten überkompensieren. Gleitende Marktprämien bieten nur dann einen Anreiz für solche Anlagen, wenn Investoren ein erhebliches Preisrisiko tragen und ausreichend vorausschauend sind. Alternativ veranlasst ein neues Referenzwertmodell Investoren dazu, Anlagen zu installieren, die die Anforderungen von Energiesystemen mit steigenden Anteilen erneuerbarer Energien erfüllen, ohne dass Investoren dadurch zusätzliche Risiken entstehen. Kapitel 2 liefert neue Belege dafür, dass einige Förderinstrumente zu höheren Finanzierungs- und Gesamtkosten der erneuerbaren Energien führen als andere. Energiesysteme mit steigenden Anteilen an Wind- und Solarenergie haben höhere Kapitalkosten und geringere Betriebskosten als Energiesysteme auf Basis fossiler Brennstoffe. Dies erhöht die Bedeutung der Finanzierungskosten für die Gesamtsystemkosten. Wir quantifizieren, wie Förderinstrumente die Finanzierungskosten beeinflussen können, indem sie regulatorische Risiken adressieren und Absicherungen ermöglichen. Zum einen verwenden wir Befragungsdaten zu den Finanzierungskosten für Windenergie aus der EU und ermitteln daraus die Auswirkungen von Förderinstrumenten auf die Finanzierungskosten der Projektentwickler. Zum anderen modellieren wir, wie langfristige Verträge zwischen Projektentwicklern und Energieversorgungsunternehmen die Finanzierungskosten bei grünen Zertifikatehandeln beeinflussen. Die Kosten für erneuerbare Energien steigen um etwa 30 Prozent im Vergleich zu Förderinstrumenten, welche implizite Langzeitverträge zwischen Projektentwicklern und Stromverbrauchern darstellen. Kapitel 3 zeigt einerseits, dass Probleme zeitlicher Inkonsistenzen bei Investitionen in erneuerbare Energien auftreten können, wodurch Investitionen verhindert werden, und andererseits, wie diese Probleme von politischen Entscheidungsträgern angegangen werden können. Investitionen in erneuerbare Energien werden üblicherweise durch Förderinstrumente unterstützt. Regierungen können jedoch Anreize und die Möglichkeit haben, von zuvor angekündigten Vergütungszahlungen abzuweichen, sobald Investitionen getätigt wurden, was Investoren abschrecken kann. Im ersten Schritt analysieren wir ein Regulierungsspiel von Investitionen in erneuerbare Energien und wenden ein Modell der zeitlichen Inkonsistenz auf die Förderung erneuerbarer Energien an. Auf der Grundlage des Modells leiten wir ab, unter welchen Bedingungen Regierungen Anreize haben, von ihren Verpflichtungen abzuweichen, und analysieren die potenziell mildernden Auswirkungen verschiedener Förderinstrumente und von erneuerbare-Energien-Zielen. Im zweiten Schritt geben wir ein numerisches Beispiel für unser theoretisches Modell und erklären, warum Spanien 2010-2013 retrospektive Änderungen seiner Förderung durchführte, während Deutschland seinen Verpflichtungen nachkam. Die Modellergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass die zusätzlichen Kosten für erneuerbare Energien in Spanien aufgrund des höheren Großhandelsstrompreises deutlich niedriger waren als in Deutschland, was eigentlich die Erfüllung der Verpflichtungen in Spanien attraktiver machte. Jedoch wird dies durch die schmutzigere deutsche konventionelle Kraftwerksflotte und insbesondere durch die Kurzsichtigkeit der spanischen Regulierer mehr als aufgewogen, welche in der Finanzkrise dem zukünftigen Nutzen erneuerbarer Energien durch hohe Diskontierung wenig Wert beimaßen.

Production of fuel ethanol in the United States has increased ten-fold since 1993, largely as a result of government programs motivated by goals to improve domestic energy security, economic development, and environmental impacts. Over the next decade, the growth of and eventually the total production of second generation cellulosic biofuels is projected to exceed first generation (e.g., corn-based) biofuels, which will require continued expansion of infrastructure for producing and distributing ethanol and perhaps other biofuels. In addition to identifying potential differences in tailpipe emissions from vehicles operating with ethanol-blended or ethanol-free gasoline, environmental comparison of ethanol to petroleum fuels requires a comprehensive accounting of life-cycle environmental effects. Hundreds of published studies evaluate the life-cycle emissions from biofuels and petroleum, but the operation and maintenance of storage, handling, and distribution infrastructure and equipment for fuels and fuel feedstocks had not been adequately addressed. Little attention has been paid to estimating and minimizing emissions from these complex systems, presumably because they are believed to contribute a small fraction of total emissions for petroleum and first generation biofuels. This research aims to quantify the environmental impacts associated with the major components of fuel distribution infrastructure, and the impacts that will be introduced by expanding the parallel infrastructure needed to accommodate more biofuels in our existing systems. First, the components used in handling, storing, and transporting feedstocks and fuels are physically characterized by typical operating throughput, utilization, and lifespan. US-specific life-cycle GHG emission and water withdrawal factors are developed for each major distribution chain activity by applying a hybrid life-cycle assessment methodology to the manufacturing, construction, maintenance and operation of each component. Emissions from activities at the end of life of equipment and infrastructure are not included, as these activities have previously been shown to contribute negligibly to life-cycle emissions. Life-cycle transportation mode GHG emission factors per tonne-kilometer (t-km) are presented for long distance pipelines (5-20 g CO2-e/t-km), ocean tankers (5-17 g/t-km), fuel-carrying barges (31 g/t-km), fuel-carrying unit trains (25 g/t-km), tanker trucks (140-180 g/t-km), and bale-transporting flatbed trucks (200 g/t-km). Life-cycle emission factors are also presented per tonne of material throughput for several types of agricultural equipment (600-19,000 g CO2-e/t handled), fuel conversion facilities (9,000-98,000 g/t), fuel storage and dispensing facilities (2,000-12,000 g/t), and the portion of passenger vehicle operations dedicated to refueling errands (2,000-200,000 g/t). The emissions intensity ranges reported for specific transportation modes are largely due to the greater energy efficiency of larger vehicles and pipelines, and the emissions intensity ranges within stationary storage and handling equipment is often due to differences in utilization of capital equipment and/or material losses during storage and handling activities. Consistent with existing literature, the contribution of non-operation stages to life-cycle GHG emissions ranges from 20% to 40% for most of the components modeled. Criteria air pollutant (NOx, PM2.5, SOx, VOC, CO) emission factors are also presented for the operation stage (e.g., tailpipe only) of each transportation mode. In order to apply the new emission factors to policy-relevant scenarios, a projection is made for the fleet inventory of infrastructure components necessary to distribute 21 billion gallons of ethanol (the 2022 federal mandate for advanced biofuels under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007) derived entirely from Miscanthus grass, for comparison to the baseline petroleum system. Due to geographic, physical and chemical properties of biomass and alcohols, the distribution system for Miscanthus-based ethanol is more capital- and energy-intensive than petroleum per unit of fuel energy delivered. Assuming steady-state annual turnover, operation, and maintenance of infrastructure to supply the projected quantities of ethanol and petroleum fuels, ethanol is estimated to be approximately five times more GHG and water intensive than petroleum (i.e., GHG emissions of more than 17 g CO2-e/MJ versus 3 g/MJ, and water withdrawals of 380 L/MJ vs. 77 L/MJ of consumed fuel, neglecting feedstock production and conversion). Embodied GHG emissions from manufacturing and maintaining infrastructure, equipment, and vehicles make up less than half of these emissions, at approximately 1 g CO2-e/MJ of petroleum fuel and 8 g CO2-e/MJ of ethanol. Although petroleum fuels are projected to supply twenty times the energy content of ethanol in 2022, the annual GHG and water withdrawal footprint of petroleum's liquid fuel infrastructure and distribution system is slightly less than four times that of ethanol (i.e., 110 vs. 30 million tonnes of CO2-e and 2,500 vs. 640 billion liters of water). Opportunities to significantly reduce emissions include shifting transportation to more efficient modes, consuming products closer to producers, and converting biorefineries to produce fuel with higher energy density than ethanol. Minimizing fuel transportation distance is believed to be the most feasible and cost-effective opportunity to reduce emissions in the near term.The transportation of biofuels away from producer regions poses environmental, health, and economic trade-offs that are herein evaluated using a simplified national distribution network model. In just the last ten years, ethanol transportation within the contiguous United States is estimated to have increased more than ten-fold in total t-km as ethanol has increasingly been transported away from Midwest producers due to air quality regulations pertaining to gasoline, renewable fuel mandates, and the 10% blending limit (i.e., the E10 blend wall). From 2004 to 2009, approximately 10 billion t-km of ethanol transportation are estimated to have taken place annually for reasons other than the E10 blend wall, leading to annual freight costs greater than $240 million and more than 300,000 tonnes of CO2-e emissions and significant emissions of criteria air pollutants from the combustion of more than 90 million liters of diesel. Although emissions from distribution activities are small when normalized to each unit of fuel, they are large in scale.Archetypal fuel distribution routes by rail and by truck are created to evaluate the significance of mode choice and route location on the severity of public health impacts from locomotive and truck emissions, by calculating the average PM2.5 pollution intake fraction along each route. Exposure to pollution resulting from trucking is found to be approximately twice as harmful as rail (while trucking is five times more energy intensive). Transporting fuel from the Midwest to California would result in slightly lower human health impacts than transportation to New Jersey, even though California is more than 50% farther from the Midwest than most coastal Northeast states.In summary, this dissertation integrated concepts from infrastructure management, climate and renewable fuel policy, fuel chemistry and combustion science, air pollution modeling, public health impact assessment, network optimization and geospatial analysis. In identifying and quantifying opportunities to minimize damage to the global climate and regional air quality from fuel distribution, results in this dissertation provide credence to the urgency of harmonizing policies and programs that address national and global energy and environmental goals. Under optimal future policy and economic conditions, infrastructure will be highly utilized and transportation minimized in order to reduce total economic, health, and environmental burdens associated with the entire supply and distribution chain for transportation fuels.

Maritime shipping is considered as the most eco-friendly and fuel-efficient method of transport in ton-miles terms and moves about 90% of the worldwide trade (UNCTAD, 2020) [1]. The third GHG study (IMO, 2014) [2] estimates that shipping accounts for approximately 2.2% of the global anthropogenic CO2 emissions, addressing a 0.5% decrease from the second GHG study measures (IMO, 2009) [3]. However, the sector has seen increasing pressure, through new guidelines to improve its environmental performance, especially considering its commitment to harmful contamination emissions on human wellbeing. Sea transport represents 5–8% of the worldwide SOx emissions (Eyring et al., 2005) [4], and around 15% for NOx (Corbett et al., 2007) [5], while PM emissions from transportation close to coastlines and ports have been connected to fatalities attributed to respiratory health issues. The IMO is regulating the greatest sulfur limits in fuel through the changed MARPOL Annex VI, which additionally assigned sulfur emission control areas (SECA) where more tight limits apply. Current SECAs incorporate the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the North American Emission control area (ECA) that broadens 200NM from the US and Canadian coasts, and the US Caribbean ECA. The last two ECAs have likewise set limitations on PM and NOx emissions. The first results of the SECAs on emissions limitation show critical enhancements. In relevant literature, there has been no recent update on the portion of sea transport in SOx emissions, and the most recent solid estimate is in the previously mentioned investigation of Eyring et al., back in 2005. On a later publication, Zis and Psaraftis (2018) [6] utilized information from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on its part nations and assessed those SOx emissions from all transportation modes represented 3.5% in 2015. Taking into account that road transport represented 0.48%, the portion of maritime transportation in SOx emissions has been radically diminished since 2005. Notwithstanding the introduction of SECAs, as of January 2010 the European Union (EU) set a sulphur limit of 0.1% for ships berth in EU ports with stays longer than 2 h, as well as when sailing on inland waterways [7]. European Commission has advanced the further arrangement of shorepower to its part states through an authority suggestion [8]. Port authorities all throughout the planet have launched initiatives that advance utilization of low-sulfur fuel in their proximity, with the port of Singapore being a notable example under the Green Ship and Green Port programs offering monetary incentives for clean practices that reduce CO2 and SOx emissions. At last, the ports of Los Angeles and of Long Beach have presented voluntary speed reduction programs (VSRP) in their proximity in return for a decrease of port disbursements accounts and are moving towards making the use of shorepower for ocean going ships mandatory. Concerning guidelines focusing on sulfur outflows, ship owners can consent by one or the other changing to ultra-low sulphur fuels like Marine Gas Oil (MGO) or investing in scrubber systems that treat the exhaust gases to remove SOx and PM emissions hence permitting the utilization of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO). Additionally, to adapt to guidelines on emissions at ports a vessel can either utilize cleaner fuel or, on the other hand, be retrofitted to get shorepower if the port has cold ironing facilities. Thusly, to address ecological regulation the shipowners have to pay to obtain abatement technology or increase their operating costs by utilizing cleaner yet more expensive fuel. Which option of the above mentioned is more cost-effective for the shipowner depends on various factors, including ship type, ship size, regulations affecting the waters in which the ship sails, and ports of call. Simultaneously, the choice of a port to put resources into innovations that permit the arrangement of shorepower relies upon a few variables, which stem from emissions decrease strategies, and the entrance pace of the innovation in the calling ships. The last decades the demand of energy is being increased continuously. The massive use of different types of non-renewable sources of energy has led to very important problems in the earth, as global warming, by the production of big amounts of greenhouse gases (GHGs) [52]. Nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO) and carbon dioxide (CO2) are some of the elements that are being produced by the burning process of marine diesel engines and pollute the atmosphere. This fact is a result of the use of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) in vessels' engines which is preferred by the shipowners especially for economy reasons [53]. New technologies concerning alternative sources of energy have started to provide new environmental standards by reducing the emissions of harmful for the environment gases as CO2. More than the 80% of the harmful emissions in the atmosphere are related to carbon [54]. Consequently, decarbonization constitutes on of the biggest environmental problems and despite the fact that the efficiency in terms of energy in the maritime transport has been increased significantly, shipping industry has the responsibility of almost 940 million tons of CO2 emissions in the atmosphere per year. Taking into consideration the continuously increase of the global fleet we can easily understand that these emissions are going to reach a higher level in the next few years [55]. The use of alternative fuels seems to be the only solution for the environment and European Union has already include in her White Paper on Transport their introduction [56]. More specifically, in 2016, European Union has already released a «Strategy for liquefied natural gas and gas storage» in order to highlight the advantages and the potential of the use of LNG to all members of the Union. Moreover, in October 2014, the executive committee of the European Union obliged 139 ports in Europe to act appropriate in order to have the possibility to offer bunkering facilities for LNG until 2020 [59]. Additionally, the effort to control the pollution emissions was strengthen by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) through the introduction of new regulations. More specifically, International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) was embraced by the IMO which also adopted amendments to MARPOL Annex VI (Resolution MEPC.203 (62)) through the introduction of an energy efficiency design index in order to reduce the CO2 emissions [54, 61]. This paper discusses the possibility of different types of fuels or technological investments to be used as marine fuels from the perspective of shipowners, terminal operators, and regulatory bodies while considering the extent of ecological improvement that can provide. The first section of this paper presents a concise literature review of relevant research in port emissions as well as regulations that are used nowadays, which are imposed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The subsequent section presents an analysis and evaluation of different types of fuels which should appraise the new ecological equilibrium following the established environmental and safety regulations. In the last part, the benefits and drawbacks of its kind of fuel are widely expressed.

Questa tesi si propone di affrontare alcune specifiche questioni riguardanti il ius militare, ovvero quello specifico ius singulare, che, a partire da Augusto, disciplinò le esistenze dei soldati e dei veterani dell'esercito romano. Nello specifico, l'indagine si concentra unicamente sulle norme regolanti la condizione di milites e veterani nell'età del Principato. La ricerca si divide in quattro parti. Nella prima si propone una breve descrizione della storia istituzionale dell'esercito, a partire dalla riforma di Caio Mario fino agli interventi di Augusto in ambito militare. Con riguardo alla riforma militare augustea ci si è soffermati, innanzitutto, sull'istituzione del servizio militare professionale e, in secondo luogo, sull'istituzione dei premi di congedo (i cosiddetti praemia militiae) e dell'aerarium militare (ovvero della cassa specificamente preposta al pagamento dei praemia). Nella seconda parte si prendono in esame le norme che disciplinavano il procedimento di reclutamento e le condizioni di accesso ai differenti corpi dell'esercito, vale a dire le legioni, le truppe ausiliarie, le coorti pretorie e urbane, le coorti dei vigiles, gli equites singulares Augusti e le flotte pretorie e provinciali. Oltre ai requisiti fisici e a quelli giuridici, previsti per accedere a tali corpi, si è approfondito lo studio dello status civitatis attribuito ai milites di alcuni reparti (segnatamente i classiarii delle flotte pretorie e gli equites singulares Augusti), al momento della loro iscrizione nei ranghi dell'unità. La terza parte approfondisce un tema molto controverso, quello del divieto di matrimonio dei militari. Dopo un'analisi approfondita delle differenti opinioni formulate su questo problema, la mia tesi si rivolge ad alcuni nodi mai sciolti dagli studiosi, chiarendo che esso, certamente introdotto prima di Claudio, fu revocato soltanto da Settimio Severo nel 197. L'indagine ha poi affrontato due questioni tra loro connesse: da un canto la natura giuridica delle unioni che i soldati intrattenevano con le donne conosciute durante la ferma, dall'altro la condizione dei figli concepiti in tali relazioni. Quanto a quest'ultimo aspetto mi sono soffermato in particolar modo sui contenuti della nota epistula di Adriano a Ramnius Martialis, la quale concesse ai figli dei soldati di alcuni reparti (in particolare a quelli dei legionari) la bonorum possessio unde cognati. Nella quarta e ultima parte si affronta il tema dei privilegi concessi con il congedo ai veterani e alle loro famiglie. L'indagine si incentra sull'esame dei formulari dei diplomata militaria, ovvero di quei documenti consegnati, al momento dell'honesta missio (congedo onorevole), agli auxiliares, ai classiarii delle flotte pretorie e provinciali, ai pretoriani, agli urbaniciani e agli equites singulares Augusti. L'esame del loro formulario ha permesso di definire la specifica condizione giuridica dei veterani di questi differenti reparti dell'esercito. Lo studio dei diplomata propone, inoltre, altre spinose questioni: occorre comprendere, in primo luogo, perché essi, salvo alcuni casi eccezionali, non furono mai consegnati ai veterani delle iustae legiones. La tesi si chiude con un'indagine sulla natura giuridica delle cosiddette leges veteranorum, vale a dire quelle constitutiones poste a fondamento del rilascio dei singoli diplomi. A tal riguardo l'indagine tenta di individuare le ragioni per le quali le leges veteranorum concernenti gli ausiliari, i classiarii e gli equites singulares Augusti, si differenziavano, anche sul piano diplomatico, da quelle dei pretoriani e degli urbaniciani. ; This dissertation aims to deal with some particular questions about ius militare, namely the specific ius singulare, which regulated the condition of Roman soldiers and veterans from the age of Augustus. In particular, the study focuses solely on the rules regulating the condition of milites and veterans in the period of the Roman Principate. The research is divided into four parts. In the first part there is a short description of the institutional history of the Roman army, from the reform of Caius Marius up to the interventions of Augustus in military affairs. With regard to the Augustan military reform, I have concentrated first on the creation of the professional military service and, secondly, on the foundation of the awards of discharge (the so-called praemia militiae) and of the aerarium militare (namely the treasury that would specifically finance the praemia). In the second part, I examine the rules pertaining to the procedure of recruitment and the conditions of access to the different units of the Roman army, namely the legions, the auxiliary units, the Praetorian Guard, the urban cohorts, the vigiles, the equites singulares Augusti, and the praetorian and provincial classes. In addition to the physical and legal requirements, necessary for access to these units, I examine in depth the status civitatis that was conferred to the milites of some units (in particular the classiarii of praetorian classes and the equites singulares Augusti), at the moment of their enrolment in the military. The third part examines a very controversial issue, namely the marriage ban for the soldiers. Following a detailed examination of the different opinions on this question, my dissertation investigates some complex issues which are still to be resolved, clarifying that the ban, certainly introduced befor Claudius, was withdrawn only by Septimius Severus in 197 AD. Furthermore, the research deals with two other related matters: namely, the legal status of the relationships maintained by the soldiers with the women that they met during the service, and, the condition of the children conceived in these relationships. As far as the latter is concerned, I particularly concentrate on the content of the well-known epistula of Hadrian to Ramnius Martialis, which conferred to the children of some milites (in particular those of the legionaries) the bonorum possessio unde cognati. In the fourth and last part, I examine the issue of the privileges conferred to the veterans and their families upon discharge. The research focuses on the analysis of the formularies of diplomata militaria, namely the documents delivered upon the honesta missio (the honorable discharge) to the auxiliares, to the classiarii of the praetorian and provincial fleet, to the praetorians, to the urbaniciani and to the equites singulares Augusti. The examination of their formularies has allowed us to clarify the specific legal condition of the veterans from these different military units. Furthermore, the study on diplomata proposes other thorny questions: firstly it must be understood why they, apart from some exceptional cases, were never delivered to the veterans of iustae legiones. The dissertation ends with a research on the legal nature of the so-called leges veteranorum, namely the constitutiones on the basis of the delivery of each diploma. In this regard, the study attempts to identify the reason why the leges veteranorum concerning the auxiliaries, the classiarii, and the equites singulares Augusti, are different from those of the praetorians and of the urbaniciani, also as regards their diplomatic structure.

Senator Lindsey Graham had two options walking into the Doha Forum in Qatar this weekend: find a way to triangulate his full-throated support for Netanyahu policies in Israel for the largely Palestinian-supportive Muslim audience Sunday, or wave his own flag without reservation. He went with the latter.The South Carolina Republican made it clear he was no stranger to the region — he touted a long friendship with his host the Emir of Qatar and lauded the kingdom's role as international mediator and host to America's Fifth Fleet. But he didn't bat an eye to tell this audience — thousands of Muslims assembled from across the Gulf and the broader Middle East, plus attendees from Global South nations and Europe — that the U.S. veto of the ceasefire was one of the few things he thought the Biden Administration got right."President Biden ...You have risen to the occasion after October the seventh," he said, addressing the audience Sunday. "I have a world of difference with President Biden on many things. But when he vetoed the ceasefire resolution, he did the right thing and let me tell you why. Every ceasefire Hamas has ever entered has been broken and we're not going to do a ceasefire until hostages begin to be released like promised and would give the Israeli military the time and space they need to make sure that Hamas ceases to be a threat to Israel and the Palestinian people.""So as a Republican, I am standing behind President Biden's decision, (against) that resolution and the one that comes next." The audience, at all times polite, sat stone faced.He also said the only way there will be peace in the Middle East will be to get Iran — the real culprit. And the only way to start building a state for Palestine ith the Israel-Saudi deal the icing on the cake."I pledge in front of the world to help President Biden secure the votes in the United States Senate to make it possible for Saudi Arabia to have a defense agreement with us, which would then make it possible for Saudi Arabia, to recognize Israel," he declared. "Before the world I pledge my support, to help reconstruct a new Palestine but none of this is possible until you have a less corrupt younger Palestinian Authority, replacing the one we have. And a Hamas can no longer wreak havoc on Israel, on their own people."That potential U.S.-brokered Israel-Saudi deal have been deemed all but dead after the Oct. 7 attacks in Israel. Graham contended that aside from hating Jews, Hamas launched the attacks to kill any hope for that deal to go forward. Observers have come to similar conclusions — that the so-called Abraham Accords had left the Palestinians on the cutting room floor, inciting anger among the militant elements in Gaza. But unlike Graham, these critics' hold that the agreements are the problem — that regional leaders' shouldn't have allowed Israel to shunt the peace process to the side in the first place.Not only did Graham ignore this fatal flaw of the agreements, he reveled in his own blind spots, choosing to ignore any culpability of the Netanyahu government over the decades leading to the violence and what appears today, an endless bombardment and on-the-ground military operation in Gaza with chances for further talks between the two sides dwindling by the hour. Instead, he appeared to blame Iran for everything."The biggest fear of the Ayatollah is that the Arab world, in conjunction with Israel, marches toward the light away from the darkness. (Iran hates) the idea that everybody in this room can find a way to work with Israel and live with Israel where everybody makes money and can live in peace. Because let me tell you, their agenda is different than yours. So I believe we cannot let Iran win."He said he was committed to a two-state solution, and if there was any moment in his talk where he put any responsibility on Israel it was this: "I'm going to Israel soon and here's what I'm telling Israeli friends — Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, none of these Arab countries can help you. Unless you make a commitment for a two state solution. ...To my friends in Israel the best thing you can do to beat Iran is to give the Palestinians a life where they're not dependent upon terrorist organizations that they can live and work and be prosperous." How Israelis could get there, from here, was not explained by Lindsey Graham, or whether he honestly thought that was possible given the "hell on earth" Gaza is becoming today. But we know he doesn't believe that the civilian crisis on the ground now will reduce the chances for peace tomorrow, because of the way he reacted to U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin's remarks earlier this month. Austin said "the lesson is that you can only win in urban warfare by protecting civilians. In this kind of a fight, the center of gravity is the civilian population. And if you drive them into the arms of the enemy, you replace a tactical victory with a strategic defeat."To which Graham responded:"Strategic defeat would be inflaming the Palestinians? They're already inflamed," Graham continued. "They're taught from the time they're born to hate the Jews and to kill them. They're taught math: If you have 10 Jews and kill six, how many would you have left?"

La biblioteca deve dimostrare la propria utilità per poter continuare a crescere e trovare i fondi per esistere, funzionare e svilupparsi. Perciò la biblioteca ha bisogno di conoscere bene il territorio nel quale si trova ad operare, cercando di adeguare continuamente i propri servizi alle sue caratteristiche, e di diventare punto di riferimento per ogni bisogno conoscitivo ed informativo di tutta la popolazione. La tecnologia GIS (Geographic Information System) può essere d'aiuto alla biblioteca nel raggiungimento di questi due obiettivi, sia come strumento di analisi e gestione a supporto delle attività di marketing, sia come ampliamento del tradizionale servizio di reference. Un GIS consente di mettere in relazione dati testuali e descrittivi con informazioni geografiche, di manipolare e analizzare questi dati, di ottenere dei risultati da questa relazione e di visualizzarli sul territorio per mezzo di mappe digitali; queste mappe sono costituite da "strati" informativi sovrapponibili, che, attraverso simboli grafici definiti, rappresentano sul territorio gli eventi, le condizioni o gli oggetti le cui caratteristiche sono espresse dai dati descrittivi utilizzati. Perché ogni strato sia sovrapponibile all'altro, è necessario che sia georeferenziato e quindi assimilato allo stesso sistema di riferimento (i.e. coordinate) usato per gli altri strati, che rappresenti la stessa porzione di superficie terrestre e che usi la stessa scala. Innumerevoli sono le applicazioni della tecnologia GIS che da anni sono utilizzate nei più disparati settori, ad esempio nella gestione delle Reti tecnologiche e delle flotte di mezzi mobili, o in attuazione delle politiche di e-government avviate dalla Pubblica Amministrazione. La biblioteca può trarre vantaggio da questa tecnologia applicandola in due macro aree: gli in-house projects e i public services. Nel primo caso, in un'ottica di pianificazione strategica dei servizi, la biblioteca può utilizzare il GIS per definire e programmare il proprio assetto rispetto al territorio, con la misurazione e definizione dell'area di competenza (market area), e rispetto alla popolazione, disegnando un vero e proprio profilo delle caratteristiche e dei bisogni degli utenti reali e potenziali (market profile). Nel secondo caso la biblioteca creerà un GIS Reference Service, come enhancement dei servizi tradizionali, a supporto di una attività di community information e come accesso alle infinite applicazioni GIS a disposizione dei lettori. Diversi sono i livelli di Reference Service che possono essere attivati sulla base della disponibilità di risorse, umane e finanziarie, e a seconda del bisogno informativo dei lettori. Numerosi sono i software disponibili per realizzare un servizio GIS sia locale che remoto, molti sono commercializzati da aziende, mentre altri sono invece disponibili come freeware o con GPL license. Negli USA è disponibile anche un servizio online dedicato alle biblioteche, LibraryDecision, accessibile previa sottoscrizione, che fornisce dati e strumenti di analisi geografica a supporto delle attività di marketing. ; The library has to show its own advantage to be able to go on growing and raising funds to exist, to work and to develop. Therefore the library needs to know in depth the area on which it operates, constantly striving to adapt its services to its features, and becoming a point of reference for the community information and knowledge needs. GIS (Geographic Information System) technology can help the library reach these two objectives, both as analysis and management tool to support the marketing activities, and as enhancement of the traditional Reference Service. A GIS application enables to relate textual and descriptive data to geographic information, to manipulate and analyse these data, to obtain results from this relationship and to display them on the territory through digital maps; these maps are constituted by superimposing information layers, which, through defined graphical symbols, represent on the region events, conditions and objects whose features are expressed by the descriptive data used. So that every layer is superimposing the others, it has to be georeferenced and therefore it has to use the same frame of reference (i.e. coordinates) used for the other layers, it has to represent the same area of Earth's surface and to use the same scale. Many are the application of GIS technology, which for years have been used in the most diverse fields, for instance in the management of technological networks and of vehicle fleets, or in carrying out the e-government policy. The library can take advantage from this technology applying it to two macro areas: in-house projects and public services. In the first case, in the perspective of the strategic planning of services, the library can use GIS to define and plan its own set-up in relation to the territory, by measuring and defining its market area, and in relation to the community by tracing the actual profile of feature and needs for its actual and potential users (market profile). In the second case, the library creates a GIS Reference Service, as an enhancement of the traditional services, to support the activity of community information and to give access to the manifold GIS application available for the users. There are several level of Reference Services, which can be activated depending on the availability of human and financial resources, and depending on the information needs of the community. Many are the software available to create a GIS service, either local or remote; many are traded by companies, while others are freely available through GPL license. In U.S. an online service devoted to libraries, LibraryDecision, is available through subscription; this service supplies data and geographic analysis tools to support marketing activities.

La biblioteca deve dimostrare la propria utilità per poter continuare a crescere e trovare i fondi per esistere, funzionare e svilupparsi. Perciò la biblioteca ha bisogno di conoscere bene il territorio nel quale si trova ad operare, cercando di adeguare continuamente i propri servizi alle sue caratteristiche, e di diventare punto di riferimento per ogni bisogno conoscitivo ed informativo di tutta la popolazione. La tecnologia GIS (Geographic Information System) può essere d'aiuto alla biblioteca nel raggiungimento di questi due obiettivi, sia come strumento di analisi e gestione a supporto delle attività di marketing, sia come ampliamento del tradizionale servizio di reference. Un GIS consente di mettere in relazione dati testuali e descrittivi con informazioni geografiche, di manipolare e analizzare questi dati, di ottenere dei risultati da questa relazione e di visualizzarli sul territorio per mezzo di mappe digitali; queste mappe sono costituite da "strati" informativi sovrapponibili, che, attraverso simboli grafici definiti, rappresentano sul territorio gli eventi, le condizioni o gli oggetti le cui caratteristiche sono espresse dai dati descrittivi utilizzati. Perché ogni strato sia sovrapponibile all'altro, è necessario che sia georeferenziato e quindi assimilato allo stesso sistema di riferimento (i.e. coordinate) usato per gli altri strati, che rappresenti la stessa porzione di superficie terrestre e che usi la stessa scala. Innumerevoli sono le applicazioni della tecnologia GIS che da anni sono utilizzate nei più disparati settori, ad esempio nella gestione delle Reti tecnologiche e delle flotte di mezzi mobili, o in attuazione delle politiche di e-government avviate dalla Pubblica Amministrazione. La biblioteca può trarre vantaggio da questa tecnologia applicandola in due macro aree: gli in-house projects e i public services. Nel primo caso, in un'ottica di pianificazione strategica dei servizi, la biblioteca può utilizzare il GIS per definire e programmare il proprio assetto rispetto al territorio, con la misurazione e definizione dell'area di competenza (market area), e rispetto alla popolazione, disegnando un vero e proprio profilo delle caratteristiche e dei bisogni degli utenti reali e potenziali (market profile). Nel secondo caso la biblioteca creerà un GIS Reference Service, come enhancement dei servizi tradizionali, a supporto di una attività di community information e come accesso alle infinite applicazioni GIS a disposizione dei lettori. Diversi sono i livelli di Reference Service che possono essere attivati sulla base della disponibilità di risorse, umane e finanziarie, e a seconda del bisogno informativo dei lettori. Numerosi sono i software disponibili per realizzare un servizio GIS sia locale che remoto, molti sono commercializzati da aziende, mentre altri sono invece disponibili come freeware o con GPL license. Negli USA è disponibile anche un servizio online dedicato alle biblioteche, LibraryDecision, accessibile previa sottoscrizione, che fornisce dati e strumenti di analisi geografica a supporto delle attività di marketing. ; The library has to show its own advantage to be able to go on growing and raising funds to exist, to work and to develop. Therefore the library needs to know in depth the area on which it operates, constantly striving to adapt its services to its features, and becoming a point of reference for the community information and knowledge needs. GIS (Geographic Information System) technology can help the library reach these two objectives, both as analysis and management tool to support the marketing activities, and as enhancement of the traditional Reference Service. A GIS application enables to relate textual and descriptive data to geographic information, to manipulate and analyse these data, to obtain results from this relationship and to display them on the territory through digital maps; these maps are constituted by superimposing information layers, which, through defined graphical symbols, represent on the region events, conditions and objects whose features are expressed by the descriptive data used. So that every layer is superimposing the others, it has to be georeferenced and therefore it has to use the same frame of reference (i.e. coordinates) used for the other layers, it has to represent the same area of Earth''s surface and to use the same scale. Many are the application of GIS technology, which for years have been used in the most diverse fields, for instance in the management of technological networks and of vehicle fleets, or in carrying out the e-government policy. The library can take advantage from this technology applying it to two macro areas: in-house projects and public services. In the first case, in the perspective of the strategic planning of services, the library can use GIS to define and plan its own set-up in relation to the territory, by measuring and defining its market area, and in relation to the community by tracing the actual profile of feature and needs for its actual and potential users (market profile). In the second case, the library creates a GIS Reference Service, as an enhancement of the traditional services, to support the activity of community information and to give access to the manifold GIS application available for the users. There are several level of Reference Services, which can be activated depending on the availability of human and financial resources, and depending on the information needs of the community. Many are the software available to create a GIS service, either local or remote; many are traded by companies, while others are freely available through GPL license. In U.S. an online service devoted to libraries, LibraryDecision, is available through subscription; this service supplies data and geographic analysis tools to support marketing activities.

This Report documents the presentations given at the World's first international conference on the management value of the resource knowledge of small scale, indigenous and commercial fishers. The conference was inspired by Dr Robert (Bob) Johannes, whose 1981 Book 'Words of the Lagoon', was the first serious study in this area, and was co-hosted by the UBC Fisheries Centre, UBC First Nations House of Learning and the BC Aboriginal Fisheries Commission. Over 200 people representing 23 countries and 36 North American First Nation representatives attended. The conference sought to provide a way to 'step beyond' fishers' frustration that their knowledge is ignored and scientists' standard position that the knowledge is anecdotal, and can not easily be captured in the reports, tables and graphs they are used to. In total, 48 papers and 26 abstracts of papers were presented during the three days of the conference. These case studies and presentations included Indigenous, Artisanal, small scale and industrial marine and freshwater fisheries in tropical and temperate environments. Species range from turtles and dugongs, through temperate trawl and tropical multi-species fisheries to the aquarium trade. The conference followed themes relating to the use of fishers' ecological knowledge about fishing practices in environmental management; the relationships between fishers' expertise (knowledge) and management; methodological issues/methods for obtaining and accurately representing fishers' knowledge; the ethical issues relating to collaboration between TEK practitioners, managers, academics and industry; and the valuation of fishers' knowledge from an ecological, economic and social approach. DIRECTOR'S FOREWORD -- CONTRIBUTED PAPERS -- MY GRANDFATHER'S KNOWLEDGE: FIRST NATIONS FISHING METHODOLOGIES IN THE MID FRASER RIVER (Arnie Narcisse) -- A NATIVE CHANT Simon Lucas -- FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE AND MANAGEMENT: DIFFERING FUNDAMENTALS IN ARTISANAL AND INDUSTRIAL FISHERIES (R.E. Johannes) -- THE ROLE OF FISHERS KNOWLEDGE IN IMPLEMENTING OCEAN ACT INITIATIVES IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR (A. S. Power and Dawn) Mercer) -- CLOSING THE LOOP: COMMERCIAL FISH HARVESTERS' LOCAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND SCIENCE IN A STUDY OF COASTAL COD IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR, CANADA (Karen Gosse, Joe Wroblewski and Barbara Neis) -- APPLYING LOCAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUSTAINABLE FISHERY: THE CURRENT WEST COAST VANCOUVER ISLAND GOOSE BARNACLE FISHERY EXPERIENCE (Joanne Lessard , Josie Osborne, Ray Lauzier, Glen Jamieson and Rick Harbo) -- PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH IN THE BRITISH COLUMBIA GROUNDFISH FISHERY. (Richard D. Stanley and J. Rice) -- THE DISCOURSE OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN MARINE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT (Heidi Glaesel and Mark Simonitsch) -- THE ROLE OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE IN DEPLETING A LIMITED RESOURCE – A CASE STUDY OF THE BUMPHEAD PARROTFISH (BOLBOMETOPON MURICATUM) ARTISANAL FISHERY IN ROVIANA LAGOON, WESTERN PROVINCE, SOLOMON ISLANDS (Richard Hamilton) -- USING FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE GOES BEYOND FILLING GAPS IN SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE – ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCES (Pascale Baelde) -- LOCAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN THE MEKONG RIVER IN SOUTHERN LAOS(Ian Baird) -- SCIAENID AGGREGATIONS IN NORTHERN AUSTRALIA: AN EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL OUTCOMES THROUGH COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH. (M.J. Phelan) -- STATUS OF RESEARCH ON INDIGENOUS FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE IN AUSTRALIA AND BRAZIL (Adam Faulkner and Renato A. M. Silvano) -- TRADITIONAL MARINE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN VANUATU – SACRED & PROFANE: WORLD VIEWS IN TRANSFORMATION (Francis Hickey) ACCOUNTING FOR THE IMPACTS OF FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE AND NORMS ON ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY (Murray A. Rudd) -- THE USE OF FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF FISH RESOURCES IN MALAWI(Edward Nsiku) -- EXAMINING THE TWO CULTURES THEORY OF FISHERIES KNOWLEDGE: THE CASE OF THE NORTHWEST ATLANTIC BLUEFISH (Douglas Wilson) THE VALUE OF LOCAL KNOWLEDGE IN SEA TURTLE CONSERVATION: A CASE FROM BAJA CALIFORNIA, MEXICO (Kristin E. Bird, Wallace J. Nichols and Charles R. Tambiah) -- PUTTING FISHERMEN'S KNOWLEDGE TO WORK: THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS (Ted Ames) -- USING EXPERT KNOWLEDGE TO IDENTIFY POSSIBLE GROUNDFISH 'ESSENTIAL FISH HABITATS' (Melanie Bergmann, B. Hinz, R. Blyth, M.J. Kaiser, S.I. Rogers and M. Armstrong) -- INTEGRATION OF FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE INTO RESEARCH ON A LARGE TROPICAL RIVER BASIN, THE MEKONG RIVER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Anders F. Poulsen) -- FISHERS' PERCEPTIONS ON THE SEAHORSE FISHERY IN CENTRAL PHILIPPINES: INTERACTIVE APPROACHES AND AN EVALUATION OF RESULTS (J. Meeuwig, M.A. Samoilys and J. Erediano) -- FOCUSING AND TESTING FISHER KNOW-HOW TO SOLVE CONSERVATION PROBLEMS (Edward F. Melvin and Julia K Parrish) -- BIOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT USING KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION [ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE] (Antonio García-Allut, Juan Freire, Alvaro Barreiro and David E. Losada) -- INTEGRATING FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE WITH SURVEY DATA TO UNDERSTAND THE STRUCTURE, ECOLOGY AND USE OF A SEASCAPE OFF SOUTHEASTERN AUSTRALIA (Alan Williams and Nic Bax) -- 'SUSTAINABILITY VECTORS' AS GUIDES IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: WITH EXAMPLES FROM NET FISHERIES IN THE PHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA (Michael D Pido, Peter Valentine and Mark Fenton) -- FISHERS AND SCIENTISTS: NO LONGER FOE, BUT NOT YET FRIEND (Melanie D. Power and Ratana Chuenpagdee) -- HARVESTING AN INLAND SEA: FOLK HISTORY, TEK AND THE CLAIMS OF LAKE MICHIGAN'S COMMERCIAL FISHERY (Michael Chiarappa) -- CAN HISTORICAL NAMES & FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE HELP TO RECONSTRUCT LAKES? (Johan Spens) -- EXPLORING CULTURAL CONSTRUCTS: THE CASE OF SEA MULLET MANAGEMENT IN MORETON BAY, SOUTH EAST QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA (Tanuja Barker and Annie Ross) -- WHO'S LISTENING? ISLANDER KNOWLEDGE IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN TORRES STRAIT, NORTHERN AUSTRALIA (Monica E. Mulrennan) -- A COLLABORATIVE, CONSULTATIVE AND COMMITTED APPROACH TO EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF DUGONGS IN TORRES STRAIT, QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA. (Donna Kwan) -- FISHING FOR ANSWERS: THE INCORPORATION OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE IN NORTHERN AUSTRALIA: DEVELOPING CROSS CULTURAL LITERACY (Melissa Nursey-Bray) THE USE OF TRADITIONAL HAWAIIAN KNOWLEDGE IN THE CONTEMPORARY MANAGEMENT OF MARINE RESOURCES(Kelson "Mac" Poepoe, Paul K. Bartram and Alan M. Friedlander) -- TWO FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AND FRONTIER STRATEGIES IN THE PHILIPPINES (Maria F. Mangahas) -- HOW SASI PRACTICES MAKE FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE EFFECTIVE (Agus Heri Purnomo) -- HOW LOCAL FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE IMPROVES THE MANAGEMENT OF FISHERIES IN NEW ZEALAND – A SEAFOOD INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE (G.J. Lydon and A. Langley) -- HISTORICAL AND CURRENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE GREENLAND HALIBUT FROM QUÉBEC FIXED-GEAR FISHERS IN THE GULF OF ST. LAWRENCE (Réjeanne Camirand, Bernard Morin and Louise Savard) -- MARINE RESOURCE KNOWLEDGE RELATED TO FISH CLASSIFICATION IN HAÏTI (Jean W. Wiener) PLATEAU FISHING TECHNOLOGY AND ACTIVITY: STL'ATL'IMX, SECWEPEMC AND NLAKA'PAMUX KNOWLEDGE (Nicholette Prince) -- KAT (AMERICAN EEL, ANGUILLA ROSTRATA) LIFE HISTORY (Kerry Prosper and Mary Jane Paulette) -- THE BARE-FOOT ECOLOGIST'S TOOLBOX (Jeremy D. Prince) -- AN EXAMPLE OF CONSERVATION AND EXPLOITATION ACHIEVED THROUGH A VOLUNTARY FISHERY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (Robert E. Blyth, Michel J. Kaiser , Paul J.B. Hart and Gareth Edwards-Jones) -- INTEGRATING SCIENTIFIC AND LOCAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE (LEK) IN STUDIES OF COMMON EIDERS IN SOUTHERN LABRADOR, CANADA (Heather Chaffey) -- HOW FISHERS' ENDEAVORS AND INFORMATION HELP IN MANAGING THE FISHERIES RESOURCES OF THE SUNDARBAN MANGROVE FOREST OF BANGLADESH (Md. Emdadul Haque) -- WHAT'S IN THERE: COMMON NAMES OF BRAZILIAN MARINE FISHES (Kátia M. F. Freire and Daniel Pauly) -- THE ROLE OF FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE IN CO-MANAGEMENT OF ARTISANAL FISHERIES IN THE ESTUARY OF PATOS LAGOON, SOUTHERN BRAZIL (Daniela Kalikoski, Marcelo Vasconcellos) -- COGNITIVE MAPS: CARTOGRAPHY AND CONCEPTS FOR BACK TO THE FUTURE FISHERIES POLICY (Tony J. Pitcher and Nigel Haggan) -- PAPERS IN ABSTRACT: ORALLY PRESENTED CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGIES, MARKET CONDITIONS, AND SOCIAL RELATIONS: THEIR LINKAGES WITH FISHERS TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE (NEW BRUNSWICK'S INSHORE FISHING FLEET IN THE SOUTHERN GULF OF ST.LAWRENCE). (Omer Chouinard and Jean-Paul Vanderlinden) -- FISHING AT KOMODAH, KITKATLA TERRITORY: RETURNING TO SELECTIVITY (Charles R. Menzies and Caroline F.) -- (Butler) -- THE LEADERSHIP ROLE OF CALIFORNIA FISHING MEN AND WOMEN: PROMOTING SCIENCE IN FISHERIES POLICY AND FISH RECOVERY (Natasha Benjamin, Paul Siri and Zeke Grader) -- INCORPORATING INDIGENOUS INTERESTS AND KNOWLEDGE INTO MANAGEMENT OF THE GREAT BARRIER REEF MARINE PARK (M.L. Sommer and L. O. Rosendale) -- USING FISHERS TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE TO IDENTIFY PRIORITY AREAS FOR CONSERVATION IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN (Lance Morgan) -- THE NOVA SCOTIA LEATHERBACK TURTLE WORKING GROUP: A MODEL FOR SUCCESSFUL COLLABORATION BETWEEN FISHERS AND SCIENTISTS (Michael C. James and Kathleen E. Martin…) -- TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE IN OCEAN AND COASTAL MANAGEMENT: A SURVEY OF RECENT EXPERIENCE IN ATLANTIC CANADA (Paul Macnab and Denise McCullough) -- THE TULALIP TRIBE'S CULTURAL STORIES PROJECT: RECORDING AND USING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE FOR CULTURAL LANDSCAPE RECOVERY, WATERSHED MANAGEMENT AND SALMON PROTECTION (Terry Williams, Julia Gold and Preston Hardison) -- Putting Fishers' Knowledge to Work: Conference Proceedings -- ENVIRONMENTAL SENTINELS: REFRAMING COMMERCIAL FISHING IN PURSUIT OF VALUE, INTEGRITY AND SUSTAINABILITY (Bryan Price) -- DEVELOPING A SET OF INDICATORS FOR EVALUATING THE CONDITION OF A RESOURCE -- CASE: FRESHWATER FISHERIES IN LAOS PDR. (Niels Jepsen, Douglas Wilson & Sommano Phounsavath) -- A METHOD TO ESTIMATE THE ABUNDANCE OF ARAPAIMA GIGAS (CUVIER 1817) -- (Leandro Castello) -- USING FISHERS' KNOWLEDGE TO EVALUATE GREAT LAKES FISHERY MANAGEMENT POLICY (Tracy A. Dobson and Laura F. Cimo) -- THE FISHERMEN AND SCIENTISTS RESEARCH SOCIETY: COLLABORATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF THE KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR MODERN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT (Kees C.T. Zwanenburg1, P. Fanning, P. Hurley and W.T. Stobo) -- FISHERIES IN THE GALÁPAGOS ISLANDS: THE PARTICIPATION OF FISHERS IN FISHERY MANAGEMENT (E. Espinoza, J.C. Murillo, M.V.Toral, R.H. Bustamante, F. Nicolaides, G.J. Edgar, J. Moreno, C. Chasiluisa, M. Yépez, J.C. Barreno, S. A. Shepherd, J. Viscaino, M. Villalta, R. Andrade, A.F. Born, L. Figueroa, P. Guerrero, M. Piu) -- HOW CAN WE HAVE MORE PARTICIPATION BY THE FISHERMEN IN FISHERIES SCIENCE? (Virginia Boudreau) -- THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF INCORPORATING INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE INTO FISHERIES MANAGEMENT (Terry Williams and Preston Hardison) -- FISHING IN MURKY WATERS: ETHICS AND POLITICS OF RESEARCH ON FISHER KNOWLEDGE (Anita Maurstad) -- BUILDING NETWORKS FOR INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (Preston Hardison) -- SOCIAL RESEARCH FOR SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES (Christie Dyer and Jessica Paterson) -- ICONS: A SOFTWARE SYSTEM FOR INTEGRATING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (Preston Hardison and Terry Williams) ASSEMBLY OF MAP-BASED STREAM NARRATIVES TO FACILITATE STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT IN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT (M.R.S. Johannes, K.D. Hyatt, J.K. Cleland, L.Hanslit, and M.M. Stockwell) -- MIGRATION PATTERNS AND SPAWNING HABITS OF AN IMPORTANT FISH, HELIGOPHAGUS WAANDERSI, OF THE PANGASIIDAE FAMILY IN THE MEKONG RIVER BASIN (Sintavong Viravong) -- INSHORE GROUNDFSH SPAWNING AND NURSERY GROUNDS IN THE BAY OF FUNDY: LEARNING WITH AND FROM FISHERMEN (Jennifer Graham) -- THE CONTRIBUTION OF FISHERS TO THE MANAGEMENT OF SEA-URCHIN FISHERIES IN BARBADOS AND ST. LUCIA (Christopher Parker, Patrick McConney and Allan Smith) -- GENERAL DISCUSSION -- LIST OF AUTHORS -- LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ; Fisheries Centre (FC) ; Non UBC ; Unreviewed ; Faculty ; Researcher ; Postdoctoral ; Graduate

The main impetus for this report (and for the reports prepared for the other six growth poles) is a request received from the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration. The request came within the context of on-going preparations for the 2014-2020 Programming period, with Energy Efficiency being one the major themes of the Europe 2020 strategy, and a critical priority for all EU Member Countries. Within Romania, local authorities that will want to access energy efficiency funds under the 2014-2020 Regional Operational Program will need to first prepare energy efficiency strategies. The TRACE tool is specifically targeted at local authorities, and is a good instrument for drafting such strategies. After the 1989 Revolution, Romania began its transition from a centralized system to a market-based economy. Today the country is a member of the European Union (EU) and NATO. After more than a decade of economic restructuring and political change, the country has taken significant steps toward catching up with the economic performance of more developed EU countries. Although radical reforms brought about significant changes in recent years, the standard of living of Romanians is still behind the EU average. The transition period after the end of the communist regime has led to significant changes in the social and economic life of the residents of Craiova. Some of these developments have positively affected people's life, whereas a few came along with inconveniences and difficulties. During the first years of transition the city attracted people from parts of Dolj County and from elsewhere in Romania. This process led to severe de-population in the rural areas of Dolj County. At the same time, due to economic constraints, some of the urban population of Craiova moved to the wider metropolitan area. Like every other city in the country, municipal buildings in Craiova require proper measures toward improving energy efficiency - particularly in health care and education facilities managed by the city government. A benchmarking of the municipal building stock, along with audit and retrofit measures, should be performed in order to identify the highest energy savings potential and proper intervention measures. As for the water sector, although the system covers the entire city and most of the households in Craiova have water meters, there are high losses in the network. In addition, in order to improve the overall efficiency of the water system, oversized pumps needs to be replaced with smaller, energy-efficient ones. Finally, although selective collection has been implemented in Craiova, there is more that can be done about improving recycling rates.

Last panel had Heather Conley, Pres of GermanMarshall Fund of the US talk to the Chair ofNATO's Military Committee The second day of the summit was mostly anti-climatic.  Unlike most summits, they released the communique after the first day, so we already knew what they had decided.  The second day was dedicated to a meeting of the North Atlantic Council (heads of state version--the key decision-making body of NATO) and Ukraine and a separate meeting of the NAC with Japan, South Korea, Australia (the PM blew it off?!) and NZ).  So before getting parochial, what did NATO decide?  After all, as I keep saying, summits are like academic conferences--they force folks to do the work. For academics, a conference makes us write the paper.  For NATO, it means coming up with decisions/deliverables:NATO will replace the US as a coordination center for aid going to Ukraine.NATO will set up a command that will also help Ukraine make progress on getting closer to membership.  The key phrase is that there is a short, well-lit, irreversible bridge for Ukrainian membership.  This is not satisfying to Ukraine, but no way will NATO get consensus to add a country that is at war.Lots of agreement that China is using "dual-use" loopholes to help Russia stay in the war, to build new tanks and other weapons, and people are miffed.  And the penalty for that?  None so far.Momentum but no decision to move the standard for how much members should spend of their GDP on defense from 2% to 2.5% or 3%.The Ukrainian rep was mostly annoyed by thefact that the questioner didn't quite get thathis country is at war and NATO countries are not.NSA Jake Sullivan hadnothing interesting tosay.  Canada finally succumbed to the pressure to hit 2%. Trudeau had pushed off that decision again and again.  I guess they thought they could wear the pressure.  That the Canadian military was also pushing in public for more money made it harder to resist?  So, at the very last moment, after suffering multiple rounds of embarrassing attacks from all kinds of folks (even Mike Johnson, although I kept telling the media that maybe they ought not pay attention to a Christian nationalist who showboated near Trump's NY trial to proclaim Trump's innocence), the Canadian government announced a heap of spending and a commitment to get to 2% by 2032, three years after the 1.76% target in the Defence Update.   The big news is a fleet of subs.  12?  Noooooo.  They say up to 12 but that is the most bullshit of bullshit.  The Royal Canadian Navy has a hard time staffing the ships they have, and they have only four mostly broken subs.  So, maybe they can get enough personnel together to fill six boats, but 12?  No way.  The letter the Minister of Defence sent out also mentions more, more snow vehicles, more helos for our ships, more missile defence stuff (have they announced they are going along with US ABM stuff since that has been a no-no for two decades?), more air defenses, more arty, better/upgraded tanks and LAVs, more drones of al kinds, and .....A deal with the US and Finland to build more icebreakers.  Will that count as defence stuff?  I guess.So far, the people I have talked to have scoffed, that there is no money for this, no ability to actually make the transactions, and so forth.  Yes, buying subs would add a heap of spending to get us closer to 2%.  But by 2032?  How long will it take to actually decide which subs to buy and then to acquire them?  How long will it take for Bombardier to turn their vaporware AWACS planes into real planes? [They apparently exist, my bad]  Tis far easier to dump a bunch of money on recruitment/retention efforts (and I am pretty sure they will do that).  Far harder to actually buy stuff.  One of the big problems is that a lot of this stuff--drones, arty, anti-aircraft, counter-drone--is in high demand since Ukraine has taught all of us how much this stuff is needed.  So, we may be on the wait list for much of this stuff, which means the money doesn't get spent.  Which means falling short of 2%.  The alternative view is not that the Liberals can't do it, but won't do it.  That they have no intention of keeping these promises.  I don't buy that--they have mostly kept their word on buying stuff--the 2017 Defence Review did lead to their acquiring a heap of stuff.  Canada partly fails to meet 2% because of the denominator--that the economy has been growing, so more spending does not always mean progress on 2%.  Anyhow, this is a trap as the Conservatives will surely cut defence spending since they care mostly about deficits (see Stephen Harper).  Now they will be cutting more?  It should also be noted that the icebreaker and the AWACS planes would both be partly made in .... Quebec.  So, is this a cynical ploy to get votes?  I don't think so, or else they would have made these decisions much earlier.Anyhow, these new commitments need to get much attention as it seemed like a half-assed announcement at the last minute so that people would stop yelling at Trudeau.  I read one news story that indicated that the media never got the chance to scrum with Trudeau, the Defence Minister, or the Foreign Minister (or me!) as the three were being kept away from yet more 2% questions.  And no, it is not a NATO summit unless Stefanie and I can hang and exchange takes on the happenings.

February 2024 marked the tenth anniversary of Russia's invasion and occupation of Crimea. In the eight years before the full-scale invasion, Crimea receded from most people's radar. Today, however, it has regained prominence—as a base for attacks on Ukraine, a region Ukrainian forces are focused on liberating, and a big piece of the puzzle in securing peace for Ukraine. But Russia has devoted considerable technologies, both infrastructural and visual, to trying to persuade the world that Russian control of the peninsula is henceforth permanent. Colonial InfrastructureThe most effective way for colonial powers to claim a territory is to build on it. Since the eighteenth century, when Russia first conquered Crimea, it has used infrastructure to secure and immortalize its hold on the territory. An example of this is the dacha, a land plot awarded to Russian settlers as an incentive to move to Crimea and a hallmark of Russian imperial rule. It allowed thousands of well-to-do Russians to resettle in Crimea and reimagine it as a Russian riviera, a splendid outpost for the middle and upper classes to sojourn during the summer months. During the Soviet era, while the image of a Crimean riviera was carefully preserved for mass consumption, the Soviet Union poured massive resources into military infrastructure on the peninsula. The Black Sea Fleet accounted for 140,000 military personnel in the 1980s, and Crimea became a foremost site for military research, production, and storage. In addition to its military equipment factories and shipyards, Crimea had ten military airfields, control system for weapons, air defense system facilities, and nuclear warheads storage facilities.Since the most recent Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russia has continued to invest in infrastructural projects as a means of cementing Russia's grip on the peninsula, securing loyalty from the population through improvement projects, and generally recasting the space as Russian. Perhaps the most famous infrastructure projects are the Crimean Bridge and Tavrida Highway. In 2018, Russia completed the construction of bridge that connected Crimea to Russia with two parallel four-lane roads and a railway track between the Taman peninsula in Krasnodar Krai and the city of Kerch. The construction of this twelve-mile-long bridge cost $3.7 billion. Two years later the four-lane Tavrida Highway, 1,606 miles long, was constructed, connecting the bridge with critical Crimean cities such as Simferopol, Sevastopol, and Yevpatoria.Both the bridge and highway, while exemplifying Russia's efforts to control and absorb Crimea into its space, also serve the specific military function of enabling the transport of troops and military. This vital logistical function explains Putin's presence at the grand opening of both projects and Ukrainian forces' intense focus on putting them out of commission since 2022. Social Colonization through InfrastructureTo compensate for the consequences of the international sanctions that have plunged Crimea into an economic abyss, Russia has invested heavily in social infrastructure: kindergartens, schools, and hospitals. Crimea is allegedly the most subsidized region under Russian control, accounting for 65–70 percent of direct subsidies from the Russian federal budget. Investment in social infrastructure, while aimed at winning the hearts and minds of Crimea's population, has simultaneously created sites for surveillance and dissemination of Russian propaganda. Especially through schools and control of curricula, Russia strives to integrate children and their parents into the "Russian world." When I visited Crimea in 2020 for research, it was apparent that even the most outspoken opponents of Russian occupation regarded these infrastructure projects with approval. Visual ColonizationMost of my interlocutors in 2020 were convinced that war against Ukraine was coming. The feeling of approaching war was palpable not only because of the growing military infrastructure but also from changes in the visual landscape. The Crimean public space had been visually reorganized around Soviet and war nostalgia themes. Already in January, four months before Russia's Victory Day on May 9, which celebrates success and valor in World War II, a huge banner was hanging in Sevastopol: "75 years of the victory (1945–2020)! Victory in the Great Patriotic War was, is, and always will be the fulcrum of Russia's people and its sustainable development!" Nearby you could see a random restaurant sign, "Heroes of a Great Country," and a poster featuring a Soviet soldier. Visual materials in all public spaces remind Crimeans of their privilege of belonging to the greatest country in the world that, if necessary, "can do it again," a slogan promising to win in a crusade against the West just as happened in 1945, according to current revisionist history. The war propaganda follows you everywhere, in the names of streets, monuments, and exhibitions scattered around the cities. One such monument is a tall stele with statues of soldiers on three sides. One statue is of a soldier of the Crimean War (1853–1856), the second is of a Soviet soldier of World War II, and the third is of a Russian soldier who participated in the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This monument is a pinnacle of Russian propaganda tailored to a Crimean audience. All these visual materials have made Crimea a Disneyland of Soviet/Russian nostalgia. Everything that could remind one of Ukraine has been removed or painted over. It is prohibited to display remembrances of the peninsula's history between 1991 and 2014. The same goes for the Crimean Tatar heritage. The Bakhchisaray Palace—the only testament to Crimean Tatar statehood—is under permanent "construction," or, more accurately, destruction. Any Crimean Tatar initiative to preserve their identity is under the strict control of the occupying authorities. Russia's Normalization Efforts Meet Ukrainians' TenacityThe longer Russia's occupation of Crimea lasts, the more permanent it seems. Russia has normalized war and a Russian presence. Memories of the "before times" fade, or those with intact memories have left. But Russia's colonization of space and memory obscures one vital point: the eventual return of the Crimean Peninsula to Ukrainian control and Ukrainian society when Russia's bellicosity crumples.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute

February 2024 marked the tenth anniversary of Russia's invasion and occupation of Crimea. In the eight years before the full-scale invasion, Crimea receded from most people's radar. Today, however, it has regained prominence—as a base for attacks on Ukraine, a region Ukrainian forces are focused on liberating, and a big piece of the puzzle in securing peace for Ukraine. But Russia has devoted considerable technologies, both infrastructural and visual, to trying to persuade the world that Russian control of the peninsula is henceforth permanent. Colonial InfrastructureThe most effective way for colonial powers to claim a territory is to build on it. Since the eighteenth century, when Russia first conquered Crimea, it has used infrastructure to secure and immortalize its hold on the territory. An example of this is the dacha, a land plot awarded to Russian settlers as an incentive to move to Crimea and a hallmark of Russian imperial rule. It allowed thousands of well-to-do Russians to resettle in Crimea and reimagine it as a Russian riviera, a splendid outpost for the middle and upper classes to sojourn during the summer months. During the Soviet era, while the image of a Crimean riviera was carefully preserved for mass consumption, the Soviet Union poured massive resources into military infrastructure on the peninsula. The Black Sea Fleet accounted for 140,000 military personnel in the 1980s, and Crimea became a foremost site for military research, production, and storage. In addition to its military equipment factories and shipyards, Crimea had ten military airfields, control system for weapons, air defense system facilities, and nuclear warheads storage facilities.Since the most recent Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russia has continued to invest in infrastructural projects as a means of cementing Russia's grip on the peninsula, securing loyalty from the population through improvement projects, and generally recasting the space as Russian. Perhaps the most famous infrastructure projects are the Crimean Bridge and Tavrida Highway. In 2018, Russia completed the construction of bridge that connected Crimea to Russia with two parallel four-lane roads and a railway track between the Taman peninsula in Krasnodar Krai and the city of Kerch. The construction of this twelve-mile-long bridge cost $3.7 billion. Two years later the four-lane Tavrida Highway, 1,606 miles long, was constructed, connecting the bridge with critical Crimean cities such as Simferopol, Sevastopol, and Yevpatoria.Both the bridge and highway, while exemplifying Russia's efforts to control and absorb Crimea into its space, also serve the specific military function of enabling the transport of troops and military. This vital logistical function explains Putin's presence at the grand opening of both projects and Ukrainian forces' intense focus on putting them out of commission since 2022. Social Colonization through InfrastructureTo compensate for the consequences of the international sanctions that have plunged Crimea into an economic abyss, Russia has invested heavily in social infrastructure: kindergartens, schools, and hospitals. Crimea is allegedly the most subsidized region under Russian control, accounting for 65–70 percent of direct subsidies from the Russian federal budget. Investment in social infrastructure, while aimed at winning the hearts and minds of Crimea's population, has simultaneously created sites for surveillance and dissemination of Russian propaganda. Especially through schools and control of curricula, Russia strives to integrate children and their parents into the "Russian world." When I visited Crimea in 2020 for research, it was apparent that even the most outspoken opponents of Russian occupation regarded these infrastructure projects with approval. Visual ColonizationMost of my interlocutors in 2020 were convinced that war against Ukraine was coming. The feeling of approaching war was palpable not only because of the growing military infrastructure but also from changes in the visual landscape. The Crimean public space had been visually reorganized around Soviet and war nostalgia themes. Already in January, four months before Russia's Victory Day on May 9, which celebrates success and valor in World War II, a huge banner was hanging in Sevastopol: "75 years of the victory (1945–2020)! Victory in the Great Patriotic War was, is, and always will be the fulcrum of Russia's people and its sustainable development!" Nearby you could see a random restaurant sign, "Heroes of a Great Country," and a poster featuring a Soviet soldier. Visual materials in all public spaces remind Crimeans of their privilege of belonging to the greatest country in the world that, if necessary, "can do it again," a slogan promising to win in a crusade against the West just as happened in 1945, according to current revisionist history. The war propaganda follows you everywhere, in the names of streets, monuments, and exhibitions scattered around the cities. One such monument is a tall stele with statues of soldiers on three sides. One statue is of a soldier of the Crimean War (1853–1856), the second is of a Soviet soldier of World War II, and the third is of a Russian soldier who participated in the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This monument is a pinnacle of Russian propaganda tailored to a Crimean audience. All these visual materials have made Crimea a Disneyland of Soviet/Russian nostalgia. Everything that could remind one of Ukraine has been removed or painted over. It is prohibited to display remembrances of the peninsula's history between 1991 and 2014. The same goes for the Crimean Tatar heritage. The Bakhchisaray Palace—the only testament to Crimean Tatar statehood—is under permanent "construction," or, more accurately, destruction. Any Crimean Tatar initiative to preserve their identity is under the strict control of the occupying authorities. Russia's Normalization Efforts Meet Ukrainians' TenacityThe longer Russia's occupation of Crimea lasts, the more permanent it seems. Russia has normalized war and a Russian presence. Memories of the "before times" fade, or those with intact memories have left. But Russia's colonization of space and memory obscures one vital point: the eventual return of the Crimean Peninsula to Ukrainian control and Ukrainian society when Russia's bellicosity crumples.The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute

With the emergence of prognostics and health management (PHM) methodology, companies are trying to fully exploit the data sources they have to build models for their assets and predict their future behavior. Therefore, the decision-making process is no longer based on only historical and actual data, but it integrates future information. On one hand, decisions in the PHM context are based on future information. On the other hand, the estimation of future conditions of the systems requires a knowledge on its future loads and usage (i.e. future decisions).Several works have studied the decision-making process in the PHM context. However, none of these works have addressed the prognostic-decision interdependency. Moreover, most of the post-prognostic decision-making works present several omissions: 1) How to emphasize the relationship between the prognostic and decision-making modules? 2) How often should the PHM process be launched? 3) How long ahead should the decision-making module plan? 4) How to better/fully use prognostic information in the decision process? 5) How to clarify the applicability of the PHM framework? 6) How to make the PHM framework robust to the system's conditions changes? These questions are addressed along this thesis. They resulted in modifying the existing PHM framework to enhance the decision-making process. The main contributions of this thesis are:• A summary of the PHM challenges followed by a thorough survey on post-prognostics decision-making and its growing interest as a strategy to exploit prognostic information to maintain and manage life cycle of critical machinery.• Some adaptation to the existing PHM framework are proposed to enhance the decision-making process. Three loops are proposed to improve the prognostic accuracy by eliminating uncertainty sources that are caused by unknown future loads and conditions, improve the performance of the decision-making process by dynamically incorporating prognostic information, and improve the reactivity of the overall PHM framework to new operating conditions.• The instantiation and implementation of the proposed post-prognostic decision framework on two different case studies. A first application studies the joint problem of maintenance and production scheduling on a single multi-purpose machine. A second application addresses the joint problem of maintenance planning and mission assignment for a fleet of rolling stock units.• The utility of applying the proposed framework, the duration of the decision horizon, and the frequency of execution are discussed. ; Durant la dernière décennie, de nombreux travaux ont été menés dans le domaine du PHM (Prognostics and Health Management). La majorité des résultats publiés concerne l'étape principale du pronostic. Cependant, le but du PHM est de fournir les bonnes informations aux bonnes personnes pour mieux gérer le cycle de vie du composant ou du système. Ainsi l'estimation ou la prédiction du RUL n'est pas l'objectif ultime du PHM. Mais, il est important d'utiliser cette information pour améliorer la qualité de la décision opérationnelle et pour optimiser la politique de maintenance prédictive.D'une part, les décisions prises pour un système modifieront l'évolution de son état de santé et par conséquence son RUL. D'autre part, une nouvelle durée de vie résiduelle engendra de nouvelles décisions à prendre. Ainsi les deux processus de prise de décision et de pronostic sont interdépendants. Le but de cette thèse est de concevoir un framework de PHM qui met l'accent sur cette interaction pronostic-décision. Dans cette thèse, des modifications sur le framework classique de PHM sont proposées pour traiter certaines de ces lacunes. Les verrous scientifiques suivants sont adressés: 1) Comment mettre en valeur les interactions pronostic-décision ? 2) Avec quelle fréquence il faut exécuter le cycle PHM ? 3) Sur quelle durée il faut prendre la décision post-pronostic ? 4) Comment améliorer l'intégration des informations prédites dans la prise de décision ? 5) Comment clarifier l'intégration du framework PHM dans les applications ? 6) Comment améliorer la robustesse du framework PHM vis-à-vis des potentiels changements dans les conditions opératoires du système étudié ? Les questions qui sont abordées dans cette thèse ont conduit à développer un framework de décision post-pronostic. Les principales contributions sont les suivantes:• Les verrous scientifiques du domaine de PHM sont analysés et récapitulés. Les travaux de décisions post-pronostic sont collectés et étudiés dans un état de l'art détaillé pour détecter des lacunes dans ce domaine.• Le schéma classique connu dans la littérature de mise en œuvre du PHM est revue. Une contribution consiste à proposer d'ajouter des boucles de retours d'information à plusieurs niveaux: (i) une boucle de construction de décision, (ii) une boucle d'application de décision et (iii) une boucle d'information. Ces boucles assurent l'intégration des prédictions dans la prise de décision et la prise en considération des futures décisions par le module de pronostic. Elles améliorent la précision des prédictions en éliminant les incertitudes sur les futures décisions, améliorent les performances du module de prise décision en intégrant dynamiquement les nouvelles données présentes et garantissent que le framework PHM soit réactif aux changements de conditions du système.• Le framework de décision post-pronostique est instancié sur deux cas d'étude; une première application sur le problème conjoint de maintenance et de production pour une machine à usage multiple, et une deuxième application qui étudie le problème conjoint de maintenance et d'affectation des missions pour une flotte de matériels roulants.• La pertinence de mise en œuvre de stratégies de PHM est étudié pour différentes configurations de machine et de problème de décision. La mise en œuvre de PHM apparait clairement plus utile dans des contextes de fortes dynamiques des dégradations et des décisions.• L'importance de l'influence de la durée de l'horizon de décision sur les performances des algorithmes de prise de décision est démontrée pour différentes dynamique de dégradation et de configuration de problème de décision. Prouvant ainsi que la durée de l'horizon de décision est un paramètre important de l'implémentation du cycle PHM et nécessite une étude plus approfondie.

The war Russia unleashed against Ukraine ten years ago, in 2014, has changed the country. The energy sector was not spared. It has especially suffered after the launch of the wide-scale invasion in February 2022. The war has also thoroughly altered Ukraine's energy relations with Russia, which Ukraine was deeply dependent on economically.During this same period, Ukraine has resolutely adopted norms and legislation to achieve deeper integration with the European Energy Community while achieving energy independence from Russia. Despite the war-related devastation of both the infrastructure and the economic profile of the energy sector, Ukraine has laid down a good track record in reforms, as evaluated by European observers.The Energy Sector before the WarBefore the invasion of 2014, during Viktor Yanukovych's presidency, his cabinet pretended to carry out reforms oriented toward European integration. In 2011, Ukraine became a member of the European Energy Community. The country was required to implement energy regulations consistent with European ones. But real progress was very slight, and only weakly supported. Implementing the requisite reforms robustly would have meant some painful changes, notably the imposition of market prices for households. Victor Yanukovych's administration was more inclined to pay lip service to reforms as a means of building the president's image rather than actually undertaking fundamental changes. But real reforms would also have threatened the power of the oligarchs and those in Yanukovych's closest circle, including his son, who tried to take control of the energy sector. The Early Days of WarThe war that began in 2014 has affected Ukrainian energy in two ways. First, some energy assets were lost in the occupied territories. The coal sector was particularly affected. Ukraine's anthracite coal mines are located only in the Donbas, and at that time, coal was the only resource in which Ukraine was self-sufficient. After the occupation of the Donbas, Ukraine became import-dependent in energy, and as a result, began experiencing power cut-offs that same year. The situation was worsened by Russia's attempts at blackmailing Ukraine over gas supplies. Under the take-or-pay provision of the then existing contract, Ukraine would have had to pay huge amounts to Russia's Naftogaz through 2019, whether or not any Russian gas was delivered. Moreover, Russia canceled the 30 percent discount stipulated in the Kharkiv Accords, agreed to in exchange for Kyiv allowing the basing of the Russian fleet in Crimea, and started demanding prices close to the highest in Europe. This two-pronged attack would have bankrupted Naftogaz. A few years later, Ukraine won the case before the Swedish International Court of Arbitration. Second, the fear of an energy crisis in 2014 and some societal hesitancy about potential EU integration impeded reforms and led to the deferral of some needed changes in the energy sector. Nonetheless, during 2014–2017, crucial laws were adopted to bring Ukraine's energy legislation in line with European rules, strengthen the country's energy security, and make the energy sector more financially sustainable. Meanwhile, Russia did not abandon its threats to Ukraine's energy sector, merely moving on to different tactics. Russia-associated hackers attacked Ukrainian energy facilities a number of times. These attacks occasionally resulted in blackouts, as happened in late 2016. The path of energy reforms from the early 2010s to February 2022 was not smooth, though important advances were made. So long as energy security was not uppermost on the risk agenda, different governments succumbed to the paternalistic—and historical—expectations of society, and extended price subsidies. The crux of the matter, and the source of political anxiety and tweaking, was the price paid by households. Introducing unsubsidized prices for households was guaranteed to produce a political fallout, so that step was deferred, raised again, and deferred again. In fact, except for a short period, the country did not see a liberalized energy market with unsubsidized energy prices for households. Run-up to Major War, and the War ItselfAt the end of 2021 and the beginning of 2022, there was a general sense that a major conflict was imminent. Concerns at the time focused on the effects of shelling or missile strikes on nuclear or hydropower plants. However, the full-scale invasion rocked the Ukrainian energy sector on a scale never before experienced as Russia targeted the energy infrastructure with missiles, drones, explosives, and artillery. (We discussed how the Ukrainian energy sector fared during the first weeks of the invasion in an earlier Focus Ukraine blog piece). Right away, Russian air strikes destroyed two dozen huge fuel depots together with refining capacities. Before the invasion, Russia and Belarus together had provided more than half the fuels consumed in Ukraine. The country faced a fuel crisis as these supplies stopped and domestic refining capacities were destroyed. The Ukrainian electricity industry suffered the most from war-related losses. The occupation of eastern territories since February 24, 2022, meant that Ukraine continued to lose access to energy capacities. Particularly devastating was the March 2022 loss of control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest such plant in Europe, which before the all-out conflict had accounted for 44 percent of Ukraine's nuclear capacities. Russian troops seized the plant immediately after the invasion. The land around the plant was mined, the NPP became the grounds for an army base, and the repeated loss of the plant's external power supply drastically increased the risk of a nuclear accident. Shelling the plant opened a veritable Pandora's box of nuclear safety risks. Today, 30 percent of Ukraine's solar capacities and 90 percent of its wind power capacities remain in the occupied territories.Continued Attacks Degrade the Energy SectorIn September 2022, Russia launched a massive airstrike campaign against Ukraine's power infrastructure on an unprecedented scale, trying to destroy both power generation and transmission infrastructure. More than half the power transmission infrastructure was destroyed or critically damaged. Missile attacks decimated the entire 750 kV high-voltage network that was used to distribute electricity from nuclear power plants throughout Ukraine.Almost all thermal and hydropower plants have come under attack. At the end of April 2023, available thermal power capacities were 65 percent less than the 17.1 GW available in early 2022, and available hydropower capacity had decreased by 29.8 percent from 6.7 GW in the same period. In 2022, Russians mined the Kakhovka hydropower plant in the occupied Kherson region. Later, in June 2023, Russians blew up the Kakhovka Dam, posing serious threats to people, the environment, and the economy. Positive Adjustments. Against all odds, Ukraine has made many positive changes to the energy sector and has hardened energy security. The war that was unleashed in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of 2022 both occasioned a decrease in dependency on Russia for energy supplies. Before 2014, Russia was the major supplier of different energy resources, and now supplies from Russia are banned. Despite the hostilities, Ukraine continues Russian oil and gas transit to Europe and is committed to doing so for as long as Europe needs these supplies. Integration with European MarketsThough strongly tied to Russia in the past, Ukraine's natural gas and electricity markets are now integrated into European markets. Already after the invasion, the Ukrainian power system, earlier connected to the Russian system, was synchronized with the European one. Ukraine has fulfilled all technical requirements and is now an essential part of the European power system. Ukraine has been adopting and implementing European energy regulations and legislation for ten years. In a recent report, the European Commission assessed Ukraine's progress in implementing energy reforms as at "a good level of preparation." For the period since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion, Ukraine was evaluated as having made "some progress." The Energy Community Secretariat noted Ukraine's impressive track record on electricity and gas market reforms in 2023. With all the progress of the past ten years, Ukraine still has some obligations to fulfill. It still needs to carry out energy reforms to comply with the European rules and regulations. At the top of the list are achieving fully transparent energy markets, abandoning subsidies for households, and eliminating the state's role in the energy sector. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.