Meşruiyet iktidarın, türü ne olursa olsun, devamlılığı ve hedef kitlesi üzerindeki etkisi bağlamında hayati önem taşımaktadır. Çünkü iktidar hedef alınan kişi, grup ya da topluluğa bir eylemi yaptırma gücü ve etkisini anlatmaktadır. Siyaset ve ilim adamı Müslüman düşünür İbn Haldun'un Umran İlmi teorisinden oluşturulan asabiye,sosyokültürel yapı ve jeopolitik konum sac ayakları üzerine kurulan meşruiyet modeli riyasetten günümüz modern devletine kadar tüm toplumsallaşma ve siyasal birlik türlerinin devamlılığı noktasında bir temel oluşturmaktadır.İbn Haldun'un meşruiyet modeli sadece yönetim biçimlerinin değil, insana dair tüm ilişki biçimlerinin tesisinde önem kazanmakta ve bu noktada halkla ilişkilerin de bir kurumsal meşruiyet aracı olarak temelini oluşturmaktadır. Çünkü meşruiyet simgesel olarak zihinlerde oluşturulmaktadır. Bu bağlamda linguistik ve semiotik önem kazanmakta, hedef kitlede iktidarın, kurumun vb. meşru olduğuna dair bir tür algı yönetimi yapılarak, zihinsel mekanizmalar işletilmekte ve meşruiyet tesis edilerek devamlılık ve toplumsal onay sağlanmaktadır. Bu model çerçevesinde yönetim sistemlerinin meşruiyeti incelenerek, hangisinin Türkiye için daha uygun olduğunun analiz edilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Batılı devletler aksine Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde tüm siyasal hak ve değişimlerin aşağıdan yukarı doğru (halk devrimi vb. hareketlerle) değil yukardan aşağıya sunulduğu (devletten topluma doğru) görülmektedir.Bu bağlamda belirleyici konumdaki siyasilerin ve siyasi partilerin seçim kampanyalarında ve parti programlarında toplumsal özellikleri göz önüne alıp almadıkları ve meşruiyetlerini tesis politikalarını bu modele ne derece uygun inşa edip etmediklerini analiz etmek amaçlanmaktadır.Çalışmada 16 Nisan 2017 tarihinde yapılan Anayasa Değişikliği Referandumu'nda AK Parti, CHP, MHP ve HDP'nin referandum kampanyasında hazırladıkları evet ve hayır kitapçıkları incelenerek Türkiye'nin sosyokültürel yapısı, asabiyesi ve jeopolitik konumu sac ayakları üzerinden oluşturulan İbn Haldun'un meşruiyet modeline göre savundukları sisteme (Parlamenter sistem mi yoksa başkanlık sistemi mi meşru tartışmaları kapsamında) yönelik olarak vaatlerini inşa edip etmedikleri analiz edilmiştir.Türkiye'de çok tartışılan meşruiyet konusuna sosyoloji ve tarih felsefesinin kurucusu kabul edilen ve pek çok Batılı düşünür tarafından fikirleri benimsenen İbn Haldun'un Umran İlminden geliştirilen meşruiyet modeli çerçevesinde bakılarak, bugün Türkiye'nin ihtiyaç duyduğu doğru siyasal modele nasıl ulaşılacağına dair çalışmanın bir kaynak oluşturulması ümit edilmektedir, --- Legitimacy is vital to the continuity of power, whatever its type, and its impact onthe mass of the target. Because the power tells the power and the effect of making an actionon the targeted person, group or community. The model of legitimacy which built on trinityof asabiyyah, socioculturel structure and geopolitic status, based on Ibn Khaldun's Umrantheory who was muslim thinker, diplomat and politic man, is a basis for the continuity of allforms of socialization and political unity, from religion to contemporary modern state.Ibn Khaldun's model of legitimacy gains importance not only in the form of governance butalso in the establishment of all forms of relationship to human beings, and at this point themodel underlies public relations as an institutional legitimacy tool. Because legitimacy issymbolically created in the minds. In this context, gaining linguistic and semioticimportance, mental mechanisms are operated by making perception management over targetgroup to provide a the power, the institution esc. is legitimacy and legitimacy is establishedand continuity and social approval are provided.It is aimed analyzes that in this model frame is examined the legitimacy of the managementsystem is which ones more suitable for Turkey. It is observed that all political rights andchange is not from the bottom up toward the (with movement such as public revolution andso on) but which is presented from top to bottom (toward the society from the state) in Republic of Turkey unlike Western States.In this context, it is aimed to analyze whetherpolitics and political parties which are at decisive position take social characteristics intoconsideration in election campaigns and party programs and whether their legitimacyconstructs the politics of the establishment properly.It was analyzed that prepeared AK Parti, CHP, MHP and HDP's YES and NO booklets forcampaing in the held on Constitutional Amendment Referendum Date April 16, 2017 areexamined to parties created or not their commitments towards the system they advocate(within the legitimate debates of the Parliamentary system or the Presidential system) inaccordance with trinity of Turkey's socio-cultural structure, asabiyyah and geopoliticalposition of the Ibn Khaldun's legitimacy model. By observing a much discussed topic is thelegitimacy In Turkey, basis on In Khaldun's legitimacy model which is evolved from UmranTheory, who is accepted as founder sociology and historycal philosophy and adopted hisideas by many Western thinkers, It is expected that the study is source on how to have thecorrect political models Turkey needs today
The current party system of Ukraine, defined its main features and trends with regard of parliamentary elections 2014 was investigated. The classification, which distinguish the parliamentary system was determined. It is established that the party system has undergone significant changes compared to previous years. Thus, according to classification Mayra Ukrainian party system evolved from a secondary party system to a system of small parties because the two largest parties have 47.5% of votes in parliament. Meyer's Index fell by almost a factor of 2, indicating that the party system became more competitive, the process of forming a coalition will be longer, and the stability of the government will be lower than in previous years. The calculated effective indices of the number of parties suggested Laakso, Taagepera and Golosov also show that the party system became more fragmented. Based on the analyzed results of parliamentary elections for 19982014 years, it has found that increasing or decreasing the percentage threshold of 1%, not significantly affected by the number of parties represented in Parliament; none of the parties could not be present in every convocation; there is uncertainty in electoral preferences. Formulation of the problem. The presence of political parties in the state and their free participation in electoral campaigns in parliament is one of the main signs of a democratic system in the state. Political parties, in turn, form a party system that is a certain indicator of the level of its democratic development, but this does not mean that it is inherent only to democratic countries. The party system exists even in authoritarian and totalitarian countries, where the one-party system is legally enshrined in the constitution. In some countries, such as the United States, Britain, thanks to established democratic traditions, bipartisan systems have been formed. In Ukraine, although it is a democratic state, there are still no established democratic traditions. In 2014, the country returned to the parliamentary-presidential form of government. This led to an increase in the role of the Verkhovna Rada and parties in political processes. In addition, parliamentary elections were held in 2014. Therefore, the relevance of the research of the modern party system of Ukraine, the changes it has undergone and the determination of its development trends for 1998-2014 is of relevance. ; Досліджено сучасну партійну систему України, визначено її основні тенденції та особливості із врахуванням результатів парламентських виборів 2014 року. Наведено класифікації, за якими розрізняють парламентські системи. Встановлено, що партійна система зазнала суттєвих змін у порівнянні з попередніми роками. Так, за класифікацією Майра українська партійна система перетворилася з системи середніх партій на систему малих партій за рахунок того, що дві найбільші партії в парламенті мають 47,5 % мандатів. Індекс Маєра знизився майже в 2 рази, що свідчить про те, що партійна система стала більш конкурентною, процес формування коаліції стане більш тривалим, а стабільність уряду буде нижчою, ніж у попередні роки. Розраховані індекси чисельності ефективних партій, запропоновані Лааксо, Таагеперою та Голосовим, також показують, що партійна система стала більш фрагментаризованою. На основі проаналізованих результатів парламентських виборів за 19982014 роки встановлено, що зменшення чи збільшення відсоткового бар'єру на 1% значно не вплинуло на кількість партій, представлених у парламенті; жодна з партій не змогла бути присутня у кожному скликанні; існує нестабільність електоральних уподобань. ; Досліджено сучасну партійну систему України, визначено її основні тенденції та особливості із врахуванням результатів парламентських виборів 2014 року. Наведено класифікації, за якими розрізняють парламентські системи. Встановлено, що партійна система зазнала суттєвих змін у порівнянні з попередніми роками. Так, за класифікацією Майра українська партійна система перетворилася з системи середніх партій на систему малих партій за рахунок того, що дві найбільші партії в парламенті мають 47,5 % мандатів. Індекс Маєра знизився майже в 2 рази, що свідчить про те, що партійна система стала більш конкурентною, процес формування коаліції стане більш тривалим, а стабільність уряду буде нижчою, ніж у попередні роки. Розраховані індекси чисельності ефективних партій, запропоновані Лааксо, Таагеперою та Голосовим, також показують, що партійна система стала більш фрагментаризованою. На основі проаналізованих результатів парламентських виборів за 19982014 роки встановлено, що зменшення чи збільшення відсоткового бар'єру на 1% значно не вплинуло на кількість партій, представлених у парламенті; жодна з партій не змогла бути присутня у кожному скликанні; існує нестабільність електоральних уподобань.
Este artículo examina el estudio de la política de las empresas latinoamericanas, centrándose en tres áreas principales: la estructura de las empresas, las preferencias de las empresas y su poder en el proceso político. La estructura de las empresas en Latinoamérica es singular, con una proporción mayor de firmas pequeñas e informales, la presencia, en términos comparativos, de firmas grandes de menor tamaño y un rol dominante de las corporaciones multinacionales (CMN) y los grupos económicos. Sostenemos que estas estructuras se reflejan en las preferencias de las empresas. Las preferencias de las CMN dependen de su orientación estratégica, ya sea que inviertan en Latinoamérica con el fin de lograr el acceso a recursos, a nuevos mercados o para aumentar su productividad global. Los grupos empresariales con frecuencia son particularmente fuertes en las industrias no-competitivas —recursos, no-transables oligopólicas, etc.— y son altamente flexibles debido a la gerencia jerárquica y las grandes reservas de liquidez. Como resultado, están bien equipados para afrontar un ambiente empresarial rápidamente cambiante y estuvieron, para sorpresa de muchos observadores, propensos a no oponerse a las políticas externas de liberalización de los años 1990. Las firmas pequeñas tienen poca masa política, pero puesto que muchas de ellas son informales, no juegan un papel importante como una voz para la flexibilización, especialmente de los mercados laborales, como sucede en muchos países industrializados avanzados. Las grandes firmas tienen varias vías para influir en los procesos políticos en Latinoamérica. Los líderes empresariales están bien representados en los gobiernos y con frecuencia son incluidos en comités asesores, los cuales pueden jugar roles cruciales en la definición de políticas. La estructura formal de los sistemas políticos —sistemas presidenciales con representaciones proporcionales en los parlamentos— incrementa aun más el poder empresarial, en la medida en que los legisladores individuales con frecuencia son puestos en la mira para negociar acuerdos legislativos. Las costosas campañas políticas de la región, financiadas por un pequeño grupo de grandes donantes, son una fuente adicional del poder empresarial en el proceso político. Mirando hacia adelante, sostenemos que muchas de estas características de las empresas latinoamericanas y de la política de las empresas es probable que sean bastante estables y, si hay algún cambio, será un incremento en intensidad. ; The article surveys the study of Latin American business politics, focusing on three main areas: The structure of business, the preferences of business, and its power in the political process. The structure of businesses in Latin America is distinct, with a larger share of small and informal firms, comparatively small large firms, and a dominant role of multinational corporations (MNCs) and economic groups. We argue that these structures are reflected in business preferences. MNCs' preferences depend on their strategic orientation, whether they invest in Latin America in order to gain access to resources, to new markets, or to enhance their global productivity. Business groups are often particularly strong in non-competitive industries – resources, oligopolistic non-tradables etc. - and are highly flexible due to hierarchical management and large cash reserves. As a result, they are well equipped to deal with a rapidly changing businesses environment and were, surprisingly to many observers, unlikely to oppose the external liberalization policies of the 1990s. Small firms have little political cloud, but since many of them are informal, they do not play an important part as a voice for flexibilization, especially of labor markets, the way they do in many advanced industrialized countries. Large firms have various avenues to influence political processes in Latin America. Business leaders are well represented in governments and are often included in advisory councils which can play crucial roles in affecting policy. The formal structure of political systems – Presidential systems with proportional representation in parliaments – further enhance the power of business, as individual legislators are often targeted for legislative deal-making. The region's expensive political campaigns, funded by a small number of large donors, are yet another source for business power of the political process. Looking ahead, we argue that many of these features of Latin American businesses and business politics are likely to be quite stable and if anything increase in intensity. Keywords: Latin America; business politics; business power; economic groups; multinational corporations; small firms; literature review.
Unstructured textual data is rapidly growing and practitioners from diverse disciplines are expe- riencing a need to structure this massive amount of data. Topic modeling is one of the most used techniques for analyzing and understanding the latent structure of large text collections. Probabilistic graphical models are the main building block behind topic modeling and they are used to express assumptions about the latent structure of complex data. This dissertation address four problems related to drawing structure from high dimensional data and improving the text mining process. Studying the ebb and flow of ideas during critical events, e.g. an epidemic, is very important to understanding the reporting or coverage around the event or the impact of the event on the society. This can be accomplished by capturing the dynamic evolution of topics underlying a text corpora. We propose an approach to this problem by identifying segment boundaries that detect significant shifts of topic coverage. In order to identify segment boundaries, we embed a temporal segmentation algorithm around a topic modeling algorithm to capture such significant shifts of coverage. A key advantage of our approach is that it integrates with existing topic modeling algorithms in a transparent manner; thus, more sophisticated algorithms can be readily plugged in as research in topic modeling evolves. We apply this algorithm to studying data from the iNeighbors system, and apply our algorithm to six neighborhoods (three economically advantaged and three economically disadvantaged) to evaluate differences in conversations for statistical significance. Our findings suggest that social technologies may afford opportunities for democratic engagement in contexts that are otherwise less likely to support opportunities for deliberation and participatory democracy. We also examine the progression in coverage of historical newspapers about the 1918 influenza epidemic by applying our algorithm on the Washington Times archives. The algorithm is successful in identifying important qualitative features of news coverage of the pandemic. Visually convincing results of data mining algorithms and models is crucial to analyzing and driving conclusions from the algorithms. We develop ThemeDelta, a visual analytics system for extracting and visualizing temporal trends, clustering, and reorganization in time-indexed textual datasets. ThemeDelta is supported by a dynamic temporal segmentation algorithm that integrates with topic modeling algorithms to identify change points where significant shifts in topics occur. This algorithm detects not only the clustering and associations of keywords in a time period, but also their convergence into topics (groups of keywords) that may later diverge into new groups. The visual representation of ThemeDelta uses sinuous, variable-width lines to show this evolution on a timeline, utilizing color for categories, and line width for keyword strength. We demonstrate how interaction with ThemeDelta helps capture the rise and fall of topics by analyzing archives of historical newspapers, of U.S. presidential campaign speeches, and of social messages collected through iNeighbors. ThemeDelta is evaluated using a qualitative expert user study involving three researchers from rhetoric and history using the historical newspapers corpus. Time and location are key parameters in any event; neglecting them while discovering topics from a collection of documents results in missing valuable information. We propose a dynamic spatial topic model (DSTM), a true spatio-temporal model that enables disaggregating a corpus's coverage into location-based reporting, and understanding how such coverage varies over time. DSTM naturally generalizes traditional spatial and temporal topic models so that many existing formalisms can be viewed as special cases of DSTM. We demonstrate a successful application of DSTM to multiple newspapers from the Chronicling America repository. We demonstrate how our approach helps uncover key differences in the coverage of the flu as it spread through the nation, and provide possible explanations for such differences. Major events that can change the flow of people's lives are important to predict, especially when we have powerful models and sufficient data available at our fingertips. The problem of embedding the DSTM in a predictive setting is the last part of this dissertation. To predict events and their locations across time, we present a predictive dynamic spatial topic model that can predict future topics and their locations from unseen documents. We showed the applicability of our proposed approach by applying it on streaming tweets from Latin America. The prediction approach was successful in identify major events and their locations. ; Ph. D.
The article surveys the study of Latin American business politics, focusing on three main areas: The structure of business, the preferences of business, and its power in the political process. The structure of businesses in Latin America is distinct, with a larger share of small and informal firms, comparatively small large firms, and a dominant role of multinational corporations (MNCs) and economic groups. We argue that these structures are reflected in business preferences. MNCs' preferences depend on their strategic orientation, whether they invest in Latin America in order to gain access to resources, to new markets, or to enhance their global productivity. Business groups are often particularly strong in non-competitive industries – resources, oligopolistic non-tradables etc. - and are highly flexible due to hierarchical management and large cash reserves. As a result, they are well equipped to deal with a rapidly changing businesses environment and were, surprisingly to many observers, unlikely to oppose the external liberalization policies of the 1990s. Small firms have little political cloud, but since many of them are informal, they do not play an important part as a voice for flexibilization, especially of labor markets, the way they do in many advanced industrialized countries. Large firms have various avenues to influence political processes in Latin America. Business leaders are well represented in governments and are often included in advisory councils which can play crucial roles in affecting policy. The formal structure of political systems – Presidential systems with proportional representation in parliaments – further enhance the power of business, as individual legislators are often targeted for legislative deal-making. The region's expensive political campaigns, funded by a small number of large donors, are yet another source for business power of the political process. Looking ahead, we argue that many of these features of Latin American businesses and business politics are likely to be quite stable and if anything increase in intensity. Keywords: Latin America; business politics; business power; economic groups; multinational corporations; small firms; literature review. ; Este artículo examina el estudio de la política de las empresas latinoamericanas, centrándose en tres áreas principales: la estructura de las empresas, las preferencias de las empresas y su poder en el proceso político. La estructura de las empresas en Latinoamérica es singular, con una proporción mayor de firmas pequeñas e informales, la presencia, en términos comparativos, de firmas grandes de menor tamaño y un rol dominante de las corporaciones multinacionales (CMN) y los grupos económicos. Sostenemos que estas estructuras se reflejan en las preferencias de las empresas. Las preferencias de las CMN dependen de su orientación estratégica, ya sea que inviertan en Latinoamérica con el fin de lograr el acceso a recursos, a nuevos mercados o para aumentar su productividad global. Los grupos empresariales con frecuencia son particularmente fuertes en las industrias no-competitivas —recursos, no-transables oligopólicas, etc.— y son altamente flexibles debido a la gerencia jerárquica y las grandes reservas de liquidez. Como resultado, están bien equipados para afrontar un ambiente empresarial rápidamente cambiante y estuvieron, para sorpresa de muchos observadores, propensos a no oponerse a las políticas externas de liberalización de los años 1990. Las firmas pequeñas tienen poca masa política, pero puesto que muchas de ellas son informales, no juegan un papel importante como una voz para la flexibilización, especialmente de los mercados laborales, como sucede en muchos países industrializados avanzados. Las grandes firmas tienen varias vías para influir en los procesos políticos en Latinoamérica. Los líderes empresariales están bien representados en los gobiernos y con frecuencia son incluidos en comités asesores, los cuales pueden jugar roles cruciales en la definición de políticas. La estructura formal de los sistemas políticos —sistemas presidenciales con representaciones proporcionales en los parlamentos— incrementa aun más el poder empresarial, en la medida en que los legisladores individuales con frecuencia son puestos en la mira para negociar acuerdos legislativos. Las costosas campañas políticas de la región, financiadas por un pequeño grupo de grandes donantes, son una fuente adicional del poder empresarial en el proceso político. Mirando hacia adelante, sostenemos que muchas de estas características de las empresas latinoamericanas y de la política de las empresas es probable que sean bastante estables y, si hay algún cambio, será un incremento en intensidad.
The article surveys the study of Latin American business politics, focusing on three main areas: The structure of business, the preferences of business, and its power in the political process. The structure of businesses in Latin America is distinct, with a larger share of small and informal firms, comparatively small large firms, and a dominant role of multinational corporations (MNCs) and economic groups. We argue that these structures are reflected in business preferences. MNCs' preferences depend on their strategic orientation, whether they invest in Latin America in order to gain access to resources, to new markets, or to enhance their global productivity. Business groups are often particularly strong in non-competitive industries – resources, oligopolistic non-tradables etc. - and are highly flexible due to hierarchical management and large cash reserves. As a result, they are well equipped to deal with a rapidly changing businesses environment and were, surprisingly to many observers, unlikely to oppose the external liberalization policies of the 1990s. Small firms have little political cloud, but since many of them are informal, they do not play an important part as a voice for flexibilization, especially of labor markets, the way they do in many advanced industrialized countries. Large firms have various avenues to influence political processes in Latin America. Business leaders are well represented in governments and are often included in advisory councils which can play crucial roles in affecting policy. The formal structure of political systems – Presidential systems with proportional representation in parliaments – further enhance the power of business, as individual legislators are often targeted for legislative deal-making. The region's expensive political campaigns, funded by a small number of large donors, are yet another source for business power of the political process. Looking ahead, we argue that many of these features of Latin American businesses and business politics are likely to be quite stable and if anything increase in intensity. Keywords: Latin America; business politics; business power; economic groups; multinational corporations; small firms; literature review. ; Este artículo examina el estudio de la política de las empresas latinoamericanas, centrándose en tres áreas principales: la estructura de las empresas, las preferencias de las empresas y su poder en el proceso político. La estructura de las empresas en Latinoamérica es singular, con una proporción mayor de firmas pequeñas e informales, la presencia, en términos comparativos, de firmas grandes de menor tamaño y un rol dominante de las corporaciones multinacionales (CMN) y los grupos económicos. Sostenemos que estas estructuras se reflejan en las preferencias de las empresas. Las preferencias de las CMN dependen de su orientación estratégica, ya sea que inviertan en Latinoamérica con el fin de lograr el acceso a recursos, a nuevos mercados o para aumentar su productividad global. Los grupos empresariales con frecuencia son particularmente fuertes en las industrias no-competitivas —recursos, no-transables oligopólicas, etc.— y son altamente flexibles debido a la gerencia jerárquica y las grandes reservas de liquidez. Como resultado, están bien equipados para afrontar un ambiente empresarial rápidamente cambiante y estuvieron, para sorpresa de muchos observadores, propensos a no oponerse a las políticas externas de liberalización de los años 1990. Las firmas pequeñas tienen poca masa política, pero puesto que muchas de ellas son informales, no juegan un papel importante como una voz para la flexibilización, especialmente de los mercados laborales, como sucede en muchos países industrializados avanzados. Las grandes firmas tienen varias vías para influir en los procesos políticos en Latinoamérica. Los líderes empresariales están bien representados en los gobiernos y con frecuencia son incluidos en comités asesores, los cuales pueden jugar roles cruciales en la definición de políticas. La estructura formal de los sistemas políticos —sistemas presidenciales con representaciones proporcionales en los parlamentos— incrementa aun más el poder empresarial, en la medida en que los legisladores individuales con frecuencia son puestos en la mira para negociar acuerdos legislativos. Las costosas campañas políticas de la región, financiadas por un pequeño grupo de grandes donantes, son una fuente adicional del poder empresarial en el proceso político. Mirando hacia adelante, sostenemos que muchas de estas características de las empresas latinoamericanas y de la política de las empresas es probable que sean bastante estables y, si hay algún cambio, será un incremento en intensidad.
The article surveys the study of Latin American business politics, focusing on three main areas: The structure of business, the preferences of business, and its power in the political process. The structure of businesses in Latin America is distinct, with a larger share of small and informal firms, comparatively small large firms, and a dominant role of multinational corporations (MNCs) and economic groups. We argue that these structures are reflected in business preferences. MNCs' preferences depend on their strategic orientation, whether they invest in Latin America in order to gain access to resources, to new markets, or to enhance their global productivity. Business groups are often particularly strong in non-competitive industries – resources, oligopolistic non-tradables etc. - and are highly flexible due to hierarchical management and large cash reserves. As a result, they are well equipped to deal with a rapidly changing businesses environment and were, surprisingly to many observers, unlikely to oppose the external liberalization policies of the 1990s. Small firms have little political cloud, but since many of them are informal, they do not play an important part as a voice for flexibilization, especially of labor markets, the way they do in many advanced industrialized countries. Large firms have various avenues to influence political processes in Latin America. Business leaders are well represented in governments and are often included in advisory councils which can play crucial roles in affecting policy. The formal structure of political systems – Presidential systems with proportional representation in parliaments – further enhance the power of business, as individual legislators are often targeted for legislative deal-making. The region's expensive political campaigns, funded by a small number of large donors, are yet another source for business power of the political process. Looking ahead, we argue that many of these features of Latin American businesses and business politics are likely to be quite stable and if anything increase in intensity. Keywords: Latin America; business politics; business power; economic groups; multinational corporations; small firms; literature review. ; Este artículo examina el estudio de la política de las empresas latinoamericanas, centrándose en tres áreas principales: la estructura de las empresas, las preferencias de las empresas y su poder en el proceso político. La estructura de las empresas en Latinoamérica es singular, con una proporción mayor de firmas pequeñas e informales, la presencia, en términos comparativos, de firmas grandes de menor tamaño y un rol dominante de las corporaciones multinacionales (CMN) y los grupos económicos. Sostenemos que estas estructuras se reflejan en las preferencias de las empresas. Las preferencias de las CMN dependen de su orientación estratégica, ya sea que inviertan en Latinoamérica con el fin de lograr el acceso a recursos, a nuevos mercados o para aumentar su productividad global. Los grupos empresariales con frecuencia son particularmente fuertes en las industrias no-competitivas —recursos, no-transables oligopólicas, etc.— y son altamente flexibles debido a la gerencia jerárquica y las grandes reservas de liquidez. Como resultado, están bien equipados para afrontar un ambiente empresarial rápidamente cambiante y estuvieron, para sorpresa de muchos observadores, propensos a no oponerse a las políticas externas de liberalización de los años 1990. Las firmas pequeñas tienen poca masa política, pero puesto que muchas de ellas son informales, no juegan un papel importante como una voz para la flexibilización, especialmente de los mercados laborales, como sucede en muchos países industrializados avanzados. Las grandes firmas tienen varias vías para influir en los procesos políticos en Latinoamérica. Los líderes empresariales están bien representados en los gobiernos y con frecuencia son incluidos en comités asesores, los cuales pueden jugar roles cruciales en la definición de políticas. La estructura formal de los sistemas políticos —sistemas presidenciales con representaciones proporcionales en los parlamentos— incrementa aun más el poder empresarial, en la medida en que los legisladores individuales con frecuencia son puestos en la mira para negociar acuerdos legislativos. Las costosas campañas políticas de la región, financiadas por un pequeño grupo de grandes donantes, son una fuente adicional del poder empresarial en el proceso político. Mirando hacia adelante, sostenemos que muchas de estas características de las empresas latinoamericanas y de la política de las empresas es probable que sean bastante estables y, si hay algún cambio, será un incremento en intensidad.
There is little doubt that political leaders have become more politically important over the past half century, although the extent which their electoral influence may have increased remains a matter of debate. This fundamental change in the role of political leaders has been especially pronounced in parliamentary systems based on the Westminster model. In parliamentary systems, the promotion of leader images during national election campaigns is now as prominentperhaps even more prominentthan party symbols, leading some to argue that the Westminster system is converging with its presidential counterpart (Mughan, 2000). In parallel with this change, governments and sometimes even oppositions are routinely labeled after the leader by the media and by the public, rather than after the party they lead (McAllister, 1996). The defining moment in this change is often traced to Margaret Thatchers accession to office in Britain as the first conviction politician of the postwar years. However, it is often forgotten that Pierre Trudeaus election as Canadian prime minister in 1968 led to the Trudeaumania phenomenon which is perhaps the earliest manifestation of a prime ministers popularity surpassing that of his or her party. Since the 1990s, it has become more commonplace for governments or parties to be named after their leader. In Germany, the popularity of Helmut Kohl and more recently Gerhard Schroder has at various times easily eclipsed the parties they lead, as has the popularity of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy and Tony Blair in Britain. The changing role of prime ministers has not only occurred in terms of their public profile within the electorate. In the context of their capacity to influence policy, postwar prime ministers in Westminster systems have accumulated considerably greater power and authority when compared to their prewar counterparts (King, 1994; Rhodes, 1995). In many Westminster systems, it is often argued that cabinet government based on collective responsibility has been undermined, in part by the increased complexity of modern decision-making, but also by a conscious effort to centralize prime ministerial authority. Moreover, in majoritarian systems such as that of Australia and Britain, the prime minister now exercises unprecedented power in shaping ministerial careers, a crucial tool in ensuring compliance and centralizing authority. The prima facie evidence suggests, then, that prime ministers and opposition leaders have replaced many of the roles historically played by political parties in ensuring the efficient operation of the parliamentary system. This chapter examines the evidence to support this observation in Australia, Britain and Canada, focusing especially on the presidentialization hypothesis. However, a major task of the chapter is also to outline some of the factors which have led to a greater focus on prime ministers, and in this, these are divided between exogenous factors, such as the changing role of television, and institutional changes, such as the increasing complexity of public policy. Australia, Britain and Canada are particularly appropriate case studies. Although all three operate political systems which have a common origin in the Westminster model, they vary considerably in how that model has evolved to cope with their differing circumstances. Both Australia and Canada adopted federal systems, although there the similarity ends. In Australia, the power of the majority party is tempered by the influence of the upper house, the Senate. Originally conceived of as the states housea house of review in which the states aims would balance those of the partiesin recent years the control of the Senate by the opposition parties has effectively meant that the government must either drop or radically alter its more controversial legislation if it wishes to see it implemented (Sharman, 1999). In neither Britain nor Canada is their such an institutional impediment to majority rule. In Britain the governing party can count on implementing its legislative program. The House of Lords represents no major impediment to the government putting its policies into law, and in the rare occasions when its lower house majority has been so small as to place its legislative program in jeopardy, an election has been called.2 In Canada the federal government is effectively independent of the provinces in the areas in which it has jurisdiction; when negotiation takes place, it is generally in the areas of provincial jurisdiction when the provinces are seeking federal financial support. In both Australia and Canada, then, prime ministerial authority must take account of federalism in realizing their policy goals, and in the former, this means the constraint placed on such authority by the upper house.
Proceedings contain: Introductory Note by Kurt W. Back, John P. Robinson, & Philip Harding; the AAPOR Award presented "For Exceptionally Distinguished Achievement" to Jean Stoetzel, President of the French Institut of PO; Presidential Address on "Public Opinion Research as Communication," by W. Phillps Davison, President, Amer Assoc for PO Res; Abstracts of 22 papers presented; summaries of 13 Luncheon Open Discussion Groups; & a note on the Annual Advisory AAPOR Business Meeting. Papers presented were: PUBLIC OPINION IN PERSPECTIVE, Chairman: W. Phillips Davison (Columbia U, New York, NY): Harold D. Lasswell (City U of New York, NY), "Communications Research and Public Policy," Public Opinion Quarterly, 1972, 36, 3, Fall, 301 -- 310. Discussion by Daniel Lerner (Mass Instit of Technology, Cambridge). EFFECTS OF TELEVISION ON SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, Chairman: Harold Mendelsohn (U of Denver, Colo); Harold Mendelsohn, "Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Can Succeed;" Sidney Kraus (U of Massachusetts, Amherst), "Mass Communication and Political Behavior: A Reassessment of Two Decades of Research." HAVE WE CHANGED OUR MINDS ABOUT PROBABILITY SAMPLING? Chairman: Alfred E. Goldman (Nat'l Analysts, Inc): Sydney Roslow & Laurence Roslow (Baruch Coll, City U of New York, NY), "Sample Design: 36-Inch or 24-Inch Yardstick;" Richard Maisel (New York U, NY), "Inference from Nonprobability Samples." ADVERTISING AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS: POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES, Chairman: Donald L. Kanter (U of Southern California, Los Angeles): John G. Myers (U of California, Berkeley), "Communication Models and Advertising Regulation;" Donald L. Kanter (U of Southern California, Los Angeles), "Government Policy and Public Service Advertising." WAPOR: INTERACTION OF RESEARCH AND GOVERNMENT POLICY, Chairman: Kurt W. Back (Duke U, Winston-Salem, NC): J. Timothy Sprehe, "Prospects for a World Fertility Survey;" Discussion: Samuel Baum (Bur of the Census, Washington, DC), David Mutchler (Aid to Internat'l Development, Washington, DC), & Michael Hoffman (Marcomer, Paris). LARGE-SCALE CONTINUING STUDIES IN EDUCATION, Chairman: Eugene L. Hartley (U of Wisconsin, Green Bay): Thomas P. Hogan (U of Wisconsin, Green Bay), "The Extent and Uses of Survey-Type Testing in American Schools;" David E. Drew (Amer Council on Educ), "Survey of Current Research in Higher Education." THE OBJECTIVITY OF NEWS COVERAGE, Chairman: Leo Bogart (Bur of Advertising, ANPA): G. Ray Funkhouser (Pennsylvania State U, University Park), "All I Know Is What I See in the Media;" Ben H. Bagdikian (Washington Post, DC), "Who Shall Watch the Watchman?"; Norman E. Isaacs (Columbia U, New York, NY), "Does News Form Overpower News Content." THE EUROPEAN ORIGINS OF PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH: A PANEL DISCUSSION, Panelists: Paul F. Lazarsfeld (Columbia U, New York, NY), Jean Stoetzel (Instit Framcais d'Opinion Publique, Paris); Albert E. Gollin (Bur of Soc Sci Res), & Gillian M. Lindt (American U, Washington, DC), "Signposts Along the Way: On Some European Origins of Public Opinion Research." WAPOR: RESEARCH ON FAMILY PLANNING, Chairman: Kurt W. Back (Duke U, Winston-Salem, NC): Ismail Sirageldin (Johns Hopkins U, Baltimore, Md), "The Survey Method in Family Planning Research and Evaluation: The Case of Pakistan." THE CHANGING BASES OF ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR, Chairman: Robert Agranoff (Northern Ill U, Normal): Everett C. Ladd Jr (U of Connecticut, Storrs, "Political Issues and Differentiation of the Citizenry Parties;" Charles H. Backstrom (U of Minnesota, Minneapolis), "Congress and the Public Opinion: How Representative Is the One of the Other?" CORPORATE TRACKING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGEMENT DECISIONS, Chairman: Sol Dutka (Audits & Surveys Inc), Malcolm A. McNiven (Coca-Cola Co), "Continuing Consumer Research at Coca-Cola USA;" Nicholas J. Mammana (AT & T), "Teeing Off on Tracking;" Robert W. Pratt, Jr & David T. Case (General Electric Co), "The Application of Tracking Data to Strategic Planning." SIMULATION GAME DEMONSTRATION: STARPOWER, Chairman: Arlene & Daniel O'Leary (Simulation Learning Instit): CHANGING VALUES IN AMERICA, Chairman: Ralph K. White (George Washington U, Washington, DC): "Contrasting Approaches to the Measurement of Values;" Milton Rokeach (U of Western Ontario, London), "Values in American Society." THE PROBLEM OF DRUG ABUSE: RESEARCH AND POLICY NEEDS, Chairman: Mitchell Balter Psychopharmacology Res Branch, NIMH), & A. John Rush (Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention), "A View from the Public Sector." This abstract is being presented in 2 Parts. Additional contribution are in the abstract that follows. M. Maxfield.
Mr. José María Vargas Vila sends his new address in Barcelona, Spain to Mr. Fernando Torreblanca and asks him to submit the attached letter to Gen. Alvaro Obregón (the letter is not in this file). Fernando Torreblanca sends Gen. Obregón a telegram originally sent by Gen. Aarón Sáenz in which he indicates that they have been working on the unification of both blocs in the Chamber. He comments on the possibility of postponing the convention in the capital city in order for it to be prepared the way it should and contrast with those held by the gomistas and the serranistas. Fernando Torreblanca announces to Gen. Alvaro Obregón that Gen. Arnulfo R. Gómez has requested a leave and the President, Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles, agreed to give it to him. He also transcribes the essential text of said request. Additionally, he indicates that Gen. Jesús M. Aguirre and Gen. Andrés Figueroa have been appointed as Chiefs of Military Operations in Veracruz and Sinaloa, respectively. Fernando Torreblanca informs Enrique Torreblanca that there are plans to make an attempt on Gen. Obregón's life and he asks him to take all manners of precautions. Fernando Torreblanca reminds Gen. Obregón that it is a constitutional requirement that the candidate remain in the national territory for one year prior to the date of the presidential election. Dr. José G. Parrés, Secretary of Agriculture and Development, sends to Fernando Torreblanca, to be forwarded to Gen. Obregón, the information pertaining to the provisional positions and the definitive possessions given during the governments of Carranza, Adolfo de la Huerta and what will come out of the current administration. Gen. Obregón asks Fernando Torreblanca if Gen. Rodríguez will be removed from Baja California. Negative reply. Guillermo R. Romay expresses his support to Gen. Alvaro Obregón. Gen. Obregón informs Fernando Torreblanca that he will start his campaign and the date of his arrival to Mexico. He indicates that Francisco Salido denied the position being offered to him in the Anatolio Ortega prison. He comments on an issue regarding the Casa Richardson. Gen. Obregón asks Fernando Torreblanca for a train ticket for Representative Jesús J. Lizárraga from Guaymas, Sonora to Guadalajara, Jalisco. Mr. Fernando Torreblanca makes an appointment with Dr. Carlos Nava Muñoz in his office. / El Sr. José María Vargas Vila remite al Sr. Fernando Torreblanca su nueva dirección en Barcelona, España y le pide entregue al Gral. Alvaro Obregón una carta adjunta (no se encuentra en el expediente). Fernando Torreblanca remite al Gral. Obregón un telegrama enviado por el Gral. Aarón Sáenz en el que informa que han estado trabajando en la unificación de los dos bloques de la Cámara. Comenta la posibilidad de aplazar la convención en la capital para que se prepare debidamente y contraste con las celebradas por los gomistas y la de los serranistas. Fernando Torreblanca participa al Gral. Alvaro Obregón que el Gral. Arnulfo R. Gómez solicita licencia y el señor Presidente, Gral. Plutarco Elías Calles acordó concederla; transcribe el texto íntegro de dicha solicitud. Asimismo, informa que el Gral. Jesús M. Aguirre y el Gral. Andrés Figueroa han sido designados como Jefes de Operaciones Militares en Veracruz y Sinaloa, respectivamente. Fernando Torreblanca informa a Enrique Torreblanca que hay propósitos de atentar contra la vida del Gral. Obregón y le pide que tome toda clase de precauciones. Fernando Torreblanca recuerda al Gral. Obregón que es requisito constitucional que el candidato permanezca en territorio nacional un año anterior a la fecha de la elección presidencial. El Dr. José G. Parrés, Secretario de Agricultura y Fomento envía a Fernando Torreblanca para que a su vez los remita al Gral. Obregón, los datos de las posiciones provisionales y las posesiones definitivas dadas durante los gobiernos de Carranza, Adolfo de la Huerta y lo que va de la administración actual. El Gral. Obregón pregunta a Fernando Torreblanca si será removido el Gral. Rodríguez de Baja California. Respuesta negativa. Guillermo R. Romay manifiesta su adhesión al Gral. Alvaro Obregón. El Gral. Obregón informa a Fernando Torreblanca que iniciará su campaña y la fecha de su llegada a México; comunica que Francisco Salido desmintió el cargo que le hacían sobre la prisión de Anatolio Ortega; comenta un asunto sobre la Casa Richardson. El Gral. Obregón pide a Fernando Torreblanca un pase de ferrocarril para el Dip. Jesús J. Lizárraga de Guaymas, Son. a Guadalajara, Jal. El Sr. Fernando Torreblanca cita en su oficina al Dr. Carlos Nava Muñoz.
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Now that President Joe Biden has made the unprecedented decision to end his reelection campaign and endorse Vice President Kamala Harris for president, we need to ask: what will be her foreign policy if she wins in November? It is safe to assume that there will be broad continuity with the Biden administration's overall approach to the world, but there is some evidence that Harris might guide U.S. foreign policy in a somewhat less destructive direction than where it has been going under Biden.First off, Harris did not run for president in 2020 on foreign policy and has relatively little foreign policy experience from her short time in the Senate and her tenure as vice president. While she has cast a number of tie-breaking votes in favor of Biden's domestic agenda in the Senate, she has played a smaller role in foreign policy by representing the U.S. at international meetings that the president has been unable to attend. She was tasked by Biden to focus on the "root causes" in Latin America leading to the undocumented migrant issue at the nation's southern border, drawing mixed reviews at best.Meanwhile, her voting record in the Senate offers some bright spots, including her opposition to U.S. backing for the Saudi coalition war on Yemen, and her early opposition to arms deals with Riyadh. She joined with her Democratic colleagues in objecting to Trump's withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and she has been generally supportive of arms control and nonproliferation measures. During her 2020 presidential run, she signaled openness to "rewrit[ing] the Authorization for Use of Military Force that governs our current military conflicts." And while Harris has a history of close ties to AIPAC, she called Trump's Iran nuclear deal exit "reckless" during the 2020 campaign and vowed to re-enter the JCPOA as president.But no one should expect any radical overhauls under Harris. She is a conventional liberal internationalist for better or worse. There are some hints that she might have a different approach to the war in Gaza than Biden, but these have mostly been differences in tone rather than major disagreements over policy so far. In contrast to the president, Harris has shown more genuine empathy for the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza. She also called for a ceasefire earlier than Biden did, but on the whole she has followed the administration's script as one would expect from a vice president. Harris has indeed been required by her position as vice president to be a vocal supporter of the president's policy agenda, so to some extent we will have to wait to find out what Harris's own views are and how much they might differ from Biden's. This is definitely the case for the Ukraine War where she has been in absolute lockstep with the president if she talks about it at all. In her remarks at the Munich Security Conference, she echoed the administration's framing of this as a war between democracy and autocracy:"No nation is safe in a world where one country can violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another where crimes against humanity are committed with impunity; where a country with imperialist ambitions can go unchecked."Our response to the Russian invasion is a demonstration of our collective commitment to uphold international rules and norms. Rules and norms which, since the end of World War Two, have provided unprecedented security and prosperity not only for the American people, not only for the people of Europe, but people around the world…"Again, the United States will continue to strongly support Ukraine. And we will do so for as long as it takes."Her previous opposition to backing the Saudi coalition in Yemen suggests that she might be more open to curtailing or ending U.S. support for the war in Gaza, but that remains to be seen. Given all of Biden's political headaches in swing states like Michigan, the war in Gaza is clearly one issue where Harris would stand to benefit by breaking with current administration policy.Some of the former government officials that resigned in protest over U.S. support for the war in Gaza are cautiously optimistic about Harris. After Biden's unconditional backing for the war, any alternative is an improvement in their eyes. Josh Paul, the first State Department official to resign in protest, told Politico, "I would say I have cautious and limited optimism — but also a deep sense of relief that the Democratic party will not be nominating for the Presidency of the United States a man who has made us all complicit in so much and such unnecessary harm."The vice president reportedly depends heavily on her foreign policy advisers, so it is worth looking more closely at the thinking of her current national security adviser, Philip Gordon, who would presumably serve in that capacity if Harris is elected. Gordon is a Clinton and Obama administration veteran with a background in working on European and Middle Eastern issues. He was one of the U.S. negotiators responsible for securing the JCPOA. After leaving government, he became one of the deal's most vocal defenders. Gordon has demonstrated that he understands the Iranian government better than a lot of his colleagues, and that could be very useful in reviving negotiations with Iran under its new reformist president Masoud Pezeshkian. Gordon has absorbed some of the important lessons from U.S. foreign policy failures, including the disastrous interventions in the Middle East and North Africa and has written about those lessons at length in his book, "Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East." The book reviews the history of major U.S. regime change policies of the last 70 years and in each case Gordon shows how the policies ended up leaving both the U.S. and the affected countries worse off. It is notable that he criticized destructive Obama administration interventions just as sharply as he did the policies of other presidents. Some analysts see Gordon's role as Harris's top adviser as an encouraging sign that her foreign policy could be an improvement over Biden's. Bourse & Bazaar CEO Esfandyar Batmanghelidj commented, "[Gordon] would be a big upgrade on Sullivan, especially when it comes to thoughtful approaches to the US role in the Middle East."There probably wouldn't be many departures from Biden administration foreign policy under Harris. As Biden's vice president and would-be successor, Harris has strong incentives to continue with his agenda. That said, there are a few reasons to hope that U.S. foreign policy could be smarter and more constructive if Harris takes Gordon's best advice to heart.
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The draft law "On transparency of foreign influence" repeatedly introduced by Georgia's ruling party has stirred this South Caucasus country's civil society. The legislation many consider repressive and based on a Russian template has already passed in at least five countries Moscow considers part of its sphere of influence.In each case, passage of this law has been a marker of Russia's influence and a block to a nation's accession to the institutions of the West. The European Union legal authorities hold "foreign agent," "foreign influence," or Hungary's Stop Soros laws to be contradictory to EU law. Famously, a law on foreign agents was part of the legislation package—described by many as the "laws on dictatorship"—passed in mid-January 2014 in Ukraine amid the Euromaidan protests. The laws were designed to stop Ukrainian society's resistance but only spurred the protests and were later mostly repealed. Similar laws have been successfully enacted in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Republika Srpska, the Serbian entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, seems to be on track to pass a law on "foreign agents," aimed at limiting the activities of foreign-funded NGOs.Those Georgians who are protesting the law on the streets of Tbilisi see it as a "test of allegiance" to Putin's Russia pushed by the moderately pro-Moscow Georgian Dream party. "Their task is to pass this law and remain softly authoritarian … through the indirect silencing of critics," Anna Dolidze of the opposition party For the People told the BBC. The law, which passed on first reading, requires NGOs and media outlets that get more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad to register as organizations "bearing the interests of a foreign power." The law imposes reporting requirements, inspections, and administrative and criminal liability, thereby combining features of Russia's 2012 foreign agents law, which concerned only NGOs, and the 2017 law, which added media to the entities it covered. From Legalese to Arbitrary RuleIn Russia, those were the first two stages of the legislation's tightening: NGOs were hit first, media outlets were hit second. Stage three came in 2019, when amendments were made to include individual people as potential "foreign agents."Step four went into effect following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The government gave itself the authority to label individuals as foreign agents by virtue of their being "under foreign influence." The government also granted itself the power to classify individuals as "affiliated with foreign agents."Let us spell this out again. Starting in 2023, when the law was enacted, the authorities in Russia could designate literally anyone as a foreign agent simply by claiming—completely arbitrarily—that the individual was under foreign influence or connected to a foreign agent.Earlier this year, in what might be considered stage five, both chambers of Russia's parliament approved a law banning Russian citizens and companies from advertising on the media resources owned by people recognized by the authorities as foreign agents. In practice, this meant that popular independent journalists and commentators who relied on websites, blogging, and social media platforms for their source of compensation had lost large parts of their income.The Kremlin LawsThe process is administrative, not judicial. Labels arrive as surprise government announcements. In practice, this means that people learn about their new status from journalists or friends who watch for updates on the Ministry of Justice's website. The updates usually happen on Fridays, and the process is surrounded by a spectacle of anticipation: "Who is it going to be this time?" The website announcements, the only document certifying the designation, do not include any motivation. People just get issued a label. The only way to get official confirmation of foreign agent status and some reasoning explaining the decision is to sue the ministry and get a court's rejection of your complaint. Those rejections usually contain some language defending the original administrative decision.Some people treat the designation as a recognition of sorts. The Friday announcements often draw a round of social media "applause" for those newly designated. In real life, the status is a nuisance. It requires public labeling and lots of paperwork to be submitted to the government to meet reporting requirements. It threatens criminal liability after a few failures to comply with it. In Russia, the foreign agent status comes complete with a plethora of civil rights restrictions. The people designated as "agents" are not allowed—among other things—to hold public office, take part in electoral campaigns even as campaign managers or funders, teach in state-run institutions, or receive state support or tax breaks.Interestingly, this process of gradual loss of all shreds of legality took the Russian legislators ten years to put in place. Legal experts who have followed the process of at least five waves of amendments added between 2012 and 2022 say that those have always been high priority, which likely meant that Putin personally was behind them.Whenever he comments on the law, Putin invariably mentions the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act. The U.S. law defines "foreign agents" as entities or individuals engaged in lobbying for foreign interests. It requires those organizations and people to register with the Department of Justice and disclose their affiliations and funding. The Russian law clearly encompasses a wider range of activities beyond lobbying or advocacy and basically criminalizes public dissent.Back in 2012, the presidential administration curators of Russia's legislative body, the State Duma, made sure that the very first foreign agents law passed almost unanimously. In the relatively benign year of 2012, only four MPs voted against the document. All the subsequent amendments were accepted nearly unanimously too. Observers note that versions of foreign agent laws form the cornerstone of what we can refer to as "the Kremlin laws." Moscow employs them to showcase its influence and target organizations and individuals in neighboring countries. As seen from the Russian example, laws of this sort are meant to erode judicial procedures and make the process of designating enemies as arbitrary as possible.Typically, these laws emerge in nations that Moscow effectively influences or dominates. Often, foreign agent laws are coupled with deliberately expansive counterterrorism legislation, enabling governments to wield terrorism accusations as a means to suppress and silence vocal activists, journalists, scholars, artists, and legal professionals.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
The draft law "On transparency of foreign influence" repeatedly introduced by Georgia's ruling party has stirred this South Caucasus country's civil society. The legislation many consider repressive and based on a Russian template has already passed in at least five countries Moscow considers part of its sphere of influence.In each case, passage of this law has been a marker of Russia's influence and a block to a nation's accession to the institutions of the West. The European Union legal authorities hold "foreign agent," "foreign influence," or Hungary's Stop Soros laws to be contradictory to EU law. Famously, a law on foreign agents was part of the legislation package—described by many as the "laws on dictatorship"—passed in mid-January 2014 in Ukraine amid the Euromaidan protests. The laws were designed to stop Ukrainian society's resistance but only spurred the protests and were later mostly repealed. Similar laws have been successfully enacted in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Republika Srpska, the Serbian entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, seems to be on track to pass a law on "foreign agents," aimed at limiting the activities of foreign-funded NGOs.Those Georgians who are protesting the law on the streets of Tbilisi see it as a "test of allegiance" to Putin's Russia pushed by the moderately pro-Moscow Georgian Dream party. "Their task is to pass this law and remain softly authoritarian … through the indirect silencing of critics," Anna Dolidze of the opposition party For the People told the BBC. The law, which passed on first reading, requires NGOs and media outlets that get more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad to register as organizations "bearing the interests of a foreign power." The law imposes reporting requirements, inspections, and administrative and criminal liability, thereby combining features of Russia's 2012 foreign agents law, which concerned only NGOs, and the 2017 law, which added media to the entities it covered. From Legalese to Arbitrary RuleIn Russia, those were the first two stages of the legislation's tightening: NGOs were hit first, media outlets were hit second. Stage three came in 2019, when amendments were made to include individual people as potential "foreign agents."Step four went into effect following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The government gave itself the authority to label individuals as foreign agents by virtue of their being "under foreign influence." The government also granted itself the power to classify individuals as "affiliated with foreign agents."Let us spell this out again. Starting in 2023, when the law was enacted, the authorities in Russia could designate literally anyone as a foreign agent simply by claiming—completely arbitrarily—that the individual was under foreign influence or connected to a foreign agent.Earlier this year, in what might be considered stage five, both chambers of Russia's parliament approved a law banning Russian citizens and companies from advertising on the media resources owned by people recognized by the authorities as foreign agents. In practice, this meant that popular independent journalists and commentators who relied on websites, blogging, and social media platforms for their source of compensation had lost large parts of their income.The Kremlin LawsThe process is administrative, not judicial. Labels arrive as surprise government announcements. In practice, this means that people learn about their new status from journalists or friends who watch for updates on the Ministry of Justice's website. The updates usually happen on Fridays, and the process is surrounded by a spectacle of anticipation: "Who is it going to be this time?" The website announcements, the only document certifying the designation, do not include any motivation. People just get issued a label. The only way to get official confirmation of foreign agent status and some reasoning explaining the decision is to sue the ministry and get a court's rejection of your complaint. Those rejections usually contain some language defending the original administrative decision.Some people treat the designation as a recognition of sorts. The Friday announcements often draw a round of social media "applause" for those newly designated. In real life, the status is a nuisance. It requires public labeling and lots of paperwork to be submitted to the government to meet reporting requirements. It threatens criminal liability after a few failures to comply with it. In Russia, the foreign agent status comes complete with a plethora of civil rights restrictions. The people designated as "agents" are not allowed—among other things—to hold public office, take part in electoral campaigns even as campaign managers or funders, teach in state-run institutions, or receive state support or tax breaks.Interestingly, this process of gradual loss of all shreds of legality took the Russian legislators ten years to put in place. Legal experts who have followed the process of at least five waves of amendments added between 2012 and 2022 say that those have always been high priority, which likely meant that Putin personally was behind them.Whenever he comments on the law, Putin invariably mentions the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act. The U.S. law defines "foreign agents" as entities or individuals engaged in lobbying for foreign interests. It requires those organizations and people to register with the Department of Justice and disclose their affiliations and funding. The Russian law clearly encompasses a wider range of activities beyond lobbying or advocacy and basically criminalizes public dissent.Back in 2012, the presidential administration curators of Russia's legislative body, the State Duma, made sure that the very first foreign agents law passed almost unanimously. In the relatively benign year of 2012, only four MPs voted against the document. All the subsequent amendments were accepted nearly unanimously too. Observers note that versions of foreign agent laws form the cornerstone of what we can refer to as "the Kremlin laws." Moscow employs them to showcase its influence and target organizations and individuals in neighboring countries. As seen from the Russian example, laws of this sort are meant to erode judicial procedures and make the process of designating enemies as arbitrary as possible.Typically, these laws emerge in nations that Moscow effectively influences or dominates. Often, foreign agent laws are coupled with deliberately expansive counterterrorism legislation, enabling governments to wield terrorism accusations as a means to suppress and silence vocal activists, journalists, scholars, artists, and legal professionals.
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Out of several countries in the coup-stricken African Sahel slated to hold elections this year, Senegal looked like the only one that might escape the threat of voter suppression, rigging, or other corrupt practices.But this is no more the case as a sudden turn of events last week plunged the West African nation into an unprecedented constitutional crisis, which pundits argue could lead anywhere at this point, from an uneasy elite pact to a total state collapse. On February 3, the eve of the official presidential campaign, Senegal's President Macky Sall announced a postponement of the election, citing dispute over the candidate list. His decision to postpone came weeks after a controversy erupted over the exclusion of opposition candidates from the ballot. The opposition Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), whose candidate Karim Wade was among those excluded by the Constitutional Council from running in the election for possessing a dual French-Senegalese citizenship, had earlier filed a formal request to postpone the vote. Also excluded is the opposition PASTEF's popular leader Ousmane Sonko, who opposed Sall in 2019 and has been behind bars since last year for immoral behavior and plotting an insurrection. His candidacy in the 2024 election was rejected last month by the Constitutional Council in a move critics say was targeted at eliminating the most potent obstacle to Sall's preferred candidate, Prime Minister Amadou Ba, running and winning the forthcoming elections. Bassirou Diomaye Faye, Sonko's substitute candidate, is also in jail on charges of contempt of court, defamation, and acts likely to compromise public peace.OutrageNever before has Senegal postponed a presidential election. Ordinary Senegalese are shocked by the strange turn of events in part due to the sense of security created by Sall's decision in July last year not to run for a third term."I feel sad for Senegal, a beautiful and peaceful country always considered as an example of democracy and for the Senegalese people who fought in 2011 in the name of democracy so that the current President Macky Sall could be elected," Awa Diouf, a Senegalese activist, told RS. Sall has repeated his stance not to run for a third term, but the opposition doesn't believe him, accusing Sall of premeditated plans to cling to power or to force his preferred candidate on the people. After the decision, protests resurfaced in the country's capital Dakar reminiscent of scenes of deadly clashes with police that were once a fixture of life from 2021 to 2023. One leading opposition politician was arrested in the renewed disturbance on Feb. 4, as police fired tear gas to disperse angry protesters amidst a growing crackdown which has seen a private television station, Walf TV, suspended for 'inciting violence' and internet cut. The crisis continued into last week at the country's parliament where a bill seeking to fix a new date for the elections and extend Sall's tenure led to a row with some opposition MPs forcibly removed by police clad in riot gear. At the end of proceedings, the parliament, which is dominated by the ruling coalition, Benno Bokk Yakaar (which includes President Sall's Alliance for the Republic party) voted for a 10-month extension of the election until December 15. Sall's term was originally meant to lapse in early April. In response, activists are once again mobilizing for new protests and many fear for more violent crackdowns.A diplomatic solutionThese developments, which occurred on the heels of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's tour of the region last month, have attracted widespread condemnation. The West African bloc, ECOWAS, whose credibility has taken a beating over its handling of a string of coups in the region, failed to condemn the postponement.In sharp contrast, a statement by the U.S. State Department was more decisive in describing the poll's postponement as a move that runs "contrary to Senegal's strong democratic tradition," while also calling the National Assembly's vote illegitimate, "given the conditions under which it took place." The U.S. also condemned the attacks on press freedom and the severing of internet communications in the country. "The U.S. is a strong all round partner with Senegal and is the leading provider of development assistance valued at $238 million per year," Dr. Joseph Siegle of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies noted to RS. Besides the significant economic ties and trade, it is in the area of regional security that Senegal is most important for the United States. As one of the most stable democracies in Africa and a model for religious and ethnic tolerance, Senegal has been a longtime partner of the U.S. in promoting peace and security in Africa. "[Senegal's] importance has become even more outsized in the wake of recent coups and military regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Guinea," Afolabi Adekaiyaoja, a research analyst with the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD-West Africa) explained. Although an outlier in the region's anti-democratic trends, this does not mean Senegal's democracy has been free of turmoil. For instance, out of four Presidents that have governed Senegal since it gained independence from France in 1960, only two have taken office in peaceful transfers of power — the first of which occurred in 2000. In 2012, Sall was only elected following a period of widespread protests against his predecessor Abdoulaye Wade's attempt to undemocratically cling to power. After 12 years at the helm of the country, critics now accuse Sall of the same crimes as Wade's, which include eroding the country's democratic credentials through a pattern of jailing political opponents under spurious charges and bending Senegal's justice system to his will. What is most significant, however, is that even in the midst of chaos "the struggle of the Senegalese people always takes place within the framework of institutions as much as peaceful and unarmed resistance," activist Louise M. Faye told RS. The hope is that today's disagreements won't be litigated in a coup like Senegal's Sahelian neighbors.By and large, experts believe what is likely is an uneasy pact within the elite, which has been brought about as a result of rising opposition to conventional politics. "The US [needs to start] talking directly to all of the relevant Senegalese actors as well as ECOWAS to navigate a stable, constitutionally-based, democratic outcome," Siegle explained. The Biden administration's playbook for the continent, U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, mandates Washington to "stem the recent tide of authoritarianism and military takeovers by working with allies and partners in the region to respond to democratic backsliding and human rights abuses."While doing this, however, Washington needs to be mindful that recent anti-French sentiment has played into Russia's plans to expand its influence in the region. "While that does not necessarily mean direct anti-American perceptions, it will also need to ensure it can retain backchannels to the different factions if it wants to diplomatically intervene. Washington's important role will be to maintain pressure on Dakar to ensure a fair and transparent review process, or national dialogue as President Sall has put it, ahead of the elections," Adekaiyaoja added.
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Quotes from Josep Colomer:Constitutional Polarization. A Critical Review of the U.S. Political SystemRoutledge, 2023. CLICK to purchaseA collection of 6 posts. 1 - Why a Federation? The aim of the Convention in Philadelphia was not to experiment with democracy in a large territory, but to create a "stronger", "firmer" government able to defend the new independent states from the British and other foreign troops still over the continent. The priority was to create a standing army, to pay the debt for the War for Independence, and to introduce the subsequent federal taxes. The basic institutions were the states-appointed Senate and the mighty President with war powers.Some delegates warned that in the new and independent United States, people would not accept, again, taxation without representation. That's why the House of Representatives was embodied as the democratic component of the government. Then, the delegates responded to its perils by designing a series of "filters" and "checks" to prevent the House from prevailing over the other components. The separation of powers and their institutional checks were a cap, intended to tame and temper democracy. NOT A DEMOCRACYMadison warned against "the amazing violence and turbulence of the democratic spirit," and stated, "democratic communities may be unsteady, and be led to action by the impulse of the moment." Later, in the campaign to ratify the Constitution in New York, he would hold that, in the past, democracies "have ever been found spectacles of turbulence and contention … and as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths."Alexander Hamilton would allege that "the zeal for the rights of the people has been a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government." In his view, democracies are manipulated by people who "commence as demagogues and end being tyrants."Gouverneur Morris was an influential delegate from Pennsylvania who is credited as the main redactor of the final text of the Constitution. He also cautioned against "the turbulence, the precipitation, changeableness, and excess" of democratic assemblies.Other delegates in the Convention referred to "the fury" and "the folly" of democracy. One confessed, "It's the anarchy, or rather worse than anarchy of a pure democracy, which I fear." Another simply stated, "democracy, the worst of all political evils." DIVINE HANDAbout the divine hand guiding the constituents, see, for example: "America felt that the hand of providence was on the young republic … There can be little question that the hand of providence has been on a nation which finds a Washington, a Lincoln or a Roosevelt when it needs him," Seymour M. Lipset, American Exceptionalism, W. W. Norton, 1997, pp. 13–14. "I can't wait to go to Heaven and meet the Framers and tell them the work that you did in putting together our Constitution is a work of genius. Thank you. It was divinely inspired," Mike Pence, Vice-President of the United States in December 2020. Reported by Gregory Jacob, Counselor of the Vice-President, to the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the United States Capitol, June 16, 2022. 2- An elected MonarchyMONTESQUIEUIn the imaginary Constitution of England described by Montesquieu, the powers of the three institutions were so challenged and limited by mutual checks that the most likely result would be governmental paralysis. He held that in order to prevent abuses, "Power should stop ["arrête" in French] power"; brake, not just "check" as it was sloppily translated. In Montesquieu's words, with these rules, "these three powers should naturally form a state of repose or inaction." In the perhaps unlikely or infrequent case that public affairs required some action, he conceded that the three powers should be "forced to move, but still in concert." Madison would only ambiguously paraphrase, "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition." There was a problem: Montesquieu had misunderstood how the British system actually worked. What he described was closer to an old-fashioned, outdated model that, in the best of cases, could be identified with a transitory, provisional past period in England's history. It did not correspond with the political system in motion when he visited London, and even less with practices contemporary to the Framers gathered in Philadelphia several decades later. By following Montesquieu's obsolete account, the authors of the US Constitution misunderstood the source.MONARCHYThe monarchical proposal was most explicitly presented by Alexander Hamilton. He did not attend most of the Convention sessions, but on June 18, he showed up, took the floor, and delivered a prepared speech for more than five hours, no break for lunch, that left the delegates flabbergasted. Hamilton proposed a president that would be chosen by electors and serve for life. Such an "elective Monarch" would appoint the state governors and could veto state laws. At the federal level, the president would also be the arbiter for expected regular conflict between the Senate also appointed for life and the popular House: "This check is a Monarch," he suggested, "capable of resisting the popular current." The president, with absolute veto over congressional legislation, would be "a salutary check upon the legislative body." According to Ron Chernow, his biographer, Hamilton had written in his personal notes for his Convention speech that the president would not only be appointed for life but also "ought to be hereditary and to have so much power that it will not be his interest to risk much to acquire more." Yet, probably sensing the audience's reluctance to his already delivered proposals, he skipped that part. Adams, who would become the US' first vice president and the second president, was suspected of having monarchist leanings. He would propose calling George Washington "His Majesty the President," thought hereditary rule inevitable, and, after Washington's childless tenure prevented it, he would be the first to make his son run for president.3-The Founders' Portraits in WashingtonWhat one can see and guess about these characters by looking at eight portraits, the first five by Gilbert Stuart and the next two by John Trumbull at the National Gallery of Art, and the eighth by Joseph Siffred Duplessis at the National Portrait Gallery. 4- How the System Actually Works CHECKS AND GRIEVANCESAlexander Hamilton clearly lay on the side of scant congressional legislation. He said, "The injury that may possibly be done by defecting a few good laws will be amply compensated by the advantages of preventing a number of bad ones." It was like fasting for the sake of not being poisoned; the result is anemia, not good political health.In practice, there are checks but no balances. The existing blockingmechanisms in the US constitutional system do not produce balances in favor of a few good laws. They are largely unbalanced in favor of the Presidency and its powers, which is aggravated by the biases of the presidential elections.The US constitutional plan, instead of relying upon positive institutionalincentives, such as the expectation of sharing power in the Cabinet, countedon politicians' virtuous behavior. Yet, absent our better angels' motivations, the system of negative checks becomes a machine for sustained conflict. PRESIDENTIALISMThe greatest increase in presidential power has derived from wars. From General George Washington, leader of the Revolutionary War for Independence, through Theodore Roosevelt, a high-level combatant in the Spanish-American War in the Caribbean, eleven of the first twenty-five presidents were war men. Whether as generals, national heroes, or upper-echelon military officers, Andrew Jackson, William Harrison, Zachary Taylor, Franklin Pierce, Ulysses Grant, Rutherford Hayes, James Garfield, Benjamin Harrison, and William McKinley fought in the wars against the British, the Indians, the Mexicans, or, in the Civil War, other Americans, and their military feats helped them to be elected.Alexander Hamilton had already identified the management of foreign affairs as the main way to expand executive powers: "It is of the nature of war to increase the executive, at the expense of the legislative authority." Discussing rates of presidents, historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. observed that war "made it easier for a president to achieve greatness. 5- No Parties, But PolarizationNO PARTIESThe Framers were confident about the future of the republic because they miscalculated that in a great, expanding, and diverse Union with multiple institutional checks, it would be unlikely that nationwide parties could be created. They expected that the best individuals with "enlightened views and virtuous sentiments" would lead the new politics against "the pestilential influence of party animosities" and "the pestilential breath of faction," as scorned by both James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, respectively. Currently, the two major political parties in the US encompass a range of policy proposals and ideological orientations comparable to the typical European system with multiple parties: There are liberals and socialists within the Democratic Party, and conservatives and populists within the Republican Party, with the minor Greens and Libertarians flanking each side. However, the political competition is polarized by two parties or candidates because of the electoral system and the election of the president.POLITICAL, NO SOCIAL POLARIZATION The polarization of parties and candidates is more politically consequential than the polarization of voters. Generally, parties can lead and carry voters in their direction, either to closeness or to distance from each other, but to a limited extent. That is because it is less difficult to coordinate and mobilize a few thousand politicians than millions of voters. If parties and political leaders move to radicalize their positions and provoke polarization, voters may follow and become more polarized in their preferences, but usually less than the politicians and parties come to be. If, conversely, parties moderate and converge in their positions, voters may also moderate themselves but less than the partisan politicians do.FEAR AND NATIONAL FERVOR During the Cold War, many citizens developed a sense of unity, love of patriotic values, and pride in the American way of life. They trusted the rulers, who appeared as their protectors and providers of security. Challenging the government in the middle of a war would have been regarded as treason. In parallel, the ruling officials were able to keep many state secrets, their policy performances were not seriously evaluated, they enjoyed discrete privacy from the media, and gained support and devotion from the public.After the Cold War, without the threat of a nuclear war, the public lost their fear. There was a new openness to indiscretion and transgression. The new political atmosphere became the opposite of the previous period: a general mistrust of government, close scrutiny of corrupt practices, leaks of confidential plans and messages, frequent scandals about politicians' business or private affairs, and loud calls for more transparency and accountability. After the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the "peace dividend" that appeared to be a potential source of domestic progress led instead to domestic mayhem. With just a little exaggeration, one could say that, over the years, the international Cold War was replaced with a domestic cold war. 6- Towards the 2024 ElectionPRIMARIESThe primaries mechanism is a substitute for the formation of multiple parties. To build a majority, in Europe and other democracies, a coalition of multiple parties must be formed after the election; in the US, a coalition of multiple factions within a party must be formed before the election. In European parliamentary systems with multiple parties, the mess comes after the election; sometimes, the formation of a coalition in parliament for the choice of a prime minister takes months. In the US, the mess is before the election; the process of simplifying the pluralistic setting to only two major presidential candidates starts more than a year before Election Day. These alternative experiences both confirm that, in the absence of a traditional monarch, simplifying a complex society to one single executive leader is always a challenging endeavor.The main drawback of the system of partisan primaries is that it may not produce a majority in support for the winning candidate but it can result in the nomination of an extreme or unqualified demagogue who would be rejected by a majority of voters.The turnout in the presidential primaries has increased to nearly 50% of the party voters in the general election since the 2010s. However, the number of primary candidates within each party has also increased, up to double digits in recent seasons, which reduced the support for the winner. In 2016, Donald Trump was voted in the primaries by only 22% of his voters in the general election; Hillary Clinton, by 26% of her votes in the general election; and in 2020, Joe Biden by only 23%.SPLITTING CANDIDATESIf popular participation increases, partisanship becomes more compact, and the potential political pluralism of the country is not well articulated by the party system, third and further candidates reappear. They indirectly made a winner by splitting partisan support in at least four of the first eight presidential elections after the Cold War. The independent Ross Perot split Republican voters twice, in 1992 and 1996, and twice produced a Democratic winner with a minority of popular votes. The other way around, the Green Party's Ralph Nader split Democratic voters in 2000 and produced a Republican winner with a minority of popular votes. Also, the Greens and other candidacies absorbed potential Democratic voters in 2016 and helped make a Republican candidate the winner with a minority of popular votes.CAN TRUMP RETURN?There are also precedents of traitors who persisted in politics, ran for office, were elected, and provoked further turmoil. At least two former presidents joined the Confederacy during the Civil War. Former Whig President John Tyler, who had replaced William Harrison at his death one month after entering office, was first elected to and chaired the Virginia Secession Convention, and during the Civil War, he was elected first to the Provisional Confederation Congress and then to the Confederate House of Representatives. Former Democratic President Franklin Pierce collaborated closely with Confederacy President Jefferson Davis. Also, former President Andrew Johnson was elected senator on an anti-Reconstruction platform.Collection:1- Why a Federation2- An Elected Monarchy3- Psychological Portraits of the Founders and Framers4– How the System Actually Works5- No Parties, But Polarization6- Towards the 2024 Election
