From the introduction: 'The more you know about the Olympics, the less it is about sport'. (Bob Perry, Design director of Olympic Projects at Scott Carver Pty. Ltd, http://www.infolink.com.au). The Olympic Games as a mega sports event attracts millions of people from all over the world. New records, fascinating performances, scandals or gigantic celebrations are just some of the attractions provided by this event. One attraction for urban planners is the fact that the Games imply opportunities to promote urban development. From an urban planning perspective, the Olympic Summer Games in Barcelona 1992 set a new standard in defining success of an event of this scale. The city used the Games to promote urban development and planning strategies, profiting from the event in a long-term perspective. Furthermore, the city took another opportunity to find again a place on the 'global map" through the Olympic Games. The case of Barcelona is one of the mostly cited successful urban development initiatives connected with a mega sports event. Olympic Cities have taken the opportunity to promote urban development with the event very differently in the history of the Olympics. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) as the event-owner sets some requirements giving only a few cities the right to stage the event. These requirements are checked in the bidding process ending with the decision which city succeeds in getting the right of staging the event. Integrating the success of an Olympic City in terms of urban development and in terms of the bidding process, the main question from an urban planning perspective is: What is the relevance of Urban Development in the Bidding Process for Olympic Games? To answer the definition of the city's success in terms of urban development and the Olympic Games bidding process, it is helpful to investigate the role of Olympic Infrastructure with a view towards urban sustainability. As such, it is believed that respecting specific planning principles in the bidding process can help to (1) ensure sustainable urban development and (2) enhance the quality of the bid. - The first aspect is relevant for the success of the city in terms of urban development to benefit from the Games in a long time perspective. - The second aspect is relevant for the city's success in the bidding process to acquire the right for staging the Games. The aim of this thesis is to examine how the quality of the bid may respond to principles of sustainable urban development. Two main objectives are identified to reach the aim: 1. Identifying opportunities and threats connected to Olympic Infrastructure in the history of the Olympics in order to formulate six main principles of sustainable urban development for the Olympic Games. 2. Analyzing official bidding documents of the IOC connected with these principles in order to understand how sustainable urban development can be considered in the bidding process. The thesis will conclude with recommendations which can be realized in the bidding process striving to ensure the defined success for the city. Abstract: This thesis is structured in four major parts. Part I consists of chapter 2 and 3 and includes the theoretical framework and methodology of the thesis. Chapter 2 describes the character of mega-events and mega sports events in specific. Based on a concept of sustainable urban development, it will place mega sports events in the context of such a development, forming a theoretical approach for the thesis. Chapter 3 presents the methodology used. Part II consists of chapter 4 and 5 and provides an overall understanding of the Olympic Games in the context of urban development. Chapter 4 gives an overview of the characteristics of the Olympic Games in order to understand the event and its background. Chapter 5 examines the relationship between urban development and the Olympic Games. A model will be presented in order to define 'Olympic Urban Development" for the following sections of the chapter. The chapter will then continue with an historical overview of Olympic Urban Development and present the decisions determining the scale of development. Finally, chapter 5 concludes with the summary of opportunities and threats identified in a literature review of the Olympic Games. The research questions of Part II can be defined as follows: - What are the significant characteristics of the Olympics in terms of mega-event factors? - How can Olympic Urban Development be defined and modelled? - Which are the opportunities and threats for the built, natural, economic and social environment related to Olympic Urban Infrastructure? An intermediate result re-structures the identified opportunities and threats putting them in connection with the concepts presented in the theoretical part. Chapter 6 will conclude with a definition of six principles of sustainable urban development for planning the Olympic Games. The research question leading to the intermediate result can be defined as follows: - Which kind of principles may respond to a sustainable Olympic Urban Development? The second part ends with Chapter 7 in which relevant IOC documents about sustainable urban development will be presented. Part III sets the bidding process in connection with sustainable urban development. Chapter 8 provides relevant information to understand the bidding process, its different phases and the selection procedure. Chapter 9 finally analyses the official bidding documents of the IOC for the defined principles of sustainable urban development. Summaries and recommendations will introduce the main findings for each principle and respond to three main research questions: - Which parts in the bidding documents deal with the principle? - How relevant is the principle in the evaluation of the bid? - Which strategies support the quality of the bid and contribute to meet the objectives of the principle? Part IV includes the conclusion of the thesis and summarizes the main findings of the analysis.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: Preface0 Index1 List of Figures and Tables4 1.INTRODUCTION5 1.1Aim and purpose of the thesis5 1.2Structure of the thesis6 PART I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 2.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK9 2.1Mega Events9 2.2Factors of mega-events11 2.3Mega Sports Events12 2.3.1Phases of Mega Sports Events13 2.3.2Bidding14 2.3.3Impacts of Mega Sports Events14 2.4Physical Impact: Mega sports event Infrastructure18 2.5Sustainable Urban Development20 2.6Sustainable Urban Development in the context of a mega sports event22 2.7Definitions and Limitations23 3.METHODOLOGY25 PART II: UNDERSTANDING THE OLYMPIC GAMES IN THE CONTEXT OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT 4.Olympic Games Characteristics29 4.1History of the Olympic Games29 4.2The Olympic Movement30 4.3Olympic Games Factors31 4.4Olympic Games Phases35 5.Olympic Urban Development37 5.1Definition37 5.1.1Olympic Infrastructure38 5.1.2Urban Infrastructure38 5.1.3Modelling an Olympic City40 5.2History of Olympic Urban Development42 5.3Decisions determining Olympic Urban Development47 5.3.1Local distribution of Olympic Infrastructure48 5.3.2Funding Model50 5.3.3Expenditure on Olympic Infrastructure51 5.3.4Use of existing Olympic Infrastructure53 5.4Opportunities and Threats54 5.4.1Built environment54 5.4.2Natural Environment57 5.4.3Economic Environment60 5.4.4Social Environment61 5.4.5Summary64 6.Intermediate Result: Defining Principles of Sustainable Urban Development for Planning Olympic Infrastructure66 6.1Principles66 6.2Objectives68 7.Relevant IOC Documents on Sustainable Urban Development70 7.1Olympic Charter70 7.2Olympic Agenda 2170 7.3IOC Manual on Sports and the Environment72 7.4Olympic Games Study Commission73 PART III: THE BIDDING PROCESS IN THE CONTEXT OF SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT 8.Olympic Games Bidding Process74 8.1History of the Olympic Games Bidding Process74 8.2The process78 8.2.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure (CAP)78 8.2.2Evaluation of the Working Group Report79 8.2.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure83 8.3Selection of the Host City85 8.3.1Election Procedure85 8.3.2Decision Making in the Electing Procedure for a host city86 8.4Summary88 9.Analysing Principles of Sustainable Urban Development in the Bidding Process90 9.1Principle 1: Integrate Olympic Infrastructure in urban development plans92 9.1.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure92 9.1.2Evaluation in the Working Group Report92 9.1.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure94 9.1.4Summary95 9.1.5Recommendations96 9.2Principle 2: Ensure Post-Event Use for Olympic Infrastructure97 9.2.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure97 9.2.2Evaluation in the Working Group Report98 9.2.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure99 9.2.4Summary100 9.2.5Recommendations101 9.3Principle 3: Maximise the use of existing infrastructure by respecting the city's budget104 9.3.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure104 9.3.2Evaluation in the Working Group Report105 9.3.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure107 9.3.4Summary107 9.3.5Recommendations108 9.4Principle 4: Ensure environmental standards for Olympic Infrastructure and accessibility to environmental goods109 9.4.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure109 9.4.2Evaluation in the Working Group Report109 9.4.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure111 9.4.4Summary112 9.4.5Recommendations113 9.5Principle 5: Integration of citizens in the planning process of Olympic Infrastructure114 9.5.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure114 9.5.2Evaluation in the Working Group Report114 9.5.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure115 9.5.4Summary116 9.5.5Recommendations117 9.6Principle 6: Stimulate improvement of Urban Infrastructure through Olympic Infrastructure118 9.6.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure118 9.6.2Evaluation in the Working Group Report119 9.6.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure120 9.6.4Summary121 9.6.5Recommendations122 PART IV: CONCLUSION126 10.Conclusion126 10.1Conclusion of the analysis126 10.1.1Relevance of Sustainable Urban Development in the Bidding Process126 10.1.2How to respond to principles of sustainable urban development in the bid127 10.2General Conclusions130 10.2.1The interest of the IOC in Sustainable Urban Development130 10.2.2The real winner of a bidding process130 10.2.3Outlook on the future of the Games131 11.Appendix133 11.1References133 11.2Abbreviations137 11.3Extracts from Bidding Documents138 11.3.1Phase 1: Candidature Acceptance Procedure (CAP)138 11.3.2Evaluation: Working Group Report140 11.3.3Phase 2: Candidature Procedure142Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 5.4, Opportunities and Threats: This section study provides a discussion on opportunities and threats related to Olympic Infrastructure. Potential effects are presented and ordered according to the different environments of a city (section 2.4). The IOC officially uses the term 'Legacy' for potential post-event effects preferably underlining positive ones. The sources used in this literature review (Cashman, 2002; Essex Chalkley, 2003; Furrer, 2002; Matos, 2006; Liao Pitts, 2006; Preuss, 2006; Centre On Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), 2007; Ward, 2007; WWF, 2004) reflect the potential effects of the Olympics critically from different perspectives (researchers, NGOs, IOC related person). If applicable, the opportunities and threats are illustrated with examples. A summary is given in the end of this section as a basis for developing principles of sustainable urban development. As the potential effects have a multidimensional character, two selection criteria limit their number: - Time: The potential effect might occur at any period of the event but must have a relevance for the city in a long-time perspective. - Space: The potential effect might occur at a micro (e.g. dislocation) or macro (e.g. polycentric development) level but is relevant mainly for a city (not a region or nation). 5.4.1, Built environment: - Boost for urban development projects and urban renewal. Locational decision on Olympic Infrastructure opens the opportunity for a city to boost its urban development projects in favour of the city. There is a chance to connect a city's urban development strategy with Olympic Infrastructure projects. History of the Olympics shows that cities have dealt very differently with this opportunity (see section 4.1). Some have used the Olympics to reinvent the city while others have concentrated solely on the successful organization of the event itself. In many cases, Olympic Infrastructure is also used to trigger massive urban regeneration projects and the idea to create new centralities within the city. Development corridors can be focused through Olympic Infrastructure and stimulate urban development nearby. Strategic positioning of Olympic Infrastructure in specific urban areas may contribute to a polycentric development. This is especially true for the positioning of key Olympic Infrastructure represented by the Olympic Main Stadium, the main indoor halls and the aquatic centre. Barcelona 1992 is probably the most successful Olympics regarded to large-scale urban development. Urban planners of the city saw the Olympic Games as an useful instrument to achieve the objectives of development plans which had been the improvement of transport system, creation of new facilities, definition of central space and balancing the city. The initial authorized to make the first draft of the Olympic from an urban perspective was part of the Olympic Bidding Team and later entered into the Organizing Committee. The changes of the entire urban fabric connected to Olympic Infrastructure based on what was already existing in Barcelona became a best practice in terms of mega-event related urban development. - Changes of Urban Development plans in favour of the event/bid. Potential changes of existing urban development plans can occur in the preparation phase of the event due to tight time constraints. To speed up land acquisition for Olympic Infrastructure some cities approve special legislative acts and give power to Organizing Committees. Special building permits are created in the area where Olympic Infrastructure has to be built and can contribute to long-lasting procedural changes in the city. A special law for the Athens 2004 Games recognized the strategic significance of the Olympic Games to the evolution of the metropolitan area. The location of Olympic Infrastructure was determined as to be in accordance with the regional, environmental and urban development guidelines of the master plan of Athens. Through this legislation and the installation of special agencies it was possible to accelerate permits of Olympic Works. - Modernization and Upgrading of existing facilities. In terms of existing infrastructure, the Olympics bring the opportunity to upgrade and modernize sports facilities. This may also decrease financial risk. The main Olympic Stadium as the centrepiece of Olympic Infrastructure relies traditionally on public funding. Some Olympic Cities have strived to use existing facilities or refurbished ones for this major infrastructure project. Naturally, development of sports facilities had to be faced by almost all Olympic cities. Moscow 1980 and Barcelona 1992 used mainly existing sports facilities and refurbished existing Stadiums to Main Olympic Stadiums. Los Angeles 1984 used existing facilities to a large extent. - Unused large-scale facilities. The history of the Olympic Games shows that many Olympic sports facilities received poor post-Games usage. International Olympic Sports Federations have often pushed host cities to provide over-ambitious state-of-the-art facilities which are not in line with the local popularity of the sport. Furthermore, local agendas have often pushed for grandiose landmark legacies to be built in order to showcase the local economy and engineering ability. These objects might be designed over-sized and turn in a post-event period to 'White elephants'. They may neither integrate a long-term urban planning policy nor relate to the population's need for leisure and culture facilities. It is sometimes difficult to convince leading teams in specific sports to move their home ground to new Olympic Infrastructures. Another problem in this respect is the difficulty to attract large crowds to newly developed parts of the city away from trying to opportunity the citizens habits. The Olympic stadium of Sydney 2000 generated continuing losses at A$38 million/year six years after the event. The competition for sports events with other stadia in Sydney caused limited booking and shows the lack of post-use planning. 'Sydney Jurassic Park' is a symbolic expression used by criticizers of the post-use of Sydney Olympic Park. - Increase of Housing stock through Olympic Village. The Olympic Village is often located close to the sports facilities and represents the accommodation for the Olympic Family. It is an essential part of Olympic Infrastructure and has to be addressed by every hosting city. In many cases, Olympic Villages become residential areas for local people or halls of residences for a local university or college after the Games. Thus, an Olympic Village is a chance to increase the city's housing stock and provide facilities for alternative uses in a post-event period. 'In Barcelona and Sydney the former Olympic Villages now provide a mixture of housing that contributes to the cities' housing stock and adds a valuable source of revenue to cover Games-related expenditure'. - Improvement of transport infrastructure. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Olympic Infrastructure induces also the upgrade of the city's transport infrastructure. For an effective transport of athletes, spectators and officials during the event many host cities tend to expand their transport system Investment of previous Olympic Cities is often focused especially on underground or light rail system. Recent Olympic Cities (Athens and Beijing) invest in tram and overhead urban rail system due to high costs and implementation difficulties of underground transport. This may contribute to a better infrastructure for citizens and decreases traffic pressure in inner city and congestion. Asian Olympic Cities have strongly linked the Games to transport infrastructure. Between 1957 and 1964 Tokyo established 73 km underground, 13.2 km monorail and 500 km Shinkansen connecting Tokyo, Kyoto and Osaka. Seoul added 157.1 km to the length of its underground network from 1978 to 1993 for the preparation of the Games. Finally, Beijing extended its light rail length by 87.1 km before 2008. A strong reliance to public transport can be observed in Seoul and Tokyo through this investment related to Olympic Infrastructure. - Development of other Infrastructure. Furthermore, development of Olympic Infrastructure can be a driver for additional infrastructural improvements in the city, affecting the entire urban fabric. A basic infrastructure is needed serving Olympic facilities. Many cities have used the event as a catalyst to induce such investment and bring other infrastructure to a higher level appropriate for international visitors. Such investments can enhance the Quality of life for citizens, tourists and attract inward investment. Tokyo included the improvement of water supply system, higher public health standards for refuse collection, street cleaning, public toilets and three sewage disposal plants. Barcelona, Atlanta and Sydney invested in telecommunication systems through the staging of the event. Cultural and research facilities (Olympic Studies Centre, Olympic Museum) close to Olympic Infrastructure supporting the Olympic Cultural Programme were realized in many Olympic Cities. - Destruction of cultural heritage. There is a potential risk that Olympic Infrastructure may affect the cultural heritage of a city negatively. The potential risk seems to be higher for Olympic Cities approaching development in the inner city. Consequently, disregarding the laws may lead to the destruction of culturally built environment and displacement of residents. Infrastructure development for the Games of Beijing 2008 negatively affected the cultural heritage of the city. Demolition in Beijing was an ongoing process in the whole city, especially threatening the old 'hutong' and 'siheyuan' areas. According to reports of COHRE the violation of Cultural Heritage Protection laws and regulations effected both irreparably damaged cultural heritage and also violated residents' rights to adequate housing.
Our motivation for writing this synthesis is the personal and collective trauma caused by a new wave of attacks in France in 2015 and their aftershocks in Belgium, Germany and Great Britain. These dramatic events have rekindled important professional and existential questions worth consideration. They encouraged thinking anew about the aims and functioning of the educational institutions in which we are involved.Our research question therefore starts from an appreciation of a contemporary humanity and state of the world that seem distant from what would have been hoped for amid immense modern technological advances, for instance massive access to information and to primary education . The working hypothesis is that the ontological dimension would certainly already be present in the educational curricula and the common core, but that it would be exercised unconsciously, even repressed, which would have the effect of slowing down the emergence of responsible individuals able to act positively toward themselves, others and the planet. The objective is therefore to try to better understand and support, in view of realizing this goal, the multi-referential process of our humanization, as long as, as the Renaissance humanist Erasmus once said: "We are not born human, but rather become human". The main theoretical frameworks and concepts that we mobilize to build this work and our proposals in Education and Training Sciences are based on three fields. First, Transdisciplinarity (complex thinking , systems of systems and consciousness ). Then, transpersonal psychology (on issues of freedom, responsibility and ethics). Finally, Digital Humanities, from technological artifacts and educational technologies , to technontology .In the form of insets, we will regularly report moments from our "life story", thus inserting us into the current of biographisation , as evidence of the evolution of our own journey.In the first part, we work on the construction of a hypothetico-deductive ontological model of Being, taking into account the human condition in its spatiotemporal context – Being as it unfolds in time and space – to understand how this model functions in terms of rooting, need, capacity, desire, surpassing etc. We represent man by a metaphorical schema, called "structure-temple", comprising seven parts. The pedestal of the building symbolizes its affiliation with the "anthropological / cultural" context of birth, currently the Anthropocene (which begins with the transformative action of sustainable human action on the planet, mainly because of its technical actions) (Wallenhorst, 2019). The first column expresses the "physical / biological / energy" dimension; the second, the "emotional / sensitive" part; the third, the "mental / cognitive"; the fourth, the "groupal / social"; and the fifth, the "axiological / existential / (post) metaphysical". The pediment is the "aperture / ontological" headdress of the ensemble, which invites an optimistic conclusion according to the maxim of the Greek temple of Delphi attributed to Socrates: "Know thyself and you will know the universe and the gods".We then analyse this approach through two temporal dimensions: the big history or long cosmic history from the big bang to the creation of our planet and the development of the biosphere, as well as the ephemeral human life during which each of us will try to accomplish an "involved project" . A third timeless dimension completes them: the life of the spirit. We observe the evolutionary dynamics of the temple-structure thanks to the complementarity that it achieves with the logic of the included third and the "Hidden Third", as well as its non-reductionist character. This model is fractal because it tends toward intra-infinity, and holographic because it is multilayered. It builds a system of "cosmodern" equilibrium, testifying to the historical epistemological separation between the world of subjects and that of the objects it brings together through the theory of "Transreality" . Ultimately, it proposes to surpass an apparent dichotomy by adopting a non-dual approach intended to be effective through the "project approach" .We thus develop a model that could be useful for an ontoformation . The action links updated in the temple-structure by the exercise of the thirds (included and hidden) can be mobilized in the "essence" of the teacher's practice. The teacher must be able to evaluate his or her professional "situated action", which we would evaluate in the context of time (Pedestal and Columns) and in the "vertical" dimension of the whole structure (From Pedestal to Pediment). This approach would shift the quasi-unidirectional binary master-student relationship in the exclusive application of the programs to a dynamic sensitive process of a ternary relationship through the mobilization of the structure-temple tool, for evaluative and then truly educational purposes, as much for the position of the master as for that of the pupil. This holistic approach integrates educational proposals that can be grouped under the terms self-training and self-co-training: "Training here refers to the vital and permanent process of shaping by interaction between oneself (self), others (socio, hetero, co) and the world (eco). Self-training is then defined as the awareness, understanding and transformation by the subject of this interaction. It is the transformation of the relationship with oneself, with others and with the world" .We therefore seek to examine, through the model of the temple-structure in an educational situation, whether the poles and various elements are invested in a correctness (the right ingredient, at the right time, in an adequate quantity) that avoids imbalances, for example disturbances of other moments of life dedicated to transmission and learning and, more broadly, life outside educational spaces. To deepen this question, we will explore the model in other contexts of learning and other educational situations, such as knowledge and disciplines, practices and pedagogies, educational technologies etc.The second part of the work contextualizes the temple-structure metaphor in the field of education and training. From a harmonious reciprocal approach of a triple development, operated on personal, professional and collective levels, emerges a proposal of "Integrative and Implicative Pedagogy" (P2i). It is anchored in the long history of New Education born in the early twentieth century. Through the technicalized updating of the socioconstructivist project approach, the P2i cultivates the efficient consideration of learners, teachers and third parts (staff, parents and other partners) in all their dimensions. This reflection requires discussing the evolution of the role of the teacher in the acquisition of the fundamental learning of primary school, from "read, write, count" to "respect others", thus passing from quantitative performance to qualitative subtlety. It is a question of anticipating the passage from an "integrative" character of educational objects in all their varieties, to the "integral" dimension of the subjects in formation. The temple-structure metaphor is then presented as a multidimensional project. The research therefore applies to the field of disciplines, peri-, para- and extra-curricular activities as well as cross-cutting issues such as eco-citizenship, empowerment, happiness and well-being, emotion management, positive education etc.The P2i studies the places, the means, the methods and the tools made available to institutions and teachers (philosophical debate, yoga or laical meditation ) to allow a secular approach allowed of spirituality , which is interested in the "life of the mind". As a method of analysis and foresight, it can be mobilized to study any question related to the Sciences of Education and Training, from secularism or evaluation to open access or big data. The temple-structure and the P2i jointly propose a theoretical and practical framework favoring the application of educational "strategies of success" by the establishment of "virtuous circles" while developing our "part of humanity". For example: "class management" x "adapted learning" x "support for personalities" x "learners' skills" x "existential dimension" and so on, situating ourselves in the current of slow education and alternatives approaches to / from education. Then a question emerges: should we be guided, by need or necessity, towards a paradigm shift in education? And if so, what should we strive for?The most important aspect would ultimately be an ability to lead multi-referential lives that are connected with each other, with educational partners, with institutions, in relation to knowledge. Examples abound, especially in the field of active pedagogies. In the manner of design thinking, which manages innovation by synthesising analytical thought and intuitive thought as it mobilizes processes of co-creativity that will involve end-users, or like the operating rules stemming from sociocracy and holacracy (as decision with zero objection, election without self-declared candidates, revocability of mandates). Such examples are an extension of work that emphasizes the spiritual dimension – the opposite of routine. It is therefore essential in teacher training not to develop only professional skills, but rather to promote the development of full-fledged human beings. As if reconciling a posture of legitimacy of the teacher with that of a permission of the student. Without force or manipulation. By focusing on the "educational flow" to better enter in the learning of "content stocks". By putting more freedom in learning while maintaining ethics. With freedom of conscience in the face of ideological approaches between normality and (relative) deviance, between independence and the need for connection. By passing from the class group to the subject group. The learner becomes an actor with the acquisition of autonomy. And when the learner realizes this, it is the beginning of emancipation, which can cause shocks. Because this dynamic in progress can also create resistance, as much for the actors concerned as for the institutions. Because we must first accept the discomfort of these new situations. Accompaniment, integration and inventiveness are practices that facilitate these processes of creation, which must each time be new, in order to prevent falling back into reproducing pre-established models.The third part presents an assessment of our journey as a researcher-practitioner in the form of a reflexive return, with its strong points and its gray areas: the examination of the slow professional and spiritual "drying up" as the technicization of our research after our appointment at the Paris IUFM in 1998; our "revivification" thanks to the action involved in non-institutional teams, the first fruits of the adventure described by the present overview; the misunderstandings of our peers and the difficulties in sharing and pursuing administratively and scientifically our work orientations.This report is completed by a presentation of the research perspectives with our laboratory on the question of the uses of digital education; international collaborations with the National Institute of Informatics (NII) in Japan and the Centro de Tecnologia da Informação (CTI) in Brazil on stress at work; by the continuity of our work in the context of current teaching (integration in the axes of GIS Rreefor-Espe); the continued testing of P2i in teacher training or the deepening of the Culture of Peace. The extent of the engagement in our research community and our actions for the promotion of the discipline of the Sciences of Education and Training are particularly notable in relation to cooperation initiatives with foreign universities for teacher training in Romania (Cluj-Napoca), Spain (Valencia), Russia (Moscow), Ecuador (Chuquipata) and China (Chengdu), through the endorsement of editorial responsibilities as a reviewer, through the organization of scientific meetings, by answering requests for expert opinions…In conclusion, in the era of the Anthropocene, which is characterized by societal and lethal environmental risks for the human species, questioning what constitutes society is now absolutely necessary. Starting from our specialty, education, this problem is tackled by the study of conditions and modalities, a strategy that allows surpassing a mere "doing together" to a true "living together". At the heart of the areas to explore further are secularism and the relationship with religion . As the pedagogue Philippe Meirieu has noted: "'Believing' divides while 'knowing' brings together" . Experience facilitates passing from the first verb to the second. Massification and longer study times seem to go hand in hand with the standardization of training courses. The latter would then risk rejecting the otherness of those who follow them and tend to format them, which would be the opposite of the search for creative solutions that society needs. Finding interest and constructing the "common points" that respect diversity, based on real benevolence, with co-constructed rules, would be a pragmatic solution to consider. Fundamental principles may include but are not limited to: citizenship, partnership, democracy, team and collaborative learning, acceptance of different ideas, small group work, and extended teacher roles beyond traditional disciplines.The apparently intuitive point of convergence between these principles can be seen by taking into account our "common point of humanity" in all its various expressions. And this common point could in turn be guided by a call for a transcendence of each individual "little person", in a transcendence that is necessarily collective. If it were a matter of something informal and unspoken, all would benefit from having it brought to consciousness. Should it not then become a subject of discussion between the stakeholders, in order to encourage more and more the expression of this common point of humanity, so that everyone finds nourishment as needed, while maintaining the broadest possible respect for others and the world? In the tradition of Metagogy Theorem , we would approach a meta-science of education: a scientific and transversal model supported by an integral pedagogical paradigm that would provide a necessary and sufficient space for the ontological and spiritual dimensions.The objective of this research is to participate in the understanding of the question of consciousness and its deployment in human activities (subject / object / project), particularly in educational situations, with intention as the first criterion of analysis. ; Notre motivation à entrer dans l'écriture de cette note de synthèse trouve sa source à la suite du séisme traumatisant personnel et collectif provoqué par une nouvelle vague d'attentats en France en 2015 et par leurs répliques en Belgique, en Allemagne et en Grande-Bretagne. Ces événements dramatiques ont ravivé chez nous des questionnements professionnels et existentiels jusque-là mis de côté faute de lieu et de moment institutionnel dédié pour réfléchir aux finalités et aux fonctionnements des instances éducatives dont nous sommes partie prenante.Notre question de recherche part donc de l'appréciation d'une humanité et d'un état du monde contemporains qui semblent loin d'être à la hauteur qu'auraient laissé espérer les immenses avancées technologiques modernes, parmi lesquelles l'accès à l'information, conjuguées à une éducation primaire dispensée à très grande échelle sur la planète .Une hypothèse est que si la dimension ontologique est d'une certaine façon déjà présente dans les programmes scolaires et dans le socle commun de connaissances, de compétences et de culture de l'école et du collège notamment au travers des humanités et des compétences relationnelles et psycho-sociales, elle s'y exercerait toutefois de façon non ou insuffisamment conscientisée, ce qui amoindrirait ses effets positifs. Cet état de fait, attaché à une sorte de refoulement, aurait pour effet de ralentir la capacité de formation et d'émergence d'une personne qui soit responsable et qui agisse de manière positive envers elle-même, envers les autres et envers la planète. L'objectif poursuivi est donc de chercher à mieux comprendre et à accompagner vers ce but le processus multi-référentiel de notre humanisation au travers de l'éducation, pour autant que, comme l'affirmait déjà Érasme à la Renaissance : « On ne naît pas homme, on le devient ». Les principaux cadres théoriques et les concepts que nous mobilisons pour construire ce travail et nos propositions en Sciences de l'Éducation et de la Formation s'appuient sur trois domaines. D'abord la Transdisciplinarité , avec la pensée complexe , la théorie des systèmes et la question de la conscience . Ensuite la Psychologie Transpersonnelle , sur les questions de liberté, de responsabilité et d'éthique. Enfin les Humanités Numériques, depuis les artefacts technologiques et les technologies éducatives jusqu'à la technontologie (technique plus ontologie).Sous forme d'encarts, nous relaterons régulièrement des moments issus de notre « histoire de vie », nous insérant ainsi dans le courant de la biographisation , en tant que témoignages de l'évolution de notre propre parcours.Dans une première partie, nous travaillons à la construction d'un modèle ontologique hypothético-déductif, « l'être en tant qu'être », en tenant compte de la condition humaine dans son contexte spatio-temporel - « l'être dans le temps de l'être »- pour en comprendre le fonctionnement en termes d'enracinement, de besoin, de capacité, de désir, de dépassement… Nous représentons l'Être humain par un schéma métaphorique, appelé « structure-temple », comprenant sept éléments. Le socle de l'édifice symbolise sa filiation dans le contexte « anthropologique / culturel » de la naissance, actuellement l'anthropocène (qui débute avec l'action transformative durable de l'action humaine sur la planète, essentiellement du fait des agissements techniques et industriels, Wallenhorst, 2019). La première colonne exprime la dimension « physique / biologique / énergétique » ; la deuxième, la part « émotionnelle / sensible » ; la troisième, le « mental / cognitif » ; la quatrième, le « groupal / social » et la cinquième, l' « axiologique / existentiel / (post-)métaphysique ». Enfin, le fronton est la coiffe « ouverture / ontologique » de l'ensemble, qui invite à une conclusion optimiste selon la maxime du temple grec de Delphes attribuée à Socrate : « Connais-toi toi-même et tu connaîtras l'univers et les dieux ».Nous procédons ensuite à une analyse de cette approche au travers de deux dimensions temporelles : la big history ou longue histoire cosmique depuis le big bang jusqu'à la création de notre planète et le développement de la biosphère ainsi que l'éphémère vie humaine durant laquelle chacun tentera d'accomplir son projet « implié » . Une troisième dimension intemporelle les complète : la vie de l'esprit . Nous observons la dynamique évolutive de la structure-temple grâce à la complémentarité qu'elle opère avec les logiques du tiers inclus et du « Tiers Caché », ainsi que son caractère non-réductionniste. Ce modèle est fractal par son caractère intra-reproductible et holographique car multicouche. Il construit un système d'équilibre « cosmoderne » témoignant de la séparation épistémologique historique entre le monde des sujets et celui des objets qu'il réunit par la théorie de la « Transréalité » . Il propose in fine de dépasser cette dichotomie apparente en adoptant une approche non-duelle destinée à être opérante au moyen de la « démarche de projet » .La deuxième partie du travail contextualise la métaphore de la structure-temple dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la formation. À partir d'une démarche en réciprocité harmonieuse d'un triple développement, opéré sur les plans personnel, professionnel et collectif, émerge une proposition de « Pédagogie Intégrative et Implicative » (P2i). Elle procède d'un cadre théorique intégratif et aboutit à un dispositif implicatif ancré dans la longue histoire de l'Éducation Nouvelle dont Philippe Meirieu décèle « les prémices dès le XVIIIème siècle » . Par l'actualisation technicisée de la démarche de projet socioconstructiviste, la P2i cultive la considération efficiente des apprenants, des enseignants et des tiers (personnels, parents et autres partenaires), et ce, dans toutes leurs dimensions. Cette réflexion nécessite de discuter de l'évolution du rôle de l'enseignant dans l'acquisition des apprentissages fondamentaux de l'école primaire, depuis le « lire, écrire, compter » jusqu'au « respecter autrui », passant ainsi de la performance quantitative à la sensibilité qualitative. Il s'agit d'anticiper le passage d'un caractère « intégratif » des objets pédagogiques dans toutes leurs variétés à la dimension « intégrale » des sujets en formation. La métaphore de la structure-temple est alors déclinée comme un projet multidimensionnel. La recherche s'applique donc aussi bien au domaine des disciplines, des activités péri-, para- et extra-scolaires qu'aux questions transversales comme l'éco-citoyenneté, le pouvoir d'agir, le bonheur et le bien-être, la gestion des émotions, l'éducation positive…La P2i étudie les lieux, les moyens, les méthodes et les outils mis à disposition des institutions et des enseignants (débat philosophique, yoga ou encore méditation ) pour permettre une approche laïque autorisée de la spiritualité , qui s'intéresse à la vie de l'esprit. Tenant lieu de méthode d'analyse et de prospective, elle peut être mobilisée pour étudier toute question touchant aux Sciences de l'Éducation et de la Formation, depuis la laïcité ou l'évaluation jusqu'à l'open access ou le big data. La structure-temple et la P2i proposent conjointement un cadre théorique et pratique favorisant l'application de « stratégies de réussite éducatives » par l'instauration de cercles vertueux tout en développant notre part d'humanité. Par exemple des notions pédagogiques ou didactiques comme « la gestion de classe », « les apprentissages adaptés », « l'appui sur les personnalités », « les compétences des apprenants », « la dimension existentielle » etc. tous envisagés et pris en compte simultanément ou à tour de rôle multiplient les effets positifs de chacune de ces dimensions. Nous situant dans le courant de la slow education et des approches alternatives de/à l'éducation, une question, qui pourrait devenir « vive », se fait jour : faudrait-il nous orienter, par besoin ou par nécessité, vers un changement de paradigme éducatif ? Et si oui, vers lequel nous diriger ?La troisième partie présente un bilan de notre trajet de chercheur-praticien sous forme de retour réflexif, avec ses points forts et ses zones d'ombre : l'examen du lent « assèchement » professionnel et spirituel au fur et à mesure de la technicisation de nos recherches après notre nomination à l'Iufm de Paris en 1998 ; notre « revivifiance » grâce à l'action impliquée dans des équipes para-institutionnelles, prémices de l'aventure de cette note de synthèse ; les incompréhensions de nos pairs et les difficultés à partager et poursuivre administrativement et scientifiquement nos orientations de travail…Ce bilan est complété par un exposé des perspectives de recherche au sein de notre laboratoire sur la question des usages du numérique en éducation ; par des collaborations internationales avec le National Institute of Informatics (Tokyo, Japon) et le Centro de Tecnologia da Informação (Campinas, Sao Paolo, Brésil) sur le stress au travail ; par la continuité de nos travaux dans le contexte d'enseignement actuel (intégration dans les axes du GIS Rreefor-Espe) ; la poursuite de la mise à l'épreuve de la P2i dans la formation des enseignants ou encore l'approfondissement de la Culture de Paix. L'ampleur de l'engagement dans notre communauté de recherche et nos actions pour le rayonnement de la discipline des Sciences de l'Éducation et de la Formation s'apprécient notamment par des initiatives de coopération avec des instituts et des universités étrangères de formation des enseignants comme le National Pedagogical College (Cluj-Napoca, Roumanie), le Florida Grup Educatiu (Valencia, Espagne), la Moscow City University (Russie), l'Universidad Nacional de Educación (Chuquipata, Équateur) et l'École Normale de Chengdu (Chine) ; par la prise de responsabilités éditoriales dans des revues relevant de la section ; par l'organisation de rencontres scientifiques ; par la réponse à des demandes d'expertises nationales et internationales…En conclusion, il ressort que l'objectif de cette recherche est de participer à la compréhension de la question de la conscience et de son déploiement dans les activités humaines (sujet/objet/projet), et particulièrement en situation éducative, avec l'intention pour premier critère d'analyse.
Our motivation for writing this synthesis is the personal and collective trauma caused by a new wave of attacks in France in 2015 and their aftershocks in Belgium, Germany and Great Britain. These dramatic events have rekindled important professional and existential questions worth consideration. They encouraged thinking anew about the aims and functioning of the educational institutions in which we are involved.Our research question therefore starts from an appreciation of a contemporary humanity and state of the world that seem distant from what would have been hoped for amid immense modern technological advances, for instance massive access to information and to primary education . The working hypothesis is that the ontological dimension would certainly already be present in the educational curricula and the common core, but that it would be exercised unconsciously, even repressed, which would have the effect of slowing down the emergence of responsible individuals able to act positively toward themselves, others and the planet. The objective is therefore to try to better understand and support, in view of realizing this goal, the multi-referential process of our humanization, as long as, as the Renaissance humanist Erasmus once said: "We are not born human, but rather become human". The main theoretical frameworks and concepts that we mobilize to build this work and our proposals in Education and Training Sciences are based on three fields. First, Transdisciplinarity (complex thinking , systems of systems and consciousness ). Then, transpersonal psychology (on issues of freedom, responsibility and ethics). Finally, Digital Humanities, from technological artifacts and educational technologies , to technontology .In the form of insets, we will regularly report moments from our "life story", thus inserting us into the current of biographisation , as evidence of the evolution of our own journey.In the first part, we work on the construction of a hypothetico-deductive ontological model of Being, taking into account the human condition in its spatiotemporal context – Being as it unfolds in time and space – to understand how this model functions in terms of rooting, need, capacity, desire, surpassing etc. We represent man by a metaphorical schema, called "structure-temple", comprising seven parts. The pedestal of the building symbolizes its affiliation with the "anthropological / cultural" context of birth, currently the Anthropocene (which begins with the transformative action of sustainable human action on the planet, mainly because of its technical actions) (Wallenhorst, 2019). The first column expresses the "physical / biological / energy" dimension; the second, the "emotional / sensitive" part; the third, the "mental / cognitive"; the fourth, the "groupal / social"; and the fifth, the "axiological / existential / (post) metaphysical". The pediment is the "aperture / ontological" headdress of the ensemble, which invites an optimistic conclusion according to the maxim of the Greek temple of Delphi attributed to Socrates: "Know thyself and you will know the universe and the gods".We then analyse this approach through two temporal dimensions: the big history or long cosmic history from the big bang to the creation of our planet and the development of the biosphere, as well as the ephemeral human life during which each of us will try to accomplish an "involved project" . A third timeless dimension completes them: the life of the spirit. We observe the evolutionary dynamics of the temple-structure thanks to the complementarity that it achieves with the logic of the included third and the "Hidden Third", as well as its non-reductionist character. This model is fractal because it tends toward intra-infinity, and holographic because it is multilayered. It builds a system of "cosmodern" equilibrium, testifying to the historical epistemological separation between the world of subjects and that of the objects it brings together through the theory of "Transreality" . Ultimately, it proposes to surpass an apparent dichotomy by adopting a non-dual approach intended to be effective through the "project approach" .We thus develop a model that could be useful for an ontoformation . The action links updated in the temple-structure by the exercise of the thirds (included and hidden) can be mobilized in the "essence" of the teacher's practice. The teacher must be able to evaluate his or her professional "situated action", which we would evaluate in the context of time (Pedestal and Columns) and in the "vertical" dimension of the whole structure (From Pedestal to Pediment). This approach would shift the quasi-unidirectional binary master-student relationship in the exclusive application of the programs to a dynamic sensitive process of a ternary relationship through the mobilization of the structure-temple tool, for evaluative and then truly educational purposes, as much for the position of the master as for that of the pupil. This holistic approach integrates educational proposals that can be grouped under the terms self-training and self-co-training: "Training here refers to the vital and permanent process of shaping by interaction between oneself (self), others (socio, hetero, co) and the world (eco). Self-training is then defined as the awareness, understanding and transformation by the subject of this interaction. It is the transformation of the relationship with oneself, with others and with the world" .We therefore seek to examine, through the model of the temple-structure in an educational situation, whether the poles and various elements are invested in a correctness (the right ingredient, at the right time, in an adequate quantity) that avoids imbalances, for example disturbances of other moments of life dedicated to transmission and learning and, more broadly, life outside educational spaces. To deepen this question, we will explore the model in other contexts of learning and other educational situations, such as knowledge and disciplines, practices and pedagogies, educational technologies etc.The second part of the work contextualizes the temple-structure metaphor in the field of education and training. From a harmonious reciprocal approach of a triple development, operated on personal, professional and collective levels, emerges a proposal of "Integrative and Implicative Pedagogy" (P2i). It is anchored in the long history of New Education born in the early twentieth century. Through the technicalized updating of the socioconstructivist project approach, the P2i cultivates the efficient consideration of learners, teachers and third parts (staff, parents and other partners) in all their dimensions. This reflection requires discussing the evolution of the role of the teacher in the acquisition of the fundamental learning of primary school, from "read, write, count" to "respect others", thus passing from quantitative performance to qualitative subtlety. It is a question of anticipating the passage from an "integrative" character of educational objects in all their varieties, to the "integral" dimension of the subjects in formation. The temple-structure metaphor is then presented as a multidimensional project. The research therefore applies to the field of disciplines, peri-, para- and extra-curricular activities as well as cross-cutting issues such as eco-citizenship, empowerment, happiness and well-being, emotion management, positive education etc.The P2i studies the places, the means, the methods and the tools made available to institutions and teachers (philosophical debate, yoga or laical meditation ) to allow a secular approach allowed of spirituality , which is interested in the "life of the mind". As a method of analysis and foresight, it can be mobilized to study any question related to the Sciences of Education and Training, from secularism or evaluation to open access or big data. The temple-structure and the P2i jointly propose a theoretical and practical framework favoring the application of educational "strategies of success" by the establishment of "virtuous circles" while developing our "part of humanity". For example: "class management" x "adapted learning" x "support for personalities" x "learners' skills" x "existential dimension" and so on, situating ourselves in the current of slow education and alternatives approaches to / from education. Then a question emerges: should we be guided, by need or necessity, towards a paradigm shift in education? And if so, what should we strive for?The most important aspect would ultimately be an ability to lead multi-referential lives that are connected with each other, with educational partners, with institutions, in relation to knowledge. Examples abound, especially in the field of active pedagogies. In the manner of design thinking, which manages innovation by synthesising analytical thought and intuitive thought as it mobilizes processes of co-creativity that will involve end-users, or like the operating rules stemming from sociocracy and holacracy (as decision with zero objection, election without self-declared candidates, revocability of mandates). Such examples are an extension of work that emphasizes the spiritual dimension – the opposite of routine. It is therefore essential in teacher training not to develop only professional skills, but rather to promote the development of full-fledged human beings. As if reconciling a posture of legitimacy of the teacher with that of a permission of the student. Without force or manipulation. By focusing on the "educational flow" to better enter in the learning of "content stocks". By putting more freedom in learning while maintaining ethics. With freedom of conscience in the face of ideological approaches between normality and (relative) deviance, between independence and the need for connection. By passing from the class group to the subject group. The learner becomes an actor with the acquisition of autonomy. And when the learner realizes this, it is the beginning of emancipation, which can cause shocks. Because this dynamic in progress can also create resistance, as much for the actors concerned as for the institutions. Because we must first accept the discomfort of these new situations. Accompaniment, integration and inventiveness are practices that facilitate these processes of creation, which must each time be new, in order to prevent falling back into reproducing pre-established models.The third part presents an assessment of our journey as a researcher-practitioner in the form of a reflexive return, with its strong points and its gray areas: the examination of the slow professional and spiritual "drying up" as the technicization of our research after our appointment at the Paris IUFM in 1998; our "revivification" thanks to the action involved in non-institutional teams, the first fruits of the adventure described by the present overview; the misunderstandings of our peers and the difficulties in sharing and pursuing administratively and scientifically our work orientations.This report is completed by a presentation of the research perspectives with our laboratory on the question of the uses of digital education; international collaborations with the National Institute of Informatics (NII) in Japan and the Centro de Tecnologia da Informação (CTI) in Brazil on stress at work; by the continuity of our work in the context of current teaching (integration in the axes of GIS Rreefor-Espe); the continued testing of P2i in teacher training or the deepening of the Culture of Peace. The extent of the engagement in our research community and our actions for the promotion of the discipline of the Sciences of Education and Training are particularly notable in relation to cooperation initiatives with foreign universities for teacher training in Romania (Cluj-Napoca), Spain (Valencia), Russia (Moscow), Ecuador (Chuquipata) and China (Chengdu), through the endorsement of editorial responsibilities as a reviewer, through the organization of scientific meetings, by answering requests for expert opinions…In conclusion, in the era of the Anthropocene, which is characterized by societal and lethal environmental risks for the human species, questioning what constitutes society is now absolutely necessary. Starting from our specialty, education, this problem is tackled by the study of conditions and modalities, a strategy that allows surpassing a mere "doing together" to a true "living together". At the heart of the areas to explore further are secularism and the relationship with religion . As the pedagogue Philippe Meirieu has noted: "'Believing' divides while 'knowing' brings together" . Experience facilitates passing from the first verb to the second. Massification and longer study times seem to go hand in hand with the standardization of training courses. The latter would then risk rejecting the otherness of those who follow them and tend to format them, which would be the opposite of the search for creative solutions that society needs. Finding interest and constructing the "common points" that respect diversity, based on real benevolence, with co-constructed rules, would be a pragmatic solution to consider. Fundamental principles may include but are not limited to: citizenship, partnership, democracy, team and collaborative learning, acceptance of different ideas, small group work, and extended teacher roles beyond traditional disciplines.The apparently intuitive point of convergence between these principles can be seen by taking into account our "common point of humanity" in all its various expressions. And this common point could in turn be guided by a call for a transcendence of each individual "little person", in a transcendence that is necessarily collective. If it were a matter of something informal and unspoken, all would benefit from having it brought to consciousness. Should it not then become a subject of discussion between the stakeholders, in order to encourage more and more the expression of this common point of humanity, so that everyone finds nourishment as needed, while maintaining the broadest possible respect for others and the world? In the tradition of Metagogy Theorem , we would approach a meta-science of education: a scientific and transversal model supported by an integral pedagogical paradigm that would provide a necessary and sufficient space for the ontological and spiritual dimensions.The objective of this research is to participate in the understanding of the question of consciousness and its deployment in human activities (subject / object / project), particularly in educational situations, with intention as the first criterion of analysis. ; Notre motivation à entrer dans l'écriture de cette note de synthèse trouve sa source à la suite du séisme traumatisant personnel et collectif provoqué par une nouvelle vague d'attentats en France en 2015 et par leurs répliques en Belgique, en Allemagne et en Grande-Bretagne. Ces événements dramatiques ont ravivé chez nous des questionnements professionnels et existentiels jusque-là mis de côté faute de lieu et de moment institutionnel dédié pour réfléchir aux finalités et aux fonctionnements des instances éducatives dont nous sommes partie prenante.Notre question de recherche part donc de l'appréciation d'une humanité et d'un état du monde contemporains qui semblent loin d'être à la hauteur qu'auraient laissé espérer les immenses avancées technologiques modernes, parmi lesquelles l'accès à l'information, conjuguées à une éducation primaire dispensée à très grande échelle sur la planète .Une hypothèse est que si la dimension ontologique est d'une certaine façon déjà présente dans les programmes scolaires et dans le socle commun de connaissances, de compétences et de culture de l'école et du collège notamment au travers des humanités et des compétences relationnelles et psycho-sociales, elle s'y exercerait toutefois de façon non ou insuffisamment conscientisée, ce qui amoindrirait ses effets positifs. Cet état de fait, attaché à une sorte de refoulement, aurait pour effet de ralentir la capacité de formation et d'émergence d'une personne qui soit responsable et qui agisse de manière positive envers elle-même, envers les autres et envers la planète. L'objectif poursuivi est donc de chercher à mieux comprendre et à accompagner vers ce but le processus multi-référentiel de notre humanisation au travers de l'éducation, pour autant que, comme l'affirmait déjà Érasme à la Renaissance : « On ne naît pas homme, on le devient ». Les principaux cadres théoriques et les concepts que nous mobilisons pour construire ce travail et nos propositions en Sciences de l'Éducation et de la Formation s'appuient sur trois domaines. D'abord la Transdisciplinarité , avec la pensée complexe , la théorie des systèmes et la question de la conscience . Ensuite la Psychologie Transpersonnelle , sur les questions de liberté, de responsabilité et d'éthique. Enfin les Humanités Numériques, depuis les artefacts technologiques et les technologies éducatives jusqu'à la technontologie (technique plus ontologie).Sous forme d'encarts, nous relaterons régulièrement des moments issus de notre « histoire de vie », nous insérant ainsi dans le courant de la biographisation , en tant que témoignages de l'évolution de notre propre parcours.Dans une première partie, nous travaillons à la construction d'un modèle ontologique hypothético-déductif, « l'être en tant qu'être », en tenant compte de la condition humaine dans son contexte spatio-temporel - « l'être dans le temps de l'être »- pour en comprendre le fonctionnement en termes d'enracinement, de besoin, de capacité, de désir, de dépassement… Nous représentons l'Être humain par un schéma métaphorique, appelé « structure-temple », comprenant sept éléments. Le socle de l'édifice symbolise sa filiation dans le contexte « anthropologique / culturel » de la naissance, actuellement l'anthropocène (qui débute avec l'action transformative durable de l'action humaine sur la planète, essentiellement du fait des agissements techniques et industriels, Wallenhorst, 2019). La première colonne exprime la dimension « physique / biologique / énergétique » ; la deuxième, la part « émotionnelle / sensible » ; la troisième, le « mental / cognitif » ; la quatrième, le « groupal / social » et la cinquième, l' « axiologique / existentiel / (post-)métaphysique ». Enfin, le fronton est la coiffe « ouverture / ontologique » de l'ensemble, qui invite à une conclusion optimiste selon la maxime du temple grec de Delphes attribuée à Socrate : « Connais-toi toi-même et tu connaîtras l'univers et les dieux ».Nous procédons ensuite à une analyse de cette approche au travers de deux dimensions temporelles : la big history ou longue histoire cosmique depuis le big bang jusqu'à la création de notre planète et le développement de la biosphère ainsi que l'éphémère vie humaine durant laquelle chacun tentera d'accomplir son projet « implié » . Une troisième dimension intemporelle les complète : la vie de l'esprit . Nous observons la dynamique évolutive de la structure-temple grâce à la complémentarité qu'elle opère avec les logiques du tiers inclus et du « Tiers Caché », ainsi que son caractère non-réductionniste. Ce modèle est fractal par son caractère intra-reproductible et holographique car multicouche. Il construit un système d'équilibre « cosmoderne » témoignant de la séparation épistémologique historique entre le monde des sujets et celui des objets qu'il réunit par la théorie de la « Transréalité » . Il propose in fine de dépasser cette dichotomie apparente en adoptant une approche non-duelle destinée à être opérante au moyen de la « démarche de projet » .La deuxième partie du travail contextualise la métaphore de la structure-temple dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la formation. À partir d'une démarche en réciprocité harmonieuse d'un triple développement, opéré sur les plans personnel, professionnel et collectif, émerge une proposition de « Pédagogie Intégrative et Implicative » (P2i). Elle procède d'un cadre théorique intégratif et aboutit à un dispositif implicatif ancré dans la longue histoire de l'Éducation Nouvelle dont Philippe Meirieu décèle « les prémices dès le XVIIIème siècle » . Par l'actualisation technicisée de la démarche de projet socioconstructiviste, la P2i cultive la considération efficiente des apprenants, des enseignants et des tiers (personnels, parents et autres partenaires), et ce, dans toutes leurs dimensions. Cette réflexion nécessite de discuter de l'évolution du rôle de l'enseignant dans l'acquisition des apprentissages fondamentaux de l'école primaire, depuis le « lire, écrire, compter » jusqu'au « respecter autrui », passant ainsi de la performance quantitative à la sensibilité qualitative. Il s'agit d'anticiper le passage d'un caractère « intégratif » des objets pédagogiques dans toutes leurs variétés à la dimension « intégrale » des sujets en formation. La métaphore de la structure-temple est alors déclinée comme un projet multidimensionnel. La recherche s'applique donc aussi bien au domaine des disciplines, des activités péri-, para- et extra-scolaires qu'aux questions transversales comme l'éco-citoyenneté, le pouvoir d'agir, le bonheur et le bien-être, la gestion des émotions, l'éducation positive…La P2i étudie les lieux, les moyens, les méthodes et les outils mis à disposition des institutions et des enseignants (débat philosophique, yoga ou encore méditation ) pour permettre une approche laïque autorisée de la spiritualité , qui s'intéresse à la vie de l'esprit. Tenant lieu de méthode d'analyse et de prospective, elle peut être mobilisée pour étudier toute question touchant aux Sciences de l'Éducation et de la Formation, depuis la laïcité ou l'évaluation jusqu'à l'open access ou le big data. La structure-temple et la P2i proposent conjointement un cadre théorique et pratique favorisant l'application de « stratégies de réussite éducatives » par l'instauration de cercles vertueux tout en développant notre part d'humanité. Par exemple des notions pédagogiques ou didactiques comme « la gestion de classe », « les apprentissages adaptés », « l'appui sur les personnalités », « les compétences des apprenants », « la dimension existentielle » etc. tous envisagés et pris en compte simultanément ou à tour de rôle multiplient les effets positifs de chacune de ces dimensions. Nous situant dans le courant de la slow education et des approches alternatives de/à l'éducation, une question, qui pourrait devenir « vive », se fait jour : faudrait-il nous orienter, par besoin ou par nécessité, vers un changement de paradigme éducatif ? Et si oui, vers lequel nous diriger ?La troisième partie présente un bilan de notre trajet de chercheur-praticien sous forme de retour réflexif, avec ses points forts et ses zones d'ombre : l'examen du lent « assèchement » professionnel et spirituel au fur et à mesure de la technicisation de nos recherches après notre nomination à l'Iufm de Paris en 1998 ; notre « revivifiance » grâce à l'action impliquée dans des équipes para-institutionnelles, prémices de l'aventure de cette note de synthèse ; les incompréhensions de nos pairs et les difficultés à partager et poursuivre administrativement et scientifiquement nos orientations de travail…Ce bilan est complété par un exposé des perspectives de recherche au sein de notre laboratoire sur la question des usages du numérique en éducation ; par des collaborations internationales avec le National Institute of Informatics (Tokyo, Japon) et le Centro de Tecnologia da Informação (Campinas, Sao Paolo, Brésil) sur le stress au travail ; par la continuité de nos travaux dans le contexte d'enseignement actuel (intégration dans les axes du GIS Rreefor-Espe) ; la poursuite de la mise à l'épreuve de la P2i dans la formation des enseignants ou encore l'approfondissement de la Culture de Paix. L'ampleur de l'engagement dans notre communauté de recherche et nos actions pour le rayonnement de la discipline des Sciences de l'Éducation et de la Formation s'apprécient notamment par des initiatives de coopération avec des instituts et des universités étrangères de formation des enseignants comme le National Pedagogical College (Cluj-Napoca, Roumanie), le Florida Grup Educatiu (Valencia, Espagne), la Moscow City University (Russie), l'Universidad Nacional de Educación (Chuquipata, Équateur) et l'École Normale de Chengdu (Chine) ; par la prise de responsabilités éditoriales dans des revues relevant de la section ; par l'organisation de rencontres scientifiques ; par la réponse à des demandes d'expertises nationales et internationales…En conclusion, il ressort que l'objectif de cette recherche est de participer à la compréhension de la question de la conscience et de son déploiement dans les activités humaines (sujet/objet/projet), et particulièrement en situation éducative, avec l'intention pour premier critère d'analyse.
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Documents CIDOB: 16Antoni Sastre Bel, Independent consultant specializing in peace mediation, conflict resolution, EU foreign policy, and EU-Africa relations. sastrebel.antoni@alumni.eui.euWinner of the Global Talent Award, launched by CIDOB and Banco Sabadell Foundation in the framework of Programa Talent Global.
This paper examines EU engagement in peace mediation in sub-Saharan Africa, and specifically in Ethiopia's Tigray war and the conflict in Sudan. It uses the analytical framework of "multi-mediation" to map, classify and analyse the mediation-related initiatives carried out by the EU. The ultimate goal is to defend the use of peace mediation as a cost-efficient and less coercive foreign policy tool, well-suited to safeguarding the EU's peace and security interests in the African continent. The conclusion presents three main points: a) the EU is well-equipped to engage in mediation and be considered a "multi-mediator"; b) the EU has structural limitations which prevent it from fully mobilising these capacities and from leading mediation efforts; c) the EU is uniquely well-placed to leverage its resources and support mediation through a nuanced normative approach that can positively impact peace processes.Key words: EU, Ethiopia, Tigray, Sudan, mediation, normative approach, foreign policy INTRODUCTION"For us, the European Union, you are more than just a neighbour. Both our unions are built on a dream – a dream of peace."Six days after assuming her new post, Ursula von der Leyen uttered this phrase at the headquarters of the African Union (AU), in what it was her first official trip as President of the European Commission (EC) (Herszenhorn, 2019). Two weeks earlier, on November 27th, 2019, when presenting her College of Commissioners at the European Parliament, she had outlined her vision to implement what she called the "geopolitical Commission" (European Commission, 2019). With it she expressed her ambition to consolidate the EU as an international, assertive and pragmatic actor operating in the "high politics" domain to advance its strategic interests in the world (Blockmans, 2020). Within this agenda, EU-Africa relations occupy a central place. This was illustrated by Von der Leyen's first trip abroad or by the Mission Letter given to Jutta Urpilainen, Commissioner for International Partnerships (DG INTPA), in which the first objective was to design a new "comprehensive strategy with Africa" (Von der Leyen, 2019: 4). This request was later met with the Comprehensive Strategy presented by the EC and the High Representative (HRVP) in March 2020. This document underlined peace and security as one of the top five cooperation areas (European Commission, 2020a). Peace and security have been a major priority of EU-AU relations since the partnership was enshrined in 2007 with the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2007: 5). The reason for this is the EU perception that to safeguard its internal security it is necessary to stabilise its neighbours and avoid damaging spillover effects. While the EU tool to ensure peace on its eastern borders has been the enlargement process, the EU-Africa partnership was the framework to address the security concerns (among others) in the EU's southern neighbourhood and its surroundings. Furthermore, the conflict management aspect has gained importance within the EU approach to Africa as it is seen as a prerequisite for achieving its other interests there, such as migration reduction or trade and economic relations. For this reason, it is no surprise that the new commission, which has a clear geopolitical ambition, considers the African continent and its security as a strategic priority for the EU.Since 2007, the EU has been investing heavily in stabilisation efforts in the African continent. Nevertheless, until now most of the resources have been concentrated in police, military and defence initiatives, such as the deployment of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations or the support for Peace and Support Operations (PSOs) led by the AU and the subsequent Regional Mechanisms.1 This is concerning, taking into account that this approach is financially very costly, politically risky and, considering its results, ineffective in achieving stability (Tull, 2022; Van der Lijn et al., 2022; Herrberg, 2021). As a result, other conflict prevention and resolution instruments which could be useful have been overlooked. Among them, peace mediation is a cost-effective, less coercive and less interventionist tool which seems to be underexploited (International Crisis Group, 2021: 2). This unequal balance raises questions about the adequacy and effectiveness of the EU approach to peace and security in the African continent, and questions whether the EU is fully leveraging the potential of its tools and institutions.To address this conundrum, this research will investigate and analyse EU engagement in peace mediation in sub-Saharan Africa during the last Von der Leyen commission. The goal is to comprehend if and how the EU, under this new "geopolitical Commission", has been turning to conflict mediation by looking into the nature, level and magnitude of the EU's engagement, and to identify its strengths, weaknesses and opportunities for improvement. More widely, this research aims to better understand if the EU exploits mediation's full potential to advance its peace and security interests in the African continent. For this purpose, the research question is: How has the EU engaged in conflict mediation in sub-Saharan Africa during the Von der Leyen commission? To empirically address this question, this research uses two case studies: the Ethiopia-Tigray war (2020-2022) and the current conflict in Sudan (April 2023-present). These cases have been selected because: they occur within the selected time frame; happen in a geographical area of strategic significance for the EU; are categorised by their high intensity in terms of violence and humanitarian impact; and have involved multiple foreign actors and mediation processes. The data on the EU engagement in peace mediation in these two case studies has been collected through two qualitative methods. Document analysis has been used to identify the multiple EU engagements and to capture the public and official EU position. To complement the gaps in the publicly available information and to obtain deeper analysis about the EU's actions, 11 semi-structured interviews with experts and decision-makers have been conducted. There is a wide literature on EU security and peace efforts in the African continent, which generally depicts the EU as an actor focused on conflict management and stabilisation through the provision of security assistance (Lavallée & Volkel, 2015; Olsen, 2009; Gegout, 2009; Raineri & Strazzari 2019; Venturi, 2017). Nonetheless, the literature on EU foreign policy has not extensively covered the EU's role in mediation (Bergmann et al., 2018: 6-7), and EU mediation in sub-Saharan Africa specifically has received little attention. While EU meditation in the neighbourhood has received wider attention (International Negotiation, 2018; Bergmann, 2020a; Vukovic, 2020), only two papers on EU mediation in sub-Saharan Africa have been published (Müller & Bergmann, 2020; Davis, 2018). Given this, this paper provides three main contributions. First, it adds analysis to the scarce literature on EU mediation and specifically on the implementation of this practice in the African continent. This is done by comparing EU engagement in both case studies. Second, it delves into the institutional architecture of EU mediation and its capacities and makes two conclusions: one, the EU has the capacities to be considered a multi-mediator, meaning an actor capable of operating on different tracks, levels and stages of peace mediation processes; and two, the EU has structural limitations that prevent it from fully mobilising these capacities and leading mediation. Third, the article will also touch on the practical implications that normativity can have on the role of the EU as a mediator, which is a very novel topic in the literature (Vukovic, 2020; Nouwen, 2022; Caruso & Akamo, 2024). EU FOREIGN POLICY AND MEDIATIONThis section will briefly explain EU foreign policy, concentrating on the role of mediation. When the Maastricht Treaty was adopted in 1992, one of the preambular clauses announced the intention of creating a "common foreign and security policy… in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the World" (Treaty on European Union, 1992: 1). With the Maastricht Treaty, the EU expressed its ambitions to be an actor with a strong foreign policy capable of advancing its interests outside Europe, including among others peace and security. This aspiration would later be consolidated with the approval of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and with the 2007 Lisbon Treaty that proclaimed in Article 2 "to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples" (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007: 11). As such, from the 1990s the EU started to develop multiple institutions and strategies intended to realise this key foreign policy objective of promoting peace and security.One of the ways to achieve this foreign policy goal is through mediation. There are multiple definitions of mediation, but the 2009 Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities describes it as "a way of assisting negotiations between conflict parties and transforming conflicts with the support of an acceptable third party" (Council of the European Union 2009: 2). The first time that the term "mediation" was explicitly mentioned as a possible tool to be used in EU foreign policy was in the Implementation Report of the ESS approved by the council in 2008. The report issued a call "toexpand dialogue and mediation capacities" and regarded them as instruments to advance the EU strategic objective of conflict prevention (Council of the European Union, General Secretariat of the Council, 2009: 21). Even though "mediation" was not included in official EU strategic documents until 2008, several scholars have emphasised that this tool had begun to be used earlier, in the late 1990s, under the lead of High Representative Javier Solana. As Herrberg explains, Solana set the precedent of EU mediation capacity when, among others, he helped to negotiate the Ohrid Agreement in 2001 and mediated between Serbia and Montenegro in 2002 (Herrberg, 2021:135). After years of practice and in the context of an ambitious foreign policy, in November 2009 the council adopted the Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities. The aim of the concept was to provide a "systematic approach" to mediation which is recognised as an "effective and cost-efficient instrument for conflict prevention, transformation and resolution" (Council of the European Union, 2009: 3). This document is important for three reasons. First, because it institutionalised the EU's ambition to use mediation as a foreign policy tool (Bergmann et al.,2018). Second, because it provided a much broader definition of mediation than the average definitions available in the literature on mediation (Bergmann et al., 2018; Haastrup et al., 2014). Haastrup et al. (2014: 3) believe that this was a deliberate choice with which the EU aimed to present a wide number of actions that could be conducted under the banner of "mediation". This point is substantiated by the fact that the concept introduced five different types of mediation (lead or co-mediator, promoting, leveraging, supporting and funding) among which just one (to lead or co-mediate) implies being directly engaged in the process, while the others are about mediation support (Council of the European Union, 2009: 6). Third, because the EU justified its interests in mediating and capability to mediate by presenting itself as a normative actor2 (Davis, 2014: 69; Nouwen, 2022), and established five guiding principles, which included acting in accordance with human rights and international humanitarian law (Council of the European Union, 2009: 6-8). In June 2016, the council approved the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) that replaced the 2003 ESS as the new security and foreign policy guiding document. The EUGS advocated for a stronger foreign policy as it interlinked internal and external EU security. To this end, it introduced the Integrated Approach, which consisted of harmonising the use of all EU foreign policy instruments under the purpose of advancing its strategic interests. Mediation was presented as a tool to be used throughout the conflict cycle (from prevention to resolution) in conjunction with the whole foreign policy toolkit (European Union Global Strategy, 2016: 29-31). The Integrated Approach encouraged the use of mediation (Bergmann & Friesen, 2021) and provided it with further leverage, as under its implementation the EU could offer a wide range of instruments to incentivise peace agreements (development and economic aid), support them (capacity building provision) and sustain them (CSDP missions for post-conflict stabilisation).As a result of the Integrated Approach and the lessons learnt since 2009, in December 2020 the council approved the new Concept on EU Peace Mediation, which cemented the conception of mediation as a strategic and foreign policy tool. The 2020 concept also fulfilled the EU's normative commitment by declaring itself to be a "value-based" actor aiming to promote its "foundational values" (Panchulidze & Bergmann, 2021: 2) and by including new "guiding principles" for its mediation efforts, such as inclusivity or promotion of gender equality. The 2020 concept proposed implementing a multi-track approach in conjunction with other actors such as partners or mediation NGOs (Herrberg, 2021) and introduced new actions that could be considered mediation, including: facilitating, accompanying, coordinating and supporting process outcome (Council of the European Union, 2020a:10-11). EU mediation actorsOne strength of the EU as a mediator is that it has multiple institutions and actors capable of undertaking complementary action. The front-line institutions in mediation are the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) (Interview I.11). According to their mandate, their tasks can include "negotiation… mediation and/or support to mediation" (Council of the European Union, 2009: 5). Other key actors are EU Delegations, Special Envoys (nominated for ad hoc cases and can include politicians from member states), HRVPs and even the member states (MSs) themselves after being delegated by the council (European Union Global Strategy, 2016). Furthermore, in some circumstances, the CSDP missions or the EC can also be involved in mediation on very specific issues such as security arrangements (Davis, 2014). At the coordination level there is the European External Action Service and its Mediation Support Unit that provides mediation capacity building to EU institutions, member states and even external partners (Interview I.11; Herrberg, 2021). Another category of relevant actors are the mediation NGOs, which receive funding from the EU and on several occasions have acted in coordination with it. (Interview I.1, I.8 and I.11; Herrberg, 2021). THE EU AS A MEDIATOR In this section I will briefly explain how the literature has been perceiving, portraying and approaching the EU as a mediator. One of the first papers on the topic was from Susanne Gentz, who in 2007 illustrated that before the Concepts were developed, the EU addressed conflict prevention and resolution through the use of political dialogue and exercised leverage through the conditionality implied in its financial and development programmes. Since then, academics and mediation NGOs have conducted further research on the topic. Still, some authors argue that there has been insufficient study of the possible modalities and impacts of EU mediation (Bergmann et al., 2018; Herrberg, 2021).An important part of the literature has evaluated the impact and effectiveness of EU mediation. Herrberg (Herrberg, 2018) and Bergmann have developed the two main analytical frameworks. They devised two separate frameworks for mediation (Bergmann, 2020b) and mediation support (Müller & Bergmann, 2020). Another aspect that has been addressed by the literature, and which I will investigate with this article, concerns the type of engagement that characterises EU mediation. A point shared by multiple authors is that EU mediation can take multiple forms, or as Herrberg put it, can be "at the table" (leading, co-leading or mediating), "around the table" (mediation support) and/or "beyond the table" (sustaining the process) (2021: 139). Laura Davis in her 2014 book was a forerunner of the concept of "multi-mediator" (2014: 196). She used the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo to demonstrate the EU's ability to operate via a multi-layered, multi-dynamic, multilateral and multi-track approach (2014). Sheriff and Hauck presented an analytical compilation of multiple EU mediation cases in which they illustrated that their success depended on the EU's capacity to exploit and leverage its specific comparative advantages in every conflict (2013). Another angle is the normativity of EU mediation. Nouwen explains that the normative character of the 2009 and 2020 concepts, together with the Eurocentrism and lack of self-reflexion ingrained in them, represent a baggage that can prevent the EU from understanding and exploiting its real added value and leverage (2022). Some scholars argue that the normative agenda can limit EU mediation's reach (Haastrup et al. 2014; Peral, 2012), and Caruso and Akamo illustrate how this dilemma materialised in the Ethiopia-Tigray war (2024). Against these points, Davies expounded that the EU's capacity to put forward a normative agenda depends on establishing clear and commonly agreed guidelines and limits on it (2014), and in this vein Bergmann and Friesen proposed a "strategic framework of overarching normative principles" (2021: 6). Finally, another often overlooked component is the interaction between the EU and independent mediation NGOs. Several scholars have highlighted how the EU has frequently used mediation NGOs to expand its reach (Haastrup et al., 2014), and how these organisations have granted it access to the grassroots (Davis, 2014) and contexts in which the EU is not institutionally welcomed (Sheriff & Hauck, 2013). Herrberg went further and endorsed NGOs as an answer to the EU's recurrent lack of flexibility and continuity, internal divisions, complex decision-making and bureaucratic constraints (2012). THE EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIPThis section provides the context for the case studies and introduces EU-Africa relations and the EU approach to the Horn. EU interests in the African continent are longstanding and peace and security comprise one of the major priorities. The 2016 EUGS is a good reflection of this, as it directly links EU security to stability in the African continent, and calls for diplomacy, CSDP and development funds to step up conflict prevention and resolution in the continent (European Union Global Strategy, 2016: 36). From the end of the Second World War until the 2000s, relations between the EU and the African countries were characterised by their asymmetry and consisted of economic cooperation based on the EU-African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries format. This dynamic started to change with the Lomé IV Convention in 1995 which included new areas of engagement such as democracy and good governance (Haastrup et al., 2021), and more widely with the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 which for the first time established peace as a policy priority, and even underlined the need for "mediation, negotiation and reconciliation efforts" (European Commission, 2014: 26). In 2001 the African countries created the African Union, which entered into force in 2002 (Haastrup et al., 2021). That same year, the AU created the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which would operate as its "collective mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution" and involved the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs), two Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and other subsequent institutions (Mabera, 2020: 2). The EU backed the creation of the AU and the APSA, and to support them in 2004 it created the African Peace Facility (APF) in response to the request made at the July 2003 AU Summit in Maputo (Mabera, 2020).In 2007, the EU and AU signed the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership – A Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), which placed a strong focus on peace and security and laid the foundations of the current EU contribution and approach to African peace and security. This document recognised the APSA as the main framework with which to cooperate, and its institutions as the actors responsible for peace and security in the continent and, therefore, the first responders to crisis. Under this scheme, the JAES states that the EU will consistently support the APSA through capacity building, training and funding, and that both institutions will strengthen cooperation and coordination in "conflict prevention and … conflict resolution" (Council of the European Union, 2007: 5). Since 2007, this cooperation modus operandi has been maintained and reinforced through multiple strategic documents and summits to date3 . The support for the APSA can be considered the backbone of EU foreign and security policy towards Africa (Interview I.11). Mediation and mediation support have been provided for in the EU-Africa partnership as instruments for conflict prevention and resolution. Since 2007, the EU has been providing training, capacity building and funding to APSA institutions that are directly or indirectly involved in mediation, such as the Panel of the Wise, the AU PSC and all the corresponding mediation units of the RMs and RECs (European Parliament, 2014). By way of examples, in 2016 the EU helped the AU to create its Mediation Support Unit (MSU); in 2019 it provided support to the IGAD MSU (Bustamante & Carvalho, 2020); and in the 2018 EU-AU Memorandum of Understanding both organisations championed the use of mediation and recommended incrementing their experts' capacity building in this field (Council of the European Union, 2018a). Nevertheless, despite these multiple commitments, one of the most common criticisms of the EU-Africa partnership is that most of the resources are allocated to Peace and Support Operations (PSOs), and therefore to military and police support, rather than to conflict prevention, resolution and mediation (Yohannes & Dessa, 2021; Bergmann, 2023). This is clearly illustrated with the case of the APF.The APF has been the main source of funding for the APSA, largely coming from the EU, and it financed three components: the PSOs, APSA capacity building (including the mediation institutions mentioned above) and the Early Response Mechanism (ERM). The ERM was aimed at funding the APSA's fast-track and preventive efforts at the early stages of conflict, such as "mediation, shuttle diplomacy, the deployment of human rights observers or fact-finding missions" (International Crisis Group, 2021a: 4). It has provided significant support to multiple mediation initiatives that resulted in peace agreements, such as in South Sudan (Müller & Bergmann, 2020) or Kenya (Sheriff & Hauck, 2013). Nonetheless, from 2004 until 2019 the EU provided around €2.9bn through the APF, and from this total 93% was for PSOs, while 6% went to APSA's capacity building and 1% to the ERM (International Crisis Group, 2021a: 2). This demonstrates the prioritisation of securitisation over mediation and conflict prevention support. In 2021, the APF was replaced by the European Peace Facility (EPF), which funds PSOs, and by the NDICI-Global Europe programme, which covers the APSA's capacity building and the ERM. This change has been identified as an example of the EU's pragmatic turn in its peace and security policy towards the African continent, because of the following implications. First, in contrast to the APF, the EPF for the first time will allow the EU and its member states to provide lethal equipment and bilateral military capacity building to partner countries, signalling the EU's interest in taking a much more defence-focused and militaristic approach (Bergmann, 2023). Second, while with the APF the AU oversaw and administered the funds received from the EU, with the EPF the EU will directly channel the funding to specific countries or ad hoc organisations without needing to consult with the AU. Some experts consider that sidelining the AU will diminish the APSA as a whole, as it breaks the subsidiarity rule and delegitimises the continental multilateral system (Woldemichael, 2022; Bergmann, 2023; Hauck & Tadesse, 2021). Third, unlike the APF, the EPF and the NDICI are two platforms with a global scope and consequently without clear earmarked funds for Africa. This complicates the financial planning of the AU PSOs that were dependent on the APF, and it risks dissipating the support provided to Africa in the event that new priorities (such as Ukraine) appear on the European agenda (International Crisis Group, 2021a; Hauck & Tadesse, 2021). The EU has conceived the EPF as a platform to guarantee tighter control over the peace and security funding that it provides abroad (Woldemichael, 2022) and as a vehicle to fulfil its geopolitical aspirations (Bergmann, 2023; Hauck & Tadesse, 2021). Nevertheless, it has also raised concern about it being a tool for potential increased interventionism in the African continent without African states' consent (Woldemichael, 2022). Additionally, the EU's pragmatic and geopolitical turn may increase with the new 2024 commission, which has clearly indicated that it will focus on the EU's immediate neighbourhood, enlargement and Russia (Louw-Vaudran, 2024). Besides the EPF, the EU's peace and security approach to the African continent has not been exempt from criticism. Over the last few years specifically the African elites and the population have displayed an increasing scepticism towards Europe (Hauck & Tadesse, 2021; Carbone, 2023; Tadesse & Di Commo, 2023). Some authors point at the asymmetric relationship of financial dependency between the AU and the EU (Yohannes & Dessa, 2021), which has also implied dynamics of "norms-setter versus norm taker" and "carrot and stick approaches" (Tadesse & Di Commo, 2023: 5), as a reason for the African states' pushback on the current partnership. Another argument widely shared within the scholar community is that EU support for the African continent has largely been securitised to advance its own migration and security agenda, rather than being based on reciprocity and development policies, as claimed (Pye, 2024; Lavallée & Volkel, 2015; Venturi, 2017; Raineri & Strazzari, 2019). A third school of thought approaches EU-Africa relations from a structural perspective and argues that the EU rationale guiding its actions in the African continent follows a deeper hierarchy with colonial roots that neglects African agency in the partnership (Carbone, 2023; Hoijtink et al., 2023) and makes cynical use of the continent to cast the EU as a strong foreign policy and security actor (Gegout, 2009; Olsen, 2009; Haastrup et al., 2021; Pye, 2024). If these concerns are not examined by EU policymakers and a true relationship of equals is not pursued, the resentment towards Europe may well increase, rendering its peace and security policies ineffective. As a concluding point, even though peace and security are a key pillar of EU-Africa relations, in practice peace mediation appears to play a minor role within the EU strategy towards the continent. Furthermore, the new signals sent out with the creation of the EPF or the new commission's priorities indicate that this role will probably become even smaller.EU and the Horn The Horn of Africa is located in the north-eastern corner of the continent and comprises the following countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. These countries are part of the AU and are also all the members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Council of the European Union, 2011). In November 2011, the council adopted the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa and in 2015, the Regional Action Plan: Horn of Africa 2015-2020. Both documents were justified referencing the geostrategic positioning of the region (on the shores of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden) and the importance of its stability for the EU. Their priorities were peacebuilding, good governance and prevention of instability. The 2015 Action Plan included migration and the Red Sea. Both documents uphold regional ownership and action as the only solution to these challenges, and consequently call for supporting the IGAD and AU. Furthermore, they defended the use of mediation as a crisis prevention and management tool, and vowed to back local, regional and international mediation initiatives (Council of the European Union, 2011; 2015). The 2016 EUGS also pointed to the Horn as a priority area and proposed to address its regional challenges by developing "triangular relationships" of diplomacy between the Horn, North Africa and the Gulf (European Union Global Strategy, 2016: 35). In May 2021, the council endorsed a new strategy for the Horn, which built on the 2011 Strategic Framework, placed new emphasis on inclusivity and human rights and reiterated the need to support African-owned dialogue and mediation mechanisms (Council of the European Union, 2021c). The 2011 Strategic Framework approved the appointment of the EUSR for the Horn, who would lead the diplomatic approach to the region (established by their corresponding mandate) and harmonise the different EU instruments and programmes (Council of the European Union, 2011). During the period of our two case studies, two consecutive mandates instructed the EUSR for the Horn to advance peace, security and stability within the region and to cooperate with multiple actors ranging from civil society to the Gulf countries and Egypt. Additionally, the documents incorporated normative commitments such as promoting EU human rights policy, IHL and humanitarian access (Council of the European Union, 2018; Council of the European Union, 2021d). The 2021 mandate specifically included the need to support political transitions in Ethiopia and Sudan and commanded the EUSR to "initiate/steer, support and promote" Africa-owned dialogue, negotiation and mediation for conflict prevention and resolution (Council of the European Union, 2021d: 2). ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK To respond to the research question, I will conduct a comprehensive mapping of the different mediation-related actions undertaken by the EU in the two selected case studies (the 2020-2022 Ethiopia-Tigray war and the ongoing conflict in Sudan) and analyse them according to the "multi-mediator" framework developed by Davies. This framework is based on the concept of "multi-mediator", which denotes a mediator capable of operating through multiple mediation tracks, engaging at multiple layers (from the local to the international), acting at multiple conflict phases (from prevention to implementation of peace agreements) and being multilateral (acting in concert with other actors). I have chosen this framework because it is accurate and well aligned with the results that I have obtained in the data analysis, in the sense that it illustrates that the EU is not a mediator with a sole modus operandi but a polyhedral actor with capacity to operate at different levels, through different institutions, with different tools and throughout the conflict cycle. To illustrate this, I will employ Davies' 2018 analytical framework with some specific modifications. The analytical framework uses the three-track model developed by Lederach, and in every track it categorises the actions according to three capabilities. In his 1997 book, Lederach divided conflict-affected societies into three different "tracks" that can engage in mediation. Track I includes the "top leadership", Track II the "middle-range leadership" which encompasses civil society organisations (CSOs), religious authorities, influential figures or mid-level politicians, and Track III comprises grassroots leadership and local communities (Lederach, 1997).The capabilities are:Capability to engage, which considers the interactions with the warring parties by employing EU "policies, institutional set-up and instruments" (Davies, 2018: 183). This includes the initiatives taken by the EUSRs, delegations or others and the exertion of leverage through incentives and punitive measures. This engagement can be either to directly mediate or to support third party mediation. Capability to fund, which refers to the use of EU instruments to fund mediation support processes. Capability to coordinate and cooperate, which covers two aspects. The first is the capacity to create internal cohesion both between EU institutions and between the EU and member states. The second is engagement with external actors that are not the warring parties (such as international and regional organisations, foreign governments, local authorities or CSOs) to back the mediation process. As the external coordination and cooperation activities are mostly used to gather and garner support for third parties' initiatives (Davies, 2018), in this aspect I also include the capacity to endorse which is defined as giving support to present "a third party as competent and legitimate" (Müller & Bergmann, 2020: 153). Additionally, the EU has presented itself in both mediation concepts as a values-based and hence normative actor. Therefore, observations on this point will be made using specific examples in the Analysis section, while a wider evaluation of the consequences and limits of this normative approach will follow in the Discussion.METHODOLOGYI used qualitative methods document analysis and semi-structured interviews. The data was then categorised and analysed according to the analytical framework. Additionally, some secondary sources have been consulted to enrich the analysis.Time frame and case study selectionTo illustrate the extent of EU mediation during the first Von der Leyen commission (2019-2024), this research uses two case studies: the 2020-2022 Ethiopia-Tigray war and the ongoing conflict (since April 15th, 2023) in Sudan. These two case studies were chosen for the following reasons. First, both conflicts happen in a geographical area of strategic significance for the EU (Council of the European Union, 2021c), so the EU would be expected to have a strong interest in finding a solution to end the violence. Second, they are two fully-fledged wars with profound humanitarian impacts and feature widespread human rights abuses. Given that the EU portrays itself as an actor aiming to "promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the World" (Treaty on European Union, 1992: 1) and the fact that the EU is the major provider of humanitarian aid to the African continent, it would be logical to assert that both wars are of concern to the EU. Third, both cases happen in a context where multiple foreign actors became involved and there were various peace mediation initiatives,4 hence given the geopolitical aspirations of this new commission it is worth exploring how the EU copes in this context.One challenge that arises from the selection of these two case studies is the fact that the Sudan conflict is still ongoing. As a result, the analysis of the Sudan case study has been limited to the period from April 2023 (when hostilities began) to April 30th, 2024.5Data-collection methodsDocument analysis has been used to review the public statements and documents of the EU to understand its positions, the support announced to third parties and to identify the main actions and processes implemented in the two case studies. The data gathered for this method were the council conclusions adopted by the Council of the EU, the statements and declarations released by the EEAS, the HRVP, the EUSR for the Horn and other related institutions or actors, and the brief statements published on the social network X, by the EUSR for the Horn. The data gathered was coded into two tables, one for each case study,6 and organised chronologically. The variables in the table are Type of Engagement (including statements/council conclusions, visits, trips, meetings, calls, sanctions, provision of aid and conferences), Date, EU institution (indicating which EU actor conducted the specific action) and Description. While this method is very useful to understand the official stance of the EU, and to identify a wide variety of engagements, it has limitations related to the secrecy that characterises the mediation field and consequently I acknowledge that I am missing a lot of information that is not publicly available or announced.Semi-structured interviews were used to address the information gaps in the public information reviewed through document analysis, and to provide a more coherent and comprehensive understanding of the processes that underpin EU mediation in the two case studies. I interviewed 11 experts via phone or video call: scholars, EU officials, officers from independent mediation organisations, members of Sudanese and Ethiopian civil society and a Tigrayan mediator. I interviewed professionals with a wide range of expertise and stakes to gain an understanding of the topic from many angles. The content of the interviews varied according to the specialisation of the interviewee and concentrated on the EU mediation capabilities in general or specifically in the case studies. Out of the 11 interviewees, six are Europeans and five are Africans, from Ethiopia and Sudan. This geographical composition was chosen purposely to integrate opinions and perceptions from both sides of the EU-Africa partnership and therefore to spot what is missing or unnecessary. All the interviews have been anonymised, numbered and included in the references. LimitationsThis research identified the following limitations. First, it was difficult to find the financial information on the support provided to the African Union, IGAD or other mediation support initiatives. This is probably because this information will only be released years after the interventions are completed. For this reason, the data used in the capability to fund section is generic and has come from the interviews and the document analysis. Second, the mediation field is traditionally based on secrecy, therefore it was difficult to obtain specific information on all the actions conducted by the EU. This was present in the interviews, as on several occasions the interviewees expressed their desire not to comment on information that was deemed confidential. Equally, at the time the research was conducted, the European Commission term had not finished so there was not enough reflection on its impact. The issue of secrecy is aggravated by the fact that the civil war in Sudan is still ongoing and this is also a reason why there is less information available. Finally, using a case study methodology implies a significant limitation in extrapolating the results of this article to EU engagement in peace mediation in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. In essence, EU mediation depends on multiple factors that must not be oversimplified. The historical and present context of each country and of every conflict is unique, so peace mediation practices will always have to be adapted to the specific context. Specifically, the two case studies are both from the Horn of Africa, and therefore their characteristics differ from other regions of sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, these case studies reveal trends and concerns which are of relevance for the field. ANALYSISThe Ethiopia-Tigray war (November 2020- November 2022)BackgroundAfter several months of internal disputes over political and constitution issues, on November 4th, 2020, fighting erupted in Ethiopia's northern region of Tigray between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF). The conflict ended on November 2nd, 2022, with the Pretoria Agreement. The war had different stages with many offensives and counter-offensives between the two sides and spread throughout the northern part of the country, almost reaching the capital Addis Ababa (International Crisis Group, 2022). During the war, the ENDF received military support from Eritrean troops and regional paramilitary forces. The war resulted in at least 307,568 fatalities (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2023), forced the displacement of more than 4.2 million people (International Organization for Migration, 2022) and there were multiple reports of widespread war crimes and human rights violations committed by both sides (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Amnesty International, 2022).Despite initial mediation attempts by the IGAD, the main peace agreement was mediated by the African Union envoy, Olusegun Obasanjo, supported by the former Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta, and South Africa's former deputy president, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. The AU efforts were strongly supported by the US, and to a certain extent by the EU. Besides Eritrea, which was a direct warring faction, both sides received different degrees of support from foreign actors such as Sudan, Egypt, the UAE, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Iran (Abate, 2023; Caruso & Akamo, 2024). Capabilities Track ICapability to engage The whole EU engagement in the mediation process was focused not on directly mediating but on supporting the mediation efforts led by the AU (Interviews I.3; I.8). Together with mediation support, the two other pillars of the EU approach were normative and consisted of calling for humanitarian aid provision to Tigray and compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). The EU engagement was conducted through the Special Envoy, the EUSR for the Horn and in some instances through the higher authorities. This last category includes some specific meetings such as the one held by HRVP Josep Borrell with the Ethiopian foreign affairs minister in December 2020 (European External Action Service, 2020b), or the three phone conversations that President of the European Council Charles Michel held with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2021 and 2022 (Council of the European Union, 2021a; 2021e; 2022c). More than having an impact, these surgical interventions served to clearly lay out the aforementioned three pillars of the EU position.The EU stepped up its engagement in late January 2021 when Borrell appointed Pekka Haavisto, the then Finnish minister of foreign affairs, as his Special Envoy to Ethiopia (Finland in EU, 2021). Haavisto made two trips to the Horn, in February and April 2021, together with EUSR for the Horn Alexander Rondos, in which he held multiple meetings with Ethiopian senior officials, including Abiy and President Sahle Work-Zewde (Pekka Haavisto, 2021a; 2021b; 2021g; 2021h; 2021i). The purpose was to engage with the Ethiopian authorities and regional partners, to pressure for dialogue and a ceasefire, humanitarian access to Tigray and compliance with IHL. Nevertheless, his role as special envoy ended in June 2021 after he revealed to the European Parliament the plausibility that the federal government was committing ethnic cleansing (Interview I.9; Cara, 2021). In the interviews, Haavisto's appointment was perceived as a clear example of the EU's readiness to step up mediation resources (Interview I.8) and despite the limitations his engagements were recognised as positive (Interviews I.2; I.9). The most active EU actor in mediation engagement was the EUSR for the Horn. When the conflict started, the EUSR was Alexander Rondos, but in July 2021 he was replaced by Annette Weber. According to publicly available data, Weber met in Addis Ababa with Ethiopian senior officials more than nine times (on some occasions with other EU officials)7, in which she constantly compelled them to join the AU mediation efforts and tied it to the normalisation of Ethiopia-EU relations (Demeke Mekonnen Hassen, 2021; 2022; Roland Kobia 2021; 2022; Jutta Urpilainen 2021; Annette Weber 2021; 2022a; 2022b; 2022e). Concerning Rondos, in the interviews it was confirmed that from the outset he was also strongly engaged with both sides (Interviews I.8; I.9). Two differences in approach between them that were noted in the interviews were: first, Weber's position was perceived as firmly pragmatic, while Rondos balanced pragmatism with strong normative principles (Interviews I.8; I.9), and second, Rondos engaged more with the TPLF than Weber (who kept strong contact mainly with the federal government) (Interview I.9). Overall, it seems clear that both EUSRs were actively involved to support and advocate for AU mediation as the preferential solution to the conflict (Interviews I.2; I.3; I.8; I.9; I.10; I.11). Despite these efforts, almost all the interviewees agreed that the EU engagement in mediation was not meaningful enough to consider the EU an essential actor in the peace process that led to the Pretoria Agreement (Interviews I.1; I.2; I.8; I.9). In fact, the EU was rejected by the federal government as a potential observing member of the latter. The reasons identified were twofold. First, Abiy's government was resentful of the EU's tough normative position taken during the first months of the conflict, through which it accused Ethiopia of blocking humanitarian aid and committing war crimes and human rights violations. (Interviews I.1; I.2; I.8; I.9). Second, the EU lacked the leverage to bring the parties to the table, but this will be explained in the Discussion section.Capability to fundPart of the support provided to the AU, was in the form of funding channelled into sustaining the efforts of Obasanjo's team (Interview I.8). Nevertheless, the exact amounts provided were not found.Capability to coordinate and cooperateInternal divisions and lack of cohesion were identified by the majority of interviewees as one of the main causes of the lack of consistent EU engagement in the Ethiopia-Tigray conflict (Interview I.1; I.8; I.9; I.10). The strong normative position taken by Borrell, the EEAS, EUSR Rondos, DG ECHO and DG INTPA contrasted with the behaviour and interests of some member states (MSs). This played out in two ways. One was through incoherence between EU and MS policies. After the EU suspended the Budget Support Programme with Ethiopia in January 2021, some MSs such as Germany, France or Italy maintained their bilateral aid to Ethiopia and consequently diminished the EU leverage (Interview I.1). The second was imposed from the council, when the March 2021 Council Conclusions (Council of the European Union, 2021b) shifted the EU normative stance to a more pragmatic one and eased the tone against Abiy's government (Interview I.1) There could be various reasons for this turn, but the most plausible seem to be political affinity and economic interests (Interview I.9), and fear that being too harsh with a strategic partner could end up pushing it towards geopolitical competitors (Interview I.8).On the subject of external coordination, this case study is a good example of how, in line with the ethos of the EU-Africa Partnership, the EU invested in coordinating and gathering support behind the AU mediation efforts (Interview I.1; I.2; I.3). This was well illustrated by the actions of the Special Envoy, the EUSR and the multiple statements of the EU. In his second mission, Haavisto visited Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt in order to harmonise positions and coordinate actions (Pekka Haavisto, 2021d; 2021e). Additionally, he also held in-person meetings and phone calls with high-ranking officials of the League of Arab States (LAS) and with UN Secretary-General António Guterres (Pekka Haavisto 2021c; 2021f; 2021j). A similar pattern was followed by the EUSR, who made several trips to the Gulf and Egypt (Egypt MFA Spokesperson, 2021; Foreign Ministry, 2021) and held meetings with Turkish and Chinese representatives (Interview I.8). Both the EUSR and Haavisto strongly engaged and coordinated with the AU (Interview I.3; I.8; Amb. Smail Chergui, 2021; Pekka Haavisto, 2021k; Amb. Bankole Adeoye, 2021; Annette Weber, 2022d; 2022f). This backing also took the form of endorsement of the AU mediation initiative, as demonstrated in the statements published by the EEAS and the Council of the EU (Council of the European Union, 2020b; 2022d; European External Action Service, 2020a; 2021a; 2022b; 2022c; 2022d), the 2021 Council Conclusions (Council of the European Union, 2021b) or in the social media accounts of EU officials (Josep Borrell Fontelles, 2021; Annette Weber, 2022b; 2022d). Additionally, the EU also worked in tandem with the US to align agendas and coordinate efforts on mediation support (Interview I.1; I.2). This cooperation materialised in joint shuttle diplomacy carried out by the EUSR and the US special envoy, in August 2022, when they approached the TPLF in Mekelle (European External Action Service, 2022b). Finally, it is worth mentioning that the EU also tried to expand its coordination efforts by engaging Eritrea in June 2022 (European External Action Service, 2022a). Nonetheless, this had little impact due to the isolationist and anti-Western character of the regime in Asmara (Interview I.8). Capabilities Track II and IIICapability to fundThis research has attempted to better understand if there was EU funding for mediation NGOs working in Track 2 and 3, but it failed to obtain clear responses. The interviewees with insider knowledge of the Ethiopian peace process said that there had been no involvement of such organisations funded by the EU, and that there was no engagement at grassroots level (Interview I.8; I.9). Nevertheless, a January 2021 International Crisis Group report explained that the EU had been funding such activities (International Crisis Group, 2021b). The Sudan conflict (April 2023- present)BackgroundOn April 15th, 2023, the conflict in Sudan began between the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Hemedti and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Al-Burhan. The immediate causes were disagreements over security sector reform and specifically over how the RSF would be integrated into the SAF, as part of a long-term plan to restore civilian rule. The fighting started in Khartoum but quickly escalated and spread throughout the whole country (International Crisis Group, 2024a). On the sidelines, there is a wide amalgam of civil society groups and political parties that were part of the previous transitional process and which are key to build a political future for the country (International Crisis Group, 2024a). To May 2024, the war provoked the largest displacement crisis in the world, with 9 million internally displaced people, and a deep humanitarian catastrophe, with approximately 28 million people in need of humanitarian assistance (International Organization for Migration, 2024).The mediation context in Sudan has been characterised by its fragmentation and diversity of initiatives. The first and most prominent was the Jeddah talks led by Saudi Arabia and the US, which focused on a ceasefire and humanitarian access. The second, led by the IGAD, tried to find a political solution to the conflict. Despite its initial success this option ultimately stalled. The third, led by Egypt, involved the neighbouring countries and concentrated on humanitarian access and the regional implications of the conflict (International Crisis Group, 2023b). Until May 15th, it seemed that the AU was the institution trying to coordinate and mainstream the different processes under the same umbrella and to integrate the political solution (African Union Peace and Security Department, 2023). The last news showed that the AU aimed to do this by scaling up the Jeddah platform (Interview I.4). Due to the lack of success in this task, in March 2024 the AU created the High-Level Panel to steer efforts (Kinkoh, 2024). At the same time, in Sudan there were several actors from outside the Horn involved in supporting the two belligerents, such as Chad, UAE, Russia or Egypt, which further complicated the mediation process (Campbell-James, 2024). Capabilities Track ICapability to engageIn this case, the EU has not attempted to mediate but it is clearly supporting the African Union-led and IGAD mediation efforts, and specifically the political process rather than the military one (Interview I.4; I.7; I.11). Four interviewees said that EUSR Weber conducted intensive shuttle diplomacy between influential regional powers and on some occasions with both sides (Interview I.6; I.7; I.10; I.11; International Crisis Group, 2024b). Weber was even present in some of the IGAD mediation initiatives, such as in January 2024 in Uganda (Interview I.4; I.7), where she had a meeting with Hemedti that went public (Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, 2024). Nevertheless, it seems that these actions have been aimed at strengthening the political process and understanding the different positions rather than at directly mediating (Interview I.7). Despite this, in January 2024 the EU used its leverage to support the AU and IGAD mediation by approving sanctions against arms-supplying entities related to the SAF and the RSF aimed at pressuring the belligerents to sit down at the negotiating table (Council of the European Union, 2023e). The different reasons put forward for the EU reticence to try to mediate have been a lack of weight and willingness to deal with the military (Interview I.2; I.6), a strong focus in the democratic transition and mediation support (Interview I.3; I.7; I.11) and even the fact that both belligerents have strong ties with geopolitical adversaries such as Russia, China or Wagner (Interview I.1). Capability to fundThe EU has been providing considerable funding to the AU mediation initiative, and specifically to the AU Core Group (in which the EU is a member) and the High-Level Panel on Sudan (Interview I.4; I.7). Nevertheless, one of the interviewees outlined that the EU funding and support is insufficient or not sufficiently well allocated, arguing that the AU is not suitable yet to be a legitimate and impartial mediator, and that it requires further technical support and capacity building (Interview I.6). Capability to coordinate and cooperateConcerning internal coordination, the EU seemed to achieve more internal cohesion with the member states than in the case of Ethiopia, and France and Germany actively teamed up with the EU to address the Sudan conflict. Weber met with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in May 2023 in Nairobi to coordinate efforts on Sudan and multiple times with Foreign Affairs Minister Annalena Baerbock in both Nairobi and Germany (Annette Weber, 2023b; 2023h; 2024a; 2024h). Baerbock specifically travelled to Nairobi with Weber in January 2024 to engage with Kenyan President Ruto and members of Sudanese civil society (Annette Weber, 2024a). In December 2023, both countries arranged a workshop on Sudan in New York with Weber and regional and international partners (Annette Weber, 2023l). On April 15th, 2024, the France-Germany-EU trio organised the International Humanitarian Conference for Sudan in Paris, which gathered a large donor community, and on the sidelines it convened a joint seminar for Sudanese civil society organisations (Annette Weber, 2024e; French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2024). Furthermore, since the crisis started Weber has been routinely informing the EU Political and Security Committee (Annette Weber, 2023c; 2024c; 2024g). One pillar of the EU mediation strategy has been to support any consistent mediation effort led by the AU or the IGAD, in order to ensure that African institutions own the process (Interview I.3; I.4; I.7; I.11). Since April 2023, the EU has been an active member of the Extended Mechanism led by the AU Commission, which aims to coordinate the different mediation initiatives "to avoid fragmentation" (African Union, 2023a). In addition, it is working in close contact with the AU High-Level Panel and is part of the AU Core Group (Birgitte Markussen, 2023; Annette Weber 2023a; 2023l; 2024d; 2024i) in charge of offering guidance on engagement and "if needed develop Mediation and Facilitation processes" (African Union, 2023b: 4). Moreover, the EUSR has been attending most of the IGAD meetings (Interview I.4; I.7; I.10) and frequently exchanging views with its executive secretary, Workneh Gebeyeh (Hon. Aden Duale, 2023; Laranjinha EU, 2023; Annette Weber, 2023e; 2023k; 2024b; 2024f). The backing for the AU and IGAD has also taken the shape of direct endorsement through multiple EU official statements (Council of the European Union, 2023a; 2023b; 2023c; 2023d; 2024). To underpin the AU and IGAD mediation efforts, the EU has conducted extensive external coordination through shuttle diplomacy between the different relevant foreign actors. The EUSR made several trips to Egypt and the Gulf (UAE and Saudi Arabia) to engage with representatives of these countries, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the LAS in order to convene, understand positions and facilitate communications and processes (Interview I.7; I.11; EU in the GCC, 2023; Gulf Cooperation Council, 2024; Josep Borrell Fontelles, 2023b; Annette Weber, 2023d; 2023f; 2023g; 2023j; 2024f). There has been prominent engagement with the Arab countries, as they have strong influence over the belligerents. Shortly after the war began, on April 17th, 2023, President of the Council Charles Michel called the UAE's de facto ruler, Mohammed bin Zayed, to discuss the need to deescalate and prioritise a ceasefire (Charles Michel, 2023). In June 2023, Borrell travelled with Weber to Cairo to visit President Al-Sisi and raise the issue of Sudan (Josep Borrell Fontelles, 2023b; 2023c), and in October 2023, the EU organised a joint Ministerial Meeting with the GCC to support the AU, LAS and IGAD political mediation track (Council of the European Union, 2023c). The EU's other key partner has been the Troika contact group (UK, US and Norway) which has been operating in the region since the independence of South Sudan in 2011 (European External Action Service, 2023a; 2023b; Norwegian Government, 2024). Nevertheless, in contrast to Ethiopia, the US has acted more independently from the EU (Interview I.6). Capabilities Track IICapability to engageThe other main pillar of the EU approach has been based on its normative principles and consisted in supporting the integration of an inclusive political track into the main mediation process, to resume the transition to civilian power interrupted by the start of the war. For this purpose, the EU has been strongly supporting Sudanese civil society organisations and political platforms and seeking the inclusion of women (Interview I.1; I.7; I.11). Part of it consisted of facilitating Track II mediation among these different organisations to create a united front. For instance, on April 15th the EU organised informal meetings on the sidelines of the Paris Humanitarian Conference to foster dialogue between the multiple civilian platforms with opposing views. This was considered groundbreaking as it was the first time that all these groups with conflicting interests (including supporters of the SAF, RSF, civilian transition, etc) had been gathered together (Interview I.7). The EUSR has been very active in this framework, consulting, supporting and facilitating communication between the various groups involved, including the Taqaddum platform led by the former transitional prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok (Interview I.6; I.7; Annette Weber, 2023i). One positive note on the EU engagement with the CSOs has been that while the member states used the "silver bullet approach", trying to gather all the groups under Taqaddum, the EU engaged in a more constructive and neutral manner, respecting the autonomy and local ownership of the process (Interview I.4). One criticism has been that the EU has failed to really identify and involve all the main CSOs and has ended up supporting the political elites that hijack the process (Interview I.6). Capability to fundThe EU has funded the different civilian political platforms and CSOs participating in the political track in order to strengthen their operational capabilities (Interview I.7). Additionally, the EU has also been funding some European mediation NGOS that have provided capacity building to the groups involved in the civilian track and facilitated dialogue between them (International Crisis Group, 2024b). Capability to cooperate and coordinateThe EU has entrusted to the AU the task of integrating the civilian track (Track II) into the core mediation process, which is the Jeddah Platform (Track I). This outsourcing initiative constitutes an EU effort to build inter-track linkages and to enhance AU ownership of the process. To this end, the EU facilitated Jeddah back-up talks in Bahrain (Interview I.4). Nevertheless, one common criticism of this approach has been that the AU has proved incapable of properly assimilating and incorporating the civilian platforms and CSOs into the process, and in the end it only cooperated with the elites. The reason for this failure has been the EU's inability to implement oversight mechanisms in the mediation support provided to the AU and its neglect of the corruption, subjectivity and bad practices rooted in this organisation (Interview I.4; I.6). Capabilities Track III Capability to fundThe main involvement in Track III has consisted of funding European mediation NGOs that have organised dialogue programmes at the grassroots level to identify points of consensus, conflict and other relevant issues. These initiatives are key to inform the main mediation processes (happening at Track I) and to open opportunities and communication channels (Interview I.7). Moreover, one interviewee explained that the EU's strong engagement with civil society has been possible thanks to the past democracy support projects (on human rights, democracy promotion, CSOs, etc.) that the EU and its member states have been funding since the times of Al-Bashir. The connections established through those projects provided support networks that the EU mobilised to build entry points for the political process and mediation (Interview I.4). DISCUSSIONThis section will explore the overall factors affecting EU engagement and involvement in peace mediation by presenting a strength, a weakness and an opportunity for improvement that have been identified after analysing the cases and relating them to the bigger picture of EU mediation. Strength: multi-mediator capacitiesFirst the strength. The two case studies have illustrated that thanks to its own capabilities, instruments and nature the EU can be considered a "multi-mediator". This is because it can operate in the following dimensions:Multi-track: As largely demonstrated with the Sudan case and to a lesser extent in Ethiopia, the EU can engage in the three mediation tracks and even create links between them. Even though it is not that well-suited to directly mediate in Track I (for reasons that will be explained later), it can be a useful coordinator aiming to support Track I efforts launched by others. In Track II the EU proved to be effective in the three capabilities, and in Track III the EU can be prominent due to its strong will and capacity to finance European mediation NGOs and local third-party initiatives.Multi-layered: As the cases displayed, mediation contexts today involve multiple levels of actors, from international and regional actors involved as sponsors or spoilers of the peace process, to local communities and non-state armed groups. The EU has a good capacity to approach these different layers because it also has a multi-level institutional toolbox that it can mobilise, from the president of the council and the HRVP for high-level contacts to the EUSR for long-term partnerships and flexible engagements, or the EU delegations and mediation NGOs for the grassroots level and CSOs. Additionally, if the member states are aligned with the same policy goals as the EU, they can provide wider diplomatic clout and complement, support or even replicate EU mediation efforts by exerting pressure or opening parallel communication channels (Interview I.5; I.8; I.10).Multilateral: The two case studies demonstrated that the EU does not act alone, but rather in concert with other actors, and generally it seeks to ensure compliance with common norms or standards. Specifically, the EU's strongest asset is its capability to steer mediation support, facilitate communication and coordinate and cooperate with other institutional actors (IGAD, AU, UN, GCC and LAS) or with states (US, Gulf countries, Troika). Multi-dynamic: The EU has capacity to engage in the different stages of the conflict cycle and to combine long- and short-term perspectives, which if well implemented can have a positive impact on the mediation process. For instance, the EU was well positioned to mobilise the CSO networks in Sudan because it had supported them previously. In Ethiopia, even though the EU was not part of the Pretoria Agreement, subsequently it is proving to be a key actor in its follow-up, in the sense that it has made the normalisation of EU-Ethiopia relations conditional on the three pillars of the initial approach (ceasefire, accountability of IHL and human rights violations and humanitarian access) (Interview I.8; I.11; Council of the European Union, 2022e). On a similar note, the EU's insistence on supporting the mediation of the AU (in Ethiopia and Sudan) and IGAD (in Sudan) is part of a wider, long-term strategy to enhance the regional stability of the Horn by strengthening its regional cooperation institutions and dialogue platforms (Interview I.3; I.7; Council of the European Union, 2021c).Weakness: structural constraintsSecond, the weakness. Even though the EU has the capacity to mobilise multiple instruments through different avenues, the two case studies have shown that it cannot lead mediation, not at least outside its neighbourhood. To put it plainly, the EU is not the decisive actor that brings the parties to the table to sign the deal. To understand this, the Ethiopia case is very illustrative. As mentioned in the analysis, together with rejection of the EU normative position, lack of leverage goes a long way to explaining why the EU was not in the Pretoria Agreement, and the three reasons for it were lack of appropriate authority, mandate and tools. Concerning authority, even though the EUSRs were very active, as one interviewee mentioned, the EUSR position does not seem authoritative enough as there is no direct power backing it (Interview I.2). Another interviewee identified the same problem in Sudan (Interview I.6). One good instrument to overcome this is the figure of the Special Envoy. As one interviewee stated, Haavisto had considerable legitimacy in the eyes of the two warring parties and the regional actors, for the simple fact that he was the foreign minister of a country (Interview I.8). Nevertheless, Haavisto failed because of the two other reasons. In contrast to the US special envoy, who was specifically sent to solve that conflict and had full flexibility and wider boundaries, Haavisto's mandate was short, part-time and unclear (it lacked parameters set by the member states) and he was considered too critical by the government (Interview I.2; I.8; I.9). The other reason is the tools. While the EU seems to have instruments to punish or to incentivise action, the main impediment is that to mobilise them it needs consensus among the 27 member states (Interview I.1; I.2; I.3; I.8; I.10). In Ethiopia, the only measure that the EU used to leverage its position was the postponement in January 2021 of the €88m from the Budget Support Programme (European External Action Service, 2021a). Nevertheless, when Borrell proposed – at least twice (Council of the European Union, 2021b) – to impose sanctions on the federal government, EU internal divisions prevented them from materialising.Building on this, the case of Ethiopia demonstrated that the lack of authoritative figures for mediation can be easily overcome by using the special envoys, or by directly mobilising the HRVP as in the Balkans, or the president of the council as in Georgia 2008 (Herrberg, 2021; Sheriff & Hauck, 2013). Nevertheless, the issue of the mediator's mandate and the tools are two problems linked to the structural characteristics and constraints of the EU, meaning the EU can only give flexible and comprehensive mandates to its mediators if the 27 member states agree to do so. The same applies to the tools, such as sanctions or development packages, which can only be employed if there is consensus in the council. The fact that the EU is an institution dependent on the 27 member states' consent has been identified by most of the interviewees as the main impediment to exercising leverage and, consequently, to successfully leading mediation (Interview I.1; I.2; I.3; I.4; I.5; I.8; I.9; I.10). Additionally, the complex and robust procedures of its financial assistance and aid further reduce the flexibility to activate its leverage (Interview I.2). Added to this is the fact that in an increasingly fragmented world with growing competition among powers, this leverage will be further weakened by the existence of new players (such as China, Russia or the Gulf countries) which are willing to provide incentives without as many conditions as the EU (Interview I.1; I.4; I.6; I.8; I.10). Bearing this in mind, it seems that the EU can only be a strong actor "at the table"8 if all its member states agree, or if there is a lack of interest and therefore they have no objections (Sheriff & Hauck, 2013). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the EU should not engage in mediation, rather that it needs to reframe its approach. Considering that the EU has multiple instruments and institutions that allow it to be a "multi-mediator", it seems that the areas where it really can make an impact are "above the table" (through mediation support) or "beyond the table" (by sustaining agreements).9 Indeed, in their work, Sheriff and Hauk illustrate that outside Europe the cases in which the EU has positively advanced mediation have been the ones in which it has been operating in these domains rather than leading (Sheriff & Hauck, 2013). Opportunity: normative approachIn this context, normativity appears to be the potential comparative that the EU has when operating "above the table" and "beyond the table", and consequently this is the opportunity to improve. Some scholars thought that the "normative character" of the EU could be an impediment rather than an advantage (Haastrup et al., 2014; Peral, 2012; Nouwen, 2022). In a sense, this point is backed by the Ethiopian case as the federal government rejected the EU due to its normative positioning (Interview I.1; I.2; I.8; I.9). At the same time, one of the interviewed experts in Ethiopia said that even despite this rebuff, the EU's constant pressure together with its coordination and cooperation capabilities had a positive effect, as the three boundaries set from the start of the war were later used by the AU and the US to formulate the content of the Pretoria Agreement (Interview I.8). This point is amplified in the Sudan case study. The three interviewees with expertise on Sudan coincided in affirming that the EU has been perceived as the main actor promoting inclusivity, leading the support for civil society and political platforms and advocating for their integration into the mediation process (Interview I.4; I.6; I.7). Thus, the cases show that thanks to its normative approach, the EU has been successful to a certain degree in setting the agenda in Ethiopia and in structuring part of the mediation process in Sudan. A normative approach is understood as the pursuit of its strategy based on norms and principles that the EU considers foundational, such as the rule of law, democracy and inclusivity. Additionally, it must be mentioned that in both cases the interviewees perceived the impacts of this normative approach as positive because the principles promoted can be considered enablers of sustainable peace (Interview I.4; I.6; I.7; I.8). Going forward, this normative approach makes sense if it is considered within the general framework of EU mediation. As explained, the EU has structural constraints that prevent it from being an impactful leading mediator in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, as the EU is a multilateral mediator, it already cooperates with other actors that are better positioned to lead mediation – either because they have clearer authority and more flexible leverage (such as the US, the EU member states or the Gulf countries) or more legitimacy and knowledge of the local context (such as the AU and IGAD). Therefore, it makes more sense for the EU to support mediation rather than to lead it. In this position of "mediation supporter", the EU is less tied to the process and therefore has more flexibility and room for manoeuvre to put forward a normative approach that can positively complement the main mediation process by introducing components that make the resulting peace more sustainable (such as rule of law, accountability, inclusivity of women and youth, etc.). Sudan is an example of how the normative approach can work. The EU has supported other actors better positioned than itself to lead mediation (the US, Saudi Arabia and the AU) and meanwhile it has concentrated on advancing matters on which it has more expertise (due to its history), which is regional integration, political dialogue and civil transition. In this regard, the normative approach is an opportunity for improvement because it would be a way of aligning the EU multiple tools and instruments with its unique comparative advantage, which are its norms and values, in order advance sustainable peace. In return, this normative approach would also serve the geopolitical ambitions of the EU, as it could be a way of projecting its unique "soft power" and, at the same time, consolidating its main interests in the EU-Africa partnership, which are advancing peace and security.Nevertheless, this normative approach can be jeopardised by two main factors. The first factor is internal divergences. This can take the form of either a lack of agreement among the 27 member states on the normative principles that should be put forward, or as was demonstrated in Ethiopia, a clash between the EU's normative ambitions and the interests-based behaviour of some member states (Interview I.1; I.5; I.8; I.9; I.10). One potential option to address this challenge could be the "strategic framework of overarching normative principles" proposed by Bergmann and Friesen. This would consist of a pre-established blueprint of basic norms and standards, agreed by all 27 MSs, to be put forward in every peace intervention in which EU actors engage (2021: 6), and from which mediators could build with more norms according to the context. This blueprint would clarify the actions of EU mediators, prevent disagreements between MSs on which position to take in every peace process and could also be presented as a distinctive EU model or "pedigree" to be brought to peace processes. Nonetheless, to be effective this blueprint should not be overly ambitious, as the normative approach could only work if it is conflict-sensitive and tailored to the local context. This means that it should be implemented with humility and most importantly by embedding the norms in the local context and letting the counterparts involved transform them into locally owned policy options (European Union State of the Union Discussion Panel, 2021).The second factor is the lack of consistency and double standards in EU foreign policy. Several interviewees confirmed that the fact that the EU advocates for some specific norms and standards (such as human rights) in some conflicts but at the same time it endorses other states that fail to comply with them is a decisive element that has damaged EU credibility in general and, more specifically, its capacity to exert a normative approach in mediation (Interview I.1; I.6; I.10). By way of example, three interviewees stated that the EU positions in the 2023 Gaza war or the prioritisation of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war over other conflicts have been signalled as elements that decisively induced African leaders' reluctance to comply with the EU mediation initiatives in conflicts such as Sudan (Interview I.1; I.6; I.10). This problem is related to the geopolitical and pragmatic turn (exemplified by the creation of the EPF) that the EU has taken since the start of the Von der Leyen commission. Under this new doctrine, EU foreign policy is guided by the pursuit of its perceived "strategic interests" even if this means undermining the norms and values that it promotes and is therefore guilty of double standards. As a result, the EU risks losing credibility as a values-based actor, which would make it impossible to implement the normative approach to mediation. Given this conundrum, this article has shown that being a values-based actor can also have positive effects on the pursuit of strategic interests as this would mean mobilising the EU's "soft power". Therefore, rather than it being a matter of impossibility to maintain strategic interests and values together, it is more about Europe having a clear strategy on what image it wants to project and being ready to commit to it. CONCLUSIONThis research has examined how the EU engages in peace mediation in sub-Saharan Africa in order to understand the role that this conflict prevention and resolution instrument plays in advancing EU interests in stability and security in the continent. To that end, the research has analysed the case studies of the Ethiopia-Tigray war and the current conflict in Sudan. The analytical framework of "multi-mediation" has been used in order to map and categorise the different mediation-related initiatives implemented by the EU in both cases. After analysing the cases and contrasting the results, there are three main concluding points. First, the EU is well equipped to be a "multi-mediator", which means being an actor capable of engaging in multi-track, multi-layered, multilateral and multi-dynamic mediation. This capacity offers the EU the potential to realise its ambition, codified in its foundational treaties, of being a force for peace. Second, despite its multiple advantages, the EU faces some structural limitations that prevent it from having the leverage and agility needed to be a lead mediator. This challenge shows that the EU needs to recalibrate its ambitions and concentrate its efforts and tools, acting not "at the table", but beyond and above the table as an assertive mediation supporter. Third, in this exact position of mediation supporter, the EU has the opportunity to transform its normative approach to mediation, illustrated in the 2009 and 2020 concepts, into a unique comparative advantage. 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ABSTRACTThis study offers a comprehensive overview of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process as a facilitator of the peace talks between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. It explains what Norway does as a facilitator (the process), as well as how (approach) and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests), not only in terms of the characteristics making Norway a suitable facilitator, but also its interests and motivations. The main goal is to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. The study concludes that, for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and role conception. 1. INTRODUCTIONSince the early 2010s, Venezuela has been embroiled in a grave economic, political, and humanitarian crisis resulting in institutional disarray that reached critical point in 2017. It was in this year that the constitutional order was broken after Decision 156 of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, whereby this organ attributed to itself the functions of the National Assembly, the country's legislative organ. Deemed unconstitutional by the political parties with a majority in the National Assembly, this move led to mass protests. The government reacted by calling for a new constitution to be drafted by a newly created Constituent National Assembly which, in August 2017, granted itself powers to pass legislation, thus overriding the National Assembly (Bronstein & Cobb, 2017). This was not recognised by the National Assembly but, in 2018, the Constituent National Assembly went ahead and blocked the participation of the main opposition parties in the presidential elections that year. These elections were rejected by a broad sector of the international community, among them the European Union (EU) and the Lima Group.1From 2017, Norway, with a population of just 5.5 million, has been exploring possibilities in Venezuela for political dialogue between the government of Nicolás Maduro and the opposition, first through the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), an independent foundation that receives funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and later, after 2019, with direct state involvement. Norway has built an image as a peace broker with its success in processes like the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and in the talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But why did Norway decide to facilitate the peace talks in Venezuela? How does Norway approach peacebuilding in this conflict? This article aims to analyse the causes, process, approaches, and motivations for Norwegian mediation in Venezuela, in order to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. I therefore explore the comprehensive role of Norway in the Venezuelan peace talks, the background, the process, and Norway's possible interests as a facilitator. I argue that,for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general, but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and the way it perceives its role as a peace-making nation. As mentioned above, the Norwegian state became officially involved in the Venezuelan conflict in 2019. The domestic situation had come to a head on 23rd January when Juan Guaidó, leader of the opposition and president of the National Assembly, rejected the authority of Nicolás Maduro and declared himself acting president of Venezuela. However, the strategy failed when the military remained loyal to Maduro. Negotiation then became a last resort (NUPI 2020) and Norway began to facilitate negotiations between government and opposition, first in Oslo and then in Barbados, in 2019. These efforts led to further discussion between the parties through 2021 and 2022, in Mexico. In 2022, the war in Ukraine prompted changes in the positions regarding Venezuela of certain actors, notable among them the United States (U.S.) and the EU. As the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (Remacha, 2023) points out, U.S. concerns about energy security made it necessary to find a way of guaranteeing the international supply, and Venezuela was (and is) considered to be a strategic source. Contacts between the U.S. and Venezuela were made in 2022, and talks began about removing the sanctions imposed on the country. Given its economic situation, and the presidential elections due in 2024, Venezuela welcomed the rapprochement. If the sanctions were to be removed (at least partially), it was necessary to resume dialogue with the opposition, so in November 2022, negotiations recommenced in Mexico with Norway's mediation. Significant progress was made, and the release of previously frozen international funds was agreed upon (up to 3,000 million dollars earmarked mainly for public health, education, and food), as well as the lifting of some sanctions. Maduro's government is also aware that the 2024 elections should be held according to a model that respects democratic safeguards, with unrestricted participation by the opposition, so that results will be internationally recognised. Venezuela would then be able to resume relations with countries and regions like the U.S. and the EU, thus enabling international investment, particularly in the oil industry, and an improved economic situation (NUPI, 2020). Although the presidential crisis formally lasted until 5th January 2023 when Guaidó's acting presidency was abolished by the National Assembly, the political crisis with the opposition continues to the present day, in November 2023. 1.2. Research goals and objectivesThis study aims to explore the role of Norway as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace talks, focusing on what it does (the process), how (approach), and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests). It seeks to demonstrate that, given Norway's national conception as a peacemaker, its strategy in Venezuela expresses a broad foreign policy endeavour that has humanitarian but also reputational and political motivations. More broadly, the importance of soft power tools for state actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives is discussed. Constructivism and Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) help to explain Norway's self-image as a peacemaker, while idealism and realism, together with Touval's "mediation as foreign policy" theory shed light on Norway's use of mediation as a foreign policy tool. Qualitative methods based on analysis of primary and secondary sources, complemented with semi-structured interviews with experts and officials of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been used. 1.3. Relevance and justificationNorway is a small country in terms of population but one with a notable ability to influence international affairs thanks to soft power. One of ways it exercises its influence is its internationally recognised image as a peacemaker, evidenced through its involvement in several peace processes. Indeed, since 1993, Norway has been engaged in 11 different peace processes (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) with some major successes but also others that were limited. The case of Norwegian facilitation of the Venezuelan peace talks is studied for two main reasons. First, is its relevance in terms of policy significance, as it is an ongoing process, which leads to questions about why Norway acts as a facilitator, and the possible interests it has in doing so, apart from the goal of peace itself. Second, is the practical reason of the author's knowledge of the three languages relevant for this research (English, Spanish, and Norwegian), which is a valuable asset in terms of good understanding of the information from primary and secondary sources written in the three languages. This is an advantage in the research, as it allows cross-checking of information, and offers a broader perspective on the topic. 2. NORWAY AS A PEACEBUILDING NATIONScholars offer several explanations of Norway's involvement in peace processes arising from international conflicts. The result of a pragmatic foreign policy, it combines idealist and realist elements in a seemingly contradictory policy which, in fact, accommodates different domestic interests and maintains inter-party foreign policy consensus (Riste, 2001; Ekengren, 2022).From a constructivist perspective, the notion of Norway as a nation for peace partly comes from its conception of its role as a small, rich, peaceful state, with a clear focus on human rights and humanitarian assistance (Leira et al., 2007). While it is true that the so-called value-oriented (idealist) diplomacy wasstrengthened, above all in the 1990s, with the increased involvement of Norway in several peace processes, its self-image as a peacebuilding nation has always been present (Leira, 2015). The Norwegian peace activist and later Foreign Affairs Minister, Halvdan Koht (1873-1965), argued in 1902 that, although the fact of its being a small state could limit its flexibility in foreign policy actions, Norway could and should secure its status by promoting peace and development. More than 80 years later, in 1989, Jan Egeland, who would become State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1997, argued that a small, rich country like Norway could be more effective in promoting human rights and peace than old colonial powers or superpowers with their historical baggage and policies based on self-interest and dominance (Sørbø, 2018).Moreover, the notion of status, which is closely linked with the concept of identity, has been prominent in Norway since the nation's beginnings. Leira (2015) describes the pursuit of status as a peace-making nation in the 19th and early 20th century as a way of achieving independence (through moral authority), a means of saving money (as the policy for peace was cheaper than power politics), and as sound realpolitik for a small state. He also refers to the words of Ole Jacob Broch in 1864 when he argued that, when small states need to "engage in the strife of other states", they should do it decisively because, "for them, honour and prestige are even more important than for the greater powers" (Broch cited in Leira 2015, p.22).The role performance of Norway, or itsbehaviour with, and approach to foreign policy actions is, according to Gulbrandsen (2022), influenced by the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998), dictated by the image the state has of itself, and constituting a basis for adopting a role in any specific context. In Holsti's view (1970), the main explanation for the role performance of a state arises from policy makers' conceptions of the role of the nation in a system (National Role Conception), but adoption of a role is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment. In this case, if the Norwegian government and the Norwegian people have an image of Norway as a nation for peace, and if the external image they project in other countries is also that of a nation for peace, the logic of appropriateness and the role prescription will dictate that Norway will have to behave as a nation for peace, and thus engage in peacebuilding policy.For Skånland (2010) the Norwegian involvement in peace processes is the result of a discursive construction, amplified by the media, above all after 1993. Media coverage of the Norwegian involvement in the Middle East peace process gave a very positive picture of Norway in general, an image that was strengthened thanks to the perceived successes in the peace processes of Sri Lanka, Guatemala, and Mali. All this crystallised into three main discursive constructions: (1) the decisive significance of the Norwegian contribution for the outcome of peace processes, (2) the importance of peace promotion as a foreign policy tool, and (3) Norway's distinctive approach for peace promotion.Other authors emphasise Norway's peace engagement efforts from a more realist perspective and, in particular, as a policy instrument in its own right (Touval, 2003). Some, like Matlary (2002) argue that mediation is used as an institutionalised strategy for dealing with some of the challenges of being a small state, as well as for promoting Norway's interests in the international arena, and having some influence in international relations. As Stokke (2014) notes, although it has a small population, Norway has a disproportionate importance in other areas (fishing, oil and gas, shipping etc.), thus implying interests beyond its borders as well as influence in other domains because of this prominence. According to Matlary (2002), some Norwegian interestsidentified from a realpolitik standpoint are security (addressed through NATO), economic interests vis-à-vis the EU, access to political decision-making power in the EU and, outside the West, considerable economic interests in oil prices and oil export. Matlary, who collected data through a series of anonymous interviews with diplomats and politicians, alludes to the effects of value-oriented diplomacy in matters of matters and concludes that, apart from a good image and profile, what value-oriented diplomacy provides is access to other arenas where one needs the best possible entry. Her interviewees referred, above all, to access to the leaders of the U.S. Department of State through the policy of peace engagement, especially in the Middle East and, to a much lesser extent, to leaders of EU states. However, she says, it was difficult to collect specific insights into the effects of such access, a perspective shared by Stokke (2010, p.166) who argues that "the extent and manner in which recognition is translated into international influence is complex and may vary from one policy field to another and between different arenas of international relations. This means that it is notoriously difficult to detect and measure the direct benefits from peace engagement". Finally, another interesting perspective is that provided by Neumann (2011). For him, the peace and reconciliation efforts of medium and small countries are a means to maintain a system with which they are reasonably satisfied, because they are not as well equipped as bigger powers to deal with other (more violent) types of conflict resolution methods, and he refers specifically to the institutionalisation of peace and reconciliation efforts by Norway.To conclude, Norway's peacebuilding policy may be understood as apparently idealist (value-oriented diplomacy) and based on a self-image as a nation for peace, which includes both idealist (moral responsibility) and realist (influence in the international arena and security) motivations. Until now, there have been no major conflicts between those two angles (Stokke, 2014), but in an increasingly polarised world, it is becoming more and more difficult for Norway to maintain a balanced policy in peacebuilding processes. 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKThis study draws on the theory of constructivism to explain Norway's national role conception and considers the notions of idealism and realism to explain mediation as its foreign policy. A theoretical framework based on such apparently antagonistic ideas is, perhaps, not very common but, as Barkin (2003) puts it, a constructivist epistemology and a classical realist theory are, in fact, compatible and, moreover, this kind of framework can be useful in International Relations (IR) theory, as it can specify the relationship between the study of power in IR and the study of IR as social constructions. Indeed, constructivism and perceptions can—and are—often applied to fulfil or justify realist objectives and policies.For the purposes of this study, I consider that mediation as foreign policy is a result of idealist (value-oriented) and realist (power) motivations arising from a constructed national identity and role conception.3.1. Constructivism and national role conceptionFor Barnett (2018), constructivism as an international relations social theory is "concerned about how to conceptualise the relationship between agents and structures, but it is not a substantive theory" (p.88). The basic premise is that the world is socially constructed, which means that "social reality is a product of human consciousness. Consciousness is created and constituted through knowledge that shapes meaning and categories of understanding and action; such knowledge and meanings can be institutionalised in social life; and this institutionalisation, in turn, shapes the construction of social reality" (p.88). These categories shape not only external reality but also its actors, which is an indicator of the importance of the social construction of interests and identity. For example, Norway's identity may shape its national interests, and one of those interests might be security, but the concept of security and how it can be achieved may be linked to Norway's identity.National Role Conceptions, a concept first developed by Holsti (1970), is defined as "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform [...] in the international system" (p. 245-246). These are, as mentioned in section 2, the main explanation for the role performance of a state, understood by Holsti as the "general policy behaviour of governments" (p. 245). Role performance is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment and have, as some of their sources, system-wide values, the structure of the international system, and the traditions, rules and expectations of states expressed through various legal instruments (p. 246).The notion of national role conception is related to that of politics of identity, which, in Aggestam's words (1999), is a set of ideas that policymakers use to create a sense of solidarity and cohesion and thus to legitimise general trust in a nation's foreign policy. She argues that speeches sometimes reveal subjective we-feelings of a cultural community related to territory, myths, rituals, institutions, and customs, and she refers to the "institutionalisation" of national identity, which makes identity constructions relatively resistant to change. Moreover, citing March & Olsen (1998), she indicates that certain practices and rules of behaviour that legitimise and explain specific identity constructions are reinforced by such institutionalisation.The starting point of the present study is, therefore, the idea that Norway's national role conception is that of a small, rich, peaceful, democratic state, whose official discourse in peace engagement, especially since the 1990s, emphasises its altruistic contribution as a "peaceful nation that has the values, competences and economic resources" for such an endeavour, but whose work is also "beneficial for Norway's own interests" (Stokke, 2014, p.8).3.2. Idealism, realism, and mediation as foreign policyThere is no generally accepted definition of idealism because there is no settled ontology of the term but, according to Wilson (2012), it generally refers to any goal, idea, or practice that is considered impractical from a state perspective, for example the prohibition and disarmament of nuclear weapons, or global eradication of poverty. In IR it is normally used in both the broad and narrow senses. Broadly speaking, idealism seeks to transcend anarchy to create a more harmonious world order while, in the narrow sense, it is a doctrine tied to the inter-war period (1919-1939) and seen as emphasising the growing interdependence of mankind. I shall focus on the first meaning, which refers to "an approach to international politics that seeks to advance certain ideals or moral goals, for example, making the world a more peaceful or just place" (Wilson, 2019).Realism is a substantive theory of IR that considers states to be the main actors in the international arena, and mainly concerned with the pursuit of their own national interests, security, and struggle for power. Realists view the international arena as a sphere without justice, and with active or potential conflict among its members. They show scepticism about the relevance of ethical norms (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). This theory has a variety of ramifications but in this study I consider, first and foremost, classical realism because, although idealism is usually heavily criticised by realists, according to Barkin (2003), classical realism perceives the art of international politics as "the practical balancing of the demands of power on the one hand and morality on the other—a dialectic between power and morality [...]. Idealism, for the classical realist, is necessary to inform our actions and underlie our interests in the pursuit of international politics, but realism will always remain a necessary part of relations among states" (p.333). Also relevant is the perspective of neoclassical realism because, while classical realism focuses on the system-level factors, neoclassical realism considers domestic-level factors as variables that can shape foreign policy, which is highly pertinent if NRC theory is used to explain Norway's behaviour in the international arena. Neoclassical realism considers that "objective reality exists, but decision making is impaired by uncertainty and the complexity of the environment" (Rathbun, 2008, p.296).According to Touval (2003), mediation as foreign policy needs to be understood as a policy instrument, as distinct from mediation theory. He argues that it derives from the mediator's perception of the international system, its foreign policy objectives and strategies, and domestic needs. I would also argue that it stems from the mediator's own national role conception and self-perception. Touval (2003) considers that ending a conflict is no longer the main concern of the mediating state, but only a part of a broadly conceived foreign policy as the mediation is also shaped by affairs that are external to the conflict. He highlights three issues arising from a state's international and domestic concerns: (1) mediation is perceived by the public and the officials engaged in it as a moral obligation, which is seldom criticised; (2) foreign and domestic motivations, apart from being an incentive for states to engage in mediation, also shape their strategies and tactics of the mediation; (3) the mediation is evaluated not only in terms of settlement of a dispute, but also the primary goals motivating the mediation. Beriker (2017) offers an expanded perspective of Touval's work, arguing that once mediation is proven to be a viable foreign policy tool, engaging in mediation enables medium-sized powers to create a political space that otherwise would not be available. 4. METHODOLOGYThis study is both descriptive and explanatory, as it inquires more deeply into the events as well as exploring why and how Norway became involved in the Venezuela peace process from 2017 to May 2023. In a deductive approach, existing theories —NRC, mediation as foreign policy, idealism, and realism— are drawn on to explain Norway's behaviour in its peacebuilding policy. The epistemology used is empiricism, since the focus is explanation rather than interpretation, and the ontology is pragmatist because, while the world is understood as existing independently from social actors, the influence of these actors to shape social realities should also be taken into account, together with the fact that, in some cases, this may affect realities existing independently of them.The methods are qualitative, as information provided with quantitative methods would be too superficial for a study that seeks to determine the existence and the characteristics of Norway's engagement in the Venezuelan peace process. The analysis is primarily based on a range of online primary and secondary sources, including government reports, memorandums of understanding, recorded interviews, articles, and academic publications. I consulted these sources, first, for better understanding of the issues and to organise this material around the research question, as well as to identify possible gaps of knowledge. I then conducted semi-structured interviews, with an official from the Norwegian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and a Norwegian academic, to fill some of the previously identified knowledge gaps, to record their perceptions, and to triangulate the documentary information thus gathered.The first interview, conducted by videoconference on 2 August 2023, was with Professor Benedicte Bull, from the University of Oslo and, inter alia, president of the Nordic Institute for Latin American Studies, whose research has been focused on Venezuela in recent years. The second was with David C. Jourdan, who coordinates the Norwegian MFA's facilitation team in the Venezuelan peace process. This interview was conducted in Oslo on 8 August 2023. Both Bull and Jourdan have given their consent to use their names in the present study. NOREF was also contacted but stated that it could not give interviews on the Venezuelan peace process. 5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION5.1. Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace processNo official documentary information about the specific manner Norway engaged in the Venezuela conflict during 2017 and 2018 has been found, apart from the mere fact stated in the NOREF website that it was engaged in talks on the conflict in those years. According to its strategic plan 2019-2023, NOREF is a "non-state actor that is able to complement formal Norwegian peacemaking efforts [... and] build directly on the Norwegian tradition of informal conflict resolution". This makes it possible "to support formal peace processes (track I), and informal back-channel conflict diplomacy (track 1.5 and 2)" (NOREF, 2019). This institution has a permanent staff of professionals, experts in conflict resolution, and is governed by a board whose director is appointed by the Norwegian MFA, and whose members come, in general, from different areas of the public sector. In the interview with David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), he confirmed that NOREF's engagement consists of track 2 approaches. Moreover, he stressed that, although NOREF receives public funds and works closely with the Norwegian state, it is a separate, independent institution. Norway's involvement in the peace process after 2019, when it became public, is described in some detail below. 2019: the first official talksAccording to the Norwegian MFA (2023), Norway has been involved in Venezuela since 2018. However, it was only in May 2019 that talks between the Venezuelan parties, facilitated by Norway, first became public. In this early stage, the negotiations between the delegations of Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó lasted until August 2019, and although significant progress was made, no agreements for solving the political conflict were reached. However, the Norwegian MFA (2023) stresses that these negotiations were a stepping-stone for further talks between the parties, which signed a collaboration agreement in June 2020, with the objective of using frozen funds in the U.S. for a joint response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with support from the Pan American Health Organisation. Several newspaper articles describing the negotiations during that year provide additional information that has been used in this study.In May 2019, Juan Guaidó sent a delegation to Oslo to participate in exploratory talks with representatives of Maduro's government to try to find a solution to the political crisis the country had faced since Guaidó declared himself acting president of Venezuela at the beginning of that year (NRK, 2019a), information that was confirmed by Jorge Valero, Venezuela's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, and the UN spokesperson in New York, Stephane Dujarric. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) reported the talks for the first time on 15 May but, according to an anonymous source, this was the second time that the parties had been in Oslo, and negotiations had previously been taking place in Cuba.Shortly afterwards, on the night between 16 and 17 May, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release confirming that there had been contacts between key political actors in Venezuela as a part of an exploratory phase aiming to find a solution to the country's situation. The Maduro government representatives present at the talks were Héctor Rodríguez, governor of the province of Miranda, and Jorge Rodríguez, minister of Communication. The opposition representatives were Gerardo Blyde, member of parliament, and Fernando Martínez Mattola, who had been minister during the government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez.In the last week of May 2019, the Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the parties would travel again to Oslo during the following week to continue with the process (NRK, 2019b). Almost at the same time, Juan Guaidó insisted that the meetings in Oslo were not part of a dialogue or negotiation, but a mediation in Norway (El Nacional, 2019). According to Voice of America/Voz de América (VOA) (2019a), Nicolás Maduro appeared a few days later on the Venezuelan public TV channel after the opposition declared that the conversations in Oslo that week had ended on 29 May without any agreement being reached. Maduro stated that conversations had been taking place in secret during the three previous months, that he was proud of his delegation, and that dialogue with the opposition had been constructive. Moreover, he insisted on his wish to find a peaceful solution for Venezuela. Indeed, VOA pointed out that Dag Nylander, a Norwegian diplomat who would become chief facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, had been travelling to Caracas and meeting with the political actors involved in the crisis since January 2019.The peace talks resumed one month later in Barbados. On 11 July 2019, after three days of conversations, Norway announced that the negotiations would continue (Reuters, 2019). Yet, only a few weeks later, the Maduro government withdrew from the talks when the U.S. president, Donald Trump, announced his decision to block U.S. citizens from engaging in business in Venezuela and to freeze the country's assets in the U.S. According to the Venezuelan government, this had been instigated by Juan Guaidó, while the opposition accused the government of reneging on its commitment to dialogue. Norway's facilitator, Dag Nylander, took note that the planned meetings would not take place and emphasised Norway's role as a facilitator acting at the request of the parties and planning the meetings according to their availability. He added that the facilitation process would continue as long as the parties wished, and provided that there was a realistic position on a solution in the best interests of the Venezuelan people (VG, 2019).According to Bull (2023), Norway, as the facilitating country, was displeased when the talks went public in May, believing that this was premature and that it would complicate the peace process. She also stresses that the Trump administration had no clear strategy for ending the conflict and that, when the U.S. sanctions were announced, there had not been any proper coordination with Norway. She also notes that mentions of the U.S. seem to refer to a single homogeneous actor, when the reality is that there are many actors involved, among them the Pentagon and the Department of State, and these actors may work in different directions, sometimes disrupting a given policy. The Norwegian MFA (2023) confirms it was not aware of the U.S. sanctions that were announced in early August 2019. Both parties and facilitator were taken by surprise.2021: The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding and negotiation rounds in MexicoA year and a half later, in March 2021, new exploratory talks began after the Biden administration's position on Venezuela allowed the parties to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which led to the launch of a new negotiation process, starting in August that year. On 5 August, the Mexican President, Manuel López Obrador confirmed that Mexico would host talks between the government of Venezuela and the opposition (Reuters, 2021) and, a few days later, the Norwegian government confirmed its involvement with a tweet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021a). The new negotiation process was launched in Mexico City on 13 August, with Dag Nylander as chief facilitator, Jorge Rodríguez representing the Venezuelan (Maduro's) government, and Gerardo Blyde representing the Unitary Platform (the opposition). A MoU —which I refer to in more detail in section 5.3— was released, defining the objective, agenda, method, and composition of the negotiation team. The Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, declared in a press note that the parties were ready to negotiate constructively and that, in the process, they would consult members of civil society as well as political actors. She also noted that there was mutual agreement on the sensitive nature of the negotiations, which was necessary for giving the parties space to make progress (Norwegian MFA 2021b).A second round of negotiations took place at the beginning of September 2021. The parties released a joint statement reporting that two agreements had been reached, the first being to act jointly in the claim of Venezuelan sovereignty over Guyana Esequiba, and the second, a "partial agreement on the social protection of the Venezuelan people". The parties conveyed that the points to be addressed in the following round of negotiations would be "respect for the Constitutional Rule of Law", protection of the national economy, and measures for the social protection of the Venezuelan people.Between the second and the third rounds of negotiation, Erna Solberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister, spoke at the UN General Assembly on 21 September, referring to Venezuela as a country where human right violations were occurring. Her comment was criticised by Dag Nylander as it could, he said, damage the credibility of Norway's role. In a tweet on 25 September, the MFA reaffirmed its commitment as an impartial facilitator in the negotiations and declared that the statement in the UN should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with that (NRK, 2021). The Venezuelan government responded to this diplomatic hitch with a slight delay in proceedings when its representatives arrived one day late at the negotiation round scheduled in Mexico from 24 to 27 September, but which finally took place after 25 September (Euronews, 2021).After this third round of negotiations, the parties released a new joint statement, focused this time on the issue of inclusion and, specifically, on the need for a gender focus in the negotiations, identification of inclusive consultation mechanisms for political and social actors, and condemnation of xenophobic attacks on Venezuelan migrants that had recently occurred in Chile. According to an article by Diego Santander in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo (2021), this third round was so fraught with problems that no specific agreements were reached. Maduro's delegation insisted on its plans to include Alex Saab in the negotiation. Saab, a Venezuelan businessman, was accused of being Maduro's front man, and a key figure in the international economic and financial activities to circumvent the U.S. economic sanctions against his government. However, Saab had been arrested for money laundering in June 2020 in Cabo Verde and was extradited to the U.S. on the weekend of October 16.Negotiations, set for 17 October, were suspended on 16 October when the Maduro government decided not to participate in the next round of negotiations, because of Saab's extradition, which Jorge Rodríguez referred to as a "kidnapping" as it had been carried out "without a warrant and without due process" and accused the U.S. of trying to prevent the dialogue (Gilbert, 2021). The Norwegian government then tweeted that it was still convinced that the negotiations were the only solution for Venezuela, and that it would keep working to encourage the parties to continue (Norwegian MFA, 2021c). In Bull's opinion (2023), while the U.S. system may have its faults, the legal proceedings are independent from political powers so, on that occasion, there was little that U.S. politicians could do to stop the extradition.2022 — 2023: talks after the beginning of the war in UkraineIn March 2022, a new chapter of the dialogue began after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A U.S. delegation formed by members of the Department of State visited Caracas to meet with the Venezuelan government and discuss an eventual isolation of Vladimir Putin. Some analysts also indicated that Venezuela was seen as a possible alternative oil supplier if the U.S. opted to restrict oil exports from Russia, which meant that removal of the sanctions on Venezuela could be considered (VOA, 2022a). Indeed, in May 2022, the U.S. announced that economic sanctions against Venezuela would be eased as a gesture in favour of reactivating the dialogues and also allowing the U.S. company Chevron to negotiate potential future activities with the state-owned oil and natural gas company PDVSA (Agobian, 2022). According to the Norwegian MFA (2023), these actions were a catalyst for the reactivation of the negotiations.Immediately after the announcement, Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde met to discuss renewal of the talks (Ocando Alex, 2022a) but, by the end of May, according to Reuters, the Venezuelan government had demanded the withdrawal of Norway as a facilitator, and the presence of Russia (formally an accompanying country in the negotiations after 2021) as conditions for reactivating the negotiations. However, convinced that the Norwegians were their only guarantee for a successful process, the opposition disagreed (Oré, 2022). Bull (2023) specifies that the stance of the Venezuelan government might have been because it saw Norway as taking an excessively "pro-allies" position after the start of the war in Ukraine. She adds that Norway prefers to involve Russia and other big powers in the negotiations rather than excluding them, as they would provide legitimacy to the Mexico talks as the only acceptable platform for solving the Venezuelan political crisis. When interviewed, David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), made it clear that Norway was never asked to relinquish its role as facilitator. Management of the process resides with the parties, which have remained committed to the MoU that names Norway as the facilitating country.On 21 and 22 June 2022, the Norwegian government held the Oslo Forum, an annual retreat focused on conflict mediation and peace processes. Around 100 conflict mediators, experts, peace process actors, and high-level decision makers from around the world gathered at Losby Gods Manor with the goal of sharing their experience on conflict resolution and peace diplomacy (Norwegian MFA, 2022). Among the peace process actors who attended the Oslo Forum were Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde. A Norwegian source told VOA (2022b) that it was "probable" that the conversations would be initiated again, but "not immediately".On 14 September 2022, a group of 18 countries from the Americas and Europe agreed to call upon Maduro and the opposition to urge a resumption of the negotiations in Mexico (Ocando Alex, 2022b).Official negotiations began again on 26 November 2022. This time, a joint statement was issued indicating that the main agenda of the meeting would be social protection of the people. A partial agreement was reached, in which the measures agreed upon were: 1) creation of an organism to implement specific actions and programmes for the social protection of the Venezuelan people (Mesa Nacional de Atención Social, or MNAS); 2) creation of an organism auxiliary to the MNAS to evaluate its processes and the effects of implementation of the measurements adopted; 3) definition of the social areas which, requiring the most urgent attention, needed to be addressed through specific programmes, in particular the public health system, the national electrical system, development of the World Food Programme, educational infrastructure, and rebuilding of the infrastructure damaged as a consequence of the torrential rains in the latter half of 2022; 4) requesting from the UN support for the design and creation of a fund for social support of the Venezuelan people; 5) identification of frozen assets belonging to the Venezuelan state that might be progressively accessed and incorporated into this fund; 6) creation of a commission to assess and verify implementation of the agreement.After this meeting, the negotiations stalled again when the Venezuelan government accused the opposition of not complying with the agreement reached but, mainly and above all, because the frozen US$3,000 million that were to be incorporated into the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People had not yet been released (August 2023). According to Maduro, this was a condition sine qua non for resuming the talks. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, organised a conference on 25 April 2023 in Bogotá, with representatives from numerous countries to discuss the Venezuelan situation. The shared positions of the Venezuelan government and the opposition were explained to the international community, in particular regarding the removal of sanctions, free elections, and reactivation of the peace talks. One of the shared positions for renewal of the talks was that of establishing the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde, 2023). The message that came out of the Venezuela Conference of Bogotá was very clear: the UN trust fund for Venezuela should be set up as swiftly as possible. According to a Reuters report by Spetalnik, Sequera and Armas (2023), on 19 May the Biden administration notified the UN that the money could operate within the U.S. financial system, and that there would be no risk of creditors seizing it to repay the outstanding Venezuelan debt. Accordingly, the UN-administered fund could have been operative at the end of May 2023. However, the decision to establish the trust fund ultimately lies with the UN Secretariat in New York and some insiders allude to the complexity of the process involved and stress that establishing the fund depends on a number of factors. As of late August 2023, it had not been established by the UN. 5.2. Norway's distinctive approach to peace diplomacyIn an interview for the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue, when asked about the distinctive approach of Norwegian diplomacy in international conflicts, Dag Nylander (2020) identified four main elements: (a) collaboration with Norwegian and international NGOs, (b) low-key diplomacy, (c) long-term commitment, and (d) the ability to make quick decisions.[5] In this section, these four elements will be briefly discussed.Norway's distinctive approach to its engagement in peace processes and with non-state actors was defined after the decentralisation of its foreign policy in the early 1990s. Humanitarian assistance and development policies called for closer cooperation between the Norwegian MFA and non-governmental actors and, according to Lehti (2014), this approach was extended to the area of peace-making. In the 1990s the Ministry responded positively to proposals and initiatives from various NGOs and well-connected individuals with regard to conflictive areas. The range of actors involved in peace-making was broadened, and Norway was then able to act beyond the bounds of government-centred diplomacy with a distinctive, more informal approach to peace diplomacy. Ann Kelleher and James Taulbe (2006) refer to this approach as "Track I½ Diplomacy", understanding Track I diplomacy as that with official representatives of governments and Track II diplomacy as that involving unofficial representatives and sectors of the civil society. An important feature of the collaboration between the state, NGOs and research institutions is that it is extensively funded by the state (Bandarage, 2011). Indeed, some Norwegian NGOs receive more than 90% of their funding from the state which, in Kelleher's view (2006), almost makes them quasi-governmental organisations.As for low-key diplomacy, Nylander (2020) affirms that activities pertaining to peace diplomacy rarely appear in the news, and that they are discreet and unnoticed, often with the involvement of low-level and mid-level diplomats, an approach that allows flexibility in seeking opportunities and in dealing with problems with relative freedom.Norway's long-term commitment to peace diplomacy is based on a broad political consensus for the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Hence, changes of government will not influence the country's engagement in any given conflict. According to the MFA (2000), the goal is not only ending violence but also support for economic, social, and political processes that lead to durable liberal peace in the country concerned.Finally, the ability of Norwegian diplomats to make quick decisions stems from the smallness of the country, not only in terms of population but also social distance. Dag Nylander (2020) mentions that the distance between a diplomat in the field and the ministry of Foreign Affairs is very short, and that it takes just a quick phone call or a text message, sometimes directly to the Minister, to obtain any clearance that may be needed. 5.3 Norwegian approach to facilitation the Venezuelan peace processNorway's approach to facilitation in Venezuela is consistent with its work in other peace processes. It began with secret talks between the parties (low-key diplomacy) and then, having advanced towards a more public and official format, it was formalised with the MoU signed in Mexico on 13 August 2021. In the MoU, the parties defined the agenda and methods for the talks. David Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023) highlighted the importance of this Memorandum, which contains not only the agenda and format for the negotiations, but also a shared vision of the process and the country.As for the method, it is important to mention that it is based on a "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" principle (comprehensive approach), although partial agreements can be reached if the parties consider that a subject has been sufficiently discussed and urgent action is required. This was the case with the two partial agreements on the Guyana Esequiba, and Social Protection of the Venezuelan people signed at the end of the talks in Mexico. This approach has its advantages, such as ensuring "big picture" negotiation, but it also comes with the risk the parties can renege anytime on anything they have agreed to. It was first used in other peace processes including Britain-Ireland in 1995, Palestine-Israel, and in Cyprus and Colombia. The Norwegian MFA (2023) emphasises that understanding the needs of the parties and ensuring that they are in charge of the process, has been key to making progress throughout the negotiations. The Venezuelan conflict is political in nature and requires political solutions, and the negotiation process provides a confidential space where the two parties have an opportunity to reconcile their interests. David Jourdan, sharing the MFA's approach to the political process, points out that Norway has probably been a more active facilitator in the Venezuelan negotiations than in other peace processes.An essential point of the MoU is participation, as it establishes mechanisms of consultation for political and social actors. The aim is for the process to be as inclusive and legitimate as possible. However, there is little information available as to whether this is actually the case and David Jourdan (2023) admits that it is not yet possible to speak of results in this area.Moreover, it should be noted that the Norwegian approach to facilitation, based on discretion and confidentiality, is one thing and how the parties actually behave is quite another matter. On more than one occasion, as can be seen in several documents and declarations, the Norwegian government has emphasised the need for the parties to be careful with their public declarations. In an interview with El País in February 2023, Anniken Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wryly acknowledges an anecdote sometimes repeated by high-profile Venezuelan politicians, according to which politicians will normally control themselves in public but, in private, tell someone else what they really think but, in Venezuela, the opposite occurs: what is said in private becomes amplified in front of a microphone (Lafuente 2023). Vicente Díaz, former director of the Venezuelan National Electoral Council, who participated in the talks held in the Dominican Republic, Oslo, and Barbados says that, since the process in Mexico was "very public" (as occurred in the Dominican Republic), it created difficulties for the parties, since national and international expectations were generated, which meant that more attention was given to audiences than to the talks (openDemocracy 2022). 5.4 Norwegian interests in VenezuelaIn this section and in keeping with the theoretical framework described above, I discuss four possible reasons for Norway's mediation in the Venezuelan conflict: (a) peace and stability (value-oriented diplomacy), (b) reputation, (c) political interests, and (d) economic interests.Value-oriented diplomacy focused on peace promotion makes sense for Norway, a country whose identity as a peaceful country and peace broker has existed at least since the late 19th century. Those values are so widely embedded that a broad political consensus exists among the population over a peace promotion policy, supported institutionally and by an extensive network of non-state actors coordinated by the state. Norway's constructed identity as a peace broker (especially intensified since the 1990s) means that the country acts as such. Moreover, promotion of such values makes even more sense when security has become globalised, and when a conflict in a faraway country can have humanitarian, political, economic, and ecological consequences in distant parts of the world. In this sense, value-oriented diplomacy may acquire realist motivations although, according to Bull (2023), this is discourse that appeared, above all from the 1980s, to justify Norway's involvement in peace processes. One of its proponents was the diplomat and former Labour Party politician, Jan Egeland.Ensuring peace and stability in Venezuela could, for example, (1) help to mitigate the external displacement crisis, which mainly affects neighbouring countries like Colombia and Ecuador as well as the U.S. and others in Europe, with all the humanitarian and economic consequences for those receiving refugees; (2) ensure Venezuela's participation, as a democratic state, in international organisations, thus promoting democratic values and human rights; (3) promote social and economic development in the country, which would create value for its nationals as well as attracting international investment and; (4) finally, through social and economic development, reduce the presence of paramilitary organisations in the country, including the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which is involved in drug trafficking. During the interview with David Jourdan (2023), we shared these points and he replied that this may well be so, but that such possibilities could also arise as a consequence of a political settlement that includes the removal of the sanctions. He added that the main reasons for Norway's peace diplomacy are the goals of preventing and reducing human suffering, as well as contributing to peaceful societies and stability.Peace diplomacy does not give rapid results (when it actually gives results), but Norway sees it as a policy consistent with its values, and as one whose long-term effects are sufficiently relevant as to justify investment in it.When it comes to image and reputation, Norway's approach on peace has been used as a public diplomacy branding tool, together with the country's natural environment and gender equality, to solve one of the image problems of small countries: invisibility.Indeed, discretion and a low profile do not necessarily mean invisibility, and as long as the right aspects of Norway's peace diplomacy are emphasised in a public diplomacy strategy —for example its role as a facilitator, an engaged partner, and good multilateralist— the discretion that peace diplomacy requires would not be jeopardised (Leonard and Small, 2003). Success in mediation of the Venezuelan conflict would, of course, be positive for Norway's image as a peace broker, although this constructed image is also enhanced through pertinent media coverage mentioning the Norwegian involvement during the Venezuelan peace process. This can be explained by NRC theory since the Norwegian image is constructed not only through success in a certain process but also through the mediating process itself. To give one example, the Google search "peace talks Venezuela Norway" offers almost 4.85 million results, while the Spanish search with "mediación de paz Venezuela Noruega" offers 1.28 million results. Moreover, when Norway uses the word "facilitation"2 it transfers responsibility for the results to the parties, implying that it has the role of supporting and accompanying them, but it will not be responsible if the parties decide that they do not want to continue with the process. This safeguard for Norway's image as a peace broker applies to the Venezuelan case.Political influence has also been identified as one of Norway's possible interests. As Matlary (2003) notes, access to key international actors can result from Norway's engagement in peace processes, including in the case of Venezuela, especially in a context of international energy insecurity, and political tensions due to the high-profile conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In my interview with David Jourdain (2023), "close dialogue with key international stakeholders" together with increased political capital were mentioned as benefits that Norway could reap by engaging in Venezuela. He also pointed out that one of the key features of this conflict is the importance of the U.S. as an actor with the capacity to contribute to the outcome of the peace process.The U.S. is now particularly concerned to find new energy suppliers, and ensuring political stability in Venezuela could provide international legitimacy for oil and gas transactions with its government. Giovanna de Michele, internationalist lecturer at the Central University of Venezuela, told VOA that the best way to extract oil from Venezuela would be through U.S. companies, but the sanctions would have to be eased if this was to happen (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde 2023). Norway offers an internationally recognised platform for making this possible: the talks in Mexico. It could therefore be a key actor in helping to resolve the political crisis in Venezuela while also supporting an ally, which would contribute to its status as a reliable partner of the U.S. However, as Matlary notes, it is difficult to quantify or define the scope of the access Norway gleans from its peace policy.Finally, with regard to economic interests, there are currently no Norwegian state-owned companies operating in Venezuela, although they can be represented through the investments of the Norwegian National Pension Fund3 in foreign companies that do operate in the country, for example, some Colombian companies, among them Bancolombia, Banco Popular, Banco Davivienda, and Cementos Argos. And, at the beginning of 2023, Ecopetrol, which is financed by Norfund, asked the U.S. for permission to negotiate with the state-owned company PDVSA to explore gas imports from Venezuela to Colombia (Quesada 2023). Among Norwegian investments in the U.S. are Chevron and Occidental Petroleum Corp, and the U.S. has recently given permission to Chevron to negotiate with the PDVSA and, at the end of 2022, a United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) court found that Venezuela was liable for discriminatory conduct in its payment of dividends from an oil and gas venture and ordered Venezuela to pay US$105 million to a Barbadian subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corp (Ballantyne 2022). If an improved political situation in Venezuela increases the revenues of these companies, it could also be positive for Norwegian investments.It should be added that, until 2021, Statoil (later Equinor), the national oil company of Norway, was present in Venezuela where it invested more than one billion dollars between 1995 and 2013 and participated in the Sincor heavy crude oil project with Total and PDVSA. However, due to concerns about the workforce and practical difficulties, Equinor pulled out of the project and transferred its 9.67% participation to CVP, a subsidiary of PDVSA, although it did keep its 51% stake in the exploration license of block 4 on Plataforma Deltana off Cocuina(Øye Gjerde, n.d.). Accordingly, Equinor participation in Venezuela is currently on hold but a greater presence in Venezuela of Norwegian companies, in particular from the oil and gas sector is possible if the country's situation improves.To sum up, although economic links between Norway and Venezuela do exist, they would seem to be limited and not sufficient to explain Norway's participation as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace process. 6. CONCLUSIONSThe core question of this study is why and how does Norway facilitate the Venezuela peace talks? The results suggest that, for Norway as a facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, the main goals of mediation-as-foreign-policy are humanitarian, security (better understood as promoting stability in the region), projection of its image as a peaceful nation and a peacemaker, and of its status vis-à-vis key international actors (especially the U.S.).All these goals can be explained through the Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) and Norway's own role prescription as a small, democratic, and peaceful nation, which means it would promote these values through altruistic (idealist) and non-altruistic (realist) actions and perspectives.Interestingly, economic factors do not seem to play a major role as a mediation-as-foreign-policy objective. The economic ties between Norway and Venezuela are presently not significant and, thanks to the diversification of the investment portfolio of the Norwegian National Pension Fund, Venezuela only represents a very small part of Norwegian economic interests.It is therefore relevant to consider the importance of constructivist aspects such as national values and self-conception in shaping the foreign policy of small countries, despite the apparent predominance of realpolitik aspects in an international context of increasing competition. These constructivist aspects offer key information for understanding and explaining the behaviour of small countries and should not be overlooked.Besides, it is worth reflecting on the definition of a mediation success in real, and in mediation-as-foreign policy terms. In the real sense, mediation is successful when it produces long-term reconciliation between the parties, in the eyes of a domestic audience while, for an audience external to the conflict, mediation may be successful simply when a peace agreement between the parties is signed. Meanwhile, for the mediating country or its allies, a mediation is deemed effective when foreign policy objectives are achieved. The approach used by Norwegian mediators in the Venezuelan process is similar to that of previous peace processes. It starts with the organisation of secret meetings and then advances towards a more public and official format. However, some distinctive traits of this peace process have been (1) a somewhat more active role of Norway as a facilitator when compared to other peace processes, (2) the weighty influence of the U.S. in causing setbacks or advances in the negotiations , and (3) premature publicity of this process, when the parties have been too eager to share their views with the press and the public, which may have been an obstacle for achieving progress. Despite these challenges, as of November 2023, Norway has continued to honour its long-term commitment to achieving a peaceful solution to the Venezuelan conflict.This study has created a first timeline of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process by means of consulting information in primary and secondary sources and, when relevant, adding further details obtained in interviews with two experts. This timeline provides an overview of the main milestones of the peace process while highlighting Norway's role as a facilitating country. Possible reasons for its engagement in the Venezuelan peace process have been identified. At a tactical level, the moral and security elements seem to be a high priority for people working in the field. These actors have considerable expertise in conflict resolution and perform their duties diligently. At a more strategic and state-centred level, besides the moral and security components, attention is given to building political capital by means of offering an attractive image to international stakeholders, especially close allies like the U.S. This is, therefore, an excellent example of the importance of peace diplomacy as a soft power tool for a middle-level country like Norway.The limits of the study arise from the nature of an ongoing mediation process. Since silence sometimes carries more weight than words and as discretion is necessary for the process to move forward, only limited information could be directly obtained from relevant actors in the peace talks. In terms of Norway's interests in certain areas, the limits of qualitative methods have not allowed quantification of the importance of each of these interests. The aim of the interviews was to obtain in-depth information that could confirm that such interests exist, and to provide distinctive details that might enrich knowledge of this peace process, rather than quantifying the results. Finally, now that Norway's possible interests as a facilitator have been identified, future research could be addressed at quantifying the weight of each of them in Norway's peacebuilding policy over the last two decades. 7. ReferencesAggestam, Lisbeth. "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy". ARENA Center for European Studies Working Paper, vol. 99/8 (1999). 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Voz de América, (30 May 2019), (on-line), [Date accessed 12.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/venezuela-noruega-negociaciones-para-poner-fin-a-la-crisis-/4936901.html Voz de América. "Tras fracaso en Barbados, Venezuela sigue esperando una solución". Voz de América, (11 August 2019), (on-line) [Date accessed 14.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/tras-fracaso-en-barbados-venezuela-sigue-esperando-una-solucion/5037644.html Voz de América. "Funcionarios de EE.UU. viajan a Venezuela y se reúnen con oficiales del gobierno: según medios". Voz de América, (6 March 2022), (on-line) [Date accessed 18.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/funcionarios-eeuu-viajaran-venezeula-reunen-oficiales-gobierno-/6472694.html Voz de América. "Gobierno y oposición de Venezuela coinciden en Noruega". Voz de América, (20 June 2022), (on-line) [Date accessed 18.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/delegaciones-maduro-dialogo-noruega-/6625220.html Wilson, Peter. "Idealism in international relations" in: Dowding, Keith (ed.) Encyclopedia of Power, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 332-333.Notes:1- Originally consisting of 12 Latin American nations and formally created on 8 August 2017, the Lima Group is a multilateral body whose goal is to explore mechanisms for a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela and restoration of a democratic order (Government of Colombia 2017).2- In this study, I use the terms "mediation" and "facilitation" interchangeably. However, mediation normally involves a formal mandate from the parties of a conflict, covering involvement in both the substance and process of the negotiation, while a facilitator is less directive (Greminger 2007).3- The Norwegian National Pension Fund, the world's largest sovereign fund, has investments in over 9,000 companies in 70 countries (Oljefondet n.d.). Key words: Venezuela, Norway, national role conception, mediation, peacebuilding, foreign policy, conflict resolutionDOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/docCIDOB.2024.15/enE-ISSN: 2339-9570
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Documents CIDOB: 15Winner of the Global Talent Award, launched by CIDOB and Banco Sabadell Foundation in the framework of Programa Talent Global.ABSTRACTThis study offers a comprehensive overview of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process as a facilitator of the peace talks between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. It explains what Norway does as a facilitator (the process), as well as how (approach) and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests), not only in terms of the characteristics making Norway a suitable facilitator, but also its interests and motivations. The main goal is to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. The study concludes that, for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and role conception. 1. INTRODUCTIONSince the early 2010s, Venezuela has been embroiled in a grave economic, political, and humanitarian crisis resulting in institutional disarray that reached critical point in 2017. It was in this year that the constitutional order was broken after Decision 156 of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, whereby this organ attributed to itself the functions of the National Assembly, the country's legislative organ. Deemed unconstitutional by the political parties with a majority in the National Assembly, this move led to mass protests. The government reacted by calling for a new constitution to be drafted by a newly created Constituent National Assembly which, in August 2017, granted itself powers to pass legislation, thus overriding the National Assembly (Bronstein & Cobb, 2017). This was not recognised by the National Assembly but, in 2018, the Constituent National Assembly went ahead and blocked the participation of the main opposition parties in the presidential elections that year. These elections were rejected by a broad sector of the international community, among them the European Union (EU) and the Lima Group.1From 2017, Norway, with a population of just 5.5 million, has been exploring possibilities in Venezuela for political dialogue between the government of Nicolás Maduro and the opposition, first through the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), an independent foundation that receives funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and later, after 2019, with direct state involvement. Norway has built an image as a peace broker with its success in processes like the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and in the talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But why did Norway decide to facilitate the peace talks in Venezuela? How does Norway approach peacebuilding in this conflict? This article aims to analyse the causes, process, approaches, and motivations for Norwegian mediation in Venezuela, in order to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. I therefore explore the comprehensive role of Norway in the Venezuelan peace talks, the background, the process, and Norway's possible interests as a facilitator. I argue that,for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general, but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and the way it perceives its role as a peace-making nation. As mentioned above, the Norwegian state became officially involved in the Venezuelan conflict in 2019. The domestic situation had come to a head on 23rd January when Juan Guaidó, leader of the opposition and president of the National Assembly, rejected the authority of Nicolás Maduro and declared himself acting president of Venezuela. However, the strategy failed when the military remained loyal to Maduro. Negotiation then became a last resort (NUPI 2020) and Norway began to facilitate negotiations between government and opposition, first in Oslo and then in Barbados, in 2019. These efforts led to further discussion between the parties through 2021 and 2022, in Mexico. In 2022, the war in Ukraine prompted changes in the positions regarding Venezuela of certain actors, notable among them the United States (U.S.) and the EU. As the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (Remacha, 2023) points out, U.S. concerns about energy security made it necessary to find a way of guaranteeing the international supply, and Venezuela was (and is) considered to be a strategic source. Contacts between the U.S. and Venezuela were made in 2022, and talks began about removing the sanctions imposed on the country. Given its economic situation, and the presidential elections due in 2024, Venezuela welcomed the rapprochement. If the sanctions were to be removed (at least partially), it was necessary to resume dialogue with the opposition, so in November 2022, negotiations recommenced in Mexico with Norway's mediation. Significant progress was made, and the release of previously frozen international funds was agreed upon (up to 3,000 million dollars earmarked mainly for public health, education, and food), as well as the lifting of some sanctions. Maduro's government is also aware that the 2024 elections should be held according to a model that respects democratic safeguards, with unrestricted participation by the opposition, so that results will be internationally recognised. Venezuela would then be able to resume relations with countries and regions like the U.S. and the EU, thus enabling international investment, particularly in the oil industry, and an improved economic situation (NUPI, 2020). Although the presidential crisis formally lasted until 5th January 2023 when Guaidó's acting presidency was abolished by the National Assembly, the political crisis with the opposition continues to the present day, in November 2023. 1.2. Research goals and objectivesThis study aims to explore the role of Norway as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace talks, focusing on what it does (the process), how (approach), and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests). It seeks to demonstrate that, given Norway's national conception as a peacemaker, its strategy in Venezuela expresses a broad foreign policy endeavour that has humanitarian but also reputational and political motivations. More broadly, the importance of soft power tools for state actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives is discussed. Constructivism and Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) help to explain Norway's self-image as a peacemaker, while idealism and realism, together with Touval's "mediation as foreign policy" theory shed light on Norway's use of mediation as a foreign policy tool. Qualitative methods based on analysis of primary and secondary sources, complemented with semi-structured interviews with experts and officials of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been used. 1.3. Relevance and justificationNorway is a small country in terms of population but one with a notable ability to influence international affairs thanks to soft power. One of ways it exercises its influence is its internationally recognised image as a peacemaker, evidenced through its involvement in several peace processes. Indeed, since 1993, Norway has been engaged in 11 different peace processes (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) with some major successes but also others that were limited. The case of Norwegian facilitation of the Venezuelan peace talks is studied for two main reasons. First, is its relevance in terms of policy significance, as it is an ongoing process, which leads to questions about why Norway acts as a facilitator, and the possible interests it has in doing so, apart from the goal of peace itself. Second, is the practical reason of the author's knowledge of the three languages relevant for this research (English, Spanish, and Norwegian), which is a valuable asset in terms of good understanding of the information from primary and secondary sources written in the three languages. This is an advantage in the research, as it allows cross-checking of information, and offers a broader perspective on the topic. 2. NORWAY AS A PEACEBUILDING NATIONScholars offer several explanations of Norway's involvement in peace processes arising from international conflicts. The result of a pragmatic foreign policy, it combines idealist and realist elements in a seemingly contradictory policy which, in fact, accommodates different domestic interests and maintains inter-party foreign policy consensus (Riste, 2001; Ekengren, 2022).From a constructivist perspective, the notion of Norway as a nation for peace partly comes from its conception of its role as a small, rich, peaceful state, with a clear focus on human rights and humanitarian assistance (Leira et al., 2007). While it is true that the so-called value-oriented (idealist) diplomacy wasstrengthened, above all in the 1990s, with the increased involvement of Norway in several peace processes, its self-image as a peacebuilding nation has always been present (Leira, 2015). The Norwegian peace activist and later Foreign Affairs Minister, Halvdan Koht (1873-1965), argued in 1902 that, although the fact of its being a small state could limit its flexibility in foreign policy actions, Norway could and should secure its status by promoting peace and development. More than 80 years later, in 1989, Jan Egeland, who would become State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1997, argued that a small, rich country like Norway could be more effective in promoting human rights and peace than old colonial powers or superpowers with their historical baggage and policies based on self-interest and dominance (Sørbø, 2018).Moreover, the notion of status, which is closely linked with the concept of identity, has been prominent in Norway since the nation's beginnings. Leira (2015) describes the pursuit of status as a peace-making nation in the 19th and early 20th century as a way of achieving independence (through moral authority), a means of saving money (as the policy for peace was cheaper than power politics), and as sound realpolitik for a small state. He also refers to the words of Ole Jacob Broch in 1864 when he argued that, when small states need to "engage in the strife of other states", they should do it decisively because, "for them, honour and prestige are even more important than for the greater powers" (Broch cited in Leira 2015, p.22).The role performance of Norway, or itsbehaviour with, and approach to foreign policy actions is, according to Gulbrandsen (2022), influenced by the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998), dictated by the image the state has of itself, and constituting a basis for adopting a role in any specific context. In Holsti's view (1970), the main explanation for the role performance of a state arises from policy makers' conceptions of the role of the nation in a system (National Role Conception), but adoption of a role is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment. In this case, if the Norwegian government and the Norwegian people have an image of Norway as a nation for peace, and if the external image they project in other countries is also that of a nation for peace, the logic of appropriateness and the role prescription will dictate that Norway will have to behave as a nation for peace, and thus engage in peacebuilding policy.For Skånland (2010) the Norwegian involvement in peace processes is the result of a discursive construction, amplified by the media, above all after 1993. Media coverage of the Norwegian involvement in the Middle East peace process gave a very positive picture of Norway in general, an image that was strengthened thanks to the perceived successes in the peace processes of Sri Lanka, Guatemala, and Mali. All this crystallised into three main discursive constructions: (1) the decisive significance of the Norwegian contribution for the outcome of peace processes, (2) the importance of peace promotion as a foreign policy tool, and (3) Norway's distinctive approach for peace promotion.Other authors emphasise Norway's peace engagement efforts from a more realist perspective and, in particular, as a policy instrument in its own right (Touval, 2003). Some, like Matlary (2002) argue that mediation is used as an institutionalised strategy for dealing with some of the challenges of being a small state, as well as for promoting Norway's interests in the international arena, and having some influence in international relations. As Stokke (2014) notes, although it has a small population, Norway has a disproportionate importance in other areas (fishing, oil and gas, shipping etc.), thus implying interests beyond its borders as well as influence in other domains because of this prominence. According to Matlary (2002), some Norwegian interestsidentified from a realpolitik standpoint are security (addressed through NATO), economic interests vis-à-vis the EU, access to political decision-making power in the EU and, outside the West, considerable economic interests in oil prices and oil export. Matlary, who collected data through a series of anonymous interviews with diplomats and politicians, alludes to the effects of value-oriented diplomacy in matters of matters and concludes that, apart from a good image and profile, what value-oriented diplomacy provides is access to other arenas where one needs the best possible entry. Her interviewees referred, above all, to access to the leaders of the U.S. Department of State through the policy of peace engagement, especially in the Middle East and, to a much lesser extent, to leaders of EU states. However, she says, it was difficult to collect specific insights into the effects of such access, a perspective shared by Stokke (2010, p.166) who argues that "the extent and manner in which recognition is translated into international influence is complex and may vary from one policy field to another and between different arenas of international relations. This means that it is notoriously difficult to detect and measure the direct benefits from peace engagement". Finally, another interesting perspective is that provided by Neumann (2011). For him, the peace and reconciliation efforts of medium and small countries are a means to maintain a system with which they are reasonably satisfied, because they are not as well equipped as bigger powers to deal with other (more violent) types of conflict resolution methods, and he refers specifically to the institutionalisation of peace and reconciliation efforts by Norway.To conclude, Norway's peacebuilding policy may be understood as apparently idealist (value-oriented diplomacy) and based on a self-image as a nation for peace, which includes both idealist (moral responsibility) and realist (influence in the international arena and security) motivations. Until now, there have been no major conflicts between those two angles (Stokke, 2014), but in an increasingly polarised world, it is becoming more and more difficult for Norway to maintain a balanced policy in peacebuilding processes. 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKThis study draws on the theory of constructivism to explain Norway's national role conception and considers the notions of idealism and realism to explain mediation as its foreign policy. A theoretical framework based on such apparently antagonistic ideas is, perhaps, not very common but, as Barkin (2003) puts it, a constructivist epistemology and a classical realist theory are, in fact, compatible and, moreover, this kind of framework can be useful in International Relations (IR) theory, as it can specify the relationship between the study of power in IR and the study of IR as social constructions. Indeed, constructivism and perceptions can—and are—often applied to fulfil or justify realist objectives and policies.For the purposes of this study, I consider that mediation as foreign policy is a result of idealist (value-oriented) and realist (power) motivations arising from a constructed national identity and role conception.3.1. Constructivism and national role conceptionFor Barnett (2018), constructivism as an international relations social theory is "concerned about how to conceptualise the relationship between agents and structures, but it is not a substantive theory" (p.88). The basic premise is that the world is socially constructed, which means that "social reality is a product of human consciousness. Consciousness is created and constituted through knowledge that shapes meaning and categories of understanding and action; such knowledge and meanings can be institutionalised in social life; and this institutionalisation, in turn, shapes the construction of social reality" (p.88). These categories shape not only external reality but also its actors, which is an indicator of the importance of the social construction of interests and identity. For example, Norway's identity may shape its national interests, and one of those interests might be security, but the concept of security and how it can be achieved may be linked to Norway's identity.National Role Conceptions, a concept first developed by Holsti (1970), is defined as "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform [...] in the international system" (p. 245-246). These are, as mentioned in section 2, the main explanation for the role performance of a state, understood by Holsti as the "general policy behaviour of governments" (p. 245). Role performance is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment and have, as some of their sources, system-wide values, the structure of the international system, and the traditions, rules and expectations of states expressed through various legal instruments (p. 246).The notion of national role conception is related to that of politics of identity, which, in Aggestam's words (1999), is a set of ideas that policymakers use to create a sense of solidarity and cohesion and thus to legitimise general trust in a nation's foreign policy. She argues that speeches sometimes reveal subjective we-feelings of a cultural community related to territory, myths, rituals, institutions, and customs, and she refers to the "institutionalisation" of national identity, which makes identity constructions relatively resistant to change. Moreover, citing March & Olsen (1998), she indicates that certain practices and rules of behaviour that legitimise and explain specific identity constructions are reinforced by such institutionalisation.The starting point of the present study is, therefore, the idea that Norway's national role conception is that of a small, rich, peaceful, democratic state, whose official discourse in peace engagement, especially since the 1990s, emphasises its altruistic contribution as a "peaceful nation that has the values, competences and economic resources" for such an endeavour, but whose work is also "beneficial for Norway's own interests" (Stokke, 2014, p.8).3.2. Idealism, realism, and mediation as foreign policyThere is no generally accepted definition of idealism because there is no settled ontology of the term but, according to Wilson (2012), it generally refers to any goal, idea, or practice that is considered impractical from a state perspective, for example the prohibition and disarmament of nuclear weapons, or global eradication of poverty. In IR it is normally used in both the broad and narrow senses. Broadly speaking, idealism seeks to transcend anarchy to create a more harmonious world order while, in the narrow sense, it is a doctrine tied to the inter-war period (1919-1939) and seen as emphasising the growing interdependence of mankind. I shall focus on the first meaning, which refers to "an approach to international politics that seeks to advance certain ideals or moral goals, for example, making the world a more peaceful or just place" (Wilson, 2019).Realism is a substantive theory of IR that considers states to be the main actors in the international arena, and mainly concerned with the pursuit of their own national interests, security, and struggle for power. Realists view the international arena as a sphere without justice, and with active or potential conflict among its members. They show scepticism about the relevance of ethical norms (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). This theory has a variety of ramifications but in this study I consider, first and foremost, classical realism because, although idealism is usually heavily criticised by realists, according to Barkin (2003), classical realism perceives the art of international politics as "the practical balancing of the demands of power on the one hand and morality on the other—a dialectic between power and morality [...]. Idealism, for the classical realist, is necessary to inform our actions and underlie our interests in the pursuit of international politics, but realism will always remain a necessary part of relations among states" (p.333). Also relevant is the perspective of neoclassical realism because, while classical realism focuses on the system-level factors, neoclassical realism considers domestic-level factors as variables that can shape foreign policy, which is highly pertinent if NRC theory is used to explain Norway's behaviour in the international arena. Neoclassical realism considers that "objective reality exists, but decision making is impaired by uncertainty and the complexity of the environment" (Rathbun, 2008, p.296).According to Touval (2003), mediation as foreign policy needs to be understood as a policy instrument, as distinct from mediation theory. He argues that it derives from the mediator's perception of the international system, its foreign policy objectives and strategies, and domestic needs. I would also argue that it stems from the mediator's own national role conception and self-perception. Touval (2003) considers that ending a conflict is no longer the main concern of the mediating state, but only a part of a broadly conceived foreign policy as the mediation is also shaped by affairs that are external to the conflict. He highlights three issues arising from a state's international and domestic concerns: (1) mediation is perceived by the public and the officials engaged in it as a moral obligation, which is seldom criticised; (2) foreign and domestic motivations, apart from being an incentive for states to engage in mediation, also shape their strategies and tactics of the mediation; (3) the mediation is evaluated not only in terms of settlement of a dispute, but also the primary goals motivating the mediation. Beriker (2017) offers an expanded perspective of Touval's work, arguing that once mediation is proven to be a viable foreign policy tool, engaging in mediation enables medium-sized powers to create a political space that otherwise would not be available. 4. METHODOLOGYThis study is both descriptive and explanatory, as it inquires more deeply into the events as well as exploring why and how Norway became involved in the Venezuela peace process from 2017 to May 2023. In a deductive approach, existing theories —NRC, mediation as foreign policy, idealism, and realism— are drawn on to explain Norway's behaviour in its peacebuilding policy. The epistemology used is empiricism, since the focus is explanation rather than interpretation, and the ontology is pragmatist because, while the world is understood as existing independently from social actors, the influence of these actors to shape social realities should also be taken into account, together with the fact that, in some cases, this may affect realities existing independently of them.The methods are qualitative, as information provided with quantitative methods would be too superficial for a study that seeks to determine the existence and the characteristics of Norway's engagement in the Venezuelan peace process. The analysis is primarily based on a range of online primary and secondary sources, including government reports, memorandums of understanding, recorded interviews, articles, and academic publications. I consulted these sources, first, for better understanding of the issues and to organise this material around the research question, as well as to identify possible gaps of knowledge. I then conducted semi-structured interviews, with an official from the Norwegian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and a Norwegian academic, to fill some of the previously identified knowledge gaps, to record their perceptions, and to triangulate the documentary information thus gathered.The first interview, conducted by videoconference on 2 August 2023, was with Professor Benedicte Bull, from the University of Oslo and, inter alia, president of the Nordic Institute for Latin American Studies, whose research has been focused on Venezuela in recent years. The second was with David C. Jourdan, who coordinates the Norwegian MFA's facilitation team in the Venezuelan peace process. This interview was conducted in Oslo on 8 August 2023. Both Bull and Jourdan have given their consent to use their names in the present study. NOREF was also contacted but stated that it could not give interviews on the Venezuelan peace process. 5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION5.1. Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace processNo official documentary information about the specific manner Norway engaged in the Venezuela conflict during 2017 and 2018 has been found, apart from the mere fact stated in the NOREF website that it was engaged in talks on the conflict in those years. According to its strategic plan 2019-2023, NOREF is a "non-state actor that is able to complement formal Norwegian peacemaking efforts [... and] build directly on the Norwegian tradition of informal conflict resolution". This makes it possible "to support formal peace processes (track I), and informal back-channel conflict diplomacy (track 1.5 and 2)" (NOREF, 2019). This institution has a permanent staff of professionals, experts in conflict resolution, and is governed by a board whose director is appointed by the Norwegian MFA, and whose members come, in general, from different areas of the public sector. In the interview with David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), he confirmed that NOREF's engagement consists of track 2 approaches. Moreover, he stressed that, although NOREF receives public funds and works closely with the Norwegian state, it is a separate, independent institution. Norway's involvement in the peace process after 2019, when it became public, is described in some detail below. 2019: the first official talksAccording to the Norwegian MFA (2023), Norway has been involved in Venezuela since 2018. However, it was only in May 2019 that talks between the Venezuelan parties, facilitated by Norway, first became public. In this early stage, the negotiations between the delegations of Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó lasted until August 2019, and although significant progress was made, no agreements for solving the political conflict were reached. However, the Norwegian MFA (2023) stresses that these negotiations were a stepping-stone for further talks between the parties, which signed a collaboration agreement in June 2020, with the objective of using frozen funds in the U.S. for a joint response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with support from the Pan American Health Organisation. Several newspaper articles describing the negotiations during that year provide additional information that has been used in this study.In May 2019, Juan Guaidó sent a delegation to Oslo to participate in exploratory talks with representatives of Maduro's government to try to find a solution to the political crisis the country had faced since Guaidó declared himself acting president of Venezuela at the beginning of that year (NRK, 2019a), information that was confirmed by Jorge Valero, Venezuela's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, and the UN spokesperson in New York, Stephane Dujarric. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) reported the talks for the first time on 15 May but, according to an anonymous source, this was the second time that the parties had been in Oslo, and negotiations had previously been taking place in Cuba.Shortly afterwards, on the night between 16 and 17 May, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release confirming that there had been contacts between key political actors in Venezuela as a part of an exploratory phase aiming to find a solution to the country's situation. The Maduro government representatives present at the talks were Héctor Rodríguez, governor of the province of Miranda, and Jorge Rodríguez, minister of Communication. The opposition representatives were Gerardo Blyde, member of parliament, and Fernando Martínez Mattola, who had been minister during the government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez.In the last week of May 2019, the Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the parties would travel again to Oslo during the following week to continue with the process (NRK, 2019b). Almost at the same time, Juan Guaidó insisted that the meetings in Oslo were not part of a dialogue or negotiation, but a mediation in Norway (El Nacional, 2019). According to Voice of America/Voz de América (VOA) (2019a), Nicolás Maduro appeared a few days later on the Venezuelan public TV channel after the opposition declared that the conversations in Oslo that week had ended on 29 May without any agreement being reached. Maduro stated that conversations had been taking place in secret during the three previous months, that he was proud of his delegation, and that dialogue with the opposition had been constructive. Moreover, he insisted on his wish to find a peaceful solution for Venezuela. Indeed, VOA pointed out that Dag Nylander, a Norwegian diplomat who would become chief facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, had been travelling to Caracas and meeting with the political actors involved in the crisis since January 2019.The peace talks resumed one month later in Barbados. On 11 July 2019, after three days of conversations, Norway announced that the negotiations would continue (Reuters, 2019). Yet, only a few weeks later, the Maduro government withdrew from the talks when the U.S. president, Donald Trump, announced his decision to block U.S. citizens from engaging in business in Venezuela and to freeze the country's assets in the U.S. According to the Venezuelan government, this had been instigated by Juan Guaidó, while the opposition accused the government of reneging on its commitment to dialogue. Norway's facilitator, Dag Nylander, took note that the planned meetings would not take place and emphasised Norway's role as a facilitator acting at the request of the parties and planning the meetings according to their availability. He added that the facilitation process would continue as long as the parties wished, and provided that there was a realistic position on a solution in the best interests of the Venezuelan people (VG, 2019).According to Bull (2023), Norway, as the facilitating country, was displeased when the talks went public in May, believing that this was premature and that it would complicate the peace process. She also stresses that the Trump administration had no clear strategy for ending the conflict and that, when the U.S. sanctions were announced, there had not been any proper coordination with Norway. She also notes that mentions of the U.S. seem to refer to a single homogeneous actor, when the reality is that there are many actors involved, among them the Pentagon and the Department of State, and these actors may work in different directions, sometimes disrupting a given policy. The Norwegian MFA (2023) confirms it was not aware of the U.S. sanctions that were announced in early August 2019. Both parties and facilitator were taken by surprise.2021: The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding and negotiation rounds in MexicoA year and a half later, in March 2021, new exploratory talks began after the Biden administration's position on Venezuela allowed the parties to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which led to the launch of a new negotiation process, starting in August that year. On 5 August, the Mexican President, Manuel López Obrador confirmed that Mexico would host talks between the government of Venezuela and the opposition (Reuters, 2021) and, a few days later, the Norwegian government confirmed its involvement with a tweet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021a). The new negotiation process was launched in Mexico City on 13 August, with Dag Nylander as chief facilitator, Jorge Rodríguez representing the Venezuelan (Maduro's) government, and Gerardo Blyde representing the Unitary Platform (the opposition). A MoU —which I refer to in more detail in section 5.3— was released, defining the objective, agenda, method, and composition of the negotiation team. The Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, declared in a press note that the parties were ready to negotiate constructively and that, in the process, they would consult members of civil society as well as political actors. She also noted that there was mutual agreement on the sensitive nature of the negotiations, which was necessary for giving the parties space to make progress (Norwegian MFA 2021b).A second round of negotiations took place at the beginning of September 2021. The parties released a joint statement reporting that two agreements had been reached, the first being to act jointly in the claim of Venezuelan sovereignty over Guyana Esequiba, and the second, a "partial agreement on the social protection of the Venezuelan people". The parties conveyed that the points to be addressed in the following round of negotiations would be "respect for the Constitutional Rule of Law", protection of the national economy, and measures for the social protection of the Venezuelan people.Between the second and the third rounds of negotiation, Erna Solberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister, spoke at the UN General Assembly on 21 September, referring to Venezuela as a country where human right violations were occurring. Her comment was criticised by Dag Nylander as it could, he said, damage the credibility of Norway's role. In a tweet on 25 September, the MFA reaffirmed its commitment as an impartial facilitator in the negotiations and declared that the statement in the UN should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with that (NRK, 2021). The Venezuelan government responded to this diplomatic hitch with a slight delay in proceedings when its representatives arrived one day late at the negotiation round scheduled in Mexico from 24 to 27 September, but which finally took place after 25 September (Euronews, 2021).After this third round of negotiations, the parties released a new joint statement, focused this time on the issue of inclusion and, specifically, on the need for a gender focus in the negotiations, identification of inclusive consultation mechanisms for political and social actors, and condemnation of xenophobic attacks on Venezuelan migrants that had recently occurred in Chile. According to an article by Diego Santander in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo (2021), this third round was so fraught with problems that no specific agreements were reached. Maduro's delegation insisted on its plans to include Alex Saab in the negotiation. Saab, a Venezuelan businessman, was accused of being Maduro's front man, and a key figure in the international economic and financial activities to circumvent the U.S. economic sanctions against his government. However, Saab had been arrested for money laundering in June 2020 in Cabo Verde and was extradited to the U.S. on the weekend of October 16.Negotiations, set for 17 October, were suspended on 16 October when the Maduro government decided not to participate in the next round of negotiations, because of Saab's extradition, which Jorge Rodríguez referred to as a "kidnapping" as it had been carried out "without a warrant and without due process" and accused the U.S. of trying to prevent the dialogue (Gilbert, 2021). The Norwegian government then tweeted that it was still convinced that the negotiations were the only solution for Venezuela, and that it would keep working to encourage the parties to continue (Norwegian MFA, 2021c). In Bull's opinion (2023), while the U.S. system may have its faults, the legal proceedings are independent from political powers so, on that occasion, there was little that U.S. politicians could do to stop the extradition.2022 — 2023: talks after the beginning of the war in UkraineIn March 2022, a new chapter of the dialogue began after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A U.S. delegation formed by members of the Department of State visited Caracas to meet with the Venezuelan government and discuss an eventual isolation of Vladimir Putin. Some analysts also indicated that Venezuela was seen as a possible alternative oil supplier if the U.S. opted to restrict oil exports from Russia, which meant that removal of the sanctions on Venezuela could be considered (VOA, 2022a). Indeed, in May 2022, the U.S. announced that economic sanctions against Venezuela would be eased as a gesture in favour of reactivating the dialogues and also allowing the U.S. company Chevron to negotiate potential future activities with the state-owned oil and natural gas company PDVSA (Agobian, 2022). According to the Norwegian MFA (2023), these actions were a catalyst for the reactivation of the negotiations.Immediately after the announcement, Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde met to discuss renewal of the talks (Ocando Alex, 2022a) but, by the end of May, according to Reuters, the Venezuelan government had demanded the withdrawal of Norway as a facilitator, and the presence of Russia (formally an accompanying country in the negotiations after 2021) as conditions for reactivating the negotiations. However, convinced that the Norwegians were their only guarantee for a successful process, the opposition disagreed (Oré, 2022). Bull (2023) specifies that the stance of the Venezuelan government might have been because it saw Norway as taking an excessively "pro-allies" position after the start of the war in Ukraine. She adds that Norway prefers to involve Russia and other big powers in the negotiations rather than excluding them, as they would provide legitimacy to the Mexico talks as the only acceptable platform for solving the Venezuelan political crisis. When interviewed, David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), made it clear that Norway was never asked to relinquish its role as facilitator. Management of the process resides with the parties, which have remained committed to the MoU that names Norway as the facilitating country.On 21 and 22 June 2022, the Norwegian government held the Oslo Forum, an annual retreat focused on conflict mediation and peace processes. Around 100 conflict mediators, experts, peace process actors, and high-level decision makers from around the world gathered at Losby Gods Manor with the goal of sharing their experience on conflict resolution and peace diplomacy (Norwegian MFA, 2022). Among the peace process actors who attended the Oslo Forum were Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde. A Norwegian source told VOA (2022b) that it was "probable" that the conversations would be initiated again, but "not immediately".On 14 September 2022, a group of 18 countries from the Americas and Europe agreed to call upon Maduro and the opposition to urge a resumption of the negotiations in Mexico (Ocando Alex, 2022b).Official negotiations began again on 26 November 2022. This time, a joint statement was issued indicating that the main agenda of the meeting would be social protection of the people. A partial agreement was reached, in which the measures agreed upon were: 1) creation of an organism to implement specific actions and programmes for the social protection of the Venezuelan people (Mesa Nacional de Atención Social, or MNAS); 2) creation of an organism auxiliary to the MNAS to evaluate its processes and the effects of implementation of the measurements adopted; 3) definition of the social areas which, requiring the most urgent attention, needed to be addressed through specific programmes, in particular the public health system, the national electrical system, development of the World Food Programme, educational infrastructure, and rebuilding of the infrastructure damaged as a consequence of the torrential rains in the latter half of 2022; 4) requesting from the UN support for the design and creation of a fund for social support of the Venezuelan people; 5) identification of frozen assets belonging to the Venezuelan state that might be progressively accessed and incorporated into this fund; 6) creation of a commission to assess and verify implementation of the agreement.After this meeting, the negotiations stalled again when the Venezuelan government accused the opposition of not complying with the agreement reached but, mainly and above all, because the frozen US$3,000 million that were to be incorporated into the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People had not yet been released (August 2023). According to Maduro, this was a condition sine qua non for resuming the talks. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, organised a conference on 25 April 2023 in Bogotá, with representatives from numerous countries to discuss the Venezuelan situation. The shared positions of the Venezuelan government and the opposition were explained to the international community, in particular regarding the removal of sanctions, free elections, and reactivation of the peace talks. One of the shared positions for renewal of the talks was that of establishing the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde, 2023). The message that came out of the Venezuela Conference of Bogotá was very clear: the UN trust fund for Venezuela should be set up as swiftly as possible. According to a Reuters report by Spetalnik, Sequera and Armas (2023), on 19 May the Biden administration notified the UN that the money could operate within the U.S. financial system, and that there would be no risk of creditors seizing it to repay the outstanding Venezuelan debt. Accordingly, the UN-administered fund could have been operative at the end of May 2023. However, the decision to establish the trust fund ultimately lies with the UN Secretariat in New York and some insiders allude to the complexity of the process involved and stress that establishing the fund depends on a number of factors. As of late August 2023, it had not been established by the UN. 5.2. Norway's distinctive approach to peace diplomacyIn an interview for the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue, when asked about the distinctive approach of Norwegian diplomacy in international conflicts, Dag Nylander (2020) identified four main elements: (a) collaboration with Norwegian and international NGOs, (b) low-key diplomacy, (c) long-term commitment, and (d) the ability to make quick decisions.[5] In this section, these four elements will be briefly discussed.Norway's distinctive approach to its engagement in peace processes and with non-state actors was defined after the decentralisation of its foreign policy in the early 1990s. Humanitarian assistance and development policies called for closer cooperation between the Norwegian MFA and non-governmental actors and, according to Lehti (2014), this approach was extended to the area of peace-making. In the 1990s the Ministry responded positively to proposals and initiatives from various NGOs and well-connected individuals with regard to conflictive areas. The range of actors involved in peace-making was broadened, and Norway was then able to act beyond the bounds of government-centred diplomacy with a distinctive, more informal approach to peace diplomacy. Ann Kelleher and James Taulbe (2006) refer to this approach as "Track I½ Diplomacy", understanding Track I diplomacy as that with official representatives of governments and Track II diplomacy as that involving unofficial representatives and sectors of the civil society. An important feature of the collaboration between the state, NGOs and research institutions is that it is extensively funded by the state (Bandarage, 2011). Indeed, some Norwegian NGOs receive more than 90% of their funding from the state which, in Kelleher's view (2006), almost makes them quasi-governmental organisations.As for low-key diplomacy, Nylander (2020) affirms that activities pertaining to peace diplomacy rarely appear in the news, and that they are discreet and unnoticed, often with the involvement of low-level and mid-level diplomats, an approach that allows flexibility in seeking opportunities and in dealing with problems with relative freedom.Norway's long-term commitment to peace diplomacy is based on a broad political consensus for the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Hence, changes of government will not influence the country's engagement in any given conflict. According to the MFA (2000), the goal is not only ending violence but also support for economic, social, and political processes that lead to durable liberal peace in the country concerned.Finally, the ability of Norwegian diplomats to make quick decisions stems from the smallness of the country, not only in terms of population but also social distance. Dag Nylander (2020) mentions that the distance between a diplomat in the field and the ministry of Foreign Affairs is very short, and that it takes just a quick phone call or a text message, sometimes directly to the Minister, to obtain any clearance that may be needed. 5.3 Norwegian approach to facilitation the Venezuelan peace processNorway's approach to facilitation in Venezuela is consistent with its work in other peace processes. It began with secret talks between the parties (low-key diplomacy) and then, having advanced towards a more public and official format, it was formalised with the MoU signed in Mexico on 13 August 2021. In the MoU, the parties defined the agenda and methods for the talks. David Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023) highlighted the importance of this Memorandum, which contains not only the agenda and format for the negotiations, but also a shared vision of the process and the country.As for the method, it is important to mention that it is based on a "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" principle (comprehensive approach), although partial agreements can be reached if the parties consider that a subject has been sufficiently discussed and urgent action is required. This was the case with the two partial agreements on the Guyana Esequiba, and Social Protection of the Venezuelan people signed at the end of the talks in Mexico. This approach has its advantages, such as ensuring "big picture" negotiation, but it also comes with the risk the parties can renege anytime on anything they have agreed to. It was first used in other peace processes including Britain-Ireland in 1995, Palestine-Israel, and in Cyprus and Colombia. The Norwegian MFA (2023) emphasises that understanding the needs of the parties and ensuring that they are in charge of the process, has been key to making progress throughout the negotiations. The Venezuelan conflict is political in nature and requires political solutions, and the negotiation process provides a confidential space where the two parties have an opportunity to reconcile their interests. David Jourdan, sharing the MFA's approach to the political process, points out that Norway has probably been a more active facilitator in the Venezuelan negotiations than in other peace processes.An essential point of the MoU is participation, as it establishes mechanisms of consultation for political and social actors. The aim is for the process to be as inclusive and legitimate as possible. However, there is little information available as to whether this is actually the case and David Jourdan (2023) admits that it is not yet possible to speak of results in this area.Moreover, it should be noted that the Norwegian approach to facilitation, based on discretion and confidentiality, is one thing and how the parties actually behave is quite another matter. On more than one occasion, as can be seen in several documents and declarations, the Norwegian government has emphasised the need for the parties to be careful with their public declarations. In an interview with El País in February 2023, Anniken Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wryly acknowledges an anecdote sometimes repeated by high-profile Venezuelan politicians, according to which politicians will normally control themselves in public but, in private, tell someone else what they really think but, in Venezuela, the opposite occurs: what is said in private becomes amplified in front of a microphone (Lafuente 2023). Vicente Díaz, former director of the Venezuelan National Electoral Council, who participated in the talks held in the Dominican Republic, Oslo, and Barbados says that, since the process in Mexico was "very public" (as occurred in the Dominican Republic), it created difficulties for the parties, since national and international expectations were generated, which meant that more attention was given to audiences than to the talks (openDemocracy 2022). 5.4 Norwegian interests in VenezuelaIn this section and in keeping with the theoretical framework described above, I discuss four possible reasons for Norway's mediation in the Venezuelan conflict: (a) peace and stability (value-oriented diplomacy), (b) reputation, (c) political interests, and (d) economic interests.Value-oriented diplomacy focused on peace promotion makes sense for Norway, a country whose identity as a peaceful country and peace broker has existed at least since the late 19th century. Those values are so widely embedded that a broad political consensus exists among the population over a peace promotion policy, supported institutionally and by an extensive network of non-state actors coordinated by the state. Norway's constructed identity as a peace broker (especially intensified since the 1990s) means that the country acts as such. Moreover, promotion of such values makes even more sense when security has become globalised, and when a conflict in a faraway country can have humanitarian, political, economic, and ecological consequences in distant parts of the world. In this sense, value-oriented diplomacy may acquire realist motivations although, according to Bull (2023), this is discourse that appeared, above all from the 1980s, to justify Norway's involvement in peace processes. One of its proponents was the diplomat and former Labour Party politician, Jan Egeland.Ensuring peace and stability in Venezuela could, for example, (1) help to mitigate the external displacement crisis, which mainly affects neighbouring countries like Colombia and Ecuador as well as the U.S. and others in Europe, with all the humanitarian and economic consequences for those receiving refugees; (2) ensure Venezuela's participation, as a democratic state, in international organisations, thus promoting democratic values and human rights; (3) promote social and economic development in the country, which would create value for its nationals as well as attracting international investment and; (4) finally, through social and economic development, reduce the presence of paramilitary organisations in the country, including the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which is involved in drug trafficking. During the interview with David Jourdan (2023), we shared these points and he replied that this may well be so, but that such possibilities could also arise as a consequence of a political settlement that includes the removal of the sanctions. He added that the main reasons for Norway's peace diplomacy are the goals of preventing and reducing human suffering, as well as contributing to peaceful societies and stability.Peace diplomacy does not give rapid results (when it actually gives results), but Norway sees it as a policy consistent with its values, and as one whose long-term effects are sufficiently relevant as to justify investment in it.When it comes to image and reputation, Norway's approach on peace has been used as a public diplomacy branding tool, together with the country's natural environment and gender equality, to solve one of the image problems of small countries: invisibility.Indeed, discretion and a low profile do not necessarily mean invisibility, and as long as the right aspects of Norway's peace diplomacy are emphasised in a public diplomacy strategy —for example its role as a facilitator, an engaged partner, and good multilateralist— the discretion that peace diplomacy requires would not be jeopardised (Leonard and Small, 2003). Success in mediation of the Venezuelan conflict would, of course, be positive for Norway's image as a peace broker, although this constructed image is also enhanced through pertinent media coverage mentioning the Norwegian involvement during the Venezuelan peace process. This can be explained by NRC theory since the Norwegian image is constructed not only through success in a certain process but also through the mediating process itself. To give one example, the Google search "peace talks Venezuela Norway" offers almost 4.85 million results, while the Spanish search with "mediación de paz Venezuela Noruega" offers 1.28 million results. Moreover, when Norway uses the word "facilitation"2 it transfers responsibility for the results to the parties, implying that it has the role of supporting and accompanying them, but it will not be responsible if the parties decide that they do not want to continue with the process. This safeguard for Norway's image as a peace broker applies to the Venezuelan case.Political influence has also been identified as one of Norway's possible interests. As Matlary (2003) notes, access to key international actors can result from Norway's engagement in peace processes, including in the case of Venezuela, especially in a context of international energy insecurity, and political tensions due to the high-profile conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In my interview with David Jourdain (2023), "close dialogue with key international stakeholders" together with increased political capital were mentioned as benefits that Norway could reap by engaging in Venezuela. He also pointed out that one of the key features of this conflict is the importance of the U.S. as an actor with the capacity to contribute to the outcome of the peace process.The U.S. is now particularly concerned to find new energy suppliers, and ensuring political stability in Venezuela could provide international legitimacy for oil and gas transactions with its government. Giovanna de Michele, internationalist lecturer at the Central University of Venezuela, told VOA that the best way to extract oil from Venezuela would be through U.S. companies, but the sanctions would have to be eased if this was to happen (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde 2023). Norway offers an internationally recognised platform for making this possible: the talks in Mexico. It could therefore be a key actor in helping to resolve the political crisis in Venezuela while also supporting an ally, which would contribute to its status as a reliable partner of the U.S. However, as Matlary notes, it is difficult to quantify or define the scope of the access Norway gleans from its peace policy.Finally, with regard to economic interests, there are currently no Norwegian state-owned companies operating in Venezuela, although they can be represented through the investments of the Norwegian National Pension Fund3 in foreign companies that do operate in the country, for example, some Colombian companies, among them Bancolombia, Banco Popular, Banco Davivienda, and Cementos Argos. And, at the beginning of 2023, Ecopetrol, which is financed by Norfund, asked the U.S. for permission to negotiate with the state-owned company PDVSA to explore gas imports from Venezuela to Colombia (Quesada 2023). Among Norwegian investments in the U.S. are Chevron and Occidental Petroleum Corp, and the U.S. has recently given permission to Chevron to negotiate with the PDVSA and, at the end of 2022, a United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) court found that Venezuela was liable for discriminatory conduct in its payment of dividends from an oil and gas venture and ordered Venezuela to pay US$105 million to a Barbadian subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corp (Ballantyne 2022). If an improved political situation in Venezuela increases the revenues of these companies, it could also be positive for Norwegian investments.It should be added that, until 2021, Statoil (later Equinor), the national oil company of Norway, was present in Venezuela where it invested more than one billion dollars between 1995 and 2013 and participated in the Sincor heavy crude oil project with Total and PDVSA. However, due to concerns about the workforce and practical difficulties, Equinor pulled out of the project and transferred its 9.67% participation to CVP, a subsidiary of PDVSA, although it did keep its 51% stake in the exploration license of block 4 on Plataforma Deltana off Cocuina(Øye Gjerde, n.d.). Accordingly, Equinor participation in Venezuela is currently on hold but a greater presence in Venezuela of Norwegian companies, in particular from the oil and gas sector is possible if the country's situation improves.To sum up, although economic links between Norway and Venezuela do exist, they would seem to be limited and not sufficient to explain Norway's participation as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace process. 6. CONCLUSIONSThe core question of this study is why and how does Norway facilitate the Venezuela peace talks? The results suggest that, for Norway as a facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, the main goals of mediation-as-foreign-policy are humanitarian, security (better understood as promoting stability in the region), projection of its image as a peaceful nation and a peacemaker, and of its status vis-à-vis key international actors (especially the U.S.).All these goals can be explained through the Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) and Norway's own role prescription as a small, democratic, and peaceful nation, which means it would promote these values through altruistic (idealist) and non-altruistic (realist) actions and perspectives.Interestingly, economic factors do not seem to play a major role as a mediation-as-foreign-policy objective. The economic ties between Norway and Venezuela are presently not significant and, thanks to the diversification of the investment portfolio of the Norwegian National Pension Fund, Venezuela only represents a very small part of Norwegian economic interests.It is therefore relevant to consider the importance of constructivist aspects such as national values and self-conception in shaping the foreign policy of small countries, despite the apparent predominance of realpolitik aspects in an international context of increasing competition. These constructivist aspects offer key information for understanding and explaining the behaviour of small countries and should not be overlooked.Besides, it is worth reflecting on the definition of a mediation success in real, and in mediation-as-foreign policy terms. In the real sense, mediation is successful when it produces long-term reconciliation between the parties, in the eyes of a domestic audience while, for an audience external to the conflict, mediation may be successful simply when a peace agreement between the parties is signed. Meanwhile, for the mediating country or its allies, a mediation is deemed effective when foreign policy objectives are achieved. The approach used by Norwegian mediators in the Venezuelan process is similar to that of previous peace processes. It starts with the organisation of secret meetings and then advances towards a more public and official format. However, some distinctive traits of this peace process have been (1) a somewhat more active role of Norway as a facilitator when compared to other peace processes, (2) the weighty influence of the U.S. in causing setbacks or advances in the negotiations , and (3) premature publicity of this process, when the parties have been too eager to share their views with the press and the public, which may have been an obstacle for achieving progress. Despite these challenges, as of November 2023, Norway has continued to honour its long-term commitment to achieving a peaceful solution to the Venezuelan conflict.This study has created a first timeline of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process by means of consulting information in primary and secondary sources and, when relevant, adding further details obtained in interviews with two experts. This timeline provides an overview of the main milestones of the peace process while highlighting Norway's role as a facilitating country. Possible reasons for its engagement in the Venezuelan peace process have been identified. At a tactical level, the moral and security elements seem to be a high priority for people working in the field. These actors have considerable expertise in conflict resolution and perform their duties diligently. At a more strategic and state-centred level, besides the moral and security components, attention is given to building political capital by means of offering an attractive image to international stakeholders, especially close allies like the U.S. This is, therefore, an excellent example of the importance of peace diplomacy as a soft power tool for a middle-level country like Norway.The limits of the study arise from the nature of an ongoing mediation process. Since silence sometimes carries more weight than words and as discretion is necessary for the process to move forward, only limited information could be directly obtained from relevant actors in the peace talks. In terms of Norway's interests in certain areas, the limits of qualitative methods have not allowed quantification of the importance of each of these interests. The aim of the interviews was to obtain in-depth information that could confirm that such interests exist, and to provide distinctive details that might enrich knowledge of this peace process, rather than quantifying the results. Finally, now that Norway's possible interests as a facilitator have been identified, future research could be addressed at quantifying the weight of each of them in Norway's peacebuilding policy over the last two decades. 7. ReferencesAggestam, Lisbeth. "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy". ARENA Center for European Studies Working Paper, vol. 99/8 (1999). 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"Idealism in international relations" in: Dowding, Keith (ed.) Encyclopedia of Power, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 332-333.Notes:1- Originally consisting of 12 Latin American nations and formally created on 8 August 2017, the Lima Group is a multilateral body whose goal is to explore mechanisms for a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela and restoration of a democratic order (Government of Colombia 2017).2- In this study, I use the terms "mediation" and "facilitation" interchangeably. However, mediation normally involves a formal mandate from the parties of a conflict, covering involvement in both the substance and process of the negotiation, while a facilitator is less directive (Greminger 2007).3- The Norwegian National Pension Fund, the world's largest sovereign fund, has investments in over 9,000 companies in 70 countries (Oljefondet n.d.).Key words: Venezuela, Norway, national role conception, mediation, peacebuilding, foreign policy, conflict resolution
Forschungskonzept Das Nachhaltigkeitsleitbild der Agenda 21 und die damit verknüpften Rollenerwartungen an die Privatwirtschaft sind ein Bezugsrahmen der vorliegenden Doktorarbeit. Die Agenda 21, ein zentrales Dokument der UN-Konferenz für Umwelt und Entwicklung (UNCED 1992), und Dokumente der Folgekonferenzen weisen der Privatwirtschaft eine zentrale Rolle bei der Verwirklichung nachhaltiger Entwicklung zu: Wirtschaftsunternehmen sollen Wertschöpfung auf der Grundlage umweltverträglichen Umgangs mit natürlichen Res-sourcen erreichen. Als verantwortungsvolle Unternehmen sollen sie die Interessen ihrer Anspruchsgruppen berücksichtigen, und diese Gruppen sollen ihrerseits die Privatwirt-schaft bei der Realisierung nachhaltiger Entwicklung unterstützen. Regierungsunabhängige Umweltorganisationen erwarten von der Privatwirtschaft umwelt-verträglichen Umgang mit natürlichen Ressourcen und üben entsprechend Druck auf Unternehmen aus. Die Literatur dokumentiert jedoch Konflikte zwischen dem Rollenver-ständnis der Privatwirtschaft und den Erwartungen internationaler Organisationen und zivilgesellschaftlicher Anspruchsgruppen. Seitens der Unternehmen bestehen Zweifel, ob die Anforderungen dieser Akteure angemessen sind und inwieweit sie die ihnen zuge-wiesene Verantwortung übernehmen sollen. Auf diese Problematik bezieht sich die vor-liegende, 2006 bis 2008 durchgeführte qualitative empirische Untersuchung. Das Ziel der Forschungsarbeit war, den Wissensstand zum Umgang kleiner bis mittelgro-ßer Produktionsunternehmen mit ihren Rohstoff liefernden natürlichen Ressourcen zu erweitern - ihrer Rolle in Marktketten, ihrer Beziehungen zu Stakeholdern und die Berück-sichtigung natürlicher Ressourcen durch ihr Management. Als Beispiel ausgewählt wur-den Holzmöbel erzeugende Unternehmen (Möbelhersteller), eine mittelständische Bran-che der holzverarbeitenden Industrie. Da Möbelproduktion hohe Wertschöpfung aus Roh-holz ermöglicht, erschien dieses Beispiel aufschlussreich im Hinblick auf die allgemeine Annahme der Agenda 21, hohe ökonomische Wertschöpfung aus Holz lasse Impulse für nachhaltige Waldwirtschaft erwarten. Die Untersuchung wurde in Regionen mit unter-schiedlichen gesellschaftlichen, volkswirtschaftlichen und insbesondere forst- und holz-wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen durchgeführt. Forschungsfragen waren: Wie stellt sich "Forst" aus der Sicht von Möbelherstellern dar? In welcher Beziehung stehen Möbelhersteller zu ihren Anspruchsgruppen und wie kom-munizieren sie "Forst" gegenüber diesen Gruppen? Wie berücksichtigen Möbelhersteller "Forst" in ihren Entscheidungen? Der Verfasser stellt diese Forschungsfragen unter den Oberbegriff "Forstrationalität". Das Konstrukt "Forstrationalität" umreißt, wie Entscheidungsträger in der Holzindustrie Wald-bewirtschaftung als ihre Rohstoffbasis wahrnehmen und in Entscheidungen einbeziehen. Es umfasst alle Aspekte der Wahrnehmung und Interpretation sowie des Verhaltens holz-verarbeitender Industrieunternehmen bezüglich ihrer Rohstoffquelle "Forst". Grundlagen hierfür sind Theorien der Ressourcenabhängigkeit (Pfeffer und Salancik 1978/2003; Steimle, 2008) und des Sensemaking (Weick 1995, 2001). Informationen zur Beantwortung der Forschungsfragen wurden in drei Zentren der Möbel-industrie mit unterschiedlichen gesellschaftlichen und forstlichen Rahmenbedingungen in Brasilien und in Deutschland gewonnen: in Rio Branco do Acre (RBA) im brasilianischen Amazonasgebiet; in São Bento do Sul (SBS) in Südbrasilien und in Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW) in Deutschland. Die drei Regionen in zwei Ländern vergleichende Feldforschung stellte besondere Anforderungen an die Forschungsmethodik. Vorgehen und Aufbau der Erhebungsinstrumente waren in den drei Regionen identisch: Grundlegendes empirisches Wissen vermittelten Inhaltsanalysen von Fachzeitschriften der Möbelwirtschaft (1) sowie die Auswertung von Sekundärinformationen (2). Telefonische Leitfadeninterviews mit Ex-perten (3) beleuchteten die Unternehmensumfelder und gaben allgemeine Hinweise zum Verhalten von Entscheidungsträgern der Möbelindustrie. Das Spektrum der "Forstrationa-litäten" der Entscheidungsträger erschloss sich im persönlichen Kontakt bei Betriebsbesu-chen; in jeder Region wurden zwei Hersteller von Massivholzmöbeln und ein Hersteller von Möbeln aus Holzwerkstoffen ausgewählt (4). Ergebnisse der Fachzeitschriftenanalyse Die quantitative Inhaltsanalyse von Fachzeitschriften diente dazu, das Gesamtspektrum der für den Wirtschaftszweig Möbelindustrie relevanten Fachthemen kennen zu lernen und die relative Bedeutung der Themenfelder "Umweltschutz" sowie "Waldressour-cen/Forstwirtschaft" einzuschätzen. Zusammenfassend konnten folgende Schlüsse gezo-gen werden: 1. Die Themenfelder "Umwelt" und "Forst" interessieren in der Möbelindustrie, erhalten aber in der Fachpresse weniger Raum als Themenfelder wie Wirtschaft, Technologie und Wettbewerb. 2. Im Themenfeld "Umwelt" sind in Deutschland wie in Brasilien Aspekte des eigenen Produktionsstandortes (innerbetrieblicher Umweltschutz) die bedeutendsten Themen der Möbelindustrie. 3. In der brasilianischen Möbelindustrie stehen "forst"-bezogene Aspekte stärker im Fo-kus als in Deutschland. Ergebnisse der regionalen Fallstudien Ergebnisse der Untersuchungsphasen (2) bis (4) stellt die Dissertation in Form von drei regionalen Fallstudien mit identischer Gliederung vor: a) Rahmenbedingungen der Möbel-hersteller b) Nicht-marktliche Anspruchsgruppen c) Lieferanten von Holzprodukten d) Mö-belabnehmer e) Interaktion der Möbelhersteller untereinander f) Forst- und Umweltmana-gement. Die regionalen Fallstudien bestätigen die Einsicht aus der Fachzeitschriftenanalyse, dass die spezifische Situation des gesamten regionalen Sektors "Forst- und Holzwirtschaft" die brasilianischen Möbelhersteller stärker prägt als die in NRW. So fanden in RBA in jünge-rer Zeit einschneidende forst- und umweltpolitische sowie institutionelle Veränderungen statt, die neue Rahmenbedingungen für alle holzbe- und -verarbeitenden Unternehmen gesetzt haben. In der Region SBS beschäftigt "Forst" die Möbelhersteller ebenso wie an-dere Zweige der Holzwirtschaft wegen eingetretener oder in der Zukunft erwarteter Holz-knappheiten sowie angesichts staatlicher Kontrolle der Verwendung von Holz aus legaler Waldnutzung. In NRW werden hingegen die einheimische Waldbewirtschaftung ebenso wie die Verarbeitung von Vorprodukten aus nichttropischen Holzarten als unproblematisch wahrgenommen, forstliche Themen erscheinen nicht als kritisch im Makroumfeld der Mö-belindustrie. In NRW wie in SBS dominiert die Auseinandersetzung mit gesamt- und bran-chenwirtschaftlichen Kerndaten, mit nationalen und internationalen Markttrends sowie mit technologischen Entwicklungen die Agenda der Möbelhersteller. Die Möbelhersteller unterliegen der Aufsicht von Umweltbehörden. Die Kontrolle des in-nerbetrieblichen Umweltschutzes, zum Teil verknüpft mit Arbeitsschutz, zeigte sich in al-len drei Regionen als Schwerpunkt der Aktivität dieser Behörden. Anders als in Deutsch-land unterliegt in Brasilien die Holzbeschaffung durch holzbe- und -verarbeitende Betriebe behördlicher Kontrolle. Die Fachverbände der Möbelindustrie in allen drei Fallstudienregionen definieren als ihre zentrale Aufgabe die Vertretung der Interessen ihrer Mitgliedsunternehmen gegenüber Politik und Gesellschaft. In beiden brasilianischen Fallstudienregionen, in denen forstbe-zogene Probleme die Möbelindustrie intensiv beschäftigen, sehen die Möbelindustriever-bände forstbezogene Angelegenheiten auch als ihre Aufgabe. In RBA agiert der Verband mit dem Ziel, die behördliche Registrierung von Möbelproduzenten des informellen Sek-tors voranzubringen und diese zur Verarbeitung von Holz aus legaler Waldnutzung zu verpflichten. In SBS haben die Möbelfachverbände in Perioden der Holzknappheit der Entwicklung der regionalen Forstwirtschaft und der Holzversorgung der Möbelindustrie große Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet; zur Zeit der Untersuchung drängten andere wirtschaftli-che Probleme die Waldthematik in den Hintergrund. Die durch die Forschungsarbeit erfassten Möbelhersteller stehen selten in direktem Kon-takt mit privaten Umweltorganisationen. Sie nehmen jedoch wahr, dass diese Organisa-tionen die Rahmenbedingungen der Möbelindustrie durch Verbraucherkampagnen, An-forderungen an die ersten Stufen der Forst-Holz-Wertschöpfungsketten und durch politi-sches Lobbying indirekt beeinflussen. Die Abhängigkeit der Möbelhersteller von Holzproduktlieferanten variiert in den drei Un-tersuchungsregionen. In NRW ist diese Abhängigkeit schwach ausgeprägt, weil die Mö-belhersteller Vorprodukte regional wie überregional problemlos einkaufen können und weil auch große Holzlieferanten Ansprüche der Möbelindustrie etwa bezüglich der Qualität, Abmessungen und Vorfertigung von Schnittholz und Holzwerkstoffen berücksichtigen. In Brasilien stellt sich die Situation anders dar. In SBS haben große bis mittelgroße Möbel-hersteller wegen der Unsicherheit der Holzversorgung und der Qualität von Vorprodukten aus Holz Schritte zur Rückwärtsintegration unternommen (eigene Sägewerke, vereinzelt eigene Bewirtschaftung von Kiefern-Plantagen) oder alternative Vorproduktquellen ge-sucht. In RBA stellt die behördlich kontrollierte Forderung, nur Holz aus "ordentlicher Waldwirtschaft" zu verarbeiten, die zu einem großen Teil staatlich geförderten Möbelher-steller des formellen Sektors vor Probleme. Denn ein hoher Anteil des entsprechenden regional verfügbaren Tropenholzes wird in Form von Holzhalbwaren in andere Regionen Brasiliens verkauft oder exportiert. Für die Möbelhersteller in RBA sind die Einkaufspreise hochwertiger Holzvorprodukte, insbesondere wenn diese aus zertifiziertem Holz erzeugt werden, deshalb in den letzten Jahren stark gestiegen, während die Möbelpreise aufgrund der Konkurrenz zahlreicher kleiner informeller Produzenten, aber auch durch das Angebot kostengünstig produzierter Serienmöbel aus Südbrasilien unter Druck stehen. Nur wenige gut organisierte Möbelhersteller in RBA scheinen bislang tragfähige Strategien zu verfol-gen, um diesem Dilemma zu begegnen. Die Beziehung von Möbelherstellern zu ihren Abnehmern ist in allen drei Fallstudienregio-nen durch Abhängigkeiten der Möbelhersteller geprägt. In RBA hängen formell registrierte Möbelhersteller stark von öffentlichen Aufträgen ab. In SBS sind Möbelhersteller von der Serienproduktion für den Exportmarkt abhängig; vielfach geben Auslandskunden die Mo-delle vor und haben großen Einfluss auf die Möbelpreisbestimmung. Beim Möbelabsatz im Inland stehen die Hersteller in NRW wie in SBS großen Einkaufsverbänden oder Kon-zernunternehmen des Möbeleinzelhandels gegenüber. In allen drei Regionen erhält die Möbelindustrie von ihren unmittelbaren Möbelabnehmern wie von Endverbrauchern nur schwache "Forst"-Signale - die Herkunft des für die angebo-tenen Möbel verarbeiteten Holzes aus "legaler" oder "nachhaltiger" Waldbewirtschaftung ist allenfalls ein nachrangiges Einkaufskriterium bzw. ist sie nur in Marktnischen relevant. Eine Ausnahme bilden die öffentlichen Auftraggeber in RBA, deren Möbelbeschaffung explizit den Aufbau nachhaltiger regionaler Forst-Holz-Wertschöpfungsketten in Acre stüt-zen soll. Experten der drei Untersuchungsregionen bezeichneten die Interaktion von Möbelherstel-lern untereinander als wenig kollegial, sondern wettbewerbsgeprägt. Unternehmen koope-rierten primär in für den Wettbewerb wenig relevanten Bereichen (z.B. gemeinsame Mes-sebesuche im Ausland). Die Initiative zu intensiverer Kooperation gehe häufig von Ver-bänden oder staatlichen Organisationen aus. Die Unternehmensbesichtigungen und Gespräche mit Experten zeigten, dass die in die Untersuchung einbezogenen Möbelhersteller nicht über ein systematisch aufgebautes Umweltmanagement verfügen. Die Beschäftigung mit Umweltproblemen orientiere sich vorwiegend an den für sie relevanten umweltrechtlichen Vorschriften. In NRW befolgen die Möbelhersteller nach Experteneinschätzung durchweg die Umweltauflagen; ihre Pro-duktionsbetriebe unterliegen strengen Kontrollen der Umweltbehörden. In Brasilien um-fassen behördliche Umweltschutzanforderungen für Möbelhersteller zusätzlich zum inner-betrieblichen Umweltschutz auch die Auflage, die Holzherkunft aus legaler Waldnutzung nachzuweisen. Bezüglich der Umsetzung der Umweltschutzanforderungen auf betriebli-cher Ebene ergab sich in beiden brasilianischen Regionen ein differenziertes Bild. Theoriebezogene Ergebnisinterpretation Der Verfasser versuchte zu verstehen, wie Unternehmer und Manager in der holzverar-beitenden Industrie das eigene Umfeld wahrnehmen und deuten, wie sie Entscheidungen treffen und begründen. Im Fokus stand die Forstrationalität von Entscheidungsträgern in möbelerzeugenden Unternehmen. Von ihm verfolgte Interpretationsansätze waren: 1. die Unterscheidung von Anlässen forstbezogenen Verhaltens der Möbelhersteller; 2. die Unterscheidung von Verhaltensbezugsebenen und Zeithorizonten; 3. die Prüfung, inwieweit das spezifische Verhalten bezüglich der für die Möbelher-stellung beanspruchten natürlichen Ressource Wald generellen Verhaltensmu-stern von Entscheidungsträgern in Produktionsunternehmen entspricht. Zu (1) Anlässe forstbezogenen Verhaltens Gefragt werden kann nach der wahrgenommenen Dringlichkeit forstbezogener Signale, die ein Möbelhersteller aus seinem Umfeld erhält: Können Anspruchsgruppen aus seiner Sicht ein bestimmtes forstbezogenes Verhalten verlangen bzw. erzwingen? Die Fallstudi-en legen den Schluss nahe, dass Möbelhersteller Einflüsse von Produktketten-externen Anspruchsgruppen wahrnehmen und reflektieren. Die Intensität wahrgenommener An-sprüche ist jedoch offenbar nur selten so hoch, dass sie Reaktionen der Möbelhersteller auslöst. In der Untersuchung erkennbar waren aber Verhaltensänderungen brasilianischer Möbelhersteller nach Einführung der DOF-Dokumentation zum Nachweis der Beschaffung von Holz aus legalen Quellen. Im Umkehrschluss lässt sich vermuten, dass Möbelherstel-ler forstbezogene Themen aus ihren Umfeldern vorwiegend als Signale wahrnehmen, die sie ihrem Selbstverständnis entsprechend individuell bewertet mit ihren Strategien ver-knüpfen, die sie aber auch ignorieren können. Die Art der für die Herstellung eines Möbelstücks verwendeten Holzvorprodukte bzw. die Materialkombination lenkt die Aufmerksamkeit von Möbelkäufern mehr oder minder stark auf den Bezug zum "Forst", wodurch auch die Forstrationalität der Möbelhersteller beein-flusst wird. In der Untersuchung ergaben sich diesbezüglich Unterschiede des Selbstver-ständnisses und der Marketingkommunikation zwischen Herstellern von Möbeln aus Holzwerkstoffen und aus Massivholz, bei den letzteren wiederum bezüglich der Möbelher-stellung aus Tropenholz oder nicht-tropischen Holzarten. Hersteller von Massivholzmö-beln stellten häufig einen Bezug ihrer Möbel zur Natur oder zum Wald her. Dabei betonten Hersteller von Tropenholzmöbeln die Individualität einzigartiger Holzarten aus artenrei-chen Naturwäldern; Hersteller von Möbeln aus nicht-tropischen Holzarten hingegen hoben die Herkunft der Möbelhölzer aus nachhaltig bewirtschafteten "nicht-tropischen" Wäldern hervor. Hersteller von Holzwerkstoffmöbeln argumentierten "ökologisch" mit den Vorteilen hoher Holzausbeute bei der Herstellung und Verarbeitung von Holzwerkstoffen, wodurch Waldressourcen geschont würden. Die brasilianischen Möbelhersteller sehen sich mit Ungewissheiten der Holzversorgung konfrontiert; sie interpretieren diese unterschiedlich, auch innerhalb der beiden Fallstudi-enregionen. In allen drei Untersuchungsregionen bekannten sich die in die Untersuchung einbezogenen Möbelhersteller zur Verarbeitung von Holz aus unbedenklichen Quellen. Sie erwarten Absatzrisiken für den Fall diesbezüglicher Zweifel ihrer Abnehmer. Gegen-wärtig sei kritisches Hinterfragen der Herkunft von Möbelhölzern seitens der Möbelab-nehmer jedoch selten und beziehe sich vorwiegend auf Tropenholz. Zu (2) Verhaltensbezugsebenen und Zeithorizonte Waldbewirtschaftung ist nur in wenigen Fällen ein eigenes Tätigkeitsfeld von Möbelher-stellern. Mit ihrem forstbezogenen Verhalten ergreifen Möbelhersteller folglich in der Re-gel nicht unmittelbar forstwirtschaftliche Maßnahmen, sondern beeinflussen diese indirekt oder reagieren auf die von anderen Akteuren gesetzten Forstthemen. Dies erfolgt zum einen durch Auswahl der für die Möbelproduktion eingesetzten Materialien und deren Be-schaffung, also durch ein direkt an die Möbelproduktion gebundenes Verhalten. Zum an-deren geschieht dies durch den Umgang und die Kommunikation mit Anspruchsgruppen im unmittelbaren Umfeld und im Makroumfeld. Materialorientiertes Verhalten und die Be-ziehungen zu Anspruchsgruppen stehen jedoch nicht isoliert nebeneinander, sondern können miteinander verknüpft sein, etwa weil bei Materialwahl-Entscheidungen das Ver-trauen zu Lieferanten und Abnehmerpräferenzen berücksichtigt werden. Mit Blick auf die Zeithorizonte der Entscheidungen von Möbelherstellern machte die Ana-lyse deutlich, dass in deren Kurzfristperspektive Forstrationalität von untergeordneter Be-deutung ist und andere Aspekte der Unternehmensumfelder im Vordergrund stehen (z.B. Holzversorgung für das aktuelle Produktionsprogramm und Wettbewerb). In der mittel- und langfristigen Zeitperspektive hingegen erhalten forstbezogene Überlegungen und Maßnahmen (wie Einsatz alternativer Holzvorprodukte oder Verwendung von Holz aus zertifizierter Waldbewirtschaftung) größeres Gewicht. Zu (3) Spiegelt Forstrationalität generelle Verhaltensmuster? Etliche der in der Forschungsarbeit registrierten Ausprägungen von Forstrationalität der Möbelhersteller lassen sich allgemeinen Verhaltensmustern von Entscheidungsträgern in Wirtschaftsunternehmen zuordnen: Legitimation: Die in die Untersuchung einbezogenen Möbelhersteller in allen drei Unter-suchungsregionen hoben hervor, ihr eigenes forstbezogenes Verhalten, insbesondere die Wahl der verarbeiteten Holzvorprodukte, sei gesetzeskonform und ökologisch unbedenk-lich. Diesen Standpunkt vertraten sie unabhängig von ihren jeweiligen Möglichkeiten, die Rohstoffquellen der beschafften Materialien zu beurteilen und zu beeinflussen. Anpassung: Die Möbelhersteller reagieren auf Anforderungen aus ihren Umfeldern, etwa auf behördliche Vorschriften und Kontrollen, Kritik von Umweltschutzverbänden, Nachfra-ge von Verbrauchern oder veränderte Wettbewerbsbedingungen. Solche Reaktionen schließen auch das forstbezogene Verhalten ein, wobei Vermeidung (zum Beispiel Ver-zicht auf die Verarbeitung von Tropenholz) ein alternatives oder komplementäres Verhal-ten sein kann. Antizipation: Unternehmen entwickeln Antizipationsstrategien, um sich auf erwartete zu-künftige Herausforderungen, Risiken und Chancen frühzeitig einzustellen. Dieses Verhal-ten zeigten Möbelhersteller in allen drei Untersuchungsregionen, etwa in ihrem Umgang mit der Forst-Holz-Produktketten-Zertifizierung oder der Erprobung neuer Holzarten und Holzwerkstoffe. Innovation: Sie ist eine Form der Umsetzung von Anpassung und Antizipation, ist aber für die Massivholz-Möbelhersteller auch eine eigenständige Verhaltensform. Zum Teil haben sie dabei Aspekte der Waldbewirtschaftung (besonders deutlich bei den Möbelherstellern in SBS, die Plantagenbewirtschaftung als neues Geschäftsfeld integriert haben) und der Weiterentwicklung ihrer Rohstoffbasis von vornherein im Blick, zum Teil ergeben sich se-kundäre Effekte für die Forstwirtschaft. Die vorliegende Untersuchung zur "Forstrationalität" holzverarbeitender Unternehmen hat gezeigt, dass Möbelhersteller Stärken und Schwächen der Waldnutzung in ihrer Standort-region wahrnehmen und forstbezogene Entscheidungen reflektiert treffen. Wie sie ent-scheiden, hängt von den Rahmenbedingungen der Industrie, dem Verhalten ihrer An-spruchsgruppen, von den spezifischen Unternehmensstrategien, auch von Wertvorstel-lungen der Eigentümer und Manager ab. Ihnen stehen bestimmte staatliche und private Anspruchsgruppen mit Erwartungen gegenüber, die dem Konzept nachhaltiger Entwick-lung der Agenda 21 entsprechen. Die Unternehmensbeispiele der Fallstudien zeigen ein-zelne Ansatzpunkte für die Verwirklichung nachhaltiger Entwicklung in waldreichen Re-gionen durch die Herstellung von Möbeln. Jedoch erscheint das gegenwärtige forstbezo-gene Verhalten der Möbelhersteller nicht umfassend nachhaltigkeitsorientiert, sondern pragmatisch selektiv abgestimmt auf die Erfordernisse, Interessen und Handlungsmög-lichkeiten der Unternehmen. Potenzial der Möbelindustrie, höhere Wertschöpfung durch immaterielle Phasen der Produktion (ihr Marketing, speziell die Produktgestaltung) zu erreichen, ist vorhanden. Auf der Grundlage neutraler Nachhaltigkeitsüberprüfung in der Holzwertschöpfungskette durch anerkannte Forstzertifizierungs-Systeme könnten von Holzmöbelherstellern durchaus stärkere Impulse für die Entwicklung und Aufrechterhal-tung nachhaltiger Forstwirtschaft ausgehen. Abschließend seien die theoretischen Erklärungsansätze Ressourcenabhängigkeit und Sensemaking angesprochen, denen in dieser Forschungsarbeit gefolgt wurde. Der Zu-sammenhang zwischen beiden ist bereits aus Pfeffer (1978) ableitbar. Steimle (2008) stellt diesen Zusammenhang explizit her, um das Nachhaltigkeitsverhalten von Unter-nehmen theoretisch zu erklären. Auch der Verfasser kombinierte beide Ansätze: Das Konzept der Ressourcenabhängigkeit war hilfreich bei der Analyse der Umfeldeinbettung der Möbelhersteller und bei der Interpretation ihrer Beziehungen zu bestimmten An-spruchsgruppen; der Sensemaking-Ansatz erleichterte es, die Umfeldwahrnehmung aus Sicht der Entscheidungsträger in der Möbelindustrie und ihr forstbezogenes Verhalten zu verstehen. ; Research concept The guideline to sustainability provided by Agenda 21, and the associated expectations of private enterprise with respect to their role in sustainability, represent a frame of reference for the study presented in this Ph.D. thesis. Agenda 21, a central document of the United Nations Conference on Climate and Development (UNCED 1992), and documents pro-duced by the following conferences attribute a central role to private enterprise in the real-isation of sustainable development. Commercial enterprises are expected to create value on the basis of an environmentally acceptable use of natural resources. Responsible en-terprises should accommodate the interests of the respective stakeholder groups, and these groups should in turn support private enterprise in the achievement of sustainable development. Non-governmental environmental organisations' expectations of private enterprise revolve around the environmentally appropriate use of natural resources and, accordingly, they exert pressure on businesses to do so. Nevertheless, the literature documents conflicts between commercial enterprise's understanding of its role and the expectations of interna-tional organisations and civil stakeholder groups. From the perspective of enterprise, doubts exist over whether the demands of these actors are reasonable and over the ex-tent to which commercial enterprise should assume the responsibility attributed to it. The objective of this study was to deepen the knowledge of the use by small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) of the natural resources providing the raw materials necessary for their production activities – their role in market chains, their relationships with stake-holders and the consideration given to the management of natural resources. Enterprises manufacturing wood furniture were chosen for the study, as a representative example of an SME branch within the wood processing industry. As furniture production facilitates high value creation from raw wood, this example was deemed to be revealing with respect to the general assumption of Agenda 21 that high economic value creation from wood generates impulses for sustainable forestry. The investigation was carried out in regions with contrasting social, economic and especially forest and wood industry framework con-ditions. The research questions were: How do furniture manufacturers perceive 'forestry'? What is the relationship between furniture producers and the corresponding stakeholder groups, and how do they communicate 'forestry' to these groups? How do furniture producers ac-count for 'forestry' in their decisions? The author posed these questions under the overarching concept 'forest rationality.' The 'forest rationality' construct outlines how decision makers in the wood industry perceive forest management as the basis of their raw material supply, and how they account for it within decision making. It incorporates all aspects of the perception and interpretation, as well as the behaviour of wood processing enterprises with respect to the source of their raw material, 'forestry.' The basis for this is theories relating to resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, 2003; Steimle, 2008) and 'sensemaking' (Weick 1995, 2001). The information used to answer the research questions was obtained from three centres of the furniture industry in Brazil and in Germany, each with different social and forestry framework conditions. The three centres were in Rio Branco do Acre (RBA) in the Bra-zilian Amazon, in São Bento do Sul (SBS) in southern Brazil and in Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW) in Germany. The comparative data collection carried out in the three regions posed particular demands in terms of the research methods. The approach chosen and the design of the data collection instruments were identical in the three regions. Funda-mental empirical knowledge was provided by means of a content analysis of furniture in-dustry journals (1) and the evaluation of secondary information (2). Guided telephone interviews with experts (3) illuminated the environments in which the enterprises operate and provided general insights into the behaviour of decision makers in the furniture in-dustry. The spectrum of forestry reasoning of the decision makers was further developed through personal contact made during visits to companies. In each region two producers of solid wood furniture and a producer of furniture from derived timber products were se-lected (4). Results of the journal analysis The quantitative content analysis of industry journals served to provide information about the overall spectrum of issues relevant for the furniture industry, and allowed for an as-sessment of the relative significance of the issues 'environmental protection' and 'forest resources/forestry.' The conclusions may be summarised as follows: 1. The issues 'environment' and 'forestry' are of interest within the furniture sector, but receive less attention in the industry press than topics such as economics, technology and competition. 2. In the furniture industry in both Germany and Brazil, the most important themes under the heading 'environment' are aspects concerning the local production site (enterprise-internal environmental protection). 3. 'Forestry'-related aspects are the focus of greater attention within the Brazilian fur-niture industry than the German. Results of the regional case studies The results of the research phases (2) to (4) are presented in the dissertation in the form of three regional case studies with an identical structure, namely a) the framework condi-tions affecting furniture manufacturers, b) non-market stakeholder groups, c) suppliers of wood products, d) furniture consumers, e) interaction between furniture manufacturers, f) forest and environmental management. The regional case studies confirmed the view provided by the analysis of the industry press that the specific situation of the entire regional 'forestry and wood industry' affects the Brazilian furniture manufacturers more so than those in NRW. In RBA there have re-cently been drastic changes in forestry and environmental policy, as well as institutional changes, which have generated new framework conditions for all wood producing and processing enterprises. In the SBS region 'forestry' occupies furniture manufacturers as much as other branches of the wood sector due to existing or expected future shortages of wood, and as a consequence of state control over the use of wood from legitimate forestry. In NRW, on the other hand, native forest management and the processing of materials derived from non-tropical tree species are considered to be unproblematic, and forestry-related themes do not appear to be critical in the macro-environment of the furni-ture industry. In NRW and in SBS the issue of core economic data for the sector as a whole, and branches within the sector, of national and international market trends and of technological developments dominate the agenda of the furniture manufacturers. The furniture manufacturers are subject to restrictions imposed by environmental authori-ties. The control of enterprise-internal environmental protection, linked in part with work safety, was identified as a focus of the activities of these authorities in all three regions. Unlike in Germany, in Brazil the sourcing of wood by wood processing enterprises is sub-ject to official control. The representative associations within the furniture industry in all three case study regions define as their central task the representation of the interests of their member organisa-tions to policy makers and society. In both Brazilian case study regions, in which forestry-related problems greatly occupy the furniture industry, the furniture industry associations also view forestry-related matters as being within their remit. In RBA the responsible as-sociation is seeking to advance the official registration of furniture manufacturers within the informal sector and to oblige them to process only wood obtained from legal sources. In SBS the furniture associations have focused considerable attention on the development of regional forestry and the supply of wood to the furniture industry in periods of wood shortage. At the time of this study, however, other economic problems had pushed the issue of forestry into the background. It was observed that the furniture producers studied as part of the research are rarely in direct contact with private environmental organisations. However, they are aware that these organisations indirectly influence the framework conditions affecting the furniture industry through consumer campaigns, by placing demands on the first links of the forest-wood value chain and through political lobbying. The dependence of the furniture producers on the suppliers of wood products varies be-tween the three study regions. This dependency is weak in NRW because the furniture manufacturers can source materials regionally and beyond without any difficulties, and because large wood suppliers take into consideration the demands of the furniture in-dustry with respect to quality, dimensions and the preparation of sawn wood and derived timber materials. This contrasts with the situation in Brazil. In SBS large to moderately large furniture manufacturers have taken a number of steps towards backward vertical integration (establishment of own sawmills, in some cases resorting to the management of pine plantations) or have sought alternative sources of pre-finished materials. The rea-sons for this are the uncertainty of the wood supply and the quality of the pre-finished wood products. In RBA the statutory requirement that only wood derived from 'legitimate sources' be used in manufacturing poses problems for the largely state-sponsored furni-ture manufacturers in the formal sector. A large proportion of the regionally available tropical wood is sold in or exported to other regions of Brazil in the form of part-wood goods. The prices paid by furniture manufacturers for high quality pre-finished wood pro-ducts, particularly those made of certified wood, have increased considerably in recent years, whereas furniture prices are under great pressure due to competition from numer-ous small, informal manufacturers and as a result of the supply of cheaply manufactured, mass produced furniture from southern Brazil. As yet, only a few well-organised furniture manufacturers in RBA appear to have adopted a strategy capable of countering this di-lemma. In all three regions the relationship between furniture manufacturers and their customers is characterised by dependencies of the furniture manufacturers. In RBA formally regis-tered furniture manufacturers are greatly dependent upon public contracts. In SBS furni-ture manufacturers are dependent upon mass production for the export market, with inter-national customers often specifying the models and exerting a considerable influence on price setting. In terms of national sales, the manufacturers in NRW and in SBS are pitted against the large purchasing associations and groups within the furniture retail industry. In all three regions the furniture industry receives only weak 'forestry' signals from its di-rect costumers and end users – that the wood used in the furniture provided is sourced from 'legal' or 'sustainable' forest management is, at best, a subordinate purchase cri-terion, or is only relevant in niches within the market. The public clients in RBA are an exception as their furniture acquisitions are explicitly intended to support the development of sustainable regional forest-wood value chains in Acre. Experts from the three research regions characterised the interaction between furniture manufacturers as competitive, with little cooperation evident. Any cooperation between the enterprises occurs primarily in those areas that are of little relevance for competition (e.g., visits to exhibitions abroad). Initiatives prompting intensive cooperation often stem from associations or governmental organisations. The visits to the enterprises in the three regions and discussions with the experts revealed that the furniture manufacturers involved in the study do not possess a systematically de-veloped system of environmental management. Consideration of environmental problems is oriented primarily towards the relevant environmental regulations. According to the ex-perts, in NRW the furniture manufacturers adhere to the rules. Their production facilities are subject to strict controls by the environmental authorities. In Brazil the statutory envi-ronmental regulations for furniture manufacturers include not only the enterprise-internal environmental protection stipulations but also the means to demonstrate that the wood used stems from legal sources. The implementation of the environmental protection re-quirements at operational level was found to be variable in the two Brazilian regions. Interpretation of the results in a theoretical context The author sought to understand how entrepreneurs and managers in the wood process-ing industry perceive and interpret their own environment; how they make and justify deci-sions. The focus was on the forestry reasoning exhibited by decision makers in furniture manufacturing enterprises. The interpretative approaches followed were: 1. The differentiation of motives for forestry-relevant behaviour displayed by furniture manufacturers; 2. The differentiation of behavioural planes of reference and time horizons; 3. The examination of the extent to which the specific behaviour with respect to the forest resource, as the principal source of the raw material used in the manufac-ture of furniture, corresponds to the general behavioural patterns of decision mak-ers in manufacturing enterprises. On (1) motives for forestry-related behaviour One might enquire as to the perceived urgency of the forestry-related signals that a furni-ture manufacturer receives from his environment: can, as far as the manufacturer is con-cerned, stakeholder groups demand or even force a certain forestry-related behaviour? The case studies suggest that furniture manufacturers perceive and take into consider-ation influences exerted by stakeholder groups external to the product chain. It would ap-pear, however, that the intensity of the perceived demands is rarely so high as to cause a reaction on the part of the manufacturers. Changes in the behaviour of Brazilian manufac-turers did become evident in the study after the introduction of the DOF documentation requiring that they be able to prove the wood they use is sourced legally. Conversely, it can be assumed that furniture manufacturers predominantly perceive forestry-related themes within their environment as signals, which they assess individually on the basis of their own beliefs and either integrate within their strategies or ignore. The type of pre-finished wood product – or combination of materials – used in the manu-facture of a piece of furniture serves to focus the attention of furniture buyers onto the relationship with 'forestry' to a greater or lesser extent, through which the forestry reason-ing of the manufacturers is also influenced. The investigation revealed differences in understanding and in marketing approaches between the manufacturers of furniture made of derived timber products and those of furniture made from solid wood; and in the latter case there was a further distinction between users of tropical and non-tropical tree spe-cies. The manufacturers of solid wood furniture often draw a link between their furniture and nature or the forest. Manufacturers of furniture made with tropical wood emphasise the individuality of unique types of wood stemming from natural forests rich in species. The manufacturers of furniture using non-tropical species, alternatively, accentuate the fact that their wood stems from sustainably managed 'non-tropical' forests. Manufacturers using derived timber products base their 'ecological' arguments on the advantages of the low levels of waste in the production and processing of derived timber products, as a re-sult of which forest resources are used more efficiently. The Brazilian furniture manufacturers are concerned by the uncertainties surrounding the supply of wood. The associated problems are perceived differently by different manufac-turers, even within the two case study regions. In all three study regions the furniture manufacturers involved in the study avowed the use of wood from legitimate sources, and expect risks to their sales if their customers were to have doubts in this regard. At present there is little critical scrutiny of the origins of the wood used in furniture by the consumer, however, and that which exists focuses predominantly on the use of tropical wood. On (2) behavioural planes of reference and time horizons In only very few cases is forest management an activity undertaken by furniture manufac-turers. The forestry-related behaviour of the furniture manufacturers does not involve di-rect participation in forest management operations, but rather in influencing these indi-rectly, or in reacting to the forest issues taken up by other actors. This is expressed in the choice of the materials used in furniture manufacture, and in their procurement; that is, through behaviour linked directly to furniture manufacture. It is also expressed in the communication with stakeholder groups situated in the enterprises' immediate surround-ings and in their macro-environment. Material-oriented behaviour and the relationship with stakeholder groups are not independent issues but may be linked; for example, because in decisions concerning material selection the manufacturer's trust in the supplier and the preferences of the consumers are taken into consideration. In terms of the time horizons of the decisions made by furniture manufacturers, the analy-sis made clear that forestry reasoning plays a subordinate role in their short term perspec-tive, and that other aspects are of greater importance for the enterprises in question (e.g., wood supply for the current production programme and competition). Forestry-related considerations and measures (e.g., the use of alternative pre-finished wood products or the use of certified wood) are afforded greater weighting in the medium to long term. On (3) whether forest rationality reflects general patterns of behaviour Many of the forms of forest rationality of the furniture manufacturers identified in the re-search can be matched to general behavioural patterns of decision makers in commercial enterprises: Legitimacy: The furniture manufacturers from all three regions involved in the study em-phasised that their own forestry-related behaviour complies with the law and is ecologi-cally sound, particularly the choice of pre-finished wood products. They adopted this posi-tion irrespective of their abilities to judge or influence the sources of the raw materials pro-cured. Adaptation: The furniture manufactures react to demands from their environment, such as statutory regulations and controls, criticism from environmental protection associations, requests from customers and altered competition conditions. Such reactions also incorpo-rate their forestry-related behaviour, with avoidance (e.g., avoiding the use of tropical wood) a possible alternative or complementary behaviour. Anticipation: Enterprises develop anticipation strategies in order to prepare in advance for expected future challenges, risks and opportunities. This behaviour was exhibited by furni-ture manufacturers in all three study areas; for example, in their manner of dealing with forest-wood product chain certification and in the testing of new wood types and derived timber products. Innovation: Innovation is a form of manifestation of adaptation and anticipation, but is also a distinct form of behaviour in the case of the manufacturers of solid wood furniture. They have, to a certain extent, aspects of forest management (particularly evident in the case of the furniture manufacturers in SBS that have integrated plantation management as a new area of operations) and the further development of their raw material base firmly in focus from the outset. There are also secondary effects for forestry. This study of the 'forest rationality' of wood processing enterprises shows that furniture manufacturers perceive the strengths and weaknesses associated with forest utilisation in their regions, and that they reflect carefully on forestry-related decisions. The decisions they make depend on the framework conditions within the industry, the behaviour of the associated stakeholder groups, the strategy of the specific enterprise and on the ideals of the owners and managers. They are confronted by the expectations of certain state and private stakeholder groups; expectations that correspond with the concept of sustainable development espoused by Agenda 21. The enterprises included in the case studies re-vealed individual starting points for the achievement of sustainable development in forest-rich regions through the production of furniture. However, the current forestry-related be-haviour of the manufacturers is not comprehensively geared towards sustainability. Rather it is pragmatically selective, tailored to the needs, interests and possible courses of action available to the respective enterprise. The potential for furniture manufacturers to achieve greater value creation in the non-material phases of the production process (marketing, and especially product design) exists. On the basis of neutral sustainability assessments in the wood value creation chain, carried out by recognised forestry certification systems, it is certainly possible for manufacturers of wood furniture to create greater impulses for the development and maintenance of sustainable forestry. Finally, to the theoretical approaches offering a potential explanation considered in the study, namely resource dependence and 'sensemaking.' The connection between the two could already be inferred from Pfeffer (1978). Steimle (2008) revealed the link between the two explicitly, in order to explain theoretically the sustainability behaviour of enter-prises. The author of this study also combined both approaches. The concept of resource dependence was helpful in the analysis of how embedded manufacturers are in their envi-ronment, and in the interpretation of their relationship with certain stakeholder groups. The 'sensemaking' approach rendered it easier to understand the perception by decision mak-ers in the industry of their business environment and their forestry-related behaviour.
Threats To International Peace And Security. The Situation In The Middle East ; United Nations S/PV.8233 Security Council Seventy-third year 8233rd meeting Saturday, 14 April 2018, 11 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Netherlands. . Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren Poland. . Mr. Radomski Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-10891 (E) *1810891* S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 2/26 18-10891 The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Threats to international peace and security The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to warmly welcome His Excellency Secretary-General António Guterres, to whom I now give the floor. The Secretary-General: I have been following closely the reports of air strikes in Syria conducted by the United States, France and United Kingdom. Last night at 10 p.m. New York time, the United States President announced the beginning of air strikes with the participation of France and the United Kingdom, indicating they were targeting the chemical-weapons capabilities of the Syrian Government to deter their future use. The statement was followed by announcements from Prime Minister May and President Macron. The air strikes were reportedly limited to three military locations inside Syria. The first targets included the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre at Al-Mazzah airport in Damascus, the second an alleged chemical-weapons storage facility west of Homs and the third an alleged chemical-weapons equipment storage site and command post, also near Homs. The Syrian Government announced surface-to-air missile responsive activity. Both United States and Russian sources indicated there were no civilian casualties. However, the United Nations is unable to independently verify the details of all those reports. As Secretary-General of the United Nations, it is my duty to remind Member States that there is an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, and with international law in general. The Charter is very clear on these issues. The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. I call on the members of the Security Council to unite and exercise that responsibility, and I urge all members to show restraint in these dangerous circumstances and to avoid any act that could escalate matters and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. As I did yesterday (see S/PV.8231), I stress the importance of preventing the situation from spiralling out of control. Any use of chemical weapons is abhorrent, and the suffering it causes is horrendous. I have repeatedly expressed my deep disappointment that the Security Council has failed to agree on a dedicated mechanism for ensuring effective accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. I urge the Security Council to assume its responsibilities and fill that gap, and I will continue to engage with Member States to help to achieve that objective. A lack of accountability emboldens those who use such weapons by providing them with the reassurance of impunity, and that in turn further weakens the norm proscribing the use of chemical weapons, as well as undermining the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture as a whole. The seriousness of the recent allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Douma requires a thorough investigation using impartial, independent and professional expertise. I reaffirm my full support for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic in undertaking the required investigation. The team is already in Syria. I am informed that its operations plan for visiting the site is complete and that the Mission is ready to go. I am confident it will have full access, without any restrictions or impediments to its performance of its activities. To repeat what I said yesterday, Syria represents the most serious threat to international peace and security in the world today. In Syria we see confrontations and proxy wars involving several national armies, a number of armed opposition groups, many national and international militias, foreign fighters from all over the world and various terrorist organizations. From the beginning, we have witnessed systematic violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international law in general, in utter disregard of the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. For eight long years, the people of Syria have endured suffering upon suffering. They have lived 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 3/26 through a litany of horrors, atrocity crimes, sieges, starvation, indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, the use of chemical weapons, forced displacement, sexual violence, torture, detention and enforced disappearances. The list goes on. At this critical juncture, I call on all States Members to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including the norms against chemical weapons. If the law is ignored, it is undermined. There can be no military solution to the crisis. The solution must be political, and we must find ways to make real progress towards a genuine and credible political solution that meets the aspirations of the Syrian people to dignity and freedom, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). I have asked my Special Envoy to come to New York as soon as possible to consult with me on the most effective way to accelerate the political process. The President (spoke in Spanish): I thank the Secretary-General for his valuable briefing. I shall now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Russia has called this emergency meeting of the Security Council to discuss the aggressive actions of the United States and its allies against Syria. This is now our fifth meeting on the subject in a week. President Putin of the Russian Federation made a special statement today. "On 14 April, the United States, with the support of its allies, launched an air strike on military and civilian infrastructure targets in the Syrian Arab Republic. An act of aggression against a sovereign State on the front lines in the fight against terrorism was committed without permission from the Security Council and in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms and principles of international law. Just as it did a year ago, when it attacked Syria's Al-Shayrat airbase in Syria, the United States took a staged use of toxic substances against civilians as a pretext, this time in Douma, outside Damascus. Having visited the site of the alleged incident, Russian military experts found no traces of chlorine or any other toxic agent. Not a single local resident could confirm that such an attack had occurred. "The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has sent experts to Syria to investigate all the circumstances. However, a group of Western countries cynically ignored this and took military action without waiting for the results of the investigation. "Russia vehemently condemns this attack on Syria, where Russian military personnel are helping the legitimate Government to combat terrorism. "The actions of the United States are making the already catastrophic humanitarian situation in Syria even worse, inflicting suffering on civilians, for all intents and purposes enabling the terrorists who have been tormenting the Syrian people for seven years, and producing yet another wave of refugees fleeing the country and the region in general. The current escalation of the Syrian situation is having a destructive effect on the entire system of international relations. History will have the last word, and it has already revealed the heavy responsibility that Washington bears for the carnage in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya." Russia has done everything it could to persuade the United States and its allies to abandon their militaristic plans threatening a new round of violence in Syria and destabilization in the Middle East. Today, and at the Council meeting we called yesterday (see S/PV.8231), the Secretary-General expressed his concern about how events are developing. Washington, London and Paris, however, preferred to let the calls for sanity go unheard. The United States and its allies continue to demonstrate a flagrant disregard for international law, although as permanent members of the Security Council they have a special duty to uphold the provisions of the Charter. It was a disgrace to hear an article of the United States Constitution cited as justification of this aggression. We respect the right of every State to honour its own fundamental law. But it is high time that Washington learned that it is the Charter of the United Nations that governs the international code of conduct on the use of force. It will be interesting to see how the peoples of Great Britain and France react to the fact that their leaders are participating in unlawful military ventures that invoke the United States Constitution. These three countries constantly lean towards neocolonialism. They scorn the Charter and the Security Council, which they attempt, shamelessly, to use for their own unscrupulous purposes. They do no serious S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 4/26 18-10891 work in the Council. They refuse to consult with us, while falsely assuring everyone of the opposite. They are undermining the Council's authority. The alleged use of chemical weapons in the Syrian city of Douma has been cited as the excuse for this aggression. After an inspection by our specialists, Russia's representatives stated unequivocally that no such incident took place. Moreover, people were found to have taken part in staging the incident, which was inspired and organized by foreign intelligence services. After the matter emerged, the Syrian authorities immediately invited experts from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to try to establish all the circumstances through a field mission to Douma. The visa formalities were dealt with quickly and security guarantees given. As the air strikes began, the specialists were already in Syria and preparing to begin their work. I would like to remind Council members and everyone else that on 10 April (see S/PV.8228), when our draft resolution (S/2018/322) on ensuring the security of the work of the OPCW's special mission was blocked, we were assured that there was no need for such a document. They said that no additional effort on the part of the Security Council was necessary to ensure that the mission could reach Douma and conduct an investigation of the chemical incident. Now, however, we can see that we were absolutely right. Yesterday, some of our colleagues — some out of naivety and others out of cynicism — told us that this situation had allegedly arisen owing to the lack of an independent investigative mechanism. The aggression today has shown, as we said, that this had nothing whatever to do with it. The OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mission (JIM) was in place during last year's attack on the Al-Shayrat airbase, but that did not stop the United States from launching a missile attack. After that, the JIM spent six months tailoring its conclusions to justify the strike. We have said over and over again that they do not need any investigations. They did not need them then and they do not need them now. The organizers of the aggression did not even wait for the international organization that is authorized to establish the basic facts to do so. Apparently they had established and instantly identified the perpetrators, after disseminating rumours about them through social networks with the help of the militias they sponsor and the non-governmental organizations that are their clients. This was backed up by mythical secret intelligence. Their masks — or rather the White Helmets — have come off once again. We have become accustomed to the fact that their efforts to achieve their dubious geopolitical aims, the aggressor countries deliberately blame the so-called Assad regime for every evil. There has been a trend recently to shift the blame onto Russia, which, as they tell it, has been unable to restrain Syria's so-called dictator. All of this goes according to a tried-and- true formula, whereby a provocation results in a false accusation, which results in a false verdict, which results in punishment. Is that how these people want to conduct international affairs? This is hooliganism in international relations, and not on a petty scale, given that we are talking about the actions of key nuclear Powers. Several missiles were aimed at the research centre facilities in Barzeh and Jamraya. There have been two recent OPCW inspections there with unrestricted access to their entire premises. The specialists found no trace of activities that would contravene the Chemical Weapons Convention. Syria's scientific research institutions are used for strictly peaceful activities aimed at improving the efficiency of the national economy. Do they want Syria to have no national economy left at all? Do they want to kick this country — only a few years ago one of the most developed in the Middle East — back into the Stone Age? Do they want to finish whatever their sanctions have not yet accomplished? And yet they still contrive false breast-beating about the sufferings of ordinary Syrians. But they have no interest in ordinary Syrians, who are sick of war and glad about the restoration of the legitimate authorities in the liberated territories. Their aggressive actions merely worsen the humanitarian situation that they claim to care about so deeply. They could end the conflict in Syria in the space of 24 hours. All that is needed is for Washington, London and Paris to give the order to their tame terrorists to stop fighting the legitimate authorities and their own people. The attacks were aimed at Syrian military airfields that are used for operations against terrorist organizations, a highly original contribution to the fight against international terrorism, which, as Washington never tires of saying, is the sole reason for its military presence in Syria, something that we are extremely doubtful about. Rather, it is becoming increasingly clear that those in the West who hide 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 5/26 behind humanitarian rhetoric and try to justify their military presence in Syria based on the need to defeat the jihadists are in fact acting in concert with them to dismember the country, a design confirmed by the categorical refusal of the United States and its allies to assist in the restoration of the areas of Syria that have been liberated by Government forces. Their aggression is a powerful blow and a threat to the prospects for continuing the political process under the auspices of the United Nations, which, despite the real difficulties, is moving forward, albeit at varying speed. Why do they bother endlessly pinning all their hopes on the Geneva process when they themselves are driving it straight towards yet another crisis? We urge the United States and its allies to immediately halt their acts of aggression against Syria and refrain from them going forward. We have proposed a brief draft resolution for the Council's attention on which we request that a vote be held at the end of this meeting. We appeal to the members of the Security Council. Now is not the time to evade responsibility. The world is watching. Stand up for our principles. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I thank the Secretary-General for his briefing today. This is the fifth Security Council meeting in the past week in which we have addressed the situation in Syria. A week has gone by in which we have talked. We have talked about the victims in Douma. We have talked about the Al-Assad regime and its patrons, Russia and Iran. We have spent a week talking about the unique horror of chemical weapons. The time for talk ended last night. We are here today because three permanent members of the Security Council acted. The United Kingdom, France, and the United States acted not in revenge, not in punishment and not in a symbolic show of force. We acted to deter the future use of chemical weapons by holding the Syrian regime responsible for its crimes against humanity. We can all see that a Russian disinformation campaign is in full force this morning, but Russia's desperate attempts at deflection cannot change the facts. A large body of information indicates that the Syrian regime used chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April. There is clear information demonstrating Al-Assad's culpability. The pictures of dead children were not fake news; they were the result of the Syrian regime's barbaric inhumanity. And they were the result of the regime's and Russia's failure to live up to their international commitments to remove all chemical weapons from Syria. The United States, France and the United Kingdom acted after careful evaluation of those facts. The targets we selected were at the heart of the Syrian regime's illegal chemical-weapon programme. The strikes were carefully planned to minimize civilian casualties. The responses were justified, legitimate and proportionate. The United States and its allies did everything they could to use the tools of diplomacy to get rid of Al-Assad's arsenal of chemical weapons. We did not give diplomacy just one chance. We gave it chance after chance. Six times. That is how many times Russia vetoed Security Council resolutions to address chemical weapons in Syria. Our efforts go back even further. In 2013, the Security Council adopted resolution 2118 (2013), requiring the Al-Assad regime to destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons. Syria committed to abiding by the Chemical Weapons Convention, meaning that it could no longer have chemical weapons on its soil. President Putin said that Russia would guarantee that Syria complied. We hoped that this diplomacy would succeed in putting an end to the horror of chemical attacks in Syria, but as we have seen from the past year, that did not happen. While Russia was busy protecting the regime, Al-Assad took notice. The regime knew that it could act with impunity, and it did. In November, Russia used its veto to kill the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, the main tool we had to figure out who used chemical weapons in Syria. Just as Russia was using its veto (see S/PV.8107), the Al-Assad regime used sarin, leading to dozens of injuries and deaths. Russia's veto was the green light for the Al-Assad regime to use these most barbaric weapons against the Syrian people, in complete violation of international law. The United States and our allies were not going to let that stand. Chemical weapons are a threat to us all. They are a unique threat — a type of weapon so evil that the international community agreed that they must be banned. We cannot stand by and let Russia trash every international norm that we stand for, and allow the use of chemical weapons to go unanswered. Just as the Syrian regime's use of chemical weapons last weekend was not an isolated incident, our response is part of a new course charted last year to deter future use of chemical weapons. Our Syrian strategy has not changed. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 6/26 18-10891 However, the Syrian regime has forced us to take action based on its repeated use of chemical weapons. Since the April 2017 chemical attack at Khan Shaykhoun, the United States has imposed hundreds of sanctions on individuals and entities involved in chemical-weapons use in Syria and North Korea. We have designated entities in Asia, the Middle East and Africa that have facilitated chemical-weapons proliferation. We have revoked the visas of Russian intelligence officers in response to the chemical attack in Salisbury. We will continue to seek out and call out anyone who uses and anyone who aids in the use of chemical weapons. With yesterday's military action, our message was crystal clear. The United States of America will not allow the Al-Assad regime to continue to use chemical weapons. Last night, we obliterated the major research facility that it used to assemble weapons of mass murder. I spoke to the President this morning, and he said that if the Syrian regime should use this poison gas again, the United States is locked and loaded. When our President draws a red line, our President enforces the red line. The United States is deeply grateful to the United Kingdom and France for their part in the coalition to defend the prohibition of chemical weapons. We worked in lock step; we were in complete agreement. Last night, our great friends and indispensable allies shouldered a burden that benefits all of us. The civilized world owes them its thanks. In the weeks and months to come, the Security Council should take time to reflect on its role in defending the international rule of law. The Security Council has failed in its duty to hold those who use chemical weapons to account. That failure is largely due to Russian obstruction. We call on Russia to take a hard look at the company it keeps, live up to its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Council, and defend the actual principles the United Nations was meant to promote. Last night, we successfully hit the heart of Syria's chemical weapons enterprise, and because of these actions we are confident that we have crippled Syria's chemical weapons programme. We are prepared to sustain this pressure if the Syrian regime is foolish enough to test our will. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): These are uncertain times and today we deal with exceptional circumstance. Acting with our American and French allies, in the early hours of this morning the United Kingdom conducted coordinated, targeted and precise strikes to degrade Al-Assad's chemical weapons capability and deter their future use. The British Royal Air Force launched Storm Shadow missiles at a military facility some 15 miles west of Homs, where the regime is assessed to keep chemical weapons in breach of Syria's obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. A full assessment has not yet been completed, but we believe that the strikes to have been successful. Furthermore, none of the British, United States or French aircraft or missiles involved in this operation were successfully engaged by Syrian air defences, and there is also no indication that Russian air defence systems were employed. Our action was a limited, targeted and effective strike. There were clear boundaries that expressly sought to avoid escalation, and we did everything possible, including rigorous planning, before any action was undertaken to ensure that we mitigated and minimized the impact on civilians. Together, our action will significantly degrade the Syrian regime's ability to research, develop and deploy chemical weapons and deter their future use. The United Kingdom Prime Minister has said that we are clear about who is responsible for the atrocity of the use of chemical weapons. A significant body of information, including intelligence, indicates that the Syrian regime is responsible for the attack we saw last Saturday. Some of the evidence that leads us to this conclusion is as follows. There are open source accounts alleging that a barrel bomb was used to deliver the chemicals. Multiple open source reports claim that a regime helicopter was observed above the city of Douma on the evening of 7 April. The opposition does not operate helicopters or use barrel bombs. And reliable intelligence indicates that Syrian military officials coordinated what appears to be the use of chlorine in Douma on 7 April. No other group could have carried out this attack. Indeed, Da'esh, for example, does not even have a presence in Douma. The Syrian regime has been killing its own people for seven years. Its use of chemical weapons, which has exacerbated the human suffering, is a serious crime of international concern as a breach of the customary international law prohibition on the use of chemical weapons, and that amounts to a war crime and a crime against humanity. Any State is permitted under international law, on an exceptional basis, to 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 7/26 take measures in order to alleviate overwhelming humanitarian suffering. The legal basis for the use of force for the United Kingdom is humanitarian intervention, which requires that three conditions to be met. First, there must be convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and urgent relief. I think that the debates in the Council and the briefings we have had from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and others have proved that. Secondly, it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved. I think that the vetoes have shown us that. Thirdly, the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of humanitarian suffering. It must be strictly limited in time and in scope to this aim. I think we have heard both in my intervention in Ambassador Haley's how that has also been met. The history of the Syrian conflict is a litany of threats to peace and violations of international law. The Security Council has met 113 times since the Syrian war started. It was therefore not for want of international diplomatic effort that we find ourselves in this position today. After a pattern of chemical-weapons use since the outbreak of the conflict, Al-Assad defied the international community in 2013 by launching a sarin gas attack on eastern Ghouta, which left more than 800 people dead. Despite the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013) and despite four years of patient engagement, Syria continues to use chemical weapons against its people and has failed to answer a long list of serious questions. The only conclusion we can reach is that Syria has not declared or destroyed all of its chemical weapons, despite its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. This is not assertion on our part but a matter of record, and I draw the Russian Ambassador's attention to his points about Barazan and Jimrya. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) still has unanswered questions and discrepancies. He knows this. We all know this. The Council was briefed by the OPCW Director-General. Resolution 2118 (2013) decides in the event of non-compliance to impose measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. Yet on 28 February 2017, when the United Kingdom together with France, proposed a draft resolution (S/2017/172) taking measures under Chapter VII short of the use of force, Russia vetoed (see S/PV.7893). The very least the Security Council should have been able to do was to follow up on the findings of the report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism by extending its mandate. Yet four times Russia vetoed different proposals from different Council Members to do just that. The Syrian regime and it supporters are responsible for the gravest violations of international humanitarian law in modern history. They have used indiscriminate weapons, notably barrel bombs and cluster munitions, against civilians, and they have deliberately targeted medical facilities and schools, as well as humanitarian personnel and civilian objects. They have used sieges and starvation as methods of warfare, accompanied by attacks on opposition-held civilian areas. The regime has persistently obstructed humanitarian aid and medical evacuations. Tens of thousands of people have been illegally detained, tortured and executed by the regime. This is one of the most serious challenges to the international non-proliferation regime we have ever faced. A State party has violated the Chemical Weapons Convention, it has defied the Security Council, and it has broken international law. Repeated attempts over several years to hold them to account have been met with Russian obstruction and resistance. In the Security Council, we have repeatedly attempted to overcome this obstruction without success. We are faced with a litany of violations, no sense of guilt, no sense of regret, no sense of responsibility, a shameful record, wrapped in a mix of denial, deceit and disinformation. I would invite those like the Russian Ambassador who speak about the Charter to consider the following. It is hard to believe that it is in line with the principles and purposes of the Charter to use or condone the use of chemical weapons, and in the United Kingdom's view it cannot be illegal to use force to prevent the killing of such numbers of innocent people. I will take no lessons in international law from Russia. Despite all the foregoing, we would like to look forward. The United Kingdom, together with France and the United States, will continue to pursue a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian crisis. My French colleague will say more about our work in a few moments. We believe that it must comprise four elements. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 8/26 18-10891 First, Syria's chemical weapons programme must be ended and the chemical weapons stockpiles destroyed once and for all. Secondly, there must be an immediate cessation of hostilities and compliance with all Security Council resolutions, including those that mandate humanitarian access. Thirdly, the regime must return to the Geneva talks and agree to engage on the substantial agenda put forward by the United Nations Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura. Fourthly and finally, there must be accountability for the use of chemical weapons and other war crimes in Syria. The Secretary-General rightly highlighted the political process. We propose that, as we members of the Security Council will all be together next weekend in the retreat with the Secretary-General very kindly hosted by Sweden, we use that opportunity to reflect on next steps and the way back to the political process. And with our allies, we stand ready to work with all members of the Security Council towards this end. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): A week after the chemical massacre in Douma and a day after last night's strikes, I want to say again straight away to those who pretend to wonder that France has no doubt whatsoever about the responsibility of the Al-Assad regime in this attack. This morning we made public a notice comprising information collected by our intelligence services. We dismiss those who try once again to challenge what is obvious and to disguise the facts before the world. For years now, Bashar Al-Assad, with the active support of his allies, has been devising a strategy of destruction designed to crush any opposition with contempt for the most basic principles of humanity and at the cost of the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians in Syria. We saw it in Aleppo, in Homs, in eastern Ghouta. For years, the Syrian regime has used the most terrifying weapons of destruction — chemical weapons — to massacre and terrorize its civilian population. We had another demonstration of this in Douma, as we had seen before in Khan Shaykhun, Sarmin, Telemens and Qaminas, where its responsibility was clearly established by the Joint Investigative Mechanism of the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). No one can say he or she did not know. For years, the Syrian regime has systematically and repeatedly violated all its international obligations. The list of such violations is long; it is overwhelming. We all know them: violations of all international chemical-weapons obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Syria has been a party since 2013, and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of such weapons against civilians; violations of the very foundations of international humanitarian law, namely, the principles of distinction, precaution and proportionality; violations of successive Security Council resolutions 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015) and 2235 (2015) and, by the same token, of its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations; finally, the use of chemical weapons against civilian populations constitutes a war crime within the meaning of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. In August 2013, the Secretary-General even described the use of chemical weapons as a crime against humanity. In view of the repeated and proven violations by the Damascus regime of all the rules on which our security is based, France has consistently called for strong action by the international community. We have made every effort to ensure that these horrors do not remain without consequences at the United Nations and the OPCW and that they are stopped. The Security Council had undertaken by successive resolutions 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015) and 2235 (2015) to impose coercive measures within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in the event of new violations. It has been prevented from acting in conformity with its commitments because of the vetoes systematically used by Russia. By making such systematic use of its veto in the Security Council, Russia has betrayed the commitment it made to the Council in 2013 to ensure the destruction of the Syrian chemical arsenal. The Security Council's blockade of the mass atrocities committed in Syria is a deadly and dangerous trap from which we must escape. When it ordered the 7 April chemical attack, the Syrian regime knew exactly to what it was exposing itself. It wanted to once again test the international community's threshold of tolerance and it found it. In the face of this attack on the principles, values and rights that are the basis of United Nations action, silence is no longer a solution. We cannot tolerate the downplaying of the use of chemical weapons, which is an immediate danger to the Syrian people and to our collective security. We cannot let the deadly genie of proliferation out of its bottle. We had clearly warned Al-Assad's regime and its supporters that such a transgression would not remain without reaction. We have acted in 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 9/26 accordance with our role and responsibility. We have done so in a controlled, transparent framework, taking care to avoid any escalation with the actors present on the ground. The President of the Republic and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France have spoken on this subject. Some who for years have flouted the most elementary rules of international law now assert that our action is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. I would remind them that the Charter was not designed to protect criminals. Our action is fully in line with the objectives and values proclaimed from the outset by the Charter of the United Nations. The Organization's mission is "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained". This action was indeed necessary in order to address the repeated violations by the Syrian regime of its obligations — obligations stemming from the law, treaties and its own commitments. Finally, our response was conceived within an proportionate framework, with precise objectives. The main research centre of the chemical weapons programme and two major production sites were hit. Through those objectives, Syria's capacity to develop, perfect and produce chemical weapons has been put out of commission. That was the only objective, and it has been achieved. My country, which knew at first hand the devastating effects of chemical weapons during the First World War, will never again allow impunity for their use. We will never stop identifying those responsible, who must be brought to justice. That is the purpose of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, which we launched last January. Allow me to stress this point: last night's strikes are a necessary response to the chemical massacres in Syria. They are a response in the service of law and our political strategy to put an end to the Syrian tragedy. To be more specific, we have four imperatives on the Syrian issue that are in the immediate interest of Syrians, but also in the interest of the entire international community, as the Secretary-General reminded us, and I want to thank him for his briefing. Let me recall those four imperatives. First, the Syrian chemical-weapons programme must be dismantled in a verifiable and irreversible way. We must spare no effort to establish an international mechanism for establishing responsibility, to prevent impunity and to prevent any repeat attempts to the Syrian regime to use chemical. Secondly, terrorism must be eradicated by permanently defeating Da'esh. That is a long-standing commitment that still requires genuine effort to ensure a definitive victory. Thirdly, there must be a ceasefire throughout the Syrian territory and humanitarian access to the civilian populations, as required by Security Council resolutions. We need full and unhindered humanitarian access in order to help people in need, in accordance with resolution 2401 (2018). In particular, it is essential and urgent that humanitarian convoys safely reach eastern Ghouta on a daily basis. Fourthly, we need a crisis-exit strategy, with a lasting political solution. We can sustainably resolve the Syrian crisis only through an inclusive political solution on the basis of the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015). We have been calling for that for seven years. It has never been so urgent to implement it and to relaunch genuine negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to achieving a political transition in Syria. Only that road map will allow us to finally emerge from the Syrian impasse. France is ready to tackle it, as of today, with all those who are ready to put all their efforts to that end. In that spirit, at the initiative of France and in line with President Emmanuel Macron's statement tonight, we will submit as soon as possible a draft resolution on those different aspects with our British and American partners. Today I ask Russia, first and foremost, to call on the Damascus regime to enter into a plan for a negotiated solution so that the long-lasting suffering of Syrian civilians can finally be brought to an end. Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his briefing. Just yesterday we were gathered in this Chamber for a meeting on the situation in Syria, during which China made clear its position on the issue of Syria, expressed profound concern about the further escalation of the tensions in Syria and made a clarion call for a political solution to the issue of Syria (see S/PV.8231). I would like to restate the following. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 10/26 18-10891 China has consistently stood for the peaceful settlement of disputes and against the use of force in international relations. We advocate respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of all countries. Any unilateral military actions that circumvent the Security Council contravene the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, violate the basic norms enshrined in international law and those governing international relations, and would hamper the settlement of the Syrian issue with new compounding factors. We urge all the parties concerned to refrain from any actions that may lead to a further escalation of the situation, to return to the framework of international law and to resolve the issue through dialogue and consultation. China believes a comprehensive, impartial and objective investigation of the suspected chemical-weapons attack in Syria is necessary in order to arrive at a reliable conclusion that can withstand the test of history. Until that happens, no party must prejudge the outcome. There is no alternative to a political settlement in resolving the Syrian issue. The parties concerned in the international community should continue to support the role of the United Nations as the main mediator and should work together unremittingly towards a political settlement of the Syrian issue. I would like to restate that China stands ready to continue its positive and constructive role in the efforts to achieve a political settlement of the Syrian issue in the interests of peace and stability in the Middle East and in the world at large. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): Kazakhstan expresses its serious concern about the sharp escalation of the situation in Syria. We call on all parties to prevent further military escalation and take effective steps aimed at restoring confidence and establishing peace and ensuring security in the long-suffering land of Syria on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. We called yesterday and the day before yesterday, and every time when we have observed increasing tensions, in this Chamber for responsible action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Who else, if not Council members, should show the world an example of compliance with the principles and provisions of the Charter? We are telling others to strictly follow international law and order, but sadly, yesterday we witnessed a different example. Whatever action taken under whatever good pretext cannot and will not justify the military use of force. Violence carried out against violence will never bring about peace and stability. Kazakhstan's position has always been, and continues to be, that military action is the last resort, to be used only in cases approved by the Security Council. There was no approval by the Council of the military strikes that took place yesterday. "Humanity hoped that the twenty-first century would herald a new era of global cooperation. This, however, may turn out to be a mirage. Our world is once again in danger and the risks cannot be underestimated. The threat is a deadly war on a global scale. Our planet is now on the edge of a new cold war that could have devastating consequences for all humankind." (S/2016/317, annex, p.2) That is an exact quote from the manifesto of my President, entitled "The World. The Twenty-First Century", of 31 March 2016. Just yesterday Secretary- General António Guterres confirmed, to our regret, that the Cold War is back with a vengeance (see S/PV.8231). Kazakhstan appeals to the parties to adhere to both the Charter of the United Nations and international law. We think that the time has come for serious talks encouraging the United States and the Russian Federation, given their standing as the co-Chairs of the International Syria Support Group and their respective influence on the parties, to move actively in the direction of finding middle ground and a political settlement to the conflict in Syria. The United Nations has a vital role to play in convening those negotiations and helping the parties resolve their disputes. My delegation is also extremely concerned about recent developments and the lack of unity among Security Council members with regard to the chemical attack in Syria. From its early days of independence, through a series of practical steps, Kazakhstan has consistently promoted peace initiatives in the international arena to achieve disarmament, non-proliferation and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and strongly condemns their development, testing and use. I repeat: Kazakhstan strongly condemns the use of chemical weapons. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 11/26 It is important to conduct a thorough, objective and impartial investigation into all aspects of the alleged chemical attack in Douma so as to enable the international community to render a fair verdict against the perpetrators, in full compliance with international law. The Government and other parties must thoroughly execute their obligations to comply with the relevant recommendations made by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations by accepting designated personnel, while providing for and ensuring the security of the activities undertaken by such personnel. We would like to remind the members of the Council that Kazakhstan's principled position is not only to condemn in the strongest terms the use of weapons of mass destruction by anyone, in particular against the civilian population, but also to resolve conflicts exclusively by peaceful means. President Nazarbayev stressed in his manifesto that the main tools for resolving disputes among States should be peaceful dialogue and constructive negotiations on the basis of equal responsibility for peace and security, mutual respect and non-inference in the domestic affairs of other States. Preventing the escalation of conflict and ending wars are the most challenging tasks; there are no other reasonable options. World leaders must treat such tasks as the highest priority on the global agenda. We must also respect the sovereignty of States Members of the United Nations and the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter. We urgently need a political solution. Only a political, diplomatic approach, dialogue and confidence-building measures in the spirit of the Charter and Security Council documents on preventive diplomacy and sustaining peace can bring about proper results. We therefore call upon the international community to show political will to overcome differences and resume negotiations, in the belief that only a United Nations-led political transition in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015) can end the Syrian conflict, which, in turn, can advance only if the Council is united. There is great need to continue to support the aims of the Astana talks and further the Geneva negotiations in order to see positive results. All parties at the international, regional and Syrian levels should support an immediate ceasefire and seriously and objectively move forward without any preconditions within the framework of the International Syria Support Group, under the auspices of the United Nations Office in Geneva. We believe that the Syrian people are capable of determining their own future. However, achieving their aspirations for democracy, reconstruction and stability is impossible without genuine international support to contain the negative impact of spoilers and to help Syrians combat terrorism and build their State on a firm and stable foundation. Kazakhstan has always stood for dialogue and the resolution of international conflicts. All parties must ensure that the situation does not further deteriorate. Military means will not work; only political solutions will succeed. My President warned that there will be no winners in any modern war, as everyone will be on the losing side. He proposed to work towards the total elimination of war and a world without conflict. Finally, we again call upon all relevant parties to persist in diplomatic efforts, seek political solutions, engage in dialogue and support the United Nations as the main mediation channel. Kazakhstan is ready to work with all colleagues to preserve peace and security on the basis of mutual understanding, goodwill and determination to make the world a safer place. Mr. Radomski (Poland): I would like to thank the Secretary-General for his briefing. Poland views the recent events in the context of repeated chemical-weapons attacks against Syria's civilian population as a consequence of the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators so far. The lack of an appropriate response encourages a greater number of attacks with the use of weapons that are both banned under international law and blatantly inhumane. In such circumstances the international community cannot remain passive. It should take all the necessary measures to prevent such attacks from being repeated in the future, in particular against a defenceless civilian population. At the same time, the competent international bodies should take decisions that will enable the perpetrators to be identified and brought to justice. We fully understand the reasons behind the action taken last night by the United States, the United Kingdom and France against Syrian chemical-weapons capabilities. We support that action, as it is intended to deter chemical-weapons attacks against the people of Syria. Let me underline that it is the primary responsibility of the Security Council to set up an S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 12/26 18-10891 investigative mechanism to examine the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In that context, we reiterate our disappointment with the politically motivated Russian veto on the proposal for establishing an independent, impartial investigative mechanism on the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Poland will continue its international efforts aimed at the complete elimination of chemical weapons. The use of such weapons is unacceptable and should be prosecuted vigorously in every instance and location in which they are used. Poland calls for refraining from actions that could escalate the situation. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): I thank you, Sir, for convening today's important meeting. I also thank the Secretary- General for his briefing. The conflict in Syria is now in its eighth year. That is longer than the Second World War. President Al-Assad is responsible for one of the worst and most enduring humanitarian disasters of our time. From the beginning of the crisis, we have witnessed terrible violations and violence and a flagrant lack of respect for international law, in particular by Syrian Government forces. We must also never forget the atrocities committed by Da'esh. As the Secretary-General stated yesterday, we have witnessed "systematic violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international law tout court — in utter disregard for the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter". Indeed, there are numerous and flagrant violations of Security Council resolutions, international protocols and conventions Chemical weapons have been used repeatedly in Syria. The Joint Investigative Mechanism concluded that the Syrian authorities were responsible for four chemical-weapons attacks, and Da'esh for two. The use of such weapons is abhorrent, intolerable, a war crime and a crime against humanity. That is why, as has been noted here before, the international community banned their use in the international armed conflict more than a century ago. Subsequent developments have confirmed the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons as a norm of customary international law. We will spare no effort to end the use and proliferation of chemical weapons by State or non-State actors anywhere in the world. Those responsible for such crimes must be held accountable; there can be no further impunity. The Security Council has the primary responsibility to act in response to threats to international peace and security. It is our joint responsibility to uphold the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in armed conflict. It is our common legal and moral duty to defend the non-proliferation regimes that we have established and confirmed. That is best done through true multilateralism and broad international consensus. In that regard, we welcome the deployment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon's Fact-finding Mission to Syria and we look forward to its findings. It is regrettable that the Council was unable to come together and agree on a timely, clear and unified response to the repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria. We regret that Russia, again this week, blocked the Council from setting up a truly impartial and independent attribution mechanism. That has contributed to the situation in which we find ourselves now. The use of chemical weapons is a serious violation of international law and it constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Deterrence and prevention of their use is the concern of the entire international community. We therefore share the rage and anger and are appalled by the repeated use of such weapons in Syria. It is necessary to rid Syria of chemical weapons once and for all, and hold those responsible accountable. At the same time, as the Secretary-General said in his statement yesterday, there is an obligation, particularly when dealing with matters of peace and security, to act consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, and international law in general. We are at a dangerous moment. We call for restraint and for avoiding any acts that could escalate, or further fuel, tensions. We need to avoid the situation spiralling out of control. Over the past few days, we have tried to ensure that all peaceful means to respond are exhausted. We worked tirelessly so that no stone was left unturned in efforts to find a way for the Council to shoulder its responsibility in accordance with the Charter. We have shared a proposal with Council members to achieve that objective by inviting the Secretary-General to come back to the Council with a proposal. In order to be successful, diplomacy needs to be backed by clear demands. The Secretary-General called on the Council to take action, but regrettably the Council could not unite. It was indeed a missed opportunity, but we stand ready to continue those efforts. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 13/26 In the light of all that has now happened, it is more critical than ever to avoid an escalation and revert to the track of diplomacy for a political solution in line with resolution 2254 (2015). We reiterate our total support for the United Nations-led political process, which urgently needs to be reinvigorated, as well as the efforts of Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) for the cessation of hostilities. Humanitarian access can wait no longer. A sustainable political solution is the only way to end the suffering of the Syrian people. Let us all then rally around that objective. Let us redouble our efforts and put an end to the long, brutal and meaningless conflict once and for all. Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren (Netherlands): I would like to begin by thanking the Secretary-General for his briefing today. Both yesterday and today, he spoke of the litany horrors that the Syrian population has experienced in the past seven years, of which the chemical-weapons attacks are among the most gruesome. The world hardly needs reminding of the unspeakable suffering that countless Syrian men, women and children have endured. It is a suffering that comes at the hands of Al-Assad and his allies. The Syrian regime has left the world no doubt as to its willingness to unleash terror on its own population. The repeated use of chemical weapons counts as the most cynical expression of that campaign. Just a week ago, the world was yet again confronted with reports of chemical-weapons use — that time in Douma. All the while, the Russian Federation has made clear to the world its readiness to stand by Al-Assad every step of the way. It has blocked draft resolutions in the Council that could have stopped the violence. I call upon all members of the Security Council to support a collective, meaningful response to the use of chemical weapons. But even if the Council fails to act, it should be clear to the world that the use of chemical weapons is never permissible. Against the background of past horrors and the unabated risk of recurrence, the response by France, the United Kingdom and the United States is understandable. The response was measured in targeting a limited number of military facilities that were used by the Syrian regime in the context of its illegal chemical-weapons arsenal. The action taken by those three countries made clear that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable. Last night's response was aimed at reducing the capabilities to execute future chemical attacks. But do not let the Syrian regime and the Russian Federation think for a moment that we will waver in our pursuit of full accountability for the perpetrators of past chemical attacks. We will not settle for anything less than an independent, impartial attribution mechanism, so that the culprits of those heinous attacks can be identified and held accountable. We call on the Russian Federation to stop opposing that. The use of chemical weapons is a serious violation of international law and may constitute a war crime or crime against humanity. The Kingdom of the Netherlands strongly believes that the international community must fully uphold the standard that the use of chemical weapons is never permissible. Impunity cannot, and will not, prevail. However, should the Council continue to suffer from the paralysis inflicted by a single permanent member, we must not forget that the United Nations is bigger than the Council alone. We have strong leadership at the top of the United Nations Organization, and we have a powerful General Assembly. Both have to consider all instruments to advance accountability for the use of chemical weapons. The Kingdom of the Netherlands welcomes every option to establish an independent and impartial mechanism, whether within the framework of the United Nations framework or of other relevant international organizations, as long as it results in a mechanism that can establish who is responsible, so that the perpetrators can subsequently be held to account. Any new mechanism should build upon the important work of the Joint Investigative Mechanism and the ongoing Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission. It is therefore crucial that the Mission have complete and unhindered access to all information and sites it deems necessary to conduct its investigations with regard to the attack with chemical weapons in Douma last weekend. The international norms against the use of chemical weapons must be respected, and the Syrian people must be relieved from the violence, hardship and injustice that has haunted them for so long. To that end, we call for a political solution and an immediate cessation of violence, as agreed upon earlier by the Council, as well as full, unhindered and immediate humanitarian access. We reiterate our determination to achieve justice for the victims. The need to collectively stand up for the fate of the Syrian people is now more apparent than ever. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): My delegation would like to thank the Secretary-General for his presence and participation S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 14/26 18-10891 in this meeting. Bolivia would also like to thank the Russian Federation for its initiative in convening this emergency meeting of the Security Council. Today is a dark day in the history of the Council. Three permanent members have made the decision, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, to take unilateral action against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another State Member of the Organization. Bolivia would like to clearly and categorically express its condemnation of the use of chemical weapons or the use of chemical substances as weapons, as it is unjustifiable and criminal wherever and whenever it happens, by whomever, given it constitutes a serious crime against international law and international peace and security. Those responsible for committing such terrible and criminal acts must be identified, investigated, prosecuted and punished with the utmost rigour. Bolivia continues to demand a transparent and impartial investigation to determine who the culprits are. Aside from that topic, the purpose of this meeting is linked to the fact that, as I stated, three permanent members of the Council have used force in breach of the Charter. It is impossible to combat the alleged violation of international law by violating international law. Bolivia is surprised by the fact that, given that, they have a greater a greater responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, the permanent Council members bypass the United Nations when it suits them. They advocate for multilateralism as long as it serves their purposes and then simply discard it. When multilateralism is no longer in their interest, it no longer concerns them. This is not the only case in which, sadly, unilateral action has been used. We recall, and will not tire in recalling, such use in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011. Any such action must be authorized by the Security Council under the Charter of the United Nations. All unilateral actions run counter to international law, as well as to the values and principles of the Charter. Bolivia rejects the use and the threat of the use of force. Unilateral actions not only respond to the specific interests of those who carry them out, but are also measures that are — allow me to use the word — imperialist. It so happens that the empires that we mentioned earlier consider themselves morally superior to the rest of the world. They consider themselves exceptional and indispensable, and therefore believe that they are above the law and international law, but in reality the interest of those who unilaterally use force and violate the Charter is not to advance democracy or freedom or to combat the use of chemical weapons. Their goal is to expand their power and domination. What we have witnessed over the past few hours is an attack on the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which has not begun the work that was scheduled to begin today. A unilateral attack is an attack on multilateral organizations, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It is an attack on the Council and its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. It is an attack on the Charter, and it is an attack on the entire international community. I wonder, with regard to the permanent members that used force just a few hours ago, how much money have they invested in arming and training the armed groups in Syria? What natural resources are they after? With what moral authority will they be able invoke the Charter in the future? Sadly, the history of violating the purposes and principles of the Charter is a long one. We mentioned Libya and Iraq, which were recent cases. The unilateral decision concerning Jerusalem also sent another absolutely clear signal of the lack of respect for international law. Who are the ones selling weapons to those who are bombing civilians in Yemen? Who are the ones who rejected the Paris Agreement on climate change? Who are the ones who stepped away from the global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration? Who are the ones who build walls? We nevertheless believe that it is also important to talk about history over the long term. Above all, we have been experiencing the consequences of the havoc wreaked by some of the colonialist Powers and of their disdain for international law in the Middle East that dates back over 100 years. We are currently reliving the same scenario in Syria, characterized by total disregard for international law. To a certain extent, we relived it, for example, when the United Kingdom refused to return the sovereignty of the Malvinas islands to Argentina or when the Chagos Archipelago issue was not resolved. I hope that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning that matter will be respected. In other words, we are talking about a whole range of policies that are detrimental to international peace and security. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 15/26 The Permanent Representative of the United States said that the United States, her country, has its finger on the trigger — "locked and loaded". Of course, we clearly heard her words with a great deal of concern and sadness. We know that the United States has aircraft carriers, satellites, smart bombs and an arsenal of nuclear weapons, and we also know that it has nothing but scorn for international law. But we have this — we have the purposes and principles of the Charter, and ultimately, as history has shown time and again, those principles will prevail. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, we thank Secretary-General António Guterres for his briefing at the beginning of this meeting. The State of Kuwait believes in and is committed to the Charter and principles of the United Nations, respect for the sovereignty of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations confers upon the Security Council the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, whereby it can act on behalf of Member States to carry out that mandate. Article 25 stipulates that the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. What we have witnessed in the Syrian crisis is an impasse concerning the international community's efforts and the flagrant violation of its resolutions. We have followed very closely and with great concern the dangerous developments in Syria relating to recent military operations in response to the use by the Syrian authorities of chemical weapons prohibited by international law. We underscore that those developments are the result of the impasse in the international community's efforts embodied by the Security Council to reach a political settlement to the bloody conflict in Syria, which has gone on for more than seven years. It has led to hundreds of thousands of casualties and millions of displaced Syrians and resulted in the major destruction of civilian infrastructure in several cities. The chemical weapons issue long enjoyed a unified approach in the Council, which condemned the use of all chemical weapons in Syria regardless of who uses such weapons. Moreover, the Security Council adopted resolution 2118 (2013) unanimously, imposing measures under Chapter VII of the Charter in case of the non-compliance of various parties with its provisions or the continued use in Syria of chemical weapons, which, as we have said, are internationally banned weapons. In order to ensure the implementation of that resolution, in August 2015 the Security Council adopted resolution 2235 (2015), established the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism to determine those responsible for any crime involving the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In fact, the Mechanism identified the perpetrators of such crimes on several incidents. The unfortunate divide in the positions of the Council encouraged the parties to the crisis to continue their violations of resolutions of international legitimacy, international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as well as relevant Security Council resolutions. The most recent resolution 2401 (2018), adopted unanimously, is another example of resolutions being violated. It calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities in order to allow for humanitarian access to the besieged areas. Unfortunately, that humanitarian resolution was not implemented, as we know. The State of Kuwait regrets this escalation and calls on members to overcome their differences within the Security Council and to restore the unity of the Council so that it can shoulder its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. We also call on members to bridge the existing gap by establishing a new, independent, impartial and professional mechanism to investigate the use of any chemical weapons in Syria and to determine who is accountable for such crimes. We reiterate our full readiness to participate in any effort aimed at achieving a compromise among the positions of members of the Council so as to ensure that those who are responsible for these crimes will be held accountable and punished, and to preserve the non-proliferation regime. It is certain that there is no military solution to the Syrian crisis. Intensive efforts must be made to spare the Syrian people further suffering. We reiterate our principled and firm position regarding the Syrian crisis, which is in line with the position of the League of Arab States calling for the preservation of the unity, sovereignty and independence of Syria; putting an end to acts of violence and the killing; avoiding bloodshed; saving Syrian lives; and reaching a peaceful settlement under the auspices of the United Nations on the basis of the 2012 Geneva First Communique, and resolution 2254 (2015), through a process of political transition S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 16/26 18-10891 with the involvement of all Syrian parties so that the Syrian people can achieve their legitimate aspirations. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): I would like to thank the Peruvian presidency for responding quickly to the request for the holding of this meeting, and we would like to express our appreciation to Russia for making the request. It would have been a serious dereliction of duty on the part of the Council if it had failed to meet in the light of what transpired yesterday. We also thank the Secretary-General for his briefing and his presence today. For those of us who are elected members of the Security Council, the responsibility is indeed extremely heavy, to the point of being unbearable. Let us not forget that we are here representing 193 countries, to which, like permanent members, we have made solemn promises that are generally encapsulated in the Charter of the United Nations. For those of us who are members of the African Union, an organization that for obvious historical reasons attaches huge importance to scrupulous adherence to the principles of the Charter, the obligation that we have to tell the truth and to stand up and be counted for peace is also enormously heavy — all the more so when the parties involved, from our own national perspective, are friends. It was only yesterday that the Secretary-General urged Member States to act responsibility in these dangerous circumstances and stressed the need to avoid the serious situation from spiralling out of control (see S/PV.8231); indeed, he repeated the same sentiment today. We have also been repeatedly expressing our concern that the dynamic in Syria could lead to devastating consequences not only nationally, but regionally and internationally. No doubt, the strike undertaken by the three countries yesterday appears not to have led to the situation spiralling out of control. We do not take that lightly, even though it might be difficult to be consoled by that fact in the light of the potential danger we still face. That is why we call for maximum restraint, the exercise of wisdom and a quick return to dialogue among the major powers that have enormous influence on the current situation in Syria. As we stressed yesterday and previously, it is absolutely vital to resume the path of diplomacy. The alternative is without a doubt catastrophic beyond our imagination. We hope that no one wants to see that happen, but it could if we do not act together with a huge sense of urgency to defuse the current tension and reduce further military escalation. By no means do we overlook the genesis of this tragedy we are facing. It has to do with the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma. At least, that is what ratcheted up the tension, leading to what took place yesterday, which is difficult to defend as being consistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. But there is also one point that makes it difficult for us to understand what took place yesterday. The Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is arriving, or, as just said by the Secretary-General, has already arrived in Syria to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons, which is the cause of all this tension. In the light of that, you must excuse us, Mr. President, if we were a little perplexed. While the priority of the time is clearly to avert the further escalation of the latest development, we are not underestimating the importance of ensuring accountability for any confirmed use of chemical weapons in Syria. In that regard, the OPCW Fact-finding Mission should be allowed to conduct a thorough investigation to establish the facts related to the alleged chemical weapons attack in Douma. The sustainable way to end impunity, which we believe is extremely important, to deter and stop the use of chemicals as weapons is through united and concerted action, including through an attribution mechanism that the Council could and must set up. That has become all the more critical now, when, as we all know, truth is becoming very difficult to establish. An opportunity has been created for parties and even individuals to claim the veracity of their own facts. We know that we are all disappointed by the current deadlock, but that should not justify overlooking the obligation to adhere to the principles of the Charter. Let me conclude by referring to what the Secretary-General said yesterday. I wanted to refer to it again because it reflects the truth and is, therefore, worth repeating: "[T]he Cold War is back with a vengeance — but with a difference. The mechanisms and the safeguards to manage the risks of escalation that existed in the past no longer seem to be present." (S/PV.8231, p. 2) That is why we must appeal to the members of the Security Council, especially the Permanent Five, to help create a situation where diplomacy would have the upper hand and the primacy of politics will be our guide for coming out of what is a troubled moment in our 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 17/26 recent history. The Geneva process and Special Envoy de Mistura need the unqualified support of the Council. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): I thank Secretary-General Guterres for his statement, which clearly illustrates the perspective of the United Nations on this issue. What took place last night was clearly not a surprise to any member of the Security Council. It remained to establish only the day and the time. In fact, as we said in our statement yesterday (see S/PV.8232), we are concerned about the rhetoric that we are hearing and where it will lead us. It has now led us to where we feared and did not want to go — military attacks against Syria. Yesterday in this Chamber, Secretary-General António Guterres spoke about the memory of the Cold War, which in fact returned with a vengeance in the early hours of the morning, reminding the peoples of the world of the conflict of interests that still exists between two blocs. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea has followed with great concern the reports on the attacks carried out by the United States, with the support of the armed forces of France and the United Kingdom. According to estimates, the coalition fired more than 100 cruise missiles and air-to-ground missiles from two United States naval ships stationed in the Red Sea, as well as from tactical warplanes that overflew the Mediterranean and B-1B bombers from another area. The coalition launched a coordinated attack on three targets, which included a scientific research centre in an area of Damascus, a facility to the west of Homs and a command post near that facility. While surgical and very selective, last night's strikes are a violation of Chapter V of the Charter of the United Nations and of the principles and norms of international law. It is important to recall that, according to Article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members of the Council must therefore refrain from creating situations of insecurity and instability. The Security Council should not highlight or disregard the fact that those strikes may have unpredictable and potentially tragic consequences for the Middle East by encouraging or justifying the development of nuclear programmes in order to prevent any further aggression. Experts of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are already in Douma to carry out investigations. Until we have reliable and irrefutable proof of the alleged chemical attack in Douma last week, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is of the view that no aggression can be justified. Our delegation also reiterates that, in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter, in the case of any dispute that is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it is imperative to seek a solution first and foremost through negotiation, mediation or other peaceful means. History continues to show us that military interventions never resolves conflicts but, instead, cause them to proliferate and to continue, causing devastation and destruction. We must ensure that that does not happen again in the case of the Syrian Arab Republic. We again point out that the military intervention in Libya in 2011 and its consequences today should be a clear lesson to the international community. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea opposes the use of force in international relations. We accept its use only when it is in line with the principles of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. As we have already said, in the case of Syria, it would not bring about any substantial change in the overall situation in the country. We reiterate that political agreement is the only viable way to find a lasting solution to the Syrian problem. All the parties involved must resolve their differences through dialogue, agreement and consultation. That process requires the support of the international community. The failure of diplomacy only exacerbates the suffering of the Syrian people and is the highest expression of the Security Council's failure. Equatorial Guinea continues to believe that, in order to fully clarify the 7 April events in Douma, a thorough, impartial and objective investigation must be carried out in order to reach a reliable conclusion. We urge the OPCW Fact-finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic to promptly carry out an investigation and to report to the Security Council on its conclusions as soon as possible. We also again reiterate the urgent need to establish, under the auspices of the Secretary- General, a professional, independent and transparent investigative body to attribute responsibility for and identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons so that those responsible, whoever they are, are brought to international justice. Only in that way can that thorny issue achieve consensus and unity among the members of the Security Council. S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 18/26 18-10891 I conclude my statement by reiterating the unequivocal position of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, which is that we wholeheartedly condemned the use of chemical weapons by whomever. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): The delegation of Cote d'Ivoire would like to thank the Secretary-General for his presence and for his briefing on the latest developments in Syria following the air strikes carried out by certain members of the Security Council during the night of Friday, 13 April. Côte d'Ivoire requests all the actors involved in the Syrian conflict at the various levels to show restraint and not to further complicate the disastrous situation in which the Syrian people find themselves. Weapons and bombs have struck Syria too often in disregard for our collective action towards peace. Is it necessary to recall that, by signing the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, the founding Members sought to establish a new world order based on multilateralism and its resolve to make peace a universal common good, the maintenance of which was entrusted to the United Nations and the Security Council as its primary responsibility? The Secretary- General has just reminded us of that. In every situation in which the Charter of the United Nations has guided the action of the international community, respect for its principles has always enabled us to overcome the most inextricable challenges, thereby preventing many disasters for humanity. Based on its strong conviction in the virtues of multilateralism, my country therefore believes that resorting to force in order to maintain international peace and security must be authorized by the Security Council in order to preserve its essential legal authority and to thereby prevent any deviation or abuse. Only a Security Council that is strong and representative of our time will be able to mobilize all Member States of the United Nations in support of its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. Côte d'Ivoire would therefore like to express its deep concern over the inability of the Council to relaunch the dialogue in Syria and to sideline the supporters of a military solution. Côte d'Ivoire would like to take this opportunity to reiterate its unequivocal condemnation of the use of chemical weapons, no matter who is responsible, and we call for the establishment of a multilateral mechanism to attribute responsibility and to bring those responsible for the use of chemical weapons to justice in the appropriate international tribunals. In that context, my delegation reiterates its support for the investigation to be conducted by the Fact-finding Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in order to shed light on the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Douma in eastern Ghouta. Côte d'Ivoire once again urges the members of the Security Council to unite with a view to putting an end to their differences and to effect the establishment of this mechanism to establish responsibility, which all the members of the Council would like to see set up. Côte d'Ivoire would like to reassert its conviction and its position of principle that the response to the crisis in Syria cannot be a military response. Quite to the contrary; it must be sought in the framework of dialogue and an inclusive political process, as envisioned in the road map set out in resolution 2254 (2015). The time has come to decisively give every opportunity for dialogue a chance and to make sure that the Council is in step with history. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Peru. Peru notes with great concern the developments in Syria. In the face of military action, as a response to information on the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population in the country, we reiterate the need to keep the situation from spiralling out of control and causing a greater threat to stability in the region and to international peace and security. Peru condemns any use of chemical weapons as an atrocity crime. For that reason, we have supported the urgent deployment to Syria of an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission, as well as the establishment of a dedicated, independent, objective and impartial attribution mechanism. We regret the stalemate in the Security Council and our inability to take a decision on the issue. In that regard, Peru encourages the Secretary-General to redouble his efforts in accordance with the prerogatives entrusted to him in the Charter of the United Nations with a view to helping to resolve the stalemate in the Council and to establish the attribution mechanism. Peru believes that any response to the crimes committed in Syria, as well as a solution to the conflict in Syria overall, must be consistent with the Charter, with international law and with the Council's resolutions. 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 19/26 As the Secretary-General has reminded us, the Council is the organ with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and it is up to its members to act in unity and to uphold that responsibility. Peru joins the Secretary-General's urgent appeal to all Member States to act with restraint in these dangerous circumstances and to avoid any act that could escalate the situation and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. My delegation reaffirms its commitment to continue working in order to achieve sustainable peace in Syria, to guarantee protection for the civilian population, to ensure that there is no impunity for atrocious crimes, as well as to help defuse the situation. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. The representative of the United Kingdom has asked for the floor to make a further statement. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I should like to respond to the remarks made by the Ambassador of Bolivia about the United Kingdom. We have no doubt about the sovereignty of the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich Islands and surrounding maritime areas. Successive British Governments have made clear that sovereignty will not be transferred against the wishes of the Falkland Islands. The Falkland Islanders voted overwhelmingly to maintain their current constitutional arrangements with the United Kingdom. Turning to the Chagos archipelago, the United Kingdom is participating in the proceedings before the International Court of Justice, even as we disagree with jurisdiction in that case. The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia has asked for the floor to make a further statement. Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): I will be very brief and limit myself to reading out what it says in the special declaration on the question of the Malvinas Islands, signed by all the Heads of State and Government of Latin America and the Caribbean. The Heads of State and Government: "Reiterate their strongest support for the legitimate rights of the Argentine Republic in the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas and the permanent interest of the countries of the region in the Governments of the Argentine Republic and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland resuming negotiations in order to find — as soon as possible — a peaceful and definitive solution to such dispute, pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the United Nations .". That would include in particular General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX). The President (spoke in Spanish): I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): I welcome the presence of the Secretary- General at this very important moment in the history and the work of the Security Council. In his important statement yesterday, the Secretary-General warned that the Cold War had returned (see S/PV.8231). That is exactly right. We all agree with the relevance of this remark. I take this opportunity to recall those who relaunched the logic of the Cold War. Of course, we all remember, following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, that a number of philosophical books were published here in this country, including The End of History and the Last Man, by Francis Fukuyama. Another author, American thinker Samuel Huntington, wrote an essay entitled The Clash of Civilizations. Those two works marked the return of the Cold War logic. Indeed, the message of those two books was as follows: To the people of the world, you must take the American approach and surrender to the American will or we will attack you. "My way or the highway", as the American saying goes. That marked the return of the Cold War philosophy. Lies serve no purpose. They serve the person who lies once and only once. Lies deceive only once. When a lie is repeated it becomes exposed and exposes the person who is lying. My colleague the Ambassador of France announced that the aggression of his country, along with the United States and the United Kingdom, was carried out on behalf of the international community. If that is the case, I wonder which international community my colleague the French Ambassador is speaking of. Is he speaking of a real international community that S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 20/26 18-10891 actually exists? Has the international community that he represents authorized this tripartite aggression against my country? Did their Governments obtain a mandate from this international community to attack my country? My American, French and British colleagues claimed that they have bombarded centres for the production of chemical weapons in Syria. If the Governments of these three countries knew the actual location of these production centres that they claim to have bombarded, why did they not share that information with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)? Why did they not share this information with the Fact-finding Mission in Damascus before attacking my country? It is just a question I am putting to the Security Council. Furthermore, I would like to assure Council members that the OPCW investigation team arrived today at noon. Obviously, the team was delayed for a full day getting from Beirut to Damascus before the attack, for reasons that we do not know, as though the team was asked not to go to Damascus until after the bombing took place. But the team did reach Damascus today at noon and will hold a meeting in two hours, at 7 p.m., Damascus time, with the local authorities. My Government will, of course, provide every support to the team so that it may carry out its mission successfully. The facility of the Barzah Research and Development Centre, the building that was targeted by the tripartite aggression, was visited twice last year by experts from the OPCW. They inspected it, after which they gave us an official document stating that Syria had complied with its obligations under the OPCW and that no chemical activities had taken place in the inspected building. If the OPCW experts gave us an official document confirming that the Barzah Centre was not used for any type of chemical activity in contravention to our obligations with respect to the OPCW, how do Council members reconcile that with what we have heard this morning? How do they reconcile that with all the accusations and claims that the aggression targeted a chemical-weapons production centre? My American colleague said that the time for discussion is over — that it was over yesterday (see S/PV.8231). If that is so, then what are we doing today as diplomats an ambassadors at the Security Council? Our mission here is to speak, to explain what happened, to shed light on all the issues. We are not here in the Security Council simply to justify an aggression. How can we state that the discussion is over? No, the discussion is continuing in this Chamber, if the idea is to put an end to aggressions or to implement the provisions of the Charter and international law. That is why we are here. My British and French colleagues spoke of a plan of action and have invited the Secretary-General to implement it before the Council and the Syrian Government have agreed to it. Their plan of action is in fact a very strange one. But I would like to present on behalf of my Government a counter plan of action, which, I assume, should have been presented today. First, we should read the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and define and recall the responsibilities of the three States in maintaining international peace and security, rather than threatening it. I happen to have three versions of the Charter, two in English and one in French. Perhaps these three States should read what the Charter actually states. Secondly, these three States must immediately stop supporting the armed terrorist groups that are active in my country. Thirdly, they should put an end to the lies and fabrications being used to justify their aggression against my country. Fourthly, these three States should realize that, after seven years of a terrorist war that was imposed on my country, Syria, a war carried out by these three countries and their agents in the region, their missiles, airplanes and bombs will not weaken our determination to defeat and destroy their terrorists. This will not prevent the Syrian people from deciding their own political future without foreign intervention. I will repeat this for the thousandth time — the Syrian people will not allow any foreign intervention to define our future. I promised yesterday that we will not remain inactive in the face of any aggression, and we have kept our promise. I will explain how we have kept our promise. Allow me now to address those States that remain committed to international law. I would tell them that the Syrian Arab Republic and its many friends and allies are perfectly capable of dealing with the brutal aggression that my country has had to face. But what we are asking the diplomats and ambassadors today who are committed to international legitimacy and the Charter to call on the United States, Britain and France to read the provisions of the United Nations Charter, in particular those pertaining to respect for 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 21/26 the sovereignty of States and to the non-use of force in international relations. Perhaps the Governments of these three countries will realize, if only once, that their role in the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security rather than to undermine it. As I just said, I have three copies of the Charter, and I would ask the Council's secretariat to distribute them to the three delegations so that they might enlighten or awaken themselves from their ignorance and their tyranny. In flagrant violation of the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter, the United States, Britain and France, at 3:55 a.m. on Saturday, 14 April, Damascus time, attacked the Syrian Arab Republic by launching some 110 missiles against Damascus and other Syrian cities and areas. In response to this terrible aggression, the Syrian Arab Republic has exercised its legitimate right in line with Article 51 of the Charter to defend itself, and we have defended ourselves against this evil attack. Syrian air defences were able to intercept a number of rockets launched by the tripartite aggression, while some of them reached the Barzah Centre in — not outside — the capital Damascus. The Centre in that location that includes laboratories and classrooms. Fortunately, the damage was only material. Some of those modern, charming and smart rockets were intercepted, while others targeted a military site near Homs, wounding three civilians. The Governments of these three States prepared for this evil attack by issuing aggressive statements through their senior officials, saying that their only excuse for preventing the advance of the Syrian Arab Army against armed groups was these allegations of the use of chemical weapons. Indeed, in a race against time, the armed terrorist groups did receive instructions from those aggressors to fabricate this charade of the use of chemical weapons in Douma. They found false witnesses and manipulated the alleged crime scene as they did before, which served as the pretext for this scandalous aggression. This can only be explained by the fact that the original aggressors — the United States of America, Britain and France — decided to interfere directly in order to avenge the defeat of their proxies in Ghouta. In fact, those who fabricated the charade of the chemical attack in Ghouta were arrested and admitted on television that it was a fabricated attack. We have a video of that if the presidency wishes to see it. I would like to draw the attention of those who align themselves with the Charter of the United Nations and international legitimacy to the fact that this evil aggression sends another message from those three aggressors to the terrorist groups that they can continue using chemical weapons in the future and committing their terrorist crimes, not against Syrian civilians only but in other countries. There is no doubt about that. In 146 letters we have drawn the Council's attention to the plans of the terrorist groups to use chemical weapons in Syria. There are 146 letters that have been sent to the Council and the Secretariat. Today, some Council members are suddenly reinventing the wheel. The Council knows that this aggression took place just as a fact-finding team from the OPCW was supposed to arrive in Syria at the request of the Syrian Government to examine the allegations of a chemical attack in Douma. Obviously, the main message that these aggressors are sending to the Council and to the world is that they are not actually interested in the Council's mandate and that they do not want a transparent and independent investigation. They are trying to undermine the work of the investigative mission and anticipating the results. They are trying to put pressure on that mission to conceal their lies and fabrications, just as happened six years ago, in 2013, when Mr. Sellström went to Khan Al-Assal from Damascus, as I have explained in a previous statement to the Council. This morning's attack was not just an attack on Syria, as my dear friend, the representative of Bolivia said; rather, it was an attack against the Charter, the Council, international law and 193 members of this Organization. The attempt by Washington, D.C., London and Paris to ensure the failure of the United Nations working groups and fact-finding missions is systematic. While those three States boast of their support for these bodies, behind the closed doors of the Organization they pressure and blackmail them not to carry out the mandates for which they were established. We recall what took place with the investigative missions in Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia and Africa. No investigative mission can be successful if it is subjected to political blackmailing. It cannot succeed. Of the three aggressors, I say they are liars. They are compulsive liars. They are hypocrites. They are attempting to ensure the failure of any action of the Organization that does not serve their interests. Ever since the Organization was established, they have tried to undermine the efforts of international investigative bodies. They have tried to exploit them. I need only mention Iraq, Yugoslavia, Libya, Syria, and Africa. The aggressors exhausted the Council agendas for decades S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 22/26 18-10891 with their attempts to divert its attention from its role in the maintenance of international peace and security. They used the Council to pursue their aggressive policy of interference and colonialism. Yesterday, in the press of the United States and of the West, the main theme was lying in the context of a campaign that was claiming success, but they know it was a lie. While these three Governments were launching their evil aggression against my country, Syria, and while my country's air defence system was countering the attacks with a great deal of bravery — one hundred missiles were destroyed and did not reach their target — the American Secretary of Defense and the Army Chief of Staff were before the American and international press in an outrageous surrealist scenario. They were not actually able to answer objective questions. Millions of television viewers must have pitied those two men because they were like dunces, repeating phrases without any meaning, and were unable to respond to the legitimate questions of a journalist about their attempts to target chemical weapons facilities and the danger that posed to civilians if the alleged chemical weapons were to spread. They did not respond. They were also unable to respond to a journalist who asked the Secretary of Defense, "You said yesterday that you had no proof that the Syrian Government was responsible for the attack in Douma. What happened in the past few hours? What made you change your mind?" His answer was that he received confirmation from intelligence services. The Syrian Arab Republic condemns in the strongest terms this tripartite attack, which once again shows undeniably that those three countries pay no heed to international legitimacy, even though they repeatedly say they do. Those countries have revealed their belief in the law of the jungle and the law of the most powerful even as they are permanent members of the Security Council, an organ entrusted with maintaining international peace and security and with stopping any aggression, in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter. The Syrian Arab Republic is disgusted by the scandalous position of the rulers in Sheikhdom of Qatar, who supported this Western colonial tripartite aggression by allowing planes to take off from the American Al Udeid air base in Qatar. It is not surprising that the little boys of the Sheikhdom of Qatar took that position. They have supported terrorist gangs, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and others, in a variety of ways in order to destabilize Arab countries, including Syria. The Syrian Arab Republic is asking the international community, if it exists — we have heard a new definition of the international community today — and the Security Council to firmly condemn this aggression, which will exacerbate the tensions in the region and which is a threat to international peace and security throughout the world. I call upon those who are committed to international legitimacy to imagine with me the meeting in which the United States National Security Council decided to carry out this attack. I cannot help wondering what was said. "We have no legal basis for attacking Syria. We have no proof that a toxic chemical weapons attack took place in Douma, but let us set that aside. We did not need international legitimacy or any legal argument to conduct military interventions in the past." I am just imagining the discussion that might have taken place among them yesterday. "This military action is necessary for us and for our allies in order to distract public attention in our countries from the scandals involving our own political elite and ensure that the corrupt system in some Gulf States pays the price of such aggression. Most important is how to protect the terrorism that we have sponsored in Syria for years." The President (spoke in Spanish): Members of the Council have before them document S/2018/355, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Russian Federation. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Russian Federation Against: Côte d'Ivoire, France, Kuwait, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 23/26 Abstaining: Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Peru The President (spoke in Spanish): The draft resolution received 3 votes in favour, 8 against and 4 abstentions. The draft resolution has not been adopted, having failed to obtain the required number of votes. I now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements after the voting. Mr. Skoog (Sweden): We voted against the draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation (S/2018/355) because we believe that its language was unbalanced. It was not comprehensive and failed to address all of our concerns about the current situation. At the same time, we agree with the Secretary-General that actions must be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with international law in general. In our national statement delivered earlier today, we explained our view on the current situation in Syria and condemned the use of chemical weapons and the many other flagrant violations of international law in Syria. We also underscore the importance of a sustainable political solution. As members of the Security Council, we reiterate that we must unite and exercise our responsibility with regard to the situation in Syria. If there is any encouragement today, it is that it appears that everyone around the table insists on a sustainable political solution as the only way to end the suffering of the Syrian population. We therefore reiterate our full support for the United Nations political process, which must now be urgently reinvigorated, including through strong support for the efforts of Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We would like to explain why we abstained in the voting on the draft resolution proposed by Russia (S/2018/355). We abstained not because the text does not contain a great deal of truth — indeed it does — or because it does not adhere to principles to which we should all adhere; it does. We abstained on the grounds of pragmatism. We know that even if it had received nine votes, it would have been vetoed. Therefore it would have had only symbolic value. Nonetheless, that is not unimportant. However, for us, it is critical to defuse tensions and prevent the situation from spiralling out of control. We would like to play a constructive role in that regard. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): Kazakhstan abstained in the voting today on draft resolution S/2018/355 because we believe that all disputes among States should be resolved through peaceful dialogue and constructive negotiations on the basis of equal responsibility for peace and security. As I mentioned in my statement earlier today, we call for all parties to refrain from actions that could aggravate tensions and cause the situation to spiral out of control. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): Our abstention reflects the frustration of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea with regard to the failure to adopt a resolution to establish an attribution and accountability mechanism to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons. We reiterate our call for a consensus-based resolution that would establish that mechanism and prevent a repeat of the action we witnessed yesterday. In that regard, we recall that the Swedish initiative was endorsed by the 10 elected members of the Council. We could introduce the required changes into the draft resolution to enable its adoption by consensus, which would allow the mechanism to be established under the auspices of the Secretary-General. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): The draft resolution submitted by Russia (S/2018/355) has just been categorically rejected. The result of the voting sends a clear message that the members of the Council understand the circumstances, reason for and objectives of the military action taken yesterday. The Council understands why such action, which has been acknowledged as proportional and targeted, was required. No one has refuted the fact that the use of chemical weapons cannot be tolerated and must be deterred. That is the key point. It is important that we now look towards the future. As I have just said, the air strikes were necessary and served to uphold international law and our political strategy to end the tragic situation in Syria. It is for that reason that, together with our American and British partners, France will work with all members of the Security Council to submit a draft resolution on the political, chemical and humanitarian aspects of the Syrian conflict with a view to devising a lasting political solution to the conflict. Mrs. Gregoire Van Haaren (Netherlands): The Kingdom of the Netherlands voted against the draft resolution proposed by the Russian Federation S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 24/26 18-10891 (S/2018/355) because the text does not provide for the urgent action that the Security Council must take in response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. It ignores the very essence of the action that must be taken by the Council. It should condemn the use of chemical weapons in Syria, protect its people and hold accountable those responsible. Today's draft resolution does none of the above. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): Kuwait voted against draft resolution S/2018/355. At the time when the State of Kuwait reiterates its adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the threat or use of force as a means to settle disputes and requires them to be settled by peaceful means, yesterday's use of force was the result of efforts to disrupt the will of the international community, specifically by hindering the Security Council in its determination to take measures at its disposal to end the ongoing use of internationally prohibited chemical weapons in Syria. That is a flagrant violation of resolution 2118 (2013), which unequivocally expresses the Security Council's intention to act under Chapter VII of the Charter when one party or several parties fail to comply with its provisions or in the case of the continued use of chemical weapons in Syria. The Council must once again show its unity and bear its responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter. It must agree on a new independent, impartial and professional mechanism for investigating any use of chemical weapons, bring those responsible for such crimes to account, and ensure that they do not enjoy impunity. We call for intensified efforts and a return to the political track, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the aim of reaching a peaceful settlement to the crisis based on the first Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and resolution 2254 (2015). Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): China has always opposed the use of force in the context of international relations. We advocate for respecting the sovereignty, independence, unity, and the territorial integrity of all countries. Any unilateral military action bypassing the Security Council runs counter to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, violates the principles of international law and the basic norms governing international relations and, in the present case, will further complicate the Syrian issue. Based on that principled position, China voted in favour of draft resolution S/2018/355, proposed by the Russian Federation. I would like to emphasize here that a political settlement is the only viable pathway to solving the Syrian issue. China urges the parties involved to remain calm, exercise restraint, return to the framework of international law and resolve issues through dialogue and negotiations We support the role of the United Nations as the main channel for mediation, and we will spare no effort to reach a political settlement of the situation in Syria together with the international community. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Today is the day when the Security Council and the world community should raise their voices in the defence of peace, security, the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Every delegation in this Chamber is a sovereign country, and no one should attempt to pressure or dictate to any of us how to interpret international law and the Charter of the United Nations, or how to consult our own consciences. We have never hesitated to vote in accordance with the dictates of international law, the Charter, our conscience and truth. Today's meeting confirms that the United States, Britain and France, all permanent members of the Security Council, continue to plunge world politics and diplomacy into a realm of myths, myths that have been created in Washington, London and Paris. That is dangerous work, representing a kind of diplomacy that traffics in myths, hypocrisy, deceit and counterfeit ideas. Soon we will arrive at the diplomacy of the absurd. These three countries create these myths and try to force everyone to believe in them. We counter their myths with facts and a true picture of what is going on. But they do not want to see or hear. They simply ignore what they are told. They have come up with a legend about Russia as a constant wielder of the Security Council veto whom they purposely provoke into using the veto so as to then present themselves in a favourable light, especially right now. They are distorting international law and replacing its concepts with counterfeits. They are unabashedly hypocritical. They demand an investigation, and before the investigation has even started they name and punish the guilty parties. Why did they not wait for the result of the investigation that they themselves all called for? The Security Council is paralysed because of these countries' persistent deceptions both of us 14/04/2018 Threats to international peace and security S/PV.8233 18-10891 25/26 and the international community. They are not only putting themselves above international law, they are trying to rewrite it. They violate international law and try to convince everyone that their actions are legal. The representative of the United Kingdom gave three reasons justifying the missile strikes based on the concept of humanitarian intervention. They are trying to substitute them for the Charter. That is why we and other countries did not support it then and do not support it now, because we do not want it to become the justification for their crimes. We demand once again that that they halt this aggression immediately and refrain from the illegal use of force in the future. Today we once again showed the whole world how we play our underhanded games. In Soviet times there was a pamphlet entitled Where Does the Threat to Peace Come From? that described Washington and the NATO countries' military preparations. Nothing has changed. The threat to peace comes from exactly the same place. Look at what they say and listen to the war drums that they are beating in Washington today in the guise of hypocritical concern for democracy, human rights and people in general. The five-minute rule in the latest presidential note's rules of procedure (S/2017/507) will not allow me to list them, because the list is too long. I could cite other examples, as for example how the President of France showed interest in a conversation with President Putin in an investigation in Douma and was ready to send French experts there when that idea suddenly disappeared. Because a different algorithm was put forward. That is obvious. Today is a sad day. It is a sad day for the world, the United Nations and its Charter, which has been blatantly violated, and the Security Council, which has shirked its responsibilities. I should like to believe that will not see another day as bad as today. The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall now make another statement in my national capacity. Peru abstained in the voting because we believe that the draft resolution did not adequately reflect the need to guarantee due accountability for the use of chemical weapons throughout Syrian terrority and because its language is imbalanced and would not help to restore the Council's unity, which is critical to addressing the events in Syria in a comprehensive manner. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. The representative of the United Kingdom has asked to make another statement. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I think it is obvious why we voted against the draft resolution. We support completely what the French representative laid out about next steps and we will work tirelessly to that objective, along with partners on the Council. The Russian Ambassador referred to myths. These are not our myths. The way forward in the Council has been blocked. The second of our own criteria for taking this action on an exceptional basis must be objectively clear. There is no practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved. In the 113 meetings of the Council on Syria, I think that has been demonstrated absolutely crystally clear. The United Kingdom believes that it cannot be illegal to prevent the use of force to save lives in such numbers as we have seen in Syria. The reason we took this action — our legal basis — was that of humanitarian intervention. We believe that that is wholly within the principles and purposes of the United Nations. The President (spoke in Spanish): The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic has ask for the floor to make a new statement. I now give him the floor. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): I apologize for requesting the floor once again. The scene that we have just witnessed is quite sad. There are those in the Council who prefer to overlook an enormous elephant that we have spoken of before. The elephant is the direct American military occupation of one-third of my country's territory — a direct American military occupation of one-third of the Syrian Arab Republic territory. However, there are those who speak of minor details which they believe to be pivotal. No, the political scene is far more dangerous than that. We are a State whose sovereignty has been facing a direct military violation by a permanent member of the Council. That is the true scene, and not the allegations and the film prepared by the terrorist organization known as the White Helmets established by British intelligence. We need to focus on the main scene here. Some would claim that they are fighting Da'esh in Syria and Iraq. However they have given air cover to Da'esh. Whenever the Syrian Arab Army makes advances against Da'esh, United States, British and French war planes bombard our military sites. Why? To prevent our decisive victory against that entity. However, they failed S/PV.8233 Threats to international peace and security 14/04/2018 26/26 18-10891 and we were able to achieve victory against Da'esh with our brothers in Iraq in three years and not in thirty, as former President Obama predicted. We understand that the capitals of the three countries that launched the aggression against my country are frustrated. Some colleagues who voted against the Russian draft resolution (S/2018/355) claim to support a political settlement. We tell them now, after their shameful vote against the draft resolution, that those who voted against it are no longer partners of the Syrian Government in any political process. The British Ambassador explained things about the Malvinas Islands. That testimony reveals the facts about the imperialistic policies of Britain. I am actually the Rapporteur of the Special Committee on Decolonization (C-24) and I work under the agenda of the United Nations and the Secretary-General. My task and that of my colleagues in the C-24 is to end colonialism throught the world. The Malvinas are on the list of territories that do not enjoy self-governance. We are working in accordance with the United Nations agenda to end the British occupation of the Malvinas. As for my colleague the Ambassador of Kuwait, I remind him — although he and his Government are well aware of it — that when my country participated in the liberation of Kuwait, we did not justify our principled position to the people of Kuwait. Our position was a principled one. We did not need draft resolutions, meetings or any tripartite aggression. We did not look into the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or undermine our national obligations to our brothers in Kuwait, nor did we join any bloc that was hostile to Kuwait. We fulfilled our national duty towards our brothers in Kuwait. The Ambassador of Kuwait will also recall that my country could have played a different role at the time and could have negatively impacted the peace, safety and security of Kuwait, but we chose not to do so. We acted pursuant to a national principled position that was not subject to negotiation or discussion. The meeting rose at 1.50 p.m.
1. IntroductionOver the last decade, increased attention has been paid to terrorism, particularly to the new wave of terrorist groups, fundamentalist movements, and extremist organisations such as Al‐Qaeda. September 11 marked the beginning of a turbulent phase in which states face a new kind of threat made up of a complex network of insidious revolutionary and nationalist forces. Such transformations have given rise to an unprecedented number of publications. However, both political violence and terrorism remain sources of endless disputes and controversies because of their political implications. At the same time, in the scientific community, terrorism studies lack conceptual and methodological uniformity. In his article, Domenico Tosini synthesises and discusses some major findings from this research. Courses using such a review will be confronted with the four major topics that any analysis of terrorism, to be comprehensive, should take into account: the definition of terrorism; its history and classification; its explanations; and an assessment of the consequences of counterterrorism policies.2. Literature recommendations Bjørgo, Tore (ed.) 2005. Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward. London, UK: Routledge.In this book, based on the analysis of numerous case studies (e.g. Palestinian armed groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, right‐wing extremists, state terrorism and state‐sponsored terrorism), experts in political violence examine the preconditions for the emergence of different types of terrorist organisations and the main factors that sustain terrorist campaigns. Cole, David 2003. Enemy Aliens: Double Standard and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism. New York, NY: The New Press.Thanks to its analysis and evaluation of the consequences of counter‐terrorism measures, David Cole's Enemy Aliens is one of the most rigorous discussions of how states (like the United States since 2001) often combat terrorism by adopting emergency powers (such as the special detention at Guantanamo Bay), which, in turn, risk undermining civil liberties. della Porta, Donatella 1995. Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Based on empirical research that compares the origins and development of left‐wing terrorism in Italy and Germany between the 1960s and the 1990s, della Porta offers a middle‐range theory of political violence that combines an analysis of the political opportunities and ideological frames exploited by armed groups, a profile of their organisational structures, and an investigation of the typical patterns underlying their recruitment processes. Gambetta, Diego (ed.) 2006. Making Sense of Suicide Missions. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.In this book, a number of distinguished social scientists, while examining the use of suicide missions by political and religious groups (such as the Japanese Kamikaze, the Tamil Tigers, Palestinian organisations, and Al‐Qaeda), specify and discuss the most important methodological questions associated with definitions, data collection, and explanations concerning this form of political struggle. Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Colombia University Press.The book introduces the most important issues of terrorism studies: the controversial problem of the definition of terrorism; a history of terrorism, from anti‐colonial struggles to international terrorism; an examination and explanation of the most recent waves of religious extremists and suicide terrorism; an analysis of the ways terrorist groups exploit old and new media such as the Internet; and, finally, an overview of the strategies, tactics, and organisational aspects of modern and contemporary terrorism. Horgan, John 2005. The Psychology of Terrorism. London, UK: Routledge.Horgan presents a critical analysis of our understanding of terrorist psychology; many shortcomings emerge, particularly the limitations of personality theories in attempting to explain militancy. Based on interviews with terrorists, the book considers the most relevant psychological and social factors underlying involvement and engagement in political violence, and the process of leaving terrorist organisations. Kalyvas, Stathis 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Scholars generally distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violence against civilians – tactics of guerrilla warfare or insurgency in civil wars, for example. However, this work makes a relevant contribution to terrorism studies. Kalyvas clarifies the rationality and micro‐processes of interactions during armed conflicts that account for indiscriminate and selective uses of violence against civilian populations by political actors. Kushner, Harvey W. 2003. Encyclopedia of Terrorism. London, UK: Sage.One of the most accurate and exhaustive dictionaries focusing on terrorism, with more than 300 entries concerning terrorist groups, key events, people, terms, and statistics, as well as biographical, historical, and geographical information. Free access is available at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) (http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/eBooks.asp). Laqueur, Walter 2002. A History of Terrorism. London, UK: Transaction Publishers.Along with Laqueur's Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study (London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), this constitutes a pioneering history of armed organisations, from nineteenth century Europe, to the anarchists of the 1880s and 1890s, to the left‐wing clashes during the 20th century, and up to the most recent terrorist groups. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York, NY: Random House.Over the last decade, suicide terrorism has become an alarming political threat and a crucial challenge for social scientists. In his work, which compares a number of organisations responsible for suicide attacks, Pape rejects the explanation of suicide terrorism based on religious fundamentalism. He argues for a correlation between the use of this tactic and specific kinds of groups engaged in separatist campaigns or in struggles for liberation from foreign occupiers. Ranstorp, Magnus (ed.) 2007. Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Directions. London, UK: Routledge.In this book, distinguished scholars of terrorism studies discuss state‐of‐the‐art field research. In exploring new trends in this area – the most important questions about the explanation of recent terrorist organisations such as Al‐Qaeda, and about counterterrorism – these essays shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of our current knowledge of political violence. Reich, Walter (ed.) 1998. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.This is another seminal work on terrorism, bringing together some of the most well known experts in political violence. The variety of approaches used in the explanations of terrorist organisations and in the analysis of counterterrorism paves the way for a real interdisciplinary setting, which is absolutely crucial once the multi‐faceted nature of terrorism is clear. Sageman, Marc 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.Based on the analysis of biographical data for nearly 200 members of global Islamist extremism (of which Al‐Qaeda is a part), Sageman accounts for the origins and developments of this movement and specifies the crucial role played by social networks in the recruitment of individuals as Islamist militants. Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge.Wilkinson examines major trends in international terrorism and liberal democratic responses. On the one hand, the book introduces the specificity of terrorism and offers a classification and explanation of the most important types of armed groups. On the other, in approaching how states deal with terrorist threats, this work discusses forms of counterterrorism, by taking into account their impact on the rule of law and on the protection of civil liberties.3. Online materials Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna (AISI) (Agency for Internal Information and Security)(http://www.aisi.gov.it)The Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza Interna (AISI) is the branch of Italian Intelligence tasked with collecting and analysing information about any criminal and terrorist threat to security. Among other activities, the AISI distributes its own periodical, Gnosis, online, where a chronology of international as well as domestic terrorist attacks since 2004 (currently updated through 2007) is available. Counterterrorism Blog (http://counterterrorismblog.org)The Counterterrorism Blog is a multi‐expert blog devoted to providing a one‐stop gateway to the counterterrorism community. It offers, among other things, overnight and breaking news, with real time commentary by experts; reports on terrorist organisations; discussions of long‐term trends in counterterrorism; and summaries of and discussions about US and international law. Center for Constitutional Rights
(CCR) (http://ccrjustice.org)Founded in 1966 by attorneys who represented civil rights organisations, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) is a non‐profit legal and educational organisation dedicated to protecting the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also offers information about important issues related to counterterrorism (e.g., the prolonged battle in defence of civil liberties associated with the special detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). Global Terrorism Database (GTD)(http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd)The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open‐source database on terrorist incidents around the world since 1970 (currently updated through 2004). It includes systematic data on international as well as domestic terrorist attacks. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the attack, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and (when possible) the identity of the perpetrator. Another important database, the Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) at the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) (http://www.mipt.org/TKB.asp), has recently ceased operations and elements of the system have been merged with the GTD. Information on terrorist groups is now available at the Terrorist Organization Profiles (http://www.start.umd.edu/data/tops). Human Security Report Project
(HSRP) (http://www.hsrgroup.org)The HSRP conducts research on global and regional trends in political violence, exploring their causes and consequences, and then making this research accessible to the policy and research communities, the media, educators, and the interested public. The HSRP's publications include the Human Security Report, the Human Security Brief series, and the Human Security Gateway. The recent Human Security Brief 2007, online, makes a relevant contribution in discussing the methodological issues associated with collecting data on terrorism and offers a comprehensive overview of terrorist incidents in the last decade. Middle East Media Research Institute
(MEMRI) (http://www.memri.org)The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) explores the Middle East through the region's media with respect to a variety of topics including terrorism. MEMRI provides translations of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish media, as well as analysis of political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious tendencies in the Middle East. A new section, the MEMRI's Islamist Websites Monitor Project, was launched in 2006 as part of the Jihad & Terrorism Studies project. Its aim is to keep Western audiences informed about the phenomenon of jihadist sites on the Internet, which are used by terrorist groups and their sympathisers to spread their extremist messages, to raise funds, and to recruit activists. Uppsala Conflict Data Project
(UCDP) (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP)The Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) collects data on armed conflicts around the world. A global conflict database is now available online. Data are useful for systematic studies of conflict origins, dynamics, and resolution. Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS)(http://wits.nctc.gov)The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) is the National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) database of terrorist incidents. NCTC serves as the primary organisation in the United States government for integrating and analysing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and, at the same time, as the central and shared knowledge bank on terrorism information. Based on WITS, the NCTC provides an annual report and statistical information about terrorist incidents. Additional Online Resources Scores of additional organisations and centres (too many to list) conduct and disseminate research on issues related to armed conflicts, terrorism, terrorist groups, security, and counterterrorism. What follows is a list of some other key organisations and centres, with links to their websites:Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)(http://www.aspi.org.au)Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS)(http://www.fhs.se/en/Research/Centers‐and‐Research‐Programmes/CATS)Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)(http://www.csis.org)Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV)(http://www.st‐andrews.ac.uk/~wwwir/research/cstpv)IntelCenter(http://intelcenter.com)International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)(http://www.pvtr.org)International Crisis Group (ICG)(http://www.crisisgroup.org)International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)(http://www.iiss.org)International Policy Institute for Counter‐Terrorism (ICT)(http://www.ict.org.il)Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)(http://www.mipt.org)Saban Center at the Brookings Institution(http://www.brookings.edu/saban.aspx)Senlis Council(http://www.senliscouncil.net)Southern Poverty Law Center(http://www.splcenter.org)Terrorism and Homeland Security at RAND Corporation(http://www.rand.org/research_areas/terrorism)Terrorism Research Center (TRC)(http://www.terrorism.org)Transnational Radical Islamism Project at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment(http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/english/start/research/Analysis_Division/_TERRA)United States Institute of Peace(http://www.usip.org/index.html)4. Sample syllabus Course Title: A Sociological Analysis of Terrorism and Counterterrorism Course Description In this course, we will explore the most relevant issues around terrorism and counterterrorism policies. Although we will largely approach this topic from a sociological perspective, this study is quite interdisciplinary. Consequently, we will be reading works from other academic disciplines, including history, psychology, political science, and economics. There are four major areas that any analysis of terrorism, to be comprehensive, should take into account: the definition of terrorism; its history and classification; its explanations; and an assessment of consequences related to counterterrorism. After an introduction to terrorism research (part 1), we will discuss the controversies related to the definition of terrorism (part 2) and to data collection (part 3), both necessary for an understanding of tendencies concerning terrorist incidents. A historical overview (part 4) will give us some preliminary information about the variety of terrorist campaigns – information that prepares us for the next exercise (part 5): grouping terrorist organisations by different types. Looking in more depth at the evolution of terrorism in the last decade, we will examine the case of Al‐Qaeda (part 6), and how this and other organisations exploit old and new media, especially the Internet (part 7). The next chapter will be the explanation of terrorism, that is, the specification of the main psychological, political, cultural, and religious factors underlying the emergence of a terrorist organisation and the unfolding of a terrorist campaign. Suicide terrorism will be used as a case study. More specifically, we will approach terrorism by examining the motivations and rationality of terrorist organisations (part 8), of the communities that support them (part 9), and of those who join them (part 10). We end the course by focusing on both the legal (part 11) and strategic (part 12) implications of counterterrorism measures adopted since 2001. Course outline and reading assignments Part 1. Terrorism Research An overview of the most important approaches to the study of terrorism and of the strengths and weaknesses of available analyses. Bjørgo, Tore 2005. 'Introduction' (pp. 1–15) and 'Conclusions' (pp. 256–264) in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London, UK: Routledge. Crenshaw, Martha 2000. 'The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century.'Political Psychology 21 (2): 405–420 (Doi: 10.1111/0162-895X.00195). Ranstorp, Magnus 2007. 'Introduction: Mapping Terrorism Research – Challenges and Priorities.' Pp. 1–28 in Mapping Terrorism Research, edited by Magnus Ranstorp. London, UK: Routledge. Silke, Andrew 2004. 'An Introduction to Terrorism Research.' Pp. 1–29 in Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, edited by Andrew Silke. London, UK: Frank Cass. Sinai, Joshua 2007. 'New Trends in Terrorism Studies: Strengths and Weaknesses.' Pp. 31–50 in Mapping Terrorism Research, edited by Magnus Ranstorp. London, UK: Routledge. Turk, Austin T. 2004. 'Sociology of Terrorism.'Annual Review of Sociology 30: 271–286 (Doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.30.012703.110510). Wilkinson, Paul 2007. 'Research into Terrorism Studies: Achievements and Failures.' Pp. 316–328 in Mapping Terrorism Research, edited by Magnus Ranstorp. London, UK: Routledge. Part 2. What is Terrorism? A discussion of one of the most controversial issues, the definition of terrorism, focusing on its political and methodological implications. Aly, Waleed 2008. 'The Axiom of Evil.'The Guardian, 8 July, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/08/nelsonmandela.terrorism (last accessed: 8 July 2008). Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–42). Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. della Porta, Donatella 2004. 'Terror Against the State.' Pp. 208–16 in The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology, edited by Kate Nash and Alan Scott. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. Schmid, Alexander P. 2004. 'Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism.'Terrorism and Political Violence 16 (2): 197–221 (Doi: 10.1080/09546550490483134). Tilly, Charles 2004. 'Terror, Terrorism, Terrorist.'Sociological Theory 22 (1): 5–16 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9558.2004.00200.x). Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat', Sociology Compass 1 (2), 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–19). Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge. Part 3. Collecting Data on Terrorism Incidents An introduction to the challenges and solutions to the collection of terrorism data, a preliminary and crucial aspect of any scientific analysis. Buchalter, Alice R. and Glenn E. Curtis 2003. Inventory and Assessment of Databases Relevant for Social Science Research on Terrorism. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division Library of Congress, http://lcweb.loc.gov/rr/frd (last accessed 10 June 2008). Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler 2006. Chapter 3 (pp. 52–83). The Political Economy of Terrorism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Lafree, Gary 2007. 'Introducing the Global Terrorism Database.'Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (2): 181–204 (Doi: 10.1080/09546550701246817). HSP 2008. Human Security Brief 2007. Dying to Lose: Explaining the Decline in Global Terrorism. Simon Fraser University, Canada: Human Security Report Project, http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/HSRP_Brief_2007.pdf (last accessed 15 June 2008). Part 4. Waves of Terror: The Evolution of Terrorism A look at terrorism from a historical perspective in an attempt to identify continuities and discontinuities in the use of political violence. Abrahms, Max 2006. 'Why Terrorism Does Not Work.'International Security 31 (2): 42–78 (Doi: 10.1162/isec.2006.31.2.42). Duyvesteyn, Isabelle 2004. 'How New Is the New Terrorism?'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (5): 439–454 (Doi: 10.1080/10576100490483750). Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Chapters 2–4 (pp. 43–130). Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Jenkins, Brian 1975. International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict. Research Paper n. 48, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy. Kaplan, Jeffrey 2007. 'The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?'Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (4): 545–570 (Doi: 10.1080/09546550701606564). Laqueur, Walter 2002. Chapters 1–2 (pp. 3–78). A History of Terrorism. London, UK: Transaction Publishers. Münkler, Herfried 2005. Chapter 5 (pp. 99–116). The New Wars. Cambridge, UK: Polity. Rapoport, David C. 2004. 'Modern Terror: The Four Waves.' Pp. 46–73 in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Great Strategy, edited by Audrey Cronin and J. Ludes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Reed, Donald J. 2008. 'Beyond the War on Terror: Into the Fifth Generation of War and Conflict.'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (8): 684–722 (Doi: 10.1080/10576100802206533). Part 5. Typologies of Terrorist Movements An overview of the complex task of classifying terrorist organisations on the basis of characteristics such as political objectives, ideological frames, and the cleavages between them and their enemies. Goodwin, Jeff 2006. 'A Theory of the Categorical Terrorism.'Social Forces 84 (4): 2027–2046. Gunaratna, Rohan and Graeme C. S. Steven 2004. Chapter 1 (pp. 1–98). Counterterrorism. Santa Barbara, CA: Abc Clio. Schmid, Alexander P. and Albert J. Jongman 1988. Chapter 2 (in collaboration with M. Stohl and P. A. Fleming, pp. 39–60). Political Terrorism. London, UK: Transaction Publishers. Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat.'Sociology Compass 1 (2), 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Chapter 2 (pp. 20–38). Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge. Part 6. Al‐Qaeda and its Affiliates: Ideologies, Strategies, Structures A sociological look at the ideological, strategic, and organisational aspects of Al‐Qaeda's terrorism from the 1980s to its most recent campaign in Iraq. Al‐Zayyat, Montasser 2004. The Road to Al‐Qaeda. London, UK: Pluto Press. Gunaratna, Rohan 2002. Chapters 1–2 (pp. 21–126). Inside Al‐Qaeda. New York, NY: Berkley Books. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapter 7 (pp. 102–125). Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York, NY: Random House. Sageman, Marc 2004. Chapters 1‐2 (pp. 1‐60). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Hafez, Mohammed M. 2007. Chapters 1–5 (pp. 35–162). Suicide Bombers in Iraq. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Part 7. Terrorism and the Media An exploration of the ways that terrorist organisations exploit old and new media, especially the Internet, as communicative channels (for staging their attacks, threats, demands, and propaganda) and as instrumental tools (for fund raising, coordination, and recruitment). Hoffman, Bruce 2006. Chapters 6–7 (pp. 173–228). Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. ICG 2006. In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency. International Crisis Group: Middle East Report No 50, 15 February, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3953&l=1 (last accessed 5 February 2008). Rogan, Hanna 2006. Jihadism Online: A Study of How Al‐Qaeda and Radical Islamist Groups Use Internet for Terrorist Purposes. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment: FFI/RAPPORT‐2006/00915, http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2006/00915.pdf (last accessed 5 June 2008). Sageman, Marc 2008. Chapter 6 (pp. 109–123). Leaderless Jihad. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Weimann, Gabriel 2006. Chapters 3–4 (pp. 49–145). Terror on the Internet. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Part 8. Terrorist Organisations and Their Logic An examination of the political objectives and ideologies of terrorist organisations and an overview of the rationality and strategies underlying their decision‐making in relation to the political opportunities and military events shaping their environment. Boyns, David and James David Ballard 2004. 'Developing a Sociological Theory for the Empirical Understanding of Terrorism.'American Sociologist 35 (2): 5–26 (Doi: 10.1007/BF02692394). Crenshaw, Martha 1998. 'The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice.' Pp. 7–24 in Origins of Terrorism, edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Gambetta, Diego 2006. 'Can We Make Sense of Suicide Missions?' Pp. 259–299 in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, edited by Diego Gambetta. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Hafez, Mohammed and Quintan Wiktorowicz 2004. 'Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement.' Pp. 61–88 in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, edited Quintan Wiktorowicz. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. Kalyvas, Stathis 2006. Chapters 6–7 (pp. 147–208). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kramer, Martin 1998. 'The Moral Logic of Hezbollah.' Pp. 131–157 in Origins of Terrorism, edited by Walter Reich. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapters 3–5 (pp. 27–60). Dying to Win. New York, NY: Random House. Tosini, Domenico 2009. 'A Sociological Understanding of Suicide Attacks.'Theory, Culture & Society (Forthcoming). Part 9. Mechanisms of Social Support A discussion of the economic, cultural, and political conditions which make possible the support for, and collaboration with, terrorist organisations by members of certain communities. Cook, David and Olivia Allison 2007. Chapters 1–5 (pp. 1–85). Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks: The Faith and Politics of Martyrdom Operations. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International. Chernick, Marc 2007. 'FARC‐EP: From Liberal Guerrillas to Marxist Rebels to Post‐Cold War Insurgency.' Pp. 51–120 in Terror, Insurgency, and the State, edited by Marianne Heiberg et al. Philadelphia, PA: University Pennsylvania Press. Hashim, Ahmed S. 2006. Chapter 2 (pp. 59–124). Insurgency and Counter‐Insurgency in Iraq. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kalyvas, Stathis 2006. Chapter 4 (pp. 87–110). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Merari, Ariel 2005. 'Social, Organizational and Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism.' Pp. 70–86 in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London, UK: Routledge. Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapters 6–8 (pp. 79–167). Dying to Win. New York, NY: Random House. Part 10. Social Networks and Recruitment An analysis of the motivations behind the process of joining terrorist organisations and of the role played by group dynamics and social networks. della Porta, Donatella 1995. Chapter 7 (pp. 165–186). Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Sageman, Marc 2004. Chapters 4–5 (pp. 99–173). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University Pennsylvania Press. Horgan, John 2005. Chapter 3 (pp. 47–79). The Psychology of Terrorism. London, UK: Routledge. Khosrokhavar, Fahad 2005. Chapter 3 (pp. 149–224). Suicide Bombers. London, UK: Pluto Press. Pedahzur, Ami 2005. Chapters 6–7 (pp. 118–181). Suicide Terrorism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Stern, Jessica 2003. Chapter 9 (pp. 237–280). Terror in the Name of God. New York, NY: Harper Collins Publisher. Wintrobe, Ronald 2006. Chapters 5–6 (pp. 108–157). Rational Extremism: The Political Economy of Radicalism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Part 11. Counterterrorism I: Legal Implications An overview of the emergency powers of antiterrorism legislations and 'special measures', and an analysis of their legal impact on the protection of human rights. Cole, David 2003. Chapters 1–5 (pp. 17–82). Enemy Aliens. New York, NY: The Free Press. Haubrich, Dirk 2003. 'September 11, Anti‐Terror Laws and Civil Liberties: Britain, France and Germany Compared.'Government and Opposition 38 (1): 3–29 (Doi: 10.1111/1477-7053.00002). Parker, Tom 2005. 'Counterterrorism Policies in the United Kingdom.' Pp. 119–148 in Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror, edited by Philip B. Heymann and Juliette N. Kayyem. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat', Sociology Compass 1 (2): 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Part 12. Counterterrorism II: Strategic Limitations An examination of the most important counterterrorism policies adopted since 2001, with special reference to the occupation of Iraq, and an assessment of their advantages and risks for combating and preventing terrorism. Nesser, Peter 2006. 'Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe.'Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (4): 323–342 (Doi: 10.1080/10576100600641899). Pape, Robert A. 2005. Chapter 12 (pp. 237–250). Dying to Win. New York, NY: Random House. Silke, Andrew 2005. 'Fire of Iolaus: The Role of State Countermeasures in Causing Terrorism and What Needs to Be Done.' Pp. 241–255 in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London, UK: Routledge. Smelser, Neil J. 2007. Chapter 6 (pp. 160–199). The Faces of Terrorism: Social and Psychological Dimensions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tosini, Domenico 2007. 'Sociology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Social Science Understanding of Terrorist Threat', Sociology Compass 1 (2): 664–681 (Doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2007.00035.x). Wilkinson, Paul 2006. Chapters 5–6 (pp. 61–102). Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London, UK: Routledge.5. Films and videos Al‐Qaeda Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings. 2006 (17 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/215/1186.htm)Excerpts from a message from 2005 London bomber Shehzad Tanweer and statements by Al‐Qaeda leaders Ayman Al‐Zawahiri and Adam Gadahn, posted on http://www.tajdeed.net.tc on 8 July 2006. A typical example of the communicative use of the Internet by Islamists in their attempt to frame terrorist attacks as legitimate acts of martyrdom, committed by courageous Muslims in defence of their brothers and sisters in occupied Muslim lands (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine). Al‐Qaeda Leader in Iraq Abu Musab Al‐Zarqawi's First Televised Interview. 2006 (17 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/344/1118.htm)A video posted by the Islamist web forum http://www.alsaha.com on 25 April 2006, in which the Al‐Qaeda commander in Iraq Abu Musab Al‐Zarqawi (killed by an airstrike on 7 June 2006) outlines all the typical condemnations (by Islamist extremists) of the Iraq occupation by the US‐led coalition, and calls for a jihad against its forces and allies. Propagandising the military capabilities of Al‐Qaeda, the video culminates in footage of Al‐Zarqawi with masked fighters, firing an automatic weapon, and 'new missiles' developed by 'the brothers'. Al‐Arabiya TV Special on the Culture of Martyrdom and Suicide Bombers. 2005 (7 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/215/807.htm)Excerpts from a show about the culture of martyrdom, aired on Al‐Arabiya TV on 22 July 2005. The documentary investigates some of the most relevant religious and political justifications and symbolic representations among Islamist extremists in favour of suicide attacks. In particular, it looks at the Palestinian organisations Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and at the Lebanese Hezbollah. The film includes an interview with Maha Ghandour, the wife of Salah Ghandour, who was responsible for a suicide attack carried out in 1995 on behalf of Hezbollah against an Israeli military convoy. Battle For Haditha. 2007 (93 min)(http://www.nickbroomfield.com/haditha.html)In this film, the director Nick Broomfield looks at the dramatic events surrounding an incident that occurred in Haditha, Iraq, when 24 Iraqis were allegedly massacred by US Marines, following the death of a Marine in a bombing perpetrated by Iraqi insurgents. The harsh reality of the war is viewed from three perspectives: that of the US troops, the insurgents who committed the attacks, and a civilian Iraqi family. Iranian Animated Film for Children Promotes Suicide Bombings. 2005 (10 min)(http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/0/0/0/0/0/215/906.htm)Including excerpts from an Iranian animated movie for children, aired on IRIB 3 TV on 28 October 2005, this film is an example of the mechanisms of de‐humanization of the enemy (the Israelis), based on a tale of the ferocious murder of innocent people by Israeli soldiers. This incident is followed by a bomb attack framed as an act of martyrdom by young militants in revenge of the previous assassination. Paradise Now. 2005 (91 min)In his film, the director Hany Abu‐Assad focuses on the final days of two Palestinian militants as they prepare to carry out a suicide attack in Tel Aviv. Once childhood friends Said (Kais Nashef) and Khaled (Ali Suliman) are offered such an attack, they feel a sense of purpose in serving their people's cause, whereas a young Palestinian woman, after learning of their plan, tries to dissuade them from carrying out their missions. Paradise Now has been viewed as a controversial attempt to examine the motivations of suicide bombers. The Reach of War: Sectarian War in Iraq. 2006 (7 min)(http://www.nytimes.com/packages/khtml/2006/12/28/world/20061228_SECTARIAN_FEATURE.html)The New York Times journalist Marc Santora reports on some of the most violent and bloody effects of the sectarian violence perpetrated in Iraq during the civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, which has followed the occupation by the US‐led coalition. The Road to Guantanamo. 2006 (92 min)(http://www.roadtoguantanamomovie.com)Directed by Michael Winterbottom, the film tells the story of four friends beginning a holiday in Pakistan. Through a series of interviews and news footage, the film shows how they end up in Afghanistan, where are then captured by American forces and kept in harsh conditions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for over 2 years. The Role of Foreign Fighters in the Iraqi Jihad. 2006 (9 min)(http://www1.nefafoundation.org/multimedia‐original.html)In this video, NEFA Foundation expert Evan Kohlmann documents the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Iraq and their role within the Sunni insurgency. The video includes footage of senior figures from Abu Musab al‐Zarqawi's terrorist group (including Lebanese, Saudi, and Kuwaiti nationals) and scenes from Al‐Qaida training camps in Iraq. The Suicide Bomber. 2005 (12 min)(http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/july‐dec05/bombers_11‐14.html)In this debate aired on PBS on 14 November 2005, three experts (Mia Bloom, Mohammed M. Hafez, and Robert A. Pape) discuss what motivates suicide bombers and their terrorist organisations, with special reference to the 2005 hotel bombings in Amman, Jordan, where a female militant joining these attacks was found alive after her bomb failed to detonate. The Terrorist Propaganda (three videos): Indexing Al‐Qaeda Online. 2005 (6 min)(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/custom/2005/08/05/CU2005080501141.html?whichDay=1) Without the Video, It's Just an Attack. 2007 (5 min)(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/video/2007/09/28/VI2007092800608.html) Al‐Qaeda's Growing Online Offensive. 2008 (14 min)(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2008/06/23/AR2008062302135.html)Over the last decade, terrorist propaganda on the Internet has increased dramatically. In these videos, experts discuss how insurgent groups, in particular Islamist extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan, are using new media to spread their messages worldwide, to chronicle their operations (including the assembly and emplacement of roadside bombs targeting US forces), to recruit, and to raise money.6. Focus questions
What challenges do researchers interested in terrorism studies face and why? What are the most important theoretical and methodological weaknesses in current terrorism research? How can we define terrorism? What political controversies affect the definition of terrorism? When comparing different terrorism data sets, what kinds of diagnoses can we make on the tendencies of terrorist incidents in the last decade? How has terrorism changed in history? Based on the literature concerning Al‐Qaeda's ideology, strategies, and structures, what continuities and discontinuities can we identify with respect to previous forms of terrorism? When dealing with the explanation of terrorism, what are the most significant factors to be taken into account? How can we learn from the current literature on suicide terrorism in order to build a comprehensive model for its explanation? Given the legislative and military responses to September 11 and subsequent attacks (e.g. the 2005 London bombings), what have been the legal consequences affecting our societies and the strategic implications for combating and preventing terrorist violence?
7. SeminarsParticipants will be divided into small groups of about three persons. Each group will be asked to make a contribution to a sociological analysis (either written or presented) of a specific armed organisation, such as:Al‐Gama'a Al‐IslamiyyaAl‐QaedaAl‐Qaeda in IraqAl‐Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly Salafist Group for Call and Combat)Ansar Al‐SunnahAnsar Al‐IslamArmed Islamic Groups (GIA)Army of GodAum ShinrikyoChechen separatistsEgyptian Islamic JihadEuskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)HamasHezbollahIrgun Zvai LeumiIrish Republican Army (IRA)Islamic Movement of UzbekistanJemaah IslamiyahKashmiri separatistsKu Klux Klan (KKK)Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)Lashkar‐e‐JhangviLibyan Islamic Fighting GroupPalestinian Islamic JihadPalestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)Red Army Faction (RAF)Red Brigades (BR)Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)Taliban.For each armed organisation, each group will examine the following aspects:
data on its attacks – including information that justifies the label of 'terrorist organisation'; a historical account of its origins and developments; an analysis of the strategy underlying its terrorist campaigns; a clarification of its social support and collaboration (if any); a profile of its militants and patterns of recruitment; a discussion of the counterterrorism policies adopted by states and their impact on the terrorist organisation.
Note * Correspondence address: Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology and Social Research, Piazza Venezia 41 – 38100 Trento, Italy, +39 0461 881324; +39 0461 881348 (fax); +39 347 2329219 (mobile); Email: domenico.tosini@soc.unitn.it http://portale.unitn.it/dpt/dsrs/docenti/tosini.htm
This book offers a contrastive, corpus-illustrated study of modal adverbs in English and Polish. It adopts a functional perspective on modal adverbs, and focuses on their interpersonal, textual and rhetorical functions in the two languages. The items under analysis (e.g. certainly, probably, evidently, clearly) are categorised differently in Anglophone and Polish linguistics, which is why this book also provides some insights into the treatment of modality and modal adverbs in English and Polish studies, thus contributing to the discussion of the ways in which such concepts as modal adverb, modal particle and discourse marker are understood across different languages and different linguistic traditions. It draws its examples from two monolingual corpora (the British National Corpus and the National Corpus of Polish), and the English-Polish parallel corpus Paralela. ; This project is financed from the grant received from the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education under the Regional Initiative of Excellence programme for the years 2019-2022; project number 009/RID/2018/19, the amount of funding: PLN 10 947.15. It has also received financial support from the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education under subsidy for maintaining the research potential of the Faculty of Philology, University of Białystok. ; a.rozumko@uwb.edu.pl ; Agata Rozumko is an Assistant Professor of English and English-Polish Contrastive Linguistics in the Institute of Modern Languages at the University of Bialystok. 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This essay continues with a discussion concerning the intersection between indigenous technological adoption/adaptation and the range of perspectives with respect to local communities' use of technology in general. Analytical instruments will be presented at the end of this article. First, however, the reader will have the opportunity to examine the 'views' of outsiders with respect to the debate surrounding sustainability, environmental management and territorial ordering. Responses to an on-line survey concerning the above issues together with my own comments, will add to the discussion. ; Gestión ambiental; Ordenamiento Territorial; Sostenibilidad; TIC; Usos ; 1 TECHNOLOGY IN NORTHWEST AMAZONIA (NWA) VIEWS OF VIEWS: SUSTAINABILITY, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND TERRITORIAL ORDERING A contribution to a Political Ecology for Northwest Amazonia1 This essay continues with a discussion concerning the intersection between indigenous technological adoption/adaptation and the range of perspectives with respect to local communities' use of technology in general2. Analytical instruments will be presented at the end of this article. First, however, the reader will have the opportunity to examine the 'views' of outsiders with respect to the debate surrounding sustainability, environmental management and territorial ordering. Responses to an on-line survey concerning the above issues together with my own comments, will add to the discussion. Aims Initially there were two aims behind the construction of a website. One of was to overcome impediments to my personal mobility and direct access3. ICT facilitated communications with other interested people and helped solicit their views on indigenous management of the forest and their opinions with respect to the process of territorial ordering in Amazonia. The other aim was to serve the process of opening up political opportunities for NWA's inhabitants. Grassroots organisations all around the globe were (and are) establishing links through ICT. The indigenous peoples of Amazonia may attempt the same and this experience could, in the future, be an instrument of education for NWA. The introduction of such technology among indigenous peoples, if possible, will have impacts, which will to be judged as positive or negative, depending of the political interests of the observer and the moment of observation. It is argued here, that despite there being no indisputable positive or negative effects of technological transfer, it would be contrary to indigenous people's rights to self-determination to prevent the promotion of ICT among them. We wish to question conservative forces: if governments, corporations, NGOs and even international drug dealers and terrorist groups are using ICT to fortify their political positions, why should indigenous peoples be denied access to it? The access (or lack of it) of grassroots organisations to ICT facilitates (or impedes) the 1 The author wishes to thank: Jim Connor and Mark Bennett of Imperial College, the former for his advice on the use of Arcview-GIS and the latter for helping to write the cgi-script form for the website. Thanks are also due to: Stuart Peters from the University of Surrey for training in Web- Page design; Adriana Rico from Páginas.Net for valuable advice during the design process and Alvaro Ocampo for a detailed critique of Kumoro.com before it went live. I also wish to thank the Board of Puerto Rastrojo Foundation, which gave me permission to use their vegetation map as a base for the Yaigojé vegetation map that appears on the web-site. Finally thanks to all the people that took the time to fill out the on-line survey. Their contributions made this chapter possible. 2 This discussion was introduced in "Technology in Northwest Amazonia: Sketches from Inside" (Forero 2002b). 3 A restriction of one of the scholarships the author was granted as well as guerrilla incursions at the time, prevented the author from going back to NWA. 2 development of their rights to be informed (and educated) in accordance with the actual historical context of a globalising corporate economy and cultural hybridisation. For indigenous peoples, as well as for other ethnic minorities, financial resources to set up ICT are extremely limited compared to those of corporations, governments and even NGOs. The establishment of an ICT network for indigenous peoples' organisations in NWA remains a Utopia. But without a Utopian vision there is no aim for social mobilisation; this is something that was underlined by responses to the on-line survey. Fieldwork in NWA involved the author in the territorial ordering process, helping with the formation of indigenous people's organisations, and getting involved in communities' economic and educational projects. My work in NWA can thus be characterised as participatory action research (PAR) and one way of continuing to engage in PAR without going back to the field was to set up a website, wait for an opportunity to share my experience with the people of NWA and promote projects that would allow them to take over the website and use it for their own projects4. Deconstruction of an Internet generated discourse Elsewhere the author has dealt with descriptions and deconstructions of discourses of indigenous and institutional organisations, be they NGOs, churches, governmental or international. This process of deconstruction has included the author's own work among indigenous organisations and NGOs, which was one of the aims of "Indigenous knowledge and the scientific mind: activism or colonialism?" (Forero 2002a). I wish to explain the inclusion of governmental and non-governmental organisations within the category 'institutional'. There are great differences as well as important coincidences in governmental actions and the work of NGOs in developing countries due to the limited nature and poor quality of State-driven action in such nations. E.g. in Colombia, COAMA, the largest NGO network in NWA, has been involved in the political administrative reforms, and served as a consultant in matters of education, health and sustainable production. Furthermore, COAMA staff accompanied indigenous peoples in all these processes and without their intervention it is doubtful that many of the indigenous political organisations of Amazonia would ever have succeeded in their quest for legal recognition5. NGOs and governmental institutions may pursue similar political aims and share administrative structures. Inasmuch as small organisations are successful, (and usually this success is a result of strong personal commitment to a cause and personal knowledge of all members of the organisation), they tend to obtain more funds, which in turn forces them to become increasingly bureaucratic. As 4 At the time of writing (May 2002) the author was preparing to visit NWA at the invitation of indigenous leaders, including the Co-ordinator of an education committee who wanted to discuss the roll of ICT in education. 5 See Forero, Laborde et al. 1998 and the interview with the director of COAMA Martín von Hildebrand, in The Ecologist 2002 (Vol. 32 No.1-February). 3 organisations grow, individual members have fewer opportunities to get to know each other personally and maintain an accordance of principles, aims and political means. This is not to say that NGOs are condemned to be inefficient bureaucratic institutions, (which is not uncommon among developing countries' governmental institutions). But it is important to draw attention to the risk that when resources are pumping in and recruitment is growing there is more chance of becoming detached from grassroots sensibilities with respect to issues and less chance of correctly interpreting local developmental idioms. Views of Indigenous Environmental Management The design, production and publishing of a website on the development of a political ecology for NWA, taking the Yaigojé Resguardo as a study case, may seem a very simple task with little impact. But it proved to be a very delicate matter that involved exhausting work. The production of a map of the Yaigojé Resguardo, (which was to be included on the website) has been explained elsewhere, although it is worth mentioning something about the methodology involved. The author accompanied shamans (who were selected by indigenous leaders from the Apaporis) on several trips in which all the recognised sacred places of the Apaporis River and some of its tributaries where identified. The shamans learn the names of the places during their training. These names are recited in myths, chants and spells. The shamans carry, as they say, the map within themselves. It is impressive to see these men point to a place and give its name without hesitation. It is like this even when they have never been in that place before. It is impressive that this orally transmitted geography corresponds so precisely to the physical aspects that start to become relevant for people who, like the author, have different epistemological instruments for their interpretations of the world. While visiting the sacred places shamans spoke of trips they had made previously. In the case of shamanistic trips, visits did not actually involve physical journeys, but what were referred to as trips en pensamiento, en espíritu (in thought, in spirit). While accompanying them I recorded the geographical co-ordinates using a satellite guided geographical positioning system (GPS). The geographical co-ordinates thus generated were converted to plane co-ordinates and a map was generated using AUTOCAD software. Translations, drawings and reflections about this map-making process are included in a MSc thesis of the University of Warwick (Forero 1999). The work I will describe now, although partially derived from my work with the shamans is distinct in character and intention from that reported in Forero (1999). The use of technological gadgetry allowed me partially to reflect the Tukano world in a way that non-indigenous people could understand. And although this was a significant and, I believe, useful undertaking the real knowledge of the territory lies within the shamans with whom I worked. The fact that the 'indigenous territorial' aspects of the website are illustrated with maps is a by-product of the technology. A more significant value of the work (and the reason behind the shamans' wish to become involved in mapping) is that the maps were going to provide evidence for the legal process through which the ACIYA 4 indigenous organisation would claim rights over lands outside the recognised Resguardo Indigenous Reserve (Forero, Laborde et al. 1998). This work was successful and an extension to the Resguardo was indeed granted. Work on the website began by making a provisional outline of the desired end product. The original plan included six pages: Introduction (Home), vegetation map, traditional territorial map, discussion (an introduction to the political ecology of the Yaigojé Resguardo), bibliography (for those looking for references to NWA and the Yaigojé in particular), and a questionnaire that would generate the information from which this chapter has been developed6. The contrasting discourses obtained from the questionnaires Although I shall refer to percentages in this section, there is no intention of making any predictions based on statistical analyses. Neither is it suggested that the analysis of questionnaires can provide an objective account of outsiders' opinions with respect to the politics of the environment and people of NWA. The following notes are not representative in that sense and such was never the intention of the exercise. What is intended is that the reader gets an insight into the perceptions of survey respondents. What is important in a qualitative data analysis, like this, is to present differential tendencies. If discourses are constituents of reality then the confusing scenario of political confrontation in NWA should be linked to the visions and perspectives of all of us, including the views of people that have never been in Amazonia but nonetheless hold an opinion. And, if there is a marked difference between indigenous and exogenous perspectives with respect to sustainability and environmental management in Amazonia, which relates to whether people have visited NWA or not, this should be reflected in the answers to the surveys. The information generated from the on-line survey was collected between May and December of 2001. Eight hundred invitations were sent through e-mail. They were sent mainly to academics and organisations working on indigenous issues, conservation or sustainable development in NWA. One of these invitations reached COLNODO7 and the ICT network asked if we wished to submit the website in a weekly contest for the best new website, which we did and subsequently won! This meant that COLNODO subscribers were notified and invited to visit the site. But we have no idea how many hits were derived from COLNODO invitation. What we know is that during these 8 months we received 51 completed survey forms. This is a 6.4% response rate to the original 800 invitations8. 6 The survey form is in Appendix 1and, a summary of the technical work involved in the construction of the web-site is in Appendix 2. 7 "COLNODO is a Colombian communications network serving organizations dedicated to community development. It is operated by the non-profit organization called Colombian Association of Non-Governmental Organizations for Email Communication" (http://www.colnodo.org.co/summary_english.html). For a critical review of COLNODO work the interested reader could consult Gómez, R. 1998. 8 This response rate is rather low relative to postal questionnaire surveys, but we are unable to assess it relative other on-line surveys. 5 For the purposes of the analysis respondents (R) were divided into two groups: those claiming to have visited NWA (VA – 29% of R) and those claiming not to have visited the region (NVA – 71% of R). With respect to occupation, 68% of R come from the academic sector, including five anthropologists (almost 10% of R) all of whom had visited NWA. In contrast, although there were the same number of environmental managers as anthropologists answering the questionnaire, none had visited NWA. With respect to gender, the percentage of male (53%) and female (47%) respondents is similar across both VA and NVA groups. In terms of age, there were four groups: 1) 18 to 24, 2) 25 to 34, 3) 35 to 50, and 4) over 50. For R the percentages were: 8%, 47%, 35% and 10% respectively. The majority of respondents belong to the second group, between 25 to 34 years of age. However with respect to age groups the composition of VA and NVA groups differs: 56% of the NVA group belong to this second age cohort (25-34), while the majority of the VA group (47%) is between 35 and 50. Additionally, 13% of the VA group are over 50. 61% of the NVA group are between 18 and 34 years of age, while 60% of those that have visited Amazonia are over 35. A comparison of age among the survey respondents thus shows that those that have visited Amazonia (VA) tend to be older than those that have not (NVA). To distinguish among the views held by survey respondents we have to present the responses to each of the questions of the survey. We have made some associations of responses with the intention of outlining the different tendencies that we identify, but the reader might identify others. Before we do so a word about the view of respondents with respect to the website itself should be said. Website evaluation An evaluation of the web-site made by users was included in the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to rate the site between four categories: poor, fair, good and excellent. These categories were chosen as follows: 0, 2, 32 and 15 respectively. Two of the respondents did not offer a rating for the site. Additionally, respondents had the opportunity to suggest improvements. Some respondents suggested changes in design: modification of fonts and colours (some changes had already taken place). There were those who asked for more pictures, a photo album, more links and the construction of a chat room. With respect to the content, some wanted more ethnographic data, another more on political ecology, others asked for better visibility of the maps, while others called for additional links to related sites, and/or more information in general. One suggestion was to make the website less personalised, while another expressed interest in knowing more about the author's research project. Others asked for an enhanced bibliography. Some changes had already taken place by the time these comments were analysed but further changes are still being undertaken at the time of writing. With respect to the questionnaire, two people suggested larger windows to facilitate vision and to be able to comment largely, in contrast, another suggested encouraging more 'yes/no' responses. An important suggestion was: "Perhaps it is now appropriate to include some questions on communication 6 and information flows" (S52). Although not sought explicitly, information was gathered with respect to the use of ICT in the territorial ordering process of Amazonia. One of the respondents suggested that in future the website should be used by indigenous peoples of the Yaigojé. This has been the intention of the author, which has made a visit to Yaigojé (summer 2002) with intention to advance in that direction. Access to ICT for the indigenous peoples of the Yaigojé Resguardo is very limited but present. Future modification of the site will respond to indigenous peoples' feedback. During the visit few indigenous people gave their opinions on the website but several discussions on the roll of ICT in developmental processes took place9. Q1 - Are development and sustainability compatible? A clear response to Question 1 was that this depends on the definition of both terms: "It is impossible to answer this question as it is, as both terms are open to interpretation… " (S26). The question could have been and was read as: Is sustainable development attainable? Respondent S26 continued: "I think sustainable development is possible but hard to achieve in an environment of often conflicting interests and values (economic vs. environmental vs. cultural.)… " One respondent (S22) did not answer this particular question, and two others seemed to be confused (S38 and S41). Forty respondents (78% of R) answered that they were or could be compatible, although there are differences in the way they perceived this compatibility. Development first There were few respondents that failed to question the meaning of 'development' as concept or practice: the developmental project. These responses somehow postulated that certain environmental concerns should be acknowledged and dealt with in order for the development processes to continue: "Yes… . Development as the integration of western technologies or increase of income per capita, can be carefully done by implementing appropriate technologies into the productive activities of the communities. Sustainability defined as a continuous productivity level over the long term." (S2); "Yes. It is only a question of integration of environmental considerations in all we do and adjustment of behaviours accordingly." (S12); "Yes, because there can never be sustainability without development. People have, first to develop for them to have a sense of sustainability." (S13); "Yes, I do. The point is how you can reach a determinate "state" of development without undermining financial, ecological and human capacities in a determinate site (or taking into account their characteristics)." (S40) SD: human - environmental security There were others that perceived the compatibility or the possibility of sustainable development as the chance to diminish human/environmental security risks: "Yes of course in the long run - otherwise life is not possible." (S18); 9 The author is currently preparing a report that will summarise some of these discussions. 7 "Yes. Both are necessary for the survival of the area." (S21); "Si. Solo las acciones en el hoy nos pueden garantizar acciones en el mañana. (Yes. Only by taking action now we can guarantee we could act tomorrow)." (S23); "Yes, development should always be sustainable otherwise there are costs that are not taken into account. i.e. cost of pollution" (S39); "We don't have any choice. We have to make development and sustainability compatible as it's the only way we can survive and at the same time preserve the earth for future generations." (S42) Pessimism, in the sense that without SD life will no longer be possible, was to be repeated in the responses to all of the survey questions. Sustainability is an aim The majority of the respondents that believed development and sustainability to be compatible or capable of becoming compatible, were also of the opinion that the goal of sustainable development had not yet been achieved. Some of them discussed requisite conditions for achieving sustainability. They either underlined the importance of accepting sustainability as a guiding principle for development policy and interventions or/(and) exemplified ways in which sustainable practices might be instituted: "They have to be. I think they are because they have to be. I am optimistic that eventually it will be seen as natural to have sustainable development, but the problem is when this attitude kicks in." (S3) "Depends on how you define the two terms. If you mean that human quality of life can improve while maintaining the natural resource base, I think this is possible but very difficult to achieve." (S5) "Yes, but development in qualitative and not in quantitative terms." (S8) "Yes… there can be sustainable development in an ecological sense of the word - which means installing 'best ecological practice' in planning development." (S24) "No solo lo creo sino que estoy seguro que ambos pueden ser compatibles. Un desarrollo sin considerar ciertos indicadores de sustentabilidad/ sotenibilidad no es posible o viceversa. Uno y otro deberan de ir al parejo tratando de limar los conflictos que a menudo surgen cuando se pretende no un desarrollo pero un crecimiento economico sin considerar la parte social/cultural o ecologica. (Not only I believe that the two can be compatible, I am certain. Development without considering certain indicators of sustainability is impossible or vice versa. Both should go hand in hand, trying to solve the social, cultural and ecological problems that often arise when economic growth rather than sustainable development is the goal)." (S 25) "Sim, no alto rio Negro onde trabalho a ideia e essa: implementar um programa regional de desenvolvimento indedgena sustentado. (Yes, in the Upper Black River, where I work, the idea is precisely to implement a regional programme for sustainable indigenous development)" (S29) "Yes they are. The problem is with the material and energy growth and its compatibility with some environmental standards, like critical thresholds and so on." (S35) "Yes. The only way is by avoiding rapid over-development and having good planning."(S37) ".El concepto de desarrollo sostenible lo veo mucho mas como algo a lo que se quiere llegar, es una nocion implementada por parte de las politicas gubernamentales y ong's donde lo que se 8 procura con estos es el aprovechamiento al maximo de los recursos con un minimo impacto ambiental y social. (I see the concept of sustainable development as goal towards which we heading. It is an idea implemented through governmental and non-governmental policies which aim at maximum exploitation of resources with a minimum of environmental and social impacts)." (S48) "Yes, because they represent the best option to keep for human life." (S51) The need for local definitions Among the respondents that considered sustainability and development compatible if certain conditions were met, there is group of responses that emphasised the need for local definitions of 'sustainability' and 'development', or 'sustainable development': "They can be compatible providing that development is targeted at the right level i.e. small scale and in-keeping with the natural resources and environment." (S5) "Depende de las condiciones y del desarrollo para quién? Por lo tanto el desarrollo es sostenible si es buscado y logrado por la misma comunidad local (It depends on the conditions and on the question 'Development for whom'? Development can only be sustainable if it is sought and implemented by the local community itself)" (S20) "Yes but mainly if made through indigenous methodologies in their territories in Amazonia" (S27) "Yes. There is work done in northern Scandinavia where the "sammi" (lapps) have been given economical support and encouraged to create their own parliament. They have programs protecting their way of life, language and customs. The Norwegian broadcasting company NRK sends news in the language and coastal dialects. All this, at least for Norwegian sammi (lapps) has been key factors in late developments where communities have developed economically achieving great sustainability, contributing, not only to their well being, but to the sustainability of the inhospitable sub-artic regions." (S31) "Yes - but only if there is an 'appropriate' deployment of tools, techniques and processes of development in line with local community needs." (S52) Semantics and the economic imperative Interestingly, one respondent was very pessimistic about the possibilities for sustainable development even when it was sought and pursued at the local level. This respondent brought into the equation the idea that people are driven by monetary benefits to deplete their environment, even though they know that such practices are unsustainable: "To a certain degree, yes. I think that monetary considerations will always outweigh humanitarian concerns and it is very hard to convince people who are seeking a living from sometimes-meagre resources that it is in their own good to give consideration to long-term sustainable use of their resources. It is usually easier and cheaper to move on to the next area when one area has been depleted." (S17) This last argument derives from a rationality that considers poor people to be collaborators in their own misery. In this particular response there was no questioning of the developmental project or the social structures within which people are stimulated to act regardless of the future; but it did address 'monetary considerations' as the driving force. 9 Those responses that argued that the concepts are incompatible claimed an intrinsic contradiction in "sustainable development": "Development of any kind cannot sustain anything." (S4). Instead of blaming the people (needy or not), the proponents of incompatibility pointed their fingers at 'the system'; contemporary capitalist structures, the current developmental project and the prevailing economic model are seen as unavoidably contrary to sustainable practices: "No because development is premised upon economic gain, and capitalism is inherently unsustainable" (S10); "The problem with sustainability is that the economic model is not compatible with social, economic and ecological aspects at the same time and proportion. The neo-liberal model promotes the economic aspect leaving as secondary the social and ecological." (S19); "No, because development does not imply a recognition of limits or the necessity to preserve the natural and human resources used to achieve it. It is an economic concept, which has bases in the apparently unlimited uses of resources… " (S47); "… Si lo entemos [desarrollo] como crecimiento economico, por supuesto que no son compatibles. Ya que el crecimiento economico, tal y como lo plantean los economistas, excluye de raiz criterios sociales, culturales y ambientales requeridos para la sustentabilidad." (If we understand development as economic growth, of course they [sustainability and development] are not compatible. This is because economic growth, as economist have brought it up, excludes from its bases the environmental, cultural and social requirements of sustainability)" (S34) S.D. inconsistent with the present There are less radical rejections of the compatibility, which do not portray sustainable development as a contradiction itself but rather as inconsistent with current economic and ecological trends. The point such respondents make is that the necessary conditions for sustainable development are currently, rather than inherently unattainable: "… The current model of industrial development, where 'development' means material economic growth, is unlikely to be sustainable on a long term basis for the majority of the world population." (S1) "Present development of our world is clearly not sustainable" (S33) "Yes, they are compatible. But in a different social and economic order, not in the one the world is living now… " (S36) "Yes, if we change the way development is understood, for instance, development is associated to living styles resembling to those Europe and USA have, which are a lot related to consumption. But we could live in a healthier and more compatible way with our environment if we change our pattern of consumption and the generalised idea of development nowadays, it would be turning it into "only use what I need and get from nature, exclusively this, not until I just can't get anymore from it", 'cause I over pressed the place, to obtain more benefits. So, at last, this could be possible but in the long term, I hope not when there's nothing left to do." (S45) 10 Greening politics Some responses expressed doubts about the compatibility of sustainability and development. These doubts arise from the apparent use of "sustainability" as a green rhetoric, the aim of which is the continuation of projects that degrade the environment or human rights: ". usually development translates into cutting down natural habitats without regard to "sustaining" cultures" (S32); "In theory 'yes' but much depends on the definition of the terms and societies' acceptance of equal human rights and obligations to others." (S7) "Los conceptos de desarrollo y de sostenibilidad resultan ser bastantes amplios y ambiguos. En la mayoria de los casos cuando se plantean proyectos de desarrollo se trata de relacionarlos directamente con proyectos que resulten ser favorables para el medio ambiente. Como si un concepto llevara implicito otro, sin embargo creo que lo que se esta haciendo desde hace algunos años es precisamente disfrazar los proyectos de desarrollo para que sean aprobados bajo el nombre de mantenimiento del medio ambiente." (The concepts of sustainability and development are very ambiguous. In the majority of cases, there is an attempt to portray development projects as environmentally friendly[, a]s if one concept implied the other. However, I believe that what has been happening for the last few years is a camouflaging of development projects, in order to get them approved under the heading of environmental management) (S48). Reflections on responses to Q110: If "all development is not 'absolute' but will have a beginning and an end" (S24) then, "[d]evelopment of any kind cannot sustain anything." (S4). The impossibility of re-establishing high quality energy after it has been transform into low quality energy (or entropy) is a characteristic feature of closed systems, this would leave us with a world in decline where there is no possibility of sustaining anything. It could be argued that this is the case, as we cannot even guarantee perpetual solar energy flow. But this is perhaps taking the concept of sustainability too far, leaving us with no possibility for discussion. The central political discussion arising from the different responses revolves around the contradiction between those arguments of compatibility that leave the development project unquestioned and those that reject any possibility of compatibility because of a profound questioning of development. Between the two, the picture is blurred, undefined, open and elusive. There does not appear to be any significant correspondence between the two opposite groups of respondents in relation to whether they have been in Amazonia or not. Three out of five of the respondents claiming that there is absolutely no compatibility between development and sustainability have been in Amazonia; but so have two out of four of the respondents that left the development project unquestioned. However, it may be of some significance that none of those that accepted 'sustainable development' are related to social sciences. Those respondents with academic backgrounds in the social sciences all fit into groups 10 A schematic summary can be found in Table 1, Appendix 3. 11 that see sustainable development as a principle, something to be defined locally or as a reformist greening of politics. None of them were found in the group arguing for absolute incompatibility. The middle ground, where the picture is most blurred, came from the majority of respondents by whom it was argued that sustainable development may be possible but that they were unsure about how it might be achieved. Although these responses varied from those expressing suspiciousness (those pointing out the rhetoric of sustainability) to hope: "They have to be. I think they are because they have to be". This acceptance of a possibility of sustainable development, despite the semantic contradiction and current political rhetorical manipulation of the term, reflects a process of thinking and acting that is deeply rooted in Utopian beliefs. This 'sustainability' will happen in the future, in another time, when local communities take control of their lives and their resources, when environmental protection is taken seriously, when today's actions reflect our responsibility toward the future, etc. According to one of the respondents even continuous increases in productivity will be possible, when the proper technology has been developed. Q2 - Is there a relationship between indigenous reserves (IR) and protected areas (PA)? In Colombia IR are called "Resguardos Indígenas" or "Resguardos de Tierras". The term resguardo, literally means protection. Its meaning is not too different from that given to natural conservation areas of different grades: áreas protegidas, protected areas (PA). Both, IR and PA, emphasise the need for an area to be specially protected. Some of the respondents of this question pointed out an implicit relationship between IR and PA perhaps departing of this meaning: "… In a general sense, indigenous reserves are protected areas; they are protected from outside influence for the benefit of the indigenous people… " (S1); "Yes there are relationships. Both have natural systems and environmental quality that requires some level of conservation and protection" (S9); "Yes , for obvious reason. Because the protected reserves are a birth child of indigenous reserves and because we do not want to lose the nature environment the relationship should be maintained." (S13); "Yes, indigenous reserves are protected areas" (S28) As in the case of Q1 (Do you think that development and sustainability are compatible?) some respondents pointed out that it would depend on what we understand by the two terms: "Depends on the sort of protected area or what we mean with protected area… " (S25). "There could be" (S38); "It could be, but I am not sure" (S46); "… this has to be context specific" (S1). Five respondents simply said "yes" (S37, S18, S22, S43, S50) and one simply said "no" (S15). However many of the respondents did go on to qualify the relationship in some way. 12 Harmony or the need for it Some of the affirmative responses portrayed indigenous peoples as the guardians of the environment while others offered concrete examples of this viewpoint: "Si. Las culturas indigenas han demostrado que sus culturas han vivido armonicamente con su entorno durante miles de años" (Yes. Indigenous peoples have demonstrated that their cultures have lived in harmony with their environment during millennia). (S23); "Empirical evidence through statistical analysis has shown (particularly in Colombia in the north west region of the Sierra Nevada) that there is a direct relation between conservation and indigenous reserves. So, the answer is "yes, I do think so". (S40) There were those that referred to the need for a harmonic relationship because: 1) the environment should be protected for the benefit of indigenous peoples: "… indigenous reserves are related with spaces or areas that the government leaves for indigenous people and protected areas are where the local authorities or government provide the ($) resources in order to protect them" (S19); "Existe una relación, historica y cultural, respecto a su territorio, esto debe ser respetado y protegido para las mismas comunidades indigenas" (There is an historic and cultural relationship with respect to their territories. This should be respected and protected by indigenous communities for their own sake (S20). 2) the protection is fundamental for biodiversity conservation: "… Podria ser que se proteja un area porque existe cierta flora o fauna que esta en peligro de extincion. Por ejemplo, muchos animales que viven en la selva solo se aparean una vez al año en cierta temporada y si estos son interrumpidos por presencia humana su decendencia podria verse aun mas en peligro de extincion… " (It may be that an area is protected because there are endangered flora or fauna. For example, there are many rainforest animals that mate once a year or seasonally; if they are interrupted by human activities their progeny could be further endangered) (S25); "… development there should be restricted for the sake of conservation" (S33) 3) sustainable practices could be developed based on indigenous peoples' experiences: "Yes. By protecting areas where almost all indigenous people are more and more confined, there will be a way to preserve indigenous experiences in order for these experiences to contribute to a sustainable development." (S11). Utopia There were also those sorts of answers that reflected a feeling of hope or a sense of Utopia, in which a harmonic, positive relationship was acknowledged as desirable but not yet achieved: "I imagine IR to equate with PA in some way. Perhaps naively. IR is implicitly protected from external development forces, but not necessarily internal." (S3); "There can be. If people are continuing a way of life that has been sustainable in the past and are able to develop sustainably (… ) there is no reason why both should not coexist." (S6); "Most indigenous reserves must be also protected areas. How to effectively do it? I don't know." (S36); "In countries with mindless and irresponsible politicians and business people, it should be mandatory that 'indigenous reserves' must be synonymous with 'protected areas'. (S42) 13 Contamination and cultural imposition Some respondents signalled the risk of contamination, this is of indigenous peoples being influenced by a mestizo culture and therefore driven to break the presumed harmonic relationship with the natural environment. This may be seen as a lost opportunity, that of the rest of humanity to learn from indigenous experiences or, that of given indigenous people to assert managerial control: "Yes, as indigenous populations tend to live in harmony with nature these areas tend to require protection from the outside world. (S12); "… I also think it is difficult to put it into practice since indigenous people want to be part of the economic system and therefore there is a risk of depletion. Anyway who is better to protect certain areas than the people who have lived there for hundred of years!!!" (S39); "Yes, in fact, so far as I know, many of our indigenous people live in these protected areas, where most of them have been able to live in a sustainable way, I say most of them, because others are affected by the mestizo men that live nearby or want to get something from that place due to its economic importance, affecting these natural areas." (S45) It was pointed out that both types of jurisdiction, IR and PA, derived from a cultural-historical process, in which self-determination was not accounted for: "Yes, a very imperialistic one - especially in the Americas (including Canada). It is an old regressive link between the two, in the 60s and 70s this paternalistic viewpoint saw indigenous culture as static --which is wrong!" (S24); "Yes, they both seem to be defined by the ruling 'white' government." (S26) A respondent that had visited Amazonia (VA) added that there is resistance to this imposition, at least as far as indigenous peoples of Colombia are concerned: "yes-especially when indigenous management systems are practised in spite of the models of dominant society in Colombia" (S27). Similarly, another VA respondent suggested that in Colombia there are no friendly relationships between IR and PA: "It depends from country to country, but in Colombia no" (S10)! Analytical responses The analysis provided by some of the respondents tended to localise the relationship: to put it into the historical process. The analysis underlined the main problem for a "non-confrontational" relationship between IR and PA regimes. As they are designations that came about without public participation and from a rationality that is especially alien to indigenous peoples, when IRs and PAs overlap, competition for management arises. These type of answers either acknowledged that the relationship happens through overlap, or mentioned the difficulties of hitting indigenous rights and conservation target simultaneously: "Freedom of choice for all people, in terms of lifestyle, cultural heritage can translate into giving management control to indigenous people in protected areas. However the balance between sustainable economic development for indigenous people and at the same time protecting the environment is a difficult topic to discuss at a macro level. Individual environmental and socio-cultural circumstances need to be fully accounted for and explicitly articulated." (S7) "Yo creo que existe una relacion estrecha entre reservas indigenas y areas protegidas alrededor del mundo. Ya que estas dos figuras juridicas en muchos casos (p.e. Colombia) se encuentran translapadas." (I believe there is a close relationship between indigenous reserves and protected areas around the world. It derives from the fact that in many cases these two jurisdictions overlap) (S34). 14 "There is a relationship when they overlap, which I think happens often." (S44) "Los resguardos y las reservas indigenas han tenido la tendencia a considerarse y definirse como areas protegidas, sin embargo me parece importante tener en cuenta que al establecer los limites territoriales entre los resguardos quedan zonas intermedias que no pertenecen necesariamente a algun resguardo, y esto hace de un modo u otro que tambien se presenten roces con diferentes actores. Por la misma razon que al no estar circunscrito en un resguardo aparentemente se consideraría como un area no protegida… " (It has been the tendency to consider the resguardos and indigenous reserves as protected areas. However, I think it is worth considering that when the resguardo boundaries are established, there are zones in-between not ascribed to any resguardo. And this makes it somehow possible for different [political] actors to get confrontational. This happens as a consequence of the non-ascription of the in-between zone, which is not considered as protected area… ) (S48) However it came about and assuming that both jurisdictions are somehow competing, some respondents argued that IR should be more effective, as it gives responsibility to the people for their own lives: "Yes, although I think indigenous reserves serve to protect the environment/area better. This is because they are protected by local people who value the resources and use them in a traditional and more sustainable way. Protected areas can be designated/run by Governments and this can remove the responsibility from the indigenous peoples." (S5); "Yes. I think that indigenous reserves do offer more protection than protected areas because it gives local people more incentive to use sustainable practices. They can see it being in their own interests" (S17) In contrast, one respondent argued: "Maybe there is, but I don't believe in reserves" (S35). And a second respondent (VA) added that poverty have driven indigenous peoples to behave unsustainably: "I think it is possible. However, some indigenous areas are completely degraded because they are selling their natural resources to survive." (S53). This response (S53) is related to one of those made to Q1: "To a certain degree, yes. I think that monetary considerations will always outweigh humanitarian concerns and it is very hard to convince people who are seeking a living from sometimes meagre resources that it is in their own good to give consideration to long-term sustainable use of their resources. It is usually easier and cheaper to move on to the next area when one area has been depleted." (S17) Both answers (Q1-S17, Q2-S53) echo a neo-Malthusian argument. It implies that a 'tragedy of the commons' is happening in Amazonia and elsewhere as result of overpopulation. The politics involved "No. Indigenous reserves and protected areas (for nature conservation) are two different political land use strategies. If the government is assigning an Indian reserve then they should respect the use the indigenous people are making of the terrain according to traditional use or to improved technologies. Areas for Nature conservation must be treated separately and with a different priority. We cannot make the indians responsible for the disappearing of the diversity. The government has to be responsible by applying appropriate conservation and management regimes" (S2) This response makes an argument for the need to differentiate between IR and PA as diverse political strategies that pursue different aims. The first would aim to 15 comply with Indigenous Peoples Rights, particularly that of self-determination. The second political strategy would aim at biodiversity conservation. The respondent acknowledges indigenous social change as indigenous management depends on both, tradition and technological improvement. Interestingly, the analysis provided does not try to conceal the confrontational nature of the relationship; nor does it neither place much hope in conciliation. On the contrary, it advocates for a distinction. If there is some hope or sense of utopia in the response it comes from solutions provided by technological improvement. Which is something this particular respondent had already stressed in Q1: "… . Development as the integration of western technologies or increase of income per capita, can be carefully done by implementing appropriate technologies into the productive activities of the communities. Sustainability defined as a continuous productivity level in the long term." (S2) Non-conclusive comment-Q211 Nowadays, the establishment or enlargement of IRs (Resguardos in Colombia) and PAs requires the interested proponents to follow long protocols, the fulfilment of precise administrative procedures and of legal conditions. One aim of the process is to allow different stakeholders to participate and to assure the fulfilment of fundamental rights to all citizens in equal conditions. In Colombia, like in many other parts of the developing world, when the "juridical figures" were established these procedures were not necessary, therefore, many IRs and PAs were established without participation of all interested parties. It is not surprising that some of the respondents refer to the confrontation or competition of regimes that began with their imposition. It could be of some significance that none of the respondents that claimed the need to harmonise IR and PA have been in Amazonia. In contrast, the two respondents that pointed out that these two regimes are conflicting in Colombia have been there. The analytical response that called for clear differentiation between the two also came from the group of people that had visited Amazonia (VA). From the set of answers given to Q2 it is clear that different and contrasting narratives ascribed to with respect to environmental management. For some of the respondents indigenous peoples are guardians of the environment, victims of colonialism or in risk of a cultural contamination that will force them to adopt maladaptive strategies that would threaten conservation strategies. For others, indigenous reserves are untrustworthy designations: the environment should be preserved against development and human intervention, be it indigenous or otherwise. Therefore indigenous peoples should not be in charge of environmental management. Yet, another political perspective is derived from hopes of compatibility between the two regimes, which although pursuing different aims are seen as relevant for environmental and human security at the same time. Thus, the third perspective could be characterised as dialectic or iterative. From this (last) perspective indigenous experience could help the development of conservation strategies; and, 11 Schematic summary: Table 2, Appendix 3. 16 at the same time, the revision of environmental and conservation management strategies could be vital for the survival of indigenous peoples. Hope or Utopian visions also have a place here: the development of technology is seen as a key component for adequate environmental management. Technological improvement would allow both compliance with indigenous peoples' rights and biodiversity conservation. We are sketching a continuum from our comment on Q1, suggesting that the narrative of conciliation 'reflects a process of thinking and acting that is deeply rooted in utopia'. Q3 - Do you think that the concepts of protected areas (PA), indigenous reserves (IR) and sustainable development (SD) are useful for environmental management today? Two respondents say that the concepts should be context specific: "Yes, but which of them is useful depends on context… " (S1). "As I said before, all these terms have to be defined properly in the first place before they can be applied." (S2). There were two respondents that simply said 'yes' (S14, S22), while one answered: "yes, if it works" (S4). S4's response suggests that concepts are instruments, and not surprisingly many answers referred to the "applicability" of these three concepts. Environmental indians and contamination risk Some respondents reiterated the idea, already expressed in Q1 and Q2, that indigenous peoples are practitioners of SD or conservation managers: "… Indigenous reserves are important because they allow the preservation of a way of living in sympathy with the environment long gone in most areas… " (S12); "Claro que si. Las culturas indigenas son un ejemplo de convivencia y explotacion sostenible del entorno en que viven" (Yes of course. Indigenous cultures are an example of coexistence with the environment they live in and of sustainable exploitation.) (S23); "Yes because indigenous people are the 'shepherds' of the landscape and they have a first-hand understanding and experience (handed down from previous generations) of ecosystem processes. Sometimes indigenous customs and habits reflect an understanding of nature's processes that can be exemplary in the planning of management plans… "(S41) One response re-enforced an idea presented in Q2, that indigenous sustainable practices are in risk as the younger generations begin to adopt western lifestyles: "… , but this knowledge is also in danger [endangered],… , shamanism is related in many cases to the management of the natural resources, but I have listened to the indigenous people from the community that I'm working in, that they're not interested in receiving this knowledge from their parents, and day by they they're a lot like us in their agricultural practices." (S45) Principles as instruments Various responses made reference to certain conditions that would have to be fulfilled in order for the concepts to be useful. This perspective, where the concepts are understood as political instruments, could be useful if a 'real' or 'truth-value' definition of them were accomplished. This truth-value would come from using the political instrumentality of a concept only if it were to reflect a set of principles such as intergenerational equity, empowerment, and participation. 17 And, in the case of participation, special emphasis were given to the incorporation of indigenous people, their knowledge and ways of dealing with the environment: "The concept of protected areas will only be successful if indigenous peoples are involved, therefore this would seem to indicate that indigenous reserves would be the best way forward of the two" (S5) "… indigenous reserves need to be redefined according to the wishes of the people who will be living in them,… (S6); "… If sustainable development means development with the means which exist and with the participation of the people concerned… " (S11); Yes. Exercising indigenous knowledge should not be limited to reserves but integrated into the management plans along with scientific knowledge more widely. (S26); "Yes… Any protected area, etc. must actively incorporate the participation of indigenous people" (S41) The idea of intergenerational equity is attached to that of resource reserve for the developmental process: "Yes… The sustainable development concept relating to the obligation of the present generation to leave enough natural assets and capital for future generations to enjoy at least the same quality of life we enjoy today must be at the heart of environmental management activities." (S12) "Yes, because the natural environment that we believe is endangered should be protected as a reference in future years to come and because of this a sense of environmental management is very important as the same environment becomes a resource for development" (S13) "Yes. We need to protect the area and its people and provide for sustainable development. (S21) "… pero estoy cierto que las areas protegidas independentemente del interes en prervarlas desempeñan un papel importante en el manejo de ambientes naturales para la captura de CO2, conservación de recursos biogenéticos/biodiversidad/ y como elementos de estudio para futuras generaciones… " (… but I am certain that, independently of the interest in preserving them, protected areas play a roll in the management of natural environment for CO2 sequestration, conservation of biodiversity/genetic resources and as study subjects for future generations (S25) "yes, otherwise development will go against our own endurance. I think we have to consider the possibility that we are not the most powerful force in this world." (S38) Risk and Protection Following this idea is that of concepts (as political instruments) being useful if they could provide and enforce protection (S13, S21 above). In this case either the environment is seen at risk (endangered species or ecosystems) or both indigenous peoples and their environments: "Yes. Protected areas are important as pools of natural resources not affected by human activity. Indigenous reserves are important because they allow the preservation of a way of living in sympathy [tune] with the environment long gone in most areas." (S12); "I think they are vital. Until everyone has a responsible attitude to environmental control certain protections have to be enforced." (S17) Some of the responses expressing a need for environmental protection have a sense of impending catastrophe: "Yes, but they are loaded concepts so we have to be careful in using them… sustainable development is the only way we will survive, but is usually glibly applied." (S6); "in a limited sense perhaps.but what we need to accomplish is protection of all that there is left, without cutting and taking land around the so called protected area. stop the modernisation process wherever it has not already reached into" (S32); "Yes, because they are the only source to preserve life on earth." (S51) 18 Protection but of cultural diversity: "… They may contribute to 'capturing' and saving fragile cultures and 'unknown' languages." (S31) Although acknowledging the need for protection, some respondents made it explicit that IRs were not effective, as the policies derived from such concepts (regimes) would increase risk instead of attenuating it: "… in terms of indigenous groups if they become circumscribed to a specific protected area then this will prevent persistence of nomadic lifestyles etc. and as a result the protected area may become 'unsustainable' as people are becoming circumscribed to a specific reserve. I guess this also answers the question on indigenous reserves, however, the indigenous reserves of N. America should be used as an example of the problems of tying people to such reserves,… " (S10) "… 'indigenous reserves' are not so useful - most of indigenous social problems have been caused by the colonisers, and are being reproduced through generations. Keeping indigenous people enclosed in such areas, and introducing paternalistic rules and laws is not healthy for any society. It instils racism in a society, and will not ensure that indigenous practices of environmental management will be maintained - that depends on the indigenous group and how they choose to manage their environment… " (S24) The need for integration and its impediments Some emphasis was put on the idea that there is or should be a link between the concepts (political instruments): "Yes all concepts are useful as they each permit different aspects of the economic/ecology debate to enter into the wider public arena. Ultimately for there to be sustainable solutions to environmental problems there needs to be a holistic approach adopted… " (S7) "… environmental development will not be meaningful without taking into account the interrelation between 'indigenous reserves' and 'sustainable development'" (S11) "Yes, because all areas are linked with each other very closely" (S18). "Yes. Exercising indigenous knowledge should not be limited to reserves but integrated into the management plans along with scientific knowledge more widely." (S26) "… Lo que creo es que tanto las reservas indigenas, como las areas protegidas deberian orientarse hacia un desarrollo sostenible. Bien sea que estas dos figuras se translapen o no. Si entendemos el desarrollo sostenible como un proceso que involucra criterios sociales, culturales, economicos, y ambientales." (… What I do believe is that indigenous reserves as well as protected areas should direct their attention towards sustainable development, whether or not the entities [juridical regimes] overlap. If we understand sustainable development as a process that involves social, cultural, economic and environmental criteria.) (S34) However, quiet a few responses pointed out the problems that prevent this integration from taking place: 1) Incompatibility of interests between IR and PA: "… Protected areas are useful, but they raise the debate as to whether one should protect an area and exclude people from it so that a certain species/ archaeological site/community can survive or whether people should have access… " (S10); "It is quite difficult to harmonies those concepts, specifically among indigenous people. They are convinced that 'sustainable development' is an imperialist concept, and the first idea they have -as far as they hear the concept- is that they are going to be exploited by others… " (S40) 2) The prevalence of economic efficiency and profit at the expense of anything else: 19 "… El desarrollo sustentable que ha sido cada vez mas un objetivo importante en varios paises del mundo. Pero encontrar los balances correctos ha sido y es dificil, particulrmente cuando las sociedades y gobiernos estan sometidos a un proceso de globalizacion y de efeicientizacion economica. He ahi los conflictos permanentes de lograr un desarrollo verdaderamente sustentable que considere no solo los aspectos economicos, pero politicos, cultrales, sociales y ecologicos o ambientales. (Sustainable development has become an increasingly important objective in several countries around the world. But to find the correct balances has been and continues to be difficult; in particular as a result of societies and governments being subjected to economic efficiency within the globalisation process. There are permanent conflicts in the way of obtaining a real sustainable development that involve not only the economic aspects, but also the social, cultural, ecological and environmental criteria " (S25). "… too many people think of 'sustainable' as meaning economic sustainability and not environmental sustainability." (S30). "… While protected areas and indigenous reserves serve to maintain environmental quality, the concept of sustainable development is often disregarded for the sake of profits and globalisation." (S33) 3) Political manipulation: "I think there have been problems with these concepts for two reasons: First, they mean different thing for different people, second, they have been used and to serve particular interests. There are several and opposite definitions of 'sustainable development' and it's a difficult concept. 'Indigenous reserve', used as a general concept does not describe usefully the complex realities and 'protected areas' have been used to serve particular interests over time so I think it is seen suspiciously by a lot of people." (S44) "I think so, but these concepts are used a lot by politicians, and then the meaning can be manipulated". (S46) "… The big problem is not related to the concepts alone, it is related to the way in which these are applied according with particular interests and purposes. Many times the terms are used by different groups or organisations in order to pretend to be environmental friendly or responsible, when the real purposes reveal an opposite target or interest." (S47) "… Muy seguaramente estos términos se manejan como deben ser en el plano académico teórico, mas no ocurre lo mismo en el ambito práctico donde lo que prevalece son los interese de los diferentes actores que trabajan en este campo, lo que lleva inevitablemente a que se presenten situaciones de tension entre estos y se deje de lado el objetivo primordial en cuanto a la conservación y le manejo ambiental" (For sure, theoretically and within the academic circles these concepts are managed as they should be. Although, in the practical scenario privilege is given to the particular interests of those different [political] actors who work in this field. Thus, it is unavoidable that tensions will arise between these [political actors], which leave aside the fundamental aim of environmental management and conservation) (S48) 4) Semantics, the concepts mean too many things to too many different political actors (S44 above): "… 'Sustainable development' is not so useful for environmental management, as the concept is too contested - it means too many different things to different people." (S24); "As I said, the problem is that there are many definitions of those terms and it makes it difficult to determine if they are useful in one place compared to other places" (S50) Dynamism The perspective of 'dynamism' reflects a perception of mutating meanings as an advantage. Under this perspective 'contested' means 'in change', which is seen as part of a learning process, which is in tune with the idea of local definition of concepts (emphasised above): "Ultimately for there to be sustainable solutions to environmental problems there needs to be a holistic approach adopted, where people can better appreciate that their lifestyle has much in 20 common with others - even if they are in an OECD country and cannot appreciate the day to day lifestyle of someone in a less developed country. … . Therefore the concepts listed can provide an opportunity to raise the awareness of the majority of the world's people." "Yes, there is plenty that can be learned from these three concepts and also applied" (S37) "A lot, I believe there are a lot of things we can learn from them, specially in this field of study,." (S45) "If these concepts are [understood or interpreted] under a dynamic and changing world (attached to contexts), which mean that there is not a unique definition or way to apply them, I think they are still useful for environmental management." [original: understanding or interpreting… ] (S47) The need for new concepts-Q3 Contradicting narratives can be appreciated through the reading of these responses. There is a group of respondents that are uncritical of the concepts or the policies derived from them (like S37, S45 above and): "Yes, they are important to efficient environmental management" (S28); "Yes. An understanding of the mechanism of these terminologies is essential for effective environmental management … " (S9). Another group could be made out of those responses that reflect suspicion or are definitely critical of the concepts (S10, S24, S25, S30, S33, S40, S44, S46, S47, S48, S50 above). And, besides the group of respondents that express conditionality or hope (see above), there is a group of responses that, while critical of the concepts, acknowledge that at present they are all we have: "… which of them is useful depends on context… If an ethnic group is to be allowed to determine the course of events within its own territory, then the territory must be reserved for them until such time as they develop complete autonomy or decide to integrate more closely with wider society. Sustainable development may seem a rather broad, unspecific term, but it does at least draw attention to the unsustainability of conventional development… " (S1) "… The concept of sustainable development is gradually getting better developed and, even if it is not strictly attainable, gives decision-makers something to work towards… (S5) "I don't agree with the concept of SD as it is a contradiction in terms, but at present there are few better alternatives… " (S10) One respondent actually moved forward in the critique, pointing out that the concepts were built on preconceptions and identifying the need to generate new concepts that would integrate the useless categorical divide of nature and society: "I think they are old fashioned, and generated by the Anglo-Saxon culture. We should move towards an increased compatibility between human activities and nature, making it therefore not necessary to talk about reserves, or natural areas." (S35) Non-conclusive comment-Q312: The majority if not the totality of respondents took 'concepts' as 'politics'. They discussed the history of these politics, their adequacy and sufficiency. It is very interesting that while the conduct through which political ideas become policies is supposed to be complex, it is obvious for the respondents that there is more than theoretical debate going on in the process of policy making. There is a prevailing, sometimes automatic or non-reflexive awareness that narratives pursue the aims that drive the policies and politics that are transforming the environment. 12 Schematic summary: table 3, Appendix 3. 21 In continuity with the results of Q2, only 1 out of five respondents of those who argued for the need to integrate the concepts had been in Amazon; while the two respondents that argued the case of 'incompatibility of interests' had been there. Of those which suggested that these concepts –political strategies- are useful for environmental protection or that this is the last chance –catastrophism- for life, none had visited Amazonia. It may be of some significance that none of the five respondents that suggested that IR might be a better strategy than PA have been in Amazonia, while one person of the two that argued that IRs are ineffective had been there. The responses correspond to several narratives that can be identified. One of them is that of 'confidence in science and trust in political instrumentality' derived from the (traditional definitions of) concepts outlined. Another narrative is that of 'natives as heroes and outsiders as villains', which is reflected in the suspiciousness of concepts based in untested assumptions and in mistrust of the governmental policies derived from them. In summary there is a status-quo narrative and a counter narrative. Yet a third type of narrative could be identified, that of 'critical understanding'. Q4 – Should environmental managers (EM) get involved in the territorial ordering process (TOP) of the Amazon? One of the respondents simply answered yes (S4). One was unsure (S52), perhaps suspicious? One considered the question was tricky (S32), and three of them put the question into question. Two of these responses asked for the term 'environmental manager' to be defined: "Difficult to answer. Define the roles, mandate and empowerment of the environmental manager… " (S31); "What do you mean by environmental managers?." (S6). The third one was more critical: "this sentence is colonialist as if indigenous peoples of Amazonia were not in fact environmental managers" (S27). With a similar intent, one respondent argued that indigenous people were better-qualified environmental mangers: "Las comunidades indigenas han sido las mejores administradoras del territorio ancestral, eso debe ser respetado y replicado en zonas donde la intervención humana 'civilizada' ha afectado las condiciones ambientales. (Indigenous communities have been the best managers of ancestral territories, this should be respected and should be replicated in areas where 'civilised' human intervention has affected environmental conditions) (S20)" The response of Indigenous peoples as better managers had been expressed in Q1, Q2 and Q3. Another three responses reinforced the ideas of catastrophism, the need for urgent environmental protection and to stop development (S32, S33, S42). Perspectives EMs are the ones: "Definitely" (S12); " … They have in many cases a better view for the long-run." (S18); 22 Yes. Who else is better suited to do so?" (S21); "Environmental Managers should get involved. They are best able to ensure protection of ecosystem" (S28); "Por supuesto que si. Ya que el ordenamiento territorial de un territorio (en este caso de la Amazonia) debe tener como objetivos el desarrollo sostenible." (Definitely. Territorial ordering (of the Amazon in this case) should have sustainable development as an objective) (S34); "Because they are the ones that can understand the balance that must exist between economic development, traditional culture and environment." (S36); " They should, how can they do whithout?" (S46) "Yes, because they can contribute to better territorial ordering in the region" (S53) EMs and scientists figure out the solutions and take the decisions: "Deben estar involucradas todas las personas del planeta, pero con mas razon los 'decision makers', que a fin de cuentas, toman las acciones concretas sobre nuestro futuro medioambiental. (All people from the planet should get involved, but the 'decision makers' have more reason to be there, after all they are the ones that take the concrete actions in respect to our environmental future) (S23); "Yes, but along with some other scientists, not only because of the importance of the Amazon from a global point of view, but specially for the importance for the people living there." (S35); "Yes, always considering multiple disciplines result in a better understanding and so better solutions." (S38) But taking into account the other opinions: "Yes, although indigenous peoples will also play a major part and without them any agreements between Governments and environmental managers will not work… " (S5); "Not always, because it is necessary to take into consideration lay people's opinions too." (53) Indigenous peoples direct EMs: "If they are asked to do so by indigenous peoples, I see no problem with this." (S1); "Territorial ordering should be primarily decided upon by the indigenous groups that inhabit them, … ultimately decisions need to come from the bottom upwards" (S10); "… The indigenous people should be in charge of the program at the ultimate level" (S14). " They should but they should make sure they respect the opinion of indigenous people and they should be very discreet in their approach and aim for cooperation." (S41) EMs have equal rights to participate as other stakeholders: " Of course. All actors should be involved in the process… It doesn't mean that they have to take decisions but they can evaluate the circumstances under different and also important perspectives." (S2); "What do you mean by environmental managers? But yes, I think they also have a stake in the fate of the Amazon, and have a right to make their voices heard. (S6); " Involvement - yes but only in collaboration and co-operation with the Amazonian people and those in the higher levels of bureaucracy and policy making … Environmental managers can make significant contributions in this area, given their depth of understanding of the issues (relative to the general public)" (S7); "Deveriam estar envolvidos no processo de re-ordenamento territorial, junto com edndios, ribeirinhos etc" (they should be involved in the territorial ordering process together with indigenous peoples, riverine inhabitants, etc." (S29); " I think they should be involved as advisors and technical support but I support the idea of a non-technical management, where decisions are taken by the different stakeholders based on the technical advice and the social, cultural and economic factors." (S44) 23 But this intervention should be avoided within indigenous territories: "Not in indigenous reserves or territories which historically have been managed by indigenous communities. In other areas, should be taking part in dialogue of knowledge between cultures, people, communities, scientists and decision makers from private and government sectors, to order process on the amazon area." [Original text:… historically has been management by… ](S47) The apolitical EM: "Yes, but not for political reasons. It should be for the cause of sustainable use of our natural environment which is our heritage." (S9); " … Generally though I think that environmentalists like missionaries before them should not get involved in political processes as this can have a very negative reaction within the local community." (S17) "Yes, their knowledge will hopefully be of use in the ordering process" (S37) The political participation of EMs: "Yes, to counteract the interference of other external actors but hopefully to work with the indigenous people respecting their values and practices, not independently." (S26) EMs as facilitators of the dialog between IK and WS: "… without them [indigenous peoples] any agreements between Governments and environmental managers will not work. Environmental Managers should facilitate discussion… " (S5); "Territorial ordering should be primarily decided upon by the indigenous groups that inhabit them, environmental managers roles here should be as referees to help in the co-ordination of the process, but ultimately decisions need to come from the bottom upwards." (S10); "It's necessary for people involved in this field of study, that had already gained a conscience, and that are able to understand that we have to work with indigenous, not from our usual management vision, but theirs, trying to see the world like they do. In this way could be easier, perhaps to understand and give convincing and why not scientific arguments to the authorities (or people in charge of handling these affairs) about the different way they have already distributed their territory, which [in] most of the case (if not all) doesn't have our political distribution. (I.E, those groups that live between Colombia and Brazil boundaries) they don't have the same division of territories, because of this, they must be managed in a way more in concordance to their political organisation." (S45) Capacity, ability and quality of EMs: "Depends who the environmental managers are - if they are from the area and have a passion for the area, then why not. If they are drafted in from outside, and seen as the 'outside experts' then probably not - it usually causes friction within the area."(S24) "Define the roles, mandate and empowerment of the environmental manager. They may fall into different categories, of which I may name at least 4: 1. The conflictive manager. Created by a lobbying body. A good example is the body (forget the name) that is in charge of the Everglades in Florida. Their work is tainted by conflict of interest: the provision of water to cities and sugar cane farmers, at the same time maintaining the 'wet lands' as an ecosystem and controlling flooding! 2. The romantic. Exemplified by rich Europeans or North-Americans. Wanting to keep habitats, they may buy some land and resort to eco-tourism in order to keep their sustainability. I believe there are some German managed 'eco' destinations in Ecuador. Driven by an alternative way of life, they may not 'manage' the environment as they should. 3. The bureaucrat. A member of a government agency or NGO that may not be aware of local needs, responding always to policies made from a distance. Current legislation may be a hinder. "Los paisas", developed and colonised what is today Risaralda, Quindio, Caldas and 24 parts of Choco in Colombia, by using legislation that enabled them to cut and clear big forest areas to be claimed afterwards, creating the concept of the "colono". A colonisation process I witnessed in Caquetá some years ago. 4. The "grass roots" manager. Perhaps, the type who knows best the ecosystem and the power relationships that develop around it by the people involved with it. Usually their voice is not heard, mainly because of the threat they represent to some landowners or 'colonos'. If the law regarding claiming land that has been cleared is still existing, managing the environment is going to be a great task. One shall not forget that the 'colono' phenomenon represents one of the many socio-economical problems a nation like Colombia faces. … Management work usually develops around a policy. Trust among all participants is primordial. There ought to be some kind of legal-economical framework that will ease management work. If this is in place and all conflicts of interest reduced, then the territorial ordering process of Amazonia may become real." (S 31) Political risks, EMs tough job: "Yes, however the pressures on the person might be extreme. It would be preferable to have both on-site environmental managers and use some respected external managers as reference." (S15); "Yes, but bearing in mind that you should work with politicians and many kinds of 'parasitic' people which are thinking every day in the short term. It means that environmental managers are not enough for sustainable management and use of natural resource: their analytical models as well as their technical capacity is necessary, but they cannot work isolated, they require to work with others, despite the fact that 'the others' could (and should) think in a different way." (S40) Summarising-Q413 Like in the responses to Q1, Q2 and Q3, we can identify different and often contradictory perspectives. There were those that argued that environmental managers14 are the best qualified for the task and appeared somewhat perplexed by the question. Within that group there were those responses that assumed that decisions were taken by environmental managers or should be taken by them, although two expressed that others' opinion should be considered to a lesser extent. In the other direction were the responses that questioned intervention by EMs and considered it useful only when the decision-making process was led by indigenous peoples themselves. Yet, a third group was of the opinion that EMs should get involve in the same conditions that other stakeholders, such as indigenous peoples but, one respondent suggested they should not intervene in the management of indigenous peoples' territories at all. 13 See also Table 4, Appendix 3. 14 Called EMs in the survey to differentiate them from other experts and indigenous peoples. As it has been explained elsewhere (See "The march of the Manikins: Agroforestry practices and Spiritual dancing in Northwest Amazonia) indigenous peoples management of the environment departs from a different rationality and uses different instruments. What indigenous people from Northwest Amazonia call "management of the world" is not only a set of shamanistic practices but a way of living that combines social aims, aesthetic values, religious believes, and economic practices in a distinctive manner. Although acknowledging indigenous peoples from Northwest Amazonia are in fact environmental managers, the author has stressed that their "management of the world" incorporates many things, some of them of tremendous importance for environmental management more generally. 25 The other contrasting perspectives concerned the character of the intervention. While one group of responses were of the opinion that EMs should not get involved in politics, but have a technical approach, others thought that they should get involved to contrast and balance the political interests of other groups. A third group emerged, which advocated the intervention of environmental managers as conciliators and facilitators. Related to this roll of managers as advisers there was a group of responses showing concern with the capacity, ability and quality of environmental managers and, the possible risks that they have to face. Non-conclusive comment-Q4: As in responses to questions one, two and three, we can trace arguments and contra-arguments. One set of respondents portrays EMs as heroes. In this scenario they face a tough job, they are well trained, better able and indispensable for the process of territorial ordering; their politically risky job in which they have to make the decisions would be fundamental for diminishing environmental risk and even saving life on earth. (As in Q2 and Q3 none of those arguing conservation/catastrophism had been in Amazonia). A counter narrative is that provided by respondents arguing that EMs' participation should be directed by indigenous peoples (IP) or that the projects should be led mainly by natives, and that EMs should not intervene in the management of indigenous territories: in this case the heroes are indigenous peoples. A second counter narrative seems to be reflected by some of the respondents. In this scenario, EMs like IP should have equal rights to participate as different stakeholders, in this case decisions would come from a rational process in which dialog between cultures would take place. The participation of EMs would not be limited by their status/power but by their capacity, ability and their roll as facilitators or conciliators. Discussion European colonisation of Africa, Asia, the Americas, and Australasia from the late fifteenth century onwards, gave a tremendous boost to the volume of global transactions involving natural resources. Over the long run, trade in these resources, and in an increasingly diverse array of environmental services, has been expanding ever since. However, much of what is called globalisation in the twenty first century has more to do with developments in information technology since the late 1900s. The increasing speed of communications media and information transfer have proved fundamental in economic restructuring and the transformation of the world into a largely urban space (Castells 1996). In the globalised, twenty first century, local political decisions have little chance of being autarchic; international policy advisors inform local stakeholders about what is considered adequate or legal in accordance with international treaties, foreign protocols and political compromises. The local politics of environmental management is the concern of everybody: corporations, governments, international, regional and national NGOs, all of which compete for access to information and expansion of their scope of power in the political arena (Ambrose-Oji, Allmark et al. 2002). During the 1990s, and especially after the Río Earth Summit in 1992, one of the main topics of discussion was management of the global environment (Sachs 26 1993). Global targets for sustainable development were established at Río and similar processes were set in train at regional, national and local scales all over the world, following the guidelines set out in one of the policy documents agreed at Río: "Agenda 21". The official discourse that emerged from the Río process was replicated and many of the assumptions that informed the original discourse have been accorded a quasi-factual status by many people all over the globe (Sevilla_Guzmán and Woodgate 1997). The official discourse on globalisation emphasised the need for environmental management at supranational levels. At the same time, counter-discourse or anti-globalisation narratives have emerged. These emphasise the rights of indigenous people and local political actors to manage natural resources independently, in ways that allow them to make their own livelihood decisions and establish resource-use regimes that can provide the environmental goods and services that people need15. The management of the environment has always motivated debate and often led to confrontation. One of the main arguments of conservative conservationists concerns the 'vulnerability' of rainforest environments, and thus the need for their protection. Since the 1980s the problem of deforestation of tropical rainforests has been a global issue with special emphasis in South East Asia, the Congo basin and Amazonia (Adger, Benjaminsen et al. 2001). In a 1998 analysis of 'rainforest' web-sites, Stott revealed four metawords within the conservation rhetoric: orientalism (the exotic other), climax (harmony), old age (ancient, undisturbed) and vulnerability (Stott 1999). Metawords such as these become key rhetorical devices so that even research and development project proposals tend to employ them, thus replicating assumptions that are no longer questioned. How is this metalanguage produced? What are the bases of its principal cannons? And why is it that semantic analysis tends to remain the preserve of scientists – or is it something that is also dealt with at a local level? Narratives can be traced back in time. Equilibrium disturbance (climax rupture) and environmental fragility (vulnerability) both played parts in Hardin's 1968 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin 1998). The neo-Malthusian discourse of environmental catastrophe as a result of an increasing population (of 'poor people') lies at the heart of Hardin's tragedy. The conservative conservationist perspective on the management of the rainforest is based on mistrust of systems of environmental management in which property rights (over life and resources) are not yet marketable. From a conservative political perspective responsible environmental action can only be achieved through the clarification of property rights to allow the unfettered action of free markets for the negotiation of such rights. It is assumed that the tragedy of the commons is happening or will happen in rainforest contexts where private property rights are not yet the rule and where societies still practise communal environmental management regimes based on indigenous knowledge rationalities in which nature and society form an ontological continuum. For conservatives only free markets for environmental rights, good and services can guarantee sustainable development. Neo-Malthusian 15 The discourses that emphasise on the need of eco-efficiency, economic transnationalization and planetary ecological management, were named by Sachs as contest and astronauts' perspectives. And the counter-discourse arising from the desempowered communities of the South as the home perspective (Sachs 1977). 27 and neo-liberal assumptions are fundamental to this perspective on sustainable development. With the aim of promoting Agenda 21 at local, national and regional levels, a complex and sophisticated process of institutionalisation was embarked upon. Amazonia did not escape this process; governmental officials or conservationist NGOs replicated the dominant conservationist discourse at the local level in NWA16. This official discourse of deforestation with its main initiative of protection of the environment from people has been labelled 'hegemonic' (Stott and Dullivan 2000) or 'neo-Malthusian' and 'managerial' (Adger, Benjaminsen et al. 2001). It should come as no surprise then that counter narratives have developed in Amazonia (and elsewhere), for many of which the principal intention is to contradict the conservative policies derived from this hegemonic discourse. The rights of indigenous people to define the course of their lives: their rights to manage natural resources and the environmental services used or supplied by the Amazonian environment have been key issues in these significant counter-claims against the official Amazonian territorial ordering politics and policies, which have involved environmental management that has been designed elsewhere. This counter-narrative pursues the principle and right of self-determination against the interests of political initiatives for global environmental management. The counter-narrative was not just a reaction to neo-liberal, neo-Malthisian conservative politics and conservation policies during the 1980s and '90s, however. In Latin America, all indigenous peoples' rebellions against the European empires were motivated by a call to reconstruct pre-colonial socio-cultural orders returning to territorial orders where the management of 'agroforestry' was undifferentiated from the sacred (Varese 1996:124-25). In modern, post-colonial states, indigenous peoples continued to struggle for the recognition of their territories. In today's NWA this struggle is related to governmental and conservationists policies of environmental management and the presence of armed groups opposed to political resolution of territorial ordering. Many of the Protected Areas (PAs) of NWA were created at a time when no legal procedure was established for public intervention in the designation of such areas. The official titles of the PA or IR (Resguardos in Colombia) have not prevented non-native invasion of lands or the expansion of illegal crop production inside either PAs or IRs. Conservationists and indigenous peoples alike have vacillated between alliances with, and the rejection of, the armed groups in charge of illegal crop production, depending on the political gains to be made and the risks involved in rejecting the proposals or achieving an alliance. The armed groups, on their part, have sought political alliances when such co-operation could benefit their military capacity or improve the managerial efficiency of their enterprises.17 16 With respect to the territorial ordering process, the Colombian Amazon controversy is discussed in Forero 1999, 2000; Forero, Laborde et al. 1998. 17 See Forero 2000, "Territoriality and Governance in the Colombian Amazon". 28 As far as local inhabitants were concerned, rainforest conservation policies arrived in NWA from another space and time. The legal establishment of protected areas took no account of the opinions or desires of the peoples already inhabiting NWA. Indigenous agro-ecosystems and the livelihood strategies of more recent colonisers were both ignored. The ideology expressed through legal frameworks was that of protection of the environment from people. The villains were local inhabitants and the regulations to be enforced were those of expelling people from the 'conservation' areas and maintaining their exclusion. The dominant discourse made no distinction between complex indigenous agro-ecosystems and the less sophisticated livelihood strategies being developed by recent immigrants. All of them were labelled as "slash and burn" agriculture (Myers 1980). Yet it has become increasingly apparent over the last thirty years that slash and burn is just an aspect of indigenous environmental management in Amazonia, which combines agricultural production, fish and game management, ritual prescriptions, and aesthetic developments18. It has even been suggested that movement towards "short cropping/long-fallow" cultivation patterns within indigenous Amazonian agro-ecosystems was an strategic response to alien invasion of territories and the introduction of metal axes (Denevan 2001: 115-31). Today, most ethnoscientists find it self-evident that the concepts of "chagras" (gardens) and "rastrojos" (abandoned gardens) are far too simplified to reflect the structure of cultivations over the short-, medium- and long-terms, in accordance with local knowledge of agro-ecological variation. It is obvious that indigenous environmental management has transformed Amazonian ecosystems for millennia; this was already evident to many of the nineteenth century European explorers19. Even the most knowledgeable people in the industrialised world have no precise idea of how 'vulnerable' rainforest is and few have accurate knowledge about the political conditions facing indigenous peoples or other human inhabitants of the Amazonian rainforest. With respect to NWA, even the most determined researcher would have problems accessing this information. It is often said that the rainforests of Amazonia are the 'lungs of the planet' (S.33), a metaphor used to emphasise the region's role in the carbon cycle, especially the absorption of CO2. This is somewhat ironic given that our own lungs actually consume oxygen and release CO2 during respiration. Indigenous people have been portrayed as villains or victims depending on the observer and the moment of observation. When portrayed as victims the picture is something like this: the wise guardians of the rainforest are obliged by violence to sell their natural resources or abandon their noble environmental practices. The role of violence in the functioning of extractive economies has been well documented. Violent coercion has been the dominant system in NWA for more than a century. Although indigenous people are no longer sold, 'debt-peonage' systems still dominate and exploit poor indigenous and immigrant inhabitants of 18 See Forero 2001, " The march of the Manikins: Agroforestry Practices and Spiritual Dancing in Northwest Amazonia". 19 See Forero 2002a, " Indigenous Knowledge and the Scientific Mind: Activism or Colonialism". 29 NWA. These people are employed for the harvesting, transport and commercialisation of coca base, cocaine and, the functioning of 'extractive economies' in general (Gómez, A. 1999). But there has been an indigenous response. This has sometimes taken the form of open rebellion and sometimes that of making strategic and tactical alliances in an attempt to obtain or preserve political power, to secure the acquisition of merchandise or simply to survive20. The counter-hegemonic narratives that we mentioned above have been labelled 'populist discourse': making it explicit that the victims are the indians and the villains the international organisations, sometimes allied to transnational corporations (like oil drilling companies) and the dependent and often corrupted governments that collaborate with these international organisations (Adger, Benjaminsen et al. 2001: 687). For NWA there are reports that seem to corroborate these arguments; e.g. indigenous peoples and environmental campaigners have protested jointly in Ecuador and Brazil against the construction of massive pipelines planned to cross through both IRs and PAs in both countries. The pipeline construction projects in both countries have arisen following collaboration between national governments and international oil exploration companies and have provoked public feelings of outrage (Weinberg 2001)21 . " [In NWA] Governments, multilateral lenders, multinational corporations, private banks and other institutions may not be counting on the convenient disappearance of indigenous peoples who get in the way of their ambitious development plans, but they often act as if they are." (Rabben 1998:122) "We who live in indigenous communities are surviving in the midst of a war imposed upon us by different factions and by the very same Colombian state that historically abandoned the countryside and permitted our lands to be invaded by waves of colonizers. Today we are caught in the crossfire, menaced by killings and displacement, while the State manifests its presence in the air with planes that slowly kill our plants and animals, our subsistence crops, and our people." (Organizacion Zonal Indigena del Putumayo_ OZIP 2002) However, is it possible to claim that there is a policy of 'ethnic cleansing' for NWA? From one side the whole issue of national sovereignty has been put into question; the expansion of Plan Andino (formerly Plan Colombia), the USA's anti-drug strategy for Latin America, exemplifies the delicate situation in which some of the Latin American countries have entered the twenty first century. The military component Plan Andino is aimed to support economic measures, the famous and indeed infamous structural adjustment plans that have provoked strikes and rebellions22. Additionally, even if there were an official policy of ethnic cleansing, South American States, given their size and power, would find it difficult to implement 20 See "Indigenous Knowledge and the Scientific Mind: Activism or Colonialism" (Forero 2002a), and "Technology in Northwest Amazonia: Sketches from Inside" (Forero 2002b). 21 For recent (March 2002) press releases on this issue see www.amazonwatch.org and www.americas.org 22 See Forero and Woodgate 2002, "The semantics of 'Human Security' in Northwest Amazonia: between indigenous peoples''Management of the World' and the USA's State Security Policy for Latin America". 30 it. The poor, be they indigenous peoples or colonisers are in the middle of a territorial war linked to international networks of criminality; they have been displaced, kidnapped or killed regardless of their claims of neutrality. In the case of Colombia, although some military authorities have been linked to some of the worst of the paramilitaries' atrocities, it has not been proved that the State itself has a policy of ethnic cleansing. In the case of Brazil, in 1996 the national executive proclaimed Decree 1775, instructing a right to contravene which, contrary to 169 WTO international agreement on Indigenous Peoples' rights, gave other stakeholders the opportunity to challenge Indigenous property rights. Paramilitary groups associated with illegal evictions of indigenous peoples in Brazilian Amazonia have long sought such a 'charter'. At the same time, the decree left the definition of indigenous land rights to the will of the executive power itself (Ministry of Justice). But, as in the case of Colombia, it cannot be proved that there is a policy of ethnic cleansing. It has been suggested in the non-conclusive comments on the survey results, that many people's responses echoed hegemonic and populist narratives. Indigenous peoples were portrayed as heroes or victims, as well as scientists and environmental managers. However, quiet a few of responses cannot be associated with either populist or hegemonic narratives. There is a group of responses that reflect critical thinking and are willing to challenge such simplistic dichotomies. Thus, the concept of sustainable development has been questioned, suspiciousness of western, scientific and technological solutions was expressed, and there was little willingness to give environmental managers carte blanche to prescribe whatever measures they might see fit. Interestingly, this last group, while acknowledging the need for: new concepts and adequate guidelines for environmental management, and the difficulty of achieving conservation targets while complying with indigenous peoples rights, still consider the concepts of SD, PA and IR as useful or the politics derived from them as desirable. What is interesting is that the responses to this survey, which were made by outsiders (respondents were not inhabitants of Amazonia), reflect a tendency to picture the conflict over territory in ways that do not correspond to either of the two main narratives. We can say that inasmuch as outsiders see possibilities for political action outside hegemonic or populist approaches, so Amazonian insiders are organising and negotiating regardless of whether their political discourse echoes either conservative or counter-hegemonic politics of territorial ordering. As no significant statistical analysis could be derived from the survey it would be difficult to speak of tendencies. At first sight it seems that adherence to hegemonic, counter-hegemonic, utopic or conciliatory narratives reflects each respondent's intellectual background more than his or her witnessing of the situation of peoples and forests in Amazonia. However, certain coincidences among the responses to each question might be representative: - For Q1-SD, two out of four of the respondents that accepted the imperative of SD without question have been in Amazon, none of them is a social scientist (SS) though and the other two were environmental managers. None of the SSs 31 that had visited the region argued for complete incompatibility between sustainability and development. Instead, SSs were part of a third group acknowledging that the concept of SD might be of some use, given certain conditions. - For Q2 – the relationship between IRs and PAs, not one of those who argued for the need to harmonise the two concepts (5), or those that emphasised SD as a desirable aim that has not yet been reached (4), or those or that argued that IRs are better than PAs (2) had been to the Amazon (in total 21 % of respondents). Respondents that had visited Amazonia (VA) were among those that acknowledged a relationship between IRs and PAs and that the relationship can be both complementary and competitive. Two respondents from the VA group argued that a complementary relationship was not possible in Colombia and one of them pointed out that being political strategies with different aims they should be kept differentiated in order to avoid conflict. This result might indicate that people that have been in Amazonia are more aware of the problems of territorial ordering caused by the imposition of regimes based in alien concepts. - For Q3 – on the usefulness of the concepts, none the five respondents arguing that IRs might be better that PAs had been in Amazonia, while one of the two that argued that IRs are ineffective had visited. Only one out of five respondents that argued for the need to integrate the concepts had been in Amazonia, while both those that argued for an incompatibility of interests have. This result seems to confirm that people who have visited the area are more conscious of the problems caused when policies formulated elsewhere are imported to Amazonia. Conclusions All technological adoption/adaptation has diverse effects in the life and development of society. People living within the society that is adopting them, and the outsiders that are analysing cultural change perceive these effects in different ways. The assessments of 'usefulness' or 'risk' a society makes when adapting/adopting technologies are linked to the conscious and subconscious present and future scenarios into which the society places itself alongside other societies. If the rest of the world wishes to respect Amazonian indigenous peoples' rights of self-determination, they should not intervene in ordering processes of indigenous territories. The problem is that indigenous ways of dealing with the world might not be compatible with the ideas that foreigners have with respect to Amazonia, its peoples and its future. And, for good or bad, fairly or unfairly, each group has a way of intervening and exercising a certain amount of power to modify the global political agenda for the governance of Amazonia in function of their own particular interests. Replication of narratives is a common strategy used by all groups aiming to make alliances and enhance their power. However, the responses analysed here seem to indicate that a large group of people (at least from the academic sector) is 32 unhappy with the assumptions behind either populists or hegemonic discourses with respect to rainforest management, and seeking new ways of environmental policy making. This group of people acknowledged that political conflict has derived from policy formulated elsewhere, and derived from an epistemology alien to local inhabitants. There are varied political groups competing for the governance of Amazonia. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) facilitates analysis and political action. It is expected that better-informed indigenous peoples would be in a better position to make decisions with respect to the governance of Amazonia. At the present time, the indigenous peoples of Amazonia have very limited and precarious access to ICT. Thus, their perspectives on territorial ordering are less likely to be represented than those such as conservation agencies, multinational developers, insurgent and mafiosi groups, all of which have far superior access to ICT. 33 Appendix 1 PRIVACY POLICY: Email addresses will be used only to send out materials related to this survey. Aggregate survey results may be distributed, but all personal data will be kept strictly confidential. No information about individual users will be disclosed to third parties. 34 Appendix 2 Summary of Web-site technical work The most demanding work was designing the pages that would contain indigenous territorial maps. CAD versions of the map would have to be transformed into image files suitable for Web use. In order to do this ArcView- GIS (Geographical Information Systems) software was needed. A picture of the map could be easily generated in ArcView-GIS and to certain extent, editing and colouring could enhance some features. But such a map or, more precisely, such a picture of the bi-dimensional representation of the Tukano territory remained inadequate for publication in WebPages. "The pics were to heavy" (I would learn the ICT design jargon), meaning that the memory used to storage, loading and unloading of these pictures was vast. Besides dividing the map and generating pictures of several areas, these pictures needed transforming to make them 'lighter'. This meant that the pictures had to be edited and the storage format had to be changed in terms of the colour pallet and resolution (a maximum of 72 dpi). Most importantly, the pictures should look better! An early version of PhotoImpactTM was used to change the colours and other features as well as to design the icons that would be used to identify the hypertext links between pages. However, the software was not appropriate for the task and the 'pics' were still too heavy. The design was poor, too rigid, with inappropriate colours and, worst of all the 'weight' of the maps would not allow for easy loading of the images by potential users. To change the maps (pics) again, PhotoshopTM was used, while major design transformations were achieved using FireworksTM software. For the actual montage and edition of the whole web-site Dreamweaver3TM was used. A similar process was followed to generate the vegetation map, which was adapted from one of the Amazonian Vegetation maps generated by Puerto Rastrojo. The introduction to a political ecology taking as a case study the Yaigojé Resguardo, was originally a single text (like in the preliminary version) but following the advice of critical reviewers, this page was divided into six parts. 35 Appendix 3 Table 1 Q1- Do you think that 'development' and 'sustainability' are compatible? RESPONSE - ARGUMENT SURVEY No. NVA VA Profession Unquestioning the developmental project 2 1 PhD Student Biology 12 1 Environmental Engineer 13 1 Environmental Engineer 40 1 Project Co-ordinator (SD) Yes, to diminish environmental risk 18 1 Student 21 1 Taxation 23 1 Designer 39 1 Postgraduate Student 42 1 Biologist Sustainable Development is an aim to be 3 1 Epidemiologist reached 5 1 Civil Servant 8 1 Accountant 24 1 Student 25 1 PhD St. Agriculture & Development 29 1 Anthropologist 35 1 Lecturer 37 1 Postgraduate Student 48 1 Anthropologist 51 1 Postgraduate Student Compatible if defined locally 5 1 Civil Servant 20 1 Lecturer: Ecotourism 27 1 Anthropologist 31 1 Postgraduate Student 52 1 Lecturer: IT & Development Possible but risk of economic imperative 17 1 Unemployed Incompatible a) Contradiction in terms 24 1 Student 4 1 PhD St. Environmental genetics b) Financial economic imperative 10 1 Student 19 1 PhD St. Agriculture & Development 34 1 PhD Student: Environmental Manager 47 1 PhD Student SD inconsistent at present time 1 1 Lecturer: Env. Sociology 33 1 PhD Student 36 1 Research Engineer 45 1 EM SD is green rhetoric 7 1 Student 32 1 Teacher 48 1 Anthropologist 36 Table 2 Q2 - Do you think there is any relation between 'indigenous reserves' (IR) and 'protected areas' (PA)? RESPONSE - ARGUMENT SURVEY No. NVA VA Profession Yes 37 1 Postgraduate Student 18 1 Student 22 1 Anthropologist 43 1 Anthropologist 50 1 PhD Student No 15 1 Consultant: Health & Safety Need to harmonise IR and PA to protect a) For (IP) Indigenous Peoples' benefit 19 1 PhD St. Agriculture & Development 20 1 Lecturer: Ecoturism b) Protection of Biodiversity 25 1 PhD St. Agriculture & Development 33 1 PhD Student c) SD based on IP experiences 11 1 Consultant: Rural Development. SD as Utopia 3 1 Epidemiologist 6 1 Lecturer Ecology Env. Management 36 1 Research Engineer 42 1 Biologist IR and PA are different political strategies 2 1 PhD Student - Biologist IR and PA are colonisation strategies 10 1 Student 24 1 Student 26 1 Student Indigenous resistance to IR/PA strategies 48 1 Anthropologist IR and PA overlapped 7 1 Student 34 1 PhD St. Environmental Management 44 1 Postgraduate Student Environmental Indian 23 1 Designer 40 1 Project Co-ordinator (SD) Environmental Indians contaminated 12 1 Environmental Engineer by mestizo culture 39 1 Postgraduate Student 45 1 Environmental Manager IR are Inefficient 35 1 Lecturer 53 1 Journalist IR more effective that PA 5 1 Civil Servant 17 1 Unemployed 37 Table 3 Q3 - Do you think that the concepts of 'protected areas' (PA), 'indigenous reserves' (IR) and SD are useful for environmental management today? RESPONSE - ARGUMENT SURVEY No. NVA VA Profession Depends on the context 1 1 Lecturer: Env. Sociology 2 1 PhD St. Biologist Yes 4 1 PhD St. Env. Genetics 14 1 Economist 22 1 Anthropologist Indigenous Environmental 12 1 Environmental Engineer 23 1 Designer 41 1 PhD Student Indigenous Environmental in contamination risk 45 1 EM Concepts: Principles and instruments a) Participation: IR better than PA 5 1 Civil Servant 6 1 Lecturer Ecology EM 11 1 Consultant: Rural Development RD 26 1 Student 41 1 PhD Student b) Intergenerational Equity: resource reserve 12 1 Environmental Engineer for Development 13 1 Agriculturist 21 1 Taxation 25 1 PhD St. Agriculture & Dvnt. 38 1 Gardener (MSc) Risk and Protection a)Environmental Protection (EP) 12 1 Environmental Engineer 17 1 Unemployed EP and catastrophism 6 1 Lecturer Ecology EM 32 1 Teacher 51 1 Postgraduate Student b) Of cultural diversity 31 1 Postgraduate Student IR as ineffective 10 1 Student 24 1 Student Integration of concepts or the need for it 7 1 Student 11 1 Consultant RD 18 1 Student 26 1 Student 34 1 PhD Student Env. Mgment. Difficulties for integration a) Incompatibility of interests 10 1 Student 40 1 Project co-ordinator (SD) b) Financial economic effectiveness' imperative 25 1 PhD St. Agriculture Devent. 30 1 Postgraduate Student 33 1 PhD Student c) Political manipulation 44 1 Post. St. Environment 46 1 Lecturer 38 47 1 PhD Student 48 1 Anthropologist d) Semiotic blur 24 1 Student 50 1 PhD Student Education: Dynamism of the concepts 37 1 Postgraduate Student 45 1 Environmental Manager 47 1 PhD Student 39 Table 4 Q4 - Should or should not environmental managers (EM) get involved in territorial ordering process in Amazon? RESPONSE - ARGUMENT SURVEY No. NVA VA Profession Yes 4 1 PhD St. Evolutionary Genetics In fact they are 22 1 Anthropologist Unsure 52 1 Lecturer: IT & Development 32 1 Teacher Question into Question 6 1 Lecturer Ecology EM 31 1 Postgraduate St Indigenous Peoples as EM 27 1 Anthropologist Yes, for Env. protection (catastrophism) 32 1 Teacher 33 1 PhD Student 42 1 Biologist Yes, EM are the ones (better able that IP) 12 1 Environmental Engineer 18 1 Student 21 1 Taxation 28 1 Lecturer 34 1 PhD student 36 1 Research Engineer 46 1 Lecturer 53 1 Journalist EM provide solutions/ take decisions 23 1 Designer 35 1 Lecturer 38 1 Gardener Yes but listening to others 5 1 Civil Servant 53 1 Journalist If Indigenous Peoples direct EM or projects 1 1 Lecturer: Env. Sociology 10 1 Student 14 1 Economist 41 1 PhD Student EM have equal rights to other stakeholders 2 1 PhD St. Biology 6 1 Lecturer Ecology EM 7 1 Student 29 1 Anthropologist 44 1 Post. Student Not inside IP territories 47 1 PhD Student Yes, if apolitical EM 9 1 Environmental Manager 17 1 Unemployed 37 1 Postgraduate Student Yes for political counteract 26 1 Student EM as facilitators 5 1 Civil Servant 10 1 Student 45 1 Environmental Manager Depends of capacity, ability & quality of EM 24 1 Student 31 1 Postgraduate Student EM tough job: political risk 15 1 Consultant: Health 40 1 Project Co-ordinator (SD) 40 References Adger, W. N., T. A. Benjaminsen, et al. (2001). "Advancing a Political Ecology of Global Environmental Discourses". Development and Change 32: 681-715. Ambrose-Oji, B., T. Allmark, et al. (2002). "The Environmental State and the Forest; of Lookouts, Leopards, and Losers". In The environmental state under pressurence. A. P. J. Mol and F. H. Buttel. Oxford, Elsevier. 10: 149-69. Castells, M. (1996). "The rise of the network society". Cambridge, MA, Blackwell Publishers. Denevan, W. M. (2001). "Cultivated Landscapes of Native Amazonia and the Andes". Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press. Ecologist (2002). Making it happen. Interview to Martin von Hildebrand. The Ecologist. 32: 44-7. Forero, O. A. (1999). From pure sciences to ethnosciences. A broad perspective on ecosystems analysis and governance. Examining the environmental management problems of the Yaigojé Resguardo Indigenous Reserve in the Colombian Amazon. Ecology and Epidemiology Group. Biological Sciences. Coventry, UK, University of Warwick: 233. --- (2000). "Territoriality and Governance in the Colombian Amazon". Conference: SLAS annual conference- 2000, Hull, (Unpublished). --- (2001). "The March of the Manikins. Agroforestry practices and spiritual dancing in Northwest Amazonia". Conference: Conservation and Sustainable Development -Comparative Perspectives, CCR-University of Yale. New Haven, Connecticut, Unpublished. --- (2002a). "Indigenous knowledge and the scientific mind: Activism or Colonialism?" Conference: Activism as History, History as Activism. History Department, Columbia University, New York. --- (2002b). "Technology in Northwest Amazonia: Sketches form Inside. A contribution to the Political Ecology of Northwest Amazonia." Unpublished. Forero, O. A., R. E. Laborde, et al. (1998). "Colombia: Yaigojé Indigenous Resguardo Natural Reserve". In Indigenous Peoples and Diversity Conservation in Latin America. IWGIA. Copenhagen, IWGIA. Doc. 87. Forero, O. A. and G. Woodgate (2002). "The semantics of 'Human Security' in Northwest Amazonia: between indigenous peoples' 'Management of the World' and the USA's State Security Policy for Latin America". In Human Security and the Environment. M. Redclift. Cheltenham UK and Northampton MA, Edward Elgar. Gómez, A. (1999). "Estructuración socioespacial de la Amazonia Colombina, siglos XIX-XX". In Domínguez, C. F. Cubides. Bogotá, CES, Universidad Nacional de Colombia: 21-40. Gómez, R. (1998). "The Nostalgia of Virtual Community. A Study of computer-mediated communications use in Colombian non-governmental organizations". Information Technology and People 11(3): 217-34. Hardin, G. J. (1998). "The Tragedy of the Commons". In Debating the Earth. The Environmental Politics Reader. S. Dryzek and D. Scholosberg. N.Y., Oxford University Press: 23-34. Myers, N. (1980). Conversion of Tropical Moist Forest: A Report prepared for the Committee on Research Priorities in Tropical Biology of the National Research Council. Washington D.C., National Academy of Sciences. OZIP (2002). SOS from Indigenous Peoples of Putumayo, Znet:http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=9&ItemID=2122. 2002. Rabben, L. (1998). "Unnatural Selection. The Yanomami, the Kayapó and the Onslaught of Civilisation". London, Pluto Press. Sachs, W. (1977). "'Sustainable Development'". In The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology. M. Redclift and G. Woodgate. Cheltenham, UK Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar: 71-82. ---, Ed. (1993). "Global Ecology. A new arena of political conflict". London, Zed Books. Sevilla_Guzmán, E. and G. Woodgate (1997). "'Sustainable rural development': from industrial agriculture to agroecology". In The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology. M. Redclift and G. Woodgate. Cheltenham, UK Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar: 83-100. Stott, P. (1999). Tropical rain forest: a political ecology of hegemonic mythmaking. IEA Studies on the Environment, No 15. London. 41 Stott, P. and S. Dullivan, Eds. (2000). "Political Ecology: Science, Myth and Power". London and N.Y., Arnold. Varese, S. (1996). "The new Environmentalist Movement of Latin American Indigenous Movement pp." In Valuing Local Knowledge. S. Brush and D. Stabinsky. Washington D.C.: 122-144. Weinberg, B. (2001). "Amazonia: Planning the Final Destruction. Mega-Development Threatens Devastation of Indian Ecologies". Native Americas: Hemisphere Journal of Indigenous Issues 450: Fall/Winter.
Issue 8.1 of the Review for Religious, 1949. ; 0 A.M.D.G. ~ Review for Religious JANUARY 15, 1949 Sancta~ EcclesiaCatholica . . . . . . . . . . . ocafionsCosfMoney.'~,.-~, ~. . PeterM. Miller .B.a.p. ~t i.s.m. . Cal r e n Mce :A c ull fet The Spirit of Poverty ~.~ . . . ¯ . . . . . Joseph F. Gallen Decisions of the Holy See Ouestlons Answered s~ Book Reviews VOLU~E VII}. .~. NUrvIBEP, I RI VII::W FOR Ri:::LIGIOUS VOLUME VIII JANUARY, 1949 -NUMBER 1 CONTENTS SANCTA ECCLESIA CATHOLICAMJ. Putz, S.J . 3 VOCATIONS COST MONEY--Peter M. Miller, S.C.J .1.8. OUR CONTRIBUTORS . 24 BAPTISM--A DEATH AND RESURReCTION--Clarence McAuliffe, S.J2.5 A REPRINT SERIES--MAYBE! . 34 THE SPIRIT OF POVERTY--Joseph F. Gall n, S.J .3.5 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS-- 1. Jubilee Gifts and the Spirit of Poverty . 43 2. Moderator Keeps Acrit~itg Funds in his own Room . 44 3. Asperges at Community Mass . 44 4. Alms to Beggars . 44 5. Vows of Novice Postponed Five Days . 45 6. Report by Administrator of Patrimony . 4~ 7. Sunday Mass Obligation of Excommunicated Persons . 45 DECISIONS OF THE HOLY SEE . 46 BOOK REVIEWS-- Discourses on Our Lady; The Prayer Life of a Religious; In Spirit and in Truth . ~ . 47 BOOK NOTICES . 49 VOCATIONAL LITERATURE . 54 MY MASS . ' . ~ ¯ . ¯ 55 BOOK ANNOUNCEMENTS . 56 REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS, January. 1949. Vol. VIII, No. 1. Published bi-monthly: January, March. May, July, September, and November at the College Press. 606 Harrison Street, Topeka, Kansas, by St/Mary's College, St. Marys, Kansas, with ecclesiastical approbation. Entered as second class matter January 15, 1942, at the Post Office, Topeka, Kansas, under the act of March 3, 1879. Editorial Board: Adam C. Ellis, S.J., G. Augustine Ellard, S.J., Gerald Kelly, S~J. Editorial Secretary: Alfred F, Schneider, S.J. Copyright, 1949, by Adam C. Ellis. Permission is hereby granted for quotations of reasonable length, provided due credit be given this review and the author. Subscription price: 2 dollars a year. Printed in U. S. A. Before writing to us. please consult noflce on fnsrde back cover. Review f:or Religious Volume VIII January--December, 1949 Published at THE COLLEGE PRESS Topeka, Kansas Edi÷ed by THE JESUIT FATHERS SAINT MARY'S COLLEGE Sf. Marys, Kansas REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS is indexed in fhe CATHOLIC PERIODICAL INDEX Sancta I::cclesia Ca hollca J. Putz, S.J. THE world needs saints; in our time especially. It needs them not only for their supernatural merits and the great works they achieve; it needs saints to lo6k up to, to admire, to venerate. The more it is sunk in scepticism and mediocrity, in selfishness and materialism, the more it needs saints, witnesses of the invisible, living proofs of what human nature is capable of--a standard and an inspiration. The mere presence or'memory of saints is a blessing for mankind. To behold the saints is, in Newman's comparison, like coming out of a dark cave and discovering the sunlight. In the saints man-kind discovers the meaning of human dignity, the true standards of right and good. "It is the great mystics," wrote the French phi- Iosopher Bergson, "that have carried and still carry along with the'm the civilized societies. The recollection of what they have been, of what they have done, haunts the memory of mankind." Carlyle';~ well-known utterances on hero-worship apply particularly to the cult of the saints, mankind's most genuine heroes: "The manner of men's hero-worship," he wrote, "verily it is the innermost.fact of their existence and determines all the rest. [What would he say if he came back and found that the chief "heroes" of countless boys and girls are now the movie stars?] No nobler feeling than this of admi-ration for one higher than himself dwells in the breast of man. It is to this hour, and at all hours, the vivifying influence in man's life . No sadder proof can be given by a man of his own littleness than disbelief in great men . Not by flattering our appetites; no, by awakening the Heroic that slumbers in every heart, can any religion gain followers." (On Heroes and Hero-worship.) Holiness inanifested in great saints has ever been a mark of tbe Church of Christ. -. "Holiness begins from Christ; by Christ it is effected . His inexhaustible fulness is the fount of grace and glory. Our Saviour is continually pouring out His gifts of counsel, fortitude, fear and piety, especially on the leading members of His Body, so that the whole Body may grow daily in spotless holiness . J. PUTZ Review for Religious "He not only cares for each individual, but also watches over the whole Church: enligh~tening and fortifying her rulers for the faithful and fruitful discharge of their functions; and-~especially when times are difficult--raising up in the bosom of Mother Church men and women of conspicuous holiness, who will be an inspiration to the rest of Christendom, for the perfecting of the Mystical Body." (Plus XII, Mgstici Corporis; nn. 49 ~A 37 of the E.C.T.S. edition.) ?it all times, and especially during the dark periods of history, the Church has been rich in admirable saints. Canonized saints, it is true, are relatively few; for canonization has become a long and complicated process and consequently is reserved to those whom for special reasons the Church singles out from among the great army of men and women who in the cloister or in the world have closely and heroically followed in the footsteps of Christ. Since the beginning of his pontificate, Plus XII has proclaimed 44 new beati (among them 29 martyrs) and 12 saints. These Christian heroes, of whom we may well feel proud, represent a variety" of conditions and walks of life. Nearly all belong to the 19th century; some of them died in the present century, and their glorification could be witnessed by friends and relatives who had been the witnesses of their lives. Thus they prove by their example, as Plus XII pointed out (in his panegyric of Contardo Ferrini), that even in our own times it is possible to be a saint. In his "homilies" (at the canonization ceremony) and with greater detail in his allocutions to the pilgrims that crowd to Rome for these solemn functions, th~ Holy Father has underlined the char-acteristics of each saint and the lessons our times can learn from them. We shall borrow from him in the following survey. 1939-1946 We can give little more than a bare mention of those beatified or canonized before 1947, although the story of every one of them is a fascinating adventure. It will be noted that among those thus honored by the Church, the foundresses of new religious institutes predc~minate. This is but one sign of the steadily increasing share religious women have been taking in the work of the Church, both at home and in the mission field. June 18, 1939.--B1. Emily de Vialar (1797-1856), foundress of the Sisters of St. Joseph of the Apparition for the care of the poor, sick, and children (some 1,200 at present). June 25, 1939.-~B1. Justin De Jacobis (1800-1860), an danuar~, 1949 SANCTA ECCLESIA CATHOLICA. Italian Lazarist, first vicar apostolic of Abyssinia. In spite of great difficulties, he converted 12,000 schismatics. May 2, 1940--St. Mary-Eupbrasia (1796-!868), foundress of the Good Shepherd of Angers (at present, 39 provinces with over I0,000 members) and of the Penitents of St. Magdalen (at present over 3,000). She was beatified in 1933. May 2, 1940.--St. Gemma Galgani (1878-1903), ~:irgin; famous mystic; prevented by her infirmities from becoming a reli-gious. Was beatified in 1933. May 12, 1940.--B1. Philippine Duchesne (1769-1852), of the Society of the Sacred Heart of Jesus; went as a missionary to North America, where she established the Sisters of the Sacred Heart. May 19, 1940.--BI. Joaquina de Vedruna (1783-1854), first married to a nobleman of Vich (Spain), had nine children; after her husband's death founded the Carmelites of Charity of Vich, for the care of the poor and the sick (at present some 2,000 in Spain and Latin America). May 26, 1940.--B1. Mary-Crucified Di Rosa (1813-1855), foundress of the Servants of Charity of Brescia (Italy), for the care of the sick, the education of children and the preservation of young girls (at present, about 3,000 members). dune 9, 1940.--BI. Emily de Rodat (1787-1852), foundress of the Congregation of the Holy Famih.j of Villefranche (France). dune 16, 1940:--B1. Ignatius de Laconi (1701-1781), a Capuchin lay Brother; most of his humble but apostolic life was spent in Cagliari (Sardinia). December 7, 1940.--B1. Maddalena de Canosso (1744-1835), foundress of the Daughters of Charity, Servants of the Poor (3,500 members in 30 provinces). War conditions suspended all solemn functions during the next years. By decretal letter of November 19, 1943, Margaret of Hungary (1242-1271) was inscribed in the catalogue of saints on the strength of the liturgical cult she had been receiving uninter-ruptedly (equivalent to canonization). She was a daughter of Bela IV, Kin~ of Hungary; at twelve she made her religious pro-fession in a Dominican monastery, and not even the offer of the throne of Bohemia could bring her back to the world. The first canonization after the war (July 7, 1946) was that of Mother Frances Xavier Cabrini (1850-1917), foundress of the Institute of the Missionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart. Though J. PUTZ Reoiew for Religious an Italian, most of her extensive and tireless work was done in America, where she became "the mother of the Italian emigrants in the United States." She crossed the Atlantic twenty-four times. Eventually she was naturalized an American, so that she is "the first American Saint." "With an exterior life extraordinarily active she joined an interior and contemplative life of rare intensity; that is the secret of her prodigious apostolate" (Plus XII). That same year saw three beatifications: October 20, 1946.--B1. Marie-Therese de Soubiran (1834- 1889). Born of an illustrious family, she founded in 1864 the Society of Marie Auxiliatrice, charac'terized by nocturnal adoration and the modern apostolate of the working girls. Ten years later, until her death, she underwent a trial that is probably unique in the history of religious foundations. Her assistant, an ambitious and scheming woman who wanted to take her place, accused her of mis-management and succeeded in convincing the ecclesiastical authorities as well as Teresa's first director, Fr. Ginhac. Abandoned by all, ignominiously expelled from the institute she had founded, she did not utter a word "lest souls might suffer greater scandal" and set out on her Calvary into the cold, dark night. After knocking vainly at the doors of contemplative convents, she found refuge in a hospital until she was received into the Order of Our Lady of Charity. There she spent the last fifteen years of her life, in agony of soul, while her own institute was being led towards ruin. For years she was assailed by doubts and temptations, yet with heroic resignation carried her cross till the end. She died a year beforethe true character of her rival and successor was found out and her institute saved from ruin. October 27, 1946.--BI. Teresa-Eustochium Verzeri (1801- 1852). Born in Bergamo, Italy; she attempted the Benedictine life three times, but attacks of epilepsy forced her to leave. Through her trials, Providence guided this gifted and strong woman towards the foundation of a new religious institute for the education of girls, the Daughters of the Sacred Heart, Nooerober 24, I946.--Twenty-nine Boxer Martyrs. The Chinese nationalist "Boxer" rising of 1900, anti-foreign and espe-cially anti-Christian, proved to be one of the bloodiest persecutions the Church has ever suffered. The victims are estimated to have been 100, 000, among them many missionaries: Franciscans, Lazarists, Jesuits, Foreign Missionaries of Paris, Scheutists. The cause of 6 danuarg, 1949 SANCTA ECCLESIA CATHOLICA beatification of 2,418 martyrs of the Franciscan missions was intro-duced in 1926; but eventually, in order to speed up the process, 29 were singled out for beatification: 15 Europeans, viz., 8 Fran-ciscans (3 Bishops, 4 priests and 1 lay Brother), and 7 Franciscan Missionaries of Mary: among these 8 were Italian, 5 French, 1 Bel-gian, 1 Dutch; 14 Chinese, 5 of whom were seminarists and 9 mis-sion servants: all of these, except three servants, were Franciscan tertiaries. The brief "of beatification declares that they were killed not merely as foreigners, but in odium catholfcae £dei. In his panegyric the Holy Father observed that "the grace of martyrdom is generally, on the part of God, the crowning of a whole series of graces that gradually lead up to it; just as, on the part of man, the witness of blood is ordinarily the final gem of a long correspondence to grace." 1947 This year began with three beatifications, which were followed by five canonizations, giving us three new beati and eight saints (several saints being canonized together). April 13, 1947.~B1. Contardo Ferrini (1859-1902). "Most of those who reach the honours of beatification are religious men and women having lived far from the world. It would be useful, I think, for the edification of certain circles, to raise to the altars a marl who has magnificently united holiness of life and purity of faith with the scientific exigencies of a professorial chair. This would give the professors and students of our universities a worthy and appropriate patron." Thus wrote M~r. Duchesne when the cause of Contardo Ferrini was introduced. On April 13th of this year the Saint in the froch-coat (as he was cai~ed by Benedict XV, who greatly admired him) was beatified in the presence of a great number of professors and graduates, some of whom had been his colleagues or students. Born in Milan, Contardo Ferrini, after distinguished studies in Italy and Germany, occupied the chair of Roman Law at the uni-versities of Messina, Modena, and finally Pavia. That is the whole history of his short life. He wrote abundantly and soon acquired an international reputation as the leading specialist in his subject; no less an authority than Theodore Mommsen declared that, for the history of Greco-Roman Law, the primacy was passing from Germany to Italy thanks to Ferrini, and that the 20th century would be the century of Ferrini as the 19th century had been that of von Savigny. J. PUTZ Retffeto for Religious He shone no less by his'holiness. Man is an ens fnitum quod tendit ad infinitum, he wrote in one of his books--and he practised it. A Franciscan tertiary, he led a celibate and ascetical life in the world, seeking light and strength in his daily programme of spir-itual exercises: Communion, meditation, the rosary, and visit to the 131essed Sacrament. His arduous and highly specialized work wzs not something by the side of his spiritual life; he considered it as his way of serving God and the Church. His scientific achievements; his simple and deep piety--"he prayed like an angel," his exquisite charity, made of him "a living apology of the faith and of Catholic life." (Cardinal Pacelli, on Feb. 8, 1931, date of the decree on the heroism of Ferrini's virtues.) April 27, 1947. '131. Maria Goretti (1890-1902) virgin and martyr. It was fitting that our "aphrodisiac civilization" should see the glorification of one who died in defense of purity. Maria Goretti was born in a little village some 30 miles from Rome, from poor but deeply Christian parents. When she was not yet quite twelve, an 18 year-old neighbour, Alexander Serenelli, took a violent passion for her, but Maria ~efused to listen to his evil suggestions. On July 5, 1902, when she was alone in the house, Alexander approached her, carrying a dagger and decided to have his way. Exasperated by her resistance, he plunged the dagger into her breast. Her last words were words of forgiveness for her murderer. Alexander was sentenced to-30 years. In prison he repented and afterwards was a witness in the process of beatification. Among the unusually vast crowd that thronged St. Peter's on April 27tb were Maria's own mother, brother, and two sisters. In his allocution to the pilgrims (largely Catholic Actioia groups of girls) on the following day, the Holy Father congratulated, the mother for "the incomparable happiness of having seen her daughter elevated to the glory of the altars." Maria, he added, is the mature fruit of a Christian home with its old, simple method of education, "of a home where one prays, where the children are brought up in the fear of God, in obedience to their parents, in the love of truth and self-respect; accustomed to be satisfied with little and to give a helping hand . " Comparing Maria with St. Agnes, the Pope remarked that the delicate grace of these adolescent girls might make us overlook their fortitude; yet strength is the characteristic virtue of virgins and of martyrs. "How great is the error of those who consider virginity as an danuarg, 1949 SANCTA ECCLESIA CATHOLICA effect of the ignorance and ingenuousness of little souls without passion, without ardour, without experience, and therefore accord it only a smile of pity! How can be who has surrendered without struggle imagine what strength it requires to dominate, without a moment of weakness, the secret stirrings and urgings of the senses and of the heart which adolescence awakens in our fallen nature? to resist, without a single compromise, the thousand little curiosities which impel one to see, to listen, to taste, to feel, and thus approach the lips to the intoxicating cup ,and inhale the deadly perfume of the flower of evil? to move through the turpitudes of the world with a fir'mness " that is superior to all temptations, to all threats, to all seductive or mocking looks? "No. Agnes in the vortex of pagan society; Aloysius Gonzaga at the elegantly licentious courts of the Renaissance; Maria Goretti living close to, and pursued by, the passion of shameless persons: they were neither ignorant nor impassible, but they were strong, strong with that supernatural strength of which every Christian receives the seed in baptism Idu[ which must be cultivated by a careful eduation . "Our Beata was a strong soul. She knew and understood; and that is precisely why she preferred to die . She was not merely an innocent 'ingenue,' instinctively frightened by the shadow of sin. She was not sustained solely by a natural feeling of modesty. No. Though still young, she already gave clear signs of the intensity and depth of her love for the divine Redeemer . " The Holy Father then denounced present-day public immorality and called on Catholics to react boldly. "Woe to the world because of scandals! "Woe to those who con-sciously and deliberately corrupt souls by the novel, the newspaper, the periodical, the theatre, the film, the immodest fashion! . . . Woe to those fathers and mothers who, through lack of energy and prudence, give in to every caprice of their sons and daughters, and renounce that paternal and maternal authority which is like a reflec-tion of the divine majesty! But woe also to so many Christians in name and appearance, who, if only they wanted could rise against the evil and would be supported by legions of right-minded persons ready to fight scandal with every means! "Legal justice punishes the child's murderer--and it is its duty to do so. But those who have armed his hand, who have encouraged him, who let him do with indifference or with an indulgent smile, J. PuTz Revfeu~ for Religious what human justice will dare or be able to strike these as they deserve? Yet they are the real guilty ones. On them--deliberate corrupters or inactive accomplices--weighs the terrible justice of God . "May the blood of the innocent victim joined to the tears of the repentant murderer, work the miracle of moving the perverted hearts, and of opening the eyes and shaking off the torpor of so man'? indifferent or timid Christians." May 4, 1947.--B1. Alix Le Clerc (1576-1622). Her spiritual career began when, after a somewhat worldly adolescence, she came under the influence of St. Peter Fourier, who was parish priest not far from her native Remiremont. With him she founded the Canonesses of St. Augustine of the Congregation of Our Lady. "The beginnings were very humble, that Christmas night of 1597, whet1 five young women consecrated themselves to God before the whole parish for the exercise of all kinds of good works among the poor, the peasants, the ignorant. No vows, no convent. Those conse-crated were to continue to live with their families, without a religious habit--neither nuns nor seculars." But in those days the world could not understand that kind of life and they were obliged to form a regular religious institute. Guided by circumstances, they made the education of girls their chief work. In that early 17th century they were pioneers in the education of women. Ma~t 15, I947.--St. Nicholas de Flue (1417-1487), a Swiss, born near the Lake of the Four Cantons, showed himself a great Christian in the military, civil, and married life before he became a hermit. As a young man he was for some years a soldier, fighting for his native canton and rising to the rank of captain. He then married Dorothy Wyss and was blessed with an offspring of ten children. A respected citizen, he tookan active part in the civil and political life of his country and held office as councillor and magis-trate- all the while spending whole nights in prayer. Suddenly, at the age of fifty, in 1467, after a vision of the Blessed Trinity, he resolved that he must leave all and go away to live entirely for God. Having obtained the consent of his wife and arranged the affairs of the family, he retired to the mountainous solitude of Ranft, where the people soon built him a little cell and chapel. Here he spent the last twenty years of his life in great austerity; many witnesses have testified that during those years he took neither food nor drink, but only Holy Communion. "Brother Klaus," as he was popularly 10 ,lanuar~J, 1949 SANCTA ECCLESIA CATHOLICA known, was greatly venerated even beyond the Swiss border. People high and low flocked to his cell to seek his counsel and prayer. In 1481, when ~be deputies of the Swiss cantons were assembled at Stans and an open breach seemed inevitable, Brother Klaus was brought in and his farsighted patriotism saved the day and thus helped to lay the foundations of modern united Switzerland. He wa~ beatified in 1669 and venerated as the patron of Switzer-land. After the First World War, devotion to him greatly increased, as the people attributed the safety of their country to his protection. At the canonization, Plus XII pointed out his "providential actu-ality." Intimately mixed up with the concrete realities of his time. he remained deeply united with God and became a model of civic and domestic virtues. Only a return to that "synthesis of religion and life" can save our modern society. June 22, 1947.--Three great models for pri.ests: St. John de Britto, S.J. (1647-1693), the royal page who became a martyr in India, (beatified in 1852); St. Bernardine Realino, S.J. (1530- 1616), the lawyer and magistrate who at the age of 34 interrupted a promising career to become a religious and was for 50 long years the "apostle of the confessional" (beatified in 1895); St. Joseph Cafasso (1811-1860), a secular priest from Turin, the "Pearl of the Italian clergy," director of St. John Bosco and superior of the Seminary of Turin from 1848 (beatified in 1925). In his homily, the Pope set "the apostolic fire and the indomitable courage even unto death" of John de Britto as an example to all missionaries. From Realino and Cafasso he asked every priest to learn "a tireless alacrity, patience, kindness, and above all, constant application to prayer, gince all human labour is vain unless it be seconded by God." The following day, speaking to the numerous pilgrims, the Holy Father began by analyzing the "unity in variety" of the two new Jesuit Saints. They.,.were so different in their youth, the gay and intelligent student of" law and the pious and serious little page; different in their priestly life: the quiet page becomes the "imitator and emulator of St. Francis Xavier," leading a life of heroic adven-tures till his violent death; the ex-lawyer finds his India in his home country, in the town of l.ecce, where he spends his long life in the humble ministry of the confessional. Yet how alike the two were spiritually, for both express the same Ignatian ideal: Homines mundo crucifixos et quibus mundus ipse sit crucifixus: both these men broke all ties of earthly satisfactions, affections and 11 J. PUTZ Ret)ietu for Religlous ambitions, for the love of Christ crucified. ("John passed through the world as a ray through the shade of a dark forest.") In labor[bus: apostolic fire, heroic iabours; with John, "a tire-less movement of action without rest, until interrupted by martyr-dom"; with Bernardine, "'the immobility without impatience of the confessor and spiritual director, who sacrifices himself day after day, hour after hour, minute after minute." Their zeal knows no bounds, and in order to "multiply and extend their action beyond the limits of space and time" they train apostles among the laity (inspired in this by St. Ignatius and by the divine Master Himself) ; in this way John multiplies conversions by communicating his missionary spirit to his converts; Bernardine, through his sodalities, his groups of nobles and workers, penetrates into every corner of Lecce and makes his charity reach every misery spiritual and material. Maximam Dei gloriam semper intuentes: "the ardent desire to promote the glory of God was the illuminating flame, the fountain of the most intense energy in the life of both John and Bernardine; it made them brothers in indefatigable work for souls; it reveals to us the secret of their contempt for the world, of their heroic labours, of their indifference to all the hazards of the road." St. Joseph Cafasso was sent by Providence for "the supremely important and fruitful work of the formation and sanctification of the clergy." He himself was so imbued with the supernatural spirit of the Gospel "that it was no longer he who seemed to live, but Christ in him." "No one more than he has left his mark on the Piedmontese clergy of the 19th and 20th centuries; he has saved them from the dessicating and sterilizing climate of Jansenism and rigor-. ism . How many owe to his guidance their firmness in the "sentire cure Ecclesia," the holiness of their sacerdotal life, their fidelity to the many duties of their vocation . His influence con-tinues; for though the pastoral ministry must adapt itself to the ever-changing circumstances--thus v.g., the social duties which today rest on the shoulders of the priest are incomparably more grave and difficult than at the time of our Saint--yet the spirit, the soul of the sacerdotal life remains the same." "At all times the priest, according to the promise of the divine Master, has been made the butt of insults and persecutions, and in his heart he reckons this promise as a beatitude. But today he is so much more exposed to the crossfire of bitter criticisms not only from 12 ,lanuarg, 1949 SANCTA ECCLESIA CATHOLICA unscrupulous adversaries who throw at him the mud of vilification and calumny, but what is more painful, sometimes also from our own ranks. As the present conditions leave the victims of such defamations practically defenseless, it is more necessary for you, beloved priests, to avoid giving to the critics not only a motive but even the slightest pretext. To this end the highest means will be to model your conduct on that of Joseph Cafasso, by the absolute abne-gation of yourselves, free from all earthly propensities and inter-ests; by a spotless life joined to that fine tact and delicate under-standing of souls which was in so high a degree the characteristic of our new Saint." The Pope .concluded with the wish that the union between the priest and his people may grow deeper. St. Cafasso had the confi-dence of all, young and old, rich and poor. "May he obtain from God, for his country and for the whole Church, a people filled with confidence in the priest, and priests worthy of that confidence!" July] 6, 1947.--Two Saints who were closely united durifig their lifetime. St. Elisabeth Bichier des Ages (1773-1838)', beati-fied in 1934. "Favoured in every way with the most varied gifts of nature and grace," Elisabeth proved her fearless and generous charac-ter during the troubled years of the French Revolution. God then made her meet a holy priest, Andre Fournet (canonized in 1933), who directed her towards high perfection and with whom she founded the Congregation of the Daughters of the Cross known as the "Sisters of St. Andrew." After the death of Andre Fournet she found another Saint to direct her, Michael Garicoits, who has now been canonized on the same day as herself. St. Michael Garicoits (1797-1863), born of poor parents, began life as a domestic servant and worked his way through the schools that he might become a priest. As a you.ng vicar he distinguished him-self by his enlightened zeal and was sent to the seminary of B~thar-ram (a famous sanctuary of Our Lady in the south of France), first as professor and then as superior. Here he became the director of St. Elisabeth Bichier and her institute. Encouraged by her, he also founded a religious congregation, the Priests of the Sacred Heart of desus of B~tharram. He was beatified in 1923. dulg 20, 1947.--St. Louis-Marie Grignion de Montfort (1673- 1716), a Breton, beatified in 1888. He had a special love for the poor, and after his ordination, at Saint Sulpice in 1700, he spent a ¯ few years as chaplain in a hosPital. In 1704 he found his true voca- 13 J. PUTZ Reviel~ [or Religious tion: he took to the road as an "apostolic missionary," and during the next twelve years went about preaching in the towns and villages of western France to revive the love of God which had grown cold. He was a fiery orator, and his extraordinary success angered the Jansen-ists, who persecuted him from town to town. He founded two reli-gious congregations: th~ Daughters o[ Wisdom, who were to devote themselves to hospital work and the instruction of the poor (at pres-ent they number about 5,000) ; and the missionaries of the Compan,.j o[ Mary, also called "Montfortists" (the initials S.M.M. stand for Societatis Mariae a Mont[ort). He is best known by his True Devotion to Mar~ , which consists in total self-dedication to Mary and through her to Jesus. In spite of the reserve of some theologians, it has been adopted with great fruit by many fervent souls, among them the Legion of Mary and numerous priests. Here are the words of Plus XII concerning it: "His great secret for attracting souls and giving them to Jesus was the devotion to Mary . Indeed he could not find a more effective means for his time. To the joyless austerity, the gloomy fear, the depressing pride of Jansenism he opposed the filial love-- confident, ardent, active--of the devout servant of Mary towards her who is the refuge of sinners, the Mother of divine grace, our life. our sweetness, our hope . "True devotion--that of tradition, of the Church, and, we might say, of Christian and Catholic common sense-~essentiaIly strives for union with Jesus, under the guidance of Mary. The form and prac-tice of this devotion may vary according to time, place, and personal inclination . True and perfect devotion to the Blessed Virgin is not so bound up with these modalities that any one of them could claim a monopoly. "Hence We ardently desire that, beyond the various manifesta-tions of this piety, all of you draw from the treasure of our Saint's writings and examples that which is the core of his Marian devo.- tion: his firm conviction of the powerful intercession of Mary, his resolute will to imitate her virtues, the burning fire of his love for her and for Jesus." dul~t 27, 1947.--St. Catherine Laboure (1806-1876) ; apeasant girl, the ninth of eleven children; at ten she lost her mother and spent her youth at home performing the duties of housekeeper. Meanwhile. having heard a call to the religious life, she applied herself to the practice of mortification arid of an intense interior life. In 1830 she 14 danuar~/, 1949 SANCTA ECCLESIA CATHOLICA was allowed to join the Daughters of Charit~g of St. Vincent de Paul in the rue du ]dac at Paris. That same year, while still a novice, she was favoured with heavenly visions and received the mission to pro-mote the devotion to Mary, Mediatrix and Queen of the Universe, by having a medal struck and a statue made according to what she had seen in the vision. She .confided in her confessor, M. Aladel, who after careful investigations received permission from the Arch-bishop of Paris to have the medal struck. The medal, issued in 1832, soon spread over the whole world and came to be known as the "miraculous medal." All the time Catherine's identity remained secret, hidden even from the ecclesiastical authorities. After her novitiate she spent her remaining 46 years in the hospice d'Enghien in Paris. There she lived an unobtrusive life, working in the kitchen, in charge of the linen room or of the poultry, or looking after the aged who were supported in the hospice. All considered her as j.ust a simple, pious Daughter of Charity, a lover of poverty and of obedience. No one in the world or in the community suspected that this obscure nun was "the Sister who had seen the Virgin" and of whom everyon~ was speaking. She kept heroic silence. But one part of Our Lady's wish, that relating to the statue, was not yet fulfilled; that is why, on her deathbed, she revealed her secret to her superior. Her funeral was the occasion of an outburst of popular veneration. A child of twelve, crippled from birth, was cured at her grave. She was beatified in 1933 by Plus XI who declared that he knew "no more shining example of the hidden life." Her long life of self-effacement is summed up by Plus XII in the words of the Imitation of Christ: "'ama nescfrf.'" November 9, 1947.~Blessed Jeanne Delanoue (1666-1736) was the child of a French shopkeeper. She devoted herself to the tare of the poor, the aged, the sick, and the suffering, and eventually founded for this work the Sisters of St. Anne of Providence. In his panegyric the Holy Father spoke of the eminent dignity of the poor as illustrated in the life of B1. Jeanne. The voice of the poor is the voice of Christ; the body of the poor is the body of Christ; the life of the poor is the life of Christ. A Schoolmaster Beatfged On April 4, 1948, Brother Benildus, a member of the Congrega-tion of St. de la Salle, was solemnly beatified by Pope Plus XII. Born in Auvergne in 1805, he joined the Brothers of the Christian 15 d. PUTZ Review [or Religious Schools at sixteen. After ~eaching in various elementary schools, in 1841 be was sent with two colleagues to opena primary school at Saugues, a little market town, where he remained till his death on August 13, 1862. His beatification has a special significance for school teachers, for Brother Benildus is probably the first school master to be raised to the altars without any other claim to such honors than the exercise of his profession according to the rules of his institute. Other teachers have been canonized who were martyrs or miracle workers or ecstatic contemplatives or founders of great institutes; but Brother Benildus was nothing but a plain school master, whose whole uneventful life was spent in the classroom. The Holy Father stressed this point in his panegyric on April 5tb. He described Brother Benildus as a model no less imitable than admirable. His secret was perfect fidelity to dut~z--his rules and the daily grind of a schoolmaster. In this he practiced the heroic virtues which the Church requires for canonization. The Pope spoke of the "slow martyrdom" of teachers, which he compared to that of St. Cassian. Speaking of the new beatus, the Pope said: "He loved his children. Yet what a heavy cross they put on his shoulders! The martyrology mentions the execution of a school-master [St. Cassian] whose pupils became his executioners and made him suffer the more as their feeble stabs prolonged his torture. This is an isolated fact, but how many teachers for years, for the whole of a long religious life, have to bear a kind of slow martyrdom from the children who are u;aaware of the suffering they inflict. 'If we did not have the faith,' Brother Benildus once said, 'our profession would be painful indeed; the children are difficult. But with the faikh how everything changes!' " His constant fidelity, the Pope added, to all the detaiIs of his duty, his radiant charity, his serenity in difficulties could .flow only fr6m a deep and vigorous interior life and habitual union with God. In one of his panegyrics of the new saints, the Pope remarked: "More than once We have made you admire, in the variety of their physiognomies, the richness of the divine palette, of that raultiforrnis gratia (~1 Pet. 4:10) which, as it were, projects on the forehead of each saint, like the prism on the screen, one of the vari-ously coloured reflections of the one and infinite Uncreated Light; so that their conjunction gives Us an image--very faint, no doubt, yet marvellously beautiful-~of her who is called par excellence 16 January, 1949 SANCTA ECCLESIA CATHOLICA 'mirror of justice,' because she reflects the splendour of her Son who Himself is the candor lucis aeternae et speculum sine macula." (July 7, 1947.) The Saints are so different, yet fundamentally alike--like varia-tions on the same theme. The common theme of all holiness is love of God, total love which implies total self-sacrifice, utter selflessness. The saints were in love with God: they lived in deep union with Him. Yet this union, far from isolating them from the rest of man-kind, filled them with a universal love and urged them on to heroic self-devotion in the service of men. They. were absolutely humble, because they saw the truth: and being bumble, they had absolute trust in God; this is the secret of their amazing daring in undertaking great things, of their invincible courage and tenacity in carrying them out in the face of apparently insuperable obstacles: "Ego tecum ero." Every Saint, to be canonized, must have given clear signs of heroic virtue. But what strikes one in the lives of many saints is that God seems to take delight in testing their heroism by accumulating on them, as .on Job of old, every kind of affliction. In their most unselfish enterprises they meet with ingratitude, opposition, and failures such as would crush an ordinary man; to these are often added very trying diseases and bodily infirmities; and within their souls, instead of finding divine light and consolation, they pass through an agony of darkness, doubt, temptations, and disgust. Among the new saints, this is illustrated most strikingly in the life of, Blessed.Marie-Th6r~se de Soubiran. The Holy Father, in his panegyric of this heroic woman, indicated a twofold purpose of such trials which often leave our natural reason completely bewildered. The first is that the saints by this bitter experience learn "the secret of total detachment; which liberates them from all apprehension and diffidence of the heart, from all pride of spirit, and which shows them the nothingness and instability of all created things, mere playthinga in the hands of the Creator." The second meaning of those crushing afflictions, this "annihilation," is found in the words of St. John (12:24): "Unless the grain of wheat fall into the ground and die. itself remaineth alone;' but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." That is why God tries His saints "as in a furnace," while giving them a supernatural strength which enables them to walk on heroically in spite of the darkness that fills their souls. [EDITORS' NOTE: The foregoing article is reprinted with permission from The Clergy Moothly, a magazine publishM in India.] 17 Vocal:ions CosE Money Peter M. Miller, S.C.J. RING the bells and shout the "Alleluias." Modern technique is being applied to religious vocations. Religious societies and congregations of both men and women are discovering that the gamble of advertising vocational wares to adventurous boys and girls can be a tremendous success. The increasing problem created by the shrinking personnel of too many religious groups is finding an adequate answer through the medium of modern advertising. This statement: "Each of my candidates for the Brotherhood is costing me $1,000," may leave a bad taste in the mouths of certain religious who affirm their greater concern for souls and a mediocre interest in "filthy lucre." Yet the vocational director who uttered the above statement discovers that be is leading noble young men to the service of Christ and is pleased that the monastery labor will be accomplished without spending thousands of dollars annually for outside labor. "Within six months," he asserts, "each of those Brothers will pay, penny for penny, the initial cost of advertising expended on them." And only the Angel of God will be able to balance the merits of their good works in the GoIden Book. Once I heard a missionary, weighing his pennies, decide to enter hospital work rather than the educational field in his mission, because statistics proved to him that the expended dollar has more value' for the lasting good of souls in that particular locality when it is used to relieve the wants of the sick and distressed. It is a pleasure then to hear of a successful method of spending dollars to relieve the vocational l~roblem confronting so many com-munities. Too long have we been idly waiting for these vocations. St. Augustine remarked that we must pray as if all depended on God (and thanks be to God, many prayers have been offered for voca-tions), but be also insisted that we must work AS IF ALL DEPENDED ON US. Centuries ago the abbot of the monastery was approached by the youth who begged for admission to the order. There are still too many who believe this is the sole method to be used in acquiring vocations. Sometimes these same persons unjustly condemn zealous vocational directors who are going out "into the highways and by- 18 VOCATIONS COST MONEY ways" as Christ did in the first century of the Church when he uttered His soul-stirring: "Follow Me!" Nor are we the only ones engaged in the vocational advertising field. The Army is lavishing thousands of advertising dollars to staff its diminishing post-war personnel. Theirs is. a high-powered technique of radio and slick, magazines, well beyond the reach of our efforts. (Or is it?) Professions, trades, and crafts are advertising the decided advantages of their mode of life to attract the youth. Should we hesitate then to adopt an organized advertising campaign that will relieve our present needs and be a glory to God for all of eternity~ ¯ Four years ago a certain priest of the Middle West was surprised to learn ,of an ordered campaign of advertising to secure vocations. One year later he had entered the field and discovered the happy taste of success. The cost was a pamphlet. A Sister was sold on the proposition, and the only advertising for which she was able to secure permission was a "blurb." Her Mother Superior was highly pleased with the results obtained. I have observed a small religious congregation increase both quality and quantity in their preparatory seminary through an organized advertising plan developed in their own experience. Eight years ago thirty students attended this seminary; this year the enrollment is 135 carefully chosen candidates. I was bi'tterly disappointed three years ago to learn of two girls who thought they would lik~ to be Sisters, but changed their minds when they could not learn enough about the congregation they wished to join. There is a great appeal in religious life, and adver-tising is a marvelous approach to.the boy or girl. It should be the concern of every order, society, and congregation to integrate such a vocational campaign to their program of winning the world for Christ. The answer of complacent satisfaction [n present personnel ~'/ supply is no answer to the tremendous world-wide demands for reli-gious vocations. The challenge of our era is the white harvest of souls. Eight out of every nine persons over the face of the earth stand in dire need of the true message of Catholicism. In our own country there are sixty million pagans, and another fifty-five million who sit in the darkness of error waiting, perhaps unknowingly, for the Light of Truth. Consider, is it worthwhile to sponsor a program whereby America will quickly have the 10,000 priests necessary? How shall we answer the "Call for 40,000" in South America? Should we 19 PETER M. MILLER Reoiew for Religious concern ourselves with the remaining countries of the world? And where shall we find the three or four Sisters that must complement the work of~every priest. Where to get the thousands of religious Brothers needed for building and maintaining? Whatever your answer may be, of this I am sure--modern adver-tising will be recognized as a powerful arm in securing the necessary vocations. But bow, you may ask, can such a campaign be organ-ized ? Fortunately there is a medium of advertising to suit every purse. While no advertiser will tell you that the element, of gamble can be totally eliminated, yet there are certain approved methods which can safely be said to guarantee results. You will admit that the product you are attempting to "sell," a religious vocation, is 100 per cent perfect. Actually only the ones whom Christ selects will be those who finally accept your message. The campaign is a combination of grace and human labor. Now where is the field for your advertising? Carefully consider the aims of your community, and even more carefully aim or direct your cam-paign. Your "sales talk" must be weighed in the balance to garner all possible vocations in your harvest. Netvspap~r Adoertisements In newspapers and magazines, which you have read, undoubtedly you have seen the vocational message of religious groups. Perhaps for years you have observed a particular advertisement in a certain magazine. That should be your first sign of encouragement. If the "ad" had failed to produce.the desired results, the advertiser would have withdrawn his message. Study the advertisement carefully. Adapt it to your message, or perhaps you can better your display. Right here I might say that we should not hesitate to call upon the technical advice of advertising experts. Certainly it is sound business to pay an experienced man for setting up your advertisement copy. You can capitalize on his knowledge of techniques. It is important to consider the type of magazine and newspaper in order that you may discover which readers your advertisement will reach. Perhaps (and I have met this isolated instance), for a reli-gious group of Sisters of one national extraction, the best organ would be a newspaper of the same national language which has a good Catholic circulation, although it might not be a Catholic news-paper. 2O danuarg, 1949 VOCATIONS COST MONEY Blurbs The blurb is a folder of i~our to six pages. It contains the salient features of your aims and vocation ambitions. Again, working under the capable direction of a display artist, you employ photographs and color, together with a good combination of display type styles, to produce a striking folder. It should be the purpose of this blurb to attract .vocationally minded youth to a contact with your com-munity. Usually different blurbs are enclosed in the letters which you send to a person who has answered your newspaper advertise-ment. This blurb could be given to all the eighth grade girls as an attractive leader for a vocational discussion. A boy of adventurous nature still responds to a color photograph of a missionary leaning against his motorcycle. Personal Contact Here is the most important step in the vocational field work. The one interested in following Christ must see a flesh-and-blood example of his or her ideal. This is concretely established in the vocational director. He (or it may be Sister . ) is your walking advertise-ment. Usually the entire vocation campaign is in his hands. Actually he is a traveling salesman "selling" a product of highest dignity. He knows better than anyone else that it is his important task to discover the vocations which God has destined for his community. The choice of vocational director is highly important. Above all, he (or she) must be an exemplary religious. He must be possessed of that electrical personality impulse which establishes friendly trust and confidefi'ce in the first few minutes of meeting. He must know thoroughly what a vocation is, and what a vocation to his com-munity is. He must be quick and accurate to analyze characters and perceive the elements of vocation or their deficiency in an individual. He must know why youth wants to partake in the great adventure. The vocational director must possess prudence and suavity to over-come the obstacles which many times stand in the path of progress to the vocational goal. His first contact with the boy might be in reply to a newspaper or magazine advertisement. He might have met the youth while showing vocational movies or slides to an eighth grade class. What-ever may have been the initial contact, the next and all-important step is to meet the individual in his home surroundings. The family background, the training field for the youth, is still an essential ele- 21 PETER M. MILLER Review for Religious ment to be considered when judg!ng the lasting qualities of a possible vocation. In the personal interview the vocation is taken from a general class and the candidate becomes an important individual whose great interest is conquering the world for Christ. Here the vocational ideals of the youth and the aims of the community are displayed for mutual consideration. This is the first visit at his home, and there may be two or three more before the candidate finds himself admitted into the seminary or convent school. Perhaps the voca-tional director will observe that the youth does not have the elements of vocation for his communit~ and then he does not hesitate to inform the boy or girl accordingly. Here let me stress the importance of instructing the youth in the necessity of prayer for his vocation during this time. Community Magazine or Newspaper Fortun~itely many religious congregations have a magazine. It is highly advantageous that the vocational director use this arm for his work. It should be his concern that timely vocational articles appear in the magazine. A convent school or seminary could initiate a monthly newspaper to be used in the same manner. Using either one or both of these methods of contact, the reli-gious community has a monthly pipeline of appropriate information flowing into the home of the possible candidate. It clears doubts, establishes a firmer desire through added knowledge, and gives the aspirant confidence in his new life by means of the truths be meets monthly. Correspondence The vocational director must be punctual in replying to ~11 let-ters and queries from the candidates. In more than one instance the students in the seminary were supplied with addressees interested in their mutual vocation. By this method the personal contact was stimulated to greater advantage. The candidate then feels that he is no stranger since for some time he continues in friendly correspon-dence. Pamphlets This is perhaps the most popular form of advertising copy in the vocational campaign. Again photographs, color, type styles, and fine paper are combined in attractive display to give the prospect a good view of his future life in a 24-, 32-, or 48-page booklet. This pamphlet may be concerned with a picture study of the different 22 ,]anuaGt, 1949 VOCATIONS COST MONEY stages of growth in his vocation. Or it may present to the youth the future fields of endeavor. Chiefly, these pamphlets are of an informative nature. However I have seen clever pamphlets that employed fictional characters of the ideal type to portray the vocational goal and attract youth. Some communities use a life of the founder of the religious group. And then again you may wish to imitate those who have a continuity of two, three, or four pamphlets in their vocational series. Whatever may be your plan, be certain that the presentation is a perfect approach, which is to say that it must employ the modern techniques of vivid writing and attractive advertising display. If, in true humility, you must admit that no person in your community could 'turn out an attractive copy, then it need only be necessary for you to gather the facts and present them to "a good writer skilled in modern techniques. He usually has a precise knowl-edge of the elements to be brought to the attention of the reader. More invaluable to you, he knows what technical processes can best illustrate the idea you wish to convey. It pays to seek perfection in the very beginning. What merely satisfies you, may not be suffi-ciently impelling to attract the candidate. Movies and Slides Every educator today knows the emphasis, that is attached to visual aids. Advertisers pay huge sums to have likely customers see their product in the glamor of a movie. Certain religious communi-ties have employed technicians to prepare a movie of their vocational attractions. Indeed some of these are in color and forcefully present their subject. Other groups have discovered' that they can establish better con-tacts with colored slides flashed upon the silver screen. Their advan-tage, they claim, is to modify the description to the reaction of the group. This is certainly evident when the slides are carried into the home. As a matter of economy it might be mentioned that the slides can be replaced conveniently with better shots and thus accomodate the rapid growth that characterizes some communities. Planning Your Campaign The above examples were not listed as separate advertising methods. All of them could be co-ordinated in one grand camPaign. Each is designed fo provoke the interest of the candidate. Of course, the alert vocational, director will discover that he can broaden and complement his advertising by using other mediums. He will have 23 PETER M. MILLER occasional outings, picnics, Christmas parties, and so forth, where the candidates may meet and join in social gatherings and fun with seminarians already forging ahead in their chosen vocation. This is a great advantage. Those who wish to present their message to the youth of today will choose some or all of the above methods. It is important that a wide selection be made, and then you must drive home one grand theme in all your mediums of advertising. At the risk of boring repetition let me state again that you can profit by sounding out good technical advice in founding your program. Then prepare to open your market: Vocations Cost Mone~l Your vocational budget should be a matter of deep concern to your community. If you consider only the expenditures, then the advertising campaign has the appearance of a costly move. How-ever, the budget is to be gauged by the results. Advertise, and dis-cover from your own experience why cigarette manufacturers are quite plea~ed to spend millions of dollars to attract their huge mar-kets. You can issue an attractive blurb for a small amount. Pam-phlets are not too costly either. It might be wise to caution the beginner. Limit your initial quantity of literature until you are convinced that your message is appealing and forceful. Then keep the printing presses busy With your project. Do not hesitate to print a message for even those of the seventh grade. Plant the seed early[ Guarantee a rich harvest by telling your community of your vocation work. Beg their prayers and sac-rifices to bring the project to a grace-filled conclusion. Then the Mystical Body of Christ will grow as the religious members lead other thousands into the Church. How much should you spend for your campaign? Tell me, what price did Christ pay for souls? OUR CONTRIBUTORS ' PETER M. MILLER has been active in the vocation field for some years and is now on the faculty of the Divine Heart Seminary, the seminary of the Congregation of the Priests of the Sacred Heart, at Donaldson, Indiana. JOSEPH F. GALLEN is professor of canon law at Woodstock College, Woodstock, Maryland. J. PUTZ is editor of The Clergy Monthly and a member of the faculty of St. Mary's Theo-' logical College, Kurseong, D. H. Ry., India. CLARENCE MCAULIFFE is a profes-sor of sacramental theology at St. Mary's College, St. Marys, Kansas. 24 I apt:ism--A Deat:h and Resurrect:ion Clarence McAuliffe, S.J. ~i MONG all the supernatural gifts showered upon each of us, the first and most fundamental is ordinarily the sacrament of baptism. Since most of us were baptized as infants, we can-not even recall the actual conferring of this gift. We know it from the testimony of our parents or guardians, or of the parish records. But we are certain that there was a day, not long after our birth, when we were borne in our mother's arms to the parish church. Once there we were transferred to the arms of our godfather or godmother. Certain rites were performed over us in the vestibule or rear of the church. We were then carried to the baptismal fo'nt or the Com-munion rail. The essential rite was accomplished when the priest poured water on our head and declared: "I baptize thee in the name of the Father and of "the Son and of the Holy Ghost." We squirmed when the cool water touched our sensitive skin. Outwardly we were unchanged by this sacred rite, but inwardly a profound change was enacted. We were put to death with Christ by dying to the devil and our natural selves, and at the same time we rose gloriously from death like Christ because our souls were spiritually renovated. Yes, it was a simple ceremony, a perfunctory washing of the head and the simultaneous pronouncement of a few words, but it was a ceremony that had th~ S'on of God for its originator, and laden with His merits, it was like an irresistible plea mounting to heaven from the. cross on Calvary. It was not a mere ablution. It was an ablu-tion performed by the dying Christ, the principal Minister of every sacrament. That is why the heart of God was touched when He witnessed our baptism. That is why He took in His hand this simple ceremony and used it as an instrument to work so many wonders in our souls. In the purely natural order, our souls before baptis.m were intact. They possessed the same faculties that Adam had before his fall, and these faculties were intrinsically unimpaired. But no descendant of Adam was ever born in a merely natural state. Humanity down to doomsday was elevated to a supernatural destiny at the very instant 25 CLARENCE MCAULI FFE Review [or Religious that Adam himself was gifted with it. That is why Adam, when be lost the means to attain this destiny, lost them not for himself alone but for all his de]cendants. Hence we say that every human being is born in original sin. Each of us at birth was confronted with a supernatural goal. But each of us, too, was born without the supernatural means to arrive at this goal because these means, our expected and lawful inheritance, had been squandered by our common father, Adam. Our souls, as a result, were at birth supernaturally paralyzed. They could not function towards the attainment of their sublime destiny until the paralysis was removed. It was baptism that cured this paralysis. It took away original sin. However, the expression "took away," though sanctioned by usage, might be misleading. It might incline us to picture original sin as a kind of black spot dis-figuring the soul. We would then imagine baptism as the divine cleanser that effaced this black spot. Such a picture would be incor-rect. In the pilrely natural sphere, our souls were unblemished, unmarred, whole, equipped with all the healthy faculties they deserved. But something was missing, something that should have been there, had Adam executed God's original plan. That some-thing was a golden light of exquisite beauty, a veritable supernatural organism which should have been superadded to arid commingled with our natural faculties. Baptism was the flame that rekindled that golden light and restored that supernatural organism. This is what we mean when we say that baptism '~takes away" original sin. Moreover, this restoratidn of supernatural gifts through baptism is not the restoratibn of mere passive qualities, however excellent these might be. It is a renewal of life, of supernatural life, a true regerleratior~. St. Paul is speaking of baptism when he tells Titus: "He saved us by the laver of regeneration, and renovation of the Holy Spirit" (Titus 3:5). By natural generation a peFson receives body and soul. He possesses a definite nature endowed with both faculties and instincts. He begins to live naturally. Similarly, by the supernatural generation of baptism a person shares iri the divine nature by the gift of sanctifying grace, and this nature also is accom-panied with its supernatural faculties and instincts. The person begins to live supernaturally. This supernatural generation is called a regeneration, a generating again or anew, because man must first be generated naturally before he can be generated supernaturally by baptism. Another reason Why the word "regeneration" is used, pro- 26 BAPTISM--A DEATH AND RESURRECTION ceeds from the fact that, if Adam had not sinned, we would have been endowed with supernatural life by mere natural generation. No baptism would have been necessary. Since, however, Adam lost this supernatural life by his sin, we are supernaturally dead at the moment of our natural conception and so must be generated again supernaturally through baptism. The very instant we were baptized, therefore, this supernatural nature with its accompanying faculties and instincts was restored to us. We were clothed with the kingly robe of sanctifying grace and thus became God's adopted sons, able to perform acts of supernatural merit and destined to the beatific vision as our inheritance. More'over, along with this grace God infused into our souls certain faculties called the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. Once we reached the age of reason, these, virtues enabled us to elicit super-natural acts corresponding to them. It is probable that by reason of our baptism God also instilled within us additional faculties, the four cardinal, virtues of prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude. Finally, through the agency of baptism God conferred upon us seven supernatural instincts which we call the gifts of the Holy Ghost. They are called wisdom, understanding, knowledge, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear of the Lord. Given all this we became super-naturally alive, equipped with an organism by which we could oper-ate in a sphere far beyond our natural powers. It is important to realize also that all these baptismal gifts are realities. Nor are they merely moral realities like the loye of a mother for her child. Neither are they simply juridical realities like the right of a human being to continue in life. They are, as a matter of fact, pbgsical realities. This means that they actually modify the soul. They are qualities that add to its beauty. True enough, they are not material, but spiritual qualities. But they have an entity of their own which is as physically real as the color of a block of granite or the light that emanates from a star. They are as physically real as a label on a box. They are so physically real that if they were material things, we could touch them with our hand or see them with our eyes. And yet they do not add anything substantial to our nature. They are accidental qualities inhering in our one substantial soul. This fact, however, should not derogate from either their intrinsic or their operational value. Even in this world the addition of a natural accidental quality can Work wonders in an object. Consider 27 CLARENCE MCAULIFFE Reoieu~ for Religious the electric bulb as it rests on the counter of a hardware store. It is substantially intact, a drab object to behold. But buy it, take it home, insert it in an electric socket and turn on the power. At once it is transformed into a thing of beauty and casts its light on all objects within its range. Yet it differs only accidentally from its condition in the hardware store. Consider also the example of water. If it is cold, it has certain accidental properties. When boiled, many of these accidental properties change. It still remains water, but now it can boil eggs or concoct a stew. It has new powers vastly superior to those of cold water, and yet it is but accidentally changed. Similarly, the baptized soul is altered only accidentally by. its reception of supernatural life, but it now is vested with powers far beyond those which it had before baptism. Indeed, it is now elevated to a supernatural plane so that it can place supernatural acts that completely transcend its natural capacities. When a Roman candle explodes in the night air on the Fourth of July it sends forth many fireballs of various hues, all of them pleasing to behold. So does baptism produce a brilliant array of supernatural gifts in the soul. But these unlike the fireballs stay within the soul, not outside it. Moreover, they do not vanish in an instant as do the fireballs, but they remain permanently unless driven out by sinful acts of the baptized person. Nor are they disparate 'elements like the fireballs, but they are intimately connected with one another. Finall~r, they are not endowed with mere chemical energy as are the fireballs, but they are forms of life. Each of them is like an eye or ear; and, when united together in an accidental union with the soul, they form a complete supernatural organism. Moreover, another physical effect, which, however, is not a form of life, is painted on the soul by baptism. It is called the sacramental character. It, too, is an accidental quality, but it is just as physical as the other gifts received. It truly modifies the soul, changes its appearance. It adds a tint to it, and this tint can never be effaced either in this life or the next. It is a sign to God and the angels and the beatified that the baptized person is consecrated to God. It is an indelible mark proclaiming to them that the baptized person belongs to the army of Christ. It is upon this ontological character that the various rights and duties flowing from baptism are based. It may be worth our while to recall now the nature of these rights and duties. First of all, the character is a sign that the baptized person has an obligation to remain always in the state of grace. This is his prime 28 danuar~t, 1949 BAPTISM--A DEATH AND RESURRECTION duty. If he loses his supernatural life by mortal sin, the character is forever declaring that he is in a state of violence, of infidelity, that he is obligated to take effective measures to restore by repentance the supernatural organism of grace, the virtues, and gifts of the Holy Ghost. If a soldier deserts the army, his uniform still notifies the world that he belongs in its ranks. In the same way, the character of baptism always marks a man as an adopted child of God even though he may have rejected this adoption by mortal sin. Moreover, the character as we have remarked, is ineffaceable. The faithless soldier can take off his uniform, burn it or sell it so that no physical sign remains to indicate that he should be in the army. But the character cannot be rejected. It is always etched on the soul, and its possessor is forever marked as one who should be Christ's friend even though be has sinned grievously. In short, baptism means a change in our allegiance. Before bap-tism we were children of darkness, not of light; we were enthralled by a powerful concupiscence whose thrusts would become more har-rowing in later life. We were, in a true sense, slaves of the devil. But we changed banners when baptism sealed us with its sacred character. We were baptized "in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." We were, therefore, consecrated to the Blessed Trinity. Through the agency of our godparents we promised sol-emnly to fulfill the obligations consequent upon the reception of bap-tism. We would observe the ten commandments ~nd the six precepts of the Church, and we would do so permanently. By their miracu-lous passage through the Red Sea, the Hebrews escaped from their Egyptian enemies and passed into God's domain, the promised land. In the same way, by baptism we renounce the devil's dominion and come under God's sway. In the last chapter of St. Matthew's gospel (Mt. 28: 19, 20) when our Lord solemnly promulgates the necessity of baptism, He inculcates the obligation to serve God that it entails: "teaching them [the baptized] to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." And St. Paul means the same thing when he declares: "All of you who are baptized, have put on Christ" (Gal. 3:27). In the fourth century St. John Chrysostom makes the same point when he says: "Trees that are well planted, if they make no return of fruit for the labor spent about them, are delivered up to the fire; the same in some sort may be said of those who are baptized, if they bring forth no fruit." This death to Satan and to sin, which was enjoined upon us by 29 CLARENCE MCAULIFFE Review for Religious our baptism, is symbolized by the very rite of baptism, especially. when it i~ performed by immersion or complete submerging into a body of water, the ordinary m.aj~ler of baptizing during many cen-turies of the Church's existen~e.¥ The catechumen goes down into the water soiled with original sin, a slave to concupiscence, subservient to Satan. He emerges cleansed from original sin, fortified against concupiscence, consecrated irrevocably to the Blessed Trinity. This total immersion in the water pictures vividly the death and resurrec-tion of Chris[. That is why St. Paul says that "we are buried together with Christ by baptism unto death, that as Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life" (Rom. 6:4). Christ died for sin; He was buried because of our sins. But when He rose, gloriously changed in body. He had endowed us with the means to overcome sin, to live as God's friends, dust as our Lord's body by its resurrection began its glori-fied life tha~. would never end, so the baptized when he emerges from his burial in the baptismal water, is obligated perpetually to live a new kind of life, a life subject to God and loyal.to His commands. The abiding sign of this allegiance is the sacramental character. But to lead this new life of loyalty to God we need supernatural helps, especially actual graces, by which we can practise virtue and counter temptations. Though we obtain these graces in various ways as we go on through life, we are assured, b/y our baptism alone of a constant flow of them to give us strength.'VAll theologians admit this fact, though they differ in their explanations of how these graces are conferred by baptism. It is a safe opinion to hold that the right to these graces is rooted in the baptismal character. This objective mark is always on the soul and is always telling God: "This person has been consecrated to You. He needs Your help. You have given him a right to receive Your intellectual lights and to feel the lift of Your omnipotent hand. By his baptismal character he is marked as Your ally and friend, but he cannot remain so unless You help him." Thus God by reason of our baptismal character does help us, not for one day or for one year, but during our entire lives. Even in old age, the baptized person still receives from his infant baptism actual graces to resist temptation and to live a good Catholic life. The waters of these graces may be dammed partially by neglect, by worldliness, by sin itself, but they overflow even such formidable barriers. The torrent of graces to which we are entitled just by the fact of our bap-tism will never be completely dry. They come to enrich our youth; 3O danuar~t, 1949 BAPTISM--A DEATH AND RESURRECTION they come to fortify and strengthen us in middle age; they come to embellish and sanctify our old age. God never forgets our baptism. He always sees the character He has impressed. Hence He helps us so that our dedication to Him made at baptism will never become a faithless one. Again, baptism signifies not only that its recipient is consecrated to God and should preserve permanently his supernatural life, but also that he is a member of God's visible kingdom on earth, the Catholic Church. Once baptism is validly received, no matter by whom, that person automatically is a subject in Christ's Church. Some, of course, such as validly baptize, d Protest~ints who are in good faith, are not aware of this fact, but their unawareness does not change the reality. Baptism means membership in the one true Church. "For in one Spirit were we all baptized into one body," declares St. Paul (I Cot. 12:12). The character is the irremovable sign of this membership. When a Sister receives that particular habit which comes with her profession, this habit tells the world that she is obliged to follow the internal spirit of her institute, but it also marks her as a member of a visible religious order or congregation. She belongs to this definite sisterhood and not to any other, and the fact is externally recognizable from the kind of religious garb she wears. "Once a Catholic, always a Catholic" is an axiom whose truth rests on the fact that the character spontaneously issuing from baptism remains imbedded in the soul and postulates perpetual allegiance to the Catholic Church. It follows, therefore, that the baptismal character is the founda-tion for those duties and rights that flow from incorporation into the Catholic body. Among these duties we might mention that of obedience to ecclesiastical superiors, especially to the Holy Father and the bishops; the duty to reverence sacred persons, places, edifices, rites, and other things stamped'with the approval of the Church; the'duty to accept the revealed teaching which she proposes; the duty to con. form to her legislation as embodied .in the code of Canon Law; the duty to participate in at least some of the religious rites which she sanctions. All these duties have as their objective foundation the sacrament~i1 character carved on the soul by baptism. The Church also grants many privileges to her actual members, that is, to the baptized who are not "separated from the unity of the Body." Such members may receive the other sacraments; they may participate intimately in the sublime action, of the Mass by interiorly 31 CLARENCE MCAULIFFE Reoiew [or Religious uniting their offering to the external offering made by the priest alone; they may share in many kinds of indulgences to remove their temporal punishment and to shorten the stay in purgatory of others, especially their loved ones; they are entitled to the help and guidance of their pastors, whether in the confessional or outside it. They have a right to enter a Catholic church at any time; to have their spiritual lives stimulated by sermons, retreats, and the use of sacramental~; to receive benefits from every Mass celebrated in the world every day; to obtain special blessings from the many "Masses for the people" which every pastor must celebrate each year; to be honored with a Catholic funeral service and burial in consecrated ground. In a word, those many upliftings of soul' which come to every loyal Catholic, those consolations that give strength to bear the sorrows of life, that illumination of mind which comes from authoritative teaching and from Catholic books or newspapers or periodicals and from spiritual exhortations, that firmness of will which perseveres in doing good and avoiding evil--all this comes directly or indirectly from membership in the Church and is founded on the ontological character bestowed by baptism. To sum up, therefore, we may say that baptism effects marvels in the physical, the moral, and the juridical orders. In the physical order it regenerates a man by endowing him with a supernatural organism consisting of sanctifying grace, the infused theological and moral virtues, and the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. In the moral order, it transfers his allegiance from Satan to the Blessed Trinity, removes all actual sins, both mortal and venial, as well as all temporal punishment due to these sins (if baptism is received by an adult), confers a life-long series of actual graces enabling him to cope with his unruly passions, and, finally, inscribes him as a member of the Catholic Church. In the juridical order, it grants him those rights that emanate from affiliation with that Church, but it also imposes on him a set of obligations to which he is bound to conform. " It is a striking fact that these effects are symbolized in a general way by the various ceremonies of baptism. The essential rite, of course, and the only rite instituted by our Lord Himself and neces-sary for the validity of the sacrament, is the washing (of the head) with water and the pronouncing of the proper words. Water is a cooling and refreshing substance. Hence at baptism it naturally sym-bolizes the mitigation of passion that results from the sacrament. Moreover, water is a universal cleanser. As such it is admirably 32 danuar[I, 1949 BAPTISM-~A DEATH AND RESURRECTION suited to represent the removal of sin and temporal punishment from the soul. Again, flowing water is vested with power. It produces a thriving vegetationalong its course. Hence the flowing water of baptism readily illustrates the spiritual regeneration effected in the soul. Especially is this true when the meaning of the flowing water is determined by words that signify a consecration to the Blessed Trin-ity. Again, every society has some form of initiation. Baptism is God's own way of initiating a person into the Catholic ChurScho. much for the symbolism of the essential, divinely instituted rite. But the Church herself has added other ceremonies that likewise typify the results of baptism. Before the infant is permitted to enter the nave of the church, the priest breathes lightly three times upon its face to suggest that the Holy Ghost is about to come upon it to effect its supernatural regeneration. After this, the priest makes the sign of the cross on the baby's forehead and breast to signify tha~ after baptism the baby will be a follower of Christ, not a follower of Satan. St. Augustine makes mention of t-his rite when he says: "You are to be signed this day on your forehead with the sign of the cross, that hereafter the devil may be afraid to touch you, as being marked with this saving sign." Next a morsel of salt is placed on the infant's tongue to signify that after baptism. God will expect and help.this child to preserve and season its mind and heart so that it will never be corrupted by serious sin. On two separate occasions the priest lays his hand on the baby's head to denote that henceforth the child will be consecrated to God. After proceeding to the baptismal font or the Communion rail, the priest touches the lips and ears of the baby with saliva. As far back as the fourth century, St. Ambrose teaches the meaning of this ceremony: "Therefore the priest toucheth thy ears that they may be opened to hear the commands of God: and thy nostrils that thou receivest the good odor of faith and devotion." This rite recalls how our Lord opened the eyes of a blind man with spittle (3ohn 9:6) and put His finger into the ears of a deaf man saying "Ephphatha, i.e., be thou opened" (Mark 7:33). After renouncing Satan three times through the agency of its sponsor, the infant is anointed on the breast and between the shoulders with the oil of catechumens. Oil naturally symbolizes strength. It is used to eliminate aches and pains and to render muscles supple. Hence the anointing on the breast represents the courage to be expected from the infant in its .fight for God. The anointing between the shoulders indicates the strength 33 CLARENCE MCAULIFFE imparted to the baptized to bear manfully the crosses of life. After the essential rite of baptism has been performed, the priest anoints the child with chrism on the top of the head. Just as in the Old Testament it was a custom to anoint priests and kings with oil; and just as it is the Church's custom today to anoint those objects and persons which she solemnly consecrates to God's service, so this ceremony denotes that the baptized baby is now irrevocably conse-crated to God and is a member of His Church. A white cloth is then placed on the head of the baptized to typify the innocence that has been wrought by baptism. Finally, a lighted candle is held by the sponsor to symbolize the same effect, but in addition, the candle sig-nifies that the baby has received a new form of life. A candle flame is not static. It flickers and its flickering is the sign of the baby's newly received supernatural life. It is a fragile flame, one that is easiIy extinguished in the later conflicts of life; but if the baby uses the means that God has provided, it can and should keep that flame forever burning. Such are the effects of baptism according to the teachings of the Church and according to the symbolism of the baptismal rites. God HimseIf is the principal cause of all the wonders accomplished by baptism. But God in His providence decided not to produce these wonders without a visible rite. He desired.that man, confo.rmably with his nature, should have some outward sign to testify to the a~bievement of these wonders. Hence through the agency of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity become Man, He instituted the visible sacrament of baptism. Whenever this sacrament is adminis-tered, God takes it in His hand and uses it as an instrument to beget a new supernatural organism, to paint a sacramental character, to confer sundry supernatural favors and to impose obligations. A REPRINT SERIESmMAYBE! Because of dil~culties which have not yet been overcome, we are unable to say whether we wilI publish the series of reprints men-tioned in our November issue (VII, 331-332). However, a definite announcement will be made in the March issue. Tentative orders are still welcome. 34 ,/ The Spirit: ot: Povert:y Joseph F. Gallen, S.J. IN RECENT ISSUES of the REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS, Father Ellis: has explained the obligati6ns of poverty that arise f~om the vo~ and from law, whether the latter is of the Church or of the par.-. ticular institute. The necessity and value of such an explanation are evident. However, as Father Ellis indicated, the spirit of poverty is of even greater importance. This follows from the admitted doctrine of moral theology that the vow and laws concerning poverty are only means of acquiring the spirit of poverty and thus subordinated to the latter as a means to an end. A brief study of the purpose of the vows of religion may clarify this importance. Christian perfection, the end of the religious life, consists in divine charity. St. Thomas places the purpose of the evangelical counsels in the religious life in the fact that they remove the principal impediments to 'divine charity. He' specifies the purpose of poverty as the. removal of all attachment for temporal things. Attachment is obviously something interior, the vow and the laws on poverty extend only to external actions. It is the spirit of poverty that is to regulate the affections. It is pos-sible to observe the vow, to secure permission, and yet to be greatly attached to the things permitted. A religious, therefore, can be faith-ful to the observance of the vow and yet fail to attain the proximate purpose of poverty. This purpose cannot be accomplished without the practice of the spirit of poverty. It may appear strange to assert that the vow ofpoverty is insuffi-cient to attain the purpose of poverty in the religious life, yet this insufficiency is evident in many other respects. In complete accord with the vow of poverty, religious could be given permission to administer their own property, to apply their pfopertyto personal needs, to have a dependent peculium (REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS, Jan-uary, 1948, p. 33), and they also could be granted any kind, quantity, or quality of material things for their own use. Such practices would not remove the waste of time, the preo.ccupation and anxiety about temporal things, the love of riches and pride that St. Thomas lists as the specific impediments to divine charity that are to be excluded by poverty. All of the above practices had to be removed by ecclesiastical law. In a similar manner, the vow cannot 35 JOSEPH F. GALLEN Ret~iew for Religious attain the purpose of religious poverty unless it is complemented by the spirit of poverty. A striving for the spirit of poverty, and especially for its perfec-tion, is also a natural manifestation of the genuine and basic religious spirit. The religious life is of counsel, and it by no means loses this character by the fact that the evangelical counsels are assumed under the obligation of sin. The religious who is faithful to the observance of what his vows command has done much, but he has not done everything. The vows of religion leave many things within the domain of counsel, supererogation, and generosity. This statement is not difficult to prove. In the practice of the Holy See for lay congre-gations, the vow bf obedience produces its obligation only when the religious is strictly commanded in virtue of holy obedience, and for a serious reason. It is further urged that such a command be given in writing or in the presence of at least two witnesses. It is evident that the religious who waits'for the obligation of the vow of obedience will have very little obedience in his life. To realize the sacrifice and purpose of his principal vow, the religious must strive after the per-fection of obedience, which is a matter of counsel and supererogation. In the same religious institutes, the constitutions do not of themselves oblige immediately under sin. This does not mean that the Holy See is indifferent to the observance of the constitutions. The principle of the Sacred Congregation in approving such constitutions is that an obligation immediately under sin is not necessary in a life inspired and dominated by the spirit of the counsels. It would be thus alien to this basic spirit of religion to be content with the vow and to neglect the spirit of poverty, even though the higher degrees of the latter do not oblige under sin. The object of the spirit of poverty is to remove all inordinate affections for material things and to use these only in conformity with the legitimate usage of the particular institute. The latter is com-monly included as part of the spirit of poverty, even though it is commanded by ecclesiastical law. We have used the expression spirit of po~ert~l, because a purely abstract dispute exists among theo-logians as to the existence of a special virtue of povert{j. The better opinion, originated by Suarez but implicit in the doctrine of St. Thomas, is that no such special virtue exists. The object of a vir-tue: must be a moral good in itself. Poverty is not a moral good in itself but something indifferent; .if this were not true, riches would be a moral evil in themselves. The Holy See has used both expressions 36 danuary, 1949 THE SPIRIT OF POVERTYi in its official documents and consistently admits the chapter heading, "The Vow and Virtue of Poverty," in the approval of constitutions. This theological dispute can be an obstacle to the perfection of pov-erty to the unguarded reader, since the conclusion can be readily drawn that the spirit or virtue of poverty is simply non-existent. The followers of Suarez merely deny the existence of one special virtue of poverty; they readily admit and assert the existence of a spirit or virtue of poverty which consists of a plurality of virtues. The spirit of poverty is thus a collection of virtues, especially temperance, patie.nce, humility, and the modesty that St. Thomas defines as a vir-tue that moderates the use of external apparel. Some authors extend the object of this modesty to the use of all material things. Observ-ance of the spirit of poverty will procure the merit of one of these virtues: violations will be sins against the same virtues. However, in its higher degrees, the spirit of poverty is a matter of counsel. The spirit of poverty complements principally the vow and the state of poverty. The Spirit of Povertg and the Vow of Povertg Poverty is opposed to riches, and the evident purpose of the vow of poverty is to make the religious, in some sense, a poor man. The extent to which this is effected by the vow is: (a) the religious must obtain permission for the disposition of money or its equivalent; (b) this permission can be revoked at any time at the mere will of the superior; (c) the permission does not give proprietorship. We can add that, in conformity with the vow, the religious may be granted the use of many valuable objects. Furthermore, the incapacity of a solemnly professed religious to acquire or retain property for him-self is not an effect of the vow but of ecclesiastical law. Therefore, the vow does not effect a poverty of external privation. It aims essentially at a poverty by which a religious is to acquire, possess, and use nothing as his own. He is to dispose of material things not as belonging to himself but as to another. In the actual disposition of money or its equivalent for personal use, the comparison, used by Billuart, of religious to slaves, who have no property rights but use food and clothing as belonging to their masters, is to be true also of all professed of simple vows. The vow does not induce the privation of beggary but it does make the religious a beggar; he must ask and depend on another for all his needs. Externally the vow renders the indigence of tl~e religious greater than that of the beggar. The beggar 37 JOSEP.H F. GALLEN Reoiew [or Religious owns the alms he receives; the religious does not own any of the material things be is granted by a superior. The plea of the beggar can frequently, mask a heart of wealth. In his words he is asking, but in his heart he is dem, anding his own. The vow forces the reli-gious to be externally dependent, but it does not despoil his mind and heart of wealth. "The mere asking of a permission does not neces-sarily exclude a proprietary mind and will in the request and espe-cially in the ensuing retention and use of the object granted by the superior. A religious can ask permission in a spirit of dependence or as a mere legal formality. He.can consider himself the owner of what be asks and look upon the superior as the mere custodian of his own property, who must grant what he asks. He can very readily believe that religious poverty consists in the mere external asking for permis-sion. The essential poverty of the vow cannot be attained unless the religious is animated by the habitual interior attithde that everything he acquires, retains, and uses belongs to another and that be retains and uses them as belonging to another. This interior attitude apper-tains to the spirit of poverty, since the. vow is limited to external actions. The interior spirit of ownership frequently detracts from the per-fection of religious poverty. It will be sufficient to adduce one common example. "I should have it because it was given to me," is a principl.e of conduct not unknown to the heart of the religious. This produces what we may style the "rebate" system. A religious of simple vows receives an absolute and personal gift of five do,liars. Mbtivated by the fact that it was given to him, he will very fre-quently ask to use the five dollars or at least part of it. There is a deadly disjunction against this practice. The purpose for which he wishes to spend the money is either legitimate or illegitimate. If illegitimate, the superior may not give the permission, despite the fact that he received the gift. If legitimate, the fact of the gift is no motive for the religious to ask for the permission nor for the superior to give the permission: Th~ only licit motive in such a case is what the religious needs, not what be has received. The relation to per-mission in religion is to our necessities, not to our income. Such a religious observes the vow, since he asks for permission, but he is qualifying his poverty by mental proprietorship. His norm for asking permission is not what he religiously needs but what he ha~ financially received. The religious who has despoiled his mind and heart of proprietorship will turn over absolutely to the superior the 38 danuar~ . 1949 THE SPIRIT OF POVERTY absolute gift made to him. When the memory of this gift has grown cold, he will present his petition to the superior and allow it to stand or fall on its own merits. This habitual interior attitude is the primary requisite in the spirit of poverty. It is clearly demanded by the essential purpose of the vow and it is of great and universal efficacy in excluding dis-ordered attachments for material things. The religious who has fundamentally put off self in mind and will in regard to material things is not apt to yield to the selfishness of a disordered affection for such an object. The same habit is of equal efficacy in animating the observance of the vow. The religious who is habitually poor interiorly will not often seek riches in his external actions. This fundamental habit also excludes a great obstacle to perfect religious poverty, that is, externalism, formalism, and legalism with regard to the precepts and counsels of religious poverty. The religious who is habitually poor in heart has already strengthened the poverty that spiritual writers call the wall of religion, and he will not easily descend to the legalistic approach that seeks the crevices of "no obli-gation" in the vow and the laws of the Church on poverty. The removal of irregular attachments for material things is the proper object of the spirit of poverty. A religious should evaluate such things only according to their reasonable necessity for his life and work. Any motive or state of will contrary to this is a viola-tion of the spirit of poverty. It is evident that such an attachment can be verified also in the observance of the vow and the state of pov-erty. The external observance of the vow and of the law of the Church does not of itself completely purify the will. Ascetical writers give means for overcoming these attachments. Oftentimes, however, they fail to mention that a great source of the attachments is an ignorance of the purpose of religious poverty and the implicit persuasion of the sufficiency of the vow. A knowledge of this pur-pose and the conviction that the vow of poverty must be comple-mented by the spirit of poverty are efficacious and practical means for avoiding and conquering the attachments. While the spirit of poverty is principally a complement and exaltation 6f the vow, it is also a vivifying source of the observance of the vow. The religious who does not ask permission because of carelessness or fear of refusal, who is habitually loath to ask permis-sion fiecause of the inconvenience and the humiliation, or who asks permission only because he is forced by the vow and would other- 39 JOSEPH F. GALLEN Review [or Religious wise sin will very frequently find that his difficulty is an ignorance or lowered esteem of the spirit of poverty. He is conceiving poverty as something that is forced from him and not as his own free gift to God. Poverty has become a merely disciplinary and external matter and has lost its soul and beauty as one of the three essential means that are to unite his mind and will with God in a more perfect love, By considering poverty as something merely external, be can readily have grown into the habit of studying how to gratify and not bow to overcome his affections towards material things, of escaping and not of accept~,ng and seeking poverty. His need is not greater fidelity in asking permission but greater motivation for asking permission. The Spirit of Poverty and the State of Poverty Father Ellis defined the state of poverty: "Each institute has its own norm of poverty, that is, a limit as to the kind, quality, and quantity of material things permitted to the religious for their use. This limit is found determined in the constitutions or, as is more commonly the case in congregations with simple vows, in traditions, customs, and usage." (REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS, July, 1948. p. 207). This limit admits of reasonable differences for such pur-poses as health or work. The expression, "state of poverty," is not too frequently found in modern usage. We have adopted it as con-venient and because it is the term used in this matter by the Council of Trent and by Clement VIII. There can be some lack of knowledge of the importance of the state of poverty in the religious, life. The persuasion that the vow is the one source of obligation has led many to believe that religious poverty is solely a poverty of dependence. It is true that the effect of the vow is a poverty of dependence, but the state of poverty is to produce at least some measure of external privation. This privation consists in the .exclusion of superfluities. The norm for distinguishing superfluities from necessities is that described in the definition given above. It is evident that the use of superfluities, without permission, is an independent proprietary act and, at least as such, a sin against the vow: but the source of the obligation of avoiding superfluities, even though a superior has granted permission, has been a matter of dis-pute for centuries. The Code of Canon Law seems to give an easy solution to tbi, s problem. Canon 5.94, §3 reaffirms a law of the Council of Trent. This law had again been emphasized by Clement 40 January, 1949 THE SPIRIT OF POVERTY. VIII, in 1599.~'The Vatican translation of canon 594, §3 is: "The furniture of the religious must be in accordance with the poverty 6f which they make profession." By "furniture" is meant all things given to supply the personal necessities of religious, as is clear from the description of Clement VIII. We are to take the words of this canon in their obvious sense, that is, they constitute a law and not a determination of the vow of poverty. The words of canon 594, §3, as also those of the Council of Trent and of Clement VIII, are clearly preceptive and directly oblige all religious, superiors and sub-jects. The laws of the Code are moral laws, not merely penal laws, and thus oblige immediately under sin. Therefore, the use of super-fluities, with permission, is a sin against this law. The permission of a superior does not exclude this malice, since lay superiors cannot dispense from the laws of the Church and clerical superiors have been granted no power of dispensing from this law. The importance of the spirit of poverty as inclusive of the state of poverty should be evident. The state of poverty complemen~ts the vow by adding at least some external privation to the dependence of the vow. It also refutes the maxim that permission makes anything licit in religious poverty. Within its essential degree, the state of poverty obliges immediately under sin. This essential degree is to acquire, retain, and use only what is necessary within the limit described in the definition of Father Ellis. The degrees of perfection and counsel are to seek or actually to suffer at times the privation of real necessities and to desire and to be satisfied with what is least in the community in food, clothing, lodging, and other personal neces-sities. The state of poverty is an essential part of the concept and law of common llfe, as prescribed for religious by canon 594. It is, per-haps, the fundamental note of this concept, since the other violations of common life, the habitual obtaining of necessities from externs and a dependent peculium, very frequently have their source in an unwillingness to observe the state of poverty. The Church is not unaware of abuses in common life and insists most emphatically on its observance in the Code of Canon Law. Canon 587, §2 enacts that common life must be perfectly observed in clerical houses of study; otherwise the students may not be promoted to orders. Canon 2389 Makes notable violations of common life an ecclesiastical crime, punishable with canonical penalties. The Sacred Congregation of Religious also inquires about the observance of common life in the 41 dOSEPH F. GALLEN Reoiew ~or Retigio~s quinquennial report that pontifical institutes must mdke to the H61y See. The history also of canon 594 reveals the great value that the Church places on common life and all of its parts. The religious who is sincerely desirous of perfect religious poverty will foster an equal evaluation. It seems idle to give specific examples of violations of the state of poverty. Any religious should know the limit of the definition given above from his study of his own institute and readily realize when he is exceeding that limit. It will not be impractical, however, to mention a rather general source of superfluities in r.eligion, and that is the addiction to gifts for personal use. Very frequently religious receive gifts, especially at such times as Christmas, feast days, and birthdays. A well-informed spectator might be tempted to bid on many of these gifts as irreligious surplus material. The cause is fre-quently in the religious himself. He has been asked what he wants, and all too often he mentions something for himself. His reaction to the,,proposed gift should have been: I can and should obtain from my community any legitimate necessity; therefore, I want nothing for myself from this extern. He should then propose a gift that wil! be useful to his community. The most practical gift for his com-munity or institute is money. We may find an occasional religious who is not living a poor life, but it will be most difficult to discover a religious institute that is not poor. At times it will not be prudent to propose' money, but such a proposal could be made with much greater frequency if the religious had constantly manifested in the past that his satisfaction and pleasure were in gifts made to his community. This attitude towards gifts is a natural consequence of common life. If we are constantly to recei;ce from the common fund, we should be willing to contribute to that fund. The absence of this attitude often implies a lack of religious maturity. It is the part of the child to receive but of the adult to give. The spirit of poverty, in all its applications, also admits a hier-archy of motive. For example, a religious, can observe the state of poverty and endure the privations of common life with mere resigna-tion, with alacrity and joy, with eager desire. He can observe the precepts and counsels of poverty from a motive of contempt of the things 6f this world, desire of eternal riches, or mortification to resemble Christ, Our Lord, from love of God and the desire of con-secrating all his affections to God's love and service. St. Bernard tells us that it is not poverty but the love of poverty 42 January, 1949 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS that is reputed virtue. It is not mere external observance of vow and law but dedication to the spirit of poverty that detaches the heart of the religious from the material goods of this world, that fulfills the purpose of religious poverty and effects the earthly, poverty that is productive of eternal riches. ( uesFons nnd Answers In a congregation professlncj a strlct decjree of poverty the followlncj custom is takin9 root. On the occasion of silver jubilees a wide variety of expensive cjiffs are received by the jubilarlan from friends and relatives. Silverware, hand missals, books, desk sets, wearln9 apparel, money for vacation trips and Mass stipends are common forms of jubilee cjiffs. May such a custom be allowed to develop without serious preiudlce ~'o the spirit of poverty and comr~unlty life? The toleration of personal gifts means in most institutes a pro-gressive relaxation of the spirit of poverty. The inquirer will read with profit the articles on Gifts to Religious (cf. REVIEW FOR RELI-GIOUS, VI and VII). The conscientious superior, in granting per-mission for any of the above-mentioned articles, will be guided by his own constitutions and canon 594, § 1, calling for uniformity of diet, dress, and: furnishings. It is diFicult to see bow a religious may be allowed to keep a set of silverware without detriment to common life. Hand missals are appropriate gifts; other books should be put at the disposal of the community when the jubilarian has finished with them. Generally speaking, books are acceptable as gifts because of their special community value. Desk sets, if permitted by custom, may be given to the jubilarian. But here too the superior must have in mind a certain uniformity of room equipment that is not to be violated by the use of a highly elaborate desk set. Wearing apparel should likewise be uniform and provided by superiors. Our last issue treated the question of money for vacation trips. Gifts for this purpose can give rise to very unfavorable comparisons in a reli-gious community. If a jubilarian wishes to devote some of the money received to the purpose of having Mass said for his intentions, there appear~ to be no reason why the superior may not grant this request. 43. Qu. ESTIONS AND ANSWERS Re~,~ew /:or Religious (Cf. REVIEW FUR RELIGIOUS, V, 335.) A sum' of money to be freely spent according to the wishes of the jubilarian could not be used without the approval of the superior, who must decide whether or not the individual objects to be bought are in keeping with common life. The questions here presented lead us to suggest that from the beginning of the religious life one should acquaint his relatives and friends with the idea of common life, which means uniformity in the use of material things. While a community may depend ~n bene-factors for help in many ways, the individual religious may nor enlist the economic aid of his relatives to defray his personal expenses. Even the shrinkage of convent income is no justification for. the gradual decay of the spirit of poverty. May a rellg~ous who has charge o{ an extra-currlcular activity in a school keep in his own room funds devoted fo fhls actMty? The ordinary rule, according to canon 594, § 2, is that such funds should be deposited with the bursar. Special circumstances would justify the superior's granting permission to keep the funds under lock and~key in a private room. May the celebrant of the Sunday community Mass give the Asperges? Authentic declarations of the Sacred Congregation of Rites tell us that the Asperges is to be given to the people before sung Masses on Sunday in collegiate churches. By a collegiate church is meant one in which a chapter of canons daily chant the Divine Office, just as is done in a cathedral. In our own country there are no such chapters. The Asperges rna~! be given in other churches. In many churches it is the custom to have the Asperges before the parochial Mass if it is sung; if it is a low Mass, no custom prescribes it. Concerning the Asperges before the Sunday Mass in a religious community, the cus-tom of the diocese 'should be followed. May a Superior, without violating his rule, give an occasional alms to a beggar? Canoh 537 permits almsgiving on the part of religious for a just cause according to the constitutions. Hence an occasional act of charity towards a mendicant would be permitted by any institute. 44 danuary, 1949 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS A novice completes his novitiate on the 10th of Aucjust. In orde¢ to make his first profession with other novices who are due on the 15th of Aucjust, he is asked to wait until that date. Does the five-day interval in any way affect the validity of his profession? The novice's first profession is certainly valid. Canon 571, § 2 states tbat'a novice who is judged fit is to be admitted to the profe's-sion on the expiration of the novitiate, (exacto novitiatu). Nothing\ in the canon indicates that the delay of a few days in such circum-stances as those pointed out above would nullify the profession. Ac-cording to canon 1 l, the express statement of the nullifyir;g character of a law must be made if it is to have this effect. No such statement is made in canon 571, § 2. Is an extern, who has been chosen by a novice accordln9 to canon 569, § I as administrator of his property durin9 the time of his simple pro-fession, obliged to make to superiors a periodic account of the disposition of the revenue arlsin9 from the religious' estate? Since the Code makes no statement prescribing such a periodic report, there is no obligation to do so unless it is required by the approved constitutions of the institute. m7~ Are all Catholics excused from the obllcjafion of Sunday Mass once they have attempted marriage before a Protestant minister or have attempted to remarry after havin9 obtained a civil divorce? The questioner apparently is concerned about a statement that appeared in REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS, VI, 215. The article treated certain aspects of the duty of hearing Mass, and it mentioned that there is a difference of opinion among theologians and canonists con-cer, ning the obligation of excommunicated persons. Having indicated this difference of opinion, the article states: "By reason of their excommunication they are deprived of their right to assist at Mass; hence some moralists argue that they cannot have a duty to do so. In practice, they may be considered as excused from the obligation; but they certainly have a duty to do what is necessary to be absolved from the excommunication." The answer to the present question, therefore, comes to this: if the parties are excommunicated, they do not have the duty of attending Mass, but they do have a duty of taking the means neces- 45 DECISIONS OF THE HOLY SEE Review for Religious sary to be absolved of their excommunication; if they are not excom-municated, they have tile duty of assisting at Mass. Are all the parties mentioned in this question excommunicated? It would be impossible for us to give a general answer to the question because for the actual incurring of an excommunication many condi-tions must be fulfilled. The best way to solve a particular case is to refer all the facts to a canonist and let him judge the conditions. Decisions o[ Holy
