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The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Capstone Autumn 1862 The High Tide of the Confederacy Colin E. Zimmerman A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH562 Capstone Paper Dr. Wesley Moody 23-August-2020. 2 Thesis: The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? It will be necessary to answer this question through a multilayered approach. Instead of viewing the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns on the tactical level, which has already consumed most of the historiography on the topic, this study will instead find an explanation to this question through political, logistical, organizational, leadership personalities, and economic components and how they dictated the overall strategic picture and framework. When synthesizing all these components together, one potential answer generates: the grand Confederate offensive in the autumn of 1862, a direct result of botched Federal strategic measures and limitations, divided political policies, and the Union's struggling logistical capabilities; indicated the high tide of the Confederacy. Through battlefield victories and seizing the initiative in direct and indirect courses, Confederate leadership allowed the Southern field armies to exploit the Federal weaknesses culminating in the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns. 3 These campaigns offered the Confederacy its only realistic chance of ending the war on political and strategic terms that favored the South. An examination of each specific component and its relation to the Confederate high tide's theory is therefore essential to back this new interpretation. Political Factors of the North, South, and Europe; and its Benefit to the Confederacy in 1862: All wars, especially civil wars, are political in their foundation, influence, and execution. In "On War," Carl von Clausewitz states that "the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and the amount of effort to be made." 1 This axiom applies to events in the autumn of 1862 since political factors dominated the motivation of strategy. The Confederacy's legitimacy resided within its field armies continued existence. Their ability to gain military victories that supported both the strategic and political realms was the essential component that needed to be sustained if the South was to remain independent. The North was in a completely different predicament, as the rival political factions, Republican's and Democrat's, each with its own opinion on the objective goals and the conduct of the war, could not in the early phase of the war come to common ground as to what the specific nature, cause, plan, and purpose of the Civil War was. The North was a nation at war without complete unification of mind, and purpose, which presented a weakness that could ultimately undo its efforts. Complicating matters for President Abraham Lincoln, and his party's agenda, was the fact the Northern Democratic party held just over 45% of the popular vote of free and border states in the 1860 election. 2 In short, the President and his administration existed only in a 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 2004. 10. 2 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 506. 4 narrow margin and needed to conduct the war in a way suitable to keep the two very different mindsets exhibited by both the Republicans and Democrats in agreement. The Kentucky and Maryland campaigns occurred while changing Republican ideas on the persecution of the war and mid-term congressional elections, which proved to be a significant juncture in Northern and foreign politics. To be sure, the summer and fall of 1862 were extremely delicate times for Lincoln and the Republicans, and they could not afford any negative setbacks. Lacking any precedent to draw on, the Lincoln Administration delicately approached the rebellion by seeking the destruction of Confederate armies and exempting the Southern population from the burdens of war by respecting the civilians' constitutional rights and property. Historian Mark Grimsley captured the conviction of the policy by pointing out that the Lincoln administration renounced any intention of attacking slavery; and the government's assumption that most white Southerners were lukewarm about secession, and if handled with forbearance, would withdraw their allegiance from the Confederacy once Union armies entered their midst. 3 This policy known as conciliation, therefore, served as the beat to which Union forces marched off to war. Not all Northern generals and radical Republicans embraced this; however, the policy served as the first step in an evolutionary process that would eventually culminate in "hard-war." The effects of conciliation created favorable conditions for the Confederacy from which they were able to exploit the "limited war" shortcomings of the Union and surge forward into the fall offensive and their high tide. These shortcomings manifest in several different forms: leadership, strategic limitation, and foreign and domestic political pressure. Unfortunately for the 3 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 3. 5 Union, the combination of these factors exposed themselves in a negative light nearly all simultaneously, creating a perfect opportunity for the Confederates to take advantage of the drawbacks and pursue victory. Fueling the fire was the Lincoln Administration's policy regarding the appointment of military governors in captured territory. The issue arose when these cities, such as Nashville, were turned into massive supply centers for Union armies, resulting in intense rivalries between city and country, neighboring communities, and whites and blacks as they competed for jobs and dominance. 4 Henry Halleck, George McClellan, Don Carlos Buell, the key leaders of the Federal armies in 1862, generated the most immediate consequences stemming from the shortcomings of conciliation from as these three adherents to firm Democratic principles and military strategy are most responsible for creating the opportunity for a Confederate offensive. Generals Halleck, McClellan, and Buell are often portrayed by historians as lacking the "killer instinct," especially when compared to Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Phil Sheridan. However, a more accurate analysis finds them as men who followed the conciliation policy almost to the letter for political, personal, or logistical reasons. Halleck himself wrote the Elements of Military Art and Science, where he harped on the capture of strategic points, incurring the least number of casualties and damage as possible as the primary strategy of winning a war. Ironically, Halleck, the most influential Union general in 1862, believed that warfare was unjustifiable in most cases and should only be conducted with the utmost caution. 5 As General in Chief, Halleck had a significant influence on the conduct of operations of the Union forces. Each of these three 4 Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 35-36; Scott Nelson and Carol Sheriff, A People of War: Civilians and Soldiers in America's Civil War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 88. The reference to negative leadership refers to the actions of Nathaniel Lyon and Francis Blair; who introduced "harsh" measures in 1861 prematurely which led to a brutal guerilla war and other political ramifications. 5 Henry Wagner Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science: Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battle, Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers, Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia, Third Edition, New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1862. 7-9. 6 commanders prescribed to similar variants of Halleck's theory, whose universal core value of caution above all else acted as the catalyst to create the conditions for the Confederacy to crest in the fall of 1862. While the reigns of military success were in McClellan's and Buell's hands during the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns; Halleck made two major errors in 1862 that are directly responsible for igniting the Confederate offensives. The first was his overabundance of caution in taking Corinth, allowing the Confederates to slip away and then failing to retain the initiative by pushing to Vicksburg while simultaneously failing to capture Chattanooga. The second major failure was his inability to harness his granted power and force McClellan to speedily and effectively send his army to the aid of John Pope, eliminating any opportunity for a combined assault on Lee's smaller army. 6 The Democratic principles these generals prescribed to differed in many respects from Lincoln and the Republican agenda on the idea of the war. Each strongly believed in the preservation of the Union yet favored winning the war by the least drastic measures, the least number of casualties, and on a platform acceptable to their Democratic party beliefs. 7 For instance, McClellan wrote Buell, upon the latter's elevation to command of the Army of the Ohio: "bear in mind that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and to uphold the power of General Government….be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us & the rebels." 8 Additionally, Generals Pope, Grant, and Rosecrans, who likely weren't as politically polarized as the former three, contributed to the growing political dissension in 1862 in their own right. Therefore, by their actions, federal military leadership did more to subvert the Union military from ending the war quickly and 6 Russel F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000. 135-136. It is arguable whether or not the Army of the Potomac could have arrived in its entirety rapidly enough to join with Pope. However, personal and in-house political agendas did not move the efficiency along any faster. 7 Weigley, A Great Civil War, xix-xxi. 8 Grimsley, 64. 7 dividing political tension based on faction theology more than any other public figures in 1862. One of the more notable incidents that fit into the framework of subversion was Grant's debacle at Shiloh, which brought strong opposition from anti-war Democrats, causing cautious leaders such as Halleck and McClellan to tighten their grip and fear repeat attacks. Most detrimental in this respect was the administration's and Halleck's decision to temporarily bench Grant during the Corinth episode, then subsequently leaving him in a position where he could not act with his usual aggressiveness against Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. Before his removal as General in Chief, George McClellan wrote Halleck then in charge of western forces, "The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant's should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of service requires it, & place CF Smith in command." 9 Grant's "recklessness" at Shiloh created quite the stir on the home front, which as a result, political rivals of the Lincoln Administration, sought to break down Grant as a way to spread discontent and fit the anti-war platform. They harped on the high number of casualties, the surprise of the Confederate attack, and the black eye to the seemingly unstoppable Union war machine. The backlash reached Washington, prompting a response from the Administration. In a telegram to Halleck, Secretary of War Stanton wrote, "The President desires to know why you have made no official report to this department respecting the late battles of Pittsburg landing. And whether any neglect or misconduct of General Grant or any other officer contributed to the sad casualties that befell our forces on Sunday." 10 The battle of Shiloh became the first political debacle that militarily opened the door for the Confederacy to take the offensive in the fall of 1862. 9 Nancy Scott Anderson and Dwight Anderson, The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee, Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. 230. 10 Anderson, The Generals, 241. 8 The most immediate politically charged consequence materialized in Halleck's handling of the advance on Corinth, which exemplified his standard cautiousness with added paranoia of avoiding another repeat of Shiloh. 11 The delicate politically charged caution continued even after the successful capture of Corinth in Halleck's decision to send Buell, over Pope or Grant to seize Chattanooga. Halleck's snail-like cautious advance on Corinth, and the decision to send Buell to Chattanooga, allowed the disorganized Confederate army to withdraw from Corinth, establish a new commander in the form of Braxton Bragg, who in turn brought reorganization, discipline, and professionalization to the Army of Mississippi; which proved to be the genesis of Bragg and Smith having the ability to advance into Tennessee and Kentucky. 12 Military shortcomings turned political disasters in the Eastern Theater during the summer of 1862, soon overshadowed Shiloh, and added dramatic momentum and opportunity to the rise of the Confederate high tide in the war's primary theater. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac, having suffered political harassment in late 1861 into the spring of 1862, began their downward political spiral with the Army of the Potomac's loss of initiative and strategic defeat during the Seven Days Battles on the Peninsula. The setbacks along the James River coupled with the black eye at Shiloh, and the defeat of Federal forces in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 had devastating political effects, which left the North and European powers believing that all hope for the Union resided with McClellan and his Army of the Potomac. The proximity of the Union and Confederate capitals made the Eastern theater a hot spot for journalists and policymakers on both sides, who saw the region as the deciding factor in the Civil War's outcome. This army's setback at the gates of Richmond did more to influence how events 11 Larry J. Daniel, Days of Glory: The Army of the Cumberland, 1861-1865, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006. 85. 12 Thomas Lawrence Connelly, Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001. 188-194. 9 unfolded in the east in 1862 in both the strategic and political sense, both foreign and domestic. 13 The shortcomings on the Peninsula stymied the Union's hope to quickly end the war while making the voices of "Peace Democrats" louder and the political situation even more delicate. As if the Lincoln Administration did not already have enough burdens, both England and France, whose neutrality was necessary for the Union war effort, began to openly question the North's ability to subdue the South and end the rebellion. 14 Stonewall Jackson's brilliant campaign in the Valley, coupled with the Army of Northern Virginia's ferocious performance on the Peninsula elevated Southern patriotism, and simultaneously dampened Northern morale, convincing many on both sides that Southern victory was achievable. 15 Colonel Charles Marshall, Lee's Assistant Adjutant General believed that Robert E. Lee's emergence onto the scene was the greatest benefit to the Southern cause. He equated Lee's leadership on the Peninsula to that of a color bearer bravely advancing his banner towards the enemy. On political matters Marshall correctly believed that the Northern people were impatient for a speedy victory and that the Federal Government expressed this sentiment in its policy on conducting the war. However, this policy was forcefully and forever altered with the aggressive Lee's emergence onto the scene, whose plan called for carrying on the war indefinitely until the Confederacy achieved victory. Marshall outlined this plan as designed to, "frustrate the enemy's designs; to break up campaigns undertaken with vast expense and with confident assurance of success; to impress upon the minds of Northern people the conviction that they must prepare for a protracted struggle, great sacrifices of life and treasure, with the possibility that all might at last be of no 13 Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992. 355. 14 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 554-555. 15 Peter Cozzens, Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. 507-508. 10 avail; and to accomplish this at the smallest cost to the Confederacy." 16 This leadership change at such a critical moment proved to be the dawn of turning Confederate fortunes in the east. Public opinion and political reactions to the Union failure on the Peninsula were mixed; however, strong opposition towards McClellan emerged and created discord among the rival Democrats and Republicans, each of whom found outlets to accuse the other of the responsibility of the campaign's failure. 17 Amid this political turmoil, Lincoln, in an effort to offset the discord introduced Major General John Pope, who only managed to escalate political dissension to a fever pitch with his disastrous Northern Virginia campaign. 18 In the Western Theater, the emergence of Braxton Bragg also came at a critical juncture in juxtaposition with the events occurring in the east. Bragg took command of the Army of Mississippi at one of its darkest hours, and through exemplary organizational skills, reshaped the Army of Mississippi into a professional, disciplined force capable of delivering a lethal blow. With such a force, Bragg was able to look to more risky opportunities that would offset the Union strategic gains in the west and regain Tennessee and perhaps set the stage for Kentucky.19 Private Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee recorded the positive change in morale from the melancholy atmosphere at Corinth to when new lifeblood in the army emerged. "We were in an ecstasy akin to heaven. We were happy; the troops were jubilant; our manhood blood pulsated more warmly; our patriotism was awakened; our pride was renewed and stood ready for any emergency; we felt that one Southern man could whip twenty Yankees. All was lovely and 16 Charles Marshall, Lees Aide-De-Camp: Being the Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall Sometime Aide-De-Camp, Military Secretary, and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee, 1862-1865, Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, and Frederick Maurice, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. 74. 17 Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 346-347. 18 John J. Hennessy, Return to Bull Run: The Battle and Campaign of Second Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. 468-472. 19 Earl J. Hess, Banners to the Breeze: the Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River, Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2010. 19-22. 11 the goose hung high." 20 Although the Confederates had suffered initial setbacks early in 1862, the advantages afforded by conciliation, cautious Federal leadership, and the emergence of Lee and Bragg allowed for a reversal of fortunes. In 1862 Southern patriotism was running high; the idea of independence and the Confederate soldier's superiority was at its wartime peak. 21 Lee's decision to invade Maryland was political in nature. Maryland Campaign historians, Joseph Harsh, Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears, James Murfin, and Ezra Carman while differing on strategic matters, all agree that Lee's primary purpose was to secure a decisive victory which would gain the South the political victory; either in the form of Northern domestic politics or international recognition and or intervention. The application of political pressure to Lee's offensive outweighs all the deficiencies faced by his army in the logistical realm, and further illustrated his grasp on the delicacy of Northern political division. Clearly, he understood this division and had faith that his smaller, ill-supplied force had a chance to deliver a blow that would fracture the Northern populace and produce an outcome that favored the South. General Lee suggested his understanding of such matters in a letter to President Jefferson Davis while in Dranesville on September 3. "The present seems to be the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate Army to enter Maryland.….if it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her and opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable." 22 The domestic and foreign political objectives acting as primary motives for the "invasion," were in that instant equal to the strategic goals which accompanied them when 20 Samuel R. Watkins, Company Aytch or A Side Show of the Big Show: A Memoir of the Civil War. Edited by Ruth Hill Fulton McAllister. Nashville, TN: Turner, 2011. 45. 21 Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse, New York: Free Press, 2008. 207; James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 263. 22 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 19. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 590. 12 defining the military value of the campaign; this is a unique feature to the Maryland Campaign and its condition for victory, while only a secondary task in Kentucky. In contrast historian Edwin Coddington paints a different picture for Lee's purposes in the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863. Coddington outlined that Lee, in this part of the war, contended with the new Federal doctrine of "hard war" and emancipation, eliminating the decisive battle matched with the political advantage that existed in 1862. Therefore, Lee's only real option was to defeat the Army of the Potomac in detail, earning a strategic victory rather than a political one. 23 Such a task required adequate logistics, and a complete and total battlefield victory, two factors that eluded the Confederacy during the war. Such victory conditions presented to Lee in 1862 were unique and would never materialize again in any substantial form. Political division in the North was at fever pitch in the late summer of 1862; evidence of the discord's depth is apparent in everything from personal letters through Northern news outlets. Robert E. Lee, an avid reader of Northern papers, understood this notion and sought to exploit it. Domestically, Northern Democrats maintained a loud voice in critical regions and states, which only grew more robust and more resilient with each military shortcoming and failure. August and early September saw a heightened level of panic and discouragement in the North, with Pope's defeat and Lee's invasion of Maryland, while at the same time Kirby Smith's Confederate Army of Kentucky demonstrated against Cincinnati. Pennsylvania was understandably the most unnerved due to its proximity to Maryland and vital war infrastructure, and its Republican governor Andrew Curtin's demand for 80,000 troops to defend his state embodied it. Additionally, the mayors of the influential northern cities of Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and 23 Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, New York: Simon and Schuster. 1968. 6-7. 13 Baltimore were alarmed, fearing their respective city was the target of Lee's advancing legions.24 In Cincinnati, the situation turned somewhat drastic. After destroying the Union forces at Richmond, Kentucky on August 30, Kirby Smith as a result had a clear road to the Ohio River. Understandably Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio all worried what Smith's next move would be while they scrambled to organize bodies of troops. General Lew Wallace arrived in Cincinnati, declared martial law and quickly set about organizing a defense. 25 With panic to the extremity of declaring martial law, the Northern population began to question their ability to win the war openly. Prominent figures such as George Templeton Strong, Samuel Galloway, Reverend Robert Laird Collier, and Senator Garrett Davis, spoke not only for themselves but also for the majority of the people by openly challenging President Lincoln and his administration on their ability to conduct the war. The accusations included Lincoln's unfitness for the Presidency, the constant change of military leadership in the east, which showed instability and was severely hurting morale in the North. Demands also arose that there be a complete reorganization of the Administration. 26 The Lincoln Administration's threat of a draft, unless an additional 300,000 volunteers could be raised created further tension. The idea of a draft disgusted many Northerners; however, with "patriotic" spirit enticed by bounties, nine-month service, and the threat of draft, the ranks of new regiments began to fill in late summer of 1862, only hitting forty-five percent of the intended quota. 27 The Union soldiers themselves cast a gloomy mood over the situation and expressed their views with varying levels of disgust. Lieutenant Elisha Hunt Rhodes of the 2nd 24 David H. Donald, Lincoln, New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996. 373. 25 Vernon L. Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground": Major General Lew Wallace Commands Cincinnati, September 1862." Indiana Magazine of History 85, no. 2 (1989): 139. 26 Donald, Lincoln, 373. 27 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 492. 14 Rhode Island expressed in his diary that: "I fear we are no nearer the end of the war than we were when we first landed at Fortress Monroe five months ago." 28 Captain Francis Donaldson of the 118th Pennsylvania captured the mood in Washington: "We are constant witness of the sad plight of the Army of the Potomac, as thousands of Genl. Pope's troops in great demoralization are ever passing the Fort in retreat to Washington. The poor old Army of the Potomac, how I pity it." 29 Captain Henry Pearson of the 6th New Hampshire also expressed his views in the aftermath of Second Manassas: "You need not be surprised if success falls to the rebels with astonishing rapidity." 30 Brigadier General Marsena Patrick's opinion bordered on insurrection: "There is a general feeling that the Southern Confederacy will be recognized & that they deserve recognition." 31 Lieutenant Charles Seton Fleming of the 2nd Florida Infantry, in a letter home to his mother describing the aftermath of the Second Manassas campaign, echoed Patrick's views when he wrote: "Our victory is complete, even the Yankee prisoners acknowledge it." 32 Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hubbell of the 3rd New York wrote in August 1862: "I am not sure that it would not be a good thing to have the rebels get possession of Washington however, as it might waken up the north to the fact that we are having a war in earnest, and not merely playing soldier…. We have got men & means enough in the north to put an end to this war in 90 days, if they would only go at it in earnest and let politics & the nigger alone." 33 28 Elisha Hunt Rhodes, All for the Union: A History of the 2nd Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Great Rebellion. Edited by Robert Hunt Rhodes. Lincoln, RI: A. Mowbray, 1985. 69. 29 Francis Adams Donaldson, Inside the Army of the Potomac: The Civil War Experience of Captain Francis Adams Donaldson. Edited by J. Gregory Acken. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998. 104. 30 D. Scott Hartwig, To Antietam Creek: the Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019. 134-135. 31 Ibid., 134-135. 32 Francis P. Fleming, A Memoir of Captain C. Seton Fleming: of the Second Florida Infantry, C.S.A., Reprint 1985: Jacksonville: Times-Union Publishing House, 1884. 66. 33 Simon P. Newman, "A Democrat in Lincoln's Army: The Civil War Letters of Henry P. Hubbell." The Princeton University Library Chronicle 50, no. 2 (1989): 155-68. 157. 15 Hubbell eluded to the growing discord of racial issues that many Democrats saw as an unnecessary and politically charged motive to a war that was supposed to be strictly for preserving the Union. Nevertheless, this issue began to transform the cause of the war in the summer of 1862, adding only more weight to a very delicate political situation. Hubbell's feelings weren't isolated; instead, the sense that the war was taking on a new front to end slavery infuriated many Northerners. Hubbell's views on racial matters and slavery were not limited to himself, in fact, the stiffest opposition to war that had anything to do with freeing slaves came from the Midwest states; where racism was an epidemic culturally, especially in the Army of the Ohio. The talk of national emancipation led hundreds of men to desert and, in some cases, join the Confederacy. 34 Sentiments similar to these echoed across the Union armies and, undoubtedly, were shared by family and friends on the home front. Some individuals turned bitter, and perhaps extreme, which reflected political, ideological, and sectional differences in the North, which under the pressure of a seemingly collapsing system reared its ugly head. The term "invasion" has been used several times thus far, especially by the Union's most publicized general, George McClellan. This term and others related to it divided the minds of many of those who had significant power to dictate the war. Abraham Lincoln, at no point, recognized the Confederacy as a legitimate entity. He always maintained that the Southern States were in rebellion and needed to be brought back into the Union. Interestingly, his senior generals in 1862, mostly Democrats, saw the Confederate offensives as invasions, insinuating their conscious or subconscious recognition that Confederate armies were "foreign invaders" intent on doing harm, which helped fuel the panic, frustration, and seemingly lost Union cause ideology. 35 34 Daniel, Days of Glory, 101. 35 Andrew Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese: Lincoln and the Army of the Potomac, 1862-1863." Australian Journal of American Studies 21, no.2 (2002): 86-100. 86-87. 16 Jefferson Davis, the Confederate cabinet, Robert E. Lee, Braxton Bragg, and all the other high-ranking Confederate officers comprehended the growing Northern political disunion. This is evident in the decision to approve a Confederate offensive and the string of strategic goals associated with it. The Army of Northern Virginia, for example, fulfilled its duty of defeating the Federals time and again, completely reversing the tide of the war in the east. As Robert E. Lee sat at his headquarters in the aftermath of Chantilly, it had become abundantly clear that he now possessed the opportunity to strike the decisive blow against whatever Union army would oppose him in Maryland or Pennsylvania, which would likely result in some sort of peace talks. 36 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Porter Alexander Chief of Ordnance in the Army of Northern Virginia saw the picture as clear as Lee. Referring to the army, we wrote: "His [Lee's] army had, that magnificent morale which made them equal to twice their numbers, & which they never lost even to the surrender at Appomattox. And his confidence in them, & theirs in him, were so equal that no man can yet say which was greatest. And no old soldier need ask a prouder record than is implied in that fact. By going into Maryland Gen. Lee could at least subsist his army for a while upon the enemy, & he doubtless hoped, too, for a chance to force the Federal army to come out & fight him under favorable conditions." 37 Confederate officer William Allan, reverberated Alexander's sentiments when he wrote of the Army of Northern Virginia: "its spirit at this time was high. A series of brilliant successes had given it unbounded confidence in itself and its leaders, and the ragged dirty soldiers hailed with joy the advance across the Potomac." 38 The comparison of the Federal and Confederate views as indicated from primary sources, on 36 Hartwig, To Antietam Creek, 52-53. 37 Edward Porter Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 139. 38 William Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, Reprint: Middletown: DE, 2020. 273. 17 leadership and the progress of the war at the beginning of the Maryland Campaign were clearly in favor of the South. The leadership of Don Carlos Buell is a prime example of political dissatisfaction, both on the home front and in the army. While McClellan was unpopular with the Administration, he still held favor with most of his officers, and certainly the rank and file of the army and the nation. Buell, however, faced contention on three similar fronts – The Indiana bloc, the general and field officers of the First Division, and the supporters of Alexander McCook, one of his corps commanders. Much of the disgust with Buell occurred during the Kentucky Campaign. This break in unified efforts favored the Confederate cause, particularly in swaying popular opinion in Kentucky. Republican Indiana newspapers ripped into Buell's leadership, declaring that he was completely mishandling the pursuit of two Confederate armies that were ripping up Kentucky and potentially heading towards Indiana, Ohio, or Illinois. Some newspapers called for his immediate dismissal, and a few even demanded he be shot. 39 When comparing Lee and his army to Buell and his, there formulates a fascinating dissection of the polar extremes in popular and political opinion. Lee and his men were on the top of their game, while Buell's forces were at a low ebb. Using these two examples as the basis of measurement, it becomes apparent that overall, the Confederate forces enjoyed a much higher sense of public support and favorability then their Union counterparts did at that particular moment in the war. Scholars have hotly debated the prospect of European powers, particularly England and France intervening and mediating an end to the conflict. The idea of such a prospect was undoubtedly the primary goal for the Confederate strategy in the autumn of 1862. It is essential to view the idea of European intervention in the simplest of forms. The Southern strategy partly 39 Daniel, 128-129. 18 hinged on it, as can be observed via strategic decisions and public opinion, the North, however, feared the prospect. Intervention and mediation on any level would, in the end, be more beneficial to the South, and the Lincoln Administration would appear as incapable; in short, it would be a disaster for the North and Republicans. 40 The onset of a "cotton famine" and the scandal of the Trent affair occurred amid all the politically charged events in 1862, resulting in the British sending an additional 11,000 men to Canada and forcing Lincoln to tread lightly in foreign political matters. 41 Historian Max Beloff believed that the possibility of British intervention was extremely likely in 1862, mainly due to the North's refusal to make anti-slavery sentiments the basis of their cause, instead still focusing on the preservation of the Union, which only supported the pro-Southern faction in Parliament. 42 An examination of Southern newspapers and other editorials, shows public opinion in the South at the beginning of the war was universal in the belief that Great Britain would be forced, through the power of cotton, to intervene either by raising the blockade or by recognizing the Confederate States as an independent nation or perhaps both. 43 Regardless of the likelihood of actual intervention or recognition, the idea of it greatly influenced Confederate leaders, particularly Lee, who notated such objective goals in his correspondence with Davis. Davis agreed outlining his desires in a communication to Lee on September 7. He reminded Lee that the Confederacy was waging war solely for self-defense. Through the eight points he outlined as the guiding principles for the field armies to abide by, Davis continually revolved his doctrine around political objectives whose chief purpose were to achieve peace with the United States. If the South maintained a self- 40 McPherson, 444. 41 Nelson, A People at War, 166. 42 Max Beloff, "Historical Revision No. CXVIII: Great Britain and the American Civil War." History, New Series, 37, no. 129, (1952): 40-48. 42. 43 Schuyler Dean Hoslett, "The Richmond Daily Press on British Intervention in the Civil War: A Brief Summary." The William and Mary Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1940): 79-83. 80. 19 defense posture, with the objective of peace through battlefield victory; then the likelihood of positive European intervention on their behalf had a much higher probability, which in turn could possibly bring a speedy end to the war with terms that favored the Confederacy. 44 Logistical Concerns and Organizational Components: While the South always lagged behind the North in terms of finance, economy, manufacturing, manpower, and many other logistical concerns, the disparity was narrower in 1862 than in the coming years. As a point of contention, several trends and circumstances in the Union war effort benefited the South more than it aided the Union on the grand stage. Concerning logistics, Clausewitz's maxim states: "The dependence on the base increases in intensity and extent with the size of the Army, which is easy to understand. An Army is like a tree. From the ground out of which it grows it draws it's nourishment; if it is small it can easily be transplanted, but this becomes more difficult as it increases in size….When therefore, we talk of the influence of the base on the operations of an Army, the dimensions of the Army must always serve as the scale by which to measure the magnitude of that influence." 45 This axiom is precisely the predicament of the Northern war effort in the first two years of the war. The logistical portion of this study will examine the condition and availability of uniforms and equipment, quality of weaponry then in circulation, training and experience of soldiers, and finally the ability of each government to produce and supply its troops effectively. A logistical understanding is crucial for understanding the obstacles and conditions faced by the armies and how it dictated their effectiveness on campaign and immediate tactical ability on the battlefield in 1862. The South, as previously stated from the very beginning of the war, was behind its 44 OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 45 Clausewitz, On War, 353-354. 20 opponent in logistical matters; however, the North in 1862 was not at the climax in its ability of production and supply, and therefore lacked significantly in certain areas. However, it is essential to note that the limitations of the Federal logistical system by the fall of 1862 were only a few months shy of efficiently supplying the vast number of troops in the field. The first evidence of a marked change in the Union's logistical ability emerged in the Chancellorsville Campaign's genesis, after the winter of 1862-63. 46 Accepting the notion that the Confederate armies were in rough shape logistically; it is important to note that the primary leadership in the field was acutely aware of the shortages. However, the unfolding opportunity demanded a military strike that outweighed logistical concerns. Therefore, an examination into the Federal system's shortcomings is necessary to show the benefits it offered toward the Confederacy. The United States Army in the Antebellum period contained roughly 15,000 men of all arms. Compared with an army of 600,000 men in 1862, it is understandable that there would be significant shortcomings and hurdles to overcome in a nation that, as a rule, did not trust professional armies nor want to foot the bill for one. Nevertheless, the North had a clear advantage when it came to industrialization and manufacturing. Over one million Northerners worked in industrial jobs, ten times more than their Southern counterparts. Furthermore, the North contained roughly 100,000 factories compared to the South's 20,000. 47 Yet, as already pointed out, the prewar army was tiny and supplied with uniforms and equipment solely from the Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia. Additionally, the arsenals producing firearms were limited, with all those existing in the South subsequently seized upon secession, having fewer firearms available to Northern regiments. 48 The North, therefore, would have to raise and equip an army 46 Stephen Sears, Chancellorsville, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996. 71-75 47 Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich, Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge, 2018. 174-175. 48 Joseph E. Chance, The Second Texas Infantry, From Shiloh to Vicksburg, Austin: Eakin Press, 1984. 16, 24. 21 primarily with outdated weapons and with an industrial system that wasn't geared toward war manufacturing. The North's only saving grace was its economic might. 49 Economically it is crucial to understand that the Union that won the war in 1865, was not the same financial institution nor economy in 1861 and 1862. It was in major part due to the Legal Tender Act of 1862 and the National Currency Act of 1863, that the North was able to pay for the sustainment of the war; yet it took time for these acts to take effect. Therefore, in 1862 financially, the North was undoubtedly at its weakest; many of the state and municipal banks, especially those in border states, had closed their doors, while millions of businesses and private civilians hoarded gold. 50 The Union was only able to field the armies it did in 1861-1862 because of its ability to pay for the conversion and development of machinery needed for equipment, weaponry, and uniforms while relying initially on its prewar militia. Faced with arming a massive army overnight, the United States was forced to arm many of its regiments with outdated firearms, such as the M-1842 Smoothbore musket, and the M-1816 Flintlocks that were converted to percussion, in addition to supplementing itself with foreign weapons, from Britain, Belgium, France, Austria, and others. These weapons except those from Britain, proved to be severely outdated compared to the technology available in the 1860s. The importance of recognizing the sub-standard firearms is their effectiveness on the battlefield and the potentiality of changing the outcome in a crucial moment in a battle. In an era of the rifled musket that was accurate from 250-300 yards, a typical smoothbore musket ranged from 80-100 yards. A significant portion of Federal troops were armed with outdated weapons in the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. A focus on any of the principal engagements in that time frame will show that regiments armed 49 McPherson, 442-445. 50 Nelson, 132-133. 22 with such weapons were in certain circumstances ineffective on the immediate tactical plane, and perhaps beneficial to their adversary. The disparity of weapons had begun to improve for the North in 1862; however, the infusion of nearly 300,000 volunteers during the summer of 1862 created a logistical gap once again. Many of the existing regiments in the army still shouldered outdated weapons, and now with legions of new men forming, these troops found themselves supplied with weapons that were unequal to the rigors of Civil War combat. Of this second wave of new recruits, the 12th New Jersey Volunteers serve as an excellent microcosm to examine the Union's logistical deficiencies in the rush to arm new recruits in 1862. Initially, the Jerseymen expected to receive the celebrated Enfield rifle; instead, they ended up with the inferior Austrian Lorenz, which was later exchanged in Washington for the equally outdated 1842 Springfield musket, although they saw this as an improvement over the detested Austrian rifle. 51 While every regiment's experience is different, the new wave and veterans alike in 1862 experienced some level of logistical deficiency that impacted their abelites on campaign or in battle. Aside from weapons, much of the equipment in the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the Ohio at the beginning of the Confederate offensives were at the end of its serviceable life span, due to months of active campaigning, and the inability to properly re-muster the army on a large scale because of the continuity of Confederate aggressiveness, which certainly affected their performance as a cohesive fighting force. Brigadier General Abner Doubleday who commanded a brigade at Second Manassas submitted requisitions to replace equipment and clothing just before the onset of the Maryland Campaign, noted in disgust: "owing to the great number [of other officers] making requisitions, mine were not filled and we were soon obliged to 51 Edward G. Longacre, To Gettysburg and Beyond: The Twelfth New Jersey Volunteer Infantry, II Corps, Army of the Potomac, 1862-1865, Hightstown: Longstreet House, 1988. 24. 23 take the field deficient in everything." 52 This sentiment was backed up by Captain James Wren of the IX Corps, who wrote that the men in his division "looked very bad, being Lousey, Dirty & Almost naked & worn out." 53 The soldiers in the Army of the Ohio were in equally if not worse shape. The vast distances covered by the Western Theater's armies created long supply lines, which fell victim to frequent raids from rebel cavalry. T.J. Wright of the 8th Kentucky Infantry noted in his diary that the Army of the Ohio was: "the hungriest, raggedest, tiredest, dirtiest, lousiest and sleepiest set of men the hardships of this or any other war ever produced." 54 While it is certain that the Confederates were in equally bad situations logistically, they had the benefit victory behind them in the east, and in Bragg's army's case, high morale. Another major struggle for the Federals in 1862 was the ability to get the supplies to its armies. The reason is not one specific aspect, but rather a compilation of bureaucracy, corruption, and lack of precedent to draw off. McClellan's army on the Peninsula had to be supplied from the sea, Pope in command of the Army of Virginia never took the time to ensure his troops had everything they needed, and Buell's army along with the rest of the western forces contended with long supply lines originating in Cairo Illinois, that were frequently raided by Confederate cavalry. The 16th Maine Infantry is a classic example of the suffering that occurred in a system that was outside its capabilities in 1862. The regiment's adjutant and historian Abner Small wrote: "How those men suffered! Hunger, daily felt, was nothing compared with it. Men of education, of refinement, and wealth, who willingly and cheerfully gave up home, with all its love and comfort, for country, made to feel degraded for want of clothing!" Small then describes 52 Hartwig, 137. 53 Ibid., 137. 54 Kenneth W. Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011. 89. 24 the horrendous conditions: "…without shelter, without overcoats, shoeless, hatless, and hundreds without blankets; and through all that long, sad, and weary tramp, we were jeered at, insulted, and called the "Blanket Brigade!" 55 While examples like this are on the extreme, the narrative fits when assessing the entire logistical picture of the Army of the Potomac in September 1862. The term logistics also dovetails into organizational tables. Aside from sharing similar shortcomings in the area of supply and outdated weaponry, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was by far the superior force in leadership, experience, and organization when compared with McClellan's force. By September 2, 1862, nearly 61 percent of Lee's infantry had fought in three or more major battles, and 81 percent fought in two or more. All of his 184 infantry regiments were veterans of at least one battle. Not only were Lee's regiments superior in this regard, but his brigade commanders were highly efficient as well. Twenty-seven of Lee's forty brigades were veterans of two or more major battles, while the remaining thirteen had fought in either the Seven Days or Second Manassas. On the divisional level, the highest official level of organization at that point for the A.N.V.; all of the eleven divisions had seen at least one battle. 56 The Union leadership backed this notion up as well. It was widely accepted, and a point still argued amongst historians, that the Southern fighting man was superior. This mythology has far back as the American Revolution corroboration has its roots in early Confederate victories, particularly at First and Second Manassas, the Shenandoah Valley, and the Seven Days battles. These victories generated an aura of invincibility around the Army of Northern Virginia that transcended into the minds of the Federal troops. 57 In fact Lee, true to form was in the first days of September 1862, the living epithet of Baron De Jomini's maxims, "the general should do 55 Abner Ralph Small, The Sixteenth Maine Regiment in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865. London: Forgotten Books, 2015. 38. 56 Joseph L. Harsh, Taken at the Flood Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Ashland: The Kent State University Press, 2013. 39-40 57 Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese", 88. 25 everything to electrify his own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he endeavors to repress his adversaries….in general, a cherished cause, and a general who inspires the confidence by previous success, are powerful means of electrifying an army and conducing to victory." 58 In contrast, McClellan's forces reformed into the Army of the Potomac, could not boast anything near the statistics of the Army of Northern Virginia could. September 1862 was the most disorganized and weakest the Army of the Potomac would find itself in the duration of the war. This school of thought canceled out, at least temporarily, any deficiencies faced by Lee's forces. When George B. McClellan rode out of Washington to take command, he found three very different organizations, each with its own command, divisional, brigade, artillery, cavalry, transportation, and quartermaster structures. Additionally, the newly formed regiments, many of whom were only a few weeks old, were rushed to the front and infused into the disorganized mess. Organizing these separate organizations into one effective command would weeks if not months, McClellan would be forced to do it in a matter of days, while in motion, in addition to planning a short-term strategy to deal with Lee. 59 The chaos of the reorganization is apparent in the 5th New York Volunteers' experience. Historian Brian Pohanka related an instance of the 5th as they passed McClellan on the march toward western Maryland: "As they marched, General McClellan reined up beside the troops of Warren's brigade. 'Well, and how is the Old Fifth this evening?' he asked. 'First rate, General, but we'd be better off if we weren't living so much on supposition." 60 Even though he had the bigger force, the disorganization and confusion associated with the rapidity of the Maryland Campaign denied the general his army's full might 58 Baron De Jomini, The Art of War, Translated by Capt. G.H. Mendell, and Lieut. W.P. Craighill, Radford: Wilder Publications, 2008. 30-31. 59 Hartwig, 133-136. 60 Brian C. Pohanka, Vortex of Hell: History of the 5th New York Volunteer Infantry. Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder Publications, 2012. 369. 26 on the battlefield. In different circumstances these obstacles may have been overcome had McClellan had time to prepare. Robert E. Lee sensed his enemy's weakness and used it as part of his foundation to seek permission from President Davis to invade Maryland. "The two grand armies of the United States that have been operating in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I understand 60,000 men have already been posted in Washington, are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field." 61 Lee identified that his logistical situation was terrible, however, he recognized the unfolding opportunity in front of him. "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. Still, we cannot not afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipment's, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. I am aware that the movement is attended with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible, and shall endeavor to guard it from loss." 62 The amount of stock Lee put into the Federals logistical organization is apparent. In fact, if taken as a whole, his reliance on the overall Federal weakness is one of his only justifications for his ill-supplied and smaller force to go on the offensive. Additionally, these logistical matters, both of his own and the Federal weakness, coincide directly with Lee's desire to deliver a decisive blow to the Federals quickly. There was not a better opportunity to do it and expect fruitful results, then while the Army of Potomac was at its weakest moment, structurally, organizationally, numerically, and logistically. 61 OR, vol 19, 1: 590-591. 62 Ibid., 590-591. 27 Lee's conclusion of the ill-preparedness of the new Union regiments applies not only to the troops in his sector but also to those in the Western Theater. Much like Lee's army within reach of Washington, Kirby Smith's small army in Kentucky created a panic and proved Lee's theory on the reliability of new soldiers. Kirby Smith successfully and thoroughly destroyed an equally sized Federal force of raw recruits at Richmond, Kentucky, on August 30, 1862, eliminating them from the military equation. Historian Kenneth Noe termed the battle of Richmond as "the most lopsided Confederate victory of the war, as Kirby Smith's men inflicted casualties so staggering that entire Union brigades ceased to exist." 63 With Smith's incursion into Kentucky, a vacuum of chaos erupted in the region, in particular, Ohio. The microcosm of Cincinnati infuses both the political and the serious logistical problems faced by the North in 1862. Historian Vernon Volpe pointed out, "Although the influx of [Union] volunteers was inspiring, with it came a shortage of arms, ammunition, and other equipment needed to outfit the troops properly." 64 This example was echoed across the entire Kentucky region in 1862. Although McClellan's army outnumbered Lee with a total of roughly 87,000 men, twenty percent of his infantry were raw, having been in the army just a handful of weeks and had not even come close to mastering the level of proficiency needed in drill and tactics to be effective on a Civil War battlefield. 65 Even though the Federals were able to put fresh regiments into the field, it became an issue of quantity versus quality. The unfortunate story of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers is a classic case in point of these raw troops' ineffectiveness. Arriving to the Army of the Potomac just a few days before the battle of Antietam, the men prepared to enter their first engagement on September 19 at Shepherdstown. Their regimental historian 63 Noe, Perryville, 39. 64 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 146. 65 Hartwig, 139. 28 wrote: "The teachings of the battalion-drill near Sharpsburg on the previous day [September 18] now had practical application." The 118th's Colonel stated in his official report that: "We returned their fire as fast as possible, but soon found that our Enfield rifles were so defective that quite one-fourth of them would not explode the caps." 66 The 118th's story, while extreme is not unique, another raw Federal regiment the 128th Pennsylvania found itself in an even worse circumstance, owing to its lack of training. The 128th Pennsylvania arrived at the army just days before as well and were assigned to the newly organized XII Corps, which itself contained some of the highest proportions of raw troops. During the battle of Antietam, the new regiment found itself in Miller's Cornfield and due lack of basic drill unable to maneuver itself back onto its brigade in the face of onrushing Confederates. Officers and sergeants from experienced neighboring outfits were sent to try and move the bewildered regiment all to no avail. In the end, the 128th was left to its fate and was nearly destroyed, having no effect on the enemy and only weakening their own brigades' position. 67 Stories similar in nature can be found across the Army of the Potomac on every sector of each battlefield during the Maryland Campaign, each in the midst of their own mishaps allowing the Confederates a level of superiority while hindering their supporting elements an opportunity to exploit any gains. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio experienced similar circumstances with green regiments as its eastern counterpart. In a letter to Kirby Smith, Bragg detailed his understanding that Buell's men were in rough shape and utterly demoralized. These circumstances, Bragg believed, offered the South a greater benefit of success. 68 The raw, ill-trained, ill-equipped, and completely unprepared 105th Ohio, 123rd Illinois, and 21st Wisconsin infantry regiments were 66 Survivors' Association 118th (Corn Exchange) Regt., P.V., History of the Corn Exchange Regiment 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers,62. 67 Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1994. 206. 68 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 16: Part 2. Correspondence, Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 754. 29 all glaring examples of this shortcoming. The 123rd Illinois found itself in a similar predicament as the 128th Pennsylvania at Antietam, exposed and on its own, and fell victim to veteran Confederate troops bearing down on them. The 105th Ohio, equally as green, found itself thrown into the breach in the midst of the 123rd Illinois collapse. Private Ayre of the 105th remarked: "…could not form into a proper line and after going through several maneuvers in order to do so we became mixed and confused." In similar fashion to the 123rd Illinois, the 105th Ohio was quickly stampeded by their Confederate attackers. 69 Much like the inferiority of outdated weapons, untrained, raw troops could not perform to a tactically sufficient level to keep par with the rapid pace and constantly changing conditions of a Civil War battlefield. While plenty of experienced units did exist in the Union armies, it is clear the inexperienced ones created more problems, affording the Confederate forces golden opportunities to exploit immediate tactical advantages they likely would not have had, had they been fighting experienced, or even trained troops. On the other side of the coin, the copious amounts of raw units severely hampered any notion gaining a decisive victory or rapidly following up a pursuit. This is evident in the in the results of Antietam and Perryville, both of which were Confederate tactical victories, and the speed at which Lee and Bragg's armies were pursued. The armies' organization is important when looking to understand the advantages and disadvantages and how this affected a particular side's likelihood of victory. The experience level and the amount of subpar weaponry in both the armies of the Potomac and Ohio was only one issue, their organizational structure in both leadership and how its units were grouped confounded their problems and offered the Confederates another edge over their opponent pushing the scale further in favor in the equation of obtaining a victory. As previously stated, the 69 Stuart W. Sanders, Maney's Confederate Brigade at the Battle of Perryville, Charleston: The History Press, 2014. 53-54. 30 Army of the Potomac during the Maryland Campaign was a conglomeration of several different organizations. It contained the II, V, and VI Corps the original Army of the Potomac, the re-designated I and XII Corps, the Army of Virginia, and the newly dubbed IX that had served on the North Carolina coast. Although there were certainly experienced troops and leaders in each of these components, they each spoke a different organizational "language." 70 George McClellan certainly had the most difficult task of any field commander regarding the organization of his army. Not only did he have three different organizations to mold together as a cohesive fighting force, but he also had the additional struggle of doing it on the fly in a military and national emergency. Therefore, although the Army of the Potomac was a potent fighting force, and managed to engage the Confederates, its capabilities in terms of operational effectiveness were severely limited. Buell's circumstances were much more appealing. His Army of the Ohio had remained intact as a cohesive fighting force since its formation; however, he received additional reinforcements from Grant, and a host of new regiments, diluting its effectiveness as an organization. The Army of the Ohio's real organizational issues manifested in the senior leadership's quirks, rivalries, and lack of cohesion. 71 The use of cavalry in both McClellan and Buell's forces paled in comparison to the South. This issue stemmed from the Federal government's inability to recognize the importance of that specific branch early in the conflict. Overwhelmingly, the cavalry found its commands broken apart and scattered across the army, acting in various guard and staff related duties. Those commands retained to perform the primary tasks of nineteenth-century, reconnaissance, screening, and raids were too few and spread out to have any significant impact on the outcome 70 Hartwig, 133-135. 71 Steven E. Woodworth, Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Vintage, 2005. 216. 31 of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. 72 Although they lacked in cavalry ability the Federals were unquestionably superior in artillery. Union guns, although far superior to that of the South were severely flawed organizationally in 1862. Circling back to the theme of different organizational structures in McClellan's force, the arrangement of this branch varied, causing communication issues, and leadership vacuums. In common with the cavalry, the prominent artillery structure in 1862 in both the Army of the Potomac and Army of the Ohio, lacked a unified system of command; instead, most batteries were the responsibility of brigade commanders or divisional commanders. Therefore, at critical moments batteries could only take orders from infantry commanders and were presented with the difficult task of coordinating mass firing on specific targets. 73 While it may seem trivial, such inefficiency in employment and "bureaucratic red tape" of military organization prevented the cavalry and artillery from performing at its maximum potential which no doubt contributed to the shortcomings of the Union armies in 1862. The Confederate military organization also had its flaws; however, as previously noted, the experience level of Confederate forces as a whole were much higher and able to adapt to a situation more efficiently. Partly this had to do with the smaller size of the forces overall, and the Confederate authorities' choice to disperse recruits and conscripts across seasoned units rather than raise new organizations. The cavalry of J.E.B. Stuart, John Hunt Morgan, and Nathan Bedford Forrest for instance were vastly superior to their Federal counterparts in every respect. These commands were led well, centralized, and overall contained extremely efficient horsemen, which had proven themselves time and again on the battlefield. 74 Confederate artillery was 72 Hartwig, 155-158. 73 Curt Johnson and Richard C. Anderson, Jr., Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. 53; Daniel, 146, 148-150. 74 Hartwig, 88-90; Hess, Banners to the Breeze, 24. 32 generally inferior in respect to quality of mechanics, yet, the branch retained a slight advantage over its foes in its organization. Lee's artillery was organized on the divisional level, allowing for easier deployment, and concentrated fire, as the Army of Northern Virginia, did not have a corps structure during this time, division commanders held greater authority in placement and employment of artillery. Furthermore, several groups of divisions fell under an unofficial "wing" structure, allowing Jackson and Longstreet to concentrate guns further. 75 Bragg organized his army different than Lee's army. Bragg operated with two wings or corps, broken down into several divisions. His army maintained an organized and effective cavalry force; however, their weakest point was the artillery. Only fifty-six guns accompanied the Army of Mississippi into Kentucky compared to Buell's 147 guns. These Confederate guns like the Federals were assigned to individual brigades, same as its Federal counterpart, eliminating opportunities to converge fire effectively. 76 Understanding the organizational structure of an army allows for a realistic understanding of what that force is capable of; how it moves in the larger scheme of a campaign; and the benefits and challenges of its employment on the tactical level. Assuming the forces involved were all organized in the same fashion, with identical structures is detrimental in interpreting the ebb and flow of battles and campaigns. A clear picture of how a field army operates through an organizational table is, therefore, paramount. Using Lee and McClellan as examples illustrate the nature of this point. In the Maryland Campaign, Lee was able to give more direct orders to independent division commanders, therefore reducing somewhat the natural confusion begot of transferring and disseminating orders through multiple tiers of officers. On the other hand, McClellan had to give orders to "wing" commanders, who then cut the orders to corps 75 Johnson, Artillery Hell, 41-47. 76 Noe, 370-373, 381-382. 33 commanders then down to the divisional level, doubling the amount of personalities the orders had to go through compared to Lee's forces. It is clear from watching the battles of Antietam and Perryville's tactical evolution that the commanding generals' intent was time and again ineffectually carried out due to communication breakdown and misinterpretation of orders on both sides. Having only scratched the surface of the organizational components of only four of the principal armies involved in the fall of 1862, it becomes clear that each differed in how it chose to conduct its internal operations. However, it is equally apparent from this brief examination, that Confederate forces in the fall of 1862 were better organized and tactically more efficient than their Federal counterparts in Maryland and Kentucky, therefore lending an edge to overall Confederate success and perhaps victory. Strategic Considerations: The strategic components are unquestionably the most important when ascertaining why the fall of 1862 was the Confederacy's high tide. Having looked at the political, logistical, and organizational components and internalizing how each affected the grand design of Confederate strategy in 1862, this section will now tie these components together and shed light on how each influenced strategic decision and guided the final results of the campaigns. A clear understanding of what strategy is necessary to further examine this section. Clausewitz defines strategy as: "the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the War." 77 The "attainment of the object" is the crucial cog in accepting the purpose and direction of operations in Maryland and Kentucky. The strategic composition of these campaigns was different in what they sought to obtain as their achievable goal. Lee's objective was political in its foundation; his 77 Clausewitz, 133. 34 campaign didn't revolve around the occupation of land or control of any specific feature; instead, it sought a climactic battle with a decisive battlefield victory in which Lee was willing to risk his army in a desperate gamble. 78 Bragg and Smith's Kentucky incursions were much more multilayered on an operational platform. While some sort of showdown battle was necessary for the west, it was not the immediate goal, only a potentiality; instead, the relief and re-establishment of Tennessee was paramount with a secondary objective of the "liberation" of Kentucky. The second tier of goals included the control of rail and river systems as a means to eliminate the Union's ability to supply its forces and occupy any portion of the Upper or Deep South. The most significant strategic gain for the South in 1862 existed in Tennessee and Kentucky. Proof of this importance is shown through the fact that six of the seven Confederate field armies would make this region their primary objective in the fall of 1862. These six armies included the commands of Generals' Braxton Bragg, Kirby Smith, Earl Van Dorn, Stirling Price, William Loring, and Humphrey Marshall. Confederate control and or occupation of Tennessee and Kentucky offered benefits and a platform for victory that the remaining Confederate states collectively couldn't offer. Having been the first state to fall under Federal control, Tennessee's recapture would be a major morale boost for the Confederacy nationally and particularly to the large amount of Tennessee regiments that made up Bragg's army. The most significant benefit, however, resided in Tennessee's industrial capability, as it contained the ability to produce more raw items for the war effort then the rest of the Confederacy combined. 79 Confederate control 78 Harsh, 25; OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 79 Connelly. 5-15. The importance of Tennessee to the Confederacy is undeniable. Connelly argues that the region was the largest concentrated area for the production of war materials in the Confederacy. The region by 1864 had produced 22,665 pounds niter. Additionally, the area contained a significant source of lead, and was the chief producer of gunpowder in 1861. Tennessee also contained a vast number of factories that repaired old weapons, manufactured new small arms, cartridges, percussion caps, and other equipment. By the fall of 1861, Nashville plants alone turned out 100,000 percussion caps daily, with some 1,300,000 caps produced weekly. The region boasted on the two major Confederate sources of livestock, the other being 35 would, therefore, help in stabilizing the struggling logistical and economic constraints faced in the South. Additionally, the state's rail system would allow for the re-establishment of a direct connection to North Carolina and Virginia and the ability to ship supplies and material to the Confederate forces in the east. Conversely, the loss of Tennessee would be a major blow to Union morale, as its loss would have undone and nullified the Federal campaigns in 1861 and early 1862. 80 Kentucky also offered significant gains for the South. It was generally believed, particularly by the Confederate government's higher echelons, that the majority of Kentuckians were sympathetic to the Southern cause and would rally to Confederate banners if field armies were able to move into the region and strategically hold it. Logistically Kentucky offered a substantial increase for the South, particularly in animals, forage, and transportation options. Like Tennessee, Kentucky contained major river systems and rail lines that would drastically increase movement for the South and partially cut off the mid-west states from the rest of the Union. Politically, Kentucky, a vital border state under Confederate control, could be crippling to Northern domestic and foreign political views. In theory, this political aspect played on a successful campaign in Maryland, another vital border state. More immediately, Kentucky offered the western Confederate armies an opportunity to turn the war from one of defense to one poising them on the edge of invasion of critical Northern states, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. Such a turn in the circumstances would be devastating for the Union, particularly politically. The Illinois town of Cairo on the Mississippi River, in 1862 was serving as the logistical launch point for the Union armies in the west; prolonged Confederate control of Kentucky would likely force the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia. More pork was raised in Tennessee save Missouri than any other state. Agriculturally, Middle Tennessee in 1860 produced an average of more than a million bushels of corn making it a leader amongst its sister states. 80 Connelly, 3-6. 36 the Federals to find an alternative method of supplying the troops in Corinth and other points in the Southern heartland. As long as the Federals controlled these regions, they would continue to pin the Confederacy in the Deep South denying them of access to vital infrastructure, maneuvering room, and favorable victory conditions. Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith had to go on the offensive if they were to alleviate the situation by the very nature of the circumstances. As Lee's army with Richmond, their backs were on the doorstep of the Deep South, and they had no room to maneuver. Fortunately for the South, the western offensive was born out of an opportune moment of Halleck's caution that was strategically seized upon by Confederate commanders. In the necessity of the moment, launching an offensive like Lee during the Seven Days battles was the only beneficial option and a necessary risk if the war was going to be taken off the doorstep of the Deep South. Robert E. Lee on the other end of things saw himself and his army as the most important entity in the Confederacy at that moment. In his mind, the only scenario for Confederate victory rested in his hands alone. He showed this belief in dispatches and letters throughout the campaign in an effort to orchestrate movements across the Confederacy to complement his objective. In a letter to Jefferson Davis, he noted his desire to see his suggestion on what he felt Loring's command should do in the Kanawha Valley, in an effort to support his operation. 81 Lee did not stop with Loring; however, days prior, he communicated his victory at Manassas and planned offensive to Braxton Bragg and requested that Bragg pass the information along to Kirby Smith for further coordination. It was Lee's desire that these western armies gain similar victories to his at Manassas, that when added together may be enough to secure Southern 81 OR, vol 19, 1: 594. 37 victory.82 Lastly, he demonstrated his understanding of the confused state of Federal forces in Washington and the need to seize the initiative before the opportunity was lost. Like Kentucky, Maryland was a vital border state, not for its potentiality in resources, but rather for its geographic relation to Washington. Any serious Confederate incursion into the state would be life-threatening to the Union, and therefore demanded desperate measures on the part of Northern armies to repel such an advance. 83 Lee's leadership has been often criticized during the Maryland Campaign from historians and even shocked his subordinates, Jackson, and Longstreet. 84 Lee was certainly aggressive and was known for taking risks; however, he was not a foolish man, and never committed his army to a disaster, at least not one he foresaw. Comparing his stratagem throughout the rest of the war, it's probable to conclude that his movements were well thought out, with the least amount of risk generated from the objective demands of the campaign. Even in moments of reaction to McClellan, Lee always retained the initiative in Maryland. In the aftermath of Seconded Manassas and Chantilly, it was the opinion of many in both military and civilian leadership that a final showdown somewhere north of the Potomac River was all that was needed for Confederate victory. 85 If Lee was a poker player, he was taking his hand and going all in, he could only hope the Federals floundered. General Longstreet understood the gravity of the moment when he wrote: "When the Second Bull Run campaign 82 OR, vol 19, 1: 589. 83 Ezra A. Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I: South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 19-21. Carman was present at the battle of Antietam and dedicated his life to research and study of the Maryland Campaign in the post war years. Carman's work was able to capture not only the historical timeline of events, but offered an emotional aspect not seen in other works. This emotional component while subtle is an important tool in internalizing the mindset of Union soldiers and perhaps the North itself. 84 James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 265. Longstreet claims that aside from himself, that General Jackson was also taken back from the boldness of Lee's designs on the Maryland Campaign, while at a meeting in Frederick MD, September 9th. 85 Harsh, 60-63. Multiple historians have agreed on this point. James Murfin considered the battle of Antietam to be the most important battle in American history, and one of the most decisive in world history. Ezra Carman portrays the campaign as requiring desperate action for the North, while Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears and James McPherson center on the political undertone. 38 closed, we had the most brilliant prospects the Confederates ever had. We then possessed an army which, had it been kept together, the Federals would never have dared attack." 86 Lee's confidence in his army was surely the determining factor in his choice to assume the offensive into Maryland, and no doubt behind his reasoning to push the army as hard as he did in the maneuvering and fighting that took place in Maryland. The General expressed his confidence in the men and the importance of the offensive in General Order No. 102. on September 4: "This army is about to engage in most important operations." He further outlines the necessity of respecting private property, and the desire for his commands to lighten their supply encumbrance to allow them to move quickly and efficiently. 87 When coupling the logistical and organizational shortcomings, the political factors reinforced by his troops' confidence and his in them proved to be the energy from which the Maryland Campaign was executed. The offensives themselves presented each of these commanders a complicated set of obstacles and decisions to overcome while ensuring they offered the best possible benefit to their cause with the least amount of risk towards their army. This is certainly one of the most challenging aspects of being a commander in charge of any offensive-minded campaign. Johnston at Shiloh, Burnside at Fredericksburg, Hooker at Chancellorsville, and Hood in Tennessee all failed to capitalize on this principle. The fact that Lee and Bragg achieved the scale of operational measures they did is a testament to their leadership and ability to seize control and direction of a developing situation. If the argument is to be maintained that the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns provided the South the best chance the South had of winning the war, then proof of this claim must lay within the strategic composition of the campaigns themselves. If taken in this context, then it must be understood that every move Lee, Bragg, and 86 Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 263. 87 OR, vol 16, 2: 592. 39 Smith, along with the supporting roles of Loring, Marshall, Price, and Van Dorn were calculated if not on a grand scale, certainly on an individual level. Unlocking the purpose of the maneuvers, and their relation to strategic success will illustrate the continually changing dynamics and environment of each campaign, and how these generals continually altered their designs to fit the goals of their strategic objectives. The evolving strategic situation in the months leading up to the campaigns created the conditions under which the operations in Maryland and Kentucky were governed. Understanding the Confederate forces' strategic focus for needing to assume the offensive will outline the gravity and weight they placed on the outcome of these fall campaigns. The most measurable strategic potential in 1862 existed in the Western Theater. As already stated, the economic and logistical importance of this region necessitated an aggressive action on behalf of the South if the Confederacy was to survive. The first attempt at recovering control of Tennessee occurred in April with the battle of Shiloh. While tactically a Confederate failure, the aftermath of the fighting created adverse reactions from the Northern press and transposed into Halleck's overall cautious and slow pursuit towards Corinth. Halleck, after taking Corinth, was faced with limited choices on where to move next. Due to political and doctrinal restrictions of conciliation and Halleck's theory on war, the massive Union army was not able logistically to move into the Deep South. The only real move available to the Federal forces in the summer of 1862, was a lateral one east towards Chattanooga. 88 With Bragg at Tupelo and Kirby Smith's small command at Chattanooga, the path of success for an aggressive officer to take Chattanooga, a major supply hub for the South, was wide open. Halleck foiled this opportunity by sending Buell's command to accomplish the task. The slow-moving cautious Buell initially created consternation among 88 Daniel, 86. 40 Confederate leadership, yet once the pace of his progress was realized, the same trepidation turned into an opportunity. 89 Clausewitz described the potential for a reciprocal effect to take place should an army go on the offensive; however, he counterweighs that thought with pointing out that an army in a precarious position with the opportunity to gain a substantial amount should jump on the opportunity if one should be presented. 90 Certainly, Bragg and Smith applied a variation of this maxim into their decision to go on the advance. The term "invasion" is the defining ideology that bound both major theaters of war and other Confederate objectives in the fall of 1862. Clausewitz wrote that even if the complete overthrow of the enemy is impossible, which it was for the Confederacy, then the only other real option of winning a war is to conquer a portion of the enemy territory. In conquering the enemy territory, the invader has the opportunity to weaken the enemy's resources, crippling their ability to sustain an army. By carrying the war in enemy territory, the conditions will further the enemy's expense and ultimately lead to peace negotiations. 91 The term "invasion" generates a delicate question concerning what an invasion actually is, and how it fits into the American context, particularly in the political spectrum in 1862. Baron De Jomoni, whose military maxims were dominant in nineteenth-century America, distinguished what an "invasion" actually is. Breaking down the idea of an offensive, he wrote that: "…an invasion occurs against a great state whose whole or significant portion of territory is attacked. If only a province or moderate line of defense is attacked, then it is an offensive, and if such actions are limited only to a confined operation, then it is termed an initiative." 92 Indeed then, if taken in this context, 89 Connelly, 200-201. 90 Clausewitz, 707. 91 Clausewitz, 706. Neither of the primary Confederate armies had the ability to "conquer" Federal territory. However, the last part in reference to Clausewitz maxim was the adaptation applied by the Confederacy in its strategic goals. 92 Jomini, The Art of War, 54. The difference in the definition in understanding the purpose of the Confederate objective is critical. Many historians point to the Army of Northern Virginia's strategic goals as fitting into the framework of an 41 Confederate efforts militarily were an offensive and an invasion only in the political spectrum. Although the press and even the top military minds used the term invasion quite frequently in the North, there is nothing in the Confederate strategic framework of 1862, that fit the definition of invasion, Lee himself in a letter to Jefferson Davis on September 4, used the term expedition implying that his foray had a specific purpose and would be short. 93 Due to logistics alone, Confederate forces across the board could not sustain the long-term goals of an invasion. However, the Clausewitzian maxim of a "strategical attack" was within reach and achievable according to the conditional logistical framework. Much of the success for the Confederates relied on the superiority of its troops, and the avoidance of exhausting itself with an over achievement of objectives. 94 The window of opportunity was narrow, operationally because of logistics, but more importantly, because of politics. The two most significant benefits afforded to the Southern cause in 1862 were the Congressional fall elections and European superpowers. If Confederate forces could score a major political victory in the east, and both a strategic reversal coupled with a political coup in the west, then perhaps Northern voters would come to resent the war and vote for "Peace Democrats" in November, and more advantageously draw England and France in as mediators or some other influential role, to end the war. It is apparent that the pressure to act decisively if not at least aggressively before November was of paramount importance. While it is debated as to how far the European powers would intercede, what is certain is that the Confederacy banked part of its strategic decisions both politically and militarily on intervention. 95 Just as apparent was the frustration and delicate invasion, yet when looking at that particular army's logistics and Lee's strategic goals only the Jominian maxim of offensive fits the framework. 93 OR, vol 16, 2: 591-592. 94 Clausewitz, 601. 95 McPherson, 534-535. 42 statesmanship which had to be executed on behalf of the Union to convince the English mainly that the war was nothing more than a rebellion that the Republic could put down on its own. 96 However, this did not appear to be the scene in the late summer of 1862 with Union defeats and setbacks continually piling up. Lee retained the initiative by keeping the enemy guessing what his next move and true objective was. According to Henry McClellan, J.E.B. Stuart's adjutant, that as late as September 13, Federal forces maintained the: "utmost uncertainty regarding Lee's movements and intentions." 97 Lee designed his army's movements to draw out the Federals from Washington. By crossing at Leesburg, his army was initially east of the Catoctin Mountains and a direct threat to Washington and Baltimore, it was this crossing point that directly forced the disorganized Army of the Potomac to leave the defenses prematurely, and more importantly to force Lincoln's hand in placing McClellan back in overall command. 98 The key to the Army of Northern Virginia's movements was speed and mobility, thus the reasoning for Lee's series of orders, which included provisions for shoeless Confederates to remain at Winchester, a lightening of supplies, and an insistence that straggling be strictly forbidden. Lee's next major objective after crossing the Potomac River was to move on Frederick. A Confederate presence in a substantial pro-Union area was a direct insult to the North, and would only further press the Army of the Potomac to hurry faster in order to "repel the invasion" and "save the nation"; while most importantly for the Confederates, continually limit the progress of McClellan organizing his army into a capable force on the battlefield. 96 Nelson, 163-168. 97 H.B. McClellan, The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J.E.B. Stuart: Commander of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia, Edison: The Blue & Grey Press, 1993. 113. 98 Harsh, 98; OR, vol 16, 2: 604-605. Letter from Lee to Davis on September 12 justifying is reasoning for crossing his army east of the mountains. 43 Lee's grand strategy was working so far; his movements northward from Richmond had stripped the Atlantic states of their Union occupiers to concentrate on Lee's Confederate force, while at the same time sending the Federal strategy of war into complete chaos as they scrambled to deal with the offensive. Lee believed that if he launched an unrelenting offensive, the Federals would be compelled to abandon their widely scattered smaller campaigns, which were gradually eating away the frontiers of the Confederacy; and, as a result, be forced to concentrate their columns in response to his initiatives. 99 Lee's movement into the western part of the state, via Frederick and into the Middleton and Pleasant valleys, opened the Shenandoah Valley up momentarily, which assisted Loring's advance in western Virginia, by isolating the small Federal commands in that region. In addition to freeing up Loring to make an offensive, Lee's army in western Maryland split the Federal war effort in half. The Army of the Potomac was now confined in environs around Washington, while Federal forces in the Western Theater had no direct route to reinforce McClellan. 100 The simultaneous advance of Lee, Loring, Marshall, Smith, and Bragg effectively drove a wedge between the Union field armies, while Price and Van Dorn's forces kept Grant fixed at Corinth. 101 Bragg and Smith's columns made their march through eastern and middle Tennessee and into Kentucky at an incredible speed, leaving Buell's army to have to hustle to catch up. 102 Kirby Smith realized the opportunity in front of him early on and moved his men forward roughly the same time Lee's men were preparing to destroy John Pope's forces near Manassas, beginning the Kentucky Campaign. Union Brigadier General George W. Morgan's command held the vital Cumberland Gap, which historian Earl Hess christened the "Gibraltar of the West." 99 Harsh, 116. 100 Hartwig, 162-163. 101 Harsh, 96-97; Hess, 31-35. 102 Hess, 57,62,64. 44 The Gap itself served as a platform for the Federals to invade East Tennessee, and as long as it remained in Federal hands, the Deep South, particularly Chattanooga and Atlanta, would be under constant threat. 103 Reducing this garrison was the first lynchpin in breaking Federal control and regaining Tennessee for the South. Smith, now free to maneuver feinted around the gap and threatened the supply lines, forcing a Federal withdrawal; he then turned his legions northward and moved into Kentucky. Smith moved through the eastern part of the state and pushed Heth's division as far as Covington, directly across from Cincinnati, sending that city and southern Ohio into a panic. 104 With Smith's small army running almost unmolested in Kentucky, Bragg's larger army moved through Middle Tennessee via Sparta feinting towards Nashville, forcing the Federals to concentrate there, while strategically widening the gap between Buell's command and Southern forces in Kentucky. Bragg, before departing to Chattanooga, left behind roughly 35,000 men in two separate commands under generals Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. These commands had a twofold objective. Their primary objective was to contain the Army of the Tennessee at Corinth, and once Bragg and Smith were in position, launch an offensive of their own against Grant, defeat him, and then rapidly march to connect with Bragg's army. 105 Bragg and Smith exposed the weakness in the Federal policy of limited war with its preoccupation of taking landmarks and reliance on cumbersome supply lines and within less than a months' time-reversed almost a year of Union progress in the west, in respect to subjugating the Upper South. Unlike John Bell Hood's offensive into Tennessee in late 1864, which, while certainly an emergency, did not deviate Sherman from his plans of marching to the sea. 106 In 103 Hess, 7-8. 104 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 141. 105 Noe, 29. 106 Eric A. Jacobson and Richard A. Rupp, For Cause and for Country: A Study of the Affair at Spring Hill and the Battle of Franklin, Eric A. Jacobson, 2013. 42. 45 1862, this simply was impossible for Federal forces. Sherman operated under a "hard war" doctrine that allowed him to subsist off the land and changed his objective from key city centers to making war on the Southern people, through the destruction of their local economy, food subsistence, and ability subsist in a normal capacity. 107 Sherman effectively narrowed the war to the immediate doorstep of the Southern People. As a result the individual citizen was forced to deal with their own survival, and naturally the bigger picture of the Confederacy became less important. Union forces in 1862 did not have the same conditional framework, and by default, would be forced to pursue any Confederate force and meet it on the battlefield. Even though the fall of 1862 didn't produce the hoped-for victory conditions, strategically, the Confederates were more successful in this period than at any other part of the war. The results of this success were more apparent in the Western Theater than in the east. However, certain components in the Eastern Theater changed as well. The most significant measurable success emerged in time bought for the Confederacy, and a prolonged timetable for the Northern plan of war. In the summer, Federal plans in the west called for the capture of Vicksburg and Chattanooga, the latter of which was in progress when the offensive started. 108 It is highly probable that if able, the Federal forces would have moved on Vicksburg in the summer of 1862, and perhaps forced its capitulation much sooner. 109 However, this is only speculation, yet, the reality is this operation was certainly delayed by the events that occurred in Kentucky and the aggressive nature of Price and Van Dorn. Kentucky was only one variable in stymieing the Federal drive toward Vicksburg. Just as important were the aggressiveness of Price and Van Dorn at the battles of Iuka and Corinth in October. Although Confederate defeats, the outcome of 107 Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 321-328. 108 McPherson, 511-512. 109 Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 243-244. 46 these battles managed to temporarily check the Federals, prompting an end to any realistic campaign season in Mississippi. At least for the foreseeable future, the Mississippi River remained open by way of Vicksburg, and Union strategy incomplete, in which case was Price and Van Dorn's big contribution. 110 Bragg and Smith failed to hold Kentucky and or convert her into a Confederate state. However, as the logistic concerns show, the state's complete occupation, with the available forces, was genuinely impossible. In all the engagements that had taken place, the Southerners had the better day. Kirby Smith's army completely routed Federal forces at Richmond in August, and Bragg's army captured the garrison at Munfordville. Before and during the campaign John Hunt Morgan's cavalry had wreaked havoc in Kentucky, capturing supplies, disrupting communications, and pushing to the Ohio River virtually unchallenged. 111 Even Kentucky's principle battle at Perryville was the better day tactically for the Confederates. More than anything, Kentucky showed the weakness of Buell, limited war, and the Union's inability to protect vital territory adequately under a conciliation policy. While in the end Bragg and Smith left, they did so generally unmolested, which showed Buell's unwillingness to fight another pitched battle. Therefore, this aftermath was certainly nothing for the Union to be proud of. In truth Buell did not drive Bragg and Smith out of Kentucky, rather the limitations of logistics and the realization of strategic objectives forced the Confederates back to Tennessee. 112 Although Braxton Bragg is surrounded by much controversy and sharp opinions on his leadership capabilities, one must look past emotion and see the facts as they present in the strategic element. While indeed, the Confederates failed to hold Kentucky, they did succeed in 110 Woodworth, 239-240. 111 Hess, 12. 112 Noe, 333. 47 regaining portions of Tennessee. In particular, Middle Tennessee by way of Murfreesboro, which sat astride the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and was seen as the key to the wealthy Stone, Duck, and Elk River valleys. 113 Historian Thomas Connelly pointed out, which was already previously noted, that Tennessee was by far the most critical state in terms of manufacturing to the South. Although the entire state wasn't in Confederate hands, over two-thirds of it was, and most importantly, the opportunity to secure the very vital Nashville and Mississippi River corridor remained a possibility for a future campaign. 114 The primary focal point in the interpretation of the Kentucky Campaign is the Confederate failure to remain within that state. However, the key phrase narrows down to opportunity and potential. If taken in this context, the Confederate forces in July were backed into a corner. However, come October, these same forces had managed to throw the Federal forces off balance and regain a significant portion of lost territory, changing the entire atmosphere and flow of the Western Theater. In short, the success of the Kentucky Campaign is that it allowed the Confederates to move from the verge of defeat to a position where the fate of the Western Theater was up in the air, which only a decisive campaign would bring to a conclusion. 115 The fall of 1862 was the last chance the Confederates had at securing Tennessee permanently during the war. While the Western Theater was more significant in terms of strategic gain and leverage, the Eastern Theater added its own momentous shift in the flow of events. Unlike the west, the Eastern Theater was very narrow, as it existed in the space between Richmond and Washington. In strategic terms, the region was harrowing regarding maneuvering room and logistical sustainment. In one sense, Lee and his army were successful in pushing the Army of the Potomac 113 Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, Chicago: University of Illinois, 1990. 8. 114 Connelly, 16-22. 115 Cozzens, No Better Place to Die, 12-14; Hess, 116. 48 away from the gates of Richmond, along with wrecking the Army of Virginia, while lastly temporarily clearing the smaller theaters, such as the coast and Shenandoah Valley of Federal forces. 116 While this situation may have provided an opportunity in the west, it meant little or nothing in the east. The fact is, Lee understood his primary objective either consisted of breaking the Northern will to fight through battlefield victory or by the complete destruction of the Union army. 117 Lee's primary objective in Maryland was to bate the Federal forces into a showdown fight. He was successful in this mission by just crossing over the Potomac River. The location of Washington in the southern portion of Maryland across from Alexandria made an incursion in Maryland a threat for the Federal government. 118 Unlike the west, where a fair amount of effort was required for Bragg and Smith to march their armies the distance required to Kentucky, the Army of Northern Virginia did not have to move far to accomplish its mission. Another key component to Lee's strategic objective was the lack of overhead in its long-term goal. Unlike the Western Theater, there was no pressure for Lee to specifically secure any particular region, as the Confederacy in the east had not lost any of its production capabilities nor any significant amount of land to Federal occupation. Therefore, the Confederate movements' direction wasn't necessarily guided by a specific purpose, but rather by the necessity of strategic gains which were designed to draw out the Army of the Potomac in a state of haste and unpreparedness. However, whereas the Kentucky Campaign had different aspects of measurable success, the 116 Harsh, 19-20. 117 Murfin, 63-64. 118 Harsh, 23; Murfin, 36-40; McPherson, 555-556. All the major historians who focus on the Maryland Campaign point to this as a major component to deterring the outcome and purpose of Lee's strategy. 49 Maryland Campaign had none, only a single purpose that demanded a climactic clash to determine its outcome. 119 At no other point in the war did Lee have such an advantage and control of the initiative. Arguably, his combination of subordinate officers was the best in their position as a whole than at any other point. His army was operating off a long track of victory, the length of which they would not experience again. 120 And most importantly, the Maryland Campaign was truly the only time in which Lee would have direct control of the flow of events; in Richmond, he had acted out of desperation, in Northern Virginia, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the Overland Campaign and Petersburg he counteracted his opponents moves, and at Gettysburg, he committed to a battle that was dictated by the Federals. In September of 1862, Lee was the composer of the campaign and the master of ceremonies, he and he alone decided when and where the climactic battle would be fought. 121 All too often, the argument arises that the Army of the Potomac moved quicker than Lee expected, and caught him off guard, forcing him to settle and fight an unprepared battle at Sharpsburg. This theory would make sense if Lee's strategic objectives were multilayered like Bragg or Smith. Nevertheless, this theory doesn't match up to his sole objective of a decisive engagement. As seen with logistical circumstances, Hagerstown was likely the limit for the army in terms of range, Lee, therefore, had decided to make the principle stand somewhere in that area. 122 Two factors make this apparent, the choice to reduce Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg, which are necessary for military doctrine, and the choice to have the army lay around Frederick 119 OR, vol 16, 2: Correspondence between Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, September 8, 1862; Harsh, 119; Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy, 139. 120 Hartwig, 126-127. 121 Harsh, 57-59. 122 Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I ,108-111; Harsh, 190; Hartwig, 116-117; Murfin, 113. All of these sources for reasons ranging from realistic logistical concerns to Lee's strategic initiative point towards the area of Hagerstown as the realistic goal of the Confederate offensive. 50 for several days. 123 If the plan had been to fight somewhere else or keep the Federals at a distance, these two factors fit the mold. The truth is that Lee wanted a fight, and he wanted it quick, the geography of Western Maryland affords a great opportunity to a defending army, which was Lee's primary tactical vision. 124 Looking at the scope of the Army of Northern Virginia's movements in the campaign, there a few abundantly clear facts that warrant Lee's strategic designs. It's already been stated that Lee's intention was to draw out the Army of the Potomac, which he did by simply crossing into Maryland, and ushered the emergency by crossing east of the mountains. 125 The next key was the layover or taunting of the Federals by having his army remain in Frederick for several days. The decision to reduce the Harpers Ferry garrison, while militarily necessary, also doubly acted as part of the "national emergency" which further put pressure on McClellan and his army to move with haste. 126 The battle of South Mountain, while a Confederate defeat, opened the way for the Federals to move over the range and meet Lee on the ground of his choosing. 127 South Mountain is interesting, particularly for strategic reasons. The choice to leave one division under D.H. Hill to hold the three passes stretched over ten miles indicates that Lee didn't intend to stop the Federals there and expected them to take the position. A decisive battle along the South Mountain range would not have been beneficial for Lee to meet his objectives. His army would not have been able to counterattack effectively due to terrain, and maneuvering room would have been limited. Although Lee initially considered scrapping the campaign due to the longer than expected siege of Harpers Ferry, once the garrison did fall, he was able to 123 Harsh, 147-150; Hartwig, 211-212, OR, vol 16, 2, 603 (Special Orders 191) 605-608. 124 Allan, 201-205; Harsh, 98-99; Marshall, 148-150. 125 Marshall, 146. 126 Brian Matthew Jordan, Unholy Sabbath: The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory September 14, 1862, New York: Savas Beatie, 2012. 80-85. 127 Jordon, Unholy Sabbath, 301. 51 concentrate his forces in the area of Sharpsburg. 128 It may not be that Lee specifically wanted to fight at Sharpsburg, but the lay of the land and the tactical and strategic components of it, offered natural terrain on which to fight a decisive battle. 129 The Antietam battlefield offered several very strong defensive opportunities. First was the Antietam Creek, which was wide and deep enough to stop infantry from crossing unless over a bridge. The terrain, particularly on the southern end of the battlefield, is very suitable for a defending force, along with the ground near the center of the battlefield. On the northern end, the terrain is its weakest for defense; however, the entire battlefield, especially the northern end, is very suitable for artillery employment. Lee's position at Antietam Creek was without question formidable. 130 Whereas the events in Kentucky were one of maneuver, Maryland hinged on the tactical climax. Therefore, both forces needed to clash and soundly defeat the other to end the campaign. The battle of Antietam itself ended in a draw, and the opposing lines virtually remained the same. 131 Having realized the day after the engagement that McClellan wasn't likely to attack again, and understanding that his position offered no benefits for his army to attack, Lee promptly withdrew back into Shepherdstown, Virginia, (West Virginia) intending to regroup his army and re-crossing the Potomac River near Williamsport to again sue for a decisive battle. The Confederate's were blocked by several determining factors though, the two primary factors being McClellan's choice to move the VI Corps north towards Hagerstown to block a crossing, and a large amount of straggling that has taken place since the start of the 128 Allan, 320. 129 Harsh, 301-303. 130 Phillip Thomas Tucker, Burnside's Bridge: The Climatic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000. 47-54. 131 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. 2: Antietam. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 501. 52 campaigning that had severely reduced Lee's army from upwards of 70,000 men down to roughly 45,000. 132 While Lee did not thrash McClellan's army at Antietam to the extent his strategic objectives called for, the opportunity for a Confederate political victory was not entirely gone. In fact, Lee's offensive convinced Britain and France that Northern armies could never restore the Union, and they contemplated mediation, which would have constituted de facto recognition of the Confederacy. 133 Moving away from the narrow view of Lee and Maryland it is important to note that Bragg's army had achieved a significant victory on September 17 at Munfordville the same day the battle of Antietam was raging. While Lee's army was more or less locked in a stalemate in Maryland, the western Confederate forces still very much retained the initiative in Kentucky. If a successful outcome in Kentucky occurred, perhaps that would be enough to enhance the stalemate at Antietam into a negative outcome for the Union. 134 Lee did not wait in position along Antietam Creek, for events to develop in Kentucky, he didn't have to. By simply moving back across the river and McClellan's inability to pursue for logistical reasons, Lee still very much posed a serious threat, especially with re-crossing into Maryland if need be. Looking at the outcome of the Maryland Campaign and the factors involved in the forces' genetic composition, Lee's army achieved all that could reasonably be expected of it. Certainly, due to its size, it would be impossible to annihilate the Army of the Potomac, yet, by remaining together and gaining the tactical victory, that would have to be enough. 135 132 Murfin, 306. 133 McPherson, 546. 134 Earl J. Hess, Braxton Bragg: The Most Hated Man in the Confederacy, University of North Carolina Press, 2016. 63. 135 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 20-21. 53 Truly then the lynchpin of the 1862 Confederate offensive rested on the shoulders of Bragg and Smith. 136 Lee's offensive and climatic battle of Antietam would have held little or no importance if the events west of the Appalachian's hadn't been taking place in the manner they were. The ultimate failure of Bragg and Smith in Kentucky was their inability to link their armies together. The process involved in making this happen didn't occur until it was too late. 137 Regardless of why this juncture of uniting these armies didn't occur, the important point was that they retained the initiative until the battle of Perryville. Unlike Lee, Bragg and Smith didn't necessarily have to defeat Buell or Wright's local forces, but rather they just needed to exist in Kentucky. Smith's forces had cleared out Morgan and what pitiful resistance Wright was able to scrape together. Buell's army lingered exhausted and timidly in the western part of the state. Bragg and Smith controlled in theory over two-thirds of the state in the last weeks of September into October. 138 The high tide of the Confederacy occurred not at Antietam, but in the days before Perryville. Up until this date, the South had been successful in relieving Richmond, Chattanooga, Vicksburg, the Carolina coast, Shenandoah Valley, western Virginia, and Northern Virginia of any significant Federal occupation, or military operations. The Confederate armies were at its maxim of manpower, at least in theory, if not in actual employment and contained men who were wholly more experienced than their counterparts. Most importantly, the South had been successful universally of maintaining a Confederate wide offensive initiative. When looking at the battles of South Mountain, Richmond, Munfordville, Antietam, and Harpers Ferry, only 136 Hess, Braxton Bragg, 64. 137 Noe, 328-329. 138 Daniel, 128-129; Hess, 62-64; Noe, 104. 54 South Mountain had been a Federal victory and Antietam a draw, while the rest were complete decisive Confederate victories. The battle of Perryville long considered the principal battle of the Kentucky Campaign was neither decisive nor climatic. 139 The battle itself was fought only by portions of the armies, on ground that held no real strategic value to the overall goals of the campaign. However, the legacy of Perryville resides in Bragg's choice to withdraw his army from Kentucky in its aftermath. Leaving aside Bragg's personality, leadership issues, and his subordinates, the important aspect to look at is what was actually accomplished by his army. It's already been stated that Bragg and Smith's offensive knocked the Federal plan of war back a few pegs and opened up at two-thirds of Tennessee for the foreseeable future. Confederate goals upon entering Kentucky were unclear and varied in design between Bragg and Smith. 140 Perhaps the largest draw was establishing the state as Confederate, which they quickly understood wasn't a popular option amongst the people. That being the case, Confederate field armies could only subsist for so long in hostile territory until they would, by necessity, be forced to withdraw to friendly Tennessee. 141 Therefore, without the support of the majority of Kentuckians to endorse a Confederate government, the continuation of a Southern army within the state offered no benefit to the Confederacy. 142 Bragg and Smith's only true strategic failing was their inability to link together and deliver a decisive blow against Buell. If looked at in the context of the genetics of an ocean wave, the advance into Kentucky was the last little bit of the wave that rolls into the edge of the beach. It neither has the momentum nor the power to damage anything of significant strength. However, the break or 139 Noe, 343. 140 Hess, 56-57. 141 Connelly, 228; Noe, 334. 142 Noe, 336. 55 impact of the wave that occurs just before hitting shore tends to denote the power of the temporary effects inflicted within that particular wave's life span. Sticking with the ocean wave analogy, the Confederate wide offensive in the fall of 1862 was the last ocean wave before the tide changed. The lifespan of the Confederacy would perish in the calm time between the next high tide. Conclusion: The interpretations of the Civil War, its key moments, critical players, and even the purpose of the conflict, vary in many different extremes, platforms, and algorithms. Surely there were other critical moments of the war, in which the Confederacy could have theoretically changed the outcome or moments in which Union forces could have ended the war much sooner. The progress of the war is a fascinating storyline of complete unpreparedness through a series of excruciating growing pains that led to the high efficiency of conducting war. Looking at the grand scope of the conflict, particularly the logistics of the opposing sides, even the most novice student of the struggle can recognize that the Confederacy was severely behind in every aspect and shouldn't have waged war. 143 However, the fact remains they did, and the reality is any Southern hope for victory resided in the slowness, unpreparedness, and political deadlock of the North's ability to wage war. The true window in which to view why the fall of 1862 was the Southern high tide occurs in the aftermath of the campaigns themselves. The first and most critical component was the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. The bold political move forever changed the direction and intent of the war. For the South, it had devastating consequences, as it eliminated 143 McPherson, 312-316. 56 any dream of European intervention, and essentially made the Confederacy an island left to its own. The proclamation also bled into the second crucial component, which truly had its roots at the beginning of 1862; however, it had become fully developed by the closing days of 1862, and that is the abandonment of "limited war" principals and the acceptance of "hard war" doctrine. 144 Militarily the South would never mount such a broad offensive again nor one with so much potential to gain from it. Lee's Pennsylvania Campaign in 1863, while more famous, did not have the potential as nine months prior when he crossed into Maryland. 145 Lee in June of 1863 was acting independently, while Confederate armies in the west were giving ground rapidly and losing Vicksburg. 146 Even with Confederate victory at Chickamauga, Bragg nor his predecessors could ever mount an effective counterthrust to regain vital Tennessee. 147 Hood's Tennessee Campaign in 1864 offered the closest opportunity; however, his cause was pyrrhic and traded the destruction of Georgia for the hope of gaining Tennessee. 148 The commencement of the Overland Campaign in 1864 saw the end of Lee's ability to mount a counterattack that had won for him on previous battlefields. With his numbers dwindling, and the Union's production capabilities at its height, continuing supply of reinforcements, and Grant's power to coordinate multiple armies upon Lee, forced the Confederate leader to dance to the tune of Grant's strategy. 149 144 McPherson, 567. 145 Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, 4-8. 146 Edwin C. Bearss and J. Parker Hills, Receding Tide: Vicksburg and Gettysburg the Campaigns that Changed the Civil War, National Geographic Society, 2010. 266. 147 Steven Woodworth, Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. 144. 148 Jacobson, For Cause and for Country, 524. 149 Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. 9-10, 12-13, 22. 57 The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns were episodes that the Union could not afford to lose. Certainly, Union armies, especially in the east, met multiple setbacks, defeats, and disasters throughout the war; however, a loss at this critical juncture in each theater would have produced devastating consequences from which the North could not recover. The brilliance of these campaigns resides in the fact that neither side could afford a negative outcome, and a victorious outcome for either side had the power and capabilities to change the entire trajectory of the war. The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns do not have a true decisive victor in respect to the definition, yet, the rate at which the Union declared victory and the rapidity with which it instituted new measures both politically and militarily showed the emergency the events in the fall of 1862 produced for the North. 150 An acceptance of that notion coupled with political density, logistical pitfalls, organizational hurtles, and strategic objectives, will clearly indicate that the fall of 1862 in the course of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns, along with their supporting offenses was the high tide of the Confederacy, and the moment the Civil War changed trajectory in both political and military senses, which was the beginning of the Confederacy's defeat. 150 Muehlbauer, Ways of War, 197-200. 58 Bibliography Secondary Sources: Anderson, Nancy Scott and Dwight Anderson. The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. Bearss, Edwin C. and J. 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Helen Horne Far, June 5, 2014 ; The Weber State College Oral History Program was created in the early 1970s to "record and document, through personal reminiscences, the history, growth and development of Weber State College." Through interviews with administrators, faculty and students, the program's goal was to expand the documentary holdings on Weber State College and its predecessor entities. From 1970 to 1976, the program conducted some fifteen interviews, under the direction of, and generally conducted by Harold C. Bateman, an emeritus professor of history. In 1979, under the direction of archivist John Sillito, the program was reestablished and six interviews were conducted between 1979 and 1983, with additional interviews being conducted by members of the Weber State community. In 2013 the campus prepared to celebrate the 125th Anniversary of Weber State University in 2014. In order to document the student experience, interviews were conducted with Weber State College Alumni on an ongoing basis. ; The following is an oral history interview with Dr. Helen Horne Farr. It was conducted on June 5, 2014 by Jamie Weeks. In the interview, Helen discusses her time spent at Weber College as a student from 1941 to 1943 and then as an instructor in the nursing program from 1959 to 1987. ; 28p.; 29cm.; 2 bound transcripts; 4 file folders. 1 videodisc: digital; 4 3/4 in. ; Oral History Program Helen Horne Farr Interviewed by Jamie J. Weeks 5 June 2014 i Oral History Program Weber State University Stewart Library Ogden, Utah Helen Horne Farr Interviewed by Jamie J. Weeks 5 June 2014 Copyright © 2014 by Weber State University, Stewart Library ii Mission Statement The Oral History Program of the Stewart Library was created to preserve the institutional history of Weber State University and the Davis, Ogden and Weber County communities. By conducting carefully researched, recorded, and transcribed interviews, the Oral History Program creates archival oral histories intended for the widest possible use. Interviews are conducted with the goal of eliciting from each participant a full and accurate account of events. The interviews are transcribed, edited for accuracy and clarity, and reviewed by the interviewees (as available), who are encouraged to augment or correct their spoken words. The reviewed and corrected transcripts are indexed, printed, and bound with photographs and illustrative materials as available. Archival copies are placed in University Archives. The Stewart Library also houses the original recording so researchers can gain a sense of the interviewee's voice and intonations. Project Description The Weber State College Oral History Program was created in the early 1970s to "record and document, through personal reminiscences, the history, growth and development of Weber State College." Through interviews with administrators, faculty and students, the program's goal was to expand the documentary holdings on Weber State College and its predecessor entities. From 1970 to 1976, the program conducted some fifteen interviews, under the direction of, and generally conducted by Harold C. Bateman, an emeritus professor of history. In 1979, under the direction of archivist John Sillito, the program was reestablished and six interviews were conducted between 1979 and 1983, with additional interviews being conducted by members of the Weber State community. In 2013 the campus prepared to celebrate the 125th Anniversary of Weber State University in 2014. In order to document the student experience, interviews were conducted with Weber State College Alumni on an ongoing basis. ____________________________________ Oral history is a method of collecting historical information through recorded interviews between a narrator with firsthand knowledge of historically significant events and a well-informed interviewer, with the goal of preserving substantive additions to the historical record. Because it is primary material, oral history is not intended to present the final, verified, or complete narrative of events. It is a spoken account. It reflects personal opinion offered by the interviewee in response to questioning, and as such it is partisan, deeply involved, and irreplaceable. ____________________________________ Rights Management All literary rights in the manuscript, including the right to publish, are reserved to the Stewart Library of Weber State University. No part of the manuscript may be published without the written permission of the University Librarian. Requests for permission to publish should be addressed to the Administration Office, Stewart Library, Weber State University, Ogden, Utah, 84408. The request should include identification of the specific item and identification of the user. It is recommended that this oral history be cited as follows: Farr, Helen Horne, an oral history by Jamie J. Weeks, 5 June 2014, WSU Stewart Library Oral History Program, University Archives, Stewart Library, Weber State University, Ogden, UT. iii Helen Horne Farr June 5, 2014 Abstract: The following is an oral history interview with Dr. Helen Horne Farr. It was conducted on June 5, 2014 by Jamie Weeks. In the interview, Helen discusses her time spent at Weber College as a student from 1941 to 1943 and then as an instructor in the nursing program from 1959 to 1987. JW: This is an oral history interview with Dr. Helen Horne Farr. It is being conducted on June 5, 2014 in her home in Ogden, Utah and the interviewer is Jamie Weeks. The subject of this interview is her time spent at Weber State College as a student from 1941 to 1943 and then as an instructor in the nursing program from 1959 to 1987. Also present is Stacie Gallagher our video technician. To begin with I'd like to ask you just about your early family life-when and where you were born and maybe a little background about your childhood. HF: I was born in my grandparent's home in Smithfield, Utah on August 12, 1923. My parents had another girl who was 21 months old when I was born. During my birth, mother hemorrhaged. The doctor was afraid that she would die and said that I was too little and wouldn't live anyway. He put me aside and took care of mother. My grandmother wisely picked me up, cleaned me and put me in a flannel lined shoebox in a coal stove oven and saved my life. I stayed in that shoebox for about six weeks and bonded very closely with my grandmother because of that. JW: Were you tiny? 1 HF: Yes. They said they measured me with two pounds of butter and that's how much they thought I weighed, but you know, farmers didn't know how much the butter really weighed, but I was a very tiny baby. Grandmother Toolson was wise enough to know to use an eyedropper to feed me. That's how I survived. JW: Oh my word, what a wonderful story. HF: Isn't that something that many years ago? 1923, that's almost a century ago. JW: Right. HF: My father was the principal of Burley High School. They had to leave for him to start school in September, so they left me with my grandparents until Christmas time. My father had an opportunity to coach at Midvale Junior High School, so we moved to Midvale. During the depression when I was in the 5th grade, the Jordon School District ran out of money early in the spring. We returned to Smithfield and stayed with my grandparents. Elaine and I enrolled in school there. I enjoyed the classes and meeting new friends. Then my father had the opportunity to move to Ogden to teach math and coach at Washington Jr. High School. That was about two days before my twelfth birthday. I'll never forget that birthday because we were very poor. It took all our money for us to move. For my breakfast that morning there was a grapefruit on the plate and my dad kept saying, "Why don't you pick up that plate, there's something wrong with it." I didn't know why he wanted me to do that, but when I picked it up there was a whole dollar bill. I thought I was the richest girl in the world. So, that was a birthday that I'll always remember. 2 Elaine and I enrolled at Lewis Junior High School. At Christmas time, the principal met with my parents to suggest that my sister and I could skip a grade. My parents decided against us moving up a grade. They bought a home at 3297 Adams Ave. and Elaine and I transferred to Washington Junior High School. I served as student body vice president in the 10th grade. We were the fourth class to graduate from the beautiful new "Million Dollar" Ogden High School. The student body was over 1500 junior and senior students. I was a member of the Student Council and the Pep Club. Those were two special years. We had a great time at Ogden High and I thought that was the best school in the world. From there I went on to Weber Junior College located at 25th and Jefferson Ave. JW: So you started with Weber in— HF: The fall of 1941 (Appendix A). JW: The reason I'm asking that is because we're missing yearbooks from 1943 to 1946, so I just wondered what happened. HF: I really don't know—World War II may have made supplies unavailable. In 1941 when we enrolled, Weber was a wonderful school. I don't know whether people have told you how that campus was organized, but it had just three buildings-the beautiful Moench Building, the Gym Building and one classroom building. West of that was President Dixon's home where his family lived. The Moench Building was just a beautiful building; it had a huge auditorium in it. We had all of our assemblies there. This is something that probably will never happen again, but every Tuesday we had an assembly at eleven 3 o'clock. The student body was filled with talent. The girls' and boys' clubs took turns presenting the programs. We enjoyed all of the singing, dancing and plays. We closed the assembly by singing "Purple and White" with J. Clair Anderson at the organ. I know "Purple and White" perfectly, and now very few students, graduates and faculty can sing this song. The student body was mostly Ogden High graduates, with some Davis County and Box Elder graduates. We had two or three men that came from Hawaii to be on the football team, but they didn't stay. They just kind of moved in and out. We had a wonderful student body, and became very close friends. It wasn't a very big student body. I don't know how many there were, but it couldn't be too large because our class sizes were only about fifteen or twenty in a room. Those first two years, Dr. Dixon was just so nice to us. It's like he said, "We were just the Weber Family". He knew most of us by name. JW: It was such a different time than it is now with so many clubs, sororities and fraternities, and they were all very active. HF: Oh yes, and very competitive. I don't know how it was after I'd left, I guess it was pretty much the same, but La Dianaeda and Otyokwa were always trying to compete and so were Phoenix and Excelsior. It was just a different type of student body than there is now. JW: You knew everyone attending the school? 4 HF: I practically knew everybody. That freshman year I was elected Freshman Representative for the Associated Women Students. I also joined La Dianaeda, which was a social club, and the Whip Club (Appendix B). We had a good time. We really enjoyed that wonderful first year. During that year, in December 1941, Pearl Harbor happened. That didn't change too much of our lifestyle, we all felt badly about it, but we all were in school and nothing really seemed to change with us. The boys just stayed in school. Then the next year I was elected President of Associated Women Students and the boys stayed enrolled. However, in April of that year, a month before graduation, most of them were drafted except about five boys who had health problems then. That was a very sad time. We put flags on all the boys' lockers the next day. That night they all had to go on the train to wherever they had to go, so we all went down to the train station to tell them goodbye. JW: It would be so life changing, to have all the boys leave at the same time. HF: When we graduated it was just those few boys and all of us girls. JW: Wow, so this was April of 1943 when they were all drafted? HF: Yes. HF: Those were all good friends. The Dixon family was very supportive and at that time we were all the "Weber Family." President Dixon always said, "The Weber Family will be doing this, the Weber Family will be doing that." He was just a good leader for us. Most of us didn't have much money. We had Shoeless Shuffle dances when we couldn't get shoes during the war. We just had a lot of fun. It was great. At the end of fall quarter in 5 1943, a friend of mine, Marjorie McKee, and I thought about becoming nurses. We went to the Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital to inquire about it and submitted an application. Both of us were admitted to the school nursing for the winter quarter. That spring during our final assembly, I received a leadership award and a scholarship for nursing from the Alpha Chi Omega sorority. So that really did help my family. JW: In the Signpost it says you were also on the honor roll. You must have been a good student too (Appendix C). HF: I have to say that I had to be for my dad. Since he was in education and he was very well-liked and respected in Ogden. If I'd done anything wrong it would have been terrible for him. I was very close to him, so I just was miss goody-two-shoes. JW: How many siblings did you have? HF: Just the one sister, Elaine, who was older than I. Those were fun days at Weber, they really were. JW: Who were some of your favorite professors? HF: I remember Lydia Tanner taught cooking. She could make a pound of hamburger in a great big pot that would serve the whole student body. I never saw a pound of hamburger go so far. We, as students, had to make that soup, but she'd tell us how to chop things up and season the food. She was a wonderful instructor. One of the things that I remember is that you could never leave anything in the sink. If you have a utensil that you used, you washed it and dried it and put it away. 6 Besides her, I had Sheldon Hayes for Biology and Walter Neville for Sociology. There was Marian Read who taught English, Ernest Miner taught science. Other faculty were Thatcher Allred—speech and drama, Roland Perry—music and Whitney Young— science. Reed Swenson and Merlin Stevenson were coaches. Clarisse Hall was the registrar at that time, and the next year she became the Dean of Students. Did I tell you Leland Monson taught Shakespeare? JW: No, but I do know who he was. HF: He was wonderful. We really had a wonderful faculty. I just don't know how we could have been so lucky to have such a good teachers, but we did. We all liked our teachers, we didn't skip classes, we stayed in class and I think everybody who was there our second year graduated. JW: That is a big accomplishment; to keep all of the students in school and have them all obtain a degree. HF: Our tuition was practically nothing and I remember people saying a few years before that they would bring produce from their garden and eggs for tuition. JW: Yes, they paid in-kind with eggs, produce, and livestock. HF: We paid, but it wasn't very much, I know. My whole expenses going to Weber the entire two years plus the few classes we had in nursing while we were still at Weber were less than $300.00 dollars. Now you can't even go one quarter for that amount. JW: No, you cannot. 7 HF: We had a wonderful student body though. They were just really, really nice people. JW: You graduated and then you were admitted into the Dee School of Nursing? HF: When we applied they immediately admitted us for winter quarter. At that time, The School of Nursing had classes two times a year - a January class and a June class. We went right into the January class, but we were allowed to stay home. We took the science classes that were required in nursing at Weber and other required courses. We lived at home for the two quarters and graduated from Weber in 1943 (Appendix D). JW: From there did you move to the Dee School? HF: Yes, then we had to move to the Dee School of Nursing on 24th and Harrison there. HF: The Dee student body president always had the top north room. First year students lived on the basement floor. On the main floor were the second year students and on the third floor were the seniors. JW: How long did it take you to go through the nursing program? HF: Three years. The total cost was $199.50 for tuition, books and uniforms. JW: So, you went through the nursing program and then did you immediately start working at the Dee Hospital? HF: No, I didn't. When I finished nursing school in 1946, I wanted to continue college and earn a BS degree. I inquired at the University of Utah and learned my credits from Weber were transferrable. I needed twenty-two more credit hours to graduate. I couldn't 8 enroll in the University of Utah that winter quarter because it was too late by the time we had graduated from nursing school. We were so afraid of state boards and we studied every day prior to spring quarter when I attended at the U of U. I don't know how they let me do this because I don't think most universities would do that now, but I was permitted to take twenty-two credit hours. That was a lot—fifteen hours was usually the regular number of hours per quarter. So, I did that and graduated from the University. I was elected into Phi Kappa Phi and graduated with honors. I really enjoyed the University that spring quarter, but I didn't get much opportunity to meet very many other students. I took an astronomy class because that was one of the sciences I needed. I sat by a bunch of celestial navigators who had just been discharged from the war. They probably knew a lot more about it than our instructor did. They coached me. I never could have passed that class if they hadn't helped me. That was a nice class, I can still remember that. I also took creative writing, home decorating and an abnormal psychology class. JW: At the University of Utah? HF: Yes. JW: Where did you get your bachelor's degree from? HF: I got my bachelor's degree in education in the spring of 1946 from the University of Utah and then I became the night supervisor at the Dee Hospital. That was my first job. My land, I was supervising people whom I had lived with in the nursing school for all those 9 years. But it was a nice experience. I didn't like night duty and soon became the Head Nurse on the Pediatric Unit. I was living with a family near the hospital when I met my husband who came to take some pictures of the family and their new baby. He had just been discharged from the Navy. When he was taking pictures, I remember I was baking some cookies and the cookies burned. It was an awful smell, but he said, "Well, they're just chocolate now." I can't remember what they were. My roommate was a former classmate in nursing school. The next day he called Max and said, "I'd like to have a date with that little blonde." Well, Max thought it was Louise because she was blonde also. So, Louise and I went down and we bought a pretty dress for her and some shoes. That's when you wore hats and gloves. She was all dolled up when he came pick her up. He had a big bouquet of flowers and a box of candy for her before they went out. The next morning she said, "That was the craziest date; all he wanted to do was talk about you." I said, "He just needed to have something to talk about." The next day he called Max and said, "You gave me the wrong girl." So then, Max said, 'Well, Helen's not dating until her boyfriend gets home." Max told him I had this ring that I needed to give back but that didn't deter my husband one bit. I returned the engagement ring and dated several boys including my husband. He kept coming when we were trying to study for state boards, I wanted to crown him. I didn't think that much about him at first. Then, I guess he wore me down. We took state boards in the early summer and passed. My husband and I both liked football and that following Thanksgiving we went to a football game at the U of U. He showed me a 10 diamond ring. It was way too—just too gaudy. I didn't want it, I just wanted something simple. So, I said, "I don't want to get married. I want to be an airline stewardess." That was my whole plan was to be an airline stewardess. JW: Instead of nursing? HF: You had to be an RN to be a stewardess at that time. At Christmas time he took me down to the airport to apply to be a stewardess. I found out that after the war they only wanted tall stewardesses and I wasn't tall enough for the larger planes. That Christmas, my husband gave me a silk pant set and some nylon stockings, which you could never get during the war, and a beautiful poinsettia. It was the tallest poinsettia I've ever seen. My folks had moved out to North Ogden then and he wanted me to look at this poinsettia and I was just getting tired of it by the afternoon. I said, "Let's go visit Helen and Max and some other people." "Oh, just look at that poinsettia." I just thought, "I don't want to see that poinsettia one more minute." I finally stood up and then looked down and there was my diamond ring on the branch of that tree. So, I thought, I really do love you. Then I took the ring. We were married the next year in 1947. My husband did crazy things like that. One Christmas he put a watch on a gold ornament and I didn't see it until I was taking the tree down. He was always doing things like that. JW: It sounds like he was very romantic. HF: Oh, he liked to make surprises. He really did. Anyway, then we were married and I didn't work for a while because I had my five children in eight years. So, I was a busy mother. 11 JW: Yes you were. How many grandkids do you have? HF: Oh goodness. I have fourteen grandchildren and fourteen great-grandchildren. JW: And five children keep you very, very busy, right? HF: Our first four children are boys; Paul, Craig, Brent and Randall. Carol, our daughter, was the fifth. They all had chores, not always completed, and an Indian girl from the Intermountain Indian School in Brigham City helped me each Saturday. I spent Sundays using the Ironrite all afternoon. I had little time for myself. I am very proud that all of our children are college graduates. Two earned doctorate degrees. Paul became an attorney and Craig is a board certified toxicologist. Brent is an industrial engineer with Master's degree in Business Administration and Randall earned his degree in Political Science. Carol, a single mother, returned to Weber, graduated in nursing and earned a BS degree. JW: Let's go back. You stayed home with five children and then when did you decide to go back to work? HF: I went back to work as a part time supervisor at the Dee Hospital. In 1953 Ruth Stewart (now Swenson) called and asked me if I would be willing to teach in the new nursing program at Weber. I told her that I had three small children and was too busy. The next spring, I did some special duty nursing. We could pick and choose the days we were able to work. I did that for a while and then St. Benedict's Hospital started their three-year nursing program and they had a nursery for the nurses' children. I taught there from 1956 until 1958. 12 Leola Davidson happened to see me during the summer of 1959 and she said, "Why don't you come to Weber to teach?" So, I guess she told Ruth Swenson. Ruth called me and asked if I would be willing to come here and teach. That was in 1959 when I started at Weber. Geraldine Hansen, a recent graduate of the Weber associate degree nursing program, had earned a BS degree from the U of U and was also hired. By that time, Weber College had moved to the new campus on Harrison Blvd. There were three small, one story buildings and a Quonset hut. Administration and registration were in building I; the printing department; social sciences and English were in building II; and Natural Science and nursing were in building III. The Quonset hut was known as the TUB, temporary Union Building. The nursing program was initiated when Ruth Swenson was a friend of Mildred Montag while attending Columbia University. In 1951, Mildred was in a doctoral program and chose as her thesis hypothesis that "It might be possible to educate students in a junior or community college to perform those functions commonly associated with the registered nurse". Weber Junior college was one of seven schools west of the Mississippi chosen to offer the two year nursing program. Ruth Swenson was appointed director. She and Marjorie Somers developed the program. In 1953, thirty-six women enrolled. They all passed state boards, as have most of the students throughout the years. JW: I read that you were the fourth woman to be hired as faculty at Weber State. HF: That's true. Loy Doss, LaPrele Neville and Leola Davidson were on the faculty. In the early 1960's, the Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) program of thirty students merged with the Associate Degree program of sixty students. This made a total of ninety freshmen 13 students. Each year there were over 700 applicants. We felt we had the best students on campus. They were all high achievers. This required additional faculty. Karen Beaver, Sonia Parker, Norma Hansen, Ruth Brown and Arlene Stein and several clinical faculty were hired. I loved the students and looked forward toward each fall to greeting and orienting them into the nursing program. About ten years after the two year program began I went to a National Nurses Association conference in San Francisco. This was in the mid-sixties. I think there were three delegates from Utah. You had so many delegates for how the membership was in that state. Anyway, it was a large group of women and I don't remember any men being there. We didn't have very many male students. The whole week was almost all dedicated to "what are we going to do with these associate degree nurses who are passing state boards". Here we had three hard years of hospital school nursing and four years in the collegiate program, now these two year graduates think they can do anything. The Weber students were actually called the "Weber Wonders" when they first started. The delegates discussed what they could do and what they couldn't do and they even said, "You're a 'Weber Wonder'," to them when they first graduated. So it was a different world then. It's amazing, during that convention, the whole time was spent on trying to figure you how we could resolve this. They finally voted and passed a resolution to the National League of Nursing to write a separate test for these associate degree nursing graduates. They believed the two year nurses could be technical nurses or associate degree nurses or some other label, but they should not be RN's because 14 they just didn't have enough education or nursing experience. Well, they proposed that to the League of Nursing and the League was so busy trying to accredit new schools of nursing that they never did write another test. So it went on for a few years and that was it. The two year program stayed and they're doing well. Now Weber has branched out to all these different campuses. It's wonderful what they've done. In 1969, Ruth Swenson passed away. I was always sorry that she was never promoted to Full Professor. Leola Davidson became the department chair. She was childless and able to devote a great deal of time to nursing. She also assisted the part time Dean, Reed Stringham, a dentist who was on campus three days a week. The last day of Spring quarter 1972, Leola announced Gerry Hansen would be her assistant and assume the role of department chair. JW: Interesting. HF: I can remember that whole week there was so much bitterness and so much animosity. I'm glad that it worked out like it did because we do have some very good nurses that graduated from our program. They've become leaders in nursing and done well. JW: The school newspaper states, "Making her the first instructor in the nursing program and the fourth woman on campus to be named a professor." HF: Yes. That's right. I was the fourth woman on campus to ever be named professor. Isn't that amazing? I didn't realize that at the time how amazing that was because it was difficult to get promoted since we didn't have a nursing doctoral program. In 1977 less than 1% of nurses in the country had earned doctorates in other fields. If you had a 15 master's degree you thought you had really done well. Most of the nurses were diploma graduates from the hospitals. Those of us with a BS degree thought we were sitting pretty good. We found out, when we became college faculty, advanced degrees were very necessary. Committees had very tight criteria for tenure and promotion. You had to have those degrees before you could be advanced. I was very lucky to get that professorship. It's probably because I was very active on campus with other committees and had excellent student evaluations. I didn't receive my doctorate degree until after I was made a full professor. JW: I'm just trying to get the timeline right. You came to work at Weber and started as an instructor in 1959 and then in 1969 you received your master's degree. Were you working in Ogden and driving down to the University of Utah in Salt Lake? HF: Yes, I was working full-time in Ogden with five children. JW: This is what I couldn't believe because I kept thinking, "She's working and trying to get another degree and has this large family." HF: I enrolled in night school. After one quarter in graduate school, one of the professors, Dr. Cecil Samuelson, offered me a stipend in rehabilitation, which I really appreciated. I had some wonderful professors; I just can't tell you how excellent they were and I got through it somehow. I received my MS degree in 1969 and was promoted to Professor in 1977. During those years, I was very active in the Utah Nurses Association and held every office in District #2. There were about 1800 members in the state association and it was a total surprise to be nominated as Utah Nurse of the Year in 1976. One of the 16 other nominees was Dean of the School of Nursing at the University of Utah and had a doctoral degree. When I received the award, I was overwhelmed. JW: Let's talk about that really quickly and then we will go back. In 1976, you then started a doctorate program at BYU? HF: There were six of us. Leola Davidson, Ruth Brown, Karen Beaver, Geri Hanson and I were from Weber and Jean Law was from McKay Dee Hospital. There were six of us that were selected. We carpooled every day all the way to Provo and then in the summer we had to be on campus, so my husband and I went down and found two apartments and we thought three in each apartment would be fine. Leola Davison, Ruth Brown and I shared an apartment. You know that doctoral program was fun. Well, let me tell you what, Leola smoked all the time. Of course BYU has very strict religious rules. This doctoral program was started in 1976 with seventy-six people in the program from Idaho, Colorado, California and Utah. One time, the BYU president, Dallin H. Oaks, called us all into a meeting and said, "We have heard that several of you are having cocktails before dinner. If you choose to do this, you'll have to leave the University. You have to abide by the rules." Well, Leola was smoking like a trooper and I'd bring my clothes home and my husband would smell my clothes and he'd say, "These just reek of smoke." I'd say, "I can't help it," she just smoked one cigarette after another when we were studying, but we never got caught. One day though, we were having some finals and testing and we felt we've got to have some coffee to keep ourselves alert and awake, so we all took this little 17 thermos of coffee with us, but we never could find a spot where we could drink it. So, we brought the coffee home. JW: Because you couldn't have coffee on campus. HF: No coffee, no liquor. The liquor didn't bother any of us. Some class members from California left the program. I don't know how many. With that many people you don't count how many are still in your class. There were some who just could not leave that alone. JW: Interesting. Let's go back and talk about your time at Weber. From everything I've read, you made some huge changes for women on campus. HF: That's the one thing I'm really proud of. JW: I'm so proud of you, because I've worked my whole life and it's a struggle even now. You always have to fight for equality. HF: In the spring of 1972, Dr. Helmut Hoffman was the Academic Vice President. He called the female faculty to a meeting and explained there was a wave of unrest across the country of faculty women realizing that they had the same education, the same experience, the same time at the institution as their male counterparts and were making much less money. So, he encouraged us to organize and try to get this solved on our campus. I wasn't aware of any salary discrepancies because the Nursing Department had all women faculty. 18 A commission was formed and I was elected chairman. Inge Adams, from the Foreign Language department and Bonnie Fitzgerald from the library were elected committee members. I drafted a constitution for the Commission of the Status of Women at Weber State College and shared it with the deans and members of the faculty senate. The three of us didn't know what to do. I said, "I don't know how to start this, I have no idea." So, it took us about a year to get our thoughts together. We finally drafted a sheet on each faculty member with these criteria: education (institution, years attended and degrees), teaching experience (years at other institutions and years at Weber), evaluations (if available) and current salary. Representatives from Weber, U of U, USU and BYU met monthly to share information. I served as state chairman in 1974. We kind of frightened the deans, though I don't know how we could; we didn't look that scary to me. We started with a list of the female faculty members and who their male counterparts might be. We'd see how much the male counterpart earned and how much this person earned and then we compared their credentials against the evaluation criteria. If the criteria matched, we realized where the women faculty member's salary should be set. It was not only the women that were given the equalization, but also, we helped some men too. We also had some new faculty members coming in that were not being given the salaries that they should have received (Appendix E). Eventually, we knew all faculty salaries. It took a long time and I'd get home sometimes so tired because I was still teaching full-time and trying to do this. It was very nerve wracking because those deans were—they thought they were God. I went to the 19 legislature twice to appeal for money to equalize salaries. By 1975, we finally completed the equalization. After all this work that I did, Dr. Jerry Storey, the Academic Vice President, gave me a third time off in 1975 to remain Chairman. I had a third time off, but I had so many other duties that I never could take that time off. It was ironic, but I never ever could. I was on a lot of school committees. I served on the tenure committee and I was very active on the whole campus. I just didn't have any time to take any time off. I loved the students. I just loved the students and felt responsible for them. JW: You served for the Phi Kappa Phi, right? HF: I was secretary, and then in 1974, I was president. Weber State hosted the first International Women's Year Conference in Utah in 1975. I served as chairman. The theme was "Invest in Yourself, Share the Dividends". It was well attended with numerous positive evaluations. JW: Tell us a little bit about your trip to China. It said in the paper that you were working— HF: I was doing my dissertation for my Doctorate in Higher Education Administration at that time. This all happened because I was invited to attend a conference on the Incorporation of Cultural Diversity in Nursing Curriculum. This conference was over a three year time period. We met twice a year during that time. There were about twelve junior colleges involved in this. We learned a lot about different cultures. Most of the time was spent discussing how to get the faculty to start changing the curriculum. Faculty are set on a path in the curriculum and don't want to change it. That was the project, to try to get the different schools to change their curriculum to include cultural 20 diversity. That's what prompted me to do my dissertation. Our faculty revised the curriculum to include culture diversity. JW: It is interesting, and what I read was your article in the Signpost (Appendix F). HF: What did it say? JW: It talks about you working towards your dissertation and how you spent twenty-four days on cultural diversity and studying the health and education of the Chinese people. HF: I tried to get into the clinics. They didn't speak English and I didn't know any Chinese, but I learned a lot about acupuncture during that time and it was very interesting. JW: It said that you learned a lot about holistic healing and that the Chinese were more about holistic healing and letting the body tell you what's wrong and how to heal itself instead of using western medicine. It's an interesting little article. HF: I forgot about that. JW: Tell us about your service on Faculty Senate. HF: Yes, I was on the Faculty Senate twice. We approved recommendations from the various committees. I was on a lot of committees—the tenure committee, the curriculum committee and the ranking committee. I was on the salary committee for a long, long time. I chaired that committee right after I resigned from being the chairman of the Women's Commission, so I knew all the salaries and it was a good thing to be able to be on that committee. I watched and made sure the women were protected then. 21 JW: Does the Women's Commission still exist? HF: Oh no. I'll tell you what happened. When I went to get my doctorate, I thought, "I can't do this anymore. I've got to stop something." By then, all of the salaries were equalized, so I resigned from that position. They gave that job to Forrest Crawford. It just went downhill from then on. It was a lot of work, but I don't know how salaries are now. I just know that it's not as equal as it was. I don't have any idea how much difference there is now, but I know there is some. So, that's what happened to the Women's Commission. JW: It's just a fact of life for women, isn't it? HF: Yes. JW: I guess the other things I saw were your Crystal Crest Award. HF: Oh I was so surprised with that. I had no idea that was coming, no idea at all. They asked me to be one of the people to show nominees two different homes and enjoy lunch with them. I remember I spent all day doing that. My husband had the flu and I really wanted to be home with him. He was very sick. I said, "Do you feel like you could come to this award ceremony." He said, "Oh, I would rather not." Monte Shupe insisted that I come but I really didn't want to go. I remember calling my husband at about 6:30 just before the meeting was supposed to start to ask how he felt. He sounded terrible. But, I went and I was just completely surprised. It was a shocker! JW: The award, just to put it in, stated, "Helen Farr has been President of the Association of Women Students and has been in the U.S. Cadet Nursing Corps. She has held every 22 office including President of the Utah Nursing Association and was the Utah Chair of the First International Women's Conference." That's a great award. After you won that award, you continued working and then you retired? HF: Let's see. When was that Crystal Crest? JW: 1984. HF: I kept teaching. I was honored as professor of the year at the university in 1985. My husband had a mild stroke in the fall of 1986 and I decided I better stay home with him. So I retired at the end of Fall quarter in 1986. The students planned a surprise retirement party, with delicious food and a humorous program. The presented me a block "W" Weber State plaque. I loved teaching, I just loved it. The Student Nurses Association of Utah honored me as the "Outstanding Nurse Educator" in 1986. Leola Davidson, Ruth Brown, and Norma Hansen retired at the end of the school year in 1987. A retirement reception was held for the four of us that spring. In the fall of 1989, I attended a Weber State football game. During halftime, President Nadauld presented me with a Silver Weber State Centennial Medallion. JW: I do not have information about that, I'm glad you brought that up. HF: Well, I don't know why I wrote this, it must have been for something, but you're welcome to have a copy of this. (Helen's Memories of Weber State, Appendix G). JW: Is there anything on there that we've missed? 23 HF: Our oldest son was an attorney, and was killed in an automobile accident on January 14, 1987. My husband had a difficult time with his death and then in March of that same year my husband died. I'd left my job a few months before. Leaving my job at Weber State, and the deaths of my son and husband all happened very close. Leola Davidson said my stress chart was clear off the board. I was really stressed, but you know, you have to get over it. You have to find a way to recover. JW: And you have to keep going. You don't have any other options. HF: Yes, that's true. JW: You have a lot of community service along with your service at Weber. HF: I did. Before I forget though, I wanted to tell you in the fifties, there was a time when Governor J. Bracken Lee wanted to dissolve all of the junior colleges. I can remember that so well and how much that concerned the entire campus. I don't know enough about that background, but I can remember how we were all concerned. That was an experience that I will not forget. JW: That was with—wasn't it President Miller that had to fight to keep Weber State because J. Bracken Lee wanted to shut it down. HF: Right. It was President Miller. He was an excellent administrator. I really liked and respected him. Following President Miller, Joseph Bishop was president. He was followed by Rodney Brady and Stephen Nadauld. Then Faye Preece and I became Co- Chairman of the Emeriti Faculty Association. 24 JW: When Stephen Nadauld was there? HF: Yes, when Stephen Nadauld was there. We were allowed to go down to the Board of Regents meeting when they decided that Weber State would be a University. I remember that so vividly because the University of Utah Regent was just so adamant that Weber and the other state colleges should not be universities. He said, "They should not be universities. There is no way they should be universities." He was just almost yelling at the top of his voice. Well, the vote finally came and our student body president was able to vote. It was one extra affirmative vote that made Weber into a university. I was so thrilled. JW: It was such a fight for a long time. I think that's one of the things about Weber State is the fight to survive has always been there. It was a church school and then the church wanted to do away with it, and then the community had to pick it up. I mean, it's been a fight every step of the way. HF: It has. We've had some marvelous leadership those first hundred years. Actually, Weber State University has done really well, especially these last ten years that Ann Milner was president. She really promoted Weber, was such a good person in the legislature and accomplished numerous projects for Weber. During her speeches she often mentioned that the "WSU Nursing Program was ranked Seventh in the nation". JW: She's changed so many things on campus. HF: She did. That was her whole life. 25 JW: Yes, I cannot say enough good things about what she has accomplished. HF: That's true. JW: What are you most proud of during your time at Weber? HF: Probably the students. They have become excellent registered nurses. Many of them are in leadership positions, scholastic research endeavors and community involvement. Several of them still write or phone me. They frequently remind me of one of my favorite thoughts, "No one cares about what you know until they know how much you care". In 2010, twenty-four years after I retired, the Weber State University Alumni Association honored and surprised me by presenting the Lewis W. Shurtliff Award for Contributions to Education. I really enjoyed the students and the teaching. I almost tear up when I talk about it, but that was such a surprise to me. JW: The way they wrote it up is: "After serving as head nurse in the pediatric unit of Dee Hospital and teaching at St. Benedict's Hospital, Helen Farr joined the faculty of Weber College in 1959, making her the first instructor in the nursing program and the fourth woman on campus to be named a professor. A 1943 graduate of Weber College, she taught 27 years at her alma mater, where she was also the coordinator of the nursing program." HF: Right. That's nice the way they wrote that. JW: It is a wonderful award and it's a nice ceremony that they have for this. 26 HF: It is. It really is. You think after you've left that many years that you won't be remembered, but that was a real surprise. JW: Well, and it hasn't been that long ago, 2010. HF: It hasn't. I still hear from my students. A lot of my students still call me and that's been a span of fifty-five years. You don't have those relationships all the time, especially with students. Anyway, I think the School of Nursing is doing very well. JW: It's made a big difference and it's nice to have an area like the nursing program that is so nationally acclaimed and it really is just— HF: One of our graduates, Marlene Summer, who was in the last class that I taught that fall quarter, is now President of the Sigma Theta Tau International Honors Society of Nursing in the state of Utah. The criteria for membership are very rigid, based on a highly educated faculty, average student GPA, record of National Board examinations and community endeavors. The University of Utah asked me to be a charter member of their chapter in 1972. They had just started their BS program in the College of Nursing and they had an excellent reputation. I didn't know what Sigma Theta Tau was and I said to my husband, "I don't think I want to go down to the University of Utah. I don't have any affiliation with the U," and he said, "You better do it." So, I did go down and become a member. In the mid 1980's, the Weber State Nursing Program requested to become a chapter and had received several information and guideline letters from the national headquarters in Indiana. I was asked to work on the application following my retirement. 27 A representative from the U of U and I met several times to prepare information for submission to the national office. Now, twenty-two years later, the Weber State chapter has won many awards in leadership, scholarship and community endeavors. It is internationally recognized as an outstanding chapter. JW: Is there anything that you'd like to add that we haven't talked about? HF: No, I've just loved you both being here. It's brought back a lot of nice memories. JW: It's been such an incredible story. We both really enjoy this so we don't limit our time schedule. We just make sure we have plenty of time. HF: I had so many good experiences at Weber and have many nice memories. I didn't have one year I didn't enjoy. It was nice. JW: It is really the alumni that have this love for Weber that are helping to keep it going and helping to keep that spirit alive. HF: Do you have a lot of faculty that feel like I do? JW: Everybody that went to school at the same time you did feels the same way you do. HF: They do? I think I'm probably one of the oldest ones you've interview though, aren't I? JW: Probably. HF: That's why I thought you needed to hear my story because I knew I was probably one of the oldest ones. 28 JW: Yes, because a lot of them weren't there in the years that you were there. JW: You've been single for since 1987, and you are still able to do so many things, so that's really good. HF: Well, I like to and as long as I have a mind and I hope it's working. You know, if people tell me I don't say things right I'll know I'm losing it. JW: I think as long as you're keeping busy and making your mind work and playing cards it helps. HF: I hope you would realize how wonderful those first two years at Weber were though. Well, I liked every year at Weber really. I was sorry to have to retire, but I'm glad I did because I knew my husband needed me to be home. JW: You did get some time with him. You were busy, just crazy busy all the time. HF: I don't know how I stayed on all those committees like I did, but I was willing to do it and that did help me learn a lot about the different campus people. I knew their names, but didn't really know them. This helped me learn more about the campus people and it was a wonderful group of people, the faculty, staff and students. JW: We sure appreciate you letting us come today. HF: Thank you very much. 29 Appendix A Appendix B-1 Appendix B-2 Appendix B-3 Appendix B-4 Appendix C Appendix D

Transcript of an oral history interview with Philip R. Marsilius, conducted by Sarah Yahm on 20 May 2015 as part of the Norwich Voices oral history project of the Sullivan Museum and History Center. Philip Marsilius was a member of the Norwich University Class of 1943. The bulk of his interview focuses on his military service in World War II as well as his continuing relationship with Norwich University as a student, alumnus, and trustee. ; Philip Marsilius, NU '43, Oral History Interview May 20, 2015 Sullivan Museum and History Center Interviewed by Sarah Yahm SY: So let's start out with, where were you born? And when you were a kid, what did you want to be when you grew up? PM: Well, I was born in Woodstock, Illinois in 1921. My father was running a company there. And my family consisted of a brother four years older, and a sister two years older. The sister and I were born in Woodstock. My father had been in World War I, and an ordinance making French 75 guns. And after that, was hired by this Woodstock typewriter company, which is older than the old typewriters, who was owned by the Sears family. And they made in addition, calculators and typewriters. And so I grew up there for two years. And then my father took an opportunity in Bridgeport to run a machine tool company, hence we moved here and lived in the north end of Bridgeport. Grew up there, went to public schools. Went to Harding High school, and from Harding, then to Norwich. SY: And did your father talk about his experiences in World War I? PM: Yes. He was a Norwegian immigrant. Came over from Southern Norway when he was 14, and learned his English in Boston at the YMCA. And then was hired by a company that made shoe machinery -- big, big company. And then they recommended he go to MIT, and he went and graduated as a mechanical engineer. And went immediately into the Army, and came out as a captain. And he was in machine tools all his life. He came here, and through the younger years -- then -- and when I was at Norwich, my folks moved to Trumbull, built a house there. And I spent a little time there, but we were accelerated in our senior year at Norwich. We went out early because they wanted us in the service. And we couldn't go to summer camp in our junior year, which was the standard routine. We were horse cavalry in those days. And we would take a trip through the back roads of Vermont up to Burlington area to the fort. And they had too many trainees at that time, so they ended up saying, we can't take you. You're gonna have to go to OCS. After four years at Norwich, we still had to go to OCS. SY: So, were you mad? PM: No, because we got out early. We got out end of February. SY: And I've heard stories of everybody on campus marching down and enlisting, was that what happened? Or? PM: Well, everybody -- a lot of them left early and joined -- volunteered for the Air Force. And some went to Canada to get in the Canadian Air Force when, like, might not be able to go in the US. And then a lot who had not finished Norwich, left and enlisted. SY: So were you eager to sort of get overseas? Were you eager to kind of get into the war? PM: Very much so. Would've left early after December 7th when Pearl Harbor hit. We went -- several of us went and volunteered. They said, you're not 21, you can't go without parental approval. And my folks said, finish your college, and then you can -- you're on your own. SY: So there was no part of you that was sort of frightened to go? PM: No. I was anxious to go. SY: And why? What was your -- why -- PM: Because I'd had good military background. The war was a devastating war. And in my mind, if we didn't stop what was going on and prevail, life would not be the same -- not be. So it just made sense to go in, and I volunteered for armored. Went to Fort Knox, and there were three others from Norwich. They had room in that class -- 110 candidates. SY: And how -- let me rewind a little bit. How did you adjust to being at Norwich? How did you adjust to being a rook? Did you take to the military lifestyle or was it difficult for you? PM: It did -- wasn't difficult. I had more -- I had more fun as a rook. And we had to come out in our pajamas. I had bought fancy pair of pajamas because I had heard about -- so I just said -- you know, they did a lot of nonsense. Bracing and all that stuff. SY: But it didn't faze you? PM: Didn't faze me. And second year, I was president of the class, and I stayed president of the class for all three years. SY: So, you did well there? PM: And I was valedictorian in addition. SY: In addition. OK, so how was the decision made that in February -- oh, tell me what you remember about Pearl Harbor. How did you hear about Pearl Harbor? PM: Oh, it was basically on the radio, and I just finished a book -- and it's in my car right now -- returning it. A Day of Deceit. FDR, and not letting Hawaii know he knew it was -- he wanted the Japanese to attack so he could declare war. And I've been through that whole book. But we knew it right away, obviously, from the radio news. Everybody knew it pretty fast. SY: Did you have radios in your room in Norwich? PM: Not in our room, no -- not. I can't -- I don't think we had radios. Today, they have everything. SY: Today, they everything. Exactly. OK, so then February, were you all called together into the Amory and told that you were gonna go to war? How as the decision made? PM: Oh, we were -- what we were told to do was, we had -- we actually had a graduation, and then we had a week off. And then we were told to return to Rutland for induction. And they made us corporals, of all good things, when we were supposed to be second lieutenants. And then we departed by train to Massachusetts, and then they went through the induction shots and all that -- get you prepared. And then they scheduled wherever you were gonna go. Some went to Riley in Kansas. Some went to chemical warfare, some went to electrical. So it was -- but four of us, I was able to get a car, and so I had a car. And the four of us drove from Florida, Massachusetts -- I can't think of the name. But that's where we were told to meet, and went through five days of basic nonsense. KP duty and all that kind of stuff. And then we drove from there, I picked up the other officers. They weren't officers then, they were corporals. And we drove all the way to Camp Polk, Louisiana, where we were entered into -- well, back up. We were at Fort Knox for three months, and then battle training for a month in Elizabethtown, Kentucky. And then we were assigned -- the four of us from Norwich were assigned to the 11th Armored Division. That's when I got my car, and we drove from there down through Alabama over to Louisiana, and we arrived. And the next day, we were ordered to come to the commanding general's office. And low and behold, he was a Norwich grad, General Brooks, and a very decent individual. He came out as lieutenant general. And we went from -- they were ready to move the whole 11th Armored to the desert training in California. But we had to go to an interim location, temporary post in Texas -- Abilene, Texas. And at that point, we had six weeks wait until the other armored division that was in training had completed. And then we moved out there. What happened when we were out there, typical of -- they have -- each company has a normal staff of say, five officers. But when they're in training, they had maybe two extra lieutenants, so you all get involved. And then about every couple of months, they go by and say, boom, boom, boom, boom. You're out, you're going to overseas, or you're going someplace. SY: So did you take a ship? I'm sure you took a ship. Obviously, everybody took a ship. But do you remember the name of the ship you took overseas? PM: No, I don't really. What I did was the second the go-around in December, I went to my colonel and volunteered to go to be one of the select. I wasn't pulled out, but I volunteered, because I didn't think 11th Armory was gonna get over there for the fighting. So I volunteered, and that's a tough decision because then, you're on your own. You go -- you go back to the East, and you go to wherever they direct you. And then you get assigned to a fort, and you go as a replacement officer. And you have hundreds of enlisted men, you don't know anybody. SY: And you don't have a relationship with them. PM: You end up having to do duty on the ocean crossing. And I had about 50 men in the lowest deck, most every one of them sick all the way over. Four bunks high -- it was a mess, but you spend 8 hours on duty with them. But anyway, we got to England, and then we went from Liverpool, went on down to Frome, England, somewhat east of London. When the officers went and replaced officers, they enlisted them and went to another post. And then you waited for your assignment. And I with another officer, made a [forayed?] to the Rangers to volunteer to join our Rangers, knowing they needed officers. And both of us were accepted physically, but they made a stipulation, we can't change orders if the time you get back to your camp. If you have orders directing you to another unit, that's it, forget us. And that's what happened. I was already assigned to the 106th Cavalry Group, which was a recon outfit. And it turned out I was -- because I was Cavalry, I was in light tanks. So, I was in tanks the whole war and it was good. You know, and we got over to Normandy in late June. Not D-Day, but mostly, we joined first Army. Patton hadn't already -- his Army hadn't been formed. And we had an interesting time in Normandy. We were right on the east end, right where the water was -- and the channel. The tide would go out a mile, and we had to send a platoon of troops out every night to collect stragglers. People trying to -- were around. And right across -- SY: Who were the stragglers? PM: Well, people who wanted to get away from the Germans. French people. You didn't know whether it was spies or what they were. Could be anybody. And we had to collect them, and make sure that they were the -- had credentials and know who they were, so that they wouldn't cause trouble. If they were just going home to join friends or family, that was OK. But there were a lot of them. And the Germans were -- got quarter of a mile from where we were, and there was a river in between, flowing out. And we had to send patrols down the beach, and one other patrol across to make sure the Germans were there. And they -- we got fired on, and fortunately got back. But -- so we did all that kind of stuff while they were waiting for the breakthrough. And when we first arrived, we -- the first combat we had was with the 82nd Airborne. And they were cleaning up a couple of villages, good size villages. And that's where they -- we broke in with them, and then they left. And then we moved over to the coast. SY: So, I've interviewed a lot of Norwich grads who were in combat, and they -- a lot of them have very intense and vivid memories of their first experience with combat. Do you have intense and vivid memories of the first time you were under fire? PM: We were under fire every day. SY: Do you remember what it was like the first time? PM: Oh sure. SY: What was it like? PM: Where I mentioned about the beach area, at one point even though we were in tanks, we got out of the tanks and went down on foot with carbines and tommy guns to stop any infiltration by the Germans 50 yards in front of us. And dusk, day, and nighttime -- well, yeah, you do what you have to do. SY: Were you frightened? PM: I never was frightened. I was -- tried to be sensible, and you couldn't go into combat and be frightened all the time, because you had to lead 30 men, and I had five or six tanks. So if I was frightened, it'd be -- that wouldn't work. SY: Some people also talk about everything being very slow, and the colors being very bright, and things sounding different. Do you -- you don't remember that? PM: No. Guns sounded like guns, and they were noisy. And -- but recon, we were out in front of everything. We were the first contact, and we have to fight then until we developed how strong the enemy is. And then if we can't handle it, we move aside and bring the heavier stuff up -- infantry or armor, who are close by. So that -- that's -- and when it's under heavy fighting, often we as recon would be on the flank. We'd be making contact with the next American unit. SY: I read the sort of memoir you wrote, briefly. Your short memoir about your time at war. PM: I tried to stay away from the gruesome stuff. SY: Yeah, but I think it's important to sort of -- you know, to talk about it. Just sort of talk about what every day was like and what sticks with you. What sticks with you now? What -- do you think about your time at war now and throughout your life, did you? PM: Not really. No. Just another episode. Once in a while, you can't help but go back. But after the war, there were about eight officers in our unit, and we had a -- the original 106th was Illinois National Guard -- that's where they started. And they had a reunion every year, and we went to the reunions for about three years. And finally decided that it made more sense for us to get a group of the officers together, because half of the enlisted men we didn't even know. And they were having a good time, but we didn't want to invade their fun. So what happened was eight officers, a couple who were in our squadron and a couple that were in the other -- there were two squadrons. And we would meet in California, Texas, Kansas. I had them to my summer home in Maine twice, and usually wives were, are all part of it. So we had a nice good time. They're all dead now. SY: It sounds like in some ways, the most intense experience was in late September at the Foret de Parroy. Am I pronouncing that right? PM: Oh yeah, Foret de Parroy. That was a tough one. SY: Do you want to talk about that? PM: Well, I think I mentioned the minefields. SY: Yeah, but why don't -- I mean, I've read the description, but people who are going to be reading the oral history won't have. So what happened there? PM: Well, we as a recon unit, were asked to take the left side of the woods, and 79th Infantry had the rest of it. It was one muddy road and fortunately, the tanks could maneuver in the light wooded area. So we find our own. But it was dense wooded, rainy, mud, and the Germans were shooting into the trees. So the shrapnel was coming down on you from wherever. And the minefields were never laid in any rational form, you just didn't know. And I don't know if I mentioned, but I called one of my tank commanders and asked him to go to headquarters for the recon group. Because we were all -- five or six tanks were all here in a line. And he jumped off the tank and right on a mine, and dead just like that. And the same -- the next day, we called on the radio and said, well, it's a minefield we're in. We need the engineers to come down with the magnetic mine finders, and they came down. And had fire breaks, and they found a way to get in. But they get there and they tripped one of these what they called a Bouncing Betties, and the shrapnel goes out at three feet. I think a dozen of them were down. And I had to go with a knife blade on hands and knees to crawl in there, with a doctor behind me. And I did a lot of the shots while he was cutting off legs and obviously tourniquetting, and Novocain for pain, and then whatever else we could do. We saved them all, but it was -- it was a messy ordeal. Fortunately, we got -- we were able to get them on stretchers, and put them on the back of the tanks and get them out of there. So anyway, we were all alive, but not in good shape. SY: And it sounds like a bunch of your sergeants asked to be relieved, what was that? SY: Yeah, two of my National Guard guys. Well, this was toward the end of that month in the woods. And these were big stoic National Guard from Illinois, and I thought one was my sergeant major and the other was a sergeant. Surprisingly to me, they came one day and said, lieutenant, we've had it. We just can't handle it anymore. And I thought these guys would be sturdy and strong, and I was wrong. But I told them there's no -- if you're not up to it, you're -- got the shakes, you're not gonna do me any good. SY: Did they have the shakes? PM: Yeah, there was -- kind of think they just couldn't handle it anymore. SY: And had they been there a long time? PM: Well, they'd been with us all the way through to that point. SY: And had they -- PM: But they were in the National Guard for years before. So I thought, you know, these are guys that know it and have been promoted up the ranks. Ones I was not expecting to lose. But I replaced them with corporals and made them -- and they stayed with me the rest of the war. SY: And did the sergeants get sent home? Was it shell-shock? Was it -- PM: I never knew what they -- I wasn't gonna follow. They weren't shell-shocked, but they were just at the point of no return, I guess, best way of stating it. SY: I know, you know, it's much more common to talk about the difficulties of combat and the aftermath, but your generation doesn't talk about it that much. It wasn't something that you guys talked about with each other, and it doesn't sound like you really have lasting effects from that difficult time. PM: I don't think so. I would say that on all of the gatherings we had -- the eight officers, we never refought the war. We never get into that. We talked about things of our present day life, family, and just enjoyed each other's company socially. SY: OK. So then it sounds like you moved through, then around the Battle of the Bulge, what happened? PM: They -- by that time, we were -- then our whole corps had moved, the 7th Army. Seventh was the Army that came up from the South. And they had a couple of corps, and they split us off from Patton, and we moved. So 3rd and 7th ran parallel through France and most of Germany, but when the Bulge hit, they were the closest. So two of their armored divisions and the recon -- similar to our recon, they moved north and went, I guess, 40 or 50 miles. We had to fill that gap they left, and we had to spread our troops out, and that's what we did. And I was in touch -- one of the four officers that had gone to Fort Knox from Norwich with me, Hal [Solon?] was in that armored group -- recon group. And I sent him a note, and he was already -- he had lost a leg, and was already on his way home. So I got a note back when it caught up with him, what had happened. So he never got up to the Bulge, he had already gotten -- but I saw him afterwards. He was active with Norwich after the war. He did fine. SY: And then it sounds like, you know, by spring, the tide has turned, right? And you're having very different experiences, all of these sort of bizarre experiences that make for good stories, right? Like, rescuing the king of Belgium. PM: Well, that was the end. And that was a happenstance and -- because the town of Strobl was -- we were told to stop here in St. Gilgen, the town of Strobl was eight miles down on the lake. And this was a gorgeous lake, about 10-12 miles long. Across from where we were in St. Gilgen, was six-seven foot high mountains. Gorgeous scenery, and Wolfgangsee was where we were. And Wolfgang town was down here, and Strobl was here, and we were here. And these -- two of the prince in Teylingen, bicycled up to St. Gilgen on an afternoon. And we were staying in this hotel, which obviously, we took over. And they come up on the porch, and we offered them a scotch. And they, sure, that'd be nice. But our mission is we want you to come to Strobl and liberate us. We've got a lousy mayor who's a tough Nazi, and he's made it -- made life miserable in the community. So we said, well, we don't have any orders. But we said, well, maybe it doesn't matter. We'll just get four officers, and we'll take my tank, and we'll just go out it. At dark, got out of the motor pool. And since we're officers, we tell the guards what we're -- where we're going. So we did. Out we went about 10 o'clock, and about 11 or before that, we arrive. And they met us at the entrance of the town. It took us right to the mayor's office, where -- but it was really fun because one of the officers had been translating for the -- some part of the government. Translating German and French, censoring material. So he could speak better German. I could speak German, but not that well. And so Nat hopped out and told the mayor that he was a no-good son of a gun, and he was through. He was our prisoner, and we were liberating the town. But the whole town was out in their pajamas having a real celebration. And then they had a nice -- Teylingen had a lovely party for us. And I think we mentioned it -- SY: Because it was you or the Russians, right? In terms of getting liberated. PM: Well, the Russians would've gotten there if we hadn't gotten there. SY: And so the town was hoping it was the Americans not the Russians. SY: Oh, they certainly didn't want the Russians. And we did send a couple officers to meet the Russians. I don't know exactly where they did, but they did meet them and got drunk on vodka. But so I can't remember exactly how far they were from. But we then learned about Leopold the next day, and that's how that all -- SY: So then you already had done one thing without orders, and then you did the next thing without orders, right? PM: Well, we didn't take the tank the next day. We took that Von Ribbentrop's six-wheel Mercedes, the staff car. All full leather seats, a gun rack in the assistant driver. The driver was on the left side, same as our cars. Not like the English. And had a rifle rack right there for the assistant. And then you could have five seats in the back to (inaudible) [00:34:20], and beautiful. And we went to Prince Von Furstenberg's house. First thing he asked about 10:30, can I get you a drink? And we had Bloody Marys, and sat there and talked, and his mother came out. And [Gerhard?] was a real gentleman, and we did see him after the war. We went back again 30 years, and he as in Vienna then, and he came out to have a reunion with us. SY: This was the Prince of Belgium? PM: He was the Prince of Austria, the Von Furstenberg family, famous family. He had been fighting on the Russian front, and he'd come back -- by that time, he'd come back. SY: Fight with? PM: With German. He had a fight with a German Army against the Russians. SY: Right. So it's odd that you were -- PM: He was out of the army by then, and back in Vienna. But he had a summer home in Strobl, and that's how he -- I don't know whether he was injured or what, but he had the -- something happened, because he had been in the fight earlier. So -- SY: Was it strange to spend time with somebody who had been on the other side? PM: Oh no, he was in -- he wouldn't have been -- he wouldn't have been in the Army if he hadn't been force to be. That, he wouldn't. It's when Germany took over Austria. SY: Yeah, yeah, the Anschluss. And then there are some other things that were really interesting. First of all, you talk about hearing about Dachau. PM: We sent one our men to go to Dachau. SY: And then when he came back, did he report to you? PM: To tell us what he saw, and the horrible scenes that he saw. I have no interest in going, because I knew -- and couple of places we found -- graves with 20-30 people. They hadn't been buried, they just laid in the graves. So we saw enough of that without even -- for me, wanting to go. SY: So you weren't surprised to hear about the concentration camps? PM: No, no. We knew about that before. You know, we were well aware of the horribleness of the Holocaust. The genocide, if you will. SY: Because people back in the US didn't really know yet about the Holocaust. PM: No, they didn't. I guess they didn't realize it. I -- maybe they didn't publicize it, but of course, I was here and knew about it. And there were more than a few, because they were in Poland and Germany. What was it, six million Jews that they killed? SY: At least six million. And then there were -- and then, you know, there were other groups that they killed as well. So we don't know the total new number. So I'm wondering if there were any other distinctive memories of your time in Europe that you sort of want to get in the record. Have we talked about the highlights? Are there any other sort of, you know, critically important moments? PM: Well, there were a lot of them important moments when I got hit -- when my tank got hit with a 75 shell, bounced off, didn't hurt us. But if I'd stayed there any longer, the second shell would've gotten me. You know, we had close calls like that. And mines were really the worst, because we could find the fighting units, the guns, and avoid them if we could. But the mines, you just had to be on the alert, and suspect that this might be a place that -- fortunately, my recon guys were pretty sharp. And we noticed areas and checked them before we just ran over them. And so -- but I lost two tanks to mines, teller mines. And both cases, my guys lost their legs, because the whole plate of armor came -- folded right up, and just cut them off here. But we, again, saved them and -- with plasma and tourniquets. And I went to visit one of them after the war, and he was already outfitted with a brand-new Oldsmobile. You didn't need any feet, you could do everything from the hydra-matic drive. And so he was -- he had been a truck driver, and he was -- but my -- I had one episode when -- I don't know if I mentioned in there, when we were attacking the town, and one trooper cavalry was on the hardpan road. And we had gone up the back woods overlooking the town from another direction. We thought we'd coordinate two troops with -- and they got stopped by a road block that they couldn't penetrate. And they were fighting, and we jumped off from the woods. Turned out, the field was mud, and two of the tanks just went right in the mud. Couldn't go, they got stuck. My tank, I just told my driver, I said, George, take your hands off the laterals. Don't try to control it. Just keep the full speed. And it kept moving, and we did get to the one single road across. Fortunately, I did, because I had a platoon of the recon troops who had taken over some trenches close to the town. But they had kicked the Germans out of it and taken over, but they needed someone there to support them. So I had to stay there for about five hours, and the Germans were shooting at me. And I bet at least I had 200 rounds shot at me, but we kept moving the tank. Didn't keep it in one place. And I was firing up where I knew they were shooting. So they claim I might have gotten one of the guns. I don't know, never would worry about that. But I stayed with them until dark. When they withdrew, I withdrew. So we saved them. They -- SY: What happened to the two tanks that got stuck in the mud? PM: When I -- I called them on the radio and told them to abandon, but put grenades in the gun and blow the guns. So they were disabled. After the war, they were still there. Still there for -- I don't know where they are now. SY: Did you go -- did you see them? Did you go back to Europe and see them? PM: I didn't go back. We went back 30 years later, but someone who had been there said the tanks were there. But they were no -- well, they were no good, because the guns were ruined. SY: Right, you disabled them. I wonder how they got rid of those tanks. I wonder how they moved them eventually. PM: Well, they had to wait until there was solid ground, and they'd have to go in with a crane and pull them out. But -- so they might be in a museum somewhere around. SY: They might. Who knows? Do you think you were a good leader, and do you think Norwich prepared you well for war? PM: Oh, I think Norwich -- everything regarding the military and Norwich was fine and appropriate for what we needed as officers going into combat. We had --- even though we were on horseback, we still had a lot of background and realized what was involved in fighting. And so I have no bad feelings at all about anything that I learned at Norwich. I think I could put it to use and -- SY: And do you think you were a good leader and a good officer? PM: Well, I ended up as a captain, so I didn't -- and I couldn't get promoted. Because at the time when I was a platoon leader -- because we had three platoons, 17 tanks, and each platoon was assigned to one recon troop. So when they were out -- I usually was B Troop because I was 2nd Platoon. But the company commander and the exec officer never fought. My tank company, they were at headquarters all the time. They never were fighting and -- because 1st Platoon was A Troop, 2nd Platoon -- B Troop, and C Troop, and they -- we never fought as a tank company. So they just were -- but there were no promotions either. You couldn't get to be the company commander because -- but in the econ troops, there was movement, because they can move to headquarters. And from -- and a number of them did. They could go from captain to major, and be at headquarters in another role. And then -- and that's what happened in B Troop. Lieutenant Bennett, who was with me -- who I fought with, he got promoted to captain when his company commander moved to headquarters. But there was no movement in the tank. SY: No, that makes sense. So let's talk about -- because I know, you know, we don't have endless time. So let's talk about you getting home and what it was like. First of all, did you -- what made you decide to leave the Army? PM: I didn't. SY: You didn't? PM: I didn't. I stayed in the Reserve. SY: Oh, you did. OK. But you didn't want to be career Army? PM: Oh no. I had no idea of career Army. SY: What was you thinking about that? PM: Well, I had no intent, but since I was in the Reserve, I was part of a tank battalion that met in Stanford, Connecticut every two weeks. And I was serving -- well, I was a captain, but I was serving in a major's role. And we did training, and we did -- and I was in until '51, I guess it was. So I was still active. But right in the middle of that the Korean War was just getting going. Two business came to me and asked me to go to Washington on a dollar a year assignment to handle the tool and die industry. They hadn't had a director of the tooling industry in World War II. They'd had machine tools and related, but they never had tool and die. And then they realized that they needed that because there were about 3,000 tool and die shops, and those tools were put on machine tools. So you can't have a machine tool, you got to put the molds and dies in the fixtures. So because I would -- I had finished -- I had gone back to MIT after the war. Because I had advanced degrees -- these businessmen who ran beautiful businesses, you know, had come through apprentice route, didn't have college background. They felt they wanted a -- should have a college person down there. So I ended up doing it for a year, and it that was what I called a graduate degree in government. You learned about Washington. I was there five days a week. Came home Friday night, flew back, and then went to my office all day Saturday and Sunday morning. Got on the Sunday night train out of Bridgeport, got into Washington Monday morning at 7:00, and went right to the office. SY: That sounds exhausting. PM: Well, it was so -- it was a busy year. SY: Did you have a family at that point? PM: I had one son, and a wife, and a little house here in Fairfield close to water -- and very pleasant. And she had her own car, and we had two cars. And -- but most the time, she drove me to the station, and then she'd pick me up in Newark when I flew back. So bring the youngster down with us. But -- SY: Oh, sorry. PM: Go ahead. SY: When you first came back, what was it like to adjust to civilian life again? PM: Well, it was -- I had 90 days of leave. I got out of -- I had to go back to Massachusetts at the camp -- oh, I forget. And we had to go back there to bust her out. But -- and my sister drove up and picked me up. And I was engaged at the time, and by February, I got married. And we took a week's long honeymoon down south and visited some of the World War II officers I had served with. And then a week later, I was at MIT, and grad work for two years. And my wife and I lived in Boston in Needham, and she went to Boston University and took courses. So -- and then we had our -- we had our first son in the last semester of the second year. And -- but I had the company business where I had agreed to join the business when I was in the war. My brother -- four years older, had come back. He was in ordinance in India, and he was a major, and they sent him back to command school in Leavenworth to become a lieutenant colonel. But while he was back, he took time and took a look at our factory and what was going on. And he wrote me a -- about a 10 page letter describing what's happening, and inviting me to consider joining him as a partner if I was interested. SY: And was it -- had it been your father's business? PM: My father was the president of the business, and -- not the major owner, but he had three other owners. And what happened was I got the letter when I was in heavy combat, and I couldn't even read it for a couple of days. But then eventually I got around to answering it, and then right after, I got another letter. And I said, you know, I think two things. I've got to go back and go to MIT, and get up to date on business management and engineering. And then if I do that, I'm willing to join you, but I want equal ownership and I want equal salary, but I don't care about titles. But he was senior, and it worked for 45 years. SY: And over the course of your career, you witnessed, you know, the decline of American manufacturing. How did that affect your business and -- PM: Well, our business was -- well, I'd been out 25 years now. But the second generation -- my son who died, and my nephew who still runs the business, we didn't just -- we bought another business in Bridgeport and merged the two. And then started a whole new technology business in New Hampshire, which is doing fine. And the -- what's left here in Bridgeport is 20 percent of what it was, but the New Hampshire business has been booming. Mostly Asia and Europe, 25 percent here in America, but 50 percent at least, Asia and 25 here. And we have another third business out in New York State, and that's in small tools, and that's doing fine. And I had a business in Mexico for a while, and I started one in Canada for a while. They both -- I gave one away, and the other one just finishing up after 65 years. Winding it down, so that's gone. But the businesses are fine, and fourth generation is in it. My grand-nephews are now in their late 30s, early 40s, and they're digging in. So things have done very well. I'm out of it completely other than just life insurance -- should be. SY: So let's talk about Norwich. So when did you start getting -- when did you get on the board of trustees, and why did you want to back in -- you know, involved with Norwich again? PM: Well, when I was at Norwich, in addition to being president of the class and valedictorian -- as I told you, I was one of the trouble makers. With the fraternities, the old rules were that the freshmen would pay for the orchestra for carnival week, but not be allowed to attend. And I, for one, said that's nonsense. Either you let us in the fraternities before carnival week, or we're not about to pay a couple thousand dollars for a New York orchestra coming up for you guys to have a good time. Well, they didn't think that was -- the class ahead, who became juniors, they -- us -- they agreed to change the fraternity rushing to November. In fact, around Thanksgiving or after Thanksgiving. But they wouldn't rush the class after us, because we screwed it up. So they didn't want us. But -- and one of my father's business partners was SigEp, and he wanted me to go to SigEp. And -- but these guys were, we don't want you guys. Eventually, they invited me to Theta Chi, and I was happy. Then I became president of Theta Chi. And then later, I was president of the inter-fraternity counsel, which was quite a turnaround from screwing them up three years before. Anyway, I enjoyed it, but I -- we had bought land with Theta Chi across from where SigEp -- is where the president lives now. We had -- and Theta Chi is over there -- a new house. We were in an old three story big house on Central Avenue. We had the money and bought the land. And when I came back from the war, I wanted to find out what happened to the funds we had. Well, they had screwed around with it, and we raised hell. And finally they got back on track, and began to put some money aside and build a house. So I stayed with it. And for some reason or another, I stayed in the alumni association, but I was not president of it. I was vice president at the time. When typically, the president was invited to the board as one of the alumni, and Harmon asked me to do it rather than the president. Which was a little embarrassing. So I can came on for a five year stint. And then -- I don't know exactly what day it was, but 1970 was when I took over as chairman. And -- SY: And what was going on at Norwich in 1970? PM: Well, Harmon was the president. And at that time, we didn't have ladies in the corps, and Vermont College was independent. So a lot of things were -- I think we were 600 or so cadets, and now horses -- tanks were replacing the horses. And Norwich had built several new buildings, it was making good progress. The upper campus was -- I don't -- SY: And then Hart became president. PM: Well, Harmon -- this was let's see, 70 -- SY: Was is Hamlett after Harmon? PM: Hamlett came first. Harmon stayed until '65, and then the Vietnam War was a big factor. SY: And how did that change the climate of campus? PM: Well, I wouldn't say it -- we had to elect -- Harmon had -- I think had 15 years or whatever, and he wanted out. And we were able to get a four-star general, Hamlett, who was vice chief of staff of the Army, and a wonderful man. And -- but it was Harmon -- oh, and Bill Adams, who was chairman of the board, and Louie Cavat of the Cavat family. They left the board meeting when Bill Adams said, it's my turn to step down. So the three of them became a nominating committee of whatever we had -- 25 member board. They came back and selected me. I don't know why, because there were military officers there. There were others -- guys that -- SY: So what role -- so the Todds say you played a really critical role in kind of keeping Norwich together in hard times. So can you talk about those hard times and -- PM: Well, that was the Vietnam War, for one. And when Barksdale Hamlett had cancer in the back, and he had to leave for health reasons. It was a hell of job finding a replacement. Who in the Vietnam era at '72, wanted to be president of a military college. And we had search committee, a good search committee, and one was lieutenant general. We -- but he wasn't -- he said he's not up to doing that job. He was a good, wonderful person. And we interviewed a number of people, but military people weren't interested. So we came back to Loring Hart, who was head of the English department. And I had a difficult time -- one thing, the chairman and the president have got to have a good rapport. You got to work together, and got to understand each other. And Hamlett and I had had excellent communication, and there was never any problems. And he knew that I wouldn't interfere with his role, and I knew where the limits were. And faculty often would come to me and ask -- I'm not gonna bypass the president. You go there, not to me. And I told him explicitly and a matter of fact, I met the whole -- the staff faculty senate and told them. I'm not interfering with pay scales or tenure or anything, that's not my role. So we made that clear and -- but finding a new president, Loring was the best we could do. Well, you're on your way. SY: Nice meeting you. PM: OK. She's out to dinner. So that was an awkward period, and Loring was -- he wasn't good at selecting -- F1: Your car is blocking me. SY: Oh no. No problem, let me move it. F1: I should have thought of that sooner. PM: Anyway -- SY: So yeah, so what happened under Loring Hart? PM: Loring was a wonderful person, but difficult in selecting subordinance, putting them in the role. And that was true all the way through. And I just don't think he was a good enough administrator. At one point, I told him he had to go to -- back to -- I'm trying to think, the American -- anyway, they have courses for corporate executives. I said, you got to go to one of these for at least a week, and get some background in executive authority. And he did, because I lectured him time and again. You've got to get the right people in the right positions who are qualified to do what needs to be done. And you can't just select people because you like them. You got to know what they're capable of. So he got the message, and he did it, he went to San Francisco to let's see, American Association of whatever. I had been to courses up in New York State for corporate executives, and they were wonderful. They really helped you. And I met some Fortune 500 companies heads there. Made longtime friends with them. Anyway, we got that done, but at the end of eight years, we -- by then we had brought women into the corps. And that meant, you know, we had to clean out our barracks and allow that strictly for women, and we had to integrate them. And then Vermont College got in trouble, they didn't have sufficient endowment. And the president decided he was ready to leave, so there wasn't any conflict. And it made sense to us to merge with them, so we went through that merger during Loring's administration. And again, that was difficult because we had to change key people over there. And two or three times, he made the wrong choices. But finally at the end of eight years, I talked to the executive committee and said I think it's time we begin looking for a new president. Obviously, he and his wife resisted very much. SY: And were probably hurt. PM: Oh yeah, yeah. And -- but I said for the good of the university, we got to do -- got to do something. And it took two years to flush it out. And we were in the executive committee meeting in Boston, at the Ritz, and we had a vote. And the vote was that -- I don't know but the executive committee was probably 11 people then, and only one voted for him. And then we decided we needed to get a new president, and we had already had a search committee. And we had identified Russ Todd as the potential. And I can remember at that -- after we had made the decision on Loring, and we already had looked at and settled on five candidates, that Russ Todd was the best. And we went through a very rigorous procedure of criteria -- and of his background. And then also laid out an eight-point plan that he had to agree to as far as running Norwich, and what had to be done. SY: It seems like you two worked very well together. PM: We did. Yeah. The same with Barksdale Hamlett. SY: So what enabled you and Russ Todd to work so well together? PM: Well, because he knew right from the start that we had laid out what he had had to agree to to become president. And he didn't mince any words, he was very forthright about everything he did. Russ, you could depend on, no BS, he told you right straightforward how he felt and what he would like. And -- but as I said at the outset, you got to have a relationship -- SY: And he said, you know, that he'd call you and you'd talk for an hour -- for hours, and you'd give him advice. So what advice were you giving him? How did you sort of -- PM: Well, I can't tell you that, could I? SY: You can't tell me that. PM: Well, I don't know because whatever the issue was -- SY: And then how did -- it seems like Norwich got back on its feet, so what happened? How did it get back on its feet? PM: Well, one thing we -- when I finished as chairman, we really went after campaign fundraising. We had very little endowment back in the early days. The first job I took as I stepped down as chairman was a 16 million dollar fundraising drive to get us launched, and we did. We raised that 16. And then we had a very strong investment committee with Fred Weintz because of his Goldman Sachs background. He had connections and contacts, and so we were doing a thorough job of investment management. You know, using the right resources, and then continuing. And now -- of course, back then -- it was 40 years ago, we started doing that. A dollar is a little different today. And the new generation of business leaders and Norwich grads are much better off. And -- SY: So, I'm just wondering -- you know, I didn't ask you at the beginning of the interview why you decided to go to Norwich, but that question connects to sort of why does Norwich mean so much to you? You've dedicated a lot of your life and time to the institution. So why? What's special about it? PM: What's -- two things that started me, my family and my high school principal, Dr. -- Mr. Hedges. His sister was the registrar at Norwich. And I had grown up with horses. Two things. They felt I needed discipline, and I enjoyed the horse life. And I played polo with Norwich and things. So I -- and they had a good chemical program. And one of my dad's partners had suggested that maybe chemistry was a good start, because he had done a lot of work for DuPont. Knew about them, and said, maybe. So I said, well, why don't I take a chemistry course, and Norwich has a good one. And so the combination of all three. SY: Yeah, sure. But then why did Norwich continue to be meaningful in your life? A lot of people are like, yeah, I went to school there, who cares. But you really dedicated a lot time to it, so what is special about the institution? PM: Well, I think everything is special. Particularly, to see it prosper and grow, and begin to really have a place in the academic world -- strong place, and one you can be proud of. And comparing to Citadel and VMI and Texas A&M, and not -- nobody -- the officers that I was with in the service were Texas A&M. So they all were cavalry background too. So we had a lot of commonality. But just to -- well, the fraternity was one thing, and when we got rid of the fraternities, Harmon was still there. He called me on the phone and asked me to -- his -- my advice about the fraternities. And since I'd been head of the counsel and head of the Theta Chi, I said, well, sympathize what you're saying -- because they were disregarding the discipline. So I went up to Norwich and went to Theta Chi unannounced, and just observed and talked to few of the cadets. I called Harmon and said, I'm with you, let them go. They're a distraction for the university. And they did, and I'm still on Theta Chi's list because it's the Alpha Chapter. And I had given them some money, but I don't now. SY: How do you feel about Norwich as it is today? It's very different than it was then. I know some alumni aren't thrilled about there being civilians on campus and things like that. How do you feel about all that? PM: Well, I helped the merger, so I was there as part of -- and a lot of -- well, first, VC was in trouble. When we merged it, we were not planning to bring it over to the campus. But it became obvious after a few years that us commuting back and forth from classes and all of that, just you better have one campus, because you're not that huge a school. And I was happy at the second civilian dorm was finished -- 285 people, so that's pretty good size. And I also -- you know, this -- our society is not just the military. And I'm happy that we have civilians, but I think because of our military program and honor code and discipline, it rubs off on the rest of them. I think it makes them better than -- better students and better people, and their -- the value system. SY: Interesting. I don't know if I have any other questions for you. Anything you want to add? PM: Oh, I had not planned -- when I took the job, I -- usually, it's a five year term. And I had another board member whose father had been to Norwich, and White Chapel was -- that's the father that -- a name for him. And Bill White was a year behind me, and he was on the board then -- replaced his father. And I think we all agreed that Bill would be the next one to follow me. And I -- because I think because of his father's background and all of that, he thought maybe he would be the selected one, and he wasn't when Harmon and the others asked me to do it. But I said to him, five years is fine. He came down with cancer with four years later, and was out of it within a couple years -- he died. So then I was in deep trouble with Loring and getting into that part. Then we were into the school mergers and the women combat. Things were just ramping up, but we managed. But again, I say it's a relationship, and we had some wonderful people on the board that -- Walter Juckett who was vice chair with me. And I was a member of his foundation, and we ended with -- he had some stock in foreign companies that he'd gotten almost gratis -- Finland, Sweden, Norway, Canada, in the wood industry. And when either Goldman Sachs or someone went over and evaluated the value of all of what they all had, they came up to many millions. And when they were bought out, that went into the foundation. And when I was having lunch with Walter in Boston one day, I said, what do you think the foundation -- a portion was coming to Norwich. Oh, he said, probably a million. It ended up to be four or five million, because he had no idea what they were gonna pay. What they'd appraised it for and what it was sold for. So I stayed on his board, and he was in foundry and machine building for the paper industry. And I had a commonality of interest, and -- but Walter and I were just very good, good friends. And he was just a wonderful person, and I could go on with anecdotes about Walter. But we did a lot of things together, including lunch at the Waldorf. And when he went to Waldorf, the waiter came in, said, oh, Mr. Juckett, you want this kind of bread? And he didn't come there every day, he -- but he was very specific about what he wanted to eat. I can remember that. But anyway, those were little anecdotes of life with -- and John Charles Daly, who was on the board -- he was "What's My Line?" He was on TV. You remember that name? Goes back, you know -- SY: I think it's before my time. PM: -- 35 years. How old are you now? SY: Thirty-six. PM: Yeah, see that goes back. He was television "What's My Line?", and he was on the board of Norwich by virtue of one of the trustees. He was chairman of the -- of a boys' school in New Hampshire, and that person recommended him to come on the board, and we became close friends. And I played golf with him down in Washington where he lived. And his wife was the daughter of the former chief of Supreme Court justice, but that was his daughter. But he was -- you know, his English language was perfect for (inaudible) [01:23:19]. And he just -- he was very serious about important things, but he was just full of fun when you got through all the heavy business. He just had a good time. So -- SY: So you had a good time on the board? PM: Yeah. Those were the kind of -- but we had a 30 member board. We brought six from VC onto the board, and they were good people. Then we had -- well, we had a lovely group of women on the board, who -- one was a lawyer in Washington, who -- topnotch person. We had -- SY: Were you involved in the decision to sell VC eventually? PM: Oh, that was over -- past my time. With -- once we moved over here, there was no reason not to sell it, and it was sold to good people. So there was no question about -- it was great property. And if someone who -- from Cincinnati -- SY: Well, they actually sold it just, you know, 10 years later -- less than 10 years later. But it's doing fine now, because it's now independent, Vermont College of Fine Arts. PM: Yeah, I don't know what it is now. SY: Yes, Vermont College of Fine Arts, it's actually doing very well. But Union Institute, that was short lived and not actually great, but -- PM: We also took part of the Marshfield College -- SY: Goddard. PM: Goddard. We took the graduate program from Goddard, and they were unionized. And we got rid of the union, brought those professors over, and they were excellent professors. They were topnotch people. SY: And they were at VC. PM: At VC? SY: Yeah. PM: Yeah, but they wanted out of Goddard too. SY: They did, because it was so unstable. PM: Well, it was a commune. SY: Well, actually, because I've interviewed a bunch of them, they didn't -- they -- a lot of them believed in Goddard's educational vision, but it wasn't economically sustainable for them and their families. PM: But they lived out in the woods with a -- I went to the campus, and I agreed that they wanted to keep their undergrad program. Yeah, that's fine. And it fitted for a certain type of people, so I was happy with that. SY: Sounds like a lot of really important decisions were made during your tenure on the board. PM: Well, I think it eventually stabilized. And in perspective looking back at it, it's hard to know how we would have done it differently in light of the circumstances. Vermont's a little different state than some others, you know? Not an easy state to do things in. So you have to put that in reasonable relationship to everything else that happened. But it -- you know, it's a changing society. It's a changing technology, which I used to be involved with. When I think back when I finished work, and where the technology is today, and then when you think of the social media that all you guys fool around with -- iPhones and oh, whatcha -- Twitter and Facebook and -- you know, I say fine, that's -- social media's great. It's done a lot of business and advertising and all that. I personally prefer person-to-person discussion, either a small group or big group. I don't want to be texting -- driving along, texting. That's not -- you know, I'm not gonna do that. Period. I have a cellphone, and I don't use it much, but I have it for safety if I need it. But when you're 93, you don't -- SY: You're certainly not gonna text and drive when you're 93. PM: I still drive, but I wonder whether I should sometimes when you get on the road. The way people cut you off and zoom, zoom. SY: Yeah, it's a fast part of world too. All right, well speaking of person-to-person contact, let's let you get to your dinner with your neighbor. PM: Well, yeah. 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