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Ten years after Chinese President Xi Jinping announced China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Kazakhstan and Indonesia, a new connectivity initiative was unveiled with great fanfare by the United States, India, and the Arab Gulf and European countries during the G20 meeting in New Delhi earlier this month.Since the announcement was made without the presence of the Russian and Chinese presidents, it has stirred conflicting interpretations. Some see it as a potential alternative to BRI, while others, pointing to the failure of similar projects backed by Western powers in the past, view it as a paper tiger.Details are still missing, but the project's ambition is enormous. It follows a transregional approach as noted by the White House statement: "Through the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), we aim to usher in a new era of connectivity with a railway, linked through ports connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia."The idea of this corridor dates back to 2021 and has also been discussed as part of the I2U2 group that includes India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the United States. Like the BRI, its design vision follows the corridor's logic. This is no surprise. "Corridorization" is the most significant spatial manifestation of infrastructural capitalism and geo-economics since the beginning of this century.Corridorization, which is part of the thriving "minilateralism" space, could be viewed as contradictory because middle powers are trying to navigate between two hardening geopolitical blocs. But the ongoing process of reshaping the global supply chain connectivities created by decades of globalization could make it a viable proposition.The BRI and the IMEC seem to share many similar goals. But there are also critical geographical differences. Most importantly, the new initiative features India, which has never been part of the BRI, as a central cross-regional player amid rearranged geo-imaginations.Each of the parties to the new initiative comes with its own perspective and interest.For the United States, the I2U2 and IMEC serve as platforms for infrastructure investment, bringing together Middle Eastern and South Asian partners and providing an alternative to Chinese projects. Washington sees this approach as an opportunity to encourage its regional partners to take a more active and independent role in shaping the region's future, allowing the United States to reduce its own resource investment while maintaining its presence and influence.For the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the goal is to strengthen their increasingly diversified and multi-networked economic diplomacy covering a wider geography. Both countries are active members of the BRI, and their cooperation with China is growing. Apart from burgeoning trade, they are dialogue partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and will soon become full members of the expanded BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Both countries are trying to expand their strategic autonomy and vying to become influential regional and international players. Getting involved in multiple new minilateral groupings is a key ingredient of their approach to strengthening their middle power status.As Saudi Arabia opens to the world with a tilt towards China, the UAE has found its new unique selling point in connectivity and multi-alignment. While diverging approaches toward geostrategic and regional issues, particularly China's rising power and global influence, remain a concern, Gulf Arab countries' participation in U.S.-led initiatives reflects their new penchant for equidistance amid U.S.-China competition.Indeed, the United States might see the IMEC as a vehicle to counter China's growing influence in the region. In the Middle East, however, competition and convergence are mixed and less black and white than the increasing U.S.-China bipolarity would suggest. If the United States expects this to be a "counter BRI" move for the region, it will likely be disappointed. Competition in the Indian Ocean could escalate, but potential synergies and convergencies should allow for some degree of mutual accommodation.India, which the United States treats as an "indispensable partner," has been showcasing a good template of multi-alignment for others to follow. It is a member of the Quad and I2U2, both comprising the United States, and it's also a member of BRICS and SCO, with China in both, despite New Delhi's feud with Beijing over border issues. The IMEC adds another thread to its longstanding multi-alignment policy, as it highlights the other connectivity corridor that India is promoting — the International North South Transport Corridor — with Iran and Russia. Together, these projects add value to India's development story and its boast that it is the fastest growing economy in the world.The new economic corridor also envisions the potential addition of Israel. This should be seen as a step in the renewed U.S. efforts to expand the Abraham Accords by facilitating the normalization of Israeli-Saudi relations. This form of regional engagement also allows Israel to manage tensions with the United States, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia in the wake of the politics of a far-right coalition led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.For Israel and the United States, expanding the Abraham Accords, especially to include Saudi Arabia, remains a top priority despite Riyadh's insistence on linking the normalization of relations to progress on the two-state solution. There are tentative indications that Netanyahu might agree to some concessions on the Palestinian front, even at the cost of his right-wing coalition falling apart, in order to capitalize and sustain Israel's broader regional integration.For China, which will soon host the first in-person BRI summit in Beijing after major COVID-19 shutdowns, IMEC throws up a challenge and an opportunity. It could dismissively treat the IMEC like the United States has done with the BRI. The other option, as indicated soon after the G20 meeting, is to demonstrate its openness to support multidirectional connectivity, even if it is not part of this corridor, as long as such projects are "open, inclusive, and form synergy," and do not become "geopolitical tools."The last piece in this new connectivity saga would be Europe, especially the Eastern Mediterranean countries. The IMEC is a welcome development because the "Global Gateway," the European Union's own connectivity project, has not gained adequate momentum because European diplomats in Brussels are hesitant about multi-alignment strategies and transregional corridors.While the IMEC is an economic-diplomatic-security interplay, its prospects will depend on its ability to promote connectivity and translate its economic potential into commercial success. Critics have already pointed out that the initiative may be unviable in terms of profit. However, it could also be argued that there are virtues other than economic efficiency. In a world of de-risking and politically induced supply chain shifts, the new corridor could be viewed as a tool for promoting strategic resilience, friendshoring, and tech cooperation, especially for middle powers.

IntroductionRapidly-growing enterprises (RGEs) can play a crucial role in emerging economies with lasting impact on their economic growth. This type of enterprises must manage the change to remain both competitive and flexible in order to survive. Similarly, the emerging economies are characterized by rapid structural change in their socio-economic institutions and traditional practices for gaining competitiveness to face the competitive pressures of the increasing globalized economy. In general, SMEs have the requisite flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances, to become a vehicle for enhancing competitiveness by upgrading their capabilities in a country, and thus become major contributors to economic growth. The added feature of RGEs is that they grow faster and achieve higher growth while facing more constrained resources than their SME counterparts. We posit that emerging economies face similar barriers and challenges and RGEs can provide valuable lessons for more effective management. Change in emerging economies is inevitable and will manifest itself at the firm, industry and institutional levels. Regardless of the original source, the instability resulting from rapid change need to be managed with a view to long term growth. For a firm to succeed in a dynamic emerging market, the lessons from other firms managing in dynamic emerging industries can be highly instructive. Emerging industries are characterized by a rapid change in terms of the definition of industry, member firms' production function, relation with buyers, suppliers and competitors. This dynamism is in part due to evolutionary changes in technology, knowledge and also is an inevitable outcome of specialization, which allows for faster growth; but results in higher interdependence of firms internationally. Emerging economies will inevitably compete with the members of those new industries; and therefore it may be efficient to learn from the players that are creating and shaping the new competitive structure. RGEs contribute to enhancing technical progress by increasing the rate of invention and innovation, and the speed with which new technology is disseminated and adopted by other firms. Globalization has forced countries to interlink their economies (Armijo, 2008), increasing their interdependence and thus forcing them to react to, and respond to change, accordingly (Hoekman and Porto, 2010). Therefore, emerging economies are facing similar situations to those of RGEs: a changing reality resulting from technological advances and shifts in macroeconomic policies due to internal and external factors such as the dynamics of WTO, Trading Blocs, among others. Given the present need of emerging markets to raise their competitive levels, RGEs are highly-suitable models from which to learn how to cope with and take advantage of the new emerging environments. In this paper we describe RGEs ´characteristics in order to learn about the crucial tasks of managing the complexity of rapid change due to the emergence change. We also explore how the emerging economies can bridge, and even close, the gap with the industrialized economies and whether or not the rapidly-growing enterprises may play an important role. The Characteristics of the Emerging Economies Emerging economies are a group of countries that play an increasingly important role in the global economy. The term "emerging economies" was originally coined by the IFC to describe a fairly narrow list of middle-to-higher income economies as a subset of developing countries. According to Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright (2000), "emerging economies" are those newly industrializing countries that have adopted market-based policies. Khanna and Palepu (1997: 42) suggest that in defining emerging economies, "the most important criterion is how well an economy helps buyers and sellers come together." They point out that the lack of proper institutions—relative to developed countries—make emerging markets more inefficient and incomplete, whereby information problems, misguided regulation, and inefficient judicial systems hamper communication between buyers and sellers. Bureaucratic judiciary systems, for example, make registration processes lengthier and costlier than in developed economies with a negative impact on transparency and providing fertile ground for favoritism and corruption. Labor markets are frequently highly regulated imposing additional costs on SMEs making them less flexible than otherwise (see Table 1). Table 1: FIRM-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS IN EMERGING ECONOMIES Output marketInput marketLow competitiveness Limited international experienceLiberalization policiesGlobalization Asymmetric access to information & to technologyLimited access to local and international capital marketsPoor dissemination of information related to international marketsLabor marketManagerial constrainsOwnership structureLack of managerial expertiseLack of consulting servicesLack of administrative structureSocial ties between senior managersFamily-owned business Sources: Adopted from Hoskisson et al. (2000), Khanna and Palepu (1997) and Mody (2004)The institutional aspects of the emerging economies Mody (2004) proposes another definition that emphasizes a) a high degree of volatility due to the transitional nature of their economic, political, social, and demographic conditions, b) the inherent trade-offs between flexibility in policy commitments, and c) the transition from transaction-specific to institutional commitments. The idea of a transition from transaction-specific to institutional commitments is appealing in view of the fact that such institutions must also subsume the socio-cultural dimension of the problem. According to North (2005), economic performance depends on institutional heritage, economic rules and, how those rules are devised and enforced, and the specific institutional constraints of each market. In order to reduce rent-seeking, free-riding and morally hazardous behaviors, it is desirable to evolve from a transaction-specifics situation to a rule-based situation, whereby the agents involved in the situation are not relevant to, or cannot influence, the due-process. Having strong and clearly-defined institutions that enhance the performance of firms is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to guaranty economic growth. Clague (1996) finds that the characteristics and stability of political regimes have an impact on economic institutions. Similarly, Mauro (1995) argues that bureaucratic and institutional efficiencies are positively correlated with political stability and that poor countries tend to have cumbersome bureaucracy and inefficient institutions. Not only the rules need to be adequate for the circumstances, but also they must be enforced. As North (1990: 107) points out, institutions "are the underlying determinant of the long-run performance of economies". The greater the transparency in terms of information and access to efficient judiciary systems the lowers transaction cost of engaging in productive activities. Artificial national asymmetries and deficiencies, for example, limited governmental support and/or biases in favor of large companies that lobby the government, creates barriers for smaller firms to access to key resources, hence, hindering their competitiveness Characteristics of Rapidly-Growing Enterprises Delmar, Davidson, and Gartner, (2003), Ala-Mutka and Etemad (2006), Fischer and Reuber (2003), Birch, Haggerty, and Parsons (1993) and Keen and Etemad (2011 and 2012) have identified a very interesting group of companies called Gazelles or, in this paper, RGEs. These companies are characterized as smaller firms experiencing explosive growth for a sustained period of time. There are not industry-specific and are found in many industries, ranging from shoes manufacturing, construction to knowledge-intensive and pharmaceutical development. Their main common characteristic is fast growth in revenues, number of employees and revenue per employee. Naturally, this rapid growth in employment and revenues are the consequents of their expansion and further penetration in local and international markets. Most of them internationalize rapidly as well by climbing over international entry barriers effectively. These aspects should be of particular interest to developing economies because of their impact at least in three ways: i) Primary and direct impact. Not only do they generate employment and incremental income but they also increase the total production of goods and service, as well as wealth, in a much shorter period of time than other enterprises. ii) Secondary impact by providing a model to learn from and emulate their action -- the spill-over effects of their success to the rest of the economy would further contributing to the well-being of their region and possibly beyond, otherwise absent (i.e., when normally growing firms are inspired, learn from and emulate local RGEs) iii) Benchmarks for best practices and world-class competitiveness. By aiming to succeed in international markets from the very beginning, these companies need to set their strategic horizons very high adopting the best managerial practices and strategies to achieve the competitive that would enable them to compete internationally at the outset. They tend to select partners, whether suppliers or buyers, that share the same working philosophy and follow similar strategies to complement them. They function collaboratively and interdependently mainly as members of networks as opposed to operating independently. RGEs are in many cases the fundamental core of potential industrial clusters that radiate their momentum to the rest of the economy. They may or may not be a part of a regional industrial cluster; but they actively manage a smaller cluster of their own value net: i.e., an efficient network of buyers and suppliers involved in the both the supply and value chains that collectively generate higher value than their counterparts. This paper will return to the topic or RGEs in the next section. It will present and briefly analyze RGEs in order to examine their main patterns of strategic operations and rapid growth for adoption by the emerging economies to speed-out the transformation of their economic growth and developments. Discussion This discussion builds on the arguments presented earlier and explores the possibility of emerging economies learning from, and emulating, RGES in the developed economies to shorten the time and the path of transformation. In so doing, five broad influential topics will assist in examining different aspect of this examination, as follows. The Need for Re-evaluation and Re-configuration of Advantages In changing environments, property-based assets lose their potency relatively faster than elsewhere. As Miller and Shamsie (1996: 522) observe ¨most competitors will be aware of the value of a rival's property-based resources, and they may even have the knowledge to duplicate these resources¨. However, the knowledge-based resources, more likely to have a higher potentials for generating competitive advantages and growth. Furthermore, the firm has more effective control over the creation and deployment of knowledge–based assets than those of property-based assets. As mentioned earlier, in dynamic environments, firms are forced to gain productivity and meet world-class standards to keep pace with others. A key suggestion of this paper, based on the experience of RGEs, is that without learning and knowledge acquisition to give rise to knowledge-based assets, capabilities and competitiveness, the probability of closing the technological gap and reducing the income inequality will simply not be feasible. Technological gap can be viewed primarily as knowledge gap combined with the lack of process know-how to exploit the technology in a timely manner. Income inequality is in part due to comparatively inefficient of firm operation characterized by their growth rates. In to the case of property-based resources, where competitor may develop the knowledge of how to replicate such resources and thus reduce the competitors' advantage, the traditional barriers (such as legal constraint or historical endowments) did not allow firms to acquire those resources easily. As discussed earlier, those barriers are eroding rapidly. In contrast, knowledge-based resources cannot be easily imitated by firms that do not already posses the requisite know-how. It would be difficult, costly or risky to replicate and time may not favour imitators. As Miller and Shamsie (1996: 522) argue, "knowledge-based resources allow organizations to succeed, not by market control or precluding competition, but by giving firms the skills to adapt their products to market needs and to deal with competitive challenges". Firms in emerging economies will have to learn how to adapt and to respond to international market needs relatively fast to reduce the risk of falling further behind. The relatively static characteristics of the closed-economies, firms were not forced to possess the requisite capabilities to deal with complex situations. Aspiring firms will have to develop collaborative skills to develop and share knowledge to devise new routines and processes to deal with increasing more complex situations. Therefore, the transitional period can be characterized by an ongoing process of unlearning the old routines and the learning the new ones, mainly from more progressive firms such RGEs in order to cope with the new requirements of increasingly more sophisticated demand conditions and tougher competition. The Need for Change in Managers Mindset and the Firm's Out Look. On the one hand, there is a need to understand the implications of the changes in order to develop potentially different courses of action available and how they affect the industry and business practices. On the other hand, according to Weick (1995), the strategic decisions of managers depend on their cognitive structures and how they make sense of the environment. Enterprises need to understand any pending or intended change in a way that "makes sense" to them, fits into some of their interpretative scheme or system of meaning (Bartunek, 1984; Ranson, Hinings, and Greenwood, 1980). When firms face a different environment, such as new international competition, new suppliers and customers, there is a need for a thorough revision because previous symbols, values, and historical attributes may no longer be relevant to the organization that faces the new reality. It is likely that there will be irreconcilable inconsistencies between key labels used in the organization and the key concepts needed for comprehending and dealing with the new reality. The awareness of alternative actions is the key to proper action "in regard to the changes occurring in the data of the markets" (Mises, 1949: 255). Past actions, thinking and experiences that were concretized in norms, standards procedures, and job specifications of the near past need to be revised and in some cases unlearned because they do not reflect the emerging reality anymore. In the entrepreneurial literature, the entrepreneur is the person who has the ability to make the transition possible, to develop new ideas and to set the strategic directions. Firms need to be alert (Kirzner, 1973) to the signal from the markets. The alertness of managers to take advantage of new opportunities and to meet changing market conditions through discovery may be considerably reduced if firms do not change their dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) in order to develop novel strategies. Firms that conducted business for years in a closed economy without much pressure to innovate and to reduce costs, face insurmountable pressures to reinvent themselves. They cannot remain indifferent because their customers will be more demanding, their supply sources will be evolving as well as the competition becoming less forgiving. (continuará en la próxima edición de Letras Internacionales)*Dr. Christian Keen, Coordinador Académico de Finanzas FACS, Universidad ORT Uruguay

This report identifies and describes the most prominent exogenous factors affecting nature-based tourism (NBT). Megatrends and associated sub-trends were identified by means of a literature review and structured using the STEEP framework, including social, technological, economic, environmental and political drivers (Dwyer et al., 2009). Research papers published in English language journals were obtained by searching electronic databases of scientific and tourism journals (Google Scholar, Web of Science, Oria). A total of 151 research papers (including 109 peer reviewed journal articles) published between the years 1998-2017 were identified. The peer reviewed research papers were published in 55 different journals spanning a wide array of disciplines. Concluding remarks put the results in the context of Norwegian nature-based toursm. Social trends • Population growth. Will lead to an overall increase in participation in nature-based tourism. However, such unprecedented growths can also lead to an overuse of natural attractions negatively affecting natural resources. • Changes in household composition. Family households are getting smaller. Sole-parent and single-person households becoming more prevalent. More income and discretionary time to travel and participate in recreational activities. • Ageing population. Healthier, wealthier and more active older persons. Growingly interested in nature-based activities which accommodate their reduced physical abilities, i.e. less strenuous activities. • Health and well-being. More emphasis on mental health; de-stressing and self-medicating. People increasingly seek out nature-based activities as a form of natural therapy/treatment. • Urbanization. Urban congestion is threatening natural environments and leading to loss of landscape. People's need for green spaces is growing, thus, the demand for NBT is increasing as well. • Changing work patterns. A reduction in physically demanding employment and household work leads to increased demand for physical activity during leisure time. The growing middle class with more flexible working conditions and an increasing disposable time and income is allowing for more flexible travel plans and a desire to spend holidays in new and exotic natural destinations. • Gender. Modern societies are more feminized and women highly influence the choice of leisure activities. Women are prone to choosing NBT activities and products of high convenience, quality and beauty. While men value challenging NBT activities (e.g. hunting, fishing, adventure activities). • Increasing cultural diversity. Multicultural society is altering NBT visitor markets. Inflow of tourists with different cultural backgrounds, preferences and expectations, may lead to conflicts among them. New management interventions required in order to accommodate tourists' different needs and expectations, and prevent probable conflicts. • Values and lifestyles. Today's tourist is money rich/time poor, individualistic, seeking unique, personalized and authentic experiences. Tourists are increasingly interested in participating in NBT activities as it helps them understand themselves better, achieve a sense of transformation and identity. Moreover, there is an increasing environmental awareness among them. Technological trends • Transportation. New technology is reducing the cost and the increasing speed of travel. Increasing accessibility to various tourist destinations. Schemes to reduce carbon emissions are expected to negatively impact destinations far from markets. • High-tech equipment. Outdoor high-tech recreational equipment and clothing are providing recreationists with increased comfort, safety and access to nature destinations. Growth in participation in different types of NBT activities. • Information and communication technology (ICT). Advanced technology allows tourist destinations to add value for their visitors and minimize operating costs. Electronic word-of-mouth becomes an increasingly important factor for destination image and travel behavior. Social media allow for more transparency between customers and suppliers. More competition among tourist destinations and greater consumer power. Mobile technology and expanded mobile service covering remote areas will encourage tourists to visit and experience new, unknown nature areas. For NBT, Internet of Things is expected to help in managing visitors flow in outdoor areas, improve traffic management and enhance the monitoring of fragile ecosystems. Indoorization of outdoor activities and artificial recreations settings may signal a shift away from recreation in nature, but it is also argued that such services can stimulate participating in NBT. Economic Trends • Economic growth in developed economies. Economic growth, increasing income and disposable time in developed countries allow more people to spend more time and money on nature-based experiences. • Economic growth in emerging economies. Economic growth in emerging economies of the BRIC nations, especially China and India, will significantly contribute to the expansion of tourism. This is leading to an alteration in the cultural and ethnic mix of tourists arriving to the EU. These tourists bring different behaviour, expectations and demands, e.g. Chinese tourists are found to be more interested in passive enjoyment of natural scenery (i.e. sightseeing) rather than active involvement in NBT activities. • Sharing economy. Tourism services and businesses such as hotels, restaurants and tour operators are being challenged and gradually replaced by individuals who offer budget-friendly services such as accommodation, transportation, excursions and meals. • Fuel costs. Despite temporary reductions, oil prices are expected to increase again which will negatively impact travel propensity via increased cost for flight tickets and introduction of fuel charges. Greenhouse gas mitigation strategies are expected to restrict and hinder future travel. Environmental trends • Climate change. Have a direct impact on NBT. Winter tourism is negatively impacted in regions such as Northern Europe and North America as winter becomes warmer and wetter; lower-altitude ski resorts are expected to face economical problems due to decline in snow cover and decline in visitation levels. While, capacity pressures will be created in higher-altitude resorts. Dog sledding and snowmobiling are also expected to face negative effects due to reduced snow cover. Climate change is leading to receding glaciers, hence, diminishing not only their aesthetic value but also their economical value associated with NBT activities such as sightseeing, trekking and skiing. Climate change is also leading to coral bleaching, starfish outbreaks and environmental degradation which negatively impact dive and snorkel tourism. • Land use and landscape change. Urbanization, rural depopulation, exploitation of land for road construction and energy production have all led to different changes to landscapes and loss of their aesthetic values. Natural landscapes are a main driving force of NBT. Hence, all such changes were found to have a negative impact on NBT via for instance reducing the attractiveness of tourist landscapes and the quality of tourists' experiences. Conflicts between various stakeholders (e.g. tourism, forestry, energy production) is also documented in the literature. Protected areas are often significant attractions in the nature-based tourism system, and more recent environmental policies in Scandinavia have emphasized the need to integrate nature-based tourism with protection of nature so that the two can be of mutual benefit. Political trends • Political turbulence, war and terrorism. Political turbulence in regions such as the Middle East, Africa and parts of Asia are predicted to diminish tourism flows overall but is predicted to enhance the attractiveness of tourist destinations perceived as 'safe'. Tourist attractions that offer settings (e.g. outdoor recreation settings) where large numbers of visitors are gathered are more prone to terror attacks and may need more security measures to ensure safety. Loss of natural heritage due to war and civil unrest is documented in the literature; examples of damaged national parks and ruined NBT industries in countries with political turbulence and terror attacks are also documented. • Changes in border regulations. Changes in border regulations via the introduction and implementation of agreements such as the Schengen Agreement or China's Approved Destination Status 'ADS' have reduced border travel restrictions, creating huge tourism opportunities and traffic in several regions worldwide. China's ADS is expected to become the largest outbound market by 2020. • Health risks. The continuing rise in international travel is a driving force in global emergence and spread of infectious diseases (e.g. Zika or Ebola virus). Future spread of persistent life-threatening diseases may make international travel be perceived as a personal risk. Future travel may be strictly regulated to prevent the spread of any virulent diseases among tourist destinations. • Geopolitics. In today's globalised world, tourism is being used as an instrument to realize particular geopolitical goals. For example, sport events among Commonwealth member states as a unification tool. China's Approved Destination Status (ADS) as a projection of its soft power. Regional blocs such as North American and the European Union Free Trade Agreement also impact tourists' movement within these multilateral entities. The report is produced with funding from BIOTOUR – a four year research project with the objective to research and disseminate key conditions for future development of nature-based tourism in the Norwegian bio-economy that contribute to business innovation, community resilience and sustainable use of resources (www.nmbu.no/biotour). ; Denne rapporten identifiserer og beskriver de viktigste faktorene som påvirker det naturbaserte reiselivet. Megatrender og tilhørende sub-trender er blitt klarlagt gjennom en litteraturstudie og strukturert ved hjelp av et eget rammeverk, STEEP, som omfatter sosiale (Social), teknologiske (Technological), økonomiske (Economic), miljømessige (Environmental) og politiske (Political) drivkrefter (Dwyer et al., 2009). Litteraturgjennomgangen baserer seg på systematiske søk i elektroniske databaser for vitenskapelige, engelskspråklige journaler (Google Scholar, Web of Science, Oria). I alt 151 forskningsbidrag (hvorav 109 fagfellevurderte tidsskriftsartikler) publisert i årene 1998-2017 ble identifisert, og disse er blitt publisert i 55 ulike tidsskrifter innenfor et bredt spekter av fagdisipliner. I konklusjonsdelen av rapporten er hovedresultatene satt inn i en norsk naturbasert reiselivskontekst. Sosiale trender • Befolkningsvekst. Vil føre til en generell økning i deltakelsen i naturbasert reiseliv. Men en slik akselererende vekst kan også føre til stort forbruk av naturattraksjoner, som igjen kan påvirke naturressursgrunnlaget på en negativ måte. • Endringer i husholdningenes sammensetning. Familiehusholdningene blir mindre. Hushold bestående av én forelder eller aleneboende blir mer vanlig. Høyere inntekter og mer fleksibel tidsbruk øker mulighetene for å reise og delta i rekreasjonsaktiviteter. • Aldrende befolkning. Bedre helse og høyere velstand blant aktive eldre personer. Økende interesse for naturbaserte aktiviteter som er tilpasset reduserte fysiske forutsetninger, dvs. mindre krevende aktiviteter. • Helse og velvære. Mer vekt på mental helse; avstressing og selvmedisinering. Folk velger naturbaserte aktiviteter som en form for naturlig terapi/ behandling. • Urbanisering. Urban vekst truer naturmiljøer og fører til tap av naturlandskap. Folks behov for tilgang til grønne områder øker, og dermed vokser også etterspørselen etter naturbasert reiseliv. • Endrede arbeidsmønstre. Reduksjon i fysisk jobbkrav og mindre anstrengende husarbeid fører til økt etterspørsel etter fysisk aktivitet i fritiden. Den voksende middelklassen med mindre rigide arbeidsbetingelser og mer disponibel tid og inntekt åpner for mer fleksibel reising og et ønske om å tilbringe ferien på nye destinasjoner med eksotisk natur. • Kjønn. Moderne samfunn er mer feminiserte, og kvinner påvirker i stor grad valg av fritidsaktiviteter. Kvinner er tilbøyelige til å velge naturbaserte reiselivsaktiviteter preget av bekvemmelighet, kvalitet og skjønnhet, mens menn i større grad søker utfordrende aktiviteter som jakt, fiske og det som representerer spenning i naturomgivelser. • Økende kulturelt mangfold. Det multikulturelle samfunnet endrer markedene i det naturbaserte reiselivet. Tilstrømmingen av turister med ulik kulturell bakgrunn, preferanser og forventninger kan føre til konflikter mellom de ulike segmentene. Nye grep fra naturforvaltningen er påkrevd for å ivareta turistenes ulike behov og forventninger, og forhindre konflikter. • Verdier og livsstiler. Dagens turist er rik på penger men fattig på tid, individualistisk, og søker unike, persontilpassede og autentiske opplevelser. Turister er i økende grad interessert i å delta i naturbaserte reiselivsaktiviteter; det hjelper dem til å forstå seg selv bedre, bidrar til en følelse av personlig forandring og uttrykker en form identitet. Videre er det en økende miljøbevissthet. Teknologiske trender • Transport. Ny teknologi reduserer reisekostnadene og øker reisehastighetene. Tilgjengeligheten til ulike turistdestinasjoner øker. Planer for å redusere karbonutslipp forventes å påvirke destinasjoner som ligger langt fra markedene, på en negativ måte. • High-tech-utstyr. High-tech utstyr og avanserte klær gir friluftslivsutøvere mer komfort, høyere sikkerhet og lettere tilgang til naturområder. Bidrar til vekst i ulike former for naturbaserte reiselivsaktiviteter. • Informasjons- og kommunikasjonsteknologi (IKT). Avansert teknologi gir turistdestinasjoner merverdi for besøkende og reduserer driftskostnader. Turistomtale i elektroniske medier blir stadig viktigere for reismålenes image og turisters reiseatferd. Sosiale media gjør tilbyder-kundeforholdet mer transparent. Mer konkurranse mellom destinasjoner og større forbrukermakt. Mobilteknologi og flere mobile tjenester som dekker avsidesliggende områder, vil oppfordre turister til å besøke og oppleve nye, ukjente naturområder. For naturbasert reiseliv forventes utstrakt bruk av internett (Internet of Things) å kunne være til hjelp i forvaltingen av turiststrømmer i naturområder, forbedre trafikkstyringen allment og raffinere overvåkningen av sårbare økosystemer. Mer tilrettelegging for aktiviteter innendørs (indoorization) og kunstig oppbygde arenaer kan signalisere et skifte bort fra rekreasjonsaktiviteter i naturomgivelser, men det er også argumentert for at slike nye tilbud kan stimulere deltakelse i naturbasert reiseliv. Økonomiske trender • Økonomisk vekst i utviklede økonomier. Økonomisk vekst, økende inntekter og mer disponibel tid i utviklede land gjør det mulig for flere å bruke mer tid på naturbaserte opplevelser. • Økonomisk vekst i utviklingsøkonomier. Økonomisk vekst i BRIC-landenes utviklingsøkonomier, spesielt i Kina og India, vil i betydelig grad bidra til ekspansjon i reisevirksomheten. Dette fører til endinger i den kulturelle og etniske sammensetningen av turister som ankommer EU. Disse gjestene har annerledes turistatferd, forventninger og krav; kinesiske turister utviser større interesse for passiv nytelse av natur og landskap (sightseeing) framfor å engasjere seg i aktive naturbaserte reiselivsaktiviteter. • Delingsøkonomi. Kommersielle foretak som hoteller, restauranter og turoperatører utfordres og blir gradvis erstattet av individer som tilbyr budsjettvennlige tjenester som overnatting, transport, utflukter og måltider. • Drivstoffkostnader. Til tross for tidvise reduksjoner forventes oljeprisen å stige, noe om vil påvirke folks tilbøyelighet til å reise på en negativ måte på grunn av økte priser på flybilletter og introduksjon av ekstra drivstoffavgifter. Strategier for å hindre utslipp av drivhusgasser forventes å begrense/ hindre fremtidig reisevirksomhet. Miljøtrender • Klimaendringer. Har direkte påvirkning på naturbasert reiseliv. Vinterturismen vil bli negativt påvirket i regioner som Nord-Europa og Nord-Amerika ettersom vintrene blir varmere og våtere; lavtliggende skidestinasjoner forventes å få økonomiske problemer som følge av redusert snødekke og mindre besøk. Det vil bli press på kapasiteten i mer snøsikre, høytliggende områder. Hundekjøring og snøskuterkjøring forventes å bli negativt påvirket på grunn av mindre snø. Klimaendringer fører til at isbreene trekker seg tilbake, noe som fører til at ikke bare deres estetiske verdi, men også økonomiske verdi knyttet til naturbaserte aktiviteter som sightseeing, brevandringer og skiturer, reduseres. Klimaendringene fører også til bleking av koraller og miljømessig degradering av marine områder som påvirker dykke- og snorklingsaktiviteter. • Arealbruk og landskapsendringer. Faktorer som urbanisering, befolkningsnedgang i distriktene, eksploatering av arealer til veibygging og energiproduksjon har alle ført til ulike typer av endringer av landskaper og tap av deres estetiske verdier. Intakte naturlandskaper er en sentral forutsetning for naturbasert reiseliv. Derfor har de nevnte faktorene negative konsekvenser for naturbasert reiseliv ettersom attraktiviteten i turistlandskapene og kvaliteten på turistopplevelsene reduseres. Konfliktene mellom ulike interessenter (turisme, skogbruk, energiproduksjon) er også dokumentert i litteraturen. Verneområder er ofte viktige attraksjoner i det naturbaserte turismesystemet, og nyere miljøpolitikk i Skandinavia understreker behovet for å integrere det naturbaserte reiselivet med områdevern til gjensidig nytte for begge parter. Politiske trender • Politisk turbulens. Krig og terrorisme. Politisk turbulens i regioner som Midtøsten, Afrika og deler av Asia forventes å redusere turiststrømmene i alminnelighet, men vil kunne øke attraktiviteten til destinasjonsområder som anses som trygge. Turistattraksjoner som tiltrekker seg store ansamlinger av besøkende (f.eks. kjente naturattraksjoner), er mer utsatt for terroranslag og vil ha behov for sikkerhetstiltak. Tap av naturarv på grunn av krig og uro er påpekt i litteraturen, og eksempler på ødelagte nasjonalparker og ruinerte naturbaserte reiselivsnæringer i land med politisk turbulens og terror er også dokumentert. • Endringer i grensekontroller. Endringer i grensekontroller gjennom introduseringen og implementeringen av avtaler som Schengen-samarbeidet eller Kinas utreisebestemmelser (Approved Destination Status, 'ADS') har redusert grenserestriksjoner og utløst enorme reisemuligheter i flere regioner rundt om i verden. Kinas ADS er forventet å bli verdens største utreisemarked i 2020. • Helserisiko. Den vedvarende økningen i internasjonal reisevirksomhet er en drivkraft i oppblomstringen og spredningen av infeksjonssykdommer (Zika eller Ebola-virus). Fremtidig spredning av vedvarende livstruende sykdommer kan bidra til at internasjonal reisevirksomhet oppfattes som en personlig risiko. Reiseaktiviteten kan tenkes å bli strengt regulert for å unngå spredning av virussykdommer i turistområdene. • Geopolitikk. I dagens globaliserte verden er turismen et redskap for å nå visse geopolitiske mål. For eksempel er felles sportsbegivenheter i Samveldenasjonene et instrument for å ivareta samholdet blant disse nasjonene. Kinas ADS er et politisk verktøy. Regionale blokker som den nordamerikanske og europeiske frihandelsavtalen påvirker også turistbevegelsene. Rapporten er finansiert av BIOTOUR – et fireårig forskningsprosjekt der formålet er å identifisere nøkkelbetingelser for videreutvikling av naturbasert reiseliv i norsk bioøkonomi som sikrer næringsutvikling, robuste lokalsamfunn og bærekraftig ressursbruk (www.nmbu.no/biotour).

Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova.  2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security.The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once.







1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.







3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.







In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.







A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.







And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "transitioning away from" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.







Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.







CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova.  2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security. The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once. 1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "leave behind" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers.DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

This Nota internacional CIDOB summarises the discussions held during a Foreign Policy Dialogue organised by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) on April 19th, 2024. It is based on contributions from the participants, although not all views and opinions expressed in this publication are necessarily theirs.Rethinking the prevailing approach to peace between Palestinians and Israelis requires more than the symbolic recognition of Palestinian statehood; it means addressing the root causes of this conflict such as colonisation and occupation, as well as practical clarity on how to guarantee the Palestinians' right to self-determination. Regional de-escalation cannot begin without a ceasefire in Gaza. In the long view, the desire to restore stability shared by most Middle Eastern countries should be seen as an opportunity to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The European Union (EU) can contribute to conflict resolution and peace by taking action against Israel's war crimes, making the two-state solution more than an empty slogan and supporting regional de-escalation.The Hamas-led attacks of October 7th, 2023, and the subsequent Israeli war on Gaza clearly represent a pivotal moment in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel's military response to these attacks, resulting in nearly 1,140 deaths and the abduction of around 240 Israelis and foreign nationals, has killed over 34,200 Palestinians, mostly civilians. Additionally, more than 85% of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip have been forcibly displaced and half of Gaza's population is on the brink of starvation. Meanwhile, violence in the West Bank has surged to levels not seen since the Second Intifada. Clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians there, coupled with increased Israeli military raids, have claimed the lives of over 460 Palestinians in the past seven months.The conflict has spilled beyond Israel and Palestine, too, heightening the risk of regional war. Increasing clashes between the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah raise the spectre of an all-out war, while other emerging flashpoints in the Red Sea, Syria, Iraq and Jordan have drawn the United States and some allies into confrontation with armed groups aligned with the "axis of resistance". The recent Iranian retaliation against Israel adds a further layer of potential risk of regional escalation.Despite mounting casualties, calls for a ceasefire in Gaza have gone unheeded. But there is a growing chorus of voices advocating for conflict resolution and peace, including High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell. While the specifics of his 10-point plan have yet to be revealed, the underlying principles resonate within the international community: a political resolution to this conflict is imperative, involving the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders alongside that of Israel. Amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza and escalating violence in the region, what impacts is this war having in Israel and the Occupied Palestinians Territories (OPT)? What does a political solution in Israel and Palestine require? How can the Palestinian question, which is pivotal to regional stability, remain at the forefront of discussions about regional de-escalation? Finally, what role can the European Union (EU) play in this volatile context? Assessing the failures in the Israeli-Palestinian conflictPrior to October 7th, the United States considered the Middle East to be "quieter" than it had been in two decades. The Hamas-led attacks shattered this perception by exposing the deep-rooted operational and conceptual failures in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Operationally, these attacks laid bare the longstanding security failures in Israel's conflict management strategy. In addition to the air, land and sea blockade of the Gaza Strip since 2007, the Israeli military occupation and expansion of illegal settlements across the West Bank have helped to make a two-state solution an elusive prospect. These approaches failed to deliver peace and security to the Israelis, not to mention how they denied Palestinian security and resulted in multilevel forms of oppression. In essence, the shift from conflict resolution to conflict management has proven ineffective.Conceptually, the Hamas attacks underscore the absence of any true "status quo" in such profoundly asymmetric circumstances, where the dominant party, Israel, continues to expand its illegal settlements in the OPT, rendering any efforts by the weaker party, the Palestinians, to challenge such a situation fraught with peril. Regionally, October 7th shattered the illusion that stability and peace in the Middle East could be attained while obliterating the Palestinian cause. Globally, they serve as a tragic reminder of the lack of accountability mechanisms and effective pressure on Israel to comply with international law and address human rights violations.While the root causes of this conflict remain the same as prior to October 7th, the main difference between the current Gaza war and previous episodes of violence lies in the unprecedented intensity of that violence. In Israel, the magnitude of the death toll resulting from the Hamas-led attacks revived the idea that Israel is under existential threat and brought an end to 39 weeks of mass protests. Portrayed by Israeli diplomats as Israel's equivalent of 9/11, these attacks have intensified calls for the erasure (or resettlement) of the Gaza Strip and the annexation of the West Bank. Israel is engaged in one of its largest and bloodiest wars since it was formed, yet the ongoing military operation has failed to achieve any of the stated goals: Hamas has not been eradicated, the Israeli hostages have not been freed through military coercion, and rockets continue to be launched from Gaza into Israeli territory. Consequently, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces pressure on at least three fronts: a military stalemate in Gaza; domestic pressure to free Israeli hostages; and growing international pressure over accusations Israel is provoking a man-made famine and committing genocide. Yet without strong US pressure, it is difficult to see an end to this war.In Gaza, the death toll and level of destruction are unprecedented. The EU's top diplomat, Josep Borrell, described the Strip as the world's "greatest open-air graveyard". According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), if the current Israeli operation were to end immediately, it would take Gaza until 2092 to restore the GDP levels of 2022. But Israel's strategy, which consisted of attacking the civil population to make it turn against Hamas, has proven a failure. While some of its leaders have been killed by Israel, Hamas is proving resilient militarily and politically. Palestinians in Gaza have not turned against it yet and support for the Palestinian movement has increased across the West Bank. Moreover, the ongoing war in Gaza has relaunched intra-Palestinian talks for national reconciliation, confirming that a role for Hamas in future negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis is inevitable.These talks should not overlook the fact that there are diverging interests between Fatah and Hamas in both the short and long term. While Fatah recognises Hamas as part of the Palestinian political landscape, it is currently under pressure from the US to exclude Hamas from any plans for after the war in Gaza. Fatah's engagement in these talks is driven by the intention on the part of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to administer Gaza once the war ends. Hamas, however, has no desire to be part of a body that has been grappling with a deep legitimacy crisis, nor does it want to participate in a hypothetical technocratic government in the Gaza Strip. Its primary objectives are to become part of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), the sole political entity representing the Palestinian people, and to have a hand in attempts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.With Israel's war against Hamas showing no signs of ending, regional escalation presents an opportunity to address these conceptual and operational failures and rethink the dominant approach to achieving peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Rethinking peace: from symbolic gestures to concrete actionIn the words of former Jordanian diplomat Marwan al-Muasher, returning to the previous negotiating format once the war on Gaza ends "would be like reheating spoiled food, and is bound to fail". Rethinking peace in the current context requires addressing the often overlooked root causes of this conflict, while applying the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.In this respect, the two-state solution should commence – rather than conclude – by addressing Israeli colonisation and occupation. Three decades on since the Oslo Accords, approximately 700,000 Israeli settlers reside illegally in the OPT. Colonisation still remains one of the main priorities of Netanyahu's government, and has accelerated dramatically since October 7th. This has exacerbated the systematic oppression, violence and discrimination against Palestinians. While various actors, including the US administration and the EU, advocate for the two-state solution, the Israeli prime minister openly stated that Israel should "control the entire area from the river to the sea" in any future arrangement. Furthermore, years-long settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank has increased over the past seven months, often with active support from the Israeli security forces. Both the US and the EU have imposed sanctions on individuals and entities financing the violence. While these sanctions are a commendable effort to hold Israel accountable for its illegal settlements, they must not overlook the systemic character of colonisation and occupation in the OPT. Discussions about the two-state solution should therefore be inseparable from ending Israeli occupation in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.Similarly, calls to recognise Palestinian statehood should carry more than symbolic weight. While they hold significant symbolic value, recognising Palestinian statehood is also an act of justice towards the Palestinians, placing them on an equal footing with Israelis. Moreover, such calls serve as a means to put pressure on Israel, which rejects the two-state solutions, and to advocate for the "revitalisation" of the Palestinian Authority. In Europe, the momentum for recognition is building, with several EU member states – including Belgium, Ireland, Malta, Norway, Slovenia and Spain – seeking to form an alliance to recognise Palestine as a nation state in accordance with the 1999 Berlin Declaration. However, the practical implications of Palestinian statehood remain unclear, highlighting the urgent need to address these issues. Questions persist regarding enforcement and implementation mechanisms to ensure Palestinian statehood, as well as how to effectively tackle colonisation and resolve the fate of over 5.9 million Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).In the immediate term, there is a consensus among observers on the need to hold new elections in both Israel and Palestine to usher in leaders committed to resolving this conflict. In Israel, the current wave of anti-government protests could trigger another snap vote. However, new elections may not necessarily bring an end to the conflict, as the majority of Israeli citizens support the ongoing war in Gaza.On the Palestinian side, the key question revolves around the role Hamas would play in such a process. Despite military setbacks, Hamas remains a necessary player in Palestinian politics. Notably, Israel has failed to "eradicate" it and its popularity has surged in the West Bank since the October 7th attacks. Put simply, Hamas is here to stay. Over the past seven months, the Palestinian movement has repeatedly signalled its willingness to engage in a peace process aimed at achieving the two state solution, which would involve recognising Israel and renouncing armed conflict against it. However, October 7th also reinforced perceptions that Hamas seeks the destruction of Israel, which presents significant obstacles to its participation in peace talks. Israel continues to call for Hamas's complete elimination and the EU continues to consider Hamas as a terrorist organisation and maintains its policy of no contact with the Islamist movement.The PA, meanwhile, faces a legitimacy crisis. There have been no elections for almost two decades and a staggering 84% of Palestinians are calling for the resignation of President Mahmoud Abbas. Despite this, the EU views the PA as the sole legitimate Palestinian interlocutor. In this context, can Hamas be excluded from Palestinian politics despite its growing popularity? If so, how can the EU avoid repeating the 2006 scenario when it rejected Hamas's victory in the democratically held parliamentary elections? More importantly, how can any peace process between Palestinians and Israelis be conducted while excluding one of the parties that is labelled a terrorist organisation? These questions become more urgent as the regional dimensions of this conflict further stress the pivotal role of Hamas in regional de-escalation efforts. Regional escalation: an opportunity for regional peace?The regionalisation of the conflict between Israel and Hamas had already happened by October 2023. Several thousand professional mercenaries and non-Israeli foreign fighters joined the IDF, while Hezbollah, the Houthis and pro-Iranian militias have attacked Israeli and US targets across the region in response to the war in Gaza. Therefore, the question is not whether regionalisation can be avoided, but rather how to prevent the situation from deteriorating. In other words, the key challenge is to avoid a complete regional unravelling.The threat of wider war became more imminent with the escalation between Israel and Iran. Over the past few months, Iran has consistently declared its intention not to get involved in this conflict as it found itself in a favourable position. Firstly, the Hamas-led attacks shattered the myth of Israel's invincibility and temporarily halted the Abraham Accords, which were threatening to marginalise Iran. Secondly, Israel has failed to achieve any of its stated objectives in its current military operation in Gaza. Furthermore, Israel faces increasing isolation on the global stage and a growing domestic discontent. Despite this, repeated Israeli attacks on Iranian targets, culminating with the air strike on Tehran's consulate in Syria, provoked a large-scale response from Iran. Iran's response may have been large in scale, but the limited damage suggests that Tehran sent a clear message to the US and Israel: it does not seek a war with Israel.From a regional perspective, the escalation between Iran and Israel serves as a litmus test for both the Abraham Accords and the ongoing reconciliation efforts between Iran and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. While some Arab states' collaboration with US intelligence and/or Israeli forces may suggest a strategic alignment with Israel, the notion of an "Arab NATO" is overstated. GCC countries are not willing to jeopardise their reconciliation with Iran by forming an anti-Iran axis, despite the importance of their strategic and security ties with the US and Israel. Conversely, since October 7th, several GCC countries have engaged in dialogue with Tehran, primarily seeking to de-escalate tensions and safeguard their own security.Contrary to what Europeans and Americans may assume, most Gulf Arab states are not inclined to choose between normalisation with Israel or reconciliation with Iran. Instead, they see the necessity for both normalisation and reconciliation to restore regional stability. Rather than viewing it as a "normalisation versus reconciliation" dilemma, most regional actors prefer a scenario of "normalisation and reconciliation". And they all agree that addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is crucial for restoring stability.In this context, the role played by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is paramount. For one thing, the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation facilitated by China has been instrumental in ensuring a minimum level of regional stability since October 2023. Following the escalation between Israel and Iran, this agreement is likely to have trickle-down effects in relation to the conflict in Yemen, regional economic cooperation dynamics and diplomacy. For another thing, a normalisation deal between KSA and Israel would not only benefit Israel but also the Biden administration, which has advocated for normalisation for several years. However, as the threat of regional escalation persists as long as the war on Gaza continues, Saudi Arabia will likely demand more concessions from the US to strike such a deal. In addition to US security guarantees and support for its civil nuclear programme, Riyadh insists on the creation of a Palestinian state as part of any such deal with Tel Aviv. Given that Arab countries have only limited ability to ease regional tensions without effective US pressure on Israel, Saudi Arabia's aspirations for regional leadership could be enhanced by advocating for the creation of a Palestinian state in exchange for normalisation of ties with Israel.While these scenarios may or may not come to fruition, one thing remains certain: regional de-escalation is impossible without a ceasefire in Gaza. Moreover, a ceasefire in Gaza alone may not suffice, considering the overlay of other conflicts. Mounting tensions between Hezbollah and Israel could escalate into full-scale war, while the Houthis in Yemen and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq have leveraged their attacks for strategic advantage. Additionally, there is no indication that the recent escalation between Israel and Iran has concluded. In essence, the regional dimensions of this conflict must be central to ongoing discussions about the "day after" in Gaza. Recommendations for the European UnionDespite the magnitude of the Gaza war, the EU appears to be stuck in the pre-October 7th era and logic, behaving as if the situation on the ground had not deteriorated. While the current conflict has deepened existing divisions among EU member states, EU officials continue to engage in the same routines, issuing regular statements expressing regret over Israel's actions in the OPT without following up with concrete action. Against this backdrop, how can EU officials navigate an approach that breaks this cycle of repetitive poor practice? Despite its waning credibility in the region, the EU still has an opportunity to contribute to peace between Palestinians and Israelis and to stabilise the new regional order in the making.First, restoring the EU's legitimacy, credibility and reputation in the region involves setting firmer boundaries regarding Israel. This means concrete action such as suspending the EU-Israel Association Agreement due to Israel's violation of the agreement's human rights clauses (as suggested by Spain and Ireland); imposing a complete arms embargo on Israel in response to its violation of international humanitarian law; and exerting effective pressure on Israel to cease its illegal settlement expansion in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem. While these actions should be taken at EU level, they can also be implemented by blocs of states, as demonstrated by the current initiative to recognise Palestinian statehood. Otherwise, the EU's failure to apply its own standards, values and principles – those it applies to Russia and Iran among others – will only render it more vulnerable to accusations of double standards and further deepen mistrust from Middle Eastern countries and societies.Second, from a regional perspective, the EU should aim for the best-case scenario for de-escalation, which would combine Arab states normalising relations with Israel and reconciliation with Iran. On the one hand, for normalisation to succeed, the Abraham Accords need to incorporate conditions for Palestinians, including the recognition of the State of Palestine and the realisation of their self-determination. On the other, any plan to de-escalate in the region should involve Iran, given its considerable influence on regional security and its leverage over Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other allies. The EU could play a key role here by diplomatically engaging with Iran to facilitate regional de-escalation. By leveraging its different approach to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the EU can contribute to building a more inclusive attitude to regional order, one that incorporates Iran rather than one shaped by an anti-Iran alliance.Third, the EU must ensure that the Palestinian question, which is crucial to regional peace, remains at the forefront of discussions related to regional stability. In the short term, a European call for – and action towards – a ceasefire in Gaza is necessary to fulfil the EU's duty and moral obligation to prevent further Israeli war crimes. Additionally, concrete action is required from the EU to make the two-state solution more than just an empty slogan. To achieve this, Brussels needs clarity on the form the State of Palestine would take and how to support it. This involves addressing issues relating to Israel's occupation, colonisation, borders and Palestinian refugees, among others, and participating in enforcement and implementation mechanisms for the recognition of Palestinian statehood.In this regard, one of the most challenging issues is how the EU will address the fact that Hamas is a necessary actor in present and future negotiations for a political settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Brussels still adheres to its policy of no contact with Hamas, despite the acknowledgement that Hamas will not be eradicated by Israel. In addition, Palestinians and many countries in the Middle East share the same observation: discussing a hypothetical state of Palestine while excluding Hamas would not only impact any project aimed at "revitalising" the Palestinian Authority, but also perpetuate this conflict for many more decades to come.All the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB or its donorsDOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2024/305/enISSN: 2013-4428

This Nota internacional CIDOB summarises the discussions held during a Foreign Policy Dialogue organised by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) on April 19th, 2024. It is based on contributions from the participants, although not all views and opinions expressed in this publication are necessarily theirs.Rethinking the prevailing approach to peace between Palestinians and Israelis requires more than the symbolic recognition of Palestinian statehood; it means addressing the root causes of this conflict such as colonisation and occupation, as well as practical clarity on how to guarantee the Palestinians' right to self-determination. Regional de-escalation cannot begin without a ceasefire in Gaza. In the long view, the desire to restore stability shared by most Middle Eastern countries should be seen as an opportunity to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The European Union (EU) can contribute to conflict resolution and peace by taking action against Israel's war crimes, making the two-state solution more than an empty slogan and supporting regional de-escalation.The Hamas-led attacks of October 7th, 2023, and the subsequent Israeli war on Gaza clearly represent a pivotal moment in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel's military response to these attacks, resulting in nearly 1,140 deaths and the abduction of around 240 Israelis and foreign nationals, has killed over 34,200 Palestinians, mostly civilians. Additionally, more than 85% of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip have been forcibly displaced and half of Gaza's population is on the brink of starvation. Meanwhile, violence in the West Bank has surged to levels not seen since the Second Intifada. Clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians there, coupled with increased Israeli military raids, have claimed the lives of over 460 Palestinians in the past seven months.The conflict has spilled beyond Israel and Palestine, too, heightening the risk of regional war. Increasing clashes between the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah raise the spectre of an all-out war, while other emerging flashpoints in the Red Sea, Syria, Iraq and Jordan have drawn the United States and some allies into confrontation with armed groups aligned with the "axis of resistance". The recent Iranian retaliation against Israel adds a further layer of potential risk of regional escalation.Despite mounting casualties, calls for a ceasefire in Gaza have gone unheeded. But there is a growing chorus of voices advocating for conflict resolution and peace, including High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell. While the specifics of his 10-point plan have yet to be revealed, the underlying principles resonate within the international community: a political resolution to this conflict is imperative, involving the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders alongside that of Israel. Amid the ongoing conflict in Gaza and escalating violence in the region, what impacts is this war having in Israel and the Occupied Palestinians Territories (OPT)? What does a political solution in Israel and Palestine require? How can the Palestinian question, which is pivotal to regional stability, remain at the forefront of discussions about regional de-escalation? Finally, what role can the European Union (EU) play in this volatile context? Assessing the failures in the Israeli-Palestinian conflictPrior to October 7th, the United States considered the Middle East to be "quieter" than it had been in two decades. The Hamas-led attacks shattered this perception by exposing the deep-rooted operational and conceptual failures in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Operationally, these attacks laid bare the longstanding security failures in Israel's conflict management strategy. In addition to the air, land and sea blockade of the Gaza Strip since 2007, the Israeli military occupation and expansion of illegal settlements across the West Bank have helped to make a two-state solution an elusive prospect. These approaches failed to deliver peace and security to the Israelis, not to mention how they denied Palestinian security and resulted in multilevel forms of oppression. In essence, the shift from conflict resolution to conflict management has proven ineffective.Conceptually, the Hamas attacks underscore the absence of any true "status quo" in such profoundly asymmetric circumstances, where the dominant party, Israel, continues to expand its illegal settlements in the OPT, rendering any efforts by the weaker party, the Palestinians, to challenge such a situation fraught with peril. Regionally, October 7th shattered the illusion that stability and peace in the Middle East could be attained while obliterating the Palestinian cause. Globally, they serve as a tragic reminder of the lack of accountability mechanisms and effective pressure on Israel to comply with international law and address human rights violations.While the root causes of this conflict remain the same as prior to October 7th, the main difference between the current Gaza war and previous episodes of violence lies in the unprecedented intensity of that violence. In Israel, the magnitude of the death toll resulting from the Hamas-led attacks revived the idea that Israel is under existential threat and brought an end to 39 weeks of mass protests. Portrayed by Israeli diplomats as Israel's equivalent of 9/11, these attacks have intensified calls for the erasure (or resettlement) of the Gaza Strip and the annexation of the West Bank. Israel is engaged in one of its largest and bloodiest wars since it was formed, yet the ongoing military operation has failed to achieve any of the stated goals: Hamas has not been eradicated, the Israeli hostages have not been freed through military coercion, and rockets continue to be launched from Gaza into Israeli territory. Consequently, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces pressure on at least three fronts: a military stalemate in Gaza; domestic pressure to free Israeli hostages; and growing international pressure over accusations Israel is provoking a man-made famine and committing genocide. Yet without strong US pressure, it is difficult to see an end to this war.In Gaza, the death toll and level of destruction are unprecedented. The EU's top diplomat, Josep Borrell, described the Strip as the world's "greatest open-air graveyard". According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), if the current Israeli operation were to end immediately, it would take Gaza until 2092 to restore the GDP levels of 2022. But Israel's strategy, which consisted of attacking the civil population to make it turn against Hamas, has proven a failure. While some of its leaders have been killed by Israel, Hamas is proving resilient militarily and politically. Palestinians in Gaza have not turned against it yet and support for the Palestinian movement has increased across the West Bank. Moreover, the ongoing war in Gaza has relaunched intra-Palestinian talks for national reconciliation, confirming that a role for Hamas in future negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis is inevitable.These talks should not overlook the fact that there are diverging interests between Fatah and Hamas in both the short and long term. While Fatah recognises Hamas as part of the Palestinian political landscape, it is currently under pressure from the US to exclude Hamas from any plans for after the war in Gaza. Fatah's engagement in these talks is driven by the intention on the part of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to administer Gaza once the war ends. Hamas, however, has no desire to be part of a body that has been grappling with a deep legitimacy crisis, nor does it want to participate in a hypothetical technocratic government in the Gaza Strip. Its primary objectives are to become part of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), the sole political entity representing the Palestinian people, and to have a hand in attempts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.With Israel's war against Hamas showing no signs of ending, regional escalation presents an opportunity to address these conceptual and operational failures and rethink the dominant approach to achieving peace between Palestinians and Israelis and. Rethinking peace: from symbolic gestures to concrete actionIn the words of former Jordanian diplomat Marwan al-Muasher, returning to the previous negotiating format once the war on Gaza ends "would be like reheating spoiled food, and is bound to fail". Rethinking peace in the current context requires addressing the often overlooked root causes of this conflict, while applying the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.In this respect, the two-state solution should commence – rather than conclude – by addressing Israeli colonisation and occupation. Three decades on since the Oslo Accords, approximately 700,000 Israeli settlers reside illegally in the OPT. Colonisation still remains one of the main priorities of Netanyahu's government, and has accelerated dramatically since October 7th. This has exacerbated the systematic oppression, violence and discrimination against Palestinians. While various actors, including the US administration and the EU, advocate for the two-state solution, the Israeli prime minister openly stated that Israel should "control the entire area from the river to the sea" in any future arrangement. Furthermore, years-long settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank has increased over the past seven months, often with active support from the Israeli security forces. Both the US and the EU have imposed sanctions on individuals and entities financing the violence. While these sanctions are a commendable effort to hold Israel accountable for its illegal settlements, they must not overlook the systemic character of colonisation and occupation in the OPT. Discussions about the two-state solution should therefore be inseparable from ending Israeli occupation in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.Similarly, calls to recognise Palestinian statehood should carry more than symbolic weight. While they hold significant symbolic value, recognising Palestinian statehood is also an act of justice towards the Palestinians, placing them on an equal footing with Israelis. Moreover, such calls serve as a means to put pressure on Israel, which rejects the two-state solutions, and to advocate for the "revitalisation" of the Palestinian Authority. In Europe, the momentum for recognition is building, with several EU member states – including Belgium, Ireland, Malta, Norway, Slovenia and Spain – seeking to form an alliance to recognise Palestine as a nation state in accordance with the 1999 Berlin Declaration. However, the practical implications of Palestinian statehood remain unclear, highlighting the urgent need to address these issues. Questions persist regarding enforcement and implementation mechanisms to ensure Palestinian statehood, as well as how to effectively tackle colonisation and resolve the fate of over 5.9 million Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).In the immediate term, there is a consensus among observers on the need to hold new elections in both Israel and Palestine to usher in leaders committed to resolving this conflict. In Israel, the current wave of anti-government protests could trigger another snap vote. However, new elections may not necessarily bring an end to the conflict, as the majority of Israeli citizens support the ongoing war in Gaza.On the Palestinian side, the key question revolves around the role Hamas would play in such a process. Despite military setbacks, Hamas remains a necessary player in Palestinian politics. Notably, Israel has failed to "eradicate" it and its popularity has surged in the West Bank since the October 7th attacks. Put simply, Hamas is here to stay. Over the past seven months, the Palestinian movement has repeatedly signalled its willingness to engage in a peace process aimed at achieving the two state solution, which would involve recognising Israel and renouncing armed conflict against it. However, October 7th also reinforced perceptions that Hamas seeks the destruction of Israel, which presents significant obstacles to its participation in peace talks. Israel continues to call for Hamas's complete elimination and the EU continues to consider Hamas as a terrorist organisation and maintains its policy of no contact with the Islamist movement.The PA, meanwhile, faces a legitimacy crisis. There have been no elections for almost two decades and a staggering 84% of Palestinians are calling for the resignation of President Mahmoud Abbas. Despite this, the EU views the PA as the sole legitimate Palestinian interlocutor. In this context, can Hamas be excluded from Palestinian politics despite its growing popularity? If so, how can the EU avoid repeating the 2006 scenario when it rejected Hamas's victory in the democratically held parliamentary elections? More importantly, how can any peace process between Palestinians and Israelis be conducted while excluding one of the parties that is labelled a terrorist organisation? These questions become more urgent as the regional dimensions of this conflict further stress the pivotal role of Hamas in regional de-escalation efforts. Regional escalation: an opportunity for regional peace? The regionalisation of the conflict between Israel and Hamas had already happened by October 2023. Several thousand professional mercenaries and non-Israeli foreign fighters joined the IDF, while Hezbollah, the Houthis and pro-Iranian militias have attacked Israeli and US targets across the region in response to the war in Gaza. Therefore, the question is not whether regionalisation can be avoided, but rather how to prevent the situation from deteriorating. In other words, the key challenge is to avoid a complete regional unravelling.The threat of wider war became more imminent with the escalation between Israel and Iran. Over the past few months, Iran has consistently declared its intention not to get involved in this conflict as it found itself in a favourable position. Firstly, the Hamas-led attacks shattered the myth of Israel's invincibility and temporarily halted the Abraham Accords, which were threatening to marginalise Iran. Secondly, Israel has failed to achieve any of its stated objectives in its current military operation in Gaza. Furthermore, Israel faces increasing isolation on the global stage and a growing domestic discontent. Despite this, repeated Israeli attacks on Iranian targets, culminating with the air strike on Tehran's consulate in Syria, provoked a large-scale response from Iran. Iran's response may have been large in scale, but the limited damage suggests that Tehran sent a clear message to the US and Israel: it does not seek a war with Israel.From a regional perspective, the escalation between Iran and Israel serves as a litmus test for both the Abraham Accords and the ongoing reconciliation efforts between Iran and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. While some Arab states' collaboration with US intelligence and/or Israeli forces may suggest a strategic alignment with Israel, the notion of an "Arab NATO" is overstated. GCC countries are not willing to jeopardise their reconciliation with Iran by forming an anti-Iran axis, despite the importance of their strategic and security ties with the US and Israel. Conversely, since October 7th, several GCC countries have engaged in dialogue with Tehran, primarily seeking to de-escalate tensions and safeguard their own security.Contrary to what Europeans and Americans may assume, most Gulf Arab states are not inclined to choose between normalisation with Israel or reconciliation with Iran. Instead, they see the necessity for both normalisation and reconciliation to restore regional stability. Rather than viewing it as a "normalisation versus reconciliation" dilemma, most regional actors prefer a scenario of "normalisation and reconciliation". And they all agree that addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is crucial for restoring stability.In this context, the role played by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is paramount. For one thing, the Saudi-Iranian reconciliation facilitated by China has been instrumental in ensuring a minimum level of regional stability since October 2023. Following the escalation between Israel and Iran, this agreement is likely to have trickle-down effects in relation to the conflict in Yemen, regional economic cooperation dynamics and diplomacy. For another thing, a normalisation deal between KSA and Israel would not only benefit Israel but also the Biden administration, which has advocated for normalisation for several years. However, as the threat of regional escalation persists as long as the war on Gaza continues, Saudi Arabia will likely demand more concessions from the US to strike such a deal. In addition to US security guarantees and support for its civil nuclear programme, Riyadh insists on the creation of a Palestinian state as part of any such deal with Tel Aviv. Given that Arab countries have only limited ability to ease regional tensions without effective US pressure on Israel, Saudi Arabia's aspirations for regional leadership could be enhanced by advocating for the creation of a Palestinian state in exchange for normalisation of ties with Israel.While these scenarios may or may not come to fruition, one thing remains certain: regional de-escalation is impossible without a ceasefire in Gaza. Moreover, a ceasefire in Gaza alone may not suffice, considering the overlay of other conflicts. Mounting tensions between Hezbollah and Israel could escalate into full-scale war, while the Houthis in Yemen and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq have leveraged their attacks for strategic advantage. Additionally, there is no indication that the recent escalation between Israel and Iran has concluded. In essence, the regional dimensions of this conflict must be central to ongoing discussions about the "day after" in Gaza. Recommendations for the European UnionDespite the magnitude of the Gaza war, the EU appears to be stuck in the pre-October 7th era and logic, behaving as if the situation on the ground had not deteriorated. While the current conflict has deepened existing divisions among EU member states, EU officials continue to engage in the same routines, issuing regular statements expressing regret over Israel's actions in the OPT without following up with concrete action. Against this backdrop, how can EU officials navigate an approach that breaks this cycle of repetitive poor practice? Despite its waning credibility in the region, the EU still has an opportunity to contribute to peace between Palestinians and Israelis and to stabilise the new regional order in the making.First, restoring the EU's legitimacy, credibility and reputation in the region involves setting firmer boundaries regarding Israel. This means concrete action such as suspending the EU-Israel Association Agreement due to Israel's violation of the agreement's human rights clauses (as suggested by Spain and Ireland); imposing a complete arms embargo on Israel in response to its violation of international humanitarian law; and exerting effective pressure on Israel to cease its illegal settlement expansion in the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem. While these actions should be taken at EU level, they can also be implemented by blocs of states, as demonstrated by the current initiative to recognise Palestinian statehood. Otherwise, the EU's failure to apply its own standards, values and principles – those it applies to Russia and Iran among others – will only render it more vulnerable to accusations of double standards and further deepen mistrust from Middle Eastern countries and societies.Second, from a regional perspective, the EU should aim for the best-case scenario for de-escalation, which would combine Arab states normalising relations with Israel and reconciliation with Iran. On the one hand, for normalisation to succeed, the Abraham Accords need to incorporate conditions for Palestinians, including the recognition of the State of Palestine and the realisation of their self-determination. On the other, any plan to de-escalate in the region should involve Iran, given its considerable influence on regional security and its leverage over Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other allies. The EU could play a key role here by diplomatically engaging with Iran to facilitate regional de-escalation. By leveraging its different approach to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the EU can contribute to building a more inclusive attitude to regional order, one that incorporates Iran rather than one shaped by an anti-Iran alliance.Third, the EU must ensure that the Palestinian question, which is crucial to regional peace, remains at the forefront of discussions related to regional stability. In the short term, a European call for – and action towards – a ceasefire in Gaza is necessary to fulfil the EU's duty and moral obligation to prevent further Israeli war crimes. Additionally, concrete action is required from the EU to make the two-state solution more than just an empty slogan. To achieve this, Brussels needs clarity on the form the State of Palestine would take and how to support it. This involves addressing issues relating to Israel's occupation, colonisation, borders and Palestinian refugees, among others, and participating in enforcement and implementation mechanisms for the recognition of Palestinian statehood.In this regard, one of the most challenging issues is how the EU will address the fact that Hamas is a necessary actor in present and future negotiations for a political settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Brussels still adheres to its policy of no contact with Hamas, despite the acknowledgement that Hamas will not be eradicated by Israel. In addition, Palestinians and many countries in the Middle East share the same observation: discussing a hypothetical state of Palestine while excluding Hamas would not only impact any project aimed at "revitalising" the Palestinian Authority, but also perpetuate this conflict for many more decades to come.All the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution.DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2024/305/en

This document is based on the debates of the Santander-CIDOB Future Leaders Forum online session titled "Bridging the digital global governance gap: international cooperation and the regulation of emerging technologies" that took place on November 21st, 2023; and the video interviews with the selected leaders from the Santander-CIDOB 35 under 35 List. The document is structured in three blocs: first, it introduces the current landscape of international digital cooperation, second, it identifies the key challenges to achieve a global framework to regulate technology; and finally, it highlights three proposals for international digital cooperation identified by the participants. The text was finalized on December 21st, 2023.The rapid development of emerging technologies is driving unprecedented changes with profound implications for our societies. On the one hand, innovations such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), including its generative capabilities, are welcomed by public administrations, businesses, and citizens because they bear the promise of enormous opportunities, the potential to help solve global challenges and the positive transformation of our societies. In fact, these technological innovations are already being used by governments and businesses alike. Indeed, AI is increasingly considered a common good, with the potential to help us in decision-making processes, improving efficiency and service delivery, and addressing some of the global challenges, such as climate change or pandemic prevention. On the other hand, this swift progress is filled with risks which need to be prevented if possible and mitigated if not. While some of these risks are still unknown, it has become evident that societies cannot afford the cost of not regulating these technologies. The potential disruption of established social structures, rising inequality, the concentration of power in digital companies, the material and social costs linked to new technologies, threats to fundamental rights – such as privacy or freedom of expression – and the increase of cyber threats are some of the reasons why regulation is imperative. This situation has become evident in the past years, with renewed enthusiasm and hyperactivity in the governance of digital technologies alongside the development of multiple initiatives to promote international cooperation in digital and technological areas. However, the ever-changing landscape of emerging and disruptive technologies has evidenced the lack of global governance and international cooperation frameworks capable of responding to the challenges arising from these developments, with many of these initiatives only finding traction in a reactive – rather than proactive – manner. Additionally, as the United Nations highlights, there are many gaps in global digital cooperation, with multiple areas of digital governance and new technologies still unregulated. Moreover, in areas where some progress has been achieved, it has been at the cost of fragmentation and voluntary frameworks. Thus, a new push towards global digital cooperation is more needed than ever, especially in a complex context characterised by permacrises, growing conflict, changing globalisation patterns, and the erosion of democratic governance.1. What is global digital cooperation?In May 2020, as the world was grappling with the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the United Nations Secretary-General published a report to establish a Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. This effort, which signals the relevance of digital technologies for rethinking the role of effective multilateralism, aimed to identify a set of five areas where the international community should collaborate and cooperate regarding the use of digital technologies while, at the same time, reducing and mitigating potential risks. One of these five key areas is fostering global digital cooperation, which is defined as a multi-stakeholder effort in which governmental actors and other stakeholders, including the private sector, technology companies, civil society, or academia, jointly work to achieve an interoperable framework for digital technologies. This approach aims to guarantee the adoption of effective, inclusive, and practical solutions and policies in the digital and technological domains (UN, 2020, p. 22). The prioritisation of global digital cooperation within the UN framework was further emphasised under the Secretary-General report in 2021, titled Our Common Agenda. This document invoked the adoption of a Global Digital Compact based on shared principles for an "open, free and secure digital future for all" for the first time (p. 63). Between 2022 and 2023, negotiations between member states and consultations with relevant stakeholders have advanced within the UN with the intention to avoid the fragmentation of the Internet, increase digital connectivity, build trust within cyberspace and promote the regulation of Artificial Intelligence. The culmination of this process will be the adoption of the Global Digital Compact during the 2024 Summit of the Future. However, the UN hasn't been the sole institution promoting new initiatives of global digital cooperation. Indeed, the unprecedented irruption of generative AI at the end of 2022 set off a global – although uncoordinated – push towards regulation, with significant advances in technical and standard-setting procedures and around social and ethical aspects of AI. Initiatives by other international organisations, like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); plurilateral agreements such as the Bletchley Declaration on security risks of AI adopted by 30 countries – including China – during the United Kingdom's AI Safety Summit in 2023; as well as regulations at national level and guidelines by private actors are rapidly proliferating. The most recent example is the G-7 adoption of the Hiroshima AI Process Comprehensive Policy Framework in December 2023, which includes guiding principles for the development of AI systems and a code of conduct with multiple recommendations for developers and users, with an explicit focus on disinformation, as well as project-based cooperation. The European Union (EU) has been at the forefront of many of these efforts, aiming to provide the world's first comprehensive legislation with solid standards in AI. The AI Act represents an act of 'courage', which will establish a series of technical standards, but it will also create moral ones. Through a de-risking approach to regulation, this initiative aims to identify some no-go zones in the development, deployment, and use of AI technologies – especially for those considered high-risk. In December 2023, the European Parliament and the European Council reached a provisional agreement on the AI Act, which will be ratified in early 2024.The EU's AI Act is the latest addition to Brussels' arsenal of digital regulations, including the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA). In 2022, the EU adopted the Declaration on European Digital Rights, proposing a digital transition defined by European values and six principles, including a people-centric approach, solidarity and inclusion, freedom of choice, sustainability, safety and security, and participation. Moreover, the EU has also adopted further legislation in highly specialised domains, such as the management of crypto assets, with the adoption of the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MICA) in 2023. Concurrently, the EU and the United States have strengthened cooperation on standards and technical underpinnings of regulation through the Trade and Technology Council (TTC). These elements are setting the framework for the future development of the data economy, the European industry, and the digital future of Europe – but with potential expansion beyond European borders, reminiscing the 'Brussels Effect' after the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) adoption. Cities are another actor of utmost relevance. While local governance is embedded and affected by national regulations, cities are also key players in experimentation, cross-border collaboration, and regulation. Trying to close the global governance gap, local governments are also adopting their own frameworks – such as AI strategies or public procurement clauses sensitive to human rights – and implementing bans on specific applications, including facial recognition technologies. One of the successful examples of good practices on AI governance at this level is the adoption of AI registries by cities such as Helsinki or Amsterdam to ensure transparency and accountability. However, no actor – country, organisation or forum - has become the centre for digital cooperation and technology regulation. While no single approach can address the multiplicity of global challenges of emerging technologies given the transnational nature of the digital and cyber domains, as well as growing digital interdependence, what these examples show is how the current governance landscape is fragmented, nationally and internationally (Fay, 2022). Furthermore, there is a considerable overlap between the different initiatives, regulations and mechanisms addressing digital issues. This creates a highly complex architecture for coordination and cooperation without the certainty of its effectiveness (UN, 2019).2. What are the challenges to adopt an effective global governance framework to regulate emerging technologies?While there have been increasing calls from different stakeholders to adopt a global approach in the regulations of these technologies, especially AI, it is important to ask why we have failed to do so until now.Firstly, given the transnational nature of digital issues alongside the speed of technological change and development, it is challenging to rely on traditional forms of governance based on sovereignty and territoriality to regulate technology. Our current tools and structures for regulation are insufficiently agile and lack the flexibility to ensure adaptation to future challenges, needs and unknown risks (Wheeler, 2023). Indeed, deep, continuous international collaboration will be fundamental to adapt to groundbreaking developments and ensure that adopted frameworks do not foreclose the opportunity for civil society and latecomer actors to get their perspectives on the table. Moreover, the multidimensional impact of digital technologies cuts across different policy issues managed by different governmental structures or international organisations. The lack of a global institution with a substantive mandate to develop a policy model or regulation of technology that is truly universal further complicates the efforts to adopt a global framework for cooperation.Secondly, there has been a lack of consensus on critical and baseline issues. Taking the example of artificial intelligence, the first of these barriers has been the lack of consensus in such fundamental issues such as its definition, the venue or process that is desirable for the governance of disrupting technologies, the authority and responsibility of actors involved in regulation – including the role of the private sector and big tech – or the digital future (a more utopian or a dystopian one?) that we imagine (Colomina, 2023). This absence of consensus is also visible in the lack of a shared understanding by different actors of how basic foundations and principles of international law apply to the use of technologies. As such, there is a mismatch of focus and agreement on what we are regulating, which tools we have or should create or which areas we should prioritise in global cooperation.Thirdly, past efforts to adopt a global framework have failed given the diversity of interests, values, or approaches to risks. Regulation faces an inherent tension between the promotion and defence of national interests and values, the balance of ethical issues and human rights and the protection of the fundamental freedoms of every citizen. In other words, it is a tension between protecting rights and promoting innovation. A clear example is the more consumer-oriented approach of EU regulation of technologies, which contrasts with the security and control-focused Chinese model or the US' laissez-faire. According to Tiberghien, Luo and Pourmalek (2022) digital governance is fragmenting around the US, European, Chinese and Indian models – marked by multiple splits on the role of state, data ownership, industrial innovation and competitiveness, and protection and fundamental rights. In contrast, there is a significant disparity of substantive participation between the actors involved in global digital cooperation. Developing countries, for example, are still facing significant digital divides and may lack the resources for a successful participation in some of these debates and initiatives, being then forced to follow systems that do not fit their realities, concerns or needs. A similar trend is also visible in a more individual-focused perspective, where non-experts, indigenous communities, women, youth and elderly, and people with disabilities are not able to join the discussions or may lack the capacity to participate in a meaningful way. Fourthly, the most evident challenge is the growing trend of politicisation and securitisation of digital technologies and its intersection with growing geopolitical rivalries between the United States and China. Together with the EU and India, these actors are bidding to achieve technological supremacy and to dominate the standard setting of these technologies to harvest the benefits of their development and use. In parallel, each jurisdiction is becoming wary of the risks from data and digital technologies, prompting the adoption of more protectionist measures to achieve data sovereignty. The centrality of technology in their competition heavily influences the capability to reach a consensus on international standards while promoting contrasting approaches to regulate digital issues.In conclusion, the lack of a coherent, global approach is unsettling the international order in digital governance and negatively impacting the delivery of effective and innovative solutions for the governance of digital and technological issues. This situation has consequential risks, such as the splintering of the Internet or the incapacity of successfully responding to critical problems, given the failure to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth assessment of multiple risks, vulnerabilities, and outcomes of digital and technological developments. The different rules and regulations – as well as the existing gaps, for example, the military use of these technologies – can have deep impacts on governance and, as a result, on citizens' lives. Paradoxically, guidelines and regulations are more needed than ever in the current context.3. Towards an effective global digital cooperationTaking into consideration the challenges of establishing a set of shared values to guide technology development and deployment, global digital cooperation should be people-centered, transparent, open, ethical, inclusive, and equitable while keeping in mind the multi-level, multi-issue and multi-stakeholder nature of digital and tech governance.Considering the current challenges and developments, the international community should focus on making progress in three different areas: Meaningful multi-stakeholderism The recent digital advances show the tension and interplay between two different cultures of governance: a bottom-up multi-stakeholder approach – for example, in the open consultation processes adopted by the UN for the Global Digital Compact – and a top-down multilateral approach which gives primacy to the role of states. However, even in these multi-stakeholder initiatives, the current objective is a multilateral solution for a better tomorrow, implying the subordination of multi-stakeholder processes to multilateral solutions.As a result, the emphasis must be placed on achieving meaningful multi-stakeholderism while upholding inclusivity and effective participation. Current efforts at regulating these technologies are being led and dominated by traditional technological powerhouses – such as the US, the EU or China–, creating a highly specialised conversation with a limited number of countries alongside a small pool of big tech companies. Countries from the Global South are mostly absent or overlooked in ongoing regulatory processes. As such, adopted international agreements may not be suitable for non-Western realities.Besides more a representative global cooperation in terms of geography, the different actors involved – governmental representatives, civil society actors, academia and the private sector – should have the opportunity to participate and influence the conversations on an equal footing. Diversity of genders, generations, and underrepresented communities – including most vulnerable populations, indigenous communities, and people with disabilities – must have their participation ensured. This is also especially relevant when addressing and ensuring youth participation – as the decisions taken today will ultimately define their future. Each of these groups can bring a unique perspective to the table and, through communication and trust-building measures, these initiatives can help build consensus and common understandings, and identify shared challenges and risks. In conclusion, the governance of technology must incorporate democratic and participatory elements on national and international levels.Ensuring interoperability across regulatory frameworks and enforcementThe current hyperactivity in the international landscape risks creating a patchwork approach with too many loopholes that allow easy forum shopping. As a result, the most urgent task at hand is the need for coordination. Feedback loops should be established between ad hoc, regional and international initiatives to avoid duplication, overlapping – and contradicting – efforts. As Internet governance is a cross-cutting issue, the current siloed governance should be connected to accurately address and respond to related issues around digital technologies that cross borders, topics, rights, and regulations. As such, for a truly comprehensive and harmonised regulatory framework, intergovernmental processes and global multilateral forums should be aligned, with a clear division of labour and consistency when it comes to the rules that apply to the work of these forums. Beyond ensuring policy coordination, two further concerns and challenges that arise from current efforts are the interoperability of regulations and the consequent protection of citizens who could be subjected to different jurisprudential criteria depending on applicable legislation. By building international frameworks grounded in consensus-adopted shared values, different jurisdictions should be committed to following this leadership by the international community while retaining enough flexibility to develop regimes tailored to their domestic environments. This can be further encouraged through capacity-building initiatives in the digital and cyber domains at a global level, using cooperation to assist countries with practical insights on regulation and implementation. Moreover, further collaboration through bringing legal expertise and knowledge will be necessary to support other countries in transposing international agreements and standards in their own legislations as well as its implementation and enforcement.Finally, a further challenge will be how to fulfil the promises made in regulations to safeguard rights effectively. Enforcement and sanctioning will be a requirement for the international community. As such, these international agreements need to become binding. The development of global, joint enforcement mechanisms and a sanctions framework for those who fail to comply should also be part of global digital cooperation debates and efforts.Going beyond regulationBesides the challenges of interoperability and enforcement, global digital cooperation should extend beyond regulation. While regulation is a fundamental first step, it is important to acknowledge that it is not enough to produce the desired change of cooperation and risk mitigation of emerging technologies. Previous experiences, such as the GDPR, offer relevant insights into the limitations of regulation to promote a shift in business models or different Internet behaviour. While the GDPR established clear obligations on the processing of personal data by operators, some have managed to circumvent or avoid these obligations. The €1.2 billion fine to Meta for violating the data privacy rules established in the GDPR is a clear example of how enforcement is not working. As such, other creative and innovative approaches should be considered – including the establishment of a new, digital social contract.Moreover, the unequal development and adoption of technologies around the world and the knowledge of these issues require further research and the development of capacity-building actions. Sharing best practices, promoting training for public administrations and the private sector, and ensuring the exchange of knowledge will be essential to guarantee that the benefits of these technological changes are equally shared. Regulations should also be coupled with awareness-raising campaigns to ensure that citizens, users, and developers are aware of their rights and responsibilities under these new frameworks.Additionally, given the unpredictable risks and impacts of these disruptive technologies, it is crucial to establish common safe spaces for experimental development, including sandboxes, funded by public bodies. The deployment of these spaces can help us identify and understand in the early stages of the development process the risks of specific technologies, but also, to test the effectiveness of regulations. These spaces will be useful in risk assessments. Adopting standards based on a value-sensitive design and participatory approaches for assessing the impact of these technologies before they are deployed in the market will test their respect for human rights and limit their negative externalities.Furthermore, global digital cooperation needs to provide public global goods and technological solutions for all. Government involvement can further enhance innovation, adopting a supporter investor and early customer role for these technology advancements. As such, countries should invest and develop open, shared digital public infrastructure – from computing power to democratically and justly governed data layers –, to boost global digital connectivity and ensure it is accessible for entrepreneurs and citizens. More critically, technological transfer will also be key between developed, emerging, and developing countries to leverage the opportunities of digital technologies and close the digital divide.Finally, one ambitious proposal concerns the need to establish new effective and flexible institutions of global governance that manage the profound changes that digital technologies pose for our societies. From international agencies to monitor and verify compliance, to global advisory bodies for truly multi-stakeholder and all-inclusive processes, public participation must be ensured to build the foundations of the future and take ownership of the governance of the unprecedented transformations for our societies.ReferencesColomina, Carme. "Una IA ética: la UE y la gobernanza algorítmica". CIDOB Opinion, 784 (December 2023). (online) https://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/opinion_cidob/2023/una_ia_etica_la_ue_y_la_gobernanza_algoritmicaFay, Robert. "Global Governance of Data and Digital Technologies: A Framework for Peaceful Cooperation". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022. (online) https://www.cigionline.org/articles/global-governance-of-data-and-digital-technologies-a-framework-for-peaceful-cooperation/Tiberghien, Yves; Luo, Danielle and Pourmalek, Panthea. "Existential Gap: Digital/AI Acceleration and the Missing Global Governance Capacity". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022 (online). https://www.cigionline.org/articles/existential-gap-digitalai-acceleration-and-the-missing-global-governance-capacity/United Nations (UN). Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. International Governance Forum, 2019 (online). https://intgovforum.org/en/content/report-of-the-un-secretary-general%E2%80%99s-high-level-panel-on-digital-cooperationUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. New York: United Nations, May 2020 (online). https://www.un.org/techenvoy/sites/www.un.org.techenvoy/files/general/Roadmap_for_Digital_Cooperation_9June.pdfUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Our Common Agenda. New York: United Nations, 2021 (online).https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/assets/pdf/Common_Agenda_Report_English.pdfWheeler, Tom. "The three challenges of AI regulation" Brookings Commentary, June 2023 (online). https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-three-challenges-of-ai-regulation/

This document is based on the debates of the Santander-CIDOB Future Leaders Forum online session titled "Bridging the digital global governance gap: international cooperation and the regulation of emerging technologies" that took place on November 21st, 2023; and the video interviews with the selected young leaders from the Santander-CIDOB 35 under 35 List. The document is structured in two blocs: first, it introduces the current landscape of international digital cooperation and the key challenges to achieve a global framework to regulate technology; and second, it highlights three proposals for international digital cooperation identified by the participants. The text was finalized on December 21st, 2023.The rapid development of emerging technologies is driving unprecedented changes with profound implications for our societies. On the one hand, innovations such as artificial intelligence, including its generative capabilities, are welcomed by administrations, businesses, and citizens because of their promises of enormous opportunities, the potential solution to global challenges and the positive transformation of our societies. These technological innovations are already being used by governments and businesses alike. AI is increasingly considered as a common good, with the potential to help us in decision-making processes, improving efficiency and service delivery and addressing some of the global challenges, such as climate change or pandemic prevention. On the other hand, the swift progress is also filled with risks, including challenges to fundamental rights, which need to be prevented if possible and mitigated if not. While some of these risks are still unknown, it has become evident that societies cannot afford the cost of not regulating these technologies. The potential disruption of established social structures, rising inequality, the concentration of power in digital companies, the material and social costs linked to new technologies, threats to fundamental rights – such as privacy or freedom of expression – and the increase of cyber threats are some of the reasons why regulation is imperative. This situation has become evident in the past years, with renewed enthusiasm and hyperactivity in the governance of digital technologies alongside the development of multiple initiatives to promote international cooperation in digital and technological issues. However, the ever-changing landscape of emerging and disruptive technologies has evidenced the lack of global governance and international cooperation frameworks capable of responding to the challenges arising from these developments, with many of these initiatives only finding traction in a reactive – rather than proactive – manner. Additionally, as the United Nations highlights, there are still many gaps in global digital cooperation, with multiple areas of digital governance and new technologies still unregulated. Moreover, in those areas where some progress has been achieved, it has been at the cost of fragmentation and voluntary frameworks. Thus, a new push towards global digital cooperation is more needed than ever, especially in a complex context characterised by permacrises, security instability and growing conflict, changing globalisation patterns, and the erosion of democratic governance.1. What is global digital cooperation?In May 2020, as the world was grappling with the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the United Nations Secretary-General published a report aimed at establishing a Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. This effort, which signals the relevance of digital technologies for rethinking the role of effective multilateralism, aimed to identify a set of five areas – such as the digital economy or the protection of human rights in cyberspace – where the international community should collaborate and cooperate with regards to the use of digital technologies while, at the same time, reducing and mitigating potential risks. One of these five key areas is fostering global digital cooperation, which is defined as a multi-stakeholder effort in which governmental actors and other stakeholders, including the private sector, technology companies, civil society, or academia, among others, jointly work to achieve an interoperable framework for digital technologies. This approach aims to guarantee the adoption of effective, inclusive, and practical solutions and policies in the digital and technological domains (UN, 2020, p. 22).The prioritisation of global digital cooperation within the UN framework was further emphasised under the Secretary-General report in 2021, titled Our Common Agenda. This document invoked the adoption of a Global Digital Compact based on shared principles for an "open, free and secure digital future for all" for the first time (p. 63). Between 2022 and 2023, negotiations between member states and consultations with relevant stakeholders have advanced within the UN with the ambition to avoid the fragmentation of the internet, increase digital connectivity, build trust within cyberspace and promote the regulation of artificial intelligence. The culmination of this process will be the adoption of the Global Digital Compact during the 2024 Summit of the Future. However, the UN hasn't been the sole institution promoting new initiatives of global digital cooperation. Indeed, the unprecedented irruption of generative AI at the end of 2022 set off a global – but also uncoordinated – push towards regulation, with significant advances in technical and standard-setting procedures and around social and ethical aspects of AI. Initiatives by other international organisations, like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); plurilateral agreements such as the Bletchley Declaration on security risks of AI adopted by 30 countries – including China – during the United Kingdom's AI Safety Summit in 2023; as well as regulations at national level and guidelines by private actors are rapidly proliferating. The most recent example is the G-7 adoption of the Hiroshima AI Process Comprehensive Policy Framework in December 2023, which includes guiding principles for the development of AI systems (keeping a whole life-cycle approach, from design to deployment and use), and a code of conduct with multiple recommendations for developers and users, with an explicit focus on disinformation, as well as project-based cooperation. The European Union (EU) has been at the forefront of many of these efforts, aiming to provide the world's first comprehensive legislation with solid standards in AI. The AI Act represents an act of "courage", which will establish a series of technical standards, but it will also create moral ones. Through a de-risking approach to regulation, this initiative aims to identify some no-go zones in dthe development, deployment, and use of AI technologies – especially for those considered high-risk. In December 2023, the European Parliament and the European Council reached a provisional agreement on the AI Act, which will be ratified in early 2024.The EU's AI Act is the latest addition to Brussels' arsenal of digital regulations, including the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA). In 2022, the EU also adopted the Declaration on European Digital Rights, proposing a digital transition defined by European values and six principles, including a people-centric approach, solidarity and inclusion, freedom of choice, sustainability, safety and security, and participation. Moreover, the EU has also adopted further legislation in highly specialised domains, such as the management of crypto assets, with the adoption of the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MICA) in 2023. Concurrently, the EU and the United States have strengthened cooperation on standards and technical underpinnings of regulation through the Trade and Technology Council. These elements are setting the framework for the future development of the data economy, the European industry, and the digital future of Europe – but with potential expansion beyond European borders, reminiscing the 'Brussels Effect' after the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Cities are another actor of utmost relevance. While local governance is embedded and affected by national regulations, cities are also key players in experimentation, cross-border collaboration, and regulation. Trying to close the global governance gap, local governments are also adopting their own regulation – such as AI strategies or public procurement clauses sensitive to elements such as human rights – and even implementing bans on specific applications, including facial recognition technologies. One of the successful examples of good practices on AI governance at this level is the adoption of AI registries by cities such as Helsinki or Amsterdam to ensure transparency and accountability.However, no actor – country, organisation or forum - has become the centre for digital cooperation and technology regulation. While no single approach can address the multiple global challenges of emerging technologies given the transnational nature of the digital and cyber domains, as well as growing digital interdependence, what these examples show is how the current governance landscape is fragmented, nationally and internationally (Fay, 2022). Furthermore, there is a considerable overlap between the different initiatives, regulations and mechanisms addressing digital issues. This creates a highly complex architecture for coordination and cooperation without the certainty of its effectiveness (UN, 2019).2. What are the challenges to adopt an effective global governance framework to regulate emerging technologies?While there have been increasing calls from different stakeholders to adopt a global approach in the regulations of these technologies, especially AI, it is important to ask why we have failed to do so until now.Firstly, given the transnational nature of digital issues alongside the velocity of technological change and development, it is difficult to rely on traditional forms of governance based on sovereignty and territoriality to regulate technology. Our current tools and structures for regulation are insufficiently agile and lack the flexibility to ensure adaptation to future challenges, needs and unknown risks (Wheeler, 2023). Indeed, in the regulation of technologies, deep, continuous international collaboration will be fundamental to adapt to groundbreaking developments and ensure that adopted regulations do not foreclose the opportunity for civil society and latecomer countries to get their perspectives on the table. Moreover, the multidimensional impact of digital technologies cuts across different policy issues which are managed by different governmental structures or international organisations. The lack of a global institution with a substantive mandate to develop a policy model or regulation of technology that is truly universal further complicates the efforts to adopt a global framework for cooperation.Secondly, there has been a lack of consensus on critical and baseline issues. Taking the example of artificial intelligence, the first of these barriers has been the lack of consensus in such fundamental issues such as its definition, the venue or process that is desirable for the governance of disrupting technologies, the authority and responsibility of actors involved in regulation – including the role of the private sector and big tech – or the digital future (a more utopian or a dystopian one?) that we imagine (Colomina, 2023). This lack of consensus is also visible in the lack of a shared understanding of how basic foundations and principles of international law apply to the use of technologies by different actors. As such, there is a lack of focus and agreement on what we are regulating, which tools we have or should create or which areas we should prioritise in global cooperation.Thirdly, past efforts to adopt a global framework have failed given the diversity of interests, values, or approaches to risks. Regulation faces an inherent tension between the promotion and defence of national interests and values, the balance of ethical issues and human rights and fundamental freedoms protection for every citizen. In other words, it is a tension between protecting rights and promoting innovation. A clear example is the more consumer-oriented approach of EU regulation of technologies, which contrasts with the security and control-focused Chinese model or the US' laissez-faire. According to Tiberghien, Luo and Pourmalek (2022) digital governance is fragmenting around the US, European, Chinese and Indian models – marked by multiple splits on the role of state, data ownership, industrial innovation and competitiveness, and protection and fundamental rights. In contrast, there is a significant disparity between the actors involved in global digital cooperation. Developing countries, for example, are still facing significant digital divides and may lack the resources for a successful participation in some of these debates and initiatives, being then forced to follow systems that do not fit their realities, concerns or needs. A similar trend is also visible in a more individual perspective, where non-experts, indigenous communities, women, youth and elderly, and people with disabilities are not able to join the discussions or may lack the capacity to participate in a meaningful way. Fourthly, the most evident challenge is the growing trend of politicization and securitization of digital technologies and its intersection with growing geopolitical rivalries between the United States and China. Together with the European Union and India, these actors are bidding to achieve technological supremacy and dominate the standard setting of these technologies in order to harvest the benefits of their development and use. In parallel, each jurisdiction is becoming wary over the risks from data and digital technologies, prompting the adoption of more protectionist measures to achieve data sovereignty. The centrality of technology in their competition heavily influences the capability to reach consensus on international standards while promoting contrasting approaches to regulate digital issues.The lack of a coherent, global approach is unsettling the international order in digital governance and negatively impacting the delivery of effective and innovative solutions for the governance of digital and technological issues. This situation has consequential risks, such as the splintering of the Internet or the incapacity of successfully responding to critical problems, given the failure to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth assessment of multiple risks, vulnerabilities, and outcomes of digital and technological developments. The different rules and regulations – as well as the existing gaps, for example, the military use of these technologies – can have deep impacts on governance and, as a result, on citizens' lives. And, while paradoxically, guidelines and regulations are more needed than ever in the current context.3. Towards an effective global digital cooperationTaking into consideration the challenges of establishing a set of shared values to guide technology development and deployment, global digital cooperation should be people-centered, transparent, open, ethical, inclusive, and equitable while keeping in mind the multi-level, multi-issue and multi-stakeholder nature of digital and tech governance.Considering the current challenges and developments, the international community should focus on making progress in three different areas: Meaningful multi-stakeholderism The recent hyperactivity in digital advances shows the tension and interplay between two different cultures of governance: a bottom-up multistakeholder approach, for example in the open consultation processes adopted by the UN for the Global Digital Compact, as well as a top-down multilateral approach that still gives primacy to the role of states. However, even in these multistakeholder initiatives, the current objective is a multilateral solution for a better tomorrow – which implies the subordination of multistakeholder processes to multilateral solutions.As a result, the emphasis must be placed on achieving meaningful multi-stakeholderism while upholding inclusivity and effective participation. Current efforts at regulating these technologies are being led and dominated by traditional technological powerhouses – such as the US, the EU or China–, creating a highly specialized conversation with a small pool of countries alongside a small pool of big tech companies. Countries from the Global South are mostly absent or overlooked in ongoing processes. As such, adopted international agreements may not be fit for purpose for non-Western realities.Besides more representative global cooperation in terms of geography, the different actors involved – governmental representatives, civil society actors, academia and the private sector – should have the opportunity to participate and influence the conversations on an equal footing. Diversity of genders, generations, and underrepresented communities – including most vulnerable populations, indigenous communities, and people with disabilities – must also see their participation ensured. This is also especially relevant when addressing and ensuring youth participation – as the decisions taken today will ultimately define their future. Each of these groups can bring a unique perspective to the table and, through communication and trust-building measures, these initiatives can help build consensus and common understandings, and identify shared challenges and risks. In sum, democratic and participatory elements must be incorporated into the governance of technology on national and international levels.Ensuring interoperability across regulatory frameworks and enforcementThe current hyperactivity in the international landscape risks creating a patchwork approach with too many loopholes that allow easy forum shopping. As a result, the most urgent task at hand is the need for coordination. Feedback loops should be established between ad hoc, regional and international initiatives to avoid duplication, overlapping – and contradicting – efforts. As Internet governance is a cross-cutting issue, the current siloed governance should be connected to accurately address and respond to related issues around digital technologies that cross borders, topics, rights, and regulations. As such, for a truly comprehensive and harmonised regulatory framework, intergovernmental processes and global multilateral forums should be aligned, with a clear division of labour and consistency when it comes to the rules that apply to the work of these forums. One of the main concerns and challenges of the current efforts is the need to ensure policy coordination, the interoperability of regulations and the consequent protection of citizens who could be subjected to different jurisprudential criteria depending on applicable legislation. By building international frameworks grounded in consensus-adopted shared values, different jurisdictions should be committed to following this leadership by the international community while retaining enough flexibility to develop regimes tailored to their domestic environments. This can be further encouraged through capacity-building initiatives in the digital and cyber domains at a global level, using cooperation to assist countries with practical insights on regulation and implementation. Moreover, further collaboration through bringing legal expertise and knowledge will be necessary to support other countries in transposing international agreements and standards in their own legislations as well as its implementation and enforcement.Finally, a further challenge will be how to fulfil the promises made in regulations to safeguard rights effectively. Enforcement and sanctioning will be a requirement for the international community and, as such, these international agreements need to become binding. The development of global, joint enforcement mechanisms and a sanctions framework for those who fail to comply should also be part of global digital cooperation debates and efforts. However, while regulation is a fundamental first step, it is important to acknowledge that it is not enough to produce the desired change of cooperation and risk mitigation of emerging technologies. Previous experiences, such as the GDPR, offer relevant insights into the limitations of regulation to promote a shift in business models or different Internet behaviour. While the GDPR established clear obligations on the processing of personal data by operators, some have managed to circumvent or avoid these obligations. The €1.2 billion fine to Meta for violating the data privacy rules established in the GDPR is a clear example of how enforcement is not working. As such, other creative and innovative approaches should be considered – including the establishment of a new, digital social contract. Going beyond regulationBesides the challenges of interoperability and enforcement, global digital cooperation should extend beyond regulation. The unequal development and adoption of technologies around the world and the knowledge of these issues require further research and the development of capacity-building actions. Sharing best practices, promoting training for public administrations and the private sector, and ensuring the exchange of knowledge will be key to ensuring that the benefits of these technological changes are equally shared. In parallel, regulations should also be coupled with awareness-raising campaigns, to ensure that citizens, users, and developers are aware of their rights and responsibilities under these new frameworks.Secondly, given the unpredictable risks and impacts of these disruptive technologies, it is crucial to establish common safe spaces for experimental development, including sandboxes, funded by public bodies. The deployment of these spaces can help us identify and understand in the early stages of the development process the risks of specific technologies, but also, to test the effectiveness of regulations. Furthermore, these spaces will be useful in risk assessments. Adopting standards – based on a value-sensitive design and participatory approaches – for assessing the impact of these technologies before they are deployed in the market will test their respect for human rights and limit their negative externalities.Thirdly, global digital cooperation needs to provide public global goods and technological solutions for all. Government involvement can further enhance innovation, adopting a supporter investor and early customer role for these technological advancements. As such, countries should invest and develop open, shared digital public infrastructure – from computing power to democratically and justly governed data layers –, to boost global digital connectivity, and ensure that it is accessible for entrepreneurs and citizens. More critically, technological transfer will also be key between developed, emerging, and developing countries to leverage the opportunities of digital technologies and close the digital divide.Finally, one ambitious proposal concerns the need to establish new effective and flexible institutions of global governance that manage the profound changes that digital technologies pose for our societies. From international agencies to monitor and verify compliance, to global advisory bodies for truly multistakeholder and all-inclusive processes, public participation must be ensured to build the foundations of the future and take ownership of the governance of the unprecedented transformations for our societies.ReferencesColomina, Carme. "Una IA ética: la UE y la gobernanza algorítmica". CIDOB Opinion, 784 (December 2023). (online) https://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/opinion_cidob/2023/una_ia_etica_la_ue_y_la_gobernanza_algoritmicaFay, Robert. "Global Governance of Data and Digital Technologies: A Framework for Peaceful Cooperation". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022. (online) https://www.cigionline.org/articles/global-governance-of-data-and-digital-technologies-a-framework-for-peaceful-cooperation/Tiberghien, Yves; Luo, Danielle and Pourmalek, Panthea. "Existential Gap: Digital/AI Acceleration and the Missing Global Governance Capacity". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022 (online). https://www.cigionline.org/articles/existential-gap-digitalai-acceleration-and-the-missing-global-governance-capacity/United Nations (UN). Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. International Governance Forum, 2019 (online). https://intgovforum.org/en/content/report-of-the-un-secretary-general%E2%80%99s-high-level-panel-on-digital-cooperationUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. New York: United Nations, May 2020 (online). https://www.un.org/techenvoy/sites/www.un.org.techenvoy/files/general/Roadmap_for_Digital_Cooperation_9June.pdfUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Our Common Agenda. New York: United Nations, 2021 (online).https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/assets/pdf/Common_Agenda_Report_English.pdfWheeler, Tom. "The three challenges of AI regulation" Brookings Commentary, June 2023 (online). https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-three-challenges-of-ai-regulation/

Issue 56.6 of the Review for Religious, November/December 1997. ; Living NUMBER 6 Review for Religious is a forum for shared reflection ~n the lived experiehce of all who find that the church's rich" he~'m_ges .of spirituality ~upport tbei~ personal and apostolic Christian li6es. . The articles in the journal are meant to be informative, practical, or inspirationM, written front a~ tbeoflogical or spiritual or s6metimes canonical poin~ t of view. Review for Religious (ISSN 0034-639X) is published bi-monthly at Saint Louis Universit3, by the Jesuits of the Missouri Province. Editorial Office: 3601 Lindell Boulevard ¯ St. Louis, Missouri 63108-3393. Telephone: 314-977-7363 ¯ Fax: 314-977-7362 E-Mail: FOPPEMA@SLU.EI)U Manuscripts, book~ for review, and correspondence with the editor: Review for Religious ¯ 3601 Lindell Boulevard ¯ St. Louis, MO 63108-3393. Correspondence about the Canonical Counsel department: Elizabeth McDonot, gh OP 1150 Cedar Cove Road ¯ Henderson, NC 27536 POSTMASTER Send address changes to Review for Religious ¯ P.O. Box 6070 ¯ Duluth, MN 55806. Periodical postage paid at St. Louis, Missouri, and additional mailing offices. See inside back cover for information o,1 subscription rates. ¢1997 Review for Religious Permission is herewith granted to copy any material (articles, poems, reviews) contained in this issue of Review for Religious for personal or internal nse, or for the personal or internal use of specific library clients within the limits outlined in Sections 107 and/or 108 of the United States Copyright Law. All copies made under this permission must bear notice of the source, date, and copyright owner on the first page. This permission is NOT extended to copying for commercial distribu-tion, advertising, institUtional promotion, or [br the creation of new collective works or anthologies. Such permission will only be considered on written application to the Editor, Review for Religious. for religious Editor Associate Editors Canonical Counsel Editor Editorial Staff Advisory Board David L. Fleming SJ Philip C. Fischer SJ Regina Siegfried ASC Elizabeth McDonough OP Mary Ann Foppe Tracy Gramm Jean Read James and Joan Felling Iris Ann Ledden SSND Joel Rippinger OSB Edmundo Rodriguez SJ David Werthmann CSSR Patricia Wittberg SC Christian Heritages .and Contemporary Living NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1997 # VOLUME56 ¯ NUMBER6 contents virtues Solidarity--More than a Polish Thing Marie Vianney Bilgrien SSND sheds light on the importance of solidarity as a virtue, especially in the preparation of the Synod for America. The Paradoxical Courage of Ananias John L. Barber draws a picture of the disciple Ananias in which the various attributes of his courage guide us in our Christian following. working together 578 587 A Quilt, a Council, and a Church Margaret Mary Knittel RSM proposes that the processes of quiltmaking and the processes of organizations call for an ever active interdependence among equal people before a loving God. Community--Healthy or Dysfunctional? Joel Giallanza CSC makes some practical observations about the choices we make for a healthy community life and describes various causes of dysfunction. 599 The Elderly among Us Eagan Hunter CSC reflects upon the importance of the elderly ~x~ among us for the vital continuity of our religious life. Revie~v for Religious 605 614 being missioned Interreligious Dialogue and the Jesuit Mission Thomas Michel SJ explains the beneficial implications of interreligious dialogue and describes the personal transformation that results. Misery Meets Mystery in Montenegro: A Survival Guide for North American Religious Annette M. Pelletier IHM pictures the "reason" for hope in the flourishing of consecrated life in North America by describing her experience of the people of the Peruvian pueblo Montenegro. perspectives 623 Itinerancy, Stability, and the Freedom of No-Where Brian J. Pierce oP examines the ascetic freedom common to apostolic itinerancy and monastic stability, the freedom both to go wherever God's Spirit moves us and to stay put wherever we have come to see that God dwells. 636 642 Grass-Roots Religious Jeanne McNulty OCV presents reflections on some new ways of living consecrated life. Jesus, Frogs, and Dancing Eileen P. O'Hea CSJ tells of the rich experience of an ever developing relationship with Jesus that deepens our love of God and love of neighbor. departments Prisms Canonical Counsel: Habit and Habitus: Current Legislation Book Reviews Indexes to Volume 56 November-December 1997 prisms Jesus Christ is the beginning and the end, the alpha and the omega, Lord of the new universe, the great hidden key to human history and the part we play in it. --Paul V-I, homily in Manila, 29 November 1970 ~esus presents us Christians with two inestimable gifts: familial intimacy with God and a share in divine vision. St. Paul speaks of God giving us wisdom to understand the mystery, "the plan he was pleased to decree in Christ, to be carried out in the fullness of time: namely, to bring all things in the heavens and on earth into one under Christ's headship" (Ep 1:9-10). Overwhelmed with the vastness of the vision, we rightly focus on the gift of intimacy. But, as we come to the end of each liturgical year, we receive reminders about the twinned vision which our relationship with Jesus entails. The many Gospel incidents of his curing blindness imply our need for Jesus to give us ever greater sight along with a deepening love relationship. One of the Gospel titles which Jesus elicits from us throughout our lives is "Teacher." As we continue to reflect on the Scriptures and receive graced insight into relationships and situations of our daily life, we become aware that Jesus remains our teacher as he was for the people during the time of his public ministry. A teacher provides information, presents new ways of seeing things, and makes connections with previous experiences, allow-ing further insights to develop. Through the gift of the Spirit, Jesus. continues giving all the richness of divine perspective. The Spirit's action gives hope to the church, whose vision is always in process of renewal. Through the focus of scripture readings during this changeover from Ordinary Time to Advent, the church faces each of us with our personal responsibility to examine whether we continue to deepen our relationship with Jesus and Review for Religious whether we allow Jesus to keep expanding our vision. The ques-tion for us: Do we seek out Jesus as our Teacher? If we enter into Matthew's final-judgment scene, how does Jesus find us "seeing" and dealing with our fellow men and women? With our aware-ness of ecological balance, how responsible are we to an envi-ronment given over to our care? Does "all things being created in him" affect our attitude of reverence in exploring Mars or some galaxy in the future? We talk about "getting stuck in our ways." We sometimes car-icature it as a special problem for the older person, but it has no age boundaries. We see children quickly get into certain ritualized ways of playing. We certainly know such patterns in our own behavior. In fact, prejudice is a fixed way of seeing or of relating. In the face of personal and historical evidence, it is a paradox to be engaged in a growing relationship with Jesus and at the same time to cling to prejudice. Does prejudice signal to us that we may be trying to focus myopically on the Jesus relationship without let-ring Jesus be Teacher for us? We may forget that faith vision is a grace always to be prayed for. Perhaps we have placed ourselves more in the position of Peter refusing to let his feet be washed, and we too need to hear Jesus' reprimand that unless we allow him to wash our feet (that is, allow our relationship with Jesus to affect our way of seeing and of acting) we will end up having no rela-tionship with him. We need to be challenged by the Pauline vision to enter into the divine pleasure of reconciling everything--both on the earth and in the heavens--in Christ. At the close of a liturgical year, as we listen to the Gospel accounts of end times and final-judgment scenes and then move on, in Advent, to the careful preparations for God's entering into our human history in Jesus, we realize anew how we are called to play our part in the cosmic vision--what St. Paul called "the mystery of Christ," the divine de, sign of salvation. Like St. Paul, we too want to make Christ known, hoping to make every human being complete in Christ, since in him--the image of the invisi-ble God--we see God's image of what it means to be human. And in our Christmas awe we continue to pray that we may have eyes to see that Mystery Incarnate, "the fullness of him who fills the universe in all its parts.'? David L. Fleming SJ The editors and staff of Review for Religious wish all our readers a most blessed Christmas and New Year! Noventber-Decevnber 1997 MARIE VIANNEY BILGRIEN SolidaritymMore than a Polish Thing virtues For too long, people have equated the concept of solidar-ity with the Solidarity Union Movement in Poland in the 1980s. On the other hand, many people have not paid any attention to solidarity because they thought of it either as a Polish thing or as just a passing event. For a few years solidarity generated written articles and symposiums after Pope John Paul II named solidarity a virtue in his 1987 encyclical Sollicitudo rei socialis. Can one birth new virtues in our religious tradition? I suspect one can, if one is pope and writing an encyclical. So maybe sol-idarity is a Polish thing! In any case, interest in the virtue soon died down. I know this because in 1994, when I was in Rome writing my dissertation tided Solidarity: d Principle, an Attitude, a Duty, or The Virtue for an Interdependent I4rorld, I seemed the only one interested in it--especially as a virtue. Yet there is a new surge of interest, due to the linea-menta prepared for the Synod of America titled Encounter with the Living.Jesus Christ: Vday to Conversion, Communion, and Solidarity. In the lineamenta, solidarity is referred to as a principle, a duty, and a virtue. Individuals and groups are urged to practice solidarity "to channel effective aid to groups and nations which suffer from poverty." Solidarity as a virtue is "a morally necessary reaction to the exis- Marie Viarmey Bilgrien SSND, director of the Hispanic ministry office in the diocese of Baker, may be addressed at P.O. Box 823; Madras, Oregon 97741 Review for Religious tence of injustice in social conditions" that affects many individ-uals and nations. Emphasizing the fact of interdependence, the lineamenta stresses that solidarity must be practiced not only by individual persons, but by entire peoples and nations, inasmuch as the world is economically, culturally, and politically more and more interconnected. What one country does regarding migra-tion, the use of natural resources, the drug trade, genetic manip-ulation, international economic relations, and so forth affects many other countries. The lineamenta stresses that solidarity is part of the church's social teaching and is to be practiced by everyone (§55); it explains as does Sollicitudo rei socialis that, if we want to undo the structures of sin so prevalent in our world, the solution lies in the moral realm. Just as sins of individuals create structures of sin that take on a hideous existence of their own, "an all-consuming desire for profit and thirst for power," so too acts of the virtue of solidarity by individuals, groups, and nations can build up structures of virtue that have a "decisive influence on economic programs and policies, on social communication, on culture, on healthcare, and so forth" not only locally but also nationally and internationally. It will be interesting to see how the idea of solidarity plays out in the meetings and documents of the Pan-America synod. Solidarity has a longer history than most people realize. It appears five times in the Latin of the Vatican II documents: twice in Apostolicam actuositatem, §8 and §14, and three times in Gaudium et spes, §§4, 32, and 57. In reading the texts one can glean that solidarity has an important spiritual dimension. It is a part of charity and has an individual and a universal dimension. It creates a responsibility to act. Jesus' incarnation shows his and God's sol-idarity with humanity. Our response to that gift is the practice of solidarity, recognizing that we are one family, that we have received gifts and talents to be used cooperatively--for the good of the whole family. Paul VI used the idea of solidarity extensively, especially in Populorumprogressio (see §§17, 43, 44, 48, 62, 64, 73, 80, and 84). It also appears in the Italian translation of Pius XII's encyclical Summipontificatus in 1939. He understood solidarity as the unity Jesus" incarnation shows his and God's solidarity with humanity. November-December 1997 Bilgrien ¯ SolidaritymMore than a Polish Thing of the human race, our.common origin from our Creator, sharing a "common habitation, this world of ours whose resources every-one has a natural right to enjoy., as they are needed for preser-vation and self-development." John Paul has been writing about solidarity since 1969. In his book The Acting Person, in describing personal development, he devotes a whole chapter to the necessity of attitudes of both oppo-sition and solidarity for the true and complete development of mature persons. In naming solidarity a virtue, he gives it greater importance. What does that mean? Solidarity as an attitude, duty, or principle only helps people to do the right thing, but as a virtue it helps them to become good. Duty implies decision and action, but virtue implies a disposition, a power, a perfection. Duty asks, What should I do? Virtue asks, How should I be? Virtue helps us do the right thing for the right reason. Solidarity is a virtue not only for individual persons, but also for groups working together and for nations in a world that is ever more interdependent. Solidarity is the virtue that can move society to the good. Solidarity is the virtue that can transform persons and society. In describing the virtue in Sollicitudo rei socialis, John Paul says that it is the response to relationships in a world that is inter-dependent; "it is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good" (§38). He adds that the virtue is valid only when we recognize others as human persons, equal in dignity; when we feel responsible for those who are weaker--the poor (§39). In two paragraphs he lays out the components of the virtue of solidarity: interdependence, the common good, the dignity of the person, the preferential option for the poor. Solidarity recognizes that people, nations, all of creation are interconnected. What happens in one area of the world can have tremendous effects in another part. The actions of individuals, nations, and blocs of nations either increase the structures of sin (thirst for power, all-consuming desire for profit, ethnic wars, unjust wages, inhuman working conditions, patterns of violence and sexual abuse) or can build up structures of virtue (cooperative efforts to bring about a more just world and preserve the integrity of creation: the United Nations, groups concerned about ecol-ogy, peace-and-justice commissions, and so forth). Solidarity as a virtue recognizes people as equal in dignity and worthy of respect. Solidarity as a virtue sees each person as a Review for Religious member of the world family, as an image and likeness of God. Instead of looking at others as simply other, solidarity helps us to see them as neighbors, as brothers and sisters. From this flow the importance and necessity of working together to preserve the human family and the integrity of creation. Some of this can be seen in the work of the U.N. as it sends groups to work with refugees or promote peace between warring eth-nic groups. One sees the virtue in Doctors with-out Frontiers, who work in many parts of the world, and in other volunteer groups promot-ing health, education, and housing in poor coun-tries of the world. In accepting and recognizing the human dignity of each person, there must be a focus on those who are poorest. Both John Paul and Paul VI noted that their eyes were opened to the poor during their travels to Latin America and India. When one stands in a different place, one sees differently. Moving out from the Vatican palace to the streets of Calcutta and the barrios of Rio de Janeiro changes the view. Their eyes were opened; their awareness of people's suffering intensified. After those journeys, both popes talked more and more strongly about the necessity of "an option for the poor." In Sollicitudo rei socialis John Paul explains that a preferential option is not an exclusive option, but is a "firm and irrevocable option." Solidarity with its component of an option for the poor helps us to see the wider issues, the intertwining of systems and structures that oppress the poor rather than raise them up. Somewhere, in solidarity's judgment, the poor have a role. It is not true solidarity if the poor are overlooked or treated with conde-scension. In each judgment that is made, each action taken, one should ask: How will this affect the poor? The real goal of an option for the poor is to move beyond helping them and provid-ing care. The goal is for the poor to be authors of their own actions, to make their own decisions, decisions that are effective in moving them from poverty to participation in society. The goal is for them to be no longer .treated as children incapable of tak-ing care of themselves, but to participate in decision making so that the effects of solidarity are felt by all and begin to reshape the unjust structures that keep the poor poor. Only when the poor Solidarity recognizes that people, nations, all of creation are interconnected. November-December 1997 Bilgrien ¯ Solidarity--More than a Polish Thing are treated with full dignity will the virtue of solidarity begin to flourish in all its splendor. What is at stake is the common good, the good of all and the good of each individual, and solidarity is the virtue that commits everyone to the common good. Solidarity directs nations to sub-ordinate their national interests for the good of the planet, for the good of all. Solidarity directs individuals to transcend their greed and selfishness and focus on the good of the whole. Our years of selfishness, of greed for power and money, have caused havoc in the environment and have placed future genera-tions in jeopardy. No one can quash worrisome questions about the "greenhouse effect," about the dangers of the ozone level in the atmosphere, and about unknown effects of massive deforesta-tion and the continuous piling up of industrial waste. We continue to kill our planet. The widespread experimentation and manipula-tion in the biological sciences has outrun our ability to make moral decisions. Those decisions or indecisions will have for future gen-erations repercussions that we cannot predict. Solidarity is the virtue that can bring us to a greater consciousness of the importance of our moral decisions. Solidarity, by focusing the common good, reminds us that the differences of race, gender, ethnicity, culture, and economic status do not have to be divisive. Solidarity is the virtue for the third millennium. It has the capacity to inform interdependence in such a way that persons, peoples, countries, and nations will relate to each other equally, as members of the same family. Solidarity as a virtue orders actions and relationships towards the common good. It is the virtue that can transform a world of unjust structures, structures of sin, into structures of virtue, structures of justice, family structures. The general secretariat of the Synod of Bishops in its working paper has begun to answer the call of John Paul to unite all peoples of the Western Hemisphere and offers the practice of solidarity as one of the ways to solve the massive problems and inequities of the two continents. Conversion, communion, and solidarity in, with, and through Jesus Christ will be important on the journey into the third millennium. Solidarity is only the beginning. Review for Religious JOHN L. BARBER The Paradoxical Courage of Ananias anlthe pages of the sacred text, we find many courageous, but so human, people. One .such bold, authentic person was Ananias of the Book of Acts. The prelude to his encounter with Paul (then named Saul) is recorded as follows: A disciple called Ananias who lived in Damascus had a vision in which he heard the Lord say to him, "Ananias!" When he replied, "Here I am, Lord," the Lord said, "You must go to Straight Street and ask at the house of Judas for someone called Saul, who comes from Tarsus. At this moment he is praying and having a vision of a man called Ananias coming in and laying hands on him to give him back his sight." When he heard that, Ananias said, "Lord, several people have told me about this man and all the harm he has been doing to your saints in Jerusalem. He has only come here because he holds a warrant from the chief priest to arrest everybody who invokes your name." The Lord replied, "You must go all the same, because this man is my chosen instru-ment to bring my name before pagans and pagan kings and before the people of Israel. I myself will show him how much he himself must suffer for my name." Then Ananias went. (Ac 9:10-16)~ We know very little about Ananias, other than what we glean from this short account in Acts; he was "a disciple" of Jesus and lived in Damascus. Rather than being a longtime citizen of that city, our Ananias may have been a refugee from the persecution of Christians in Jerusalem. Though this is uncertain, we will John L. Barber, a lawyer, married and the father of two college-age sons, is also a lay minister at St. Paul's Episcopal Church. He writes to us from 600 Nokomis Court; Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27106. November-Decentber 1997 Barber ¯ The Paradoxical Courage of Ananias Saul is not only a real person, but also a symbol for the challenge to move from what we know, from safety, into the unknown and risk. --y-72J assume that he was indeed one who had fled from religious oppression. From Paul's address to the Jews of Jerusalem, we learn he was also "a devout follower of the Law and highly thought of by all the Jews living" in Damascus (Ac 22:12). Apparently his name was a common one, for in Acts we meet two other Ananiases. The first appears in chapter 5--Sapphira's husband, who lied to the Holy Spirit--and in chapter 23 we encounter the other, the high priest who ordered Paul struck on the mouth. In the same type of human plight in which our faith is tested, the constancy of Ananias was tried. In this sense Saul is a metaphor for those predicaments into which we must walk, involving a difficult or dangerous person or situation and presenting some risk from which we fear harm. The potential injury we face may not be as grave as the arrest and imprisonment that Ananias dreaded. Nonetheless, to us it feels and seems harmful, and we are afraid. As we journey on our Christian pilgrimage, all of us must face our own fear-provoking Sauls. Who are these Sauls for us? They are those places and people to which we would not go, were it not for God leading, moving, and stirring us and urging us to grow. They are life passages and problems we would not engage in, were it not for God inviting us or interrupting our lives. Saul may appear in life passages such as a midlife crisis or that time when the last child leaving home creates what is commonly called "the empty nest." In these interruptions we lose our bearings. Our "Saul" in them is the challenge of finding our direction again and reorienting ourselves. They might be crises like a divorce or the death of a spouse or loved one, the loss of a job or dissatisfaction with one's career. In these situations we face Saul when we are forced out of our ruts to seek new or renewed meaning for life. Saul is not only a real person, but also a symbol for the chal-lenge to move from what we know, from safety, into the unknown and risk. He is a sign for that time in life when our devotion to God demands concrete but hazardous action. We may find our Sauls in people with whom we have some Review for Religious confrontation, particularly if we are conflict avoiders. On the other hand, the Saul could be a confrontation with our own selves as we meet the challenge of seeing the truth in our own failings and weaknesses, limitations andsins, and dysfunctions and addic-tions. The dangerous Saul might be the challenge of learning healthier ways of relating and living. These types of self-con-frontation, in which we face the painful reality in our own hearts, can require even more courage than conflict with others. Typically, life's Sauls, in the guise of hard and risky challenges, involve both types of encounters: encountering self and encountering another person or some passage or crisis. For both of these, fortunately, we have a guide in the person of Ananias: he faced his own fear and Saul as well. A pattern for a bold Christian spirituality, he presents, when viewed from dif-ferent angles, a multidimensional courage. What, then, were some of the facets of his intrepidity? His Christian courage involved at least five attributes: openness before God, obedience, reluc-tance, calculated surrender, and the gift of grace. Openness before God The characters of the Bible portray many different stances or postures vis-~a-vis God. The prophet Jonah tried "to get away from Yahweh" (Jon 1:3). In Genesis, after Adam and Eve suc-cumbed to temptation, they hid from the Lord God who came to them "walking in the garden in the cool of the day." Ananias, on the other hand, was neither taking flight nor hiding. While he may have fled the persecution in Jerusalem, he did not flee from God. The Lord did not have to say to him, "Ananias, where are you?" as he did to Adam (Gn 3:8-10) or unleash "a violent wind on the sea" as he did against Jonah (Jon 1:4). Instead, Ananias had laid, himself bare before God, saying, "Here I am, Lord. Speak, your servant is listening." This "I-tere I am, Lord" stance in the presence of God is the courageous spirituality. Living "out there," in front of God, is the stalwart posture of discipleship. It is scary to live openly before God. What sins will God allow us to see? How will the glow of his love and the heat of his righteousness feel on our faces? What sufferings that our broth-ers and sisters endure will we, too, be privileged to face? What will the Lord ask us to do? For example, we pray earnestly, longing to hear God as clearly as Ananias did. Then, L.f-73 November-December 1997 Barber ¯ The Paradoxical Courage of Ananias when we do, we are hesitant to do what God has asked of us. We question God, saying, "Lord, did you really say what I thought you said?" or "God, I wanted you to speak to me, but I really don't want to do what you asked." Hiding from God among the trees of the garden is the spir-ituality of fear. Taking flight from God is the spirituality of escape. Openness before God is the spirituality of Ananias. Obedience The obedience of Ananias flowed out of his openness before God. This aspect of courage led to another, that of obedience. Courage for the Christian is different from bravery in other con-texts. For the believer, courage is connected to our obedience to God. An outgrowth of Ananias's openness was his vision in which he heard God speak, a time of intent listening for and to the voice of God. According to author Henri Nouwen, there is a com-monalty between obedience and intent listening. The word obe-dience springs from the Latin ob-audire, which signifies intent listening? Such intent listening is an act of courage in itself. For, if we begin to listen, we may come to know the sound of God's voice. And, if we come to know the sound of the voice, we may actually hear it. And, if we hear what God has to say to us, we are left in a dilemma of response and answer, as was Ananias. Reluctant Courage In our society we tend to view brave people as those who have no fear. In fact, the word "fearless" is a synonym for "courage." Yet, if we wait until we have no fright or consternation before we take a particular action, we will never act; for who among us is never afraid? This, however, is all-or-nothing thinking. Instead of being either valiant or afraid, we are simultaneously both3--valiant and afraid. Bravery, in truth, is action in spite of fear. In the face of the terror which looks us straight in the eyes, courage is a life stance or attitude which enables us to go to that dreadful place where God may be leading and we otherwise would not travel. For Ananias, bravery existed coexisted with his fear. He was obviously afraid of Saul, who journeyed to Damascus "still breath-ing threats to slaughter the Lord's disciples" (Ac 9:1). Having ReviewforReligious heard the Lord, Ananias responded by saying, "But, Lord, let me point out a few things to you. This Saul is a dangerous man. He might arrest me and put me in prison. I've already fled Jerusalem to get away from persecution, and now you want me to walk straight back into it." There is no evi-dence that Ananias ever got over being afraid of Saul. Although he was reluctant in his fear of Saul, Ananias nevertheless responded in faithfulness to the voice of God. He went to Saul in and with his fear. Following the example of Ananias, courage for the Christian exists not in overcoming our human- Courage for the Christian exists not in overcoming our humanity, but in our humanity. ity, but in our humanity. For the Christian, courage lives where there is obedience to the voice of God in spite of a very real dread. A Calculated Surrender For the Christian, courage is also an ambiguous place of ten-sion between knowing and counting the costs of our obedience, on the one hand, and, on the other, surrendering to consequences of our listening to God that are yet unknown. It is action flowing out of a paradoxical wisdom and foolishness. Whatever we might say about Ananias, he counted the cost of obeying God. He knew the risks. About our Ananias, there was a certain sophistication and wisdom. He had a firm grip on life as it really is, including the ugly part, particularly if he was a refugee from the persecution in Jerusalem. As a realistic person, his brav-ery was not a gullible one. Arrest, prison, stoning, persecution-- he knew very well what he might be getting into if he obeyed God and went to Saul. He was regardful of the reality of this man, who "entirely approved of the killing" of Stephen and "worked for the total destruction of the Church" by going "from house to house arresting both men and women and sending them to prison." (Ac 8:1 and 3). While he was well acquainted with the kind of man he was, his encounter with Saul also held a very real terror of the unknown and unfamiliar. Ananias did not know whether he would survive this ordained meeting or be stoned to death. Though we count the costs of our obedience, we still cannot know the ultimate out- Noventber-December 1997 Barber ¯ The Paradoxical Courage of Ananias come. The future cannot be envisioned. An old Jewish proverb says that "man plans but God laughs." Despite our best planning we cannot eliminate all surprises and exigencies. For the Christian, courage involves surrender into the hidden outcome of our obe-dience. In our confrontations we must know the risks we face. We are called to be wise as serpents. At the same time we cannot fore-see all the risks, and so our courage must have some element of surrender in it. In facing others we miglit lose our jobs, endure retribution, or suffer alienation in relationships. In the passages and crises of life, we might be forced from our comfortable lifestyle to one of greater risk as well as service and deeper mean-ing. In discovering ourselves as we really are, we may feel the heat of God's gaze with an intensity similar to the sun shining through a magnifying glass. Discomforting it is to see both the chaff and the wheat of the ripening crop of our own lives. Ananias's intrepidity was not naive, but one rooted in reality. Nonetheless, it involved a letting go of his life and relinquish-ment to God. If we are to be brave Christians, we must enter the place of tension between counting the cost and surrender. Gift of Grace We return to the name Ananias. For actors in the Biblical drama, a name was significant. So it was for Ananias. His name is derived from the Hebrew name Hananiah, meaning "the Lord is gracious" or "the Lord shows grace." For us to hear God's voice, the Lord must speak--which in itself is a special grace. With its limited resources, our own courage can take us only so far. Then, in order to heed the sound of God's voice, we come to the point where our humanity needs a healthy dose of grace. God's gra-ciousness is our access to Christian courage that is required of us if we are to be disciples. Grace is the window through which we step from hiding before God to the presence of God. Grace is the threshold which we cross from a fearful inaction to an obe-dience of reluctant courage. The irony of Christian courage is that it requires both a personal achievement and a gift from God. Living openly before God, Ananias of Damascus exposed him-self to hear whatever the Lord might say. Once he heard the voice of God, he responded in obedience. But his response was a human one of courage in its reluctance and hesitancy in its bravery. Review for Religious Realistic in his intrepidity, he both knew the risk and counted the cost of going to Saul. At the same time, he abandoned himself to the unknown consequences. Then he relied on God's grace so that he might be obedient to his voice. To varying degrees we are all Ananiases, whom William Barclay called "one of the forgotten heroes of the Christian Church." The mystery is that we are persons of paradox--as was Ananias; reluctantly courageous, calculated in our surrender, and obedient through grace--as was Ananias. Notes ~ Scripture quotations are from the Jerusalem Bible. 2 Seeds of Hope: A Henri Nouwen Reader, ed. Robert Durback, p. xxix. 3 I am indebted to Maurice Briggs MA for this insight about "all or nothing" or "either!or" thinking ove? and against "both/and" thinking. Rev. Briggs is a member of the faculty in the Department of Chaplaincy and Pastoral Education at North Carolina Baptist Hospital, Winston- Salem, North Cai'olina. Advent Cave Plato knew about the dark, how we prisoners face the wall in chains, only the fire b~hind us letting us see the m~oving shadows we call real. Far above, looms the door to light, reachable only by those who turn ~ away,from all they know. Wisdom, who lived in the cave at Nazareth where parents made a home and carried water to thefire, sitting at night in quiet, thoughts and the animals dozing near embers, the dying light, after a day of learning the real, calls us to turn and face the door. Evelyn Mattern November-Deconber 1997 MARGARET MARY KNITTEL | A Quilt, a Council, and a Church working together The quilt movement should be preserved as a col-lective enterprise with an ethical concern. If taken seriously as women's art, quilts cannot be perceived and enjoyed as isolated aesthetic objects divorced from the relationships of women to each other and to the rest of humankind. Quilts emin~ently pose the question of how one behaves in the asking and viewing of art. --Radka Donnell, Quilts as Women's Art Twenty years ago I took several tries at developing skills "for the home," sensing at first blush of midlife that my. more productive impulses would require something for my hands to do in my old age. Firs~t, there were the needlepoint classes, ~e.~n quilting. Quiltmaking is not for the faint of heart. As a dropout from Advanced Quilting, I can attest to the shaky feeling in the knees when faced with what appears to be an infinite number of steps. This quiltmaking episode would be instructive. As I have come to understand them, both quiltmaking and organizations involve mutuality and interdependence as essential pro-cesses within their respective collective enterprises. A Collective Enterprise In quiltmaking, the mutuality and interdependence of the women are reflected in th~ final product. Design, tex- Margaret Mary Knittei RSM works as a grants consultant for nonprofit organizations. She may be addressed at P.O. Box 634; Geneva, Illinois 60134. Review for Religious ture, color, and template come together through their hands, through their spirit shaping. "Quilts are healing because they accept the uniqueness, the positive difference, and the mortal limit of each human being."1 A quilt's design, texture, color, and template over a period of time will collect these human beings and express their individualities anew. Design, texture, color, template .become interdependent, one with the others, to bring beauty to the whole. The overall design of a quilt needs a working principle, a template, to express the color and'the texture, to specify the difference. One shape, a tri-angle for example, can be the basic design of countless quilts~ The textures of various fabrics add to color and design, with the template giving the basic shape. Color in all its bold or modest hues as textured by the various materials gets a specific shape and then is pieced'into a growing design. The mutuality and interdependence among the quiltmakers affirm them all. Positive differences go somewhere into a future, not wasting time with empty words of control; rather, they speak of vision. Limit recognizes this is a bordered piece, this quilt, and we its .shapers affirm the grace of the moment~, knowing it could be the grace of a lifetime. .Quiltmaking is a healing image, one that includes authentic conversation, meaning-filled relationships, among the people sharing the brganizational life of a parish, a religious community, a church. "Religion here is the sensation of being one with the whole, of belonging, not of subjection.''~ The virtues of quilt-making are the virtues of a healthy human organization. A Demo~cratic and Affirming Mission . Radka Donnell says in her perceptive book: "To the work of piecing quilts I was silently called, and i( took me years to sort 6ut the problems it revealed and the-difficulties it created. The early groups of contemporary quiltmakers were inspired by a sense of mission. If not expressly feminist in each case, this mission certainly was democratic and affirmative of each individual quiltmaker a'nd each quilt. (p. 6) The metaphor of quiltmaking can remind us of the Second Vatican Council's challenge to the church to accept both its divine mission and the human organization called to participate in thLa$t-7-9 November-December 1997 Knittel ¯ A Quilt, a Council, and a Church mission. Facing problems and difficulties, it is an organization capable of error, of hurt and pain, in search of truth, in sea.rch of healing and grace. During the thirty and more years since the council's call, at times its substantive energy seems depleted and diminished; but ultimately, in the hearts of people, the message will never be muffled or suffocated. The post-Vatican church as organization, as. human organi-zation, seems destined for democratic and affirming conversa-tions. That kind of, change and growth lies in the hands of all believers, as people seated as equals around a corporate quilt. If we are quiet.like the quiltmakers, we still hear, from the heart of the council, that call, that sense of being missioned, to the inclu-sive and respectful goodness of lives lived to the full in the sight of God. Our lives continue on, and as we look desperately for mileposts we acknowledge we are still on the way. Concerns for democratically and respectfully affirming connections become earnest calls for better ways of being together, whether it be in a parish, a religious community, or the church universal. Religious organizations, as human organizations, need to face their corporate humanity. A corporate way of being human is important, whether we admit or deny the fact, whether we like it or not. The foibles of people's human interaction can be acutely felt at an individual level. Often, however, corporate humanity recognizes the problems only after many have been hurt. Words like "low morale" or "uncooperative" become blame tags. The dilemma for leadership is that, when you blame, you do not lead. The nature of bureaucracies is to maintain power, no. matter what the cost. The church needs to ask itself just how bureau-cratic it wants to be. If it chooses to be increasingly pastoral, it will find that parishes, religious orders, dioceses, and the church uni-versal will raise new questions, demand new ways of~behaving. Within a bureaucratic church organization, the individual-- parishioner, ~priest, vowed religious, bishop, employee--will mat-ter less than the maintenance of power: posturing, identifying totally with power, seeking to dominate. To survive, members might feel they must be subservient in one way or another. Within a bureaucracy the common good is co-defined with the maintenance of the organization itself. More time and energy are given to protecting a bureaucratically bungled decision than to thinking through afresh what is happening. Things as we hard known them remain the same. In the face of an entrenched Review for Religious bureaucracy, the better educated, the more aware, may leave. Feeling tokenism and lack of care, they may go off, re,searching for their soul. For those who stay, the mission seems dissolved within the bureaucratic. Doing the task mindlessly and relating to self, oth-ers, and God make it all bearable. Fair Dealing Radka Donnell makes this observation about quiltmaking: To be interested in the theory and practice of quiltmaking means to look for fair dealing between women, as well as between men and women. It indicates a readiness to fight against all obstacles preventing us from creating a better world together. (p. 72) One systems view of organizations sees them as made up of four equal subsystems, mutually interdependent in their rela-tionships. These four separate and different subsystems are called the task, the structure, informal groups, and the individual. These four separate and different subsystems function optimally when all are equal to one another in importance and mutually interde-pendent in their relating. If one of these subsystems puffs up, the whole system is affected. The other subsystems get leaned upon, diminishing their contributions within the whole. If one of these subsystems withers, the functioning whole likewise suffers, gets skewed. Parishes; religious communities, and the church universal as human organizations are distinct systems. Each could be said to consist of the four subsystems of task, structure, informal groups, and the individual. The Task as Subsystem. The task in a. religious community would be its charism, the unique mission of a community as per-ceived within the Catholic tradition in its particular context. Similarly, a parish has a particular local task to accomplish. A contemplative group of religious women varies from an active one, and0an inner-city parish from a suburban one. While each participates in a still larger system, locally they are themselves separate organizations. Over time numerous activities accrete to any organization, but its central mission remains. Confusion, dif-ferences, outright hostilities occur when an important question is not acknowledged or goes unasked: "Just who does the sending, November-December 1997 Knittel ¯ A Quilt, a Council, and a Church the missioning?" Is it God, a founder or foundress, this hospital, a church, the history of a town or city? The Structure as Subsystem. The second subsystem to be looked at here is structui'e or governance. Within a community or a parish, we all know the persons making up the structure. Vv'hether community government be elected or discerned, it finds itself in Whether community government be elected or discerned, it finds itself in a quandary of expectations from membership, and from itself. a quandary of expectations from mem-bership and from itself. Likewise, a new pastor looking around for the first time feels various expectations arising. Leadership needs to lead, but, when it does, its performance may not fit pre-conceived notions. Then leadership may be tempted to resist the future; to lean back and maintain the present, and hence to end up reissuing the past. Leadership in the ideal sustains the vision of the common good, which in itself is a process both democratic and affirming. A structure ideally assumes lines and processes of accountability that are at .once just and active. Leapfrogging .and micromanaging from a0distant central office can bypass managers and commit-tees on the scene and violate the rights of the organization itself. Again, if local people .spontaneously blurt out their evaluation of an associate pastor at a parish council meeting, they bypass proper procedures and strip away the individual's right to an appropriate evaluation of job performance. The structure, we need to remem-ber, is one of four equal and interdependent, subsystems contex~ tualized within an organization. Informal Groups as Subsystem, The informal groups in an orga-nization would be various clusters of individuals espousing simi-lar norms and sanctions among themselves. They appear neutral in a well-functioning organization, manifesting as they do a nat-ural affinity of persons. Sometimes, however, an informal group skews an organization, a company, a religious community, or a parish by losing sight of the larger task, the mission, the com-mon good, and seeking its own way of goverfiing the whole. The informal group may try to impose its own values on the majority in any number of ways: by inclusion, exclusion, intimidation, and oppression, by pushing to be the most holy, the most dedicated to Review for Religious the poor, the most attentive to keeping the church intact, the most pro-life. Many masks can disguise the will for power over others, and an informal group in any organization can obscure and even obliterate the vision. The Individual as Subsystem. The fourth subsystem within this model of organization is the individual. Individuals and the moti-vations they bring to the organization impact the entire system. The recognition of the variety of motivations at play within any group can be a sobering and staggering realization. From studies on the impact of opportunity in organizations, we know that the "anointed" in organizations, those high flyers who move quickly through ~the ranks, are given life through our desire to observe them as winners. We endow their ideas and words with more credibility. We entrust them with more resources and better assignments. We have already decided that they will succeed, and so we continu-ally observe them with the expectation that they will con-firm our beliefs.3 The anointed individual in this language of organization-as-system distorts the life of the organization, overshadowing struc-ture, informal groups, task or mission, and other individuals. Other members give over their .truth, their experience, and, in thus surrendering their individual dignity, they suffocate the pos-sibility of democracy or the achievement of the common good. The anointed individual becomes a god. Within a church or reli: gious organization the confusion of gods for God needs contin-ued sorting. Self-Healing Among her comments about quilting, Radka Donnell says: The.more the system gets into high gear, the more self-he~ aling is needed. (pp. 126-127) In church organizations, isolation and wrongly constructed obediences sometimes intensifies the claim of the few to be anoint-eds. A particular organization's structure, informal groups, and task or mission could conceivably be dominated by an anointed; in this mix, religious language might be used to cover ambition, to anoint the anointed. A wonderful scene from the movie Richard 111 swipes at the capacity of religious language to cover up. Richard, pretending to be secluded and hard at prayer, emerges to be "convinced." to November-Dece~nber 1997 Knittel ¯ A Quilt, a Council, and a Church accept the English throne he has serpentinely plotted and mur-dered to acquire, Knowing that people consider him in some way the anointed one, he now considers himself a god. He becomes increasingly foreign to those around him, and later he meets defeat in battle. Have we ever looked on when a locally anointed individual (now apparently feeling godlike as well) strongly inserted irrele-vant and impertinent opinion into a community or parish com-mittee, spilling the work of months down the drain? Numbers of those very committee members, still ~motionally inclined to attribute greater knowledge and perhaps even a cosmic wisdom to the anointed one, may find themselves recoiling in disarray. Can we recall an experience in our lifetime when an individual crashed through the lines of accountability appropriate to structure, manipulated informal groups by feeding them what they want to hear, and used language of mission or church or patriotism to keep the advantage? Is this the call of the prophetic, we. wonder, as we give over our own individual power to this other individual, the anointed? "Prophetic ministry consists of offering an alternative perception of reality and in letting people see their own history in the light of God's freedom and his will for justice.''4 The test suggested is whether the anointed gives space for us to reflect courageously on our 'individual histories "in the light of God's freedom." To con-tinually strive to see one's own history in God's light will be to know our own history, our own experience, anew each time. This is not a blaming game, an unhealed existence, or a quick fix with aphorisms, but a genuine opening in my life, your life, for healing, for Jesus the Christ. Self-healing is not a plastic therapy for believers, but an engagement with a living. God. The question remains: Does the message of an. anointed one leave room for all these variables, for the lights of a freeing God? Margaret Wheadey contrasts the "anointed" individual within an organization to the "dead" individual. Others in organizations go unobserved, irrevocably invisi-ble, bundles of potential that no one bothers to look at. Or they receive summary glances, are observed to be "dead," and are thereafter locked into jobs that provide them with no opportunity to display their many pote.ntials,s A post-Vatican II church unfurled to Catholics a new way of being, and we need to revisit those challenges. Dying to self, we Review for Religious have come to increasingly realize, never meant not unbundling our own gifts, our own graces, as we become acquainted with them. Our own baptismal anointing as Christians, no longer a vague memory, becomes a constant call. But, alas, we knew that struggling to be "undead"--not be to an anointed, just to be undead--would have its own price, Declaring the king to be naked in a bureaucracy brings life-mark-ing, career-reversing implications. A question, a deviation, could bring death-dealing expulsion from the informal life of the group or from the larger organization itself. Each person having and wanting to have influence, each want-ing to "see their own history in the light of God's freedom," becomes incessantly difficult if declared or assumed to be among the "dead." The equality of persons within an organization is the paradigm for the equality of each subsystem in the model offered here. Puffing up one impinges upon all the others. Withering one depletes all. Equality equates to mutuality among members. The Incessant Pursuit The church, embracing sinners in her bosom, is at the same time holy and always in need of being purified, and inces-santly pursues the path of penance and .renewal. (Lumen gentium, §8) The processes of quiltmaking and the processes of organiza-tions call for an incessant pursuit of mutuality and interdepen-dence among women and men equal before a loving God. The Second Vatican Council invited the church of the 20th century to know both its humanity and its wonder. If parishes, orders of women and men religious, and the church universal in a post-Vatican II church accept themselves as corporate human organizations, they will steadily come to under- Stand the strengths and pitfalls that accompany such aggregate groups, The rich heritage of the church cannot afford to forget that it is an organization of human persons. Such forgetting rehearses feudal futility. There is both frailty and strength in its organizational life. At the level of shared humanity, frailties and strengths within any group will always be fa!i'ly evident. To deny this shared humanity is to set up the religious organization as exempt from the foibles and frets that indeed call on God for its life principle. Novetnber-Decentber 1997 Knittel ¯ A Quilt, a Council, and a Church "The church, or, in other words, the kingdom of Christ now pres-ent in mystery, grows visibly in the world through the power of God" (LG §3). To deny the church's humanness is to deny the power of God. As we continue to unpack that sublimely historic event we fondly call "the council," there is more to do, more to remind others about, more for ourselves to be .reminded about. The Roman Catholic Church as a religious organization, ceasing to gloss over its frail corporate humanity, will come to understand its corporateness at a more profound level. The church as a human organization will come to truly trust in the mystery of its shared life of faith in Jesus the Christ. This living quilt we call "church" calls to a people deeply conversant with a living God. Notes I Radka Donnell, Quilts as Women's Art: A Quilt Poetics (North Vancouver, Canada: GaIlerie Publications, 1990), p. 425. 2 Dorothee Soelle, Theology for Skeptics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), p. 28. 3 Margaret J. Wheadey, Leadership and the New Science (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1994), p. 60. 4 Walter Brueggemann, The Prophetic Imagination (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), p. 110. s Wheatley, pp. 60-61. Subscriptions to Review for Religious can now be ordered or renewed by I~AX and.paid for by MasterCardor ~sa. FAX the order form inside the back cov~r~ or CALL our office with, you~r.tcgedit carol numbi~r:.? o. FAX: 314-~-7-7362 ¯ PHONE: 314297727363 Review for Religious JOEL GIALLANZA Communitym Healthy or Dysfunctional? ~or these reflections about community living in religious .~. orders and congregations, I propose what may seem a curi-ous biblical passage, the one that concludes with "Very well, pay Caesar what belongs to Caesar--and God what belongs to God" (Mr 22:21). We are more accustomed to texts on loving one another or bearing one another's burdens or remaining united and at peace among ourselves or reconciling with one another whenever necessary. All those principles and practices are very important for the life of a healthy community. From this text, however, two :practical norms can be drawn which also are impor-tant for life in community: appropriateness and balance. These two norms are tightly intertwined, like a fine weaving; in fact, both can be drawn from those same words of Jesus: "Pay Caesar what belongs to Caesar--and God what belongs to God." First, appropriateness: We do not give to Caesar what belongs to God or to God what belongs to Caesar. In community we can bring realities into~our life together which are not really appro-priate precisely because they are misplaced: for example, unfair expectations of someone or of one another as a group; unwill-ingness to share or communicate something which by our pro-fession we commit ourselves to share and communicate; personal agendas, with their accompanying attitudes and perspectives, and emotions, which may really belong in ministry or to only one of our relationships or somewhere else altogether. Joel Giallanza CSC writes for us once again from: Congregation of the Holy Cross; Via Framura, 85; 00168 Roma; Italy. November-December 1997 Giallanza ¯ Community--Healthy or Dysfunctional? Serious personal reflection and realistic self-knowledge bring with them the ability to answer this simple question: Where does what I am experiencing--this issue, this feeling, this concern-- belong? Where will it be most appropriately articulated and addressed? Inappropriate placement of issues, feelings, and con-cerns generates an inadequate response. Then all frustrations sur-rounding them will be intensified as they continue to be unaddressed. Second, balance: We give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God at the same time. Of the two points, balance is the more challenging, even on a daily basis. Most of our time and energy as apostolic religious are invested in ministry. This is important, given who we are as religious com-mitted to continue the mission of Jesus in the spirit of our founders and foundresses. Nevertheless, we do need to remind ourselves from time to time that each of us has only one limited pool of time and energy. Too easily we can fall out of balance by expending the maxi-mum of our quality time and energy in ministry--or on some-thing else--and simply neglect community or prayer. While that might never degenerate into complete negligence; we may grad-ually adopt a very minimalist approach to community. Then, from time to time, we may feel shocked that those with whom we live every day have changed or rearranged this or that without our having been consulted. Conveniendy we might forget to ask our-selves if we were sufficiently present, available, and interested when those decisions were being formulated and then imple-mented. Community life can be joyful and it can be painful; at times it can be the greatest of blessings and at times the heaviest of burdens. But never has there been a guarantee, that it would be easy. As long as we are human, working to live closely with other people, appropriateness and balance in approaching our commu-nity life will continue to be significantchallenges. "Pay Caesar what belongs to Caesar--and God what belongs to God." We may not always make that payment perfectly, but we are responsible for making the effort 'to live community with the appropriateness and balance which can facilitate the love and unity we seek. Though other things must also be included, these are principal ingredients that determine the quality of life and health within a community. Review for Religious Quality of Community: Healthy or Dysfunctional? Very little, if anything, about community is theory.It is work to live with one another. But through our commitment it is meant to be a work of the heart. The alternative is that members care lit-tle about one another and about the space in which they live. Gradually each individual b~comes the center of a personal uni-verse which has minimal contact and communication with the other personal universes in the vicinity. Then all the theories about community and loving one another constitute little more than fine words carried on hot air. , Community life, then, can be healthy or dysfunctional. These present thoughts will focus on some characteristics of a healthy community and on some earmarks of a dysfunctional community. The following sets of contrasting characteristics represent spec-trums present in all communities. They are presented here only as a stimulant for further reflection and discussion vis-h-vis the specific experiences and contexts of actual local communities. The health or dysfunction of a community is evident from its location on the spectrum. Determining that location is not a random, arbi-trary exercise; it emerges from the members' individual and com-munal self-knowledge, hgnesty, self-examination, and willingness to adapt. Only then can the members decide what adjustments will facilitate living more effectively as a healthy community. Community or Computer? Communication, sharing and processing information, has a major influence on the health or dysfunction of a community. Healthy choices and decisions are based on sufficient and appro-priate, information and clear communication. This assumes gen-uine listening, not simply hearing. Attentive listening enables us to analyze and respond to. someone's words with understanding and love. , , The alternative is not :merely a failure to listen, though that will be part of it. Much more, the alternative strips the entire interchange--the information sharing and the personal decision making--of any affective, human quality. We may react mechan-ically to what we barely hear, quickly making preliminary and sometimes permanent judgments. As individuals and as a com-munity, we may focus,only on facts, with little regard for how all this decision or this expressed opinion will affect the people involved. Then we are no longer a community, but a computer. November-Decentber 1997 Whether the members are a "community or a computer depends upon how they share and deal with information among themselves, how they communicate with one another. A healthy community remains focused on people; it puts information at the service of people. A dysfunctional community operates much like a computer, focusing on the precision and,.processing 6f infor-mation; it tends to view people as servants of that information. A healthy community strives always to choose and decide wi.th understanding and love. By contrast, a dysfunctional community may be efficient, but is not likely to be person oriented. What needs to be done gets done, but with little regard for the vari-ables of human personality, for people's preferences and per-spect. ives, for the rich nuances that the talents and experience of the individual members could provide. Efficiency may be an important value, but it is no guarantee against dysfunction; only love can prevent that. The quality of communication among community members colors the atmosphere, the climate, the spirit, of their residence, marking it as either a home or a hohsing facility: In turn, that atmosphere affects the quality of relationships among 'the mem-bers and thus the witness,they present to'the world around them through their presence and ministry. Assessing the quality of com-munication within a community is among the mos~t effective and direct means of improving the overall health of that community. Community or Condominium? When the members actively establish and actually engage in their communal lifel the community's ;health benefits d.ireetly. Several elements are involved: first, common call and mission. The healthy commianity understands its call and articulates its mission. This becomes a source ofenergy and provides meaning and direction, with far-reaching implications for every dimension of religious life, from personal and communal lifestyles, to voca-tion promotion, to decisions concerning ministries and the use of financial resources. By contrast, a dysfunctional community drifts without a clear sense of where it is going or how it wants to present itself to the world around it. As a result, irreconcilably wide gaps develop among the lifestyles and philosophies of the various members and local communities and jeopardize the very fibers holding the com-munity together. Efforts to identify and maintain any common Revie~v for Religious call and mission are not a priority among the members of a dys-functional community. A second element of community health is mutual respect. Members have a certain maturity and respect one another's per-sons, possessions, and perspectives. This is not to imply that there will be constant and. consistent agreement; that is not realistic. Respect has more to do with recogniz-ing, accepting, and even honoring the differences among the members than with arriving at some superficial level of agreement. By contrast, a dysfunctional commu-nity has replaced respect with recipe. Its members work hard to redesign one another according to some image or stan-dard' they hold which may have nothing to .do with the ideals put before them by the life and example of the founder, or the constitutions, or the experience and capabilities of the members. Redesigning one another consumes much time and energy that should be directed elsewhere., ~ Third--this expands the preceding point--a healthy community celebrates " the 'members' giftedness. Rejoicing in one~ another's gifts is a concrete expression of respect. This assumes that we have made the effort to know one another's gifts; further, this effort involves sharing and communicating with one another. The challenge here is to go beyond knowledge toward: affirmation and even promotion of one another's gifts. This is possible only if we are secure and comfortable with ourselves, with our own individual gifts and goodness. By contrast, the members of a dysfunctional community tear down one another, not so much through specific hatred or dislike, but because of personal insecurity, being uncomfortable with one~ self. Jealousy and envy emerge from .low self-esteem and superfi-cial self-knowledge. If we feel and come to believe that Our gifts or talents are insufficient and inadequate, we may be tempted to build up ourselves by tearing down others. This may be quite subtle: a roll of the eyes, .a nod of the head, a sigh that commu-nicates "There he/she goes again!" In time the only comfort zone The quality o.f communication among community members colors the atmosphere, the climate, the spirit, of their residence, marking,it as either a home or a housing facility. Nov~nber-December 1997 Giallanza ." Communi~--Healtb~ or D~Cunctional? we may experience is when we maintain our distance from one another. We are polite, but politic: never disturbing or unsettling one another, but also never challenging and ultimately, never really knowing and loving one another. Fourth, a healthy community does, of course, provide and allow space--physical, psychological, and spiritual--for the mem-bers, as individuals and as a community, to be alone and silent, to pray, think, reflect, and relate to God. Maintaining and respect-ing such space requires a level of maturity and comfort that does not equate community with constant togetherness nor reduce it to comfortable superficiality. By contrast, a dysfunctional community sacrifices environ-ment and atmosphere to organization and structure. Though everyone has space, the community does not seem to be alive. There is no sense of an appropriate ambiance, a balance between the private and public forums of the members. Privacy tends to degenerate into secrecy, and public times together become safely and securely sociable. Shared prayer and significant interaction among the members are minimized or routinized to assure the completion of requirements without the responsibilities of com-mitment. Fifth, a certain spirit characterizes a healthy community. The atmosphere, the spirit, of a healthy community encourages the members to feel at home with one another, with the physical space, and with the rhythm of life. This spirit speaks more loudly to prospective members and occasional guests than any other aspect of the community's life. If our guests do not perceive that we .feel at home in this space and with this rhythm of life, then they are not likely to feel at home either. The questions confronting us are direct: Do we feel at home here? Is this an atmosphere which encourages~us to contribute, to be open, to trust? If not, why?- By contrast, a dysfunctional community has a climate from which members try to escape in one way or another. This is most clearly observable when the balance between presence and absence collapses. Personal activities of the demands of ministry are allowed to expand and overflow so that it becomes difficult if not impossible to be present for the community meetings, common meals and prayer, and other gatherings and celebrations as well. Away from the community, members feel more alive, and they feel a heaviness when it is time to return. They find it emotion-ally and spiritually draining to live in this community setting. Review for Religious Sixth, efforts to preserve unity indicate a healthy community. Recognizing the work and the sacrifice involved, the members enter willingly into one another's lives through appropriate self-revelation and compassionate listening. And they willingly make the time for that work and sacrifice. By contrast, a dysfunctional community no longer invests time and energy in the quality of its life. Its members may be quite civil and sociable, but they do not form significant affec-tive and spiritual bonds with one another. Their residing together is merely a coin-cidence of time and space rather than a reflection of a deeper commitment to one another. Given the importance of these six characteristics of a healthy community, when dysfunctional cl~aracteristics are dominant, we no longer have a commu-nity but a condominium. Everything appears to be in order, well organized, running smoothly, and comfortably .appointed--but the place is merely a habi-tation, not a home. Everyone is self-con-tained. People pass one another and exchange all the acceptable courtesies and If our guests do not perceive that we feel at home in this space and with this rhythm of life, then they are not likely to feel atohome either. appropriate pleasantries, but maneuver away from any deeper sharing. Obviously, a dysfunctional community can neither attract nor nurture healthy vocations. Those who desire to live in this way could easily find what they want in a well-managed and efficiendy operated condominium. Community or Cold Storage? Life in community necessitates some personal and communal qualities. Though any list is somewhat arbitrary, I would suggest that members of any healthy communit~ have some basic quali-fies that facilitate and sustain their relationships with one another. In their personal qualities, the individual members of a healthy community will have a rich diversity. These qualities, moreover, will vary from community to community. They will, however, include mutual affection and affirmation, willingness to apolo-gize and to forgive, fostering friendships, generosity, compassion, and joy. All these and others communicate a distinctively posi- Novetnber-Dece'mber 1997 Giallanza ¯ Community--Healthy or Dysfunctional? tive response to two simple questions: Am I / Are we happy in this way of life? Would others perceive that we are happy and enthusiastic as they observe our everyday life? This is not to deny the human reality of the striving of us all, with various ups and downs in community life, prayer, ministry, the vowed life, and personal relationships. Admittedly, these qualities may not always be fully evident in us, but it ig essential that we have a commitment and a willingness to make constant efforts to develop them. By contrast, a dysfunctional community seems only to exist, to survive. It does not give the impression of flourishing with all the warmth and beauty of human relationships. It appears to be merely a group of people occupying the same space together, but never encountering one another on a deeper level that calls them to life. A dysfunctional community does not and cannot commu-nicate that the members are truly happy to be living and carrying out their everyday tasks and responsibilities. Communal qualities do not differ significantly from the per-sonal qualities necessary for healthy community. In fact, they reflect the interaction of those personal qualities among the mem-bers. The health of that interaction is especially evident when community members genuinely enjoy one another's company and are generously hospitable to others. They plan for time together on a regular basis, and they safeguard that time as a priority. VChat they do during that time together is not as important as their tak-ing the time to be present and attentive to one another. That attentiveness will overflow so tha.t guests feel welcome to activi-ties of the members' common life. By contrast, the members of a dysfunctional community find time together to be a chore, and so they reduce it to a minimum, either by unchallenged design or through the deterioration of relationships. It would not be uncommon to find much loneli, ness in these situations, loneliness that is compensated for by hav-ing all or most of one's primary friendships outside the local community. In a healthy context, loneliness can teach us and chal-lenge us to deepen .our relationship with the Lord and sharpen our compassion for and sensitivity to the loneliness of others. In a dysfunctional community, however, loneliness takes a very dif-ferent direction: it tends to breed discouragement and depres-sion which lead to compensatory behaviors. Vv'hen a group gives little or no evidence of these personal and communal qualities, they have cold storage, not community. Review for Religious They live together, but only as if in suspended animation, with-out those human qualities and interactions that bring life and happiness and growth to a community. Even if the members of a local community are not aware of this and do not acknowledge it, their guests will see it, and, most certainly, so will those who are considering a vocation to their way of life. Given the realities, of society,today, many of those considering a vocation to religious life come from environments that have little human warmth, little sense of family. It is. unlikely--if they truly want to live in a healthy way--that they would commit themselves to a life of cold storage in a dysfunctional community. Community or Committee? Community is a straightforward reality. If we do not take the time and energy to create it, if we do not take responsibility for it and take initiatives for it, then it will not really exist. Community is never the result of spontaneous generation, nor does it work by automation. The mem-bers of a healthy community do not abdi-cate their right and duty to make, maintain, and monitor the quality of their common life. They accept the idea that reflection together, sharing, and bonded-ness are key elements in the health of community life. By contrast, a dysfunctional commu-nity seems to drift as the members wait for someone to do something, to take responsibility for moving the community forward. On occasion, some issue or sit-uation becomes a crisis before the members mobilize enough to respond reasonably. For instance, the demands o.f ministry may have been allowed to control the scheduling of regular times together for reflection and sharing, or some members' manipu-lative behaviors may have been left unchallenged for so long that the community now manifests a growing collective passivity. The challenge here is to decide if people's lives together will be a community or a committee. "Committe~" here means a tem-porary group formed for a particular purpose. Its members address an issue or perform a task and then they disperse. Maintaining relationships is not a committee's function; in fact, that could Community is never the result of spontaneous generation, nor does it work by automation. Noventber-Dece~nber'1997 Giallanza ¯ Community--Healthy or Dysfunctional? hinder its efficiency and effectiveness. In the case of a community, however, failure to maintain relationships compromises its capac-ity for being a prophetic presence and witness in and for our world. Community or Convenience? There is a genuine asceticism involved in building and sus-taining a healthy community life. This asceticism has some com-ponents. First, the qualities of love and unity in a community must be personal and individual before they can exist commu-nally. If as individuals we take personal responsibility to foster these qualities by helpful activity, then the group we belong to will do so too. In a dysfunctional community there is a wide gap between talk about responsibility and the reality of what is actually done. Everyone may say "we" do such-and-such, but, in reality, only a few take any initiative or action in response to the situation or issue at hand. Second, within a healthy community, care and concern are given generously and appropriately. Generously, because they are directed to each individual within the community. Appropriately, because they are adapted to the particular situations, personalities, and needs of the individual members. The sensitivity and aware-ness at work here are mutual, respectful, and inclusive. Third, individual, active participation is essential to healthy community life. If individuals do not participate in community meetings or contribute to common decisions, they get in the way of healthy community life. Really, there is not much middle ground in this regard. Silence and passivity are not automatically harmless to the quality of community life, Members of a dysfunctional community are passive partici-pants. Every dimension of their consecrated life--prayer, daily interactions, conversation at meals, attentiveness to guests-- reflects a general lack of energy and interest. The members put their energy and interest outside the community. Two means for facilitating this asceticism are personal accountability and effective conflict resolution. Calling one another to accountability is never easy to do, but it does mark the care and concern, the participation and love, of a healthy community. In a dysfunctional community, life together is lived at Review for Religious the lowest common denominator. Community members do not challenge one another, either because of fear or because no one wants to be challenged. Then the whole community will be only as strong as the weakest member; it will make progress only at the pace of the slowest one. Effective conflict resolution is indispensable. A community with absolutely no conflict is not perfect, it is dead!_How con-flict is dealt with in community can weave the members together into a magnificent tapestry of healing and love, or it can tear them into so many scattered pieces of cloth with no common threads. Often a small event or issue, left unaddressed, becomes infected over time, changing a community from health to dys-function, from bondedness to brokenness. If we are unwilling to practice the components of this asceti-cism and use the means that help us do so, we are no longer speak-ing of community, but of convenience. The dysfunctional community protects and promotes and projects a life of conve-nience. Therefore, whatever is inconvenient--whether it is related to prayer or practicalities of living together or personal relation-ships-- never reaches the level of consideration as a community priority. Convenience can assure that no one is upset, but it also guarantees that people will grow in only minimal ways. The Choice before Us The quality of our community is not a onetime choice; we must choose to live in love with one another day in, day out. If we do not make that choice daily and affirm it by our actions daily, we begin to live something else. Eventually our life together becomes ~omething else: a computer, a condominium, cold stor-age, a committee, or a convenience. We become something, but not community. We give witness to something, but not to unity and love. The choice is ours. We know well the words of Deuteronomy 30:19 calling us to "choose life." Sirach, too, .expresses bluntly the choice before us: If you choose, you can keep the commandments, and to act faithfully is a matter of your own choice. God has placed before you fire and water: stretch out your hand for whichever you choose. Before you are life and death, and whichever you choose will be given to you. (15:15-17) November-December 1997 Giallanza ¯ Community--Healthy or Dysfunctional? Three questions can assist us in reflecting on our individual and communal response to that life-or-death choice which is ever before us. First, what brings us together? VChy are we here? Is it our faith in Jesus and our desire to live that faith through this religious community and its mission? Or is this life simply a way to do a ministry--teaching or nursing or social service or pas-toral work or whatever? Admittedly, our faith in Jesus and the work we do are not mutually exclusive; but the question here con-cerns the foundation of our life's identity and meaning. Second, what keeps us together? Is it our love for one another and our efforts to support one another in living the way of love? Or is it that we have no alternatives and have become comfort-able? Or are we afraid to consider any alternatives? Having no alternatives and being unwilling to consider other options are not good indications that we have made a healthy and mature choice of what we are doing. Third, what flows from our being together? Is it the prophetic witness of our faith in Jesus and our love for one another? Or is it: our accomplishments? The compliment paid to the early Christians was "See how they love one another!" not "See how much they get done!!~ Healthy community is built and sustained by faith and love and witness. Dysfunctional community is concerned only with the work to be done, the status quo, and the results of what is done. Only a healthy community can project Christian life and human warmth and prophetic witness. These thoughts will close with the Gospel te~t which opened them: "Very well, pay Caesar what belongs to Caesar--and God what belongs to God" (Mt 22:21). Because he is referring to a Roman coin, Jesus speaks in terms of payment. His words remind us that healthy community costs something--we will have to pay. A healthy community costs each of us individually because we must constantly give of ourselves,° thus making our commitment to one another real in our attitudes and our actions. COmmunity costs us collectively because we must commit ourselves to make our life together a witness of love and peace and unity. Together we must call one another to this commitment. Dysfunctional com-munity is free of charge. Healthy community costs something. Individually and collectively, we must determine our willingness to make the necessary payment. Review for Religious EAGAN HUNTER The Elderly among Us Tue, we always have had elderly religious among us. But ~ two factors have changed the emphasis. First~ everyone is living longer, in the secular world and in the religious life as well. In 1900 only four percent of the total general population was over the age of 65--one in every twenty-five. By the year 2000 it is projected that as much as thirteen percent of the total :general population will be over 65. Life expectancy has been extended. It is projected that those arriving at age 65 today can expect to live approximately 16.3 years beyond that age. Second, the median age of religious communities is getting older, changing the dimen-sions of the concern. These two factors have made aging in reli-gious communities a more visible, more widely known concern. The problems faced by elderly religious are not necessarily a matter of increasingly poor health. Even though more vulnerable to ill health than in their earlier years, many continue to live healthy lives into very advanced years and some almost until death. Growing old is physiologically and psychologically inevitable, but these changes vary from individual to individual, with no pre-dictable'pattern emerging. Physiologically, advancing years bring problems of lessened mobility, gradual diminishment of the senses (especially sight and hearing), weakened ability to think and remember, Increasingly, heart problems and strokes occur, bones weaken, and arthritic and other impairments increase. Most older religious seem able to adjust more rapidly to various changes in their physiological world than in their psychological one. Eagan Hunter CSC is professor of education at St. Edward's University; 3001 South Congress Avenue; Austin, Texas 78704. Novonber-Deconber 1997 Hunter ¯ The Elderl~ amon~ Us Many times the decline of physical powers causes a brother or sister to remain somewhat isolated within his or her religious house, out of the "mainstream" and interacting less frequently with others. In the religious life we have been taught that one of the major facets of our existence is our contribution to the ministry and apostolate. Our religious formation tends to make us become self-sufficient. When the necessity asserts itself of cutting back on former activities once managed quite easily, older religious may experience feelings of depression, of uselessness. They may feel themselves a burden to others and no longer able to do their fair share. They seek ways and means through which to make some form of contribution to the common life and to the ministry. Sometimes there is a tendency for younger people to assume tasks which the elderly could do if provided sufficient extra time. In the interest of efficiency and effectiveness, we may become impatient and take the tasks out of their hands. Thus for the elderly the depressing feeling of 'not being able to contribute their part becomes magnified. Younger religious must seek ways to continue incorporating the elderly into the community's daily activities. The contemplation of retirement involves a psychological state, a sense of psychological withdrawal from the demands of one's ministry or occupation and the entry into a totally new ori-entation towards oneself and one's work. The taking of this step in our work-oriented society indeed is a milestone event and a very sensitive process. It marks a turning point in one's adult life, a shift from the middle years to old age. The extent to which retirement is viewed as a positive life transition depends much upon the attitudes of the individual. Some have more difficulty adjusting to retirement than others. Some are reluctant to retire, for their work seems to give their lives structure and meaning which is seen as becoming void in the future. What decisions need to be made when facing this stage of one's lifespan? What choices are available to the individual? Such a transitional adjustment incorporates a process of con-templation and evaluation of life's meaning and purpose, one's vocational call to service. It involves integrating the many expe-riences, meanings, and facts of one's life. It brings into focus one of the most incomprehensible concepts of all--one's own human. mortality. Such an adjustment involves acceptance of one's life with dignity and without too much regret for things not done, roads not followed. This reorientation phase of adjUstment should Review for Religious involve exploring new avenues and ways of being involved. The elderly who are well educated and who have enjoyed their work life will desire to continue some type of positive experiences related to that former occupation, but with lessened participa-tion and responsibilities. I had a great-aunt who was a nun. For some sixty years she was a successful teacher and administrator. With the limitations of advancing old age and the resultant physical losses, it became necessary for her to surrender one by one those things which she loved doing and did well. I can remember visiting her in their infirmary before her death. While we were talk-ing, a younger nursing nun entered the room with a tray containing a stack of small plastic cups used to give medication and a small bowl of soapy water. My aunt had insisted that she still could make a contribution, and this was her way. As we talked, she carefully and slowly washed and dried each cup. A contented smile of pleasure filled her face when the nursing nun returned an hour later to pick up the tray and complimented my great-aunt on the help she was to them. Even this litde bit meant much to my elderly aunt. She still was a con-tributing member of her religious community in her own little way. In my own religious community, we have a brother who cel-ebrated his hundredth birthday in 1996. For many years he was an active teacher, administrator, religious superior. In addition to the task assigned him through his ministry, he reached out in other ways to those around him. Before entering the religious life, he had been a member of the Souza band. It was this gift of music he shared with others over the years of his religious life through playing in various civic musical groups and symphonies. After a major stroke, one of his primary goals was to rehabilitate his muscular coordination to the degree that once again he could make joyful sounds to the Lord on his cello. Prayer, music, and his community became the center of his retirement. He continues to have many gifts to share with others, and share he does. Many of us feel the limitations that the ac6ve demands of our ministry place on our personal time. We sometimes feel there is not sufficient time to pray. But, for many of our retired religious, Younger religious must seek ways to continue incorporating the elderly into the community's daily activities. November-Decentber 1997 Hunter ¯ The Elderly among Us time is what they have most of--so we must plug into this spiri-tual "powerhouse." We must stress to the elderly religious that their contribution is to storm heaven in behalf of the concerns and problems being encountered by those in the active ministry. They can pray and are happy to assume this role of petitioner. Seen in the proper perspective, the lives of our older reli-gious need not be brooding or unhappy. We must give them our support and understanding, realizing the emotional tensions, phys-ical trauma, and disease which have become so much a part of their lives. We must remember that these are the community's elderly of today, and that the elderly of tomorrow will be us! How would we want to be treated? Younger religious must be careful not to participate in a form of age stratification within our religious communities. Such strat-ifying may be seen in the general society, with people being divided into classes and castes of various sorts. In such a society it becomes the norm administered to qualify or disqualify indi-viduals for desired roles and positions. Age is a significant variable in such social stratifications and becomes an operative factor in the qualification or disqualification process. Many of our elderly once held leadership roles in commu-nity undertakings. Through age discrimination such religious may feel that their expertise and experiences are no longer sought, that their role in community has been terminated. We must real-ize the symbolic value of their witness roles. It is their footprints that led our various religious communities to the roles we fill today. The elderly hold a vital position in the continuity of our religious life. Vatican Council II speaks, of the heritage of our various religious orders and congregations. We are asked to turn~ to the sources of Christian life, to the inspirations, conceptions, traditions, and ideals of our founders, as well as to those who fol- ¯ lowed later in our histories. We are asked to restore these to our religious life through modifications that meet contemporary reli-gious and social needs. The elderly among us are those who helped mold our particular institute into what it represents today. They,:are our living heritage, our legacy. Thus we must continue to reach out in order to -benefit from their years of knowledge and understanding of our particular mode of living the religious~ life. Their guidance and insights form a treasure which we cannot afford to ignore or'discredit. The elderly religious among us have seen their family mem- Review for Religious bers as well as their religious associates die. More and more of their generation is disappearing. Feeling the loss of these loved ones, they come face-to-face with their own mortality. The pos-sibility of one's own death becomes a factor of life. When young, we tend to believe we are indestructible--death is something asso-ciated with old age, and we are young. Time passes and the pos-sibility of one's death becomes a reality. Our religious beliefs provide us with a solid and positive creed. The Vatican Council stresses that we have been created by God and that, through the passion and death of Jesus, the terrors of bodily death have been conquered. If we live this life fully, we will be restored to whole-ness and a sharing in .the divine life which lies beyond all corruption. "Hence to every thoughtful man a solidly established faith provides the answer to his anxiety about what the future holds for him. At the same time faith gives him the power to be united in Christ with his loved ones who have already been snatched away by death. Faith arouses the hope that they have found true life with God" (Gaudium et spes, § 18). The resultant insights make it easier to develop one's own coping mechanisms for dealing with the future. Yet death remains a mystery. Our goal should be to assist the elderly to reflect upon their life's achievements done in the name of our Lord and to reflect upon the truths of Christianity related to the meaning of life and death. As Erikson points out, the last stage of the human life cycle encompasses old age and the retirement from the pro-ductive years of life. He sees this last stage as ego integrity.versus disgust and despair. The positive outcome of this last stage is an acceptance of one's self and one's life without bitterness or regret. It is a coming to terms with i:he approaching finality of one's life. It incorporates the avoidance of the negative feelings that one's life has been wasted, the avoidance of discontentment about one's limited accomplishments, the "road not taken," the task not done. Upon going blind, Milton feared that God would chide him for wasting talents and gifts that were now lying useless in him. An inner struggle went on until Milton reached the conclusion that, rather than rejecting the role given him by God, he simply needed to accept it. He phrased this acceptance exceedingly well The elderly among us are those who helped mold our particular institute into what it represents today. November-December 1997 Hunter ¯ The Elderly among Us when he said, "They also serve who only stand and wait." This quiet acceptance is difficult, for most people are action oriented. In the declining years of our lives, God is not asking anything heroic. Rather, he is asking for the quiet acceptance of one's infir-mities, one's physical disabilities and limitations, one's sufferings and pains. St. Paul expresses this acceptance when he says, "I find my joy in the suffering I endure for you. In my own flesh I fill up what is lacking in the sufferings of Christ for the sake of his body, the church" (Col 1:24). This submission and acceptance can be raised as one's gift to heaven. This is a task we all can do. These elderly religious have preceded us in the labors of our ministries. The burdens ~they carried frequendy were heavy. They did not trudge; they strode onward, for they were people of faith and hope. Approaching the end of their individual journeys, they need our support, our understanding, and our willingness to assist. This we must be willing to give them in their time of need. Simply this is all they are asking of us. To Mary, Journeying (A Visitation Song) "For all your ways~ are beautiful . " Be with us in the morning as with joyful hearts we travel tq carry Christ within us in silence and in song. Be with us as we labor on the hills and in the valleys with your care and with your mercy to all within our world. And when evening shadows lengthen, be our strength as still we journey to our God whose arms await us in the darkness of your peace. Louise Finn CND Review for Religious THOMAS MICHEL I Interreligious Dialogue and the Jesuit Mission "All good theology is autobiography" is a phrase often repeated today. If theology is a reflection on our faith and its implications, then the personal history of how God has acted and is acting in the life of each of us is the starting point for theological understanding. Moreover, as Jesuits, it has been a part of our communitarian spirituality from the beginning to "share our desires," that is, to speak with each other about the great things we want to do for the Lord. From this starting point I would like to share the spiritual desire that has dominated my relationship with God in prayer and work for the past quarter century. It is the desire for greater understanding and love between Christians and Muslims and my desire to make a contri-bution to that end. being missioned Transformation through Dialogue As a Jesuit and a priest,I am today a product of inter-religious dialogue. The way I live my Jesuit vocation is the result of twenty-five years of sharing life with Muslims, discovering the spiritual riches they possess, learning from them, being challenged by them, and at the same time Thomas Michel SJ, secretary of the Vatican Secretariat for Interreligious Dialogue, originally presented this article as a talk to young Jesuits in both Manila and Rome. He may be addressed at Curia Generalizia; Compagnia di Ges~a; C.P. 6139; 00195 Roma PRATI; Italy. ¯ November-December 1997 Micbd ¯ Interreligious Dialogue and the ~esuit Mission having occasion both to bear witness to my faith in what God has achieved for all people in the person of Jesus Christ and to explain to them my understanding of what it means to be a disciple of Christ. In more recent years my apostolate has taken me beyond encounter with Muslims and more and more into dialogue with Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists, and the followers of indigenous religions. When I reflect on what has been going on in my life, I see God forming me and transforming me by his grace, over and over, into a person different frbm what I "alas at the beginning of my interreligious journey. I am conscious that, when I teach courses on Islam or when I speak about Muslims, what I say and how I say it are different from the words of someone who has not had my experience of coming to know the Muslim community from the inside. When someone says something tha( pu~ts down or denigrates Islam unfairly, I ~nd myself reacting spontaneously and even emotionally, because they are talking about people that I know, people who have welcomed me into their lives, people whom I love and who have shown love to me. When Muslims are insulted, I feel insulted; when they are wronged, I feel wronged; when they undergo a tragedy, I suffer with them. When something good happens to them, I rejoice with them. When Muslims do wrong, to themselves or to others, I feel ashamed and beg God's forgiveness. When real dialogue occurs, no partner is left unchanged. When I see how much God has enriched my life and deepened my faith through my being in dialogue with others, it is a great source of hope and encouragement to me. For the same Holy Spirit who has been active in my own life is also at work in the lives of my friends of other faiths, using our encounters to touch them too and transform their lives. Most of the time we do not see evidence of this. We work in hope, which is, after all, trusting that God is invisibly active in this world. But God knows that we need encouragement from time to time and gives us "feedback" to keep our hopes alive. About four years ago I received such a .response from Said Khorramshahri, a pious Iranian Qur'an reciter. I had gone to Tehran to represent the Vatican at a national function and was staying about two weeks. Said, a graduate student in English, was assigned to interpret for me at the meetings and conferences that made up my schedule. Review for Religious During this time Said and I had many opportunities to talk about all sorts of things: life in Iran and in Rome, sports, politics, music, our own personal hopes and desires~ and, of course, what is deepest in our lives--our faiths. We shared deeply and hon-estly, and I could often feel the presence of the Lord when we were in conversation. When I returned to Rome, he wrote me a long letter saying that he never imagined that God would use his encounter with a Catholic priest as the instrument by which to pro-foundly change and deepen his outlook on life, faith, and his relations with others. I real-ized that I was not the only one who recog-nized that God was present and active in our encounters. This pious Muslim also saw that God was with us and that "our hearts were burning within us" from the movement of God's grace: I offer this experience merely as an exam-ple. Every Jesuit--every Christian--who has been involved in interreligious dialogue to any extent can tell comparable stories. If my experience has been mostly with Muslims, others could testify to some strikingly similar" experiences of God's activity gathered over the course of their years in dialogue with Buddhists or Hindus, Jews or Baha'is, or followers of the tradi-tional religions of Africans or Native Americans. The point is that, when we truly open ourselves to God in dialogue with another, the Holy Spirit takes over and guides the encounter. As the document "Our Mission and Interreligious Dialogue" puts it, "Open and sincere interreligious dialogue is our cooperation with God's ongoing dialogue with humanity (OMID §5). When we truly open ourselves to God in dialogue with another, the Holy Spirit takes over and guides the encounter. The Need for a Document The document of th~ 34th General Congregation "Our Mission and Interreligious Dialogue" is remarkable. For the first time in Jesuit history, the Society as a whole explored the inter-religious dimension of our Jesuit mission. Certainly, there were always some Jesuits who were involved in various forms of inter-religious dialogue. For a few it was their main apostolate, but for most it was something in which they were involved when they Novetnber-Dece~nber 1997 Michel ¯ Interreligious Dialogue and the ~esuit Mission had extra time, an apostolate they added on to their main duties. Dialogue was often considered a kind of luxury in the Society, of secondary importance to works such as schools, seminary and theological education, parishes. It frequently happened that stu-dents who were interested in carrying out studies on other reli-gions were assigned to other, "more important" fields of study like Scripture, theology, and philosophy. Most of us .involved in dialogue have had the experience of hearing a fellow Jesuit tell us we were wasting our time. "Why do you bother with Muslims?" I have been asked; "you will never convert them." Some comments have seemed to presume that interreligious dialogue and proclamation of the gospel are incom-patible activities, or that dialogue somehow undermined or com-promised the church's mission of evangelization. These questions show that the goal of dialogue was not well understood. It was confused with a type of soft sell, a way to insinuate ourselves into another religious community in order to make converts, or it was seen as a lack of commitment to bear witness to our Christian faith. Dialogue and PrOclamation One of the first issues that the general congregation had to take up was the way int.erreligious dialogue is related to the work of evangelization. It is in this context that the goal of dialogue can be understood. In the one evangelizing mission that Christ gave to his disciples, dialogue and proclamation of the gospel are two distinct aspects. Neither can replace the other. "They should not be confused, manipulated, or regarded as identical, as though they were interchangeable" (OMID, §7). Just as dialogue is not meant to replace proclamation of the gospel, so the duty to pro-claim the gospel must never preempt or negate the work of engag-ing in dialogue. The document describes dialogue as "a new way of being church," in which we discover the "deeper dimensions of our Christian faith and wide~ horizons of God's salvific presence in the world" and engage in activity that "grasps the deeper truth and meaning of the mystery of Christ in relation to the universal his-tory of God's self-revelation" (OMID, §7). What this dense the-ological statement means is that God is at work in the lives of all those who sincerely seek him and that sometimes God's grace Review for Religious produces anyplace in the world people of great holiness, gen-erosity, and love. God carries out this saving work among people of other faiths through the Holy Spirit, who makes use of the religious tradi-tions that people follow to lead them farther and farther along the path of true holiness. Sometimes a person's knowledge of God's saving work in Jesu's Christ precedes: the person is bap-tized and receives the fullness of the Holy Spirit. More often the Holy Spirit precedes people's knowledge of Christ. There is no contradiction here: it is the One God who is at work, whether in Christ'or in the Spirit. Quoting the bishops of Asia, the GC34 document says: "It is the same Spirit, who has been active in the incarnation, life, death, and resurrection of Jesus and in the church, who was active amongst all peoples before the incarnation and is active amongst the nations, religions, and peoples today." We see, then, that the deepest motivation for dialogue is to recognize the Spirit of God wherever the Spirit is at work in the world today and to praise God for the generous action of the Spirit. When we meet Muslims, Buddhists, Sikhs, and others who bear the fruits of the Holy Spirit in their lives, our reaction should be to praise and thank God. Time spent with sincere believers of other faiths is time spent in discovery of the many and varied fruitsalove, joy, peace, patience, goodness, kindness, gentleness, faithfulness, self-control--~at the Spirit continues to produce in the lives of other believers. Four Types of Dialogue and Their Goals "Interreligious dialogue," as the document points out, is not one thing, and the document outlines four basic types of dialogue. The goal of each type is not exactly the same. The dialogue of life is a dialogue on the plane of being, and the goal i~ living together in peace, mutually enriching each other by bearing witness to the values we stand for. The dialogue of action is on the plane of doing--working together to oppose whatever enslaves and degrades people, defending the weak, accompanying the poor in their struggle for justice. Its goal is to build together societies formed in accord with the will of God and in reverence for human dignity. An example of the dialogue of religious experience is what was going on during my time with Said in Iran. The goal is for those November-December 1997 Michel ¯ Interreligious Dialogue and the ~esuit Mission in such dialogue to open themselves fully .to God's movements (God's personal history in the life of each person) so that the Spirit can use them to touch and transform the persons. The dialogue of theological'exchange is to .clarify points of con-vergence and divergence, to overcome misunderstandings, half-truths, and distortions, and to come to a greater appreciation of each other's spiritual values (OMID, §4). It is not meant to arrive at a common formulation, to gloss over the differences between religions, or to find a common denominator on which we can all agree. The irreconcilable differences that we discover should nei-ther surprise nor discourage us, since we acknowledge from the start that each religion, is unique and offers its particular com-plex of doctrines and way of life. Dialogue in Patience and Hope If dialogue is about love (OMID, §6), then it is by examining the qualities of love that we learn the attitudes that must accom-pany our efforts at dialogue. In his great hymn on love in the First Letter to the Corinthians, St. Paul lists some of the qualities of love. It is. significant that the first quality on Paul's list is patience: "Love is patient, kind . oIt is important to spend time reflecting on the quality of patience, because lack of patience, in my opinion, is one of .the great causes of failure in dialogue. Patience includes more than not looking for quick results. I would rather say, "Do not look for results at all." In the Bhagavad Gita, Krishna tells Arjuna, "Do your duty conscientiously, and do not be concerned about suc-cess or failure?' We might paraphrase this advice by saying that the document "Our Mission and Interreligious Dialogue~' challenges Jesuits to "throw yourselves into this activity, without counting the cost or trying to measure the results." We engage in dialogue because it is our duty as disciples of Christ. As the OMID document puts it, dialogue is an integral element of our Jesuit mission in the world. We are people of hope, .one of the three greatest gifts that God has given us. We work in the hope that God will use our efforts in a way pleasing to God to advance the comingof God's reign in the world. Sometimes we hear people say, "What have you accomplished after all these years of dialogue? There are still religious tensions, ,conflicts, and wars." Review for Religious ~ The same could be said of other aspects of our mission. Those working for justice know that--despite years and years of tireless effort, sacrifices, even martyrdoms, despite vast amounts of time and energy spent--we are still confronted with countless forms of -injustice, oppression, and exploitation in the world. Recent years have even produced new forms. The occasional victories seem few in comparison with the rampant injustices still existing in almost every society. Does this mean that all those efforts at building more just societies have been in vain? No, we recognize ~that we have to keep on struggling in every age, culture, and nation to oppose injustice and defend the oppressed and marginalized. , It-is a similar case with interreligious dia-logue. At the same time that relations between the followers of various religions become better in one place, new conflicts and tensions break out elsewhere. Regions that have had long tra-ditions of people living together in peace sud-denly find themselves enmeshed in religious wars. On the other hand, reconciliation does occur where there has been conflict. People do learn to forgive and move beyond the past. Some peo-ples do find, often through much painful searching and with many setbacks, ways to live together with their neighbors of other faiths. We have all inherited two attitudes that make the effort at dialogue more difficult: One is the modern business ethic of quick and concrete results. In business, people feel they do not have time to wait. If they do not get the job done and done fast, a com-petitor will get an edge on them. People have graphs and tables .and prbjections to show how soon they can expect results. If they fail to achieve them in the time allotted, they go back to the draw-ing board to revise their policies. But it does not work that way with human relations. Things take time, and our efforts may be building a basis of fellowship whose benefits can be seen only in the future. The second attitude that makes dialogue difficult is an attitude of historical optimism that has dominated the philosophy of his-tory in this century. In this view, humankind, through education and technology, is continually evolving towards greater maturity, openness, and well-being. Obscurantism, ignorance, and violence are characteristics of primitive society and bound to be super- We engage in dialogue because it is ourduty as disciples of Christ. November-December 1997 Michel ¯ Interreli~ous Dialogue and the Jesuit Mission seded. In interreligious terms, many Catholics saw the period of the Second Vatican Council as a time when the old religious con-flicts would become a thing of the past. Dialogue would be the instrument of an inevitable result, putting an end to the misun-derstandings and divisions that kept us apart. Patience and Dialogue It seems to me that, if we Jesuits are going to make a contri-bution towards greater interreligious harmony, we must have a more realistic attitude. Dialogue will not solve all the religious conflicts in the world, just as our struggle for justice will never put an end to all forms of injustice and oppression. Rather, dialogue is something that must be carried on in every, society, in every age. Understanding and respect must be built anew in every gen-eration. The challenge will never come to an end, because sin is a part of who we are as humans and, where there is sin, there will be suspicion, hatred, and conflict. The need for patience is not only seen at the macro level of societies and nations. It is also the case in our personal dealings with people of other religions. We are all so full of suspicions, fears, and preconceptions. It takes much rime to get beyond these, to break down the natural resistance that we all bring to dialogue. If people seem unwilling, indifferent, or even hostile to invita-tions to dialogue, we should not be surprised. The burden of his-tory that we all bear is an obstacle that cannot be overcome quickly. We should also not be surprised if dialogue encounters seem superficial or seem to be characterized by an insincere politeness. This indicates that a level of trust at which we can relate hon-estly and deeply has not yet been built. That too takes time and much patient effort. We human beings are not willing to share what is deepest in our lives with people whom we are not yet ready to trust. Until we are convinced that the others will .treat our sharing with due respect, we tend to keep things at a nonthreat-ening, surface level. Only through the slow and laborious pro-cess of forming friendships and building trust do we arrive at the point where people can break through their latent distrust to begin to share frankly and honestly. But, if we Christians are motivated by Christ's love, we will find the determination and perseverance we need, for; as St.Paul says, "Love is always ready to excuse, to trust, to hope, and to endure whatever comes.?' Review for Religious I mention these negative factors, the effects of sin, because interreligious dialogue, although an exciting adventure of dis-covery of the manifold ways in which God lavishes his grace upon humankind, is also a path on which we encounter obstacles, set-backs, and frustrations and painful forms of self-discovery as well. When we are rebuffed, it is not easy to forgive. When we are misunderstood, it is not easy to go back again and again. When confronted with our own limitations and those of our commu-nity, we are tempted to give it all up and retreat to easier ways of life. However, as Jesuits we have a source of strength that we did not have even four years ago. We have the commitment of our whole Society--of our friends in the Lordmto engage in this aspect of our mission. We are helped to do so by our Ignatian vision that comes from our personal relationship to Jesus Christ. We are urged by the 34th General Congregation to develop a "culture 'of dialogue in our approach to believers of other reli-gions that should become a distinctive characteristic of our Society, sent into the whole world to labor for the greater glory of God and the help of human persons" (OMID, § 17), ' What a tremendous ideal to live for! What a challenge we have set for ourselves! ~Ours is the .generation, living immediately after and formed by General Congregation 34, that can make its document "Our Mission and Interreligious Dialogue" a vibrant part of our Jesuit mission in the world. Many foreign missionaries depend upon,people like you who donate subscriptions for them to Review for Religious. To start a subscription for a deserving missionary, please send $24 to: Review for Religious ¯ 3601 Lindell Blvd. ¯ St. Louis, MO 63108 To pay by credit card, phone: 314-977-7363. November-December 1997 ANNETTE M. PELLETIER Misery Meets Mystery in Montenegro: A Survival Guide for North American Religious oes consecrated life possess the latent power to continue evangelizing North American culture? Current literature on the topic suggests that the "holy experiment" of founding a culture on evangelical values has turned ominously unholy. The pioneer barks that brought (he Pilgrims, Quakers, and Shakers are saidto be aimlessly adrift, having lost their orientation to the Holy. On the other hand, the heritage of integration evident in the cultures in the Southern Hemisphere, where Santa Fe (Holy Faith) was the principal colonizing feature, suggests the power of the sacred to perdure despite a history marked by gore as well as glory. Upon returning to the United States after a time of mission-ary experience in the cultures to the south, one senses how deep the ache for the Sacred is in North American culture. The pro'- gressive deconstruction of the core values and virtues that made the experiment holy suggests that our culture may have lost its. :heart.~ ',Although you express tous what is most precious to you, you do not realize how far we are from where you are," remarks Fred, Henri Nouwen's "world!y" friend for whom he composed his profound reflections, on what it means to be the beloved chil- ~ren of the Holy,G~od present in secular culture. "You speak from Annette M. Pelletier IHM c0nsid~rs this article, following upon her 'contributions to our Septembe~:-October 1993 and July-August 1994 issues, to be the conclusion of a trilogy on Mystery in relation to conse-crated life. She may be addressed at Convento Santa Rosa de Lima; E. Montenegro; Apartado 18-0703; Lima 11, Peru. Review for Religious a context and tradition that is alien to us . Many, many questions need: to be answered before we are able to be fully open to what you say about the life of the Beloved.''2 What is to be the role of us who are called, consecrated, and sent to proclaim such "belovedness" in this deconsecrated world; of us whose specific task it is to offer radical eschatological testi-mony of the coming of the kingdom? 3 Peter, a designated, author-itative witness of that kingdom (realized 'in the presence and per-son of Jesus), reminded his early Christian community "to always be ready to give a reason for their hope" (1 P 3:15). What, then, would be the reason for our hope that the consecrated life will con-tinue to exert a positive influence on a heart-less culture, one that seems no longer to have experience of the "Holy"? The "reason" for my hope. for not just the survival bat the flourishing of consecrated life in North America escapes the concrete directions suggested by the many and various scientific analyses of consecrated life that appear fis part of a search for a definitive future, The "reason" for my hope springs from what I and many oth-ers have "seen and heard" (1 Jn 1:3) of the Mystery of God made manifest in the misery of the absolute poverty in one of our sis-ter cultures in Latin America, Peru. Montenegro, a densely pop-ulated pueblojoven or asentamiento humano (shanty town) situated about forty-five minutes by bus from Lima, owes its misery to both Shining Path terrorism and the disastrous effects of "fujishock" economics on those who have fled from terrorism in the Peruvian sierra during the last decade. No sociological anal-ysis explains why the pueblo children still danced for the fiestas in their school, Fey Alegria 37, and the sisters and the teachers and families stuck together in hope despite the extreme poverty and the designation of the zone as "red" during the darkest days of the reign of terror.4 One "reason" for hope, then, can be the simple fact that this pueblo and its fragile institutions have survived, despite the unholy One "reason" for hope, then, can be the simple fact that this pueblo and its fragile institutions have survived, despite the unholy cultural influences of terrorism and hunger. November-December 1997 Pelletier ¯ Misery Meets Mystery in Montenegro cultural influences of terrorism and hunger. Here is hard:evi-dence, provided by real people who survived' to live, instead of living to merely survive. The madres solteras (single mothers) who raise children of partners who abandon them for another; the youth who are old before they have a chance to be young; the knot of little children who play on the step of the mission-house door--none of these Montenegro dnawim have access to analyt-ical research charting their survival or demise. They simply live their reality, struggling to survive, struggling to find. meaning. Without the luxury of an education, they meet Mystery in their misery on Mystery's 6wn terms. Even though most of them will never really better their lot in life according to North American standards, they seem not to have lost. the reason for their hope. Yes, large numbers may eventually resort or succumb to every vice that a culture of absolute poverty provokes. Yet there :are those who do survive with their dignity as human beings intaci:. Who are they? How are they able to survive? What do they have to say to the religious missioned to the first world, who also seek to survive, but in a culture whose very richness impoverishes the attractiveness, the beauty, the dignity, and the grace of a way of life in love with Life itself?. Could the observation ofMircea Eliade, the famed scholar of religious anthropology, be true: that the evo-lution of modern cultures has generated an atmosphere of intel-lectual elitism in which detachment from the patterns of traditional religion severs Western culture from its core values and belief systems? 5 So what recourse do persons consecrated to the Holy have if they are to survive the consequences of Western culture's demise? The Word had a special word for the religiously lettered and learned Who came by night to ask him questions about signs seen hinting the advent of a new world within the world. To the Nicodemus-like, Jesus counseled that the lettered and the elite turn and become like a child. Anyone privileged to see, hear, and touch the children who, despite the misery of their absolute poverty and the scourge of terrorism, sing and dance in the desert cannot help marveling at the mystery of their "unreasonable" rea-. son to hope. What do they, the "little ones," the ones immersed in the misery of absolute poverty, have to say about the mystery of their survival? Could it be that their link to traditional popu-lar religion provides them with the treasure which cultures to the north have lost: a reason for hope?6 , Review for Religious Who are these ragtag "children of the dust" gathered on the luxurious slab of cement gracing the mission-house front door? From early in the morning until late in the night, this mob of ragamuffins never seems to wonder about "survival," despite the dubious nature of their next meal. They do not have time to worry. They are obviously too busy creatively constructing their own livable-in-the-now reality. The ever plentiful stones and rocks are transformed in,their imagination to sports cars and trucks. Rags and bits of scrap paper adorn a gringa-faced "Barbie" in highest fashion. So actively engaged in living life to the hilt, these tawny tots are too busy having fun to be concerned about surviving. Sure, they are hungry and ill clad. By our standards they are woefully abused by family systems that claim "the more I beat you, the more I love you." But they are too resiliently cre-ative to let abuse or malnutrition get in the way of living. The ".proper7 things they deserve as fundamental rights--healthcare, education, food--hardly get a thought. One hesitates to say it, but, to almost every visitor, these kids on the step are definitely having fun. Their joy, laughter, unsuppressible desire to befriend anyone, especially foreigners visiting the mission house, betrays the secret entry of Mystery into their absolute misery. Their grasp on an unseen reason for their hope renders ridiculous the first-world worries about where God and religion and the church might fit in a deconstructed culture. "Multiphrenia" is one malaise the Montenegrinos never get. The inner' chaos caused by too much input from too many conflicting media sources promoting ever changing values is a postmodern misery they miss.7 Take, for example, ten-year-old Lorenzo, a victim of his father's abuse. Every so often Lorenzo is whacked in the face. with an iron pipe for not bringing in his share of the family keep. How could little Lorenzo, every visitor's fast friend, keep smiling, jest-ing, and joking despite the ugly scarson his ever dirty face? The Mystery of God peeks through his misery in his nonconcern for predictable "survival." That unerasable smile insists that God's Mystery is manifest even in this most undeserved misery. Just what is it that keeps that smile on his face--and so many others like his!--in this desert valley of so many, many tears? Does his smile betray a reason to hope that we cannot, yet, see? These stepkids also deal with the reality of too few resources and personnel to assure them of a viable future. Most children are without parents until late in the night, when Mom or Dad or November-December 1997 Pelletier ¯ Misery Meets Mystery in Montenegro live-in mate come