Suchergebnisse

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Germany is one of the few industrialized nations in which the tobacco industry remains a legitimate force in business, government, science and society at large. Though Germany has been an international leader in environmental protection, the German tobacco industry has been successful in preventing the translation of knowledge of the dangers of pollution from secondhand smoke into effective public health policy through a carefully planned collaboration with scientists and policymakers and a sophisticated public relations program which it initiated in the 1970's and has been quietly running ever since. The tobacco industry in Germany founded the Verband der Cigarettenindustrie, a trade association, in 1948. Located in Germany's capital cities in order to as best as possible influence political decisions, the Verband includes all the multinational and national tobacco companies doing businessin Germany (7 in 2006). In Germany, secondhand smoke emerged as a political issue in the early 1970s, but the federal government failed to enact a proposed statutory law on protection from tobacco smoke. To date, there has been no passage of effective legislation for the protection against tobacco in public places. Understanding that secondhand smoke was the crucial issue for the tobacco industry's viability, the Verband engaged the issue long before the German government and the main voluntary health agencies, leading to the industry's continuing success in preventing government action to protect citizens from the toxic chemicals in secondhand smoke. The Verband influenced science and policy by challenging the scientific evidence linking secondhand smoke to disease by conducting or financing research, recruiting independent scientists, influencing high-level working groups and commissions, and by coordinating, sponsoring and participating in scientific conferences. In 1975, the "Research Council Smoking & Health" was created as an advisory body to the scientific department of the Verband to convey the impression that the tobacco industry was committed to objective exploration and further development of its product. Research that was deemed to be too sensitive to be contracted to outside researchers was conducted in a laboratory in Munich, headed by Franz Adlkofer. In 1992, the Research Council was replaced when the Verband created the VERUM foundation with Adlkofer as Scientific and Executive Director. The Medical Action Group on Smoking or Health, a small nongovernmental organization active in the protection of nonsmokers since the 1970s founded by medical scientist Ferdinand Schmidt, made numerous attempts to influence governmental health policy in Germany. The tobacco industry successfully responded by framing the Medical Action Group and Schmidt as out of the mainstream. Probably the most important health authority allied with the tobacco industry from the 1980s onwards was Karl Überla, President of the German Federal Health Office until 1985 and simultaneously head of a private research institute, the GIS, in Munich. In 1982, the Verband contracted with Überla's GIS for a study on "passive smoking and lung cancer." In 1983, a working group on smoking-related cancer risks was set up by the Federal Ministry of Health as part of Germany's contribution to the EU "Europe Against Cancer" program. Of the 24 members the Ministry invited to comprise this working group, at least five individuals, Franz Adlkofer, Dietrich Schmähl, Gerhard Lehnert, Klaus Thurau and Jürgen v. Troschke, had worked for or received funds from the Verband. Overall, the tobacco industry in Germany has been able to maintain a level of respectability that allowed it access to high-level authorities and scientists who either themselves held a policy-relevant office or served on political advisory bodies, including Karl Überla, President of the Federal Health Office, Dietrich Henschler, Chairman of the MAK-commission, and Helmut Valentin, President of the Bavarian Academy for Industrial and Social Medicine. Despite the fact that public attitudes in Germany were very supportive of government action to restrict smoking, the industry worked to cast tobacco control as a serious threat to the European culture that was portrayed as too open, modern and enlightened for such action. Secret tobacco industry polling showed even higher levels of support for smoking restrictions in Germany than in the United States; still, the German tobacco industry portrayed policies protecting workers from secondhand smoke as examples of US extremism. Several unsuccessful efforts to pass non-smoker protection legislation followed in subsequent years, and on October 3, 2002, a revised workplace ordinance took effect that nominally puts the duty on employers to protect their employees from secondhand smoke in the (non-hospitality) workplace; still, the ordinance overall failed to guarantee smokefree workplaces and as of January 2006, the German government had not established any meaningful program to promote implementation and enforcement of the ordinance. In 2003, approximately one-third (32.5%) of Germans were smokers. Recent data shows at least 9 persons die from passive smoking each day in Germany. As this calculation only takes into account frequent domestic exposure of nonsmokers, the actual death toll is likely to be much higher. Still, as of 2006, with few smokefree laws in place, none of the major voluntary health agencies in Germany had continuously made secondhand smoke a major topic. Public health policymaking in Germany remains dominated by tobacco interests. KURZFASSUNG Deutschland ist eines der wenigen industrialisierten Länder in denen die Tabakindustrie heute in derGeschäftswelt sowie vonseiten der Regierung, der Wissenschaft und der Gesellschaft im Allgemeinen noch als eine legitime Größe angesehen wird. Obgleich Deutschland im Umweltschutz international eine Führungsrolle einnimmt, hat es dieTabakindustrie in Deutschland erfolgreich verstanden, die Umsetzung der Erkenntnisse über die Schädlichkeit des Passivrauchens in wirksame Gesundheitspolitiken zu verhindern. Sie bediente sich hierzu einer sorgfältig geplanten Kollaboration mit Wissenschaftlern und politischen Entscheidungsträgern, und eines ausgeklügelten PR-Programms das in den 1970er Jahren eingeleitet wurde und seitdem still betrieben wird. Die Branchenorganisation, der Verband der Cigarettenindustrie (VdC, kurz "Verband") wurde im Jahr 1948 von der Tabakindustrie in Deutschland gegründet. Der Verband vertritt sowohl nationale als auch multinationale Tabakkonzerne, die in Deutschland ihre Geschäfte treiben und war bzw. ist in der bundesdeutschen Hauptstadt (Bonn, Berlin) ansässig, um politische Entscheidungen bestmöglich zu beeinflussen. Bereits in den frühen Siebzigerjahren wurde das Thema Passivrauchen in Deutschland zum Politikum, doch die Bundesregierung schaffte es nicht, einen damals existierenden Gesetzesvorschlag für eine Rechtsvorschrift zum Schutz vor Passivrauchen zu erlassen. Vielmehr hat die Bundesregierung es bis heute versäumt, eine wirksame Gesetzgebung zum Schutz vor Tabakrauch im öffentlichen Raum zu erlassen. Aufgrund der Einsicht dass Passivrauchen der entscheidende Faktor für Lebensfähigkeit der Tabakindustrie ist, hat sich der Verband bereits lange vor der Bundesregierung und den wichtigsten Organisationen im Gesundheitswesen und Interessengemeinschaften dieses Thema zu eigen gemacht. Dies hatte zur Folge, dass die Tabakindustrie Regierungshandeln zum Schutz der Bürger vor den giftigen Inhaltsstoffen des Tabakrauchs erfolgreich verhindert hat. Der Verband hat Einfluss auf Wissenschaft und Politik genommen indem er die wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse über den Zusammenhang von Passivrauchen und Krankheit bestritten hat, Forschungsarbeiten durchgeführt oder finanziert hat, unabhängige Wissenschaftler rekrutiert hat, Einfluss auf hochrangige Arbeitsgruppen und Kommissionen genommen hat sowie an wissenschaftlichen Tagungen teilgenommen, diese koordiniert oder finanziell gefördert hat. Im Jahr 1975 wurde der "Forschungsrat Rauchen und Gesundheit" gegründet. Er diente der Wissenschaftlichen Abteilung des Verbandes als Beratungsorgan und sollte den Eindruck vermitteln, dass die Tabakindustrie sich der objektiven Erforschung und Weiterentwicklung seines Produktes verschrieben hat. Untersuchungen die als zu heikel galten, um sie an externe Wissenschaftler zu vergeben wurden in einem Labor in München durchgeführt das von Franz Adlkofer geleitet wurde. Im Jahr 1992 wurde der Forschungsrat Rauchen und Gesundheit ersetzt durch die vom Verband gegründete Stiftung VERUM, deren Wissenschaftlicher und Geschäftsführender Direktor wiederum Adlkofer wurde. Der Ärztliche Arbeitskreis Rauchen und Gesundheit, eine kleine Nichtregierungsorganisation, die seit den 1970er Jahren im Bereich Nichtraucherschutz aktiv ist und von Ferdinand Schmidt gegründet wurde, machte zahllose Versuche, die Regierungspolitik Deutschlands zu beeinflussen. Die Tabakindustrie reagierte darauf- erfolgreich - damit, dass sie den Ärztlichen Arbeitskreis Rauchen und Gesundheit und Schmidt als jenseits der politischen Mitte darstellte. Vermutlich die wichtigste Autorität im Gesundheitsbereich, die mit der Tabakindustrie seit den 1980er Jahren verbündet war ist Karl Überla, bis 1985 Präsident des Bundesamtes für Gesundheit und zugleich Leiter einer privaten Forschungseinrichtung in München, der Gesellschaft für Information und Statistik in der Medizin (GIS). Im Jahr 1982 nahm der Verband Überla's GIS unter Vertrag für eine Untersuchung über "Passivrauchen und Lungenkrebs". Im Jahr 1983 stellte das Bundesgesundheitsministerium eine Arbeitsgruppe über "Krebsgefährdung durch Rauchen"zusammen, als ein Beitrag vonseiten Deutschlands zum EU-Aktionsprogramm "Europa gegen den Krebs". Von den 24 Mitgliedern, die das Ministerium geladen hatte, hatten zumindest fünf Personen, Franz Adlkofer, Dietrich Schmähl, Gerhard Lehnert, Klaus Thurau und Jürgen v. Troschke für den Verband gearbeitet oder von diesem Finanzmittel erhalten. Im Großen und Ganzen ist es der Tabakindustrie in Deutschland gelungen, einen Grad der Angesehenheit aufrechtzuerhalten, die ihr Zugang zu hochrangigen Autoritäten und Wissenschaftlern verschaffte, die entweder selbst politikrelevante Ämter innehatten oder die als Sachverständige oder Mitglieder von wissenschaftlichen Beiräten direkten Zugang zur Politik hatten. Beispiele hierfür sind Karl Überla, Präsident des Bundesgesundheitsamtes, Dietrich Henschler, Vorsitzender der MAK-Kommission, und Helmut Valentin, Präsidentder Deutschen Gesellschaft für Arbeitsmedizin sowie der Bayrischen Akademie für Arbeits- und Sozialmedizin. Trotz der Tatsache, dass die Einstellung der deutschen Bevölkerung Einschränkungen des Rauchens deutlich unterstützt, war die Tabakindustrie bemüht, die Tabakkontrolle als eine ernsthafte Bedrohung für die Europäische Kultur darzustellen, indem diese als zu offen, modern und aufgeklärt für derartige Aktivitätenporträtiert wurde. Ungeachtet der Tatsache, dass Umfragen die von der Tabakindustrie durchgeführt und geheim gehalten wurdenfür Deutschland sogar eine stärkere Befürwortung von Einschränkungen des Rauchens zeigten als in den Vereinigten Staaten, karikierte die Tabakindustrie in Deutschland Maßnahmen zum Schutz der arbeitenden Bevölkerung vor Passivrauch als US-amerikanischen Extremismus. Etliche erfolglose Anläufe zur Verabschiedung eines Nichtraucherschutzgesetzes folgten in den Jahren darauf und am 3. Oktober 2003 trat die novellierte Arbeitsstättenverordnung in Kraft, die die Arbeitgeber nominelldazu verpflichtet, ihre Angestellten am Arbeitsplatz vor dem Tabakrauch zu schützen (ausgenommen sind Arbeitsstätten mit Publikumsverkehr). Durch diese Verordnung werden jedoch übergreifend keine rauchfreien Arbeitsplätze geschaffen und bis Januar 2006 hatte die Bundesregierung noch kein bedeutsames Programm aufgelegt um die Umsetzung und Vollzug der Verordnung zu fördern. Im Jahr 2003 waren nahezu ein Drittel (32,5%) der deutschen Bevölkerung Raucher, neueste Daten zeigen, dass in Deutschland täglich mindestens neun Menschen an den Folgen des Passivrauchens sterben. Da dieser Berechnung lediglich die häufige Exposition von Nichtrauchern zu Hause zugrunde liegt, ist die wirkliche Zahl der Todesopfer wahrscheinlich deutlich höher. Dennoch garantieren bisher nur wenige Gesetze Rauchfreiheit und auch sonst hat bis heute keine der wichtigsten Gesundheitsorganisation in Deutschland sich kontinuierlich dem Passivrauchen angenommen bzw. dieses zu einem Hauptthema gemacht. Die Gesundheitspolitik wird in Deutschland bis zum heutigen Tag von Tabakindustrieinteressen dominiert.

Cigarette consumption among people 15 years or older peaked in Switzerland in the early 1970's with 3,700 cigarettes per capita and per year, followed by a decline to 2,800 cigarettes per capita and per year in 1994. After a decline of the proportion of smokers from 37% in 1980 to 31% in 1992, this proportion has increased again to 33% in 1997. Women, particularly the young, and children and adolescents, have shown a continued increase in smoking prevalence, despite the focus of tobacco prevention efforts on children and adolescents. Every year, over 10,000 people die from tobacco use in Switzerland, about a sixth of all annual deaths in Switzerland, making smoking the leading preventable cause of death in Switzerland. This number is more than 20 times higher than the number of deaths caused by illegal drugs. The tobacco excise tax in Switzerland is the lowest in Western Europe. The laws governing tobacco products, their marketing and sales, are weak and have little practical effect on the tobacco industry. There is no meaningful protection of nonsmokers from the toxic chemicals in secondhand tobacco smoke, in public places or work places. A ten-country survey on people's experiences and attitudes concerning tobacco and smoking in 1989, commissioned by Philip Morris International, showed that Swiss people were aware of secondhand smoke's adverse effects on health, but only a minority favored government regulations for smoking in restaurants and workplaces. A first comprehensive 5-year tobacco prevention program, 1996 to 1999, issued by the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health lacked adequate financial resources, focus on specific interventions, cooperation between partners for tobacco prevention, and program coordination and management. It ignored the role of the tobacco industry. As a result of recent events in the US and WHO's active engagement of the tobacco industry, the draft five-year plan for tobacco prevention in Switzerland for 2001 to 2005 identifies the tobacco industry as a major obstacle to tobacco prevention. Until the recent merger of British American Tobacco (BAT) with Burrus-Rothmans in 1999, the single most important tobacco company in Switzerland was Philip Morris (PM), with a market share of close to 50% (and close to 25% for Marlboro alone). Since the merger, the tobacco market is dominated by PM and BAT, each with a market share of cigarette sales between 45% and 50%. As was the case in the US, in the early 1960's, the scientists in Swiss tobacco industry research laboratories (in this case, FTR (Fabriques de Tabac Réunies) / Philip Morris) accepted and discussed the dangerous effects of smoking on health in internal company communications. At that time, these scientists earnestly tried to find ways to reduce the carcinogenic effects of cigarettes through elimination of carcinogenic components. Contrary to privately expressed views, tobacco industry's public position in Switzerland was that there was ongoing controversy in the issue whether smoking caused diseases or not. The "controversy" was nurtured through regular media briefings and scientific meetings with carefully chosen scientists who would publicly support the industry's position, but without declaring their liaisons with the tobacco industry. Relationships with these industry "consultants" or "witnesses" were maintained through direct payments and indirectly through funding of their research. By late 1980's the tobacco industry had identified the decline of social acceptability of smoking in Europe as a major threat to its viability. This recognition led to the development of a comprehensive strategy to fight the secondhand smoke issue. "Courtesy and tolerance" and economic arguments were used to divert the public's and policy makers' attention from the health issue. The resulting strategies were often devised in consultation with executives of other Philip Morris subsidiaries and Philip Morris International headquarters in New York. Well aware of its low credibility with the public, journalists were given interviews and told not to mention the tobacco company's name in the newspaper article. Official publications, such as "Smoking and Mortality in Switzerland" by the Federal Office of Public Health, the report on the respiratory effects of secondhand smoke by the US Environmental Protection Agency, as well as original scientific publications, such as an article in the American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine, dealing with secondhand smoke and respiratory symptoms in Switzerland (SAPALDIA study) written by a group of Swiss scientists, were massively attacked by the tobacco industry. The tobacco industry employed "consultants" and politicians with industry ties, who used standard industry arguments. One of the most active industry consultants in Switzerland was Peter Atteslander, a Swiss citizen and professor at the University of Augsburg in Germany. He wrote white papers for the tobacco industry and reported from meetings worldwide. Atteslander appeared to be the essence only member of the Switzerland-based "Arbeitsgruppe für Gesundheitsforschung (AGEF) ("Working Group on Health Research"), which published his work without disclosing the ties to the tobacco industry. To fight smoking restrictions in restaurants and hotels, the tobacco industry developed a strong ally in the hospitality association, the International HoReCa. The secretary general of International HoReCa at the time was Dr. Xavier Frei, also president of the SCRA (most likely the Swiss Café and Restaurant Association). The hospitality association made extensive use of tobacco industry resources and repeatedly printed tobacco industry positions in hospitality industry newsletters, without the members of International HoReCa or SCRA being informed about the close ties between their organization and the tobacco industry. The "accommodation program," a well-known tobacco industry strategy to preempt regulatory measures against smoking in restaurants and workplaces first developed in the United States, was used in Switzerland. The fact that even the logo was the same as the one used in the US is another illustration of tobacco industry's recycling of strategies and tactics worldwide. The shift of focus from the problem of secondhand smoke to one of indoor air quality in general was (and remains) a major strategy used by the tobacco industry worldwide to dilute the problem of secondhand smoke with other indoor air pollutants and ventilation of buildings. To this end, an indoor air quality control company with close ties to the tobacco industry, ACVA Atlantic Inc., USA, later renamed Healthy Buildings International, HBI, collected data which was used extensively by the tobacco industry to further their goal of downplaying the role of secondhand smoke as a major component of indoor air pollutant. Employees of HBI were sent to Switzerland to collect data on Swiss office buildings, and the data were used in the newsletters of HoReCa to support the accommodation program and against non-smoking regulations. HBI has been discredited in the US. The tobacco industry tried to influence smoking policy in airplanes through partial funding of IFAA's (International Flight Attendants Association) world congresses. This influence was established through close relationship with the president of the association, a common industry strategy in influencing organizations. When, in the wake of smoke-free flights in the US and other countries, Swissair finally introduced smoke-free flights, it was heavily criticized in newspaper articles by the Swiss "Smokers Club," and later the Swiss "Club of Tobacco Friends," whose president and founder is a former public relations official for the tobacco industry. The Swiss Cigarette Manufacturers Association successfully influenced smoking policy in railway trains through letters to the publishers of newspapers and direct lobbying toward cantonal authorities and the head of the national railways. Two referendums on tobacco and alcohol advertising bans in 1979 and 1993 were rejected by Swiss voters despite pre-referendum polls favoring advertising bans through a strong and lasting alliance of the tobacco industry with the advertising agencies and the print media. The tobacco industry successfully kept itself behind the scenes in order to avoid negative publicity while financing the anti-advertising ban campaigns and supplying the alliance against advertising bans with well-crafted arguments by tobacco industry public relations and law firms through the International Tobacco Information Center, INFOTAB. The tobacco industry and its allies used economic and political arguments, such as purported effects on employment, state tax revenues, and individual and corporate freedom to fight the advertising bans. Close relationships with officials and politicians were emphasized and maintained through regular meetings with the head of the political parties and briefings of the "tobacco caucus" in the parliament. This caucus gave the tobacco industry the means to stay well informed about the political agenda and to easily influence the political process in their favor. While Switzerland has some of the most progressive and innovative public health promotion programs, most public health advocates underestimate the power of, and driving forces behind, a tobacco industry, and only few of them have confronted the industry directly.

DE LA TESIS DOCTORAL El documento base de este trabajo es el aprobado el 1-de marzo de 1996 por la comisión Europea que establece los criterios para la concesión de la ecoetiqueta a ropa de cama y camisetas de algodón o algodón-poliéster. Uno de los criterios, delimita el contenido de la fibra de algodón cruda en ciertos pesticidas. El trabajo realizado ha consistido en: -Recabar datos sobre la producción de algodón a nivel mundial: principales países productores, volumen de producción, sistemas de cultivo etc. -Recopilar datos de la legislación de diferentes países productores de algodón sobre uso de pesticidas en las diferentes fases productivas de dicha fibra. -Comparar el criterio en contenido de pesticidas sobre algodón crudo de la Etiqueta europea con la legislación de países productores sobre aplicación de pesticidas sobre algodón, estableciendo paralelismos y divergencias. -Establecer y optimizar, dentro de los recursos disponibles, el protocolo de análisis de los pesticidas limitados por la Etiqueta europea sobre algodón crudo, haciendo especial hincapié en las fases de extracción y purificación, para las cuales la Etiqueta europea no establece método alguno. -Realizar un estudio del contenido de aquellos pesticidas limitados por la Etiqueta europea sobre muestras de algodón crudo procedente de diferentes áreas productoras. El análisis de pesticidas se puede desglosar en tres fases bien diferenciadas: extracción, purificación y análisis de la muestra. La Ecoetiqueta de 1996, define la técnica de análisis propiamente dicho a emplear: US EPA 8270 pero no hace ninguna mención a los métodos de extracción, purificación y concentración de las muestras. Se focalizaron los esfuerzos en determinar un procedimiento de extracción, de purificación y de concentración que fuera el óptimo en cuanto a sencillez del material empleado y a volumen de solvente (datos que redundan en el coste final del análisis. Las conclusiones generales obtenidas son: - El documento inicialmente aprobado por la Comisión europea para la concesión de la Ecoetiqueta europea para artículos textiles, a nivel de pesticidas está sobradamente alejado de la situación real en cuanto a pesticidas limitados/empleados sobre algodón. - Existen discrepancias entre las legislaciones internas de los países miembros de la Unión Europea en cuanto a uso de pesticidas, existiendo un grupo de países europeos más permisivos. -Los pesticidas limitados por la Ecoetiqueta europea se corresponden con los más limitados a nivel mundial, en cambio en los principales países productores. China (1er productor mundial 22%), India (3er productor mundial 13%) y Pakistán (4º productor mundial 8%) presentan una legislación en la que se admite el uso de la mayoría de los pesticidas prohibidos por la ecoetiqueta europea. Estados Unidos (2º productor mundial 21%) permite el uso de algunos de ellos. - Se establece un protocolo de análisis de pesticidas sobre algodón considerado óptimo consistente en: Extracción con diclorometano de los pesticidas mediante un Soxhlet automatizado, con lo que se reduce el consumo de solvente (se recupera en un 60-70%) y el tiempo de análisis, presentando una recuperación de promedio superior al 80%.Purificación del extracto graso mediante un sistema de Florisil en el que se minimiza también el volumen de solvente empleado y que presenta una recuperación promedio de un 90%. Análisis del extracto graso mediante un sistema de CG-MS que presenta una elevada reproducibilidad de los tiempos de retención y que permite una cuantificación automatizada de muestras una vez establecidas las rectas de calibración pertinentes para cada analito a determinar. ; DOCTORAL THESIS SUMMARY STATUTORY CONTEXT The European Union countries have included the environmental protection in their main goals since the mid-80's. One of the most important keys for this new European policy is the Ecolabeling. This project is based in the law passed the 1rst. of March, 1996, which sets up the requirements to qualify with the Ecolabel bedlinen, cotton or cotton-polyester t-shirts. Later on, the Comision reviewed and amended the law whose last version dates of the 17th of February, 1999. The Comision sets up in this document a generic Ecolabel for textile products. The main modified points which affect this experimental project are: the number and the kind of pesticides to analyze: (1996) Aldrine, Captafol, Camphechlor, Chlordane, DDT, Dieldrine, Endrine, Heptachlor, Hexachlorobenzene and 2,4,5- T. In addition to Pentachlorophenol, with a different criterion. (1999) Aldrine, Captafol, Chlordane, DDT, Dieldrine, Endrine, Heptachlor, Hexachlorobenzene, Hexachlorociclohexane, 2,4,5- T, Chlordimerform, Chlorbenzilate, Dinoseb and its sales and Monocrotophos. In both documents the limit allowed for each pesticide it is 0.005 ppm when the methods sensitivity enables it. Analysis regularity Tests must be carried out 4 times a year. No kind of periodicity is specified. ECONOMICAL CONTEXT After the first version of the enacted law for the cotton and cotton-polyester manufactures ecolabeling was necessary a experimental project like this focused in the analysis of the cotton pesticides mentioned in the law. On one hand, there is an important European textile industry although the European Comunity countries (Greece and Spain excluded) produce almost no cotton. In the context of cotton textile industry most of the raw material is imported. On the other hand, the main cotton producer areas are in Asia (Pakistan, China, India), EEUU and the ex-URSS. In these countries the legislation about the use of the cotton pesticides waves from strict to almost inexistent. With regard to this, the European textile industry can find incongruent to try to make products which fulfil the ecological criterion, set up by the European Comision, (which have to be qualified with the Ecolabel), and the fact that they import the raw material from permissive countries. EXPERIMENTAL CONTEXT There is huge information abaut the difficulty to determinate the pesticides in solid material in an analylitcal context. That is the problem of the cotton fibre. The general method to analyze the quality and quantity of the pesticides consists of three steps: extraction, purification and later, gas chromatography analysis with electron detector de captura de electrones, en el caso de organoclorados (GC-ECD) o espectrómetro de masas (GC-MS). For the reason stated before this project consisted of: · Compiling topical information about the production of cotton in the world and about the use of pesticides in cotton growing, harvesting, transport in the main cotton producer countries. · Comparing the European legislation (Ecolabel, 1996) to the legislation of some producer countries to stablish parallelisms and divergences. · Stablishing a working protocol to analize the pesticides on yarn cotton which are limited by the Ecolabel. · Studying the pesticides contexts on yarn cotton samples from different producer areas for the evaluation of the imported cotton. Once again the main work guidelines are stablished, it is important to point out the research institutes where the development of the experimental protocol has been carried out. · Laboratorio de Control de la Contaminación del Institut d'Investigació Tèxtil i Cooperació Industrial de Terrassa (INTEXTER). · Universidad Nacional de Misiones (Posadas, Argentina) · Southwest Research Institute (San Antonio, Texas, EEUU). EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL The analysis of pesticides can be set aside in three different steps: extraction, purification, and the anlysis of the samples itself (we can consider the concentration of the samples as a fourth step as much important as the other ones). The basic law of this project, Ecolabel, 1996, explains the methods to make the anlysis: US EPA 8270 "Compuestos orgánicos semivolátiles por GC/MS:"(), but it doesn't mention the methods for the pesticide extraction from the samples. They talk, for the first time, about the extraction step in the document of 1999. In the document is recommended the ultrasonic and solvents but no conditions are specified. Considering the document of the beginning of the experimental project all the efforts were focused to determine the most favorable extraction, purification and concentration procedures in relation with the simplicity of the material used and the volume of solvent (both are noticeable in the analysis final cost). The different procedures carried out were: The following is the considered the very best analysis protocole: · Extraction from the yarn cotton samples (5 grams wighted on an analytical balance using an automatized Soxleth during two hours at 105ºC in at about 100 ml of DCM. One hour in "boiling" position and the other in "rinsisng" position. · Quantitative transference of extract to a 12 ml vial adding DCM 3 times to take away any residuum left from the Soxleth glasses. · Concentrate the extracts with nitrogenum placing los viales into warm water: 30- 35ºC. · Purification of the samples using Florisil, activated and moistened with about 10 ml of n-hexane, increase with the samples to be purifies and use a solvent to eluir it to a total of 25m l0% (v/v) acetona-n-hexano, just prepared. · Concentration of the extracts final volume which had been purified with nitrogenum placing los viale, when it's possible in warm water, 30-35ºC. Analysis using GC-MS US EPA 8270 from the final samples. ; Postprint (published version)

This text provide students with a comprehensive guide to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australia. The result of extensive research and experience, it offers fresh insights into a range of topics and, most importantly, is written by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander academics. It addresses topics ranging from history and reconciliation, to literature and politics, to art, sport and health. It presents social, cultural and political perspectives on these areas in a manner that is accessible to undergraduate students from a range of backgrounds and academic disciplines. Each chapter opens with a precis of the author's journey to engage students and offer them an insight into the author's experiences. These authentic voices encourage students to think about the wider issues surrounding each chapter and their real-life implications. This text emphasises the importance of relationships between non-Indigenous and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures

International audience ; This chapter discusses the "seigniorage argument" in favor of public money issuance, according to which public finances could be improved if the state more fully exercised the privilege of money creation, which is, today, largely shared with private banks. (.)

International audience ; This chapter discusses the "seigniorage argument" in favor of public money issuance, according to which public finances could be improved if the state more fully exercised the privilege of money creation, which is, today, largely shared with private banks. (.)

International audience ; This chapter discusses the "seigniorage argument" in favor of public money issuance, according to which public finances could be improved if the state more fully exercised the privilege of money creation, which is, today, largely shared with private banks. (.)

International audience ; This chapter discusses the "seigniorage argument" in favor of public money issuance, according to which public finances could be improved if the state more fully exercised the privilege of money creation, which is, today, largely shared with private banks. (.)

La storia della Sicilia greca è scandita, nei suoi momenti chiave, dalla persistente presenza dell'immagine del Dinomenide Gelone. Questo lavoro analizza le valenze paradigmatiche assunte dalla sua figura nella memoria civica siracusana e nella produzione storiografica; inoltre ricostruisce le dinamiche politiche che hanno spinto i principali tiranni siracusani (da Dionisio I a Ierone II) a stabilire un confronto con Gelone. Il suo exemplum è utilizzato per legittimare azioni politiche e impegno antipunico; particolare attenzione è posta alla Biblioteca storica di Diodoro Siculo e al ruolo che in essa assume la figura del Dinomenide; in relazione a questi aspetti l'opera dell'Agirinense sembra recare talvolta segni di una interpretazione storica personale, non sempre spiegabile in relazione all'uso delle due principali fonti per la storia occidentale, ovvero Timeo e Filisto.