Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.
PERILAKU MEMILIH MASYARAKAT BOLAANG MONGONDOW UTARA PADA PEMILIHAN UMUM KEPALA DAERAH TAHUN 2013 (Suatu Studi di Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat)[1] OLEH : Abdul Halil Pontoh[2] NIM : 100814011 ABSTRAK Sebelum adanya demokrasi terdapat sistem pemerintahan yang di kuasai oleh negara.Hal ini yang menyebabkan rakyat tidak boleh ikut campur dalam urusan penyelenggaraan negara.Demokrasi merupakan jawaban atau solusi dari keinginan untuk menciptakan negara yang tidak berpihak pada siapapun, tetapi rakyat yang menjadi penentu kemajuan suatu negara Dalam negara demokrasi, pemerintahan berlangsung atas persetujuan dari yang di perintah.Dalam negara demokrasi, rakyat paling berhak dan paling mengetahui tentang siapa yang layak menjadi penyelenggara negara ataupun daerah.Oleh karena itu suatu negara dapat di katakan negara demokrasi, kalau di negara tersebut terdapat pemilihan umum yang bebas.mekanisme dalam pemilihan kepala daerah secara langsung diatur dalam UU No.32/2004 tentang Pemerintah Daerah dalam Pasal 56 ayat (1) yang mengatakan bahwa "Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah dipilih dalam satu pasangan calon yang dilaksanakan secara demokratis berdasarkan asas langsung, umum, bebas, rahasia, jujur, dan adil. Dalam sistem politik yang menganut paham demokrasi, rakyat dipandang sebagai pemegang kedaulatan tertinggi.hal ini terlihat dimanifestasikan melalui pemilihan umum, dimana rakyat memilih langsung orang yang akan duduk memimpin pemerintahan sesuai dengan periode yang berlaku. Seperti halnya Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah di Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara yang dilaksanakan pada tanggal 8 Mei 2013. Pemilihan tersebut di ikuti oleh 4 ( Empat ) pasangan calon Bupati dan Wakil Bupati. Yang pada Akhirnya Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah di Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara tersebut di menangkan oleh pasangan Depri Pontoh – Suriansyah Korompot yang hanya di usung oleh partai PPP.Padahal sebelumnya bapak Depri Pontoh pernah menjabat sebagai wakil Bupati dari bapak Hamdan Datunsolang periode yang lalu, yang dalam hal ini bapak Hamdan Datunsolang juga mencalonkan diri sebagai bupati. Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah di Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara tersebut sedikit maupun banyak tentunya dipengaruhi oleh faktor-faktor yang berkembang di masyarakat, mulai dari latar belakang partai politik, ekonomi, agama, ketokohan dari pada kandidat, sampai pada kondisi sosial budaya. Hal ini yang akan membentuk perilaku politik masyarakat dalam menentukan pilihannya. Penelitian ini Menggunakan menggunakan pendekatan penelitian kualitatif.Dengan menggunakan tekhnik pengumpulan data berupa wawancara, observasi, studi pustaka dan tekhnik analisa data.Data-data tersebut di ambila dari informan yang dalam hal ini masyarakat Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara yang sudah termasuk sebagai wajib pilih.Dan data tambahan lainnya di ambil dari PPK Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat. Kata Kunci : Perilaku Memilih Masyarakat, Pemilukada PENDAHULUAN Latar Belakang Masalah Sebelum adanya demokrasi terdapat sistem pemerintahan yang di kuasai oleh negara.Hal ini yang menyebabkan rakyat tidak boleh ikut campur dalam urusan penyelenggaraan negara.Rakyat hanya menjalankan apa yang sudah di gariskan negara[3]. Dalam negara demokrasi, pemerintahan berlangsung atas persetujuan dari yang di perintah.Penyelenggaraan negara, khususnya pimpinan eksekutif dan anggota legislatif di pilih langsung oleh rakyat dalam pemilihan umum.Oleh karena itu suatu negara dapat di katakan negara demokrasi, kalau di negara tersebut terdapat pemilihan umum yang bebas. Pemilihan umum memiliki beberapa fungsi yang tidak dapat di pisahkan antara satu dengan yang lain. Fungsi tersebut yaitu :Pertama : sebagai sarana legitimasi politik. Kedua : fungsi perwakilan politik. Ketiga : sebagai mekanisme sirkulasi elit politik. Keempat : sebagai sarana pendidikan politik rakyat.[4]. Ramlan Surbakti menjawab pertanyaan mengapa kepala daerah dan wakil kepala daerah di pilih secara langsung oleh rakyat melalui pemilihan umum.Jawabannya yang pertama agar lebih konsisten dengan system pemerintahan presidensial.Kedua, untuk menciptakan pembagian kekuasaan yang seimbang dan saling mengecek antara DPRD dan kepala daerah/wakil kepala daerah.[5]. Bagi masyarakat umum, pilkada langsung sering juga di tafsirkan sebagai kesempatan bagi-bagi uang.Mereka tahu bahwa tiap-tiap kandidat menyediakan anggaran yang cukup besar untuk memenangkan kompetisi.[6] Seperti halnya Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah di Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara yang dilaksanakan pada tanggal 8 Mei 2013. Pemilihan tersebut di ikuti oleh 4 ( Empat ) pasangan calon Bupati dan Wakil Bupati. Yaitu nomor urut 1 adalah pasangan dari Drs. Hi. Depri Pontoh bersama Suriansyah Korompot, SH yang diusung oleh Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), nomor urut 2 adalah pasangan Hamka, SH, MAP bersama Fellix Adri Mende, ST yang diusung partai gabungan (Hanura, PKB, Republikan, PBB, PBR, PMB), nomor urut 3 adalah pasangan Karel Bangko, SH-Mohamad Irianto Ch. Buhang, S.Sos yang diusung oleh partai Golkar dan PDIP, serta nomor urut 4 adalah pasangan Drs. Hi. Hamdan Datunsolang, MM bersama Hi. Farid Lauma, SE yang di usung PAN, PKS, Demokrat dan Gerindra. Yang pada Akhirnya Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah di Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara tersebut di menangkan oleh pasangan nomor urut 1 yaitu pasangan dari Drs. Hi.Depri Pontoh bersama Suriansyah Korompot, SH yang diusung oleh Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah di Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara tersebut sedikit maupun banyak tentunya dipengaruhi oleh faktor-faktor yang berkembang di masyarakat, mulai dari latar belakang partai politik, ekonomi, agama, ketokohan dari pada kandidat, sampai pada kondisi sosial budaya. Berdasarkan uraian di atas, maka penulis tertarik untuk melakukan penelitian dengan judul Perilaku Memilih Masyarakat Bolaang Mongondow Utara Pada Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah Tahun 2013. Dan yang menjadi pokok permasalahan yang akan di angkat adalah Faktor-faktor apa yang mempengaruhi perilaku memilih masyarakat Bolaang Mongondow Utara Pada Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah Tahun 2013.Dengan tujuan penelitian untuk mengetahui faktor - faktor yang mempengaruhi perilaku memilih masyarakat Bolaang Mongondow Utara pada pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah tahun 2013.manfaat dari penelitian ini terbagi atas dua. Yang pertamaManfaat Teoritis yang Diharapkan dapat menambah wawasan ilmiah bagi mahasiswa khususnya mahasiswa Jurusan Ilmu Pemerintahan, Program Studi Ilmu Politik maupun akademis umum lainnya, yang melakukan penelitian yang berhubungan dengan perilaku memilih. Dan juga dapat dijadikan model atau acuan dalam melakukan penelitian tentang pemilukada yang berkaitan dengan perilaku memilih, serta dapat memberikan kontribusi bagi perkembangan ilmu pengetahuan khususnya bidang politik. Dan manfaat yang kedua yaitu manfaat Praktis. Yaitu Penelitian ini diharapkan agar penulis lebih dapat meningkatkan kemampuan dalam menulis karya ilmiah tentang perilaku memilih masyarakat Bolaang Mongondow Utara dalam Pemilihan UmumKepala Daerahtahun 2013di Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara.Dan dapat dijadikan konsepdalam penyusunan strategi pelaksanaan Pilkada pada masa yang akan datang. TINJAUAN PUSTAKA Perilaku Politik Secara bebas perilaku politik dapat di artikan sebagai keseluruhan tingkah laku politik para aktor politk dan warga negara yang dalam manifestasi kongkritnya telah saling memiliki hubungan[7]. Perilaku politik di nyatakan sebagai suatu telaah mengenai tindakan manusia dalam situasi politik.interaksi antara pemerintah dan masyarakat antara lembaga- lembaga pemerintah dan antara kelompok dan individu dalam masyarakat[8]. Perilaku politik pada umumnya di tentukan oleh faktor internal dari individu sendiri seperti idealisme, tingkat kecerdasan, kehendak hati dan oleh faktor eksternal (kondisi lingkungan) seperti kehidupan beragama, sosial, politik, ekonomi dan sebagainya yang mengelilinginya[9]. Perilaku Memilih Menurut Affan Gaffar, dalam menganalisis voting behavior dan untuk menjelaskan pertimbangan-pertimbangan yang digunakan sebagai alasan oleh para pemilih dalam menjatuhkan pilihannya, dikenal dua macam pendekatan, yaitu Mazhab Columbia yang menggunakan pendekatan sosiologis dan mazhab Michigan yang dikenal dengan pendekatan psikologis[10]. Selain itu terdapat pula pendekatan rational choice yang melihat perilaku seseorang melalui kalkulasi untung rugi yang didapatkan oleh orang tersebut. Menurut V. O. Key, masing- masing pemilih menetapkan pilihannya secara retrospektif, yaitu dengan menilai apakah kinerja partai yang menjalankan pemerintahan pada periode legislatif terakhir sudah baik bagi dirinya sendiri dan bagi negara, atau justru sebaliknya[11]. Perilaku pemilih di Indonesia, di pengaruhi oleh beberapa faktor antara lain : orientasi agama, faktor kelas sosial dan kelompok social lainnya, faktor kepemimpinan dan ketokohan, faktor identifiikasi, orientasi isu, orientasi kandidat, kaitan dengan peristiwa , rekonfigurasi papan catur politik[12]. Pemilihan Umum Pemilu merupakan cara yang terkuat bagi rakyat untuk berpartisipasi di dalam sistem demokrasi perwakilan modern. Sebuah instrumen yang di perlukan bagi partisipasi ialah system pemilu.Jika system ini tidak memperbolehkan warga Negara untuk menyatakan pilihan-pilihan dan preferensi politik mereka, maka pemilu bisa menjadi kegiatan yang hamper tidak bermakna[13]. Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah Otonomi selalu dilihat sebagai suatu hak atau kewenangan dari suatu daerah untuk mengatur dan mengurus daerahnya sendiri.Otonomi yang di pergunakan adalah otonomi nyata dan bertanggung jawab yang merupakan saahh satu prinsip untuk mendukung terwujudnya sistem penyelenggaraan pemerintahan di daerah. Sebagai mana tertuang dalam pasal 18 ayat 4 UUD 1945 sebagaimana telah di amandemen berdasarkan TAP MPR pada tanggal 18 agustus tahun 2000 yang menyebutkan bahwa " Gubernur, Bupati dan Walikota masing-masing sebagai kepala pemerintahan propinsi, kabupaten dan kota dipilih secara demokratis"[14]. Seiring dengan itu pemerintah juga telah mengeluarkan PP No. 17 tahun 2005. Sebagai pengganti PP Nomor 6 tahun 2006 tentang pemilihan, pengesahan, pengangkatan dan pemberhentian Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah. Salah satu isu penting dalam UU bahwa adalah berkaitan dengan pengaturan pemilihan kepala daerah secara langsung.dengan pemilihan kepala daerah secara langsung kepala daerah seperti gubernur dan bupati akan di pilih oleh rakyat[15]. METODOLOGI PENELITIAN Penelitian ini akan di laksanakan selama kurang lebih 1 bulan, yaitu mulai tanggal 16 April s/d 16 Mei 2014. dengan lokasi penelitian terletak di Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat, Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara. Penelitian ini merupakan jenis penelitian deskriptif analitis yang bertujuan untuk menggambarkan gejala atau kenyataan yang ada sehingga data yang disimpulkan dalam penelitian akan dijelaskan dengan metode kualitatif.Yang menjadi sumber data pada penelitian ini terbagi atas dua yaitu data primer data sekunder.Pada penelitian kualitatif ini, informan atau narasumber yaitu yang memiliki pengetahuan yang cukup serta mampu memberikan informasi dan menjelaskan keadaan sebenarnya tentang obyek penelitian. tehnik pengumpulan data dalam penelitian ini terdiri dari wawancara ( interview ), observasi, dan studi pustaka.Dalam analisa kualitatif, terdapat tiga alur keegiatan yang terjadi bersamaan. Yaitu : menelaah sumber data, reduksi data, verifikasi[16]. HASIL PENELITIAN DAN PEMBAHASAN HASIL PENELITIAN Pasangan Calon dan Partai Pengusung. Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah secara langsung oleh rakyat yang di selenggarakan di Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara pada tanggal 8 Mei 2013 di ikuti oleh empat (4) pasangan calon. Nomor urut 1 adalah pasangan dari Drs. Hi. Depri Pontoh bersama Suriansyah Korompot, SH yang diusung oleh Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), nomor urut 2 adalah pasangan Hamka, SH, MAP bersama Fellix Adri Mende, ST yang diusung partai gabungan (Hanura, PKB, Republikan, PBB, PBR, PMB), nomor urut 3 adalah pasangan Karel Bangko, SH-Mohamad Irianto Ch. Buhang, S.Sos yang diusung oleh partai Golkar dan PDIP, serta nomor urut 4 adalah pasangan Drs. Hi. Hamdan Datunsolang, MM bersama Hi. Farid Lauma, SE yang di usung PAN, PKS, Demokrat dan Gerindra. Jumlah TPS dan DPT di Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat. Adapun jumlah Tempat Pemungutan Suara (TPS) dan Daftar Pemilih Tetap (DPT) di Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat, Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara pada Pemilukada tanggal 8 Mei 2013 yang terdiri dari 16 Desa dan 28 TPS yang di gunakan untuk memilih Bupati dan Wakil Bupati. Dari 16 Desa dan 28 TPS tersebut terdapat sebanyak 10.284 pemilih. Namun pada kenyataannya pada pemilihan Bupati dan Wakil Bupati yang di selenggarakan pada tanggal 8 Mei 2013 itu tidak semua yang menggunakan hak pilihnya, yaitu hanya 9.169 jiwa yang memilih dan 1.118 jiwa yang tidak memilih. Rekapitulasi Hasil Pemilukada Kabupaaten Bolmut di Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat. Pasangan Depri Pontoh - Suriansyah Korompot yang di usung oleh satu partai saja yaitu Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) mengungguli perolehan suara dengan memperoleh 5.800 suara, sedangkan pasangan Hamdan Datunsolang - Farid yang di usung oleh partai PAN, PKS, Demokrat dan Gerindra memperoleh 1.599 suara, kemudian di susul oleh pasangan Karel Bangko - Mohamad Irianto Ch. Buhang yang di usung oleh Golkar dan PDIP memperoleh 1.478 suara, dan terakhir pasangan Hamka - Fellix Adri Mende yang di usung oleh Partai Hanura, PKB, Republikan, PBB, PBR, dan PMB memperoleh 135 suara. Mengenai jumlah pemilih yang hadir di TPS sebanyak 9.186, dengan perhitungan suara yang tidak sah yaitu berjumlah 174, dan suara yang sah berjumlah sebanyak 9.012 suara. PEMBAHASAN Menurut Afan Gaffar (1992) tentang perilaku pemilih secara garis besar di dasarkan pada tiga model pendekatan, yaitu : yang pertama pendekatan sosiologis ( Mazhab Columbia) yang meliputi faktor sosial, ekonomi, afiliasi etnik, tradisi keluarga, keanggotaan terhadap organisasi tertentu, jenis kelamin, pekerjaan, dan tempat tinggal. Yang kedua pendekatan psikologis (Mazhab Michigan) yang meliputi faktor partai, sikap seseorang terhadap isu-isu politik, dan faktor kandidat.Dan pendekatan yang ketiga yaitu pendekatan Pendekatan Rasional (Rasional Choice) yaitu rasionalitas perilaku pemilih. Adapun faktor-faktor yang dimaksud antara lain: 1. Faktor Identifikasi Partai Partai politik tidak memberi jaminan seorang kandidat akan lebih banyak dipilih masyarakat pemilih. Seperti yang di katakan oleh salah satu informan : Wawancara dengan M. P. alias Mulyadi. "Awalnya partai memang memegang peranan penting dalam pemilihan, tapi sekarang tidak seperti itu lagi.Karena kenyataannya di seluruh wilayah nusantara ini hanya di Bolmut saja Partai PPP bisa memenang dan mampu mengalahkan partai- partai besar yang sebelumnya pernah menjadi pemenang pada pemilu-pemilu sebelumnya.itu menunjukan bahwa partai sudah tidak terlalu berpengaruh terhadap masyarakat untuk menentukan pilihannya. Ada juga yang menjatuhkan pilihannya karena faktor partai, namun itu tidak seberapa.Jadi menurut saya masyarakat Bolmut menjatuhkan pilihannya pada Pemilukada 2013 itu bukan karena faktor partai namun karena figur". Sebagian besar informan yang ditemui di lapangan tidak ada yang mengatakan alasan mereka menjatuhkan pilihan politiknya karena factor partai.Mungkin ada juga sebagian masyarakat yang menjatuhkan pilihannya karena latar belakang partai, namun hitungannya hanya dalam skala kecil. Karena mesin partai saja ternyata tidak cukup untuk memenangkan seorang calon dalam Pemilukada. Kapasitas intelektual, kepribadian, dan karya nyata sang calonlah yang sekarang menjadi pertimbangan utama para pemilih. Artinya, kualitas dan performa individu berada di urutan pertama dan kedua, di atas afiliasi dengan partai. 2. Faktor Kandidat Person adalah profil dari kandidat yang akan dipilih melalui suatu kontestasi politik, yang secara otomatis dapat membentuk sikap politis pemilih dalam menetapkan pilihannya. Bahkan person atau figur kandidat seringkali menentukan keputusan pilihan dibandingkan dengan partai. Hal ini berkaitan dengan proses pembentukan keyakinan para pemilih, bahwa para pemilih lebih mudah diyakinkan dengan menawarkan figur. Seperti yang di katakan oleh salah satu informan : Wawancara dengan U. P. alias Udin yang merupakan salah satu anggota masyarakat… "Alasan saya memilih pasangan DP-SYAH( Depri dan Suriansyah ) pertama karena hubungan emosional, dan yang kedua karena menurut saya kandidat ini memiliki karakter yang baik atau kharisma. Bukan kandidat lain tidak memiliki kharisma, namun menurut penilaian saya pasangan kandidat yang saya pilih ini berbeda dengan kandidat yang lain". Wawancara dengan E. H. alias Evan yang merupakan salah satu pemuda yang tergolong dalam ikatan pemuda imfordes … "Alasan saya memilih pasangan DP-SYAH( Depri dan Suriansyah ) bukan karena partai, melainkan karena figur pasangan calon. Karena semua itu saya lihat dari kedekatan pasangan kandidat dengan masyarakat dan mampu menjalin komunikasi yang dengan masyarakat.bukan hanya itu, menurut saya pasangan ini merupakan pasangan yang cocok, karena sebelumnya Bapak Depri sudah pernah menjabat sebagai Wakil Bupati dan Bapak Suriansyah pernah menjadi Anggota Dewan. Hal inilah yang membuat saya sampai menjadikan pasangan ini sebagai idola.Dan saya yakin pasangan ini bisa memberikan yang terbaik untuk kemajuan Bolmut". Komunikasi yang paling efektif antara kandidat dan rakyat pemilih adalah komunikasi langsung/tatap muka.Penekanannya adalah bagaimana kebutuhan komunikasi dan aspirasi rakyat pemilih bisa tersalurkan serta mendapat respon dari kandidat kepala daerah, yang tentunya ditindak lanjuti dengan program dan aksi nyata. Wawancara dengan Bapak Ebi yang merupakan salah satu anggota masyarakat… "Alasan saya memilih kepada salah satu pasangan kandidat yang menjadi pilihan saya yaitu, dari segi penyampaian ataupun kampanye itu termasuk memperhatikan masyarakat.memang dari semua calon itu tidak ada yang tidak baik, semuanya baik dan visi misinya hamper sama. Jadi yang mendorong saya menjatuh pilihan saya sampai menjatuhkan pilihan politik saat itu bukan karena factor partai, hubungan emosional ataupun ego wilayah, melainkan karena figure". Hal ini menunjukan bahwa masyarakat Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara khususnya Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat dalam menjatuhkan pilihannya, sebagian besar masyarakat tersebut menilai bahwa dengan sifat dan karakter yang di miliki oleh kandidat yang menjadi pilihan mereka menjadi faktor utama dalam menentukan pilihan politiknya. Mereka yakin dan percaya karena kedekatan dengan masyarakat dan kepedulian terhadap masyarakat yang dimiliki oleh para kandidat tersebut bisa mensejahterakan masyarakat dan mampu mewujudkan cita- cita seluruh masyarakat Bolmut, yaitu Bolaang Mongondow Utara yang sejahtera. 3. Isu-Isu Program Pilkada secara langsung tidak hanya sekadar dimaksudkan sebagai instrumen untuk memperbaiki kualitas demokrasi di daerah.Lebih dari itu adalah agar kebijakan-kebijakan yang dibuat oleh Kepala Daerah dirumuskan berdasarkan selera dari masyarakat, demikian pula implementasinya.Seperti yang di ungkapkan oleh salah satu informan : Wawancara dengan K. P. alias Kisman yang merupakan tokoh masyarakat "Alasan saya memilih pada Pemilukada 2013 karena saya menilai kandidat yang saya pilih memiliki kepedulian terhadap rakyat bawah. bagaimana perubahan warna Kabupaten Bolmut sebelum-sebelumnya seperti apa dan itu lebih dia tumbuh kembangkan dan lebih dia tingkatkan. Itu semua disampaikan dalam penyampaian kata hati politik dari kandidat ini.Misalnya bagaimana ekonomi bisa meningkat, pendidikan, kesehatan yang otomatis ini menyentuh kita semua. Bukan di kandidat lain tidak seperti itu, sama juga. Namun kita harus melihat realisasinya, Karena itu baru kata hati politik yang di sampaikan". Berbagai program tersebut disosialisasikan kepada pemilih melalui kampanye-kampanye yang dilakukan para pasangan calon sehingga menarik minat pemilih melalui tawaran program-program yang atraktif dan populis. 4. Faktor Agama. Seperti kita ketahui bersama masyarakat Bolaang Mongondow Utara mayoritas masyarakatnya Bergama muslim dan hanya sebagian kecil yang Bergama non muslim. Namun dalam hal menjatuhkan pilihannya masyarakat tersebut tidak terlalu melihat faktor agama.Hal ini terlihat pada pelaksanaan pemilukada Kabupaten Bolmut tahun 2013. Masyarakat yang menjatuhkan pilihannya kepada pasangan Depri Pontoh-Suriansyah Korompot bukan hanya masyarakat yang memiliki latar belakang agama muslim saja, namun ada juga masyarakat yang beragama non muslim. Padahal saat itu ada kandidat lain yang beragama non muslim yaitu pasangan nomor urut 2 Hamka-Fellix yang dalam hal ini Felix memiliki latar belakang agama kristen. Dan ada juga masyarakat yang memiliki latar belakang agama muslim menjatuhkan pilihannya kepada pasangan Hamka-Fellix. Jadi pada Pemilukada Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara tahun 2013, faktor agama tidak berpengaruh dalam menentukan perilaku memilih masyarakat. Faktor Etnis/Wilayah Faktor Etnis/wilayah juga memiliki hubungan dengan perilaku pemilih.Adanya rasa kedaerahan mempengaruhi dukungan seseorang terhadap partai politik atau kontestan tertentu.Seperti yang di katakan oleh salah satu informan : Wawancara dengan W. G. alias Wawan yang merupakan salah satu anggota masyarakat… "Dari pengamatan saya, kandidat calon kepala daerah yang di pilih oleh sebagian besar masyarakat Bolangitang Barat bukan pada pilihan partai, akan tetapi isu-isu putra daerah. Karena sebagian besar masyarakat Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat selalu membanding-bandingkan dengan kemajuan Kecamatan lain seperti Kecamatan Bintauna, Karena sebelumnya Kabupaten Bolmut di pimpin oleh putra asli Bintauna". Selain itu, argumen yang sama juga dikatakan oleh : Bapak A. T. alias Alimin salah satu tokoh agama. "Alasan saya, karena saya menginginkan agar supaya putra Bolangitang yang mendapat giliran memimpin daerah ini.Karena menurut saya ini lebih memudahkan masyarakat Bolangitang dalam menyampaikan aspirasi.Siapa tahu dengan terpilihnya putra asli Bolangitang bisa memberikan perubahan yang lebih baik untuk Kecamatan Bolangitang ini.Jadi menurut saya, kalau ada yang dekat, buat apa kita memilih yang jauh". Masyarakat Bolangitang Barat lebih tertarik dengan kepala daerah yang merupakan warga Bolangitang itu sendiri. Mereka melihat perkembangan pembangunan yang ada di wilayah atau Kecamatan lain, yang kemudian mereka bandingkankan dengan kemajuan yang terjadi di wilayah atau Kecamatannya sendiri. Wawancara dengan U. P. alias Udin yang merupakan salah satu anggota masyarakat… "Alasan saya memilih pasangan DP-SYAH karena berbagai suku bangsa, Dimana Bapak Depri Pontoh merupakan putra asli Bolangitang, jadi hal yang tidak mungkin saya orang Bolangitang memilih kandidat yang bukan orang asli Bolangitang". Masyarakat Bolangitang Barat yang sebagian besar adalah penduduk asli Bolangitang, yang sejak turun-temurun tinggal, menetap dan mencari nafkah di Kecamatan Bolangitang memiliki ikatan psikologis yang kuat dengan wilayahnya, bukan hanya karena kandidat yang akan dipilihnya. Mereka mengidentifikasikan dirinya dengan lingkungan yang sudah ditinggalinya sejak turun-temurun. Wawancara dengan A. B .alias Awal yang merupakan salah satu anggota masyarakat… "Bagi saya ego wilayah itu penting, karena saya berfikir dari pada saya memilih orang lain yang di luar dari wilayah saya dan hanya memperbaiki wilayah mereka sendiri, lebih baik saya memilih orang yang wilayahnya sama dengan saya". Dari wawancara tersebut maka terlihat jelas adanya sifat loyalitas yang ada di masyarakat Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat bila mereka dipimpin oleh warga daerahnya sendiri.Loyalitas tersebut dikarenakan orientasi mereka terhadap kandidat dari daerah sendiri yang tercermin dalam kebanggaan mereka terhadap kandidat yang mereka pilih. 5. Politik Uang (Money Politics) Penerapan demokrasi seringkali dinodai dengan penyimpangan-penyimpangan pada proses demokrasi (Pemilihan Umum) antara lain adanya praktik Money Politics (Politik Uang). Salah satu usaha yang dilakukan oleh para kandidat maupun partai politik dalam pemilihan umum agar memenangkan perolehan suara di pemilihan menggunakan cara yang kotor, cara kotor tersebut yaitu dengan transaksi jual beli suara atau dikenal dengan istilah money politics. Wawancara dengan Ibu Ratna : Money Politics sangatlah berpengaruh terhadap perilaku politik masyarakat.hal ini bisa di buktikan dengan apa yang telah banyak di katakan oleh masyarakat"bahwa masyarakat sekarang sudah tidak bisa di bodohi, kalau ada uang pasti ada suara". Namun hal itu tidak bisa menjadi patokan.karena ada juga masyarakat yang meskipun sudah di berikan uang atau barang, tapi tidak menjatuhkan pilihannya kepada kandidat yang memberikan uang atau barang tersebut. Melainkan memilih kandidat yang jauh sebelumnya sudah menjadi pilihannya. Di dalam prakteknya money politicsternyata tidak selalu berhasil, karena belum tentu rakyat yang mencicipi uang benar-benar mau memilih calon kandidat yang memberi uang atau mereka hanya mau menerima uang tanpa adanya tindakan yang pasti sebagai timbal baliknya. Seperti yang di katakan oleh salah seorang ibu RT yang tak ingin namanya di sebutkan. Bahwa pada Pilbup Bolmut 2013 yang lalu saya menerima uang dari Tim Sukses salah satu kandidat, namun Tim Sukses tersebut mengatakan "napa doi, terserah ngoni mo pilih pa sapa. Yang penting doi yang pa kita, kita so kase salur". Jadi saya menerima uang itu, saya merasa tidak punya hutang apa-apa kepada kandidat tersebut, dan memang kandidat tersebut bukan calon yang menjadi pilihan saya. Jadi Berdasarkan hasil pembahasan di atas, dapat ditarik sebuah kesimpulan bahwa faktor yang paling dominan dalam perilaku memilih kepala daerah secara langsung bagi masyarakat Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara, khususnya Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat dalam menjatuhkan pilihan politiknya selain di pengaruhi oleh faktor kandidat dan isu-isu politik juga di pengaruhi oleh faktor etnis/wilayah. Karena bagi mereka pemimpin yang memiliki etnis/wilayah yang sama saja sudah cukup mewakili selera dan harapan mereka guna memimpin daerah yang mereka cintai. PENUTUP KESIMPULAN Pada penelitian tentang faktor- faktor yang mempengaruhi perilaku memilih masyarakat Bolaang Mongondow Utara pada Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah tahun 2013, di Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat dapat di simpulkan sebagai berikut : Sesuai dengan uraian di atas maka dapat di simpulkan bahwa faktor identifikasi partai memiliki pengaruh yang rendah terhadap perilaku memilih masyarakat Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat pada Pemilukada Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara tahun 2013. faktor kandidatternyata memiliki pengaruh besar terhadap perilaku memilih masyarakat Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat pada Pemilukada Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara tahun 2013.isu program memiliki pengaruh besar terhadap perilaku memilih masyarakat Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat dalam menjatuhkan pilihan politiknya pada Pemilukada Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara tahun 2013.Ternyata faktor agama memiliki pengaruh yang rendah terhadap perilaku memilih masyarakat Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat pada Pemilukada Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara tahun 2013. Dalam menjatuhkan pilihan politiknya selain di pengaruhi oleh faktor kandidat dan isu-isu program, masyarakat Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat pada Pemilukada Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara tahun 2013 juga di pengaruhi oleh faktor etnis/wilayah.Politik uang atau Money Politic ternyata memiliki pengaruh yang rendah terhadap perilaku memilih masyarakat Kecamatan Bolangitang Barat pada Pemilukada Kabupaten Bolaang Mongondow Utara tahun 2013. A. SARAN Jadi saran saya sebagai penulis menuliskan beberapa saran yaitu : Demi menumbuhkan kembali citra partai politik di tengah-tengah masyarakat, maka partai politik tersebut harus dapat mengevaluasi beberapa hal, di antaranya evaluasi karakter dan agenda partai serta penerapan standar kualifikasi yang tinggi untuk merekrut kader yang berkualitas.Dalam studi perilaku memilih, faktor figur merupakan salah satu faktor yang dapat mempengaruhi keputusan politik masyarakat untuk memberikan dukungannya kepada seorang kandidat. Hal ini karena dipengaruhi oleh bagaimana kualitas seorang kandidat terlihat dimata masyarakat, yang dalam hal ini sebagai pemilih. Jadi seorang kandidat harus dan perlu menjaga dengan baik kepercayaan dan dukungan yang di berikan oleh masyarakat. dan menunjukan kualitasnya sebagai seorang pemimpin untuk memperjuangkan aspirasi masyarakat demi kesejahteraan bersama.Program yang di tawarkan oleh kandidat saat kampanye tersebut harus di perhatikan dan direalisasikan dengan baik. Dan masyarakat juga harus bisa ikut serta dalam pengawasan program tersebut. Agar supaya program tersebut benar-benar bisa sampai dan di rasakan sepenuhnya oleh masyarakat.Dalam rangka menyukseskan proses demokrasi di Indonesia sekaligus dalam rangka memilih wakil rakyat dan pemimpin yang amanah serta menolak segala bentuk praktik money politics,maka diperlukan kerjasama dari berbagai pihak.Perlunya sosialisasi politik berupa komunikasi politik dan pendidikan politik bagi masyarakat sehingga masyarakat dapat menggunakan hak pilih dan hak politiknya dengan baik. Untuk itu, tugas kitalah baik ilmuwan, kalangan akademisi, pers, politikus, lembaga-lembaga politik baik yang berasal dari kalangan pemerintah maupun non-pemerintah untuk mensosialisasikan hal ini.Karena dengan membentuk masyarakat yang rasional dalam berpolitik, maka cita-cita sebagai negara demokrasi dapat berjalan dengan baik. DAFTAR PUSTAKA Amirudin dan zaini bisri, pilkada langsung problem dan prospek, Penerbit Pustaka Peelajar. Januari 2006 Arifin Rachman. System politik Indonesia, Penerbit SIC : 2001 Adman, Nursal. 2004. Politikal Marketing : Strategi Memenagkan Pemilu sebuah pendekatan baru kampanye DPR, DPD, Presiden. Jakarta : P.T. Gramedia Pustaka Utama. Dr. Jazim Hamidi dan Mustafa Lutfi. Civik Education, Antara Realitas Politik dan Implementasi Hukumnya.Penerbit PT. Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta : 2010. Dr. H. M. Busrizalti, S. H., M. H., 2013. Hukum Pemda. Yogyakarta : Total Media. Dr. Husaini Usman, M.P.d., dan Purnomo Setiady Akbar, M. Pd., 2006. Metodologi Penelitiian Sosial.Jakarta : Bumi Aksara Gaffar, Afan, 1992. Javanese Voters :A Case Study Of Election Under A Hegemonic Party System, Gajahmada University Press, Yogyakarta Efriza.Political Explore, Sebuah Kajian Ilmu Politik. Penerbit Alfabeta. Bandung 2012 Merphin panjaitan.Logika demokrasi. Rakyat Mengendalikan Negara. Penerbit Permata Aksara, Jakarta : 2011 Muhammad Asfar. Mendesain manajemen pilkada.Pusdeham.Surabaya : 2006 Prof. Roth Dieter. Studi Pemilu Empiris. Jakarta : Friedrich- Naumann- Stiftung Furdia Freiheit Ramlan surbakti.Pilkada Langsung dan Kepemimpinan Daerah Yang Efektif, Surabaya : Java Pustaka Media Utama Ramlan Surbakti. Memahami ilmu politik.Gramedia : Jakarta : 1992 [1] Merupakan Skripsi penulis [2] Mahasiswa Program Studi Ilmu Politik FISIP Unsrat [3]Dr. Jazim Hamidi dan Mustafa Lutfi. CIVIK EDUCATION, Antara Realitas Politik dan Implementasi Hukumnya.Penerbit PT. Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta : 2010. Hal 183-184 [4]Merphin Panjaitan. Logika Demokrasi. Rakyat Mengendalikan Negara. Penerbit permata aksara, jakarta : 2011. Hal 158, 159, 160 [5]. Ramlan surbakti. Pilkada langsung dan kepemimpinan daerah yang efektif, surabaya : java pustaka media utama. Hal 5 [6]. Amirudin dan zaini bisri, pilkada langsung problem dan prospek, penerbit pustaka peelajar.Januari 2006. Hal 1 [7]. Arifin Rachman. System politik Indonesia, penerbit SIC : 2001 [8]. Ramlan Surbakti. Memahami ilmu politik. Gramedia : Jakarta : 1992 [9]Arifin Rachman. System politik Indonesia, penerbit SIC : 2001 [10]Prof. Dr. Afan Gaffar, MA. [11]. Prof. Roth Dieter, 23- 54 [12]. Nursal, Adman. 2004. Politikal Marketing : Strategi Memenagkan Pemilu [13]. Efriza. Political Explore, Sebuah Kajian Ilmu Politik. Penerbit Alfabeta. Bandung 2012 : hal. 355 [14]. Dr. H. M. Busrizalti, S. H., M. H., 2013.HUKUM PEMDA.Yogyakarta : Total Media. Hal 5 [15]. Muhammad Asfar. Mendesain manajemen pilkada.Pusdeham.Surabaya : 2006 hal. 2 [16]. Dr. Husaini Usman, M.P.d., dan Purnomo Setiady Akbar, M. Pd., 2006 : 4- 54- 57
Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Week 11 Final Paper Wilsonianism in the First World War: Progressivism, American Exceptionalism, and the AEF Doughboy Brian P. Bailes A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH 562B Dr. John Broom August 16, 2020 Bailes 2 While the duration of American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) involvement in First World War combat operations remained short compared to the armies of the European powers, the experience had a lasting impact on the United States' status as a global power. President Woodrow Wilson's mediation in the European affair throughout American neutrality, his integration of the AEF into Allied operations, and his contribution to the post-war peace process cast him as a central figure of the conflict as well as a harbinger of United States interventionist foreign policy. Through the more than a century since the end of the war, historians have analyzed and debated various facets of United States belligerency. Historians have explored President Wilson's ideologies and the decision making that ultimately led to him making his April 1917 appeal to Congress for American belligerency. Additionally, historians have expanded on AEF actions in Europe and argued how General Pershing's adamancy on maintaining an independent American command created tension with the Allied leaders. Historians have not connected these two topics to analyze how a reader can conceptually link Wilson's ideas and doughboy exploits in Europe. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation? Throughout the historiography of United States involvement in the First World War, specific themes reoccur as significant areas of consensus. The historiography presents two primary arguments in which historians agree. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives drastically differed from those of the Allies, and historians agree that these differences motivated Wilson's decisions regarding how the United States would enter the war. Historians also agree that friction existed between General Pershing and the Allied Commanders once the AEF arrived in Europe and began combat operations. These two commonalities in the historiography remain Bailes 3 relatively constant throughout the past 50 years of historical research, and even when portraying more positive sentiments expressed between AEF and Allied soldiers, historians still note some tension between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Historians agree that Wilson's peace objectives differed significantly from those of the Allies. David Woodford argues that the gap between British imperial interests and Wilson's peace objectives affected the alliance between the United States and England throughout the war.1 William Widenor argues that Wilson failed in achieving his goals during the Versailles Peace Settlement because he attempted to make too many concessions for enduring peace, and he claims that Wilson grew at odds with the Allied leaders at the peace conference.2 George Egerton argues that British policymakers were closely monitoring the dispute within the United States Senate during the Treaty of Versailles conference, and he suggests that British leadership remained skeptical of Wilson's League of Nations.3 Historians capture Wilson's opposing peace aims throughout the European conflict, and they seemingly agree on how these aims influenced Wilson's policies and actions. Some historians cite the most significant gap in peace aims as existing between the United States and France. David Stevenson argues that French leaders were continually at odds with Wilson throughout the war as the French war aims focused much more on their national security, which they saw as requiring the destruction of Imperial Germany.4 Stevenson points out that while Wilson's peace aims differed from England as well as France, many French objectives 1 David R. Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918 (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 7-25, 35-43, 77-80, 125-9, 208-20. 2 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," Modern American Diplomacy, eds. John M. Carroll and George C. Herring (Lanham: SR Books, 1996), 46-59. 3 George W. Egerton, "Britain and the 'Great Betrayal': Anglo-American Relations and the Struggle for United States Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919-1920," The Historical Journal 21, no. 4 (December 1978): 885-911, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638973. 4 David Stevenson, "French War Aims and the American Challenge, 1914-1918," The Historical Journal 22, no. 4 (December 1979): 877-894, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638691. Bailes 4 were more aggressive against Germany as they involved reclaiming land lost to Germany in previous wars, specifically the 1870 Franco-Prussian War.5 Stevenson highlights the fact that Wilson could not get French officials to see the "two Germanys" concept that prevailed in American thinking at the time. While the American public generally saw two Germanys – the autocratic ruling party dominated by the Prussian elite and the German people living under that oppressive regime – Stevenson argues that France only saw Imperial Germany as a total enemy.6 Robert Bruce explains that during the post-war occupation period, the American doughboys perceived Frenchmen as distrustful and hateful toward German soldiers, and this sullied the alliance between France and the United States.7 In line with Wilson's ideology, historians cite Wilson's desire for Europe to achieve a "peace without victory" as he attempted to serve as a mediator during the United States period of neutrality. These historians ultimately conclude that Wilson believed any of the European powers achieving their aims through victory would lead to a continuation of balance of power politics in Europe. They argue that Wilson thought merely putting an end to the fighting would be the only way to achieve lasting peace. Ross Gregory argues that Wilson acted as a persistent mediator throughout the war as he strove for a "peace without victory."8 Arthur Link explains that Wilson believed a "peace without victory" and a "draw in Europe" proved the best solution for establishing a new system to replace the broken power structure in Europe.9 Ross Kennedy portrays Wilson as advocating the United States as a neutral mediator striving for a "peace 5 Stevenson, 884, 892-4. 6 Stevenson, 885. 7 Robert B. Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms: America & France in the Great War (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2003), 286-95. 8 Ross Gregory, The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971), 115-6. 9 Arthur Link, "Entry into World War I," Progress, War, and Reaction: 1900-1933, eds. Davis R.B. Ross, Alden T. Vaughan, and John B. Duff (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1970), 141. Bailes 5 without victory" before the U.S. entered the war, then as an advocate of "just peace" after they entered the war.10 Kennedy argues that Wilson blamed the international system that led to power politics and wanted to have a separate voice in the peace process to shape a new diplomatic and global political order.11 Historians point to Wilson's ideology as a reason for his differing peace objectives, and historians point to Wilson's Christian faith as a significant motivation for his progressive philosophy. Lloyd Ambrosius highlights Wilson's four tenets of national self-determination, open-door economic globalization, collective security, and progressive history as the framework in which he envisioned a global order shaped by American democratic ideals that would bring the world to peace.12 Ambrosius examines Wilson's embrace of "American Exceptionalism" and looks at how his Anglo-American bias clouded his vision and prevented him from seeing the various cultural factors throughout the world.13 Ronald Pestritto examines Wilson's progressive form of history while arguing that Wilson saw democracy emerging within society as a phenomenon only natural to specific groups of people, and he only saw a few civilizations as "progressed."14 Pestritto notes Wilson's Christian inspiration, referencing early manuscripts written by Wilson titled "Christ's Army" and "Christian Progress."15 William Appleman Williams argues that Wilson maintained a Calvinist idealism that intensified the existing doctrine 10 Ross A. Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," Diplomatic History 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 15, 29, https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00247. 11 Kennedy, "Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and American National Security," 2-3. 12 Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 2-47. 13 Ambrosius, Wilsonianism, 125-34; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 33-49; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, "World War I and the Paradox of Wilsonianism," The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 17 (2018): 5-22, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781417000548. 14 Ronald J. Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 6-61. 15 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 23, 40. Bailes 6 based on God's supposed ordination of American influence and expansion in the world.16 Richard Gamble explains that Wilson's vision and rhetoric nested with many of the Christian messages of progressive religious leaders in the United States during the First World War who saw the war as a Christian crusade to spread American ideals.17 Historians seem in unanimous agreement that Wilson's separate peace aims formed the primary impetus for him seeking an independent American presence in the war effort. David Esposito argues that Wilson wanted to have an American presence in the war because he realized that to establish a dominant American voice in the post-war peace talks, the United States needed to make a significant contribution to Allied victory.18 Edward Coffman details the United States' experiences in the First World War by explaining Wilson's desire to gain an independent voice in the peace process.19 David Trask maintains that Wilson wanted to "remain somewhat detached from the Allies" in defeating Imperial Germany to provide Wilson leverage so that he could directly influence the post-war peace process.20 Arthur Link explains that Wilson did see the benefit of not joining the Entente but keeping the United States independent of "any political commitments" with the Allies as providing a chance to ensure an American presence at the peace conference.21 Thomas Knock argues that Wilson faulted the "balance of power" politics of Europe and saw the United States as the actor to save Europe and create a new system of 16 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959; New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), 67-112. Page references are to the 2009 edition. 17 Richard M. Gamble, The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003), 22-3, 86-208, 254-5. 18 David M. Esposito, "Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the AEF," Presidential Studies Quarterly 19 no. 1 (Winter 1989): 127-38, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574570. 19 Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1968), 5-8. 20 David F. Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1993), 2-6. 21 Link, "Entry into World War I," 141. Bailes 7 diplomacy.22 Overall, historians agree that President Wilson desired very different peace outcomes for a post-war Europe, and this influenced him as he made decisions regarding United States actions throughout the war. In addition to the agreement that Wilson's peace aims differed from the Allies, historians also agree that once the United States did enter the war and the AEF arrived in Europe, friction quickly developed between General Pershing and the Allied commanders. David Trask argues many instances of "increasing friction" existed between Pershing and the French and British command. Trask includes a case where the Allies "attempted to bypass Pershing" by working directly with Wilson even though Wilson had appointed Pershing as Commander in Chief of the AEF.23 Trask argues that Pershing believed that the preceding few years of trench warfare had "deprived the French and even the British of offensive spirit," and he maintains that with Pershing's "open warfare" tactics, his methods of training drastically differed from the Allies.24 Michael Adas cites disagreement between Pershing and the Allied commanders immediately after Pershing arrived in France due to Pershing's unwillingness to listen to the experienced French and British leaders as they tried to suggest ways to employ the AEF.25 Adas argues that Pershing's desire to pursue "open warfare" did not take into account the realities of trench warfare and resulted in costly casualties.26 Russell Weigley cites frequent tensions between Pershing and the Allied commanders, including an example in September of 1918 in which AEF 22 Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest For a New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 30-69. 23 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 38-9. 24 Trask, AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 25 Michael Adas, "Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I," Diplomatic History 38 no. 4 (September 2014): 705-7, http://doi.org/10.1093/dh.dhu032. 26 Adas, "Ambivalent Ally," 710. Bailes 8 "traffic congestion" caused a significant disturbance in a visit from Georges Clemenceau.27 Weigley explains that Pershing's belief in "open warfare" would not work due to the enormous American divisions built for the trenches, arguing that Pershing would need "smaller, maneuverable divisions" if he wanted his open warfare to work.28 All historians agree that the issue of AEF amalgamation with the French and British forces served as the primary reason for the friction between the military leaders. David Woodford cites the notion that AEF amalgamation would "undermin[e] the significance of the American military role." Hence, Pershing remained adamant in his stance not to let the Allies use American soldiers to fight under French or British flags.29 Woodward notes that Pershing felt his AEF superior to the Allies as he "believed that the Americans had almost nothing to learn from French and British officers."30 Woodford explains that war aims and peace objectives formed the basis of a fractured Anglo-American relationship that finally crumbled during the peace conference.31 Mitchell Yockelson argues that despite tension between Pershing and the Allied leaders regarding the question of amalgamation, the 27th and 30th Divisions contributed significantly to the Allied effort under British command. Yockelson highlights a fascinating illustration of Pershing's stubbornness in noting that Pershing did not follow the exploits of these divisions even though they proved instrumental in the offensive against the Hindenburg Line.32 As an enduring theme throughout the amalgamation debate, historians point to Pershing's desire for the United States to deliver the decisive blow against Germany with an independent 27 Russell F. Weigley, "Strategy and Total War in the United States: Pershing and the American Military Tradition," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 333. 28 Weigley, "Pershing and the American Military Tradition," 341-2. 29 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 57-8. 30 Woodward, 88. 31 Woodward, 7-80, 112-220. 32 Mitchell A. Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers: Americans Under British Command, 1918 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 92-228. Bailes 9 American army. Allan Millett argues that Wilson gave Pershing the explicit directive to keep the AEF separate from the Allies and allowed Pershing the freedom to make decisions on how to integrate the AEF.33 Millett cites Pershing's initial plan to use an AEF offensive on Metz as the critical blow that would decide the war and establish an American contribution to defeating Imperial Germany. Pershing would not have his AEF ready to carry out this offensive until 1919, and his stubbornness in dealing with the requests for amalgamation in the interim "frustrated the Allies."34 Bullitt Lowry narrates Pershing's attempt to shape the post-war peace terms by arguing that Pershing wanted to force Germany into an "unconditional surrender." While Lowry concludes that Pershing's effort to influence the political realm failed, he believed that the only way to "guarantee victory" would be to crush Germany in battle.35 David Woodward argues that Pershing believed that the AEF would decide the war by becoming "the dominant role in the war against Germany."36 Woodward cites Pershing's ideas regarding "the aggressive American rifleman, whose tradition of marksmanship and frontier warfare" could rid the Western Front of trench warfare and execute a great offensive against Germany.37 Historians cite the notion throughout the ranks of the AEF that the United States should remain independent from the Allies, and historians point to the fact that many doughboys saw themselves as superior soldiers to the Allies. Robert H. Zieger argues that "virtually the entire military establishment" agreed with Pershing's desire to have an independent American 33 Allan R. Millett, "Over Where? The AEF and the American Strategy for Victory, 1917-1918," Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to the Present, eds. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (Westport: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986), 237. 34 Millett, "Over Where?," 239. 35 Bullitt Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," The Journal of American History 55 no. 2, (September 1968): 281-291, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1899558. 36 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 81. 37 Woodward, 89, 207. Bailes 10 command.38 Still, Zieger does note that this separate American command relied heavily on the Allies for logistics support, and the AEF "misunderstood the military dynamics of the Western Front."39 Richard Faulkner argues that Pershing's doctrine rested on his belief that the "superior American rifle marksmanship, aggressiveness, and skilled maneuvering" could win the fight for the Allies.40 Faulkner argues that American soldiers saw themselves as intervening in the war effort to help the failing French and British, taunting their British partners by claiming AEF stands for "After England Failed." He devotes a chapter named as such to explain the AEF belief in the superiority of the American fighting man.41 Harold Winton argues that Pershing believed that the United States soldier was superior to his European counterpart.42 Jennifer Keene argues that issues such as the treatment of African-American soldiers and disagreements about which nation contributed the most to the Allied victory created rifts between the two allies.43 In her full text, Keene narrates AEF interactions with their French Allies, and she claims that doughboys saw themselves as superior fighters who could help turn the tide of war.44 Michael Neiberg explains that United States citizens and soldiers came away from the conflict with the belief in the "inherent superiority" of the American system over that of Europe.45 38 Robert H. Zieger, America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 92-102. 39 Zieger, America's Great War, 96. 40 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders: The American Soldier in World War I (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2017), 285. 41 Faulkner, 281-304. 42 Harold Winton, "Toward an American Philosophy of Command," The Journal of Military History 64, no. 4 (October 2000): 1059, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2677266. 43 Jennifer D. Keene, "Uneasy Alliances: French Military Intelligence and the American Army During the First World War," Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (January 2008): 18-36, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432461. 44 Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 105-11. 45 Michael S. Neiberg, The Path to War: How The First World War Created Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 23. Bailes 11 Even when historians convey a more positive relationship between the AEF and their Allied counterparts, they still address the tension between Pershing and Allied leadership. Robert Bruce portrays a much more positive partnership between the doughboy and his French ally. Bruce documents Marshal Joseph Joffre's visit to the United States after Congress declared war against Germany to muster American support for the French. By comparing France's visit to Britain's, Bruce argues that Joffre established the framework for an intimate Franco-American partnership.46 Bruce maintains that the French respected the American soldier and viewed the entry of the AEF into the war as the saving grace of the Allies. Bruce narrates a bond between doughboys and French troops that increased as they trained and fought together.47 Despite this positive portrayal by Bruce of the French and AEF bond, Bruce still highlights the tension in Pershing's interactions with French commanders as well as noting the general perception amongst French commanders that Pershing thought "he knew everything there was to know about modern warfare."48 Bruce adds that different peace aims and post-war sentiments towards Germany created disagreements amongst American and French soldiers that fractured the relationship built during the war.49 Of note, Bruce suggests that the doughboys harbored what they saw as a "perceived lack of aggressiveness in the French."50 After synthesizing the historiography, the question remains regarding how these two arguments can be linked. Why did Wilsonian ideals influence AEF actions in the First World War, and how did that affect the United States' involvement in the nation's first large-scale 46 Robert B. Bruce, "America Embraces France: Marshal Joseph Joffre and the French Mission to the United States, April-May 1917," Journal of Military History 66 no. 2 (April 2002): 407-441, http://doi.org/10.2307/3093066; Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 32-59. 47 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 86-121. 48 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 128, 143. 49 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 286-95. 50 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 122. Bailes 12 coalition operation? Wilsonian ideals influenced the AEF's actions in the First World War because most American leaders and soldiers shared Wilson's concepts of Progressivism and believed that the United States should play a role in saving Europe. Even if some did not agree with Wilson's politics, most doughboys shared his ideas of American Exceptionalism, and these views affected United States involvement in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. In merging the two topic areas of Wilson's ideologies and AEF involvement in the war, this essay will attempt to answer how the American doughboy found motivation in the same principles that guided President Wilson. Perhaps a reader will identify that the AEF demonstrated trends in Europe that highlight an "American way of war" that still resonates in United States coalition operations today. When President Wilson brought the United States into the First World War in April of 1917, he sold it as an effort to make the world safe for democracy. In Wilson's war address to Congress, Wilson called Imperial Germany's resumption of their unrestricted submarine campaign "warfare against mankind."51 Wilson maintained that Imperial Germany had given the United States no other choice but to declare war when they resumed their submarine attacks on merchant ships in the early spring of 1917. Still, Wilson furthered his justification for war by appealing to the broader ideal of fighting to defeat the Imperial German autocracy. Wilson described the "selfish and autocratic power" against which a free people needed to wage war.52 Later in his address, Wilson stated that he found hope in what he saw as the restoration of power to the people demonstrated in the Russian Revolution. Wilson saw a pre-Lenin revolution as 51 Woodrow Wilson, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress Calling for a Declaration of War" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, ed. Mario R. DiNunzio (New York: NYU Press, 2006): 399, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.15. 52 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 400. Bailes 13 bringing democracy to the people of Russia, and it opened the door for the realization that the Allies fought because "the world must be made safe for democracy."53 Arthur Link comments on Wilson's initial optimism on hearing of the Russian Revolution overthrowing Czar rule.54 While the Russian Revolution took a different turn in the following years, the initial news of the Russian people revolting against the Czar gave Wilson confidence that democracy could spread in Europe since now the Allies truly represented a democratic system. Wilson had spent the first years of the war trying to mediate peace in Europe through United States neutrality, and he tried to negotiate an end to the fighting without a victory for any of the imperial belligerents. Wilson did not see a lasting peace coming to Europe if any of the imperial powers achieved their peace objectives, so he attempted to mediate a truce. Kendrick Clements narrates how Wilson's desire to keep the United States neutral grew at odds with his economic support for the Allies. War for the United States rose to be more likely as Imperial Germany became increasingly aggravated with the United States for supplying aid to France and Britain while professing neutrality.55 Fraser Harbutt argues that at the initial outbreak of war in Europe, leaders as well as citizens of the United States concerned themselves with the economic impacts of the war primarily, and the United States benefited economically by supporting the Allies, specifically in the steel trade.56 Imperial Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, as well as the capture of Germany's Zimmerman Telegram in January 1917, soliciting an alliance with Mexico, prompted Wilson to support waging war on Imperial Germany. Now American entry into the conflict presented Wilson with some new options for shaping the post- 53 Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401-2. 54 Link, "Entry into World War I," 122-3. 55 Kendrick A. Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 2004: 62-82, https://www.jstor.org/stable/27552564. 56 Fraser J. Harbutt, "War, Peace, and Commerce: The American Reaction to the Outbreak of World War I in Europe 1914," An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture Before 1914, eds. Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 320-1. Bailes 14 war world. Thomas Knock describes how even though the United States entry into the war meant the essential failure of Wilson's "Peace Without Victory," the international community had seemingly bought into Wilson's concept of "collective security."57 In the previous few years of American neutrality, Wilson had advocated for creating a collection of democratic nation-states to band together to prevent war, and by 1917 the international community seemed interested. Wilson would use American belligerency to shape his new world order for peace. Russia's withdrawal from the war in March of 1918 made the need for a United States presence all the more significant for the Allies. The American soldier would be a crusader of sorts, attempting to cure Europe of the diplomacy of old that had brought her to destruction. The European July crisis of 1914 that erupted in a full-scale war the following month proved to be the culmination of decades of the European balance of power diplomacy that led to rival alliances and an armament race between the feuding dynasties.58 European power politics had dominated the continent for centuries, which inevitably escalated into a world war, and the United States soldier would have the opportunity to save the nations from which most of their ancestors had descended. Michael Neiberg argues that by 1917, the American people felt an obligation to enter the war to save Europe. While the people of the United States supported neutrality initially, Neiberg explains that public opinion swayed over time toward a desire to save Europe from the terror of Imperial Germany.59 The United States Secretary of War from 1916-1921, Newton Baker, published a text almost two decades after the armistice in which he maintained that the United States went to war to stop Imperial Germany and make the world safe for democracy. Baker took issue with the 57 Knock, To End All Wars, 115. 58 James Joll and Gordon Martel, The Origins of the First World War, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 9-291. 59 Neiberg, The Path to War, 7-8, 31-3, 235. Bailes 15 historians of the 20s and 30s who claimed that economic interest influenced the United States entry into the war, and he argued they ignored the necessity of U.S. involvement to stop Germany. Baker explained that the American public remained overwhelmingly critical of the German autocracy and desired to intervene to save the European people.60 Private Alexander Clay of the AEF's 33rd Division demonstrated this sense of duty as he wrote regarding his 1918 deployment to France. As Clay's ship passed the Statue of Liberty while leaving the New York harbor, he thought to himself of the French leader Lafayette's role in securing United States victory during the American Revolution. He wrote that the AEF went to France to "repay the debt of our gratitude to your country for your country's alliance with our country in obtaining liberty from an oppressor England."61 For the United States to effectively reshape the world, there needed to be an independent American command that would ensure the United States contributed to the victory over Imperial Germany, which would give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks. In a January 22, 1917 address to the Senate in which he articulated his vision for peace in Europe, Wilson claimed that the warring European nations could not shape a lasting peace. While Wilson still did not advocate for United States intervention at this point, he did state that to achieve peace "[i]t will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it."62 In this speech, Wilson advocated for a "peace without victory" because he did not envision a peaceful 60 Newton D. Baker, Why We Went to War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936), 4-10, 20, 160-3. 61 Private Alexander Clay in American Voices of World War I: Primary Source Documents, 1917-1920, ed. Martic Marix Evans (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2001; New York: Routledge, 2013), 19, Kindle. 62 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe" in "President Wilson," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 393. Bailes 16 outcome if any of the imperial powers achieved victorious peace terms.63 Wilson reiterated his stance that the United States should play a decisive role in shaping post-war Europe and ensuring that "American principles" guided the rest of the world.64 When the United States declared war against Imperial Germany a few months after this speech, it essentially put Wilson's vision into motion. Diplomatic historian William Widenor argues that Wilson realized that the United States needed to participate in the war "rather than as an onlooker" to achieve his visions for peace.65 Widenor notes Wilson's desire for the United States to enter the war as an "associate" to the Entente as opposed to an "ally," and Widenor maintains that Wilson desired to change the world and "democratize and also, unfortunately, to Americanize it."66 The late international historian Elisabeth Glaser captures the Wilson administration's balancing between maintaining an economic relationship with the Entente powers while attempting to remain "an independent arbiter in the conflict."67 Wilson appointed General Pershing to lead the American effort, and Wilson gave him the simple instruction to keep the American Expeditionary Forces as a command separate from the Allies. In 1928, the Army War College published The Genesis of the American First Army, which documented the details surrounding how the War Department created an independent army of the United States. The text includes a caption from Secretary of War Baker's memorandum to Pershing. Baker informed Pershing of Wilson's order to "cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against the enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of 63 Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 394. 64 Wilson, 396-7. 65 William C. Widenor, "The United States and the Versailles Peace Settlement," 42. 66 Widenor, 42-3. 67 Elisabeth Glaser, "Better Late than Never: The American Economic War Effort, 1917-1918," Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds. Roger Chickering and Stig Förster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 390. Bailes 17 the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved."68 The President did give Pershing the authority to decide how the AEF would integrate into Allied operations. Upon Pershing's June 13, 1917 arrival in Paris, he began making decisions regarding AEF employment as it pertained to logistics, training, and an initial American area of operations on the Western Front. With a plan of achieving a force of 1,328,448 men in France by the end of 1918, Pershing needed to ensure his troops were able to build combat power and prepare for war while simultaneously ensuring that he maintained a distinct American command.69 The following 17 months of conflict with American boots on the ground in Europe saw significant political and diplomatic friction between Pershing and the Allied commanders. Pershing attempted to keep his AEF intact while satisfying Allied requests for American soldiers to replace French and British casualties, especially when Germany launched their Spring 1918 offensives. Pershing described in his memoirs that the French and British requested American soldiers to fill their gaps on the front lines when they had each sent diplomatic missions to America shortly after the United States entered the war. Pershing maintained his adamancy against the United States "becoming a recruiting agency for either the French or British," and he recounted that the War Department retained his position as well.70 While Allied leaders ostensibly supported having an independent American army participate in the war effort, the need to replace casualties in the trenches proved to be their immediate concern. Russia withdrawing from the conflict allowed Germany to reinforce their strength on the Western Front and mount a series of offensives. Germany knew they had a limited window of time for victory 68 Army War College (U.S.) Historical Section, The Genesis of the American First Army (Army War College, 1928), Reprints from the collection of the University of Michigan Library (Coppell, TX, 2020), 2. 69 The Genesis of the American First Army, 2-9. 70 John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931), 30-3. Bailes 18 with the United States continuing to build combat power, so they surged in the early months of 1918. Pershing faced a strategic dilemma of trying to support the Allies and get his troops in the fight while simultaneously attempting to build an independent American army. Ultimately, Pershing gave the Allies some of his army divisions as much needed replacements, and he made an effort to ensure that these divisions remained as intact as possible. Pershing endeavored to organize these divisions under a U.S. corps level command, but this corps command proved mostly administrative rather than tactical.71 By the time Pershing activated his independent American First Army, it only spent a few months in combat. The temporarily amalgamated doughboys Pershing gave to the Allies to meet their requests had contributed more to the defeat of Imperial Germany than Pershing's independent army. Mostly because Pershing had interspersed his divisions throughout the French and British fronts to meet the Allied requests for replacements, the American First Army did not activate until August of 1918. The September 20-25 Meuse-Argonne offensive would be the first significant operation for Pershing's independent army.72 David Trask concludes his critique of Pershing by recognizing the contribution that the American soldier played in providing manpower to the Allies. Trask commends the bravery of the American doughboy, but he argues that the amalgamated U.S. divisions contributed more to victory than the American First Army.73 In a similar vein, Mitchell Yockelson contends that the 27th and 30th Divisions who remained under British command throughout the war benefited over the rest of the AEF from extensive training led by the experienced British troops, and they contributed significantly to the Allied 71 The Genesis of the American First Army, 9-46. 72 John J. Pershing, Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing: Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), 37-8; The Genesis of the American First Army, 45-58. 73 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174-7. Bailes 19 victory.74 Pershing detailed his plans to capitalize on the initiative gained with his Meuse-Argonne offensive to deliver his decisive blow against Germany. The November 11 armistice came before he could achieve his grand vision.75 While the American doughboy played a critical role in providing an Allied victory over Imperial Germany, Pershing never realized his concept of an independent American command autonomously crushing the German army. The American soldier contributed most significantly to the Allied victory by taking part in offensives planned and conducted under the control of French and British Generals. Understanding American motivation during the war effort requires understanding the Progressive Movement taking place in the early-twentieth-century United States. Michael McGerr writes a detailed account of the cause and effect of the Progressive Movement. McGerr describes the wealth disparity brought about by Victorian society and the Gilded Age, and the class conflict emerging from this gave birth to a social and political movement that attempted to enact massive change in the American system.76 McGerr claims that the Progressive Movement attempted such major reform that no social or political action since has tried "anything as ambitious" due to the adverse reactions of such massive change.77 The Progressive Movement engulfed American society and brought about changes in family structures, race relations, and governmental powers. Herbert Croly illustrated the drive for monumental change rooted in the Progressive Movement with his text Progressive Democracy. In his narrative, Croly advocated for a complete overhaul of the American system to achieve freedom and alleviate wealth disparity. Croly saw governmental reform as the method for spreading democracy to all 74 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 213-23. 75 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 355-87. 76 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 3-146. 77 McGerr, 315-9. Bailes 20 citizens.78 In describing American public opinion during the time of United States entry into World War I, David Kennedy argues that for those Americans who championed progressive ideals, "the war's opportunities were not to be pursued in the kingdom of commerce but in the realm of the spirit."79 While the United States maintained a formidable economic link with the Allies throughout American neutrality, Wilson appealed to American ideals to garner public support for the war. United States entry into the war did not come as the natural development of the Progressive Movement. Still, the American public's reason for supporting the war certainly borrowed progressive sentiments. Wilson championed progressive initiatives that had ingrained themselves in the national mood of early-twentieth-century America. Wilson ran for President in 1912 on the principles he codified the following year in his text The New Freedom. Wilson argued that the Jefferson era of United States democracy had long ended. Wilson maintained that because of the new complexities found in American society, a "reconstruction in the United States" needed to occur to achieve real economic and social freedom.80 Ronald Pestritto articulates Wilson's vision for a governmental system as it relates to a society's history and progress. According to Wilson, the method of government that works for people depends on how far that population has progressed. In that manner, the government should always change to reflect the progression of its people best.81 Pestritto argues that a major theme found in Wilson's 1908 text Constitutional Government in the United States rests in the idea that: [T]here are four stages through which all governments pass: (1) government is the master and people are its subjects; (2) government remains the master, not through 78 Herbert Croly, Progressive Democracy (New York: Macmillan, 1914; New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers; Second printing 2006), 25, 103-18. 79 David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 39. 80 Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom: A Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People (New York and Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1913), www.philosophical.space/303/Wilson.pdf. 81 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 34-42. Bailes 21 force but by its fitness to lead; (3) a stage of agitation, when leaders of the people rise up to challenge the government for power; and (4) the final stage, where the people become fully self-conscious and have leaders of their own choosing.82 Wilson epitomized the Progressive Movement's ideals regarding the government adapting to the changes of the people to create a more representative system of government. He would appeal to these principles in advocating for United States intervention in Europe. An underlying sentiment existed within the Progressive Movement that sought to bring about massive change, and this energy extended into the war effort. Lloyd Ambrosius explains the rise of the United States as an imperial power during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. The outcome of the American Civil War created a more powerful central government, and economic growth during the following decades allowed more opportunity for global expansion.83 As the United States extended its global presence, the ideals that formed the nation began to influence foreign policy. David Kennedy writes about the shift in prominent progressives toward support of the war effort. Kennedy references John Dewey as a significant advocate for utilizing the war to satisfy progressive initiatives. According to Kennedy, progressives found appeal in Wilson's reasons for American belligerency in Europe as "a war for democracy, a war to end war, a war to protect liberalism, a war against militarism, a war to redeem barbarous Europe, a crusade."84 Michael McGerr states that the First World War "brought the extraordinary culmination of the Progressive Movement."85 Regardless of the typical progressive view of war, progressives could find merit in Wilson's justification for United States involvement. 82 Pestritto, 37. 83 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 26-32. 84 Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society, 50-3. 85 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 280. Bailes 22 Even though a vast segment of the United States population did not support going to war in Europe, the notion of saving Europe still permeated throughout American society. In a series of essays published in the July 1917 edition of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, multiple thinkers of the time expressed the necessity of the United States entering the war to save Europe. Miles Dawson argued the importance of the United States' mission in the war by documenting the five "fundamentals" that made the United States unique, and he explained the importance of spreading those principles globally. Dawson advocated for the spreading of American ideals throughout the rest of the world.86 George Kirchwey argued that the United States must go to war to defeat Imperial Germany and secure peace. Kirchwey suggested that the war was a fight against an autocratic empire and a crusade to make the world safe for democracy. Kirchwey maintained that the United States needed to lead the effort in creating a world order for peace.87 Samuel Dutton saw the purpose of the United States as transcending party lines. Dutton suggested that the aim of defeating autocratic Imperial Germany needed to be a united American mission.88 Emily Greene Balch wrote that the United States "enters the war on grounds of the highest idealism, as the champion of democracy and world order."89 Walter Lippman argued that once the United States entered the war, they were obligated to fight to make the world safe for democracy. Lippman placed the blame for the war squarely on Germany and their aggression in Belgium and unrestricted submarine warfare. Similar to Wilson in his war address, Lippman drew parallels to the Russian Revolution and the 86 Miles M. Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 72 (July 1917): 10-13, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013639. 87 George W. Kirchwey, "Pax Americana," Annals, 40-48, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013645. 88 Samuel Dutton, "The United States and the War," Annals, 13-19, http://www.jstor.com/stable/1013640. 89 Emily Greene Balch, "The War in Its Relation to Democracy and World Order," Annals, 28-31, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013643 Bailes 23 importance of it signaling that the Allies truly represented democracy.90 Wilson's reasons for war had found a voice in the academic circles of the United States, and they nested well with the progressive message. Wilson's goals for peace illustrate how Progressive initiatives manifested into the global sphere. In his August 18, 1914 address advocating for the American population to remain neutral during the European conflict, Wilson maintained that the United States held a responsibility "to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend."91 Similarly, when addressing the Senate over two years later communicating his persistent intent of mediating peace in Europe through American neutrality, Wilson criticized the demands for peace submitted by the Entente that sought revenge over Imperial Germany rather than a lasting peace. Wilson instructed that "peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again."92 In line with his progressive ideology, Wilson believed in United States intervention in the European conflict that would fundamentally improve their diplomatic system entirely. The United States would intervene in Europe to not only end the conflict but restructure the political climate in a more peaceful, progressive manner. Kendrick Clements argues that Wilson's economic and diplomatic decisions throughout United States neutrality drew him into the war gradually as he continued to side with the Allies. Wilson attempted to maintain his ideals for peace as the United States continued to get closer to belligerency.93 When the United States entry into the war proved virtually inevitable, Wilson 90 Walter Lippman, "The World Conflict in Its Relation to American Democracy," Annals, 1-10, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1013638. 91 Woodrow Wilson, "An Appeal for Neutrality in World War I," 390. 92 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 392. 93 Clements, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," 63-81. Bailes 24 ensured that the reasons for fighting aligned with the progressive energy that moved within American society. A religious vigor inspired military action that can be seen as a product of the Progressive Movement as well. Richard Gamble narrates the origin of the opinion that the United States represented a light for the rest of the world, and he describes how this concept brought the nation into the war. Gamble argues that these Christian ideals drove the political climate as Wilson's vision echoed the religious sentiment, and they prompted men to fight.94 Gamble describes the "social gospel" movement that had energized progressive Christians in the United States as extending into the international realm. The same energy that had influenced Christians to enact domestic change had transcended into a desire to improve the world, and Wilson ensured these sentiments carried over into United States foreign policy.95 Ronald Pestritto argues Wilson's religious conviction and explains that Wilson linked his faith with his duty to help shape the rest of the world. Pestritto explains the belief that "America was a key battleground in the victory of good over evil."96 Richard Gamble's mention of literature such as Washington Gladden's 1886 "Applied Christianity" highlights the popular message of progressive faith that nests with Pestritto's argument.97 Wilson illustrated the linkage of religion and progressive reform when he spoke in Denver, Colorado, in a 1911 build-up to his run for the Presidency. Wilson commented that "liberty is a spiritual conception, and when men take up arms to set other men free, there is something sacred and holy in the warfare."98 Wilson went on to champion the necessity of finding truth in the Bible's message, and he concluded by warning against believing "that 94 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 5-87. 95 Gamble, 69-87. 96 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 40-3. 97 Gamble, The War for Righteousness, 49-67. 98 Woodrow Wilson, "The Bible and Progress" in "On Religion," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.7, 54. Bailes 25 progress can be divorced from religion."99 To Wilson, Christianity taught the spiritual duty of working toward social progress, and most progressive men of faith believed in these same sentiments which carried over toward United States actions in France. At the core of this Progressive energy and Wilson's peace aims were the sentiments surrounding an idea of American Exceptionalism. Many of the same ideas found in the religious aspect of the need to work for social progression catered to a sense of American Exceptionalism. In the same May 7, 1911 address in Denver, Colorado, Wilson spoke of the greatness of the United States as a direct correlation to the religious zeal and Biblical principles with which the founders had established the nation. According to Wilson, "America has all along claimed the distinction of setting this example to the civilized world."100 Wilson believed that the United States should serve as the model of Christian values for the rest of the world as "America was born to exemplify that devotion to the elements of righteousness which are derived from the revelations of Holy Scripture."101 In his text In Search of the City on a Hill, Richard Gamble describes how the United States narrative utilized an interpretation of divine providence to create an image of a nation built on religious principles that should serve as an example for the rest of the world.102 Lloyd Ambrosius describes the prevalent belief in the early twentieth-century United States that considered the United States a "providential nation" as citizens attempted to justify global expansion.103 If the United States existed as a providential manifestation of God's will, then that could rationalize the spread of the American system into the international realm. 99 Wilson, "The Bible and Progress," 53-9. 100 Wilson, 56. 101 Wilson, 59. 102 Richard M. Gamble, In Search of the City on a Hill: The Making and Unmakng of an American Myth (London: Continuum International Publishng Group, 2012), 6-119. 103 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and Ameriam Internationalism, 33. Bailes 26 Men of faith found a divine message in the need for the United States to intercede in the global sphere to mold the world in her image. Wilson's brand of progressive history nested well with his idea of American Exceptionalism. Lloyd Ambrosius explains Wilson's fundamental belief that "primitive peoples moved toward greater maturity over the generations."104 Wilson applied this to the history of the United States. As Ronald Perstritto describes, Wilson believed that "the history of human progress is the history of the progress of freedom."105 As people progressed, they, in turn, developed a governmental system that allowed for more representation for its citizens. According to Ambrosius, Wilson believed that "the United States represented the culmination of progressive historical development."106 The American people had achieved real progression in Wilson's historical model, and democracy achieved through the American Revolution solidified his theory. Wilson certainly made this point evident in his writings regarding history. Wilson suggests that "the history of the United States demonstrates the spiritual aspects of political development."107 The United States embodied the ideal form of Wilson's progressive history. Wilson saw it as the responsibility of the United States to spread its exceptional personification of progressive history with the rest of the world. Wilson acknowledged his views on the uniqueness of the United States in his New Freedom. While arguing for progressive reform in the states, Wilson stated that "[t]he reason that America was set up was that she might be different from all the nations of the world."108 Indeed, Wilson believed in the providential nature of the United States, and he desired to shape the rest of the world. 104 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 105 Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, 37. 106 Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism, 236. 107 Woodrow Wilson, "The Historian," Essential Writings and Speeches of the Scholar-President, 216, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfgbg.10. 108 Wilson, The New Freedom, 16. Bailes 27 Early in the war during the period of United States neutrality, Wilson's reasons for remaining neutral stemmed from his belief in the exceptional nature of the American system and his desire for the United States to stay clear of European affairs. Even in American neutrality, Wilson still sought to mediate a peace in Europe because he perceived a chance to spread the democracy of the United States to Europe. Wilson believed that he needed to mediate in the European conflict because "mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves," and he questioned whether the Entente and Central powers fought "for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power."109 Wilson's peace aims were in sharp contrast to the Allied leaders, which illustrated his emphasis that the United States should mold a post-war Europe, and this tied directly to American Exceptionalism. While the British leadership concerned themselves with imperial interests, the French sought revenge on Germany from the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Wilson made it clear in his war address that the United States had "no quarrel with the German people."110 Wilson's vision for a post-war world remained focused on a lasting peace rather than what he perceived as selfish imperial gains or senseless revenge. American Exceptionalism formed the foundation for the interventionist foreign policy of the Progressive Era, and it profoundly motivated Wilson as well as the bulk of American society. Diplomatic historian William Appleman Williams details the rise of the United States as a global power. Williams argues that most Americans in the early twentieth-century United States agreed not only with "Wilson's nationalistic outlook," but they also agreed that the nation should serve as an example for the rest of the world.111 As mentioned previously, Miles Dawson contributed 109 Woodrow Wilson, "Essential Terms for Peace in Europe," 393. 110 Woodrow Wilson, "Declaration of War," 401. 111 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 86. Bailes 28 to the July 1917 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science to voice the justification of United States intervention in France. In his text, Dawson defined the five uniquely American fundamentals as: 1. The inalienable right of every man to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness – not as a mere dead saying, but as a living reality. 2. The right of local self-government, within territories possessing or entitled to claim such right, embracing every power of government not expressly granted to the union. 3. The guaranty to each state of a forum for the redress of grievances of one state against another with full power to enforce the verdict of that forum. 4. The guaranty of a republican form of government to each constituent state. 5. The right and duty to maintain the union.112 To thinkers like Dawson, this unique set of traits not only provided United States citizens with a system of government that separated them from the rest of the world, but it inherently gave them a duty to spread the American ideology to the rest of the world. Fundamentally, the idea that the world should take the lead from the United States exemplified the broad theme of American Exceptionalism inspiring AEF actions in the war. With Progressivism and American Exceptionalism at the root of the war effort, the citizen-soldier of the AEF found inspiration in the same rhetoric. Nelson Lloyd described the "melting-pots" of the army cantonment areas in which soldiers who were born outside of the United States "have become true Americans. They have learned the language of America and the ideals of America and have turned willing soldiers in her cause."113 Michael Neiberg argues that a lasting legacy of United States involvement in the war became a unified American mission superseding any cultural allegiance, and "disagreements would no longer be based on ethnicity 112 Dawson, "The Significance of Our Mission in This War," 11. 113 Newson Lloyd, How We Went to War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), 58, https://archive.org/details/howwewenttowar00lloyrich/page/n7/mode/2up. Bailes 29 or religion."114 United States entry into the war gave the American citizen-soldier a reason for fighting to preserve a democratic system in Europe, and Wilson's belief that the United States would play a central role became widespread amongst the ranks of the AEF. Lieutenant Willard Hill of the Transport Division and 94th Aero Pursuit Squadron claimed when hearing of the United States entry into the war "that this war is not over yet and that the U.S. troops will play a very decisive factor."115 The purpose of United States entry into the war inspired an idealism that would unify soldiers and champion a belief that the AEF would save Europe from the autocracy of Imperial Germany. Private Willard Newton of the 105th Engineers, 30th Division, exclaimed his joy during the September offensives by stating, "[a]t last we are at the beginning of a real battle between Prussianism and Democracy! And we are to fight on the side of Democracy that the world may forever be free from the Prussian peril!"116 The sentiments of these soldiers expressed a voice that echoed Wilson's desire to utilize an American army to bring peace to Europe, and Pershing dutifully followed his instructions. Pershing's stubbornness in not giving in to the Allies' request to amalgamate troops remained the most significant source of friction between him and the Allied military leaders. Still, Pershing's belief that the doughboy remained a superior warrior to the French and British soldier intensified Pershing's negative feelings toward his Allied counterparts. Pershing did not hide his views regarding coalitions when he wrote early in his memoirs that "[h]istory is replete with the failures of coalitions and seemed to be repeating itself in the World War."117 Russell Weigley argues that Pershing believed "that only by fighting under American command would 114 Michael S. Neiberg, "Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America's Road to the Great War, 1914-1917," Diplomatic History 38, no. 4 (2014): 812, https://doi:10.1093/dh/dhu023. 115 Lieutenant Willard D. Hill (Cleburne, Texas) in American Voices of World War I, 47. 116 Private Willard Newton (Gibson, North Carolina) in American Voices of World War I, 140. 117 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1, 34. Bailes 30 American soldiers retain the morale they needed to fight well."118 This assertion proved incorrect as those American doughboys who fought under French and British command performed extraordinarily.119 David Trask maintains that Pershing's "presumption that the American troops were superior to others in the war helps explain his stubborn insistence on an independent army even during the greatest crisis of the war."120 Although the German Spring Offensives of 1918 put the Allies in desperate need of replacements, Pershing held his ground in resisting amalgamation. He only agreed to temporary amalgamation after much deliberation. Pershing's plan required maintaining a separate and distinct American force if the United States was to play a critical role in defeating Imperial Germany. This plan did not always synchronize with General Foch's overall plan for the Allied strategy for defeating Imperial Germany. Mitchell Yockelson describes an instance in late September 1918 in which a newly established AEF officers' school near Pershing's headquarters pulled a bulk of American officers from the front lines, which "affected the AEF First Army divisions that were about to attack in the Meuse-Argonne operation."121 United States political leadership back home undoubtedly noticed the friction between Pershing and the Allied leaders. David Woodward mentioned that at one point, Wilson and Secretary Baker intervened to plead with Pershing to be more accommodating to the Allies. According to Woodward, "Pershing proved as immovable as ever when it came to wholesale amalgamation and introducing Americans to trench warfare before he deemed them ready for combat."122 118 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 335. 119 Weigley, 335. 120 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 61. 121 Yockelson, Borrowed Soldiers, 127. 122 Woodward, Trial by Friendship, 168-9. Bailes 31 Pershing's doctrine of "open warfare" proved predicated on a firm belief in the exceptional quality of the American fighting man. In his memoirs, Pershing documented his view that the results of the Battle of the Marne had placed the opposing forces in a trench defensive that had taken away their aggression and ability to fight an offensive battle. Pershing maintained that "victory could not be won by the costly process of attrition, but it must be won by driving the enemy out into the open and engaging him in a war of movement."123 Sergeant-major James Block of the 59th Infantry, 4th Division, wrote after an offensive near Belleau Wood that his troops "had proven to ourselves that we were the Hun's master, even in our present untrained condition. The Hun could not stand before us and battle man to man."124 David Trask argues that Pershing's reliance on the rifle and bayonet under his open warfare doctrine limited the AEF's ability to adapt to the combined arms fight as quickly as did the French and British.125 In his Final Report, Pershing praised the Allied training system that prepared his inexperienced troops for combat on the Western Front. Although he admitted that his soldiers needed to learn from the experiences of the combat tested French and British, he stated that "[t]he long period of trench warfare had so impressed itself upon the French and British that they had almost entirely dispensed with training for open warfare."126 Pershing relied heavily on his infantrymen, and he saw the rifle and the bayonet as the superior weapon. He did not factor advances in the machine gun, tanks, and artillery to integrate all lethal assets onto the battlefield. According to Richard Faulkner, Pershing planned on using his troops – who he believed were 123 Pershing, 151-4. 124 Sergeant-major James W. Block (Marquette, Michigan) in American Voices of World War I, 108. 125 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 19. 126 Pershing, Final Report, 13-5. Bailes 32 better suited for offensive warfare – to "force the Germans from their trenches into open terrain where the Allies' greater resources would then destroy the unprotected enemy army."127 Perhaps nothing exhibited Pershing's obtuse attitude toward his Allied counterparts more than his desire to beat the French in seizing Sedan from the Germans. Pershing outlined his wishes that his "troops should capture Sedan, which the French had lost in a decisive battle in 1870."128 Russell Weigley comments on Pershing's intent "to try to snatch from the French army the honor of recapturing the historic fortress city of Sedan, where the Emperor Napoleon III had surrendered to the Prussians on September 1-2, 1870."129 Sergeant-major Block described the fierce German resistance during the late September Allied offensives. Still, he claimed that "[o]nce the Americans penetrated that line, their advance northward would be comparatively easy. Sedan would fall next."130 The AEF performed well during the offensives in early November, and the crumbling Imperial German army made Sedan easily attainable for either Pershing's Second Army or the Franco-American armies.131 David Trask points out the diplomatic issue that would ensue if Pershing were to "deprive the French army of this honor."132 The new commander of the American First Army, General Liggett, ultimately did not carry out the attack, which undoubtably prevented a political and diplomatic disaster.133 Russell Weigley maintains that Liggett changed plans after "the offended French" updated him of Pershing's plans on November 7.134 The idea that Pershing wished to take away French retribution by giving 127 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 285. 128 Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 2, 381. 129 Weigley, "Pershing and the U.S. Military Tradition," 342. 130 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 135. 131 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 282-3. 132 Trask, The AEF & Coalition Warmaking, 174. 133 Trask, 174, 134 Weigley, 343. Bailes 33 his troops a decisive victory and morale boost demonstrated his disconnect from the sentiments of his Allied counterparts. Pershing's belief in the superiority of the American soldier to his French and British counterpart extended to the lower ranks of the AEF. While perhaps sensationalizing his account, Scout Corporal Edward Radcliffe of the 109th Infantry, 28th Division wrote regarding actions around St Agnon "that the French of the 10th or 6th army had fallen back, their officers being shot by our men when they ordered them to retreat."135 In a post-World War I survey, Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler of the 16th Infantry, 1st Division answered a question about what he learned about America and Americans from the war. Sergeant Kyler stated that "Americans are inclined to brag about their systems and accomplishments which may or not be superior to those of other peoples or cultures."136 In many of the accounts of AEF actions in Europe, General Pershing and his doughboys showcased American Exceptionalism. Richard Faulkner devotes a chapter of his text to argue that most of the AEF doughboys perceived inferiority in the French way of life compared to the United States. The majority of white AEF soldiers came away from the war, believing that, in terms of technology as well as general health and welfare, American society remained superior to that of France and England.137 Faulkner makes note that "with the notable exception of the African Americans, the soldiers generally believed that their society was markedly superior to anything they encountered in Europe."138 Sergeant-major Block wrote a letter home to his parents during the post-war occupation period. He wrote of the perception that "Paris makes up for the backwardness of the rest of France."139 135 Corporal Edward Radcliffe in American Voices of World War I, 94. 136 Sergeant Donald Drake Kyler (Fort Thomas, Kentucky) in American Voices of World War I, 196. 137 Faulkner, Pershing's Crusaders, 188-93. 138 Faulkner, 189. 139 Sergeant-major Block in American Voices of World War I, 191. Bailes 34 While the bond formed between the French and British soldiers and the AEF doughboy proved strong, there still seemed to be a sentiment of American superiority amongst the AEF ranks. Tasker H. Bliss, who served as Army Chief of Staff from September 1917 to May 1918, documented the challenge of absent unified Allied command in a 1922 essay. Bliss wrote a detailed piece in which he criticized the lack of a unified Allied mission while praising General Foch and championing his eventual selection as "Allied Commander-in-Chief."140 Bliss condemned the Allied leaders for waiting so long before establishing any sort of unified command, and he argued that for the first years of the war, they fought for their national goals only. Bliss maintained that this hindered United States integration into the war effort as well.141 Charles Pettit wrote an account of his time on the Western Front. Initially serving in the British army, Pettit joined the AEF once they arrived and concluded his 42 months of combat with the Rainbow Division. Pettit commented that "[w]e know why the French and English didn't win the War. They was waiting for us."142 Robert Bruce expands on the relationship between the American and French soldiers during the post-war occupation period. The doughboys believed that the Allied victory had eliminated the threat of autocratic Imperial Germany. At the same time, the French soldiers still demonstrated distrust of the German for fear of a future war. According to Bruce, "Americans did not want to hear about the need to prepare for a future war with Germany. They believed that victory in the Great War and the conversion of Germany to a democracy was enough to end the menace; Americans were unwilling to do more."143 For the AEF doughboy, the United States' actions in the war had saved Europe from the threat of the 140 Tasker H. Bliss, "The Evolution of the Unified Command," Foreign Affairs 1, no. 2 (December 1922): 1-30, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20028211. 141 Bliss, 7-30. 142 Charles A. Pettit in Echoes From Over There: By the Men of the Army and Marine Corps who Fought in France, eds. Craig Hamilton and Louise Corbin (New York City: The Soldiers' Publishing Company, 1919), 107-9. 143 Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms, 289. Bailes 35 Imperial German autocracy. United States' involvement in its first large-scale coalition operation had solidified the dominance of the American soldier and the system for which he fought. The American doughboy contributed significantly to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany. Without American boots on the ground in France, Imperial Germany may have defeated the Allies. Allan Millett argues that Pershing's independent army did not achieve all that Pershing had hoped. Still, Millett maintains that an accurate assessment of the war would be that the "Allies might have lost the war without the American Expeditionary Forces."144 With the Russian withdrawal from the war and Germany's surge in the Western Front in the Spring of 1918, the Allies desperately needed more boots on the ground. AEF actions in Cantigny, Belleau Wood, and the attack on the Hindenburg line proved the value of the doughboys to the Allied victory over Imperial Germany and the Central Powers. Acknowledging the contribution of the American soldier to the Allied victory should remain a critical focus of any study of United States involvement in the war. While the presence of American troops on the ground benefited the Allies and did give Wilson his seat at the post-war peace talks, Pershing did not realize his grand vision of an independent American army crushing Imperial Germany. Bullitt Lowry documents Pershing's desire to capitalize on increasing the United States combat power to continue pressing a weakening German army and deliver a crushing blow.145 The Germans signed the armistice before Pershing could make this happen. While Wilson gained his seat at the peace conference and Pershing did not get his chance to win a tactical victory, the French and British still received their original desires and delivered Germany "harsh armistice terms."146 144 Millett, "Over Where?," 251. 145 Lowry, "Pershing and the Armistice," 286-91. 146 Lowry, 291. Bailes 36 With the eventual collapse of the League of Nations, Wilson never achieved his vision of a new world order for peace. Still, the United States government had established its importance and commenced its entry into the realm of global powers. United States involvement in the First World War helped solidify a national identity as well as establish an American presence on the international stage. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. wrote a letter on May 15, 1919, in which he documented the benefit of the war and what he saw as "Americanizing and democratizing" the soldiers through military service.147 Roosevelt commented that through service in support of the war effort, "love of the men for their country has been deepened, that their sense of real democracy has been sharpened and steadied and that insofar as any possible bad effect goes, the men are more than ever ready and determined to see order and fair play for all."148 In a similar vein, Italian born AEF Sergeant Morini wrote that the war provided him a chance "to make good on my Americanism."149 To Morini, fighting in the war provided him with "the right to the name Yankee all right."150 While the United States' efforts in the war were in support of the Allies, the war became a chance for the nation to claim its identity. A country that had been torn apart by civil war half a century before utilized the war effort to continue to unify and recover its self-proclaimed providence. The war ostensibly became an effort to Americanize its own citizens. The historiography of United States involvement in the First World War presents various arguments. Some historians such as David Trask and Russell Weigley remain critical of General Pershing and his decision making. While some scholarly history shows a narrative less scathing of Pershing, most of the description found in popular history showcases valiant actions of 147 Theodore Roosevelt in Echoes From Over There, 95. 148 Roosevelt, 95. 149 Sergeant Morini in Echoes From Over There, 115. 150 Morini, 115. Bailes 37 Pershing and his efforts in maneuvering the American Expeditionary Forces to achieve victory for the Allies against Imperial Germany. The fact remains that while the doughboys contributed significantly to the Allied victory, they helped the most when they were not fighting Pershing's fight. In his Final Report, Pershing highlights the benefit that the Allies provided to the American forces. In terms of training as well as logistics, the Allies provided the doughboys with the resources they needed to defeat Imperial Germany and the Central Powers effectively.151 Pershing recognized what the Allies had supplied him and his men, but his stubbornness and arrogance still clouded his vision to a degree. While Pershing did build a trusting relationship with the Allied commanders, and his troops were efficient, he did not always operate per their same vision. At times, Pershing's desire to maintain an independent American army superseded his desire to enable the Allied strategy. Pershing strived to meet Wilson's intent of keeping a distinct American command. The question remains if, in carrying out his President's instructions, Pershing prolonged the war and delayed the defeat of the Central Powers. Secondary and primary source literature from the First World War showcases both Wilson's peace aims – which were shaped by his ideology – as well as General Pershing and AEF actions while attempting to remain an independent command in the war. When war broke out in August 1914 in Europe, Wilson tried to mediate a peace while maintaining United States neutrality. When continued trade with the Allies brought the United States into the war in April of 1917, he seized the chance to shape a new world order by establishing an independent American command to defeat Imperial Germany. Primarily because of the Progressive Movement in the United States and the concepts surrounding American Exceptionalism, the American soldier embraced Wilson's ideologies for fighting and fought valiantly to defeat the 151 Pershing, Final Report, 90. Bailes 38 Imperial German autocracy. The Progressive Movement had established itself in American society by the time the citizen-soldier went to war in France, and the principles of American Exceptionalism permeated in virtually every facet of American culture. The American doughboy carried both of these concepts with him to France. Despite Pershing not attaining his decisive blow against the German army, and Wilson not achieving his vision for a new world order, the United States still met a significant amount of Wilson's original intent for entering the war. Wilson's ideologies influenced how the AEF fought in France. As the First World War shaped the United States standing as a global power, it also demonstrated the critical nature of maintaining relationships with coalition partners. Hew Strachan begins the conclusion to his history of the war by stating that "[t]he First World War was a coalition war."152 The American doughboy established a positive relationship with his French and British counterparts. The ability of the American soldier to learn from the experiences of the combat tested Allies, to adapt to the rigors of trench warfare, and to perform well in battle fighting beside his international partners shows the success of the AEF's performance in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation. Despite these successes, the AEF doughboy exhibited American Exceptionalism in the First World War. As the United States built its presence in the international realm over the following century, and the need for maintaining partnerships with allied nations continued to increase, the precedent set by the AEF in the nation's first large-scale coalition operation would be essential. 152 Hew Strachan, The First World War (New York: Viking Penguin, a member of Penguin Group, 2004; New York: Penguin Group, 2013), 303. Bailes 39 Bibliography Secondary Sources Adas, Michael. "Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I." Diplomatic History 38 no. 4 (September 2014): 700-712, http://doi.org/10.1093/dh.dhu032. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Woodrow Wilson and American Internationalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Ambrosius, Lloyd E. "World War I and the Paradox of Wilsonianism." 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0 ORGANIZZAZIONE DEL PROGETTO: "Analisi degli ambiti prioritari di domanda e offerta di tecnologie per la "Fabbrica Intelligente"" 0.1 Cenni Teorici sull'attività di Project Management La parola "Progetto" è utilizzata per indicare compiti e attività in apparenza molto diverse tra loro, basti pensare ad un progetto di ricerca e ad un progetto di costruzione di un edificio: due attività assai diverse e formalmente senza punti in comune. Al fine di approfondire i concetti legati al progetto in esame, sarebbe utile definire in maniera più precisa cosa si intende con la parola "progetto". Sin dai primi studi di Taylor e Gantt ad inizio del 1900 si è cercato di dare una definizione chiara del termine, arrivando a definirlo come: "Un insieme di persone e di altre risorse temporaneamente riunite per raggiungere uno specifico obiettivo, di solito con un budget determinato ed entro un periodo stabilito" (Graham, 1990) "Uno sforzo complesso, comportante compiti interrelati eseguiti da varie organizzazioni, con obiettivi, schedulazioni e budget ben definiti" (Russel D. Archibald, 1994) "Un insieme di sforzi coordinati nel tempo" (Kerzner, 1995) "Uno sforzo temporaneo intrapreso per creare un prodotto o un servizio univoco" (PMI – Project Management Institute, 1996) "Un insieme di attività complesse e interrelate, aventi come fine un obiettivo ben definito, raggiungibile attraverso sforzi sinergici e coordinati, entro un tempo predeterminato e con un preciso ammontare di risorse umane e finanziarie a disposizione." (Tonchia, 2007) È da notare che, a prescindere dall'organizzazione e dal settore di riferimento, un progetto è caratterizzato da alcuni elementi distintivi: • un obiettivo da raggiungere con determinate specifiche; • un insieme di attività tra loro coordinate in modo complesso; • tempi di inizio e fine stabiliti; • risorse normalmente limitate (umane, strumentali e finanziare); • carattere pluridisciplinare o multifunzionale rispetto alla struttura organizzativa. La specificità dell'obiettivo determina l'eccezionalità del progetto rispetto alle attività ordinarie e quindi l'assenza di esperienze precedenti. Le organizzazioni, siano esse imprese, enti pubblici o Università, svolgono appunto due tipologie di attività con caratteristiche distinte: 1. funzioni operative; 2. progetti. Talvolta le due categorie presentano aree comuni e condividono alcune caratteristiche: • sono eseguiti da persone; • sono vincolati da risorse limitate; • sono soggetti a pianificazione, esecuzione e controllo. Nonostante queste caratteristiche comuni, progetti e funzioni operative hanno obiettivi diversi tra loro: il progetto infatti è di natura temporanea e ha lo scopo di raggiungere il proprio obiettivo e quindi concludersi, la funzione operativa invece è di natura ripetitiva e fornisce un'azione di supporto continuativo all'azienda. Un progetto indipendentemente dal settore e dall'organizzazione nel quale si sviluppa, ha 3 vincoli fondamentali tra loro in competizione: • qualità o prestazioni; • tempo; • costo. Per di più se il progetto è commissionato da un cliente esterno sarà presente un quarto vincolo, ovvero le buone relazioni tra l'organizzazione e il cliente, è chiaro infatti che è tecnicamente possibile gestire un progetto rispettando i primi tre vincoli senza coinvolgere il cliente, ma così vengono pregiudicati i futuri business. Le principali caratteristiche di un progetto sono: 1. Temporaneità: Ogni progetto infatti ha come detto una data di inizio e di fine definite, e quest'ultima viene raggiunta quando: a. gli obiettivi del progetto sono stati raggiunti; b. è impossibile raggiungere gli obiettivi; c. il progetto non è più necessario e viene chiuso. Temporaneità non significa che un progetto ha breve durata, i progetti infatti possono durare anche diversi anni, l'importante è comprendere che la durata di un progetto è definita con l'obiettivo di creare risultati duraturi. La natura temporanea dei progetti può essere applicata anche ad altri aspetti: - l'opportunità o finestra di mercato è generalmente temporanea; - come unità lavorativa, raramente il gruppo di progetto sopravvive dopo il progetto, il gruppo infatti realizzerà il progetto e alla conclusione di questo verrà sciolto, riassegnando il personale ad altri progetti. 2. Prodotti, servizi o risultati unici: Un progetto crea prodotti, servizi o risultati unici. I progetti solitamente creano: - un prodotto finale o un componente di un prodotto; - un servizio; - un risultato, come degli esiti, dei documenti e report. L'unicità è un'importante caratteristica degli output di un progetto. 3. Elaborazione progressiva: con questa espressione si intende lo sviluppo in fasi, organizzate attraverso una successione incrementale per tutto il ciclo di vita del progetto, infatti man mano che un Project Team (Gruppo di Progetto) approfondisce la conoscenza del progetto è anche in grado di gestirlo ad un maggiore livello di dettaglio e sarà in grado di arricchirlo di maggiori dettagli via via che il Team sviluppa delle conoscenze sul settore. L'attività di Gestione del Progetto o Project Management è l'applicazione di conoscenze, abilità, strumenti e tecniche alle attività di progetto al fine di soddisfarne i requisiti, dove il Project Manager (PM) è la persona incaricata del raggiungimento degli obiettivi di progetto. La gestione di progetto include: • identificare i requisiti; • fissare obiettivi chiari e raggiungibili; • adattare specifiche di prodotto, piani e approccio alle diverse aree di interesse e alle diverse aspettative dei vari stakeholder. • individuare il giusto equilibrio tra le esigenze di qualità, ambito, tempo e costi, che sono in competenza tra di loro. Nella gestione dei progetti infatti, è costante lo sforzo atto a bilanciare i tre vincoli (qualità e prestazioni, tempi e costi), poiché i progetti di successo sono quelli che consegnano il prodotto, il servizio o il risultato richiesti nell'ambito stabilito, entro il tempo fissato e rimanendo entro i limiti del budget definito, infatti la variazione anche di uno solo dei tre vincoli implica che almeno un altro ne risulta influenzato. Il PM si occupa inoltre di gestire i progetti tenendo conto dei rischi intrinseci di un progetto, ossia eventi o condizioni incerte che, se si verificano, hanno un effetto o positivo o negativo su almeno uno degli obiettivi di progetto. Una Gestione dei Progetti efficace ma allo stesso tempo efficiente, può essere definita quindi come il raggiungimento degli obiettivi del progetto al livello di prestazioni o qualità desiderate, mantenendosi nei tempi e nei costi previsti e utilizzando senza sprechi le risorse disponibili. Tutto ciò è fondamentale che sia conforme al desiderio del cliente, infatti nei casi in cui un progetto è commissionato da un cliente esterno, le relazioni con quest'ultimo diventano un ulteriore vincolo di progetto e quindi Il successo di un progetto si raggiunge con quanto detto sopra e con l'accettazione da parte del cliente. Raramente i progetti vengono completati rispettando l'obiettivo originale, spesso infatti con l'avanzamento del progetto alcune modifiche sono inevitabili, e se non gestite in maniera opportuna possono anche affossare il progetto e il morale di chi ci lavora. Perciò è necessario un accordo reciproco tra PM e cliente relativo ai cambiamenti degli obiettivi, che comunque devono essere minimi e sempre approvati. È da ricordare infine che i PM devono gestire i progetti in base alle linee guida dell'azienda a cui fanno riferimento, rispettando procedure, regole e direttive dell'organizzazione, altrimenti si rischia che il PM venga considerato come un imprenditore autonomo, finalizzato esclusivamente al raggiungimento dei suoi obiettivi, rischiando così di modificare il flusso di lavoro principale dell'organizzazione. 0.2 Scopo del Progetto Sotto il suggerimento della Commissione Europea, tutte le Regioni degli Stati membri dell'UE, sono state invitate a stilare un documento nel quale si definisca la propria Smart Specialisation Strategy SSS , al fine di favorire lo sviluppo delle politiche di coesione delle regioni e degli stati membri, da finanziare con i Fondi Strutturali per il periodo 2014-2020. Il concetto indica Strategie d'innovazione concepite a livello regionale ma valutate e messe a sistema a livello nazionale con l'obiettivo di: • evitare la frammentazione degli interventi e mettere a sistema le politiche di ricerca e innovazione; • sviluppare strategie d'innovazione regionali che valorizzino gli ambiti produttivi di eccellenza tenendo conto del posizionamento strategico territoriale e delle prospettive di sviluppo in un quadro economico globale. In linea con le direttive comunitarie e in coerenza con quanto indicato nella SSS della Regione Toscana, IRPET Regione Toscana ha incaricato quindi il Consorzio QUINN a redigere un report denominato "Analisi degli ambiti prioritari di domanda e offerta di tecnologie per la "Fabbrica Intelligente"", affinché venga delineato il panorama delle imprese regionali che fanno uso di queste tecnologie, al fine di erogare in una seconda fase dei finanziamenti per la ricerca e lo sviluppo, in particolare quelli gestiti nell'ambito dei fondi strutturali che svolgono un ruolo rilevante come promotori dell'innovazione tecnologica. La "Fabbrica Intelligente" infatti rappresenta una delle 9 aree tecnologiche individuate dal Bando «Cluster Tecnologici Nazionali» presentato dal MIUR il 30 maggio 2012, e definita come strategica per la competitività del Paese. Nella SSS regionale, l'ambito prioritario legato alle tecnologie per la Fabbrica Intelligente si rivolge alle tecnologie dell'automazione, della meccatronica e della robotica. Ai fini degli obiettivi della SSS queste tre discipline concorrono in maniera integrata a sviluppare soluzioni tecnologiche funzionali all'automazione dei processi produttivi, in termini di velocizzazione, sicurezza e controllo, della sostenibilità ed economicità degli stessi, nonché dell'estensione della capacità di azione. Per un più semplice inquadramento definitorio, le tecnologie di questi tre settori vengono di seguito approfonditi e descritti in maniera distinta. 1. AUTOMAZIONE : Per "automazione" si intende lo sviluppo di sistemi, strumentazioni, processi ed applicativi che consentono la riduzione dell'intervento dell'uomo sui processi produttivi. L'automazione in tal senso si realizza mediante soluzioni di problemi tecnici legati all'esecuzione di azioni in maniera ripetuta, nella semplificazioni di operazione complesse, nell'effettuazione di operazioni complesse in contesti incerti e dinamici con elevato livello di precisione. Il concetto di automazione assume un carattere estensivo di integrazione di tecnologie e di ambiti applicativi (dal laboratorio, alla fabbrica intelligente), mantenendo il focus sul controllo automatico dei processi. 2. MECCATRONICA : La "meccatronica" è una branca dell'ingegneria che coniuga sinergicamente più discipline quali la Meccanica, l'elettronica, ed i sistemi di controllo intelligenti, allo scopo di realizzare un sistema integrato detto anche sistema tecnico. Inizialmente la meccatronica è nata dalla necessità di fondere insieme la meccanica e l'elettronica, da cui il nome. Successivamente l'esigenza di realizzare sistemi tecnici sempre più complessi ha portato alla necessità di integrare anche le altre discipline per applicazioni industriali robotiche e di azionamento elettrico. 3. ROBOTICA : Come ramo della cibernetica rivolto alle tecniche di costruzione (ed i possibili ambiti di applicazioni) dei robot, la robotica è la disciplina dell'ingegneria che studia e sviluppa metodi che permettano a un robot di eseguire dei compiti specifici riproducendo il lavoro umano. La robotica moderna si è sviluppata perseguendo principalmente: a) l'autonomia delle macchine; b) la capacità di interazione/immedesimazione con l'uomo e i suoi comportamenti. 0.3 Stakeholder del Progetto La definizione stakeholder o portatori di interesse fu elaborata nel 1963 al Research Institute dell'Università di Stanford da Edward Freeman, definendoli come i soggetti senza il cui supporto l'impresa non è in grado di sopravvivere. Gli stakeholder di un progetto sono persone o strutture organizzative coinvolte attivamente nel progetto o i cui interessi possono subire effetti dell'esecuzione o dal completamento del progetto, possono quindi avere influenza sugli obiettivi e sui risultati del progetto. Ignorare gli stakeholder può portare a conseguenze negative sui risultati del progetto, il loro ruolo infatti può avere sia un impatto negativo che positivo sul progetto: gli stakeholder positivi sono quelli che traggono vantaggi dalla buona riuscita del progetto, è quindi vantaggioso supportarne gli interessi, mentre i negativi sono quelli che vedono risultati sfavorevoli dalla buona riuscita del progetto, gli interessi di questi ultimi avrebbero la meglio con un aumento dei vincoli sull'avanzamento del progetto. Solitamente gli stakeholder principali in un progetto sono rappresentati da: • Project Manager: persona responsabile della gestione del progetto; • Cliente/utente: persona o struttura organizzativa che utilizzerà il prodotto del progetto; • Membri del Team di progetto: membri del gruppo incaricati all'esecuzione del progetto; • Sponsor: persona o gruppo che fornisce le risorse necessarie al progetto; • Soggetti influenti: persone o gruppi che sono non direttamente collegati con l'acquisto o l'uso del prodotto ma che, a causa della posizione ricoperta nella struttura organizzativa del cliente, possono influire positivamente o negativamente sul corso del progetto. Il compito di gestire le aspettative degli stakeholder va al Project Manager, spesso ciò non è semplice a causa dei differenti e contrastanti obiettivi degli stakeholder. Nel presente progetto gli stakeholder coinvolti nelle varie attività possono quindi essere ricondotti a quattro soggetti o gruppi: • Ente Committente: IRPET; • Ente Incaricato: Consorzio QUINN; • Team di Progetto; • Regione Toscana. 0.3.1 IRPET: ISTITUTO REGIONALE PER LA PROGRAMMAZIONE ECONOMICA DELLA TOSCANA L'IRPET, nato nel 1968 come organo tecnico-scientifico del CRPET (Comitato regionale per la programmazione economica della Toscana) con la finalità di compiere gli studi preliminari all'istituzione dell'ente Regione, è diventato Ente pubblico con legge della Regione Toscana nel 1974. L'Istituto è ente di consulenza sia per la Giunta che per il Consiglio regionale per lo svolgimento di compiti di studio e ricerca in materia di programmazione. Sono compiti dell'Istituto, in particolare: a) lo studio della struttura socio economica regionale e delle sue trasformazioni, degli andamenti congiunturali e dei relativi strumenti analitici; b) lo studio della struttura territoriale regionale e delle sue trasformazioni e dei relativi strumenti analitici; c) lo studio delle metodologie di programmazione, di valutazione e di verifica delle politiche; d) gli studi preparatori per gli atti della programmazione regionale e per il piano di indirizzo territoriale regionale in ordine ai problemi economici, territoriali e sociali; d bis) elaborazione dei documenti o rapporti di valutazione dei programmi nazionali e dell'Unione europea gestiti dalla Regione Toscana, di cui agli articoli 10, comma 5, e 12 della legge regionale 2 agosto 2013, n. 44 (Disposizioni in materia di programmazione regionale). e) la circolazione delle conoscenze e dei risultati di cui alle lettere a) b) e c). L'Istituto, nell'ambito delle medesime materie, può altresì svolgere altre attività di studio, ricerca e consulenza su committenza di soggetti pubblici e privati diversi dalla Regione, e inoltre: • stabilisce relazioni con enti di ricerca, anche esteri, istituti specializzati, dipartimenti universitari; • assume iniziative di formazione specialistica nelle discipline oggetto dell'attività dell'Istituto. 0.3.2 QUINN: CONSORZIO UNIVERSITARIO IN INGEGNERIA PER LA QUALITÀ E L'INNOVAZIONE Istituito nel 1989 su iniziativa dell'Università di Pisa con l'adesione di numerose grandi imprese italiane e riconosciuto dal MURST (oggi MIUR) con Decreto del 1991, l'attuale QUINN: Consorzio Universitario in Ingegneria per la Qualità e l'Innovazione viene costituito inizialmente con il nome "Qualital" allo scopo di far collaborare un gruppo di grandi imprese nella ricerca applicata e nella formazione manageriale in una disciplina in forte crescita, il Total Quality Management ed in particolare l'ingegneria dei processi aziendali. Nel 2005 alla missione originaria se ne affianca un'altra: l'innovazione. Cambia il nome: Quinn, Consorzio Universitario in Ingegneria per la Qualità e l'Innovazione, ma resta l'approccio rigoroso: sviluppare metodologie e strumenti di supporto ai processi innovativi derivanti dalla migliore ricerca e dalle esperienze più avanzate a livello internazionale. Il Consorzio con sede a Pisa, non ha fine di lucro; esso mira a creare sinergie tra le competenze del suo staff e dei partner accademici e le capacità operative delle Imprese industriali, delle Organizzazioni pubbliche e private operanti nella produzione di beni e servizi, allo scopo di promuovere e svolgere: • ricerca applicata e sperimentazione on field di metodologie e strumenti per il miglioramento della qualità di prodotti e servizi; • progetti di rilievo nazionale ed internazionale finalizzati allo sviluppo scientifico e tecnologico dell'ingegneria della qualità e dell'innovazione. Per quanto concerne la ricerca applicata le linee strategiche seguite riguardano: • Metodiche, strumenti per l'innovazione, la qualità, il miglioramento delle performance aziendali; • Gestione per Processi sviluppata in contesti diversificati; • Sistemi Integrati Qualità, Ambiente, Sicurezza, Sostenibilità. Il Consorzio QUINN è una struttura professionale con al vertice un rappresentante della componente accademica dell'Università di Pisa (discipline ingegneristiche) e gestito dal Direttore operativo con comprovata esperienza manageriale. QUINN opera quindi con un pool di professionisti che, con background multidisciplinare e approccio per «commessa», presidiano i principali ambiti di intervento: • il recupero di efficienza dei processi organizzativi; • la capitalizzazione dell'ascolto dei clienti e delle lessons learned; • il miglioramento continuo delle performance di unità operative e key people; • l'evoluzione dei sistemi di gestione Qualità, Ambiente e Sicurezza verso la sostenibilità. I componenti del pool, oltre ad operare personalmente sul campo, attivano collaborazioni con esperti del mondo della ricerca e delle professioni, per portare a termine progetti e ricerche che creino valore tangibile per i Committenti. Gli incarichi di QUINN si caratterizzano per la relativa non convenzionalità degli obiettivi assegnati, dei metodi di lavoro utilizzati e per l'interdisciplinarietà delle competenze richieste; costante è la flessibilità di approccio per rispondere ad esigenze che evolvono anche durante l'iter progettuale e l'attenzione a coinvolgere le risorse del Cliente che possono contribuire al risultato finale. Tra le linee di intervento a supporto dell'Innovazione attivate da QUINN negli ultimi 15 anni evidenziamo i "Servizi di supporto alle Policy pubbliche", che per la realizzazione di interventi di supporto alle policy regionali toscane (2010-2014) per l'innovazione delle imprese si sono articolate in: • Organizzazione e gestione di un percorso d'incontri per i centri servizi e di trasferimento tecnologico aderenti alla Tecnorete della Regione Toscana; • Revisione catalogo dei servizi avanzati e qualificati, sua estensione all'internazionalizzazione; • Analisi del concetto e di esperienze di Dimostratore Tecnologico; • Linee guida per la Divulgazione Tecnologica nel Trasferimento Tecnologico; • Linee guida per la valutazione della performance dei laboratori di ricerca e trasferimento tecnologico e laboratori di prova/analisi; • Linee guida alle attività di Business-Matching / Matchmaking; • Studio di fattibilità per una società di seed capital per Toscana Life Sciences e collaborazione con le attività di incubazione di Siena (2006); • Studi di fattibilità per le policy di sostegno alla nascita di nuove imprese innovative - CCIAA Lodi, ARTI/Regione Puglia (2007- 2008); • Indagine sul sistema dei Parchi Scientifici e Tecnologici Italiani (2010); • Studio di fattibilità dell'incubatore universitario di Sesto Fiorentino (2009); • Progettazione condivisa con gli attori territoriali del progetto Innovation Building a Prato (2009); • Ricerca sulla nuova imprenditorialità e attrazione di investimenti nel distretto della nautica della Spezia (2007-2008); • Attività di supporto all'Incubatore tecnologico di Firenze finalizzate alla ricerca e accoglimento di nuove imprese (2007); • Analisi di opportunità di nuove imprese innovative derivanti dalla costruzione di un nuovo ospedale (2006-2007). 0.4 Fasi del Progetto La Pianificazione del Progetto, nell'ottica di un'efficace Project Management, è stata svolta suddividendo il progetto in fasi al fine di poter effettuare un miglior controllo. I passaggi da una fase all'altra del progetto, che rappresentano il ciclo di vita del progetto, comportano generalmente una forma di trasferimento tecnico o comunque un passaggio di consegne, dove gli output ottenuti da una fase a monte, prima di essere approvati per procedere alla fase a valle vengono analizzati per verificarne completezza e accuratezza. Quando si ritiene che i possibili rischi sono accettabili, può essere che una fase venga iniziata prima dell'approvazione dei deliverable della fase precedente. Per fasi si intendono sequenze identificabili di eventi composti da attività coerenti che producono risultati definiti e che costituiscono l'input per la fase successiva. Le fasi standard identificabili nella maggior parte dei progetti sono: • Concezione e Avvio del Progetto; • Pianificazione; • Esecuzione e Controllo; • Chiusura. In sostanza il ciclo di vita del progetto definisce quale lavoro tecnico deve essere svolto in ciascuna fase, quando devono essere prodotti i deliverable in ciascuna fase e come ciascun deliverable deve essere analizzato, verificato e convalidato, chi è coinvolto in ciascuna fase e come controllare e approvare ciascuna fase. Le fasi che hanno portato alla redazione del report, nel quale le informazioni raccolte sul campo sono state organizzate in modo tale da consentire l'inquadramento del fenomeno della Fabbrica Intelligente in Toscana, sono così individuabili: • FASE 0: Fase Preliminare Dopo aver ricevuto l'incarico da parte di IRPET per la redazione del report, il QUINN ha analizzato la fattibilità del progetto, in modo da prevenire un rischio di insuccesso e dare concretezza all'idea progettuale, e una volta verificata ha redatto la propria Offerta Tecnica. Dopo l'accettazione dell'Offerta da parte dell'Ente Committente, QUINN ha costituito il Team di Progetto incaricato a svolgere le attività progettuali, assegnando a ciascun componente le proprie responsabilità e mansioni. Grazie all'utilizzo di tecniche efficaci per la pianificazione, sono state programmate nel dettaglio tutte le attività da svolgere, al fine di completare il report entro il termine fissato. • FASE 1: Comprensione del Contesto di riferimento In questa fase l'obiettivo centrale era rappresentato dalla comprensione del contesto del progetto, il Team di Progetto rispetto al contesto imprenditoriale italiano ha svolto un'analisi interna e una esterna, che hanno permesso di inquadrare il tema della "Fabbrica Intelligente". Partendo dalle origini prettamente letterarie del concetto, è stata illustrata l'evoluzione industriale che ha preceduto questo fenomeno, successivamente sono stati analizzati i macro trend socio-economici che hanno maggiore impatto sull'industria che stanno caratterizzando l'attuale scenario industriale, concludendo infine con la presentazione delle varie iniziative comunitarie e nazionali a sostegno della ripresa manifatturiera attraverso la "Fabbrica Intelligente". • FASE 2: Esplorazione del Concetto nel Panorama Internazionale Durante questa fase, svolta quasi in parallelo con la precedente, sono state analizzate le varie declinazioni al concetto di Fabbrica Intelligente e congiuntamente ricercati i trend e le tecnologie abilitanti. Attraverso un esercizio di Forecasting Tecnologico, osservando molteplici studi condotti da un altrettanto numero di esperti, sono stati identificati i trend attuali e quelli emergenti connessi alla Fabbrica Intelligente, con i conseguenti impatti sulle aziende e sulla forza lavoro. Alla fine sono stati ricercati alcuni casi di Fabbrica Intelligente, o di Industria 4.0 che dir si voglia, sviluppati da diverse aziende nel mondo. • FASE 3: Studio dell'Applicazione del Modello nella Regione Toscana Nello svolgimento di questa fase, si è passati allo studio degli ambiti prioritari della domanda e dell'offerta di tecnologie per la Fabbrica Intelligente nella Regione Toscana, per come identificata all'interno della SSS, focalizzandoci sulle tecnologie connesse all'automazione, alla meccatronica e alla robotica. Successivamente si è passati ad individuare possibili legami tra gli ambiti tecnologici analizzati e lo sviluppo di soluzioni tecnologiche funzionali ai processi produttivi, "in termini di velocizzazione sicurezza e controllo dei processi, della sostenibilità ed economicità degli stessi, nonché dell'estensione della capacità di azione". Si è arrivati infine a delineare il panorama della diffusione del modello della Fabbrica intelligente nelle imprese del sistema produttivo toscano, grazie all'analisi della diffusione fra le aziende produttrici e utilizzatrici delle tecnologie correlate, attraverso il merging di due DB di imprese Toscane stilati da enti qualificati, interviste in profondità e telefoniche, e infine attraverso l'organizzazione di due Focus Group. • FASE 4: Realizzazione Conclusiva del Report La quarta e ultima fase ha portato alla redazione finale del report, nel quale le informazioni sia di carattere quantitativo, ma soprattutto qualitativo raccolte sul campo sono state elaborate in maniera tale da evidenziare la diffusione del fenomeno nel tessuto produttivo toscano. I risultati conseguenti all'elaborazione di tali informazioni risultano essere: - la descrizione di casi studio sia di utilizzatori che di sviluppatori, con la presentazione delle peculiarità di adozione delle tecnologie che prefigurano possibili modelli di adozione alla Fabbrica intelligente; - la mappatura della diffusione delle tecnologie abilitanti della Fabbrica intelligente in Toscana con riferimento alle imprese utilizzatrici; - inquadramento del livello di maturità dei diversi settori produttivi toscani rispetto alle tecnologie target identificate dal Cluster Fabbrica Intelligente; - raccomandazioni di policy. 0.5 Strumenti e Tecniche utilizzate nell'ambito del Progetto Per una più facile comprensione dei contenuti, in questo paragrafo vengono descritti in forma teorica gli strumenti e le tecniche gestionali, che il Team di Progetto ha utilizzato per lo svolgimento delle attività progettuali, elencandoli in funzione dell'impiego nelle diverse fasi del progetto. Nel proseguo del lavoro, dove verranno presentati i contenuti del report, saranno illustrate le modalità operative realmente avviate nell'applicazione dei vari strumenti. 0.5.1 FASE 0: FASE PRELIMINARE In questa fase preliminare il PM detiene la responsabilità della pianificazione, integrazione ed esecuzione dei piani. La pianificazione, ovvero il P nella logica PDCA, è fondamentale a causa della breve durata del progetto e per l'assegnazione delle risorse. L'integrazione risulta altrettanto importante, altrimenti ogni soggetto sviluppa la propria pianificazione senza tener conto degli altri. La pianificazione è la definizione di cosa fare, quando va fatto e da chi; è destinata in linea teorica a: • "acquisire" gli obiettivi del processo; • individuare le fasi o meglio processi, diretti ed indiretti, che consentono di raggiungere gli obiettivi prefissati ovvero stesura della "mappa" di processi e delle interazioni; • scegliere metodi per il do, il check e l'act, il personale, i materiali e/o le informazioni, le macchine/tecnologie e/o attrezzature per ogni processo operativo aggredibile; • provare, sperimentare, verificare là dove non si sa; • emettere specifiche, standard; • occuparsi delle eventuali attività di comunicazione e addestramento. Per un PM è fondamentale utilizzare tecniche di pianificazione efficaci, e di seguito sono descritte quelle utilizzate durante tutte le fasi del progetto: • Work Breakdown Structure (WBS); • Matrice RACI; • Diagramma di Gantt; • Flow Chart (FC). 0.5.1.1 Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) La WBS (Work Breakdown Structure) è una forma di scomposizione (o disaggregazione secondo una struttura ad albero) strutturata e gerarchica del progetto che si sviluppa tramite l'individuazione di sotto-obiettivi e attività definite ad un livello di dettaglio sempre maggiore. Scopo della WBS è di identificare e collocare all'ultimo livello gerarchico pacchetti di lavoro (Work Package) chiaramente gestibili e attribuibili a un unico responsabile, affinché possano essere programmati, schedulati, controllati e valutati. La WBS è uno strumento di fondamentale importanza nel Project Management, infatti fornisce le basi per sviluppare una matrice delle responsabilità e successivamente effettuare lo scheduling . Attraverso la suddivisione dei deliverable in componenti più piccoli definiti "work package" si semplifica la gestione del progetto. Il work package infatti rappresenta il gradino più basso della gerarchia WBS ed è tramite questo che si possono definire in maniera più affidabile schedulazione dei tempi e costi. La suddivisione per livello procede riducendo ampiezza e complessità fino a quando non perviene a una descrizione adeguata e inequivocabile della voce finale. La Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), ha permesso di individuare, ai vari livelli, tutte le attività di sviluppo del progetto. La logica di scomposizione utilizzata è stata quella del processo di lavoro, questa logica consiste nel suddividere il progetto in relazione alla sequenza logica delle attività realizzative che verranno messe in opera, e ci ha permesso di individuare, per ogni pacchetto di lavoro: • scopo del lavoro con obiettivi e vincoli; • il processo di lavoro e le sue interfacce; • le risorse assegnabili e assegnate; • i limiti di tempo. 0.5.1.2 Matrice RACI La Matrice RACI è uno strumento che viene utilizzato per l'individuazione delle responsabilità all'interno di un progetto. Essa indica alle risorse umane coinvolte le mansioni e il grado di responsabilità all'interno del progetto, inoltre fornisce indicazioni specifiche su come comportarsi nel gestire le relazioni e responsabilità di altre persone coinvolte, rappresentando un forte elemento di motivazione per le stesse. La matrice di responsabilità nella sua intersezione indica il tipo di persona a cui è delegata una persona o un'unità organizzativa. Generalmente vengono utilizzate delle sigle che esprimono le responsabilità, le più utilizzate sono quelle corrispondenti all'acronimo RACI: • R: "Responsabile": è il ruolo di colui che è chiamato ad eseguire operativamente il task (per ogni task è possibile avere più Responsabili); • A: "Approva": è aziendalmente il ruolo a cui riporta il Responsabile o che comunque dovrà svolgere un ruolo di supervisione del lavoro del/dei Responsabili(ci può essere un solo A per ogni attività); • C: "Coordinamento": è il ruolo di chi dovrà supportare il/i Responsabile nello svolgimento del task fornendogli informazioni utili al completamento del lavoro o a migliorare la qualità del lavoro stesso • I: "Informato": è il ruolo di chi dovrà essere informato in merito al lavoro del/dei Responsabile e che dovrà prendere decisioni sulla base delle informazioni avute. 0.5.1.3 Diagramma di Gantt La complessità sempre maggiore di molti progetti, la gestione di grandi quantità di dati e le scadenze rigide incentivano le organizzazioni verso l'utilizzo di metodi per la pianificazione delle attività su scala temporale. Le tecniche di scheduling più comuni sono: • Diagrammi a barre o di Gantt; • Tecniche reticolari: - PDM (Precedence Diagram Method); - ADM (Arrow Diagram Method); - PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique); - CPM (Critical Path Method). • Approccio della Catena Critica CCPM (Critical Chain Project Management). La tipologia di rappresentazione utilizzata nel presente report, è il diagramma a barre (di Gantt), un mezzo molto semplice e intuitivo per visualizzare le attività o gli eventi tracciati in relazione al tempo, come nel nostro caso, o al denaro. La rappresentazione utilizzata riguarda l'evoluzione del progetto su scala temporale, dove ogni barra rappresenta un'attività la cui lunghezza è proporzionale alla durata dell'attività stessa, la quale è collocata sulla scala temporale. Il diagramma di Gantt permette perciò di definire cosa fare in una determinata quantità di tempo, e stabilisce inoltre eventi o date chiave (milestone) di progetto e un riferimento per il controllo dell'avanzamento. Il vantaggio che ha apportato sta nell'ottimizzazione delle risorse, attraverso una contemporanea visualizzazione delle attività, delle tempistiche e dei soggetti coinvolti. Ha comunque tre limitazioni principali, infatti non illustra: • le interdipendenze tra le attività; • risultati di un inizio anticipato o tardivo nelle attività; • l'incertezza inclusa nell'esecuzione dell'attività. 0.5.1.4 Flow Chart (FC) o Diagramma di Flusso Il Diagramma di Flusso, detto anche Flow Chart, rappresenta una modellazione grafica per rappresentare il flusso di controllo ed esecuzione di algoritmi, procedure o istruzioni operative. Esso consente di descrivere in modo schematico ovvero grafico: • le operazioni da compiere, rappresentate mediante forme convenzionali (ad esempio : rettangoli, rombi, esagoni, parallelogrammi, .), ciascuna con un preciso significato logico e all'interno delle quali un'indicazione testuale descrive tipicamente l'attività da svolgere; • la sequenza nella quale devono essere compiute, rappresentate con frecce di collegamento. Tale strumento permette pertanto di visualizzare tutto o parte del processo e di capire il collegamento delle sequenze necessarie a svolgere una funzione. In particolare permette di individuare i punti del processo in cui si verifica l'effetto che si vuole analizzare e di risalire il flusso fino alle origini delle cause potenziali. 0.5.2 FASE 1: COMPRENSIONE DEL CONTESTO DI RIFERIMENTO Tutti i progetti si interfacciano con il mondo reale, quindi occorre considerare i diversi contesti in cui il progetto converge. Alla luce di questo il PM ha incaricato i componenti del Team di Progetto di effettuare, un'analisi del contesto di riferimento, svolgendo un esercizio di Forecasting Tecnologico, attraverso la Ricerca sul Web, allo scopo di realizzare: • un'Analisi Interna; • un'Analisi Esterna; • l'Analisi SWOT. 0.5.2.1 Ricerca sul Web Lo strumento che normalmente viene utilizzato per effettuare una ricerca sul web è il cosiddetto motore di ricerca, il quale è basato sull'inserimento di una o più parole-chiave le cui occorrenze vengono cercate all'interno dei vari documenti presenti in rete. Bisogna dire che il processo di ricerca e di selezione delle informazioni è molto più complesso di quanto si possa pensare, per l'appunto possiamo differenziare la ricerca delle fonti in due modi: • Fonti Istituzionali (es. Regolamenti Comunitari, EUROSTAT, ISTAT, etc.); • Fonti Pubbliche (es. Unioncamere); • Enti di natura scientifica (es. società di consulenza). La conoscenza precedente dell'argomento influenza e da maggiori garanzie di successo nella ricerca, in questo modo l'utente è in possesso di termini specifici che può utilizzare direttamente come keywords. Gli elementi per impostare una soddisfacente ricerca sul web possono essere riassunti in: • chiarezza dell'oggetto, quesito o obiettivo della ricerca; • tempo e capacità dell'utente che effettua la ricerca; • qualità delle risposte in termini di: - adeguatezza, completezza ed esaustività; - affidabilità e autorevolezza della fonte; - grado di aggiornamento. 0.5.2.2 Forecasting Tecnologico Il Forecasting Tecnologico è un settore dei Technology Future Studies che racchiude varie strumenti volti ad anticipare e a capire la direzione potenziale, le caratteristiche e gli effetti del cambiamento tecnologico. Sono identificabili 9 cluster: 0.5.2.2.1 Expert Opinion Questa famiglia comprende tecniche basate sull'opinione di esperti, e include la previsione o la comprensione dello sviluppo tecnologico attraverso intense consultazioni tra vari esperti in materia. Uno dei metodi più diffusi è sicuramente il Metodo Delphi. Questo metodo combina richiesta di pareri riguardanti la probabilità di realizzare la tecnologia proposta e pareri di esperti in materia dei tempi di sviluppo. Gli esperti si confrontano e si scambiano pareri in base alle proprie previsioni tecnologiche, in modo da arrivare a una linea comune. 0.5.2.2.2 Trend Analysis L'Analisi del Trend comporta la previsione attraverso la proiezione dei dati storici quantitativi nel futuro. Questa analisi comprende modelli sia di previsione economica che tecnologica. Una tecnologia di solito ha un ciclo di vita composto di varie distinti fasi. Le tappe includono tipicamente • una fase di adozione • una fase di crescita • una fase di sviluppo • una fase di declino. L'analisi cerca di identificare e prevedere il ciclo della innovazione tecnologica oggetto dello studio. 0.5.2.2.3 Monitoring and Intelligence Methods Questa famiglia di metodi (Monitoring e le sue variazioni: Environmental Scanning and Technology Watch) ha lo scopo di fare acquisire consapevolezza dei cambiamenti all'orizzonte che potrebbero avere impatto sulla penetrazione o ricezione delle tecnologie nel mercato. 0.5.2.2.4 Statistical Methods Fra i metodi statistici, i più diffusi sono l'Analisi di Correlazione e l'Analisi Bibliometrica. • L'Analisi di Correlazione anticipa i modelli di sviluppo di una nuova tecnologia correlandola ad altri, quando lo stesso modello è simile ad altre tecnologie esistenti. • L'Analisi Bibliometrica si concentra sullo studio della produzione scientifica (pubblicazioni, etc.) presente in letteratura. In particolare risulta utile al fine di: - sviluppare conoscenza esaustiva del tema oggetto di studio; - analizzare i database da usare, da cui trarre informazioni e dati; - acquisire conoscenza sulle informazioni dei brevetti, fonte importante per acquisire informazioni uniche dal momento che spesso i dati e le informazioni rintracciabili nei brevetti non sono pubblicati altrove; - definire la strategia di ricerca; - utilizzare gli strumenti di analisi, attraverso software di data e text mining efficienti; - analizzare i risultati, grazie alle informazioni di vario tipo da cui gli esperti possono estrarre informazioni strategiche. 0.5.2.2.5 Modelling and Simulation Per "modello" si intende una rappresentazione semplificata delle dinamiche strutturali di una certa parte del mondo "reale". Questi modelli possono mostrare il comportamento futuro dei sistemi complessi semplicemente isolando gli aspetti essenziali di un sistema da quelli non essenziali. Tra i principali metodi: • Agent Modeling, tecnica che simula l'interazione dei diversi fattori in gioco; • System Simulation, tecniche che simulano la configurazione di un sistema a fronte dell'azione di possibili variabili aggiuntive. 0.5.2.2.6 Scenarios Costituiscono rappresentazioni alternative delle tecnologie future, sulla base di considerazioni e condizioni ulteriori a seguito di possibili cambiamenti delle condizioni al contorno inizialmente ipotizzate. 0.5.2.2.7 Valuing/Decision/Economic Methods Tra i metodi il più popolare è il "Relevance Tree Approach": le finalità e gli obiettivi di una tecnologia proposta sono suddivisi tra: • obiettivi prioritari; • obiettivi di basso livello. Grazie ad una struttura ad albero è possibile identificare la struttura gerarchica dello sviluppo tecnologico. In base ad esso viene eseguita la stima delle probabilità di raggiungere gli obiettivi ai vari livelli di sviluppo tecnologico. 0.5.2.2.8 Descriptive and Matrices Methods In crescente affermazione in questa famiglia di metodi è la definizione di Roadmap dello sviluppo di tecnologie, che consiste nel proiettare i principali elementi tecnologici di progettazione e produzione insieme alle strategie per il raggiungimento di traguardi desiderabili in modo efficiente Nel suo contesto più ampio, una Roadmap tecnologica fornisce una "vista di consenso o visione del futuro" della scienza e della tecnologia a disposizione dei decisori. 0.5.2.3 Analisi SWOT L'analisi SWOT è uno strumento di pianificazione strategica semplice ed efficace che serve ad evidenziare le caratteristiche di un progetto o di un programma, di un'organizzazione e le conseguenti relazioni con l'ambiente operativo nel quale si colloca, offrendo un quadro di riferimento per la definizione di strategie finalizzate al raggiungimento di un obiettivo. La SWOT Analysis si costruisce tramite una matrice divisa in quattro campi nei quali si hanno: • Punti di Forza (Strengths); • Punti di Debolezza (Weaknesses); • Opportunità (Opportunities); • Minacce (Threats). L'Analisi SWOT consente di distinguere fattori esogeni ed endogeni, dove punti di forza e debolezza sono da considerarsi fattori endogeni mentre minacce e opportunità fattori esogeni. I fattori endogeni sono tutte quelle variabili che fanno parte integrante del sistema sulle quali è possibile intervenire, i fattori esogeni invece sono quelle variabili esterne al sistema che possono però condizionarlo, su di esse non è possibile intervenire direttamente ma è necessario tenerle sotto controllo in modo da sfruttare gli eventi positivi e prevenire quelli negativi, che rischiano di compromettere il raggiungimento degli obiettivi prefissati. I vantaggi di una analisi di questo tipo si possono sintetizzare in 3 punti: • la profonda analisi del contesto in cui si agisce, resa possibile dalla preliminare osservazione e raccolta dei dati e da una loro abile interpretazione si traduce in una puntuale delineazione delle strategie; • il raffronto continuo tra le necessità dell'organizzazione e le strategie adottate porta ad un potenziamento della efficacia raggiunta; • consente di raggiungere un maggiore consenso sulle strategie se partecipano all'analisi tutte le parti coinvolte dall'intervento. 0.5.3 FASE 2: ESPLORAZIONE DEL CONCETTO NEL PANORAMA INTERNAZIONALE Anche in questa fase, dove l'obiettivo era quello di ricercare nella letteratura le varie declinazioni al concetto di "Fabbrica Intelligente" e le tecnologie attuali ed emergenti connesse ad essa, è stata svolta un'analisi degli organismi specializzati nel Foresight Tecnologico e di profondi conoscitori del settore dell'automazione industriale, per studiare le tendenze tecnologiche per i prossimi anni. 0.5.4 FASE 3: STUDIO DELL'APPLICAZIONE DEL MODELLO NELLA REGIONE TOSCANA Durante lo svolgimento di questa fase, si è intrapreso un percorso di raccolta delle informazioni legate al tema della "Fabbrica Intelligente" nel tessuto produttivo toscano, che è stato strutturato in 3 diverse attività: • Mappatura della Diffusione delle Tecnologie in Toscana attraverso il merging dei DB "Osservatorio sulle imprese high-tech della Toscana" e delle "Aziende eccellenti" dell'IRPET con l'estrapolazione dei dati da Fonti Aziendali: questa attività verrà discussa nel dettaglio nel proseguo del lavoro; • Interviste in Profondità e Interviste Telefoniche; • Focus Group. 0.5.4.1 Intervista L'intervista semi-strutturata è l'equivalente del questionario, con domande predefinite dal ricercatore in fase di preparazione dello strumento; a differenziare i due metodi è il modo di presentazione, orale nel caso dell'intervista, scritto nel caso del questionario, che assicura maggiore capacità di adattamento all'interlocutore e di valorizzazione di tutte le opportunità di raccolta d'informazioni "non strutturate". L'intervista ha quindi il vantaggio di essere un metodo versatile, che è possibile utilizzare in ogni stadio della progettazione, dalla fase di esplorazione a quella di validazione ex post delle informazioni. A differenza dei questionari, la presenza del ricercatore allontana l'eventualità che il soggetto interpreti in maniera errata le domande o che si trovi in imbarazzo perché non comprende quanto gli viene richiesto; inoltre, nel caso di una risposta non attinente, il ricercatore può riformulare la domanda. Il vantaggio maggiore rispetto al questionario consiste nel fatto che l'intervista non registra la stessa alta percentuale di mancati recapiti da parte dei soggetti contattati; di conseguenza, i dati raccolti godono di maggiore validità . A differenza dell'intervista personale, l'intervista telefonica appare concepibile nell'ambito di un sondaggio, offrendo vantaggi legati soprattutto al costo e al tempo di esecuzione, nonostante la mancanza di un'interazione faccia a faccia limita la "competenza comunicativa" () dell'intervistatore e dell'intervistato. Durante l'intervista telefonica l'intervistato non può prendere visione diretta del questionario, come accade nel sondaggio tramite intervista personale, e non consente all'intervistatore il ricorso a tecniche che comportano strumenti da sottoporre visivamente all'intervistato, come forme di gadgets o scale auto-ancoranti. Dal punto di vista dell'intervistatore, si dispone di meno informazioni per valutare se l'intervistato ha capito davvero la domanda; di conseguenza tenderà a ridurre gli interventi opportuni per chiarire il testo. Non è possibile integrare il resoconto dell'intervista con informazioni relative all'ambiente fisico in cui essa ha luogo e al comportamento non verbale dell'intervistato. 0.5.4.2 Focus Group Interviste rivolte a un gruppo omogeneo di 7/12 persone, la cui attenzione è focalizzata su di un argomento specifico, che viene scandagliato in profondità. Un moderatore (spesso definito: 'facilitatore') indirizza e dirige la discussione fra i partecipanti e ne facilita l'interazione, anche attraverso la predisposizione di un "sceneggiatura" finalizzata a fare emergere le peculiari conoscenze ed esperienze, nonché finalizzata a favorire il confronto "creativo". Ogni partecipante ha l'opportunità di esprimere liberamente la propria opinione rispetto all'argomento trattato ma nel rispetto di alcune "regole del gioco" introdotte dal facilitatore; la comunicazione nel gruppo è impostata in modo aperto e partecipato, con un'alta propensione all'ascolto. Il contraddittorio positivo che ne consegue consente di far emergere i reali punti di vista, giudizi, pre-giudizi, opinioni, percezioni e aspettative del pubblico di interesse in modo più approfondito di quanto non consentano altre tecniche di indagine . Nella tabella seguente, sono riportati i metodi di Forecasting Tecnologico , suddivisi nei 9 cluster definiti dal "MIT- Massachusetts Institute of Technology", indicando quali sono stati impiegati nelle attività progettuali e in che fase. 0.5.5 FASE 4: REALIZZAZIONE CONCLUSIVA DEL REPORT Durante la fase conclusiva di redazione finale del report, il Team di Progetto si è concentrato nell'elaborazione dei dati raccolti durante le fasi precedenti attraverso strumenti grafici che hanno facilitato l'attività di capitolazione delle informazioni, tra cui: • Istogrammi; • Diagramma a Torta; • Mappatura con metrica a "semaforo" : questa tecnica di rappresentazione è stata ideata dal Team di Progetto. Le sue peculiarità saranno illustrate più nel dettaglio successivamente. • Modello di Maturità (Maturity Model). 0.5.5.1 Istogramma L'istogramma è la rappresentazione grafica di una distribuzione in classi di un carattere continuo. Un istogramma consente di rappresentare i dati attraverso rettangoli di uguale base ed altezza differente a seconda dei dati stessi, ed in un solo colpo d'occhio permette di capire se una "quantità" è maggiore, minore o uguale di un'altra semplicemente guardando l'altezza dei rettangoli. 0.5.5.2 Diagramma a Torta Un Diagramma a Torta è una tecnica di rappresentazione che in un modo semplice e diretto è evidenzia il peso delle varie componenti di una grandezza. In questo modo la grandezza in questione viene rappresentata sottoforma di cerchio i cui spicchi hanno un angolo e di conseguenza, un arco, proporzionale alle varie componenti. 0.5.5.3 Modello di Maturità Tale modello definisce il livello di maturità di un'entità. L'aspetto caratteristico di tale rappresentazione è il fatto di essere organizzato per livelli. Il modello definisce diversi profili di maturità crescente, indicando implicitamente anche una strategia molto generale di miglioramento che si basa sull'introduzione di quelle pratiche che permettono solitamente ad un'azienda, di muoversi da un livello di maturità al successivo.
This paper aims to discuss how institutional racism plays a part in the continued criminalisation of cannabis in the United Kingdom. I will start with a short history of usage and attitudes toward cannabis in the United Kingdom, mainly England. I will then assess the relationship that the criminal justice system has with cannabis and its users, and delve into how racial bias operates within law enforcement, using stop and search as a point of focus. This paper will explore how these biases lead to a disproportionate application of the law on certain groups of people. It will be argued while using Canada as point of comparison, that cannabis is being used in the United Kingdom as a political tool to favour voters of certain demographics, and that while more research is needed to fully assess the effects of cannabis, the reasoning behind maintaining cannabis' status as a dangerous substance is both absurdly hypocritical and entirely no longer necessary. Medicinal, recreational, and the law The United Kingdom first listed cannabis as a prohibited drug in 1928 by adding it to the Dangerous Drugs Act 1920 in accordance with the International Opium Convention 1912. For an immeasurable amount of time the cannabis plant has been used recreationally, medicinally, and industrially across the planet, including many former British colonies and overseas territories.[1] The Misuse of Drugs Act currently lists cannabis and cannabis derivatives as Class B controlled drugs.[2] This classification means that it is a criminal offence in the United Kingdom to possess, grow, or supply cannabis to others. Section 6 of the act outlines the cultivation of any species of cannabis plant as a specific offence. Cannabis related offences are punishable through schedule 4 of the act. On indictment production or supplying of cannabis could result in up to fourteen years in prison, whilst possession alone, up to five years in prison, (an unlimited fine, or both). In 2004 cannabis was moved from Class B to Class C, which holds less prison time for possession while retaining the same fourteen years penalty for production and supply.[3] This was done after the Advisory Council claimed that even though cannabis was harmful, it was not as harmful as other Class B drugs; amphetamines, methylamphetamine, barbiturates, and codeine.[4] Another driving point was to take the pressure off arrests for possession of small amounts of cannabis to shift the focus of law enforcement toward other more dangerous drugs and crime.[5] This reclassification only stood for five years as cannabis returned to Class B in 2009 against the advice of the Advisory Council.[6] Currently in the United Kingdom a person can get a warning or Penalty Notice for Disorder (PND) for possession of small amounts instead of being arrested.[7] The United Kingdom was once the world's largest exporter of cannabis for medical and scientific use, producing around 95,000 kilograms of cannabis in the year 2016.[8] In 2015, that production was at 41,706 kilograms.[9] For a country so determined to prohibit the use and supply of cannabis within its borders, it is quite ironic that businesses are being licensed for production for export, and that production doubled in that year. Law and Enforcement: stop and search and racial bias Canada, having legalised recreational cannabis in October 2018, will be used as a point of comparison to explore the UK's complex legal and political relationship with cannabis. While recreational cannabis is still considered illegal in most of the world, many countries seem to not strictly enforce their laws. In pre-legalised Canada, cannabis use became increasingly socially acceptable. The enforcement of possession laws became less and less important to society, which was reflected in the prioritisation used by the police.[10] While unregulated sales remained illegal post the legalisation of medical cannabis in 2001, there still existed brick and mortar dispensaries where the public was able to purchase cannabis illegally. For the most part, law enforcement would leave them to their business unless they suspected a connection to gang violence, sale to minors, or other crime. It was common to see them reopen after being raided and shutdown.[11] Law enforcement in the United Kingdom has a lot of say about the way that perpetrators of cannabis-related crimes are dealt with. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in the UK released an official policing guideline for cannabis possession for personal use in 2009 following the substance's return to a Class B status in the UK.[12] This document outlines whether a warning or PND should be issued in place of an arrest and explains the 'escalation policy' used to determine which of the three the perpetrator will receive. To determine the severity of the possession they look at 'aggravating factors' such as whether they were caught in a public place, whether a young person is involved or could be exposed to drug use, and repeat offences.[13] This document states the purpose of these 'aggravating factors' as 'The circumstances of the offence form part of the consideration in determining whether an arrest can be made and justified'.[14] So in theory as per this document an adult over the age of 18 with no prior history caught in possession of cannabis for personal use and not falling under any of the aggravating factors should be let off with a warning (which would not show up on a standard criminal record check) even though it is a Class B illicit drug. There are two important points regarding these guidelines. The first is that even though cannabis at this point had returned to Class B status, it was not being treated the same as other Class B substances – it is now being treated more leniently by law enforcement in comparison to other Class B substances. These more forgiving rules send a message to the public that even though cannabis was moved back to Class B status, it is accepted to be not as 'sinister' as the others. It begs the question of whether moving the drug back to Class B even had any bearing or real practical purpose. Herein lies an interesting unsynchronized relationship between the statute regarding the legality of cannabis and the approaches taken by law enforcement. Law enforcement is seemingly doing a better job than legislature at keeping up with public opinion by relaxing their approaches. Secondly, while they cover England, Wales, and Northern Ireland in a uniform manner, they are just that: guidelines. Each local policing authority has the prerogative of deciding how they may deal with a case of cannabis possession.[15] What is evident is that this prerogative is used, to varying degrees. Some policing authorities, such as Durham, have made public statements in which they have announced they will not be targeting individuals for possession for personal use.[16] An article in the Canterbury Journal interviews a resident that describes the city as 'weed central', indicating the city even has its own cannabis club (the Canterbury Cannabis Collective) that lobbies politicians at Westminster.[17] It would suffice to say that being affiliated with this cannabis club would be enough to fulfil the 'reasonable belief' that law enforcement needs to target someone. They are lobbying openly for the legalisation of cannabis, which indicates that law enforcement is largely just allowing it to happen. So, if the people want recreational cannabis legalised (or are indifferent to it), and law enforcement has begun acknowledging that it is not a priority for them to police, why has Westminster not caught up? Interestingly, in the same article another interviewee who is opposed to legalisation said she thinks, 'it'll increase the number of people smoking it by making it socially acceptable, like areas of Canada where people started smoking it openly and regularly once it had been legalised.'[18] This is statistically not true. According to Statistics Canada, self-reported cannabis use amongst Canadians rose from 14.9% before legalisation to 16.8% after legalisation. However, most of that difference of 1.9% could simply be accounted for by less hesitation to admit usage once it was not a criminal offence since results are self-reported. Additionally, respondents were to only report on whether they used in the three months prior to being surveyed.[19] So this is evidence of some apparent misconceptions about legalisation, and while a lax attitude from law enforcement may make cannabis users in those areas very happy, it is arguable that this prerogative in law enforcement's hands is a detriment to equal treatment of perpetrators of the same crime from different backgrounds. There are many facets to consider when discussing the United Kingdom's relationship to cannabis. For one, it is not a plant native to the country and its use was introduced during the colonial period mostly through the Indian subcontinent.[20] In South Asia, cannabis was widely used medicinally and recreationally and is considered in Hindu Ayurveda to be one of five sacred plants that relieve anxiety.[21] While many may think of cannabis in the context of a relaxed Caribbean stereotype (or even particularly Jamaican), the plant was first introduced to the Caribbean through the movement of Indian indentured workers brought there by the British regime.[22] The origins of this plant are culturally and socially connected to (but not exclusively) two racial groups, people of South Asian and of African descent. Its history plays a part in the way that it is viewed socially. It is no secret that both of these racial groups have faced tribulations at the hands of British colonialism, the legacy of which still lingers. One of these tribulations that has spilt into our modern existence is the entrenched racism that plagues the criminal justice system in the United Kingdom, of which law enforcement plays a huge part. The demonisation of dark skin leads to a disproportionate treatment of people of colour by law enforcement, and a disproportionate number of arrests and convictions. Crimes involving cannabis are one of the ways in which this disproportionality is manifested, but it is in no way the only one. Stop and Search, and the Macpherson Report The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, which in 1999 generated the Macpherson Report, followed the racially motivated murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993.[23] It was an important conversation-starter on the processes used when investigating a racially charged crime, in this case the murder of a black British teenager by a group of white youths. Under 'stop and search' police officers can search you if they have 'reasonable grounds' to suspect you are carrying illegal drugs (or similar), or without reasonable grounds if it was approved by a senior officer.[24] According to the Home Office, as of the 2011 census, persons of black ethnicity comprise about 4% of the population of the UK, yet the Ministry of Justice reports that they are involved in about 20% of all drug stop and searches as well as prosecutions for cannabis.[25] With people of black ethnicity there is also a higher number of prosecutions than there are stop and searches in comparison with people of white ethnicity. The racial element of these statistics is clear. If only 4% of the population is represented by black ethnicity, why are they involved in 20% of the searches? There is no correlation to suggest people of black ethnicity consume more cannabis in the UK. According to statistics on drug misuse available through the UK Government's website, in the 2018/2019 findings of adults aged 16 to 59, 8% of the white respondents versus 6.7% of the 'Black or Black British' respondents reported use of cannabis in the previous year.[26] Stop and search gives individual police officers the power to use their own judgement to decide whether a person may be involved in a crime of some sort without seeing a crime being committed (in this case, in possession or planning to supply illicit drugs). Stop and search methods have been thoroughly scrutinised and continuously reformed as many do believe that they are not effective or an efficient use of law enforcement's time and resources.[27] The idea of law enforcement being able to search anyone they feel necessary could lead to a gross misuse of power. Figure 1[28] Figure 1 illustrates the bias that exists within this system of law enforcement. The dotted flat line represents the likelihood of a person of white ethnicity being stopped within the years 2014-2016. Every non-white group surveyed had a higher probability of being involved in a stop and search. The black community does not consume more cannabis, and therefore should not be any more likely than someone of white ethnicity to be in possession of cannabis. Yet black individuals are still 6.5 times more likely to be stopped. According to the same data bank, people of black ethnicity used all surveyed drugs (powder cocaine, ecstasy, hallucinogens, amphetamines, mephedrone, ketamine and cannabis) less commonly than those of white ethnicity.[29] The obvious link: racial bias. By this logic, police officers are, even unconsciously, under the impression that a black person is more likely to be involved in something illegal. The result of that is that the black population are being disproportionally affected by the law – a gross miscarriage of justice. We as citizens may want to believe that these statistics are an improvement, that the racial bias in the United Kingdom is a work in positive progress. However, 'figures for 1997/98 show that "black people were, on average, five times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police than white people." Black people are also "more likely to be arrested than white or other ethnic groups."'[30] Many of these statistics are also based on self-identified ethnicity, where as to clearly see a bias or prejudice, one must know what others assume that person's ethnicity to be. What they identify themselves as, may be a useful indicator of how others view them, but it does not necessarily facilitate an understanding of the exact impact of racial identity on law enforcement. The Macpherson Report is arguably one of the most important modern documents outlining the racial biases within the UK's criminal justice system. What it found was astonishing evidence exposing racial bias within the response and investigation of the death of Stephen Lawrence. No police officer on the scene performed any form of first aid after finding him, nor did they check his vitals to see if he was still alive.[31] The victim's parents reported being treated unprofessionally with insensitivity and were deprived of information regarding the case which they were entitled to. There was evidence suggesting that the perpetrators were not arrested for the crime, because they were white even though they were suspects with sufficient evidence to procure a warrant. In general, they found that there was a lack of enthusiasm to find the murderers of a black man by white suspects.[32] While murder is beyond the scope of this essay, the findings of this report solidify the notion that in multiple ways people of black ethnicity are victims to the institutional racism present in the criminal justice system. Cannabis and politics The current Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau and his Liberal Party's political crusade to legalise recreational cannabis use in Canada sat on two very important points: to make it harder for minors to access cannabis, and to tackle gang violence associated with cannabis sales.[33] Legalisation of cannabis was just one of the ways in which Justin Trudeau managed to rally two unlikely voter demographics: people of colour, and young voters between the age of 18-25. This won him two consecutive federal elections, while remaining at the time relatively appealing to the older voters.[34] With the changing demographic in Canada, rallying these voters was, and remains, a key political tool to holding power. He, like his father, former Prime Minister the late Pierre Elliott Trudeau, prized multiculturalism in his political platform – a concept very important to the Canadian identity and society. The Canadian Multiculturalism Act is a law passed in 1985 by the late Trudeau outlining all the ways in which it is expected that multiculturalism is to be upheld by the federal government. This includes, but is not limited to, 'ensur[ing] that all individuals receive equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity.'[35] This policy of upholding diversity is part of the Canadian constitution. The closest comparable statute existing in the United Kingdom is the Equality Act 2010. This piece of legislation covers a wider breadth of demographical information that may lead to discrimination, including, but not limited to, race, religion, gender, and age. Section 1 of the Act outlines the duty that public figures such as ministers, courts, police, and councils have toward socio-economic inequalities: An authority to which this section applies must, when making decisions of a strategic nature about how to exercise its functions, have due regard to the desirability of exercising them in a way that is designed to reduce the inequalities of outcome which result from socio-economic disadvantage.[36] What is compelling is that Section 3 states that any breach of section 1 'does not confer a cause of action at private law,'[37] which limits how these public bodies are held accountable for breaching the Act and is realistically mostly just applicable to employers' relations with employees. The purpose of this act reads like a guide on what your legal options are if you feel that you were wrongly discriminated in the workplace by any of the protected demographics. The purpose of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act is to focus much more on the acts and efforts that are expected of the Federal Government to uphold the integrity of diversity by recognising differences and adopting practices to accommodate them. This also includes promoting the use of languages other than English and French, the two official languages.[38] The entrenchment of this Act into the Canadian constitution, and the language used within it, shows just how important it is to Canadian society, run by a liberal government, as it holds everyone, including federal bodies, accountable for nurturing diversity in Canada. Whether or not it always plays out that way is beyond the scope of this paper. There is a political connection with the way in which cannabis is 'officially' viewed versus the way that it is socially viewed when comparing Canada and the United Kingdom. Dalhousie University in Halifax published a study suggesting that 68% of Canadians (another 6.9% were indifferent) supported the legalisation of recreational marijuana in September 2017.[39] In a poll by YouGov for the Conservative Drug Policy Reform Group in the UK, 48% supported legalisation while only 24% opposed.[40] If that was not enough, a government survey found in 2017/2018 that 30% of adults aged 16 to 64 have tried cannabis at least once.[41] If the majority of the country is supportive or indifferent to the legalisation of recreational cannabis, why are the two governments approaching the idea so differently? This puts into question the strength of democracy in the United Kingdom as well, since the existing legislation does not reflect public opinion. In 2019 three Members of Parliament from three parties visited Canada in order to evaluate the legal cannabis sector first-hand. Not surprisingly, the Liberal Democrat and Labour MPs later declared that they would support a change in 'cannabis legislation in the next five to ten years'. Only the Conservative MP did not show support for cannabis legalisation following the visit.[42] The Conservative Party of the UK has historically maintained that cannabis should remain an illegal substance.[43] There have also been allegations of racism linked to the Conservative Party and its leaders. One such point is the commentary on Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech in 1968 which, riddled with racist undertones, was aimed against the 1968 Race Relations Bill.[44] This bill made it illegal to refuse employment, public services, or housing to any person based on colour, race, or ethnic origin.[45] More recently, the current Prime Minister Boris Johnson has been quoted numerous times making racist comments. An article for the Guardian mentions that in articles written by Johnson before becoming Prime Minister he has referred to black people as 'piccaninnies with watermelon smiles' as well as claiming that the police were 'cowed' by the Macpherson Report.[46] While these claims were not made while he was in office, they are a glimpse into the rhetoric that has been accepted by the Conservative Party. An NHS study suggested that while around 10% of cannabis users may develop an addiction to cannabis, 32% of tobacco users and 15% of alcohol users will become addicted to tobacco and alcohol, respectively. There is also no recorded case of death caused by cannabis in the United Kingdom.[47] Alcoholchange.org has compiled statistics from the government showing that 24% of adults in England and Scotland regularly drink more than what is considered low-risk[48]; they found that in 2016 there were 9,214 alcohol-related deaths.[49] The Office for National Statistics found that 14.7% of adults over 18 years of age smoked cigarettes in the UK in 2018. In the same year there were 77,800 deaths attributed to smoking tobacco in the UK.[50] So, on the basis of death and addiction, cannabis seems to be relatively low risk compared to two substances that are legal and regulated. Yet, it is health concerns that are repeatedly cited when officials are asked about why there has been no significant movement toward legalisation of cannabis.[51] Conclusion: A long road to legalisation There is a worldwide shift happening in terms of social views of cannabis use. In Canada, while cannabis was still illegal it was clearly not a major concern of law enforcement, and there seems to be a similar attitude in the United Kingdom where other forms of crime take a greater importance. There is a complex web of connection between institutionalised racism, parliament, law enforcement, and politics regarding cannabis. There is a visible lag when it comes to legislation and law enforcement being up to date with social attitudes and there is clearly a disconnect between them. It seems even law enforcement does not stand on the same side of legalisation as current legislation. They seem to be shifting toward polled public attitudes that possession of cannabis and personal recreational use should not be criminalised. Talking about the impact of a law moves far past the wording of the provision or the sentencing for the crime. Law enforcement is a key piece of the system that perpetuates this racial oppression. Even with the public support for cannabis legalisation, changing social attitude, and the prevalence of usage it does not necessarily look like the English Parliament will be pushing any bills forward to make that a reality anytime soon, especially not under a Conservative government. By looking at two multicultural countries we are able to see how political differences impact the legality of cannabis. The uses of cannabis in many other countries are tied to cultural significance as well as social tolerance such as in India, mentioned previously. Cannabis is not the problem; it is the connection to organised crime and violence which can be tackled through government regulation. This has been shown in the data gathered by statistics Canada showing that in every province and territory, legalisation has brought at minimum a 26% decrease in police reported cannabis offences.[52] It is important that we continue to question the legitimacy of the claims the government makes about why they refuse to legalise and regulate cannabis as well as the institutionalised racism involved. There is evidence to suggest that the government has been using cannabis as a proverbial 'garden tool' to weed-out groups that they choose to target, or they believe are less important, and there is plenty of evidence showing that it is the black community that received the short end of that stick. All should be equal before the law, but this is virtually impossible to uphold when the law is represented through people, because people make judgements based on their inherent biases. There is no one statistic, statute, or study that will conclusively prove that politicians through the ages have used cannabis to paint a target on the backs of the black community, but there is evidence of it everywhere. With the information that we do have in consideration, cannabis is no more dangerous to human health than alcohol and tobacco. Continuing to demonise cannabis and insist that it should have no place in the UK's society is hypocritical. Based on the attitudes of the public, as well as law enforcement, its criminal status is also completely unnecessary. There are better things for the justice system to be focusing on, and worse things to be keeping out of society. [1] Mohamed Ben Amar, 'Cannabinoids in Medicine: A Review of Their Therapeutic Potential' (2006) 105 Journal of Ethnopharmacology 1. [2] Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, Schedule 2 Part II. [3] ibid Schedule 4. [4] Patrick McCrystal and Kerry Winning, 'Cannabis Reclassification: What is the Message to the Next Generation of Cannabis Users?' (2009) 15 Child Care in Practice 57. [5] 'Cannabis Reclassification' (Press Releases, 28 January 2005) accessed 20 April 2020. [6] McCrystal and Winning (n 4). [7] Simon Byrne, 'ACPO Guidance on Cannabis Possession for Personal Use: Revised Intervention Framework' (Association of Chief Police Officers, 28 January 2009). [8] '420: Seven Charts on How Cannabis Use Has Changed' (BBC News, 20 April 2019) accessed 12 March 2020. [9] 'Comments on the Reported Statistics on Narcotic Drugs' (International Narcotics Control Board, 18 October 2012) accessed 28 April 2020. [10] Marc I D'Eon, 'Police Enforcement of Cannabis Possession Laws in Canada: Changes in Implementation by Street-Level Bureaucrats' (Master's thesis, University of Saskatchewan 2017) accessed 28 April 2020. [11] Zach Dubinsky and Lisa Mayor, 'Who's Really behind Toronto's Chain of Illegal Pot Shops That Won't Quit?' (CBC News, 19 July 2019) accessed 28 April 2020; Robert Benzie, 'Trudeau urges police to "enforce the law" on marijuana' (The Star, 3 December 2016) accessed 4 May 2020. [12] Byrne (n 7). [13] ibid 4. [14] ibid 9. [15] Tom Harper, 'Police "Going Soft" on Cannabis Users' (The Times, 6 April 2019) accessed 2 May 2020. [16] Damian Gayle, 'Durham Police Stop Targeting Pot Smokers and Small-Scale Growers' (The Guardian, 22 July 2015) accessed 25 April 2020. [17] Pub Spy, 'Canterbury is "weed central" so why don't we just legalise it, say potheads' (The Canterbury Journal, 2 March 2018) accessed 28 April 2020. [18] ibid. [19] Michelle Rotermann, 'What has changed since cannabis was legalized?' (Statistics Canada, 19 February 2020) accessed 28 April 2020. [20] Leslie L Iversen, The Science of Marijuana (OUP 2008). [21] Chris Conrad, Hemp for Health: The Medicinal and Nutritional Uses of Cannabis Sativa (Healing Arts Press 1997). [22] Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege (Pennyslvania State UP 1997). [23] William MacPherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (The Stationery Office 1999). [24] Government Digital Service, 'Police Powers to Stop and Search: Your Rights' (GOV.UK, February 23, 2017) accessed 28 April 2020. [25] Benzie (n 11). [26] 'Drug Misuse: Findings from the 2018 to 2019 Crime Survey for England and Wales' (Home Office, 19 September 2019), 18. Available at . See Figure 3.1 'Proportion of 16 to 59 Year Olds Reporting Use of Illicit Drugs in the Last Year by Personal Characteristics'. [27] 'Stop and Search: How successful is the police tactic?' (BBC News, 4 April 2018) accessed 28 April 2020. [28] Jodie Hargreaves, Chris Linehan, and Chris McKee, 'Police powers and procedures, England and Wales, year ending 31 March 2016' (Home Office, 27 October 2016), 26. [29] 'Stop and Search…' (n 28). [30] MacPherson (n 23). [31] ibid. [32] ibid. [33] Benzie (n 11). [34] 'Youth Voter Turnout in Canada' (Publication No. 2016-104-E, Library of Parliament, Canada, 13 October 2016). Available at . [35] Canadian Multiculturalism Act 1985 s3(1)(e). [36] Equality Act 2010 s1(1). [37] ibid s3. [38] ibid s3(1)(i). [39] Sylvain Charlebois and Simon Somogyi, 'Marijuana-infused food and Canadian consumers' willingness to consider recreational marijuana as a food ingredient' (September 2017) accessed 28 April 2020. [40] Elena Mazneva, 'U.K. Legalizing Cannabis Supported by Near-Majority of Voters' (Bloomberg, 14 July 2019) accessed 28 April 2020. [41] 'Drug Misuse: Findings from the 2017/18 Crime Survey for England and Wales' (Home Office, July 2018). Available at . [42] Emily Ledger, 'Cannabis Policy of the Political Parties – the Conservatives' (The Cannabis Exchange, 30 November 2019) accessed 26 April 2020. [43] ibid. [44] Michael Savage, 'Fifty Years on, what is the legacy of Enoch Powell's "rivers of blood" speech?' (The Guardian, 15 April 2018) accessed 26 April 2020. [45] Race Relations Act 1968. [46] Frances Perraudin, 'New controversial comments uncovered in Historical Boris Johnson articles' (The Guardian, 9 December 2019) accessed 27 April 2020. [47] Maria Correa, 'How Close Is the UK to Legalising Cannabis?' (The Lawyer Portal, 8 January 2019) accessed 26 April 2020. [48] 'Alcohol Statistics' (Alcohol Change UK, 2 March 2020) accessed 27 April 2020. [49] Melissa Bennett, 'Dataset: Alcohol-related deaths in the UK' (ONS, 7 November 2017) accessed 26 April 2020. [50] Danielle Cornish and others, 'Adult smoking habits in the UK: 2018' (ONS, 2 July 2019) accessed 26 April 2020. [51] Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, 'Cannabis: Classification and Public Health' (Home Office, April 2008) accessed 27 April 2020. [52] Gregory Moreau, 'Police-reported cannabis offences in Canada, 2018: Before and after legalization' (Statistics Canada, 24 July 2019) accessed 27 April 2020.
Editorial Aniversario y balance Por una renovación de la agenda historiográfica de las izquierdas Colectivo Editor Se han cumplido veinte años ya de aquel viernes 3 de abril de 1998 en que el CeDInCI abriera por primera vez sus puertas en el barrio porteño de Almagro. Poco antes de la universalización del correo electrónico, y a través del antiguo sistema de invitación por tarjeta de cartón, del rumor boca a boca y el llamado telefónico, más de doscientos asistentes desbordaron la vieja casa de la calle Sarmiento cuando todavía olía a pintura fresca. Más de la mitad de los concurrentes debió esperar en la calle a que salieran los primeros para poder ingresar. ¿Qué fue lo que convocó en aquellos años de reflujo de las izquierdas y de apogeo del menemismo a las más diversas figuras de la cultura argentina, desde David Viñas a Juan José Sebreli, desde Emilio J. Corbière a Mary Feijóo, desde José Sazbón a Abel Alexis Lattendorf? Sin lugar a dudas, la expectativa de que, finalmente, un centro de documentación concebido a la manera de las modernas instituciones europeas pudiera recoger en un espacio único y plural el patrimonio documental de los movimientos sociales y las izquierdas que hasta entonces se dispersaba, y a menudo se perdía. Sin embargo, esa fundación no vino, como suele decirse, a "llenar un vacío". Fue necesario librar a lo largo de los años una verdadera batalla cultural para introducir en la agenda pública y en la agenda social el concepto de patrimonio documental. Para entonces, cuando el primero de estos términos era apenas un sinónimo de patrimonio arquitectónico, el legado documental era una noción carente de sentido. En lo que a la cultura de izquierdas respecta, los fondos personales de militantes, dirigentes, sindicalistas, escritores y editores, o los acervos de pequeñas organizaciones políticas y sociales se volatilizaban; y con ellos, la posibilidad de escribir la historia de las izquierdas, de los movimientos sociales, de las clases subalternas. La fundación del CeDInCI conjuró para siempre aquel desdén, aquel olvido. Desde ese abril de 1998 su acervo creció exponencialmente. Veinte años después, se contabilizan con nombre y apellido casi dos mil donantes. A pesar de su fragilidad institucional —apenas una asociación civil sin fines de lucro, gestionado por un equipo de una decena de profesionales—, el CeDInCI apareció a lo largo de estos años como un espacio que ofrece a los donantes garantías de transparencia, estabilidad y pluralidad. La modernización que propuso el CeDInCI en el terreno bibliotecológico, hemerográfico y archivístico vino estrechamente ligada a una propuesta de renovación historiográfica. Poner a disposición de los investigadores un acervo documental cuantioso, rico y diverso era condición necesaria pero no suficiente para una actualización de los estudios sobre las izquierdas. Recordemos brevemente aquel contexto. Para fines del siglo XX el estudio de las izquierdas estaba fuera de la agenda historiográfica. La historia obrera, una de las ramas que se había desprendido de la historia social a mediados del siglo XX, había quedado reducida a un rol residual, apenas cultivada por un porfiado puñado de historiadores, entre los que sobresalía la figura tutelar de Alberto Pla, fallecido en 2008. El cierre del CICSO (un centro de investigación fundado en 1966 que había producido una obra colectiva de referencia a comienzos de la década de 1970),[1] la dispersión de sus investigadores más reconocidos y la donación de su archivo a una institución tan poco previsible como la SADE (Sociedad Argentina de Escritores) constituían un síntoma elocuente de aquel fin de ciclo. Algunos de los historiadores obreros más jóvenes apelaban por entonces a la renovación que había conocido la historiografía inglesa desde la década de 1960, pero a menudo sus referencias a las obras de un E. P. Thompson fueron, antes que un índice de lecturas fructíferas o una puesta en acto de sus aportes teórico-conceptuales, verdaderos modelos de citas de autoridad.[2] Mientras estos historiadores obreros resistían desde un paradigma historiográfico francamente conservador (una teoría de la clases sociales y de su conciencia de corte leninista, una reificación del conflicto social y una metodología positivista de recolección "objetiva" de "datos"), la historiografía conocía una renovación vertiginosa a escala global, que socavaba incluso muchos de sus supuestos epistemológicos. Desde el impacto del "giro lingüístico" hasta al correspondiente al "giro material" (por no hablar del más reciente "giro reflexivo"), tanto la microhistoria, la historia de las mujeres, la historia de lo cotidiano, la historia de la sexualidad, la historia social de la cultura como la nueva historia política conmovían los cimientos de la profesión, despertaban la vocación de los nuevos historiadores y reorientaban incluso los intereses muchos investigadores formados. De modo que para fines de la década de 1990 la mayor parte de los miembros del PEHESA,[3] un centro fundado en 1977 a comienzos de la última dictadura militar y que había venido a modernizar los estudios de historia social, habían abandonado la historia obrera stricto sensu. Si bien durante algunos años prosiguieron los trabajos de Silvia Badoza sobre la Sociedad Tipográfica Bonaerense, los de Mirta Lobato sobre las obreras de los frigoríficos de Berisso, los de Juan Suriano sobre el anarquismo argentino o los de Ricardo Falcón sobre la formación de la clase obrera en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX, buena parte de los investigadores fueron atraídos enseguida por otras demandas historiográficas. Suriano fue desplazando sus intereses desde el movimiento obrero anarquista hacia la cultura libertaria.[4] Leandro Gutiérrez —el principal inspirador de la historia y la cultura obrera, y su último cultor a tiempo completo, fallecido en 1992—, había iniciado junto a Luis Alberto Romero un desplazamiento de su objeto hacia los que entonces se designaban como "sectores populares".[5] Significativamente, la obra que reunía gran parte de los trabajos maduros de historia social y obrera de esa generación —nos referimos a Jeremy Adelman (ed.), Essays in Argentine Labour History 1870-1930— no encontró un editor en la Argentina.[6] Si la historia de la clase obrera se veía progresivamente desplazada de la renovada agenda historiográfica de fin de siglo, la historia de las corrientes de izquierda que no se encuadraba en lo que entonces llamábamos "historias oficiales", seguía siendo cultivada casi exclusivamente por el periodismo de investigación. La popularidad que gozaron en los años '80 y '90 las contribuciones sobre anarquismo, socialismo, comunismo y nueva izquierda de figuras como Osvaldo Bayer, Emilio J. Corbière, Isidoro Gilbert y María Seoane contrastaban con la reticencia de la historiografía académica frente a estos objetos. Sólo unas pocas obras clave nacidas entre esas dos décadas vinieron a dar una nota discordante en ese clima académico: nos referimos a Una modernidad periférica: Buenos Aires 1920 y 1930 (1988) de Beatriz Sarlo, Nuestros años sesentas. La formación de la nueva izquierda intelectual en la Argentina (1956-1966) (1991) de Oscar Terán, e Intelectuales y poder en Argentina en la década del sesenta (1991) de Silvia Sigal. Aunque respondían más a ejercicios de balance histórico por parte de intelectuales formados en las décadas pasadas que a la agenda académica de esos años, estas obras iban a abrir una brecha en la renovación historiográfica nacida con el nuevo siglo. Fue en ese contexto de innovación al mismo tiempo que de profesionalización de la historiografía argentina, que el CeDInCI postulaba en torno a 1998, además de la necesidad de un acervo documental, una agenda historiográfica para el estudio de las izquierdas y de las clases subalternas. Por supuesto, ya la propia organización de un centro que reuniera en forma integral y al mismo tiempo diferenciada áreas de biblioteca, hemeroteca y archivo, hablaba de una renovación respecto de las antiguas bibliotecas donde estas áreas solían estar confundidas. La hemeroteca adquiría en este proyecto un lugar central, poniendo a disposición de los investigadores un universo revisteril mucho más denso, diverso y proteico que el de las pocas revistas canónicas que había consagrado la historia literaria en el siglo XX. El archivo, centrado en los fondos de militantes, escritores y editores, venía a ofrecer un corpus hasta entonces apenas transitado por la historiografía. La novedad no estaba tanto en la diversidad de los soportes ofrecidos, como en el orden con que fueron organizados y presentados. La organización y la catalogación misma de los libros, los folletos, los afiches, los periódicos, las revistas, las cartas privadas, fueron concebidas desde un inicio para propiciar una historia renovada y multidimensional de las izquierdas. Borges decía que el orden de una biblioteca era un modo silencioso de ejercer la crítica. Para nosotros, el catálogo excedía su dimensión técnica, el orden de las piezas respondía a una perspectiva de la historia, el tesauro a un universo conceptual, la descripción se comprometía con la investigación. También el propio nombre de la institución, con su referencia expresa no a "la izquierda" lisa y llana, sino a una "cultura de izquierdas", sugería además de la pluralidad todo un abanico de dimensiones materiales, simbólicas e imaginarias de social y de lo político que connotaba el término cultura, excediendo con creces la clásica historia institucional centrada en pasar revista de los congresos, analizar la corrección de los discursos de los dirigentes y en contabilizar la cantidad de obreros que el partido controlaba entre los marítimos o los ferroviarios. El lanzamiento del CeDInCI fue acompañado de una serie de libros y de artículos de carácter programático elaborados por algunos de sus fundadores que en poco tiempo era asumida y enriquecida por una nueva camada de historiadores.[7] A contrapelo de un clima historiográfico en el que Marx y el marxismo eran sacrificados en el altar del "fin de las ideologías", esos textos, al mismo tiempo que celebraban la profunda renovación historiográfica en curso, se esforzaban en mostrar el estímulo intelectual y el provecho historiográfico que ofrecían ciertas figuras y conceptos forjados por el marxismo crítico de un Gramsci o un Benjamin, así como por historiadores marxistas extraacadémicos olvidados como Issac Deutscher, Arthur Rosenberg o Fernando Claudín. Pugnaban, asimismo, por mostrar los signos de renovación de la historia social británica a los que la academia argentina comenzaba a darle la espalda —desde los estudios clásicos de Eric Hobsbawm, E.P. Thompson y Raymond Williams hasta los de Raphael Samuel, Perry Anderson y Gareth Stedman Jones—, la innovación historiográfica que había representado en las décadas de 1970 y 1980 la obra de figuras como Robert Paris, Georges Haupt y Franco Andreucci para la historia del marxismo y las internacionales obreras, así como los aportes contemporáneos de la sociología de la cultura (Pierre Bourdieu y su escuela) y la sociología de los intelectuales revolucionarios (Michael Löwy). La nueva historia de las izquierdas y de las clases subalternas incluía y al mismo tiempo excedía la historia partidaria, la historia obrera o la historia del mundo del trabajo. Proponía, por ejemplo, otras claves para repensar la dimensión institucional (desde el socioanálisis de René Lourau y Georges Lapassade hasta la teoría foucaultiana de los micropoderes, pasando por la dimensión imaginaria teorizada por Cornelius Castoriadis),[8] incorporaba la perspectiva de género y el concepto de vida cotidiana para repensar las subjetividades militantes, dialogaba con los aportes conceptuales y metodológicos de la sociología cultural, de la historia intelectual y la historia del libro y la edición para reconsiderar dimensiones claves de la cultura de izquierdas, hasta entonces apenas exploradas en nuestro país por unos pocos estudios pioneros, como los de Dora Barrancos. El CeDInCI promovió un diálogo productivo de la historia de las izquierdas con la nueva historia intelectual, menos atento a ciertas prescripciones de la Escuela de Cambridge de Skinner y Pocock —sobre todo las que parecen "querer apresar las ideas de una época en sus marcos lingüísticos"[9] — que a las vertientes que ponen en el centro los soportes materiales de los procesos históricos de la cultura, aquellos que se resisten a ser simplemente reducidos a texto. Comprometida en un proyecto de historización radical de las ideas, Políticas de la Memoria promovió estudios y debates sobre la problemática de la recepción y la circulación internacional de ideas y saberes, poniendo sobre todo de relieve los problemas de "traductibilidad", los "desvíos" y "malentendidos" propios de las "ideas fuera de lugar". Dentro de la renovación que conoce la historia de los intelectuales, nuestra revista atendió antes que nada a la dimensión relacional de la historia social de la cultura, prestando especial atención a las redes intelectuales, las redes editoriales y las redes revisteriles. Siguiendo estas líneas, fue plataforma de difusión de diversos referentes de esa renovación historiográfica como Enzo Traverso, Bruno Groppo, Perry Anderson, Christophe Prochasson, Daniel James, Judith Revel, Roberto Schwarz, Ricardo Melgar, Claudio Batalha, Ricardo Piglia, Giselle Sapiro, Jean-Yves Mollier, Vivek Chibber, Philippe Artières y Dominique Kalifa, entre muchos otros. Una política de edición que anticipó y complementó una revista hermana del CeDInCI como El Rodaballo, menos acotada al campo historiográfico y más abierta a los debates intelectuales, que dio a conocer entre 1994 y 2006 textos inéditos en español de Toni Negri, Michael Hardt, Perry Anderson, Robin Blackburn, Michael Löwy, Boris Kagarlitsky, Nancy Fraser, Judith Butler, André Gorz, John Holloway, Frédrik Jameson, Robert Castel, Daniel Bensaïd, Richard Greeman, Terry Eagleton, Etienne Balibar, Régis Debray y René Lourau, entre muchos otros. Con el apoyo de estas renovadas lecturas, Políticas de la Memoria garantizaba la puesta en circulación de un amplio espectro de problemas referidos al mundo de la cultura de izquierdas en Argentina, Latinoamérica y Europa; participando, de este modo, de diferentes y entrecruzadas agendas historiográficas, debates político-académicos y temas de marcada recurrencia entre historiadores y cientistas sociales. A partir de la publicación de artículos, dossiers e intervenciones se abordaron cuestiones como la recepción argentina de Marx y la configuración de una cultura marxista en nuestro país, la formación y las derivas del socialismo argentino, las vicisitudes del anarquismo en América Latina, la historia intelectual del comunismo latinoamericano, el sindicalismo y sus diversas corrientes ideológicas, el antiimperialismo en los albores del siglo XX, el indigenismo y los latinoamericanismos, los intelectuales y su relación con la política revolucionaria, los avatares del trotskismo en la Argentina, del peronismo de izquierda, de las "nuevas izquierdas" y de los grupos armados a nivel continental. Asimismo, Políticas de la Memoria dio lugar a debates recientes sobre la historia europea contemporánea (guerras mundiales, revolución rusa, totalitarismos, guerra fría), ofreciendo estudios referidos al desarrollo de los partidos socialistas y comunistas a nivel mundial y a la historia de las Internacionales Obreras. La historia del marxismo europeo y latinoamericano ocupó en sus páginas un lugar sostenido, lejos tanto del desdén de la historia académica como de los abordajes trillados de los órganos semipartidarios. La serie sobre las sucesivas "crisis del marxismo", aún en curso de publicación, ofreció textos hasta entonces inéditos en español de Masaryk, Sorel, Croce, Gentile y Mondolfo, así como los sustantivos estudios introductorios de Daniel Sazbón, Miguel Candioti y Horacio Tarcus. Finalmente, debemos destacar al anuario como uno de los pioneros en la difusión de estudios y debates sobre los movimientos feministas y sobre la cuestión sexo-genérica en la cultura de izquierdas. En la construcción sostenida de esta singular agenda de temas y de problemas, no fue menor la exhumación de documentos inéditos (piénsese en la correspondencia cruzada entre Ingenieros, Darío y Lugones, en las cartas de Simón Radowitzky a Salvadora Medina Onrubia, en la correspondencia de Mario R. Santucho con Carlos Astrada, en la de José Aricó con Héctor P. Agosti, o en las Actas del Comité Obrero de 1890) así como la incorporación de trabajos que reconstruyen la trayectoria biográfica, política e intelectual de figuras clave en la historia de las izquierdas, como Germán Avé-Lallemant, Virginia Bolten o Ernesto Laclau. Por su parte, la publicación de reseñas críticas, fichas de libros y de revistas que ofrece cada año Políticas de la Memoria —secciones que fueron engrosándose hasta formar parte constitutiva del anuario—, constituyen un insumo fundamental de actualización bibliográfica para cualquier interesado en el mundo de las izquierdas. Pero el aporte de Políticas de la Memoria a los estudios sobre la cultura de izquierdas no es simplemente temático. Su contribución tampoco se resume en la incorporación y en la difusión de autores y de obras de reconocimiento internacional. El anuario interviene en el debate de ideas y se interesa por diferentes perspectivas historiográficas: a su modo, ha formado parte del cultivado campo de la historia intelectual argentina y latinoamericana, ha mostrado un interés sostenido pero también crítico por los modos en que a menudo se cultiva la historia reciente, dando lugar a debates sobre la relación entre historia y memoria, y señalando las potencialidades y los límites de la historia oral. Políticas de la Memoria ha sido pionera en difundir nuevas corrientes de investigación dedicadas a la historia del libro y la edición, a las políticas de archivo y a la relación entre historia cultural y nueva historia política. El mero enunciado de los ejes temáticos con que fueron convocadas las sucesivas Jornadas de Historia de las Izquierdas del CeDInCI a lo largo de los últimos 20 años ofrece un índice ilustrativo de su programa historiográfico, tal y como se fue desplegando a lo largo del tiempo: "Exilios políticos latinoamericanos y argentinos" (2005); "Prensa política, revistas culturales y emprendimientos editoriales de las izquierdas latinoamericanas" (2007); "¿Las 'ideas fuera de lugar'? El problema de la recepción y la circulación de ideas en América Latina" (2009); "José Ingenieros y sus mundos" (2011); "La correspondencia en la historia política e intelectual latinoamericana" (2013); "Marxismos latinoamericanos. Tradiciones, debates y nuevas perspectivas desde la Historia cultural e intelectual" (2015); "100 años de Octubre de 1917: Peripecias latinoamericanas de un acontecimiento global" (2017). El estudio de Juan Maiguashca incluido recientemente en Marxist historiographies. A global perspective tomaba justamente a las Jornadas del CeDInCI como un índice de la renovación historiográfica latinoamericana de izquierdas posterior a los años de la "crisis del marxismo".[10] El historiador ecuatoriano, actualmente profesor de la Universidad de York, Canadá, ofrecía un cotejo entre los que identificaba como los dos polos paradigmáticos de la renovación del marxismo historiográfico de inicios de siglo: la revista mexicana Contrahistorias. La otra mirada de Clío, que fundó en 2003 Carlos Antonio Aguirre Rojas, y las jornadas bianuales del CeDInCI. Maiguashca reconocía como notas distintivas del caso argentino la creciente voluntad de exceder los límites de la historia nacional para abrazar un horizonte latinoamericano; la consolidación de un espacio de diálogo que vino a reemplazar "las actitudes solipsistas de antaño"; el rigor en el tratamiento y el citado de las fuentes; la apertura hacia los diversos marxismos y más allá de los marxismos; y la ampliación del universo de la cultura de izquierdas hacia problemáticas antes negadas o desconocidas como el feminismo, los movimientos sociales o la memoria histórica. "La preocupación obsesiva con las clases se ha ido y los participantes están comenzando a explorar con una mente abierta las importaciones analíticas de otras variables: etnia, género, territorio, entre otros".[11] Además de sus jornadas bianuales, el CeDInCI organizó o promovió la coorganización de encuentros académicos sobre campos de estudio más amplios, como los Coloquios Argentinos de estudios sobre el libro y la edición (2012, 2016 y 2018), los Encuentros de Investigadore/as del Anarquismo (2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 y 2015), el Primer Congreso de Investigadorxs sobre Anarquismo (2016), o las Jornadas de Archivo (2015 y 2017) así como el Encuentro nacional de Teoría Crítica José Sazbón (Rosario, 2010), las Jornadas Internacionales José María Aricó (Córdoba, 2011) y las Jornadas A 100 años de la Reforma Universitaria. Historia, Política, Cultura (Rosario, 2018). Además, en los últimos años, se han creado en el marco del CeDInCI dos nuevos espacios específicos que han mancomunado archivo e investigación. Primero, el Programa de Investigación del Anarquismo que animó, junto a otros colegas, un proceso de intercambio que culminó con la organización del Congreso de 2016 cuya continuidad, en un Segundo Congreso Internacional de Investigadorxs del Anarquismo, se celebrará en Montevideo en 2019. A su vez, en el año 2017 se creó el Programa de memorias políticas feministas y sexogenéricas que, con una notable Colectiva asesora, lleva adelante un intenso trabajo de recuperación, preservación y disposición a la consulta pública de un invaluable material que se encontraba en riesgo de pérdida, disperso o inaccesible. Finalmente, el CeDInCI fue parte activa de las sucesivas Jornadas de Trabajo sobre Historia Reciente, librando batallas, desde sus primeras manifestaciones en el año 2003 y hasta el presente, a favor de esa historia crítica que se resiste a ser avasallada por la memoria; el CeDInCI protagonizó asimismo las primeras manifestaciones pluralistas de los Congresos de Historia Intelectual Latinoamericana (CHIAL) realizados en Medellín (2012) y Buenos Aires (2014), tomando luego prudente distancia de un espacio que fue adquiriendo en México (2016) y más gravemente en Santiago de Chile (2018) contornos elitistas y conservadores. * * * A lo largo de estos 20 años, la producción historiográfica sobre las izquierdas conoció una expansión inédita, no sólo en nuestro país sino en toda América Latina. En los textos programáticos de la década de 1990 que anunciaban el nacimiento del CeDInCI, la bibliografía argentina sobre las izquierdas apenas superaba una carilla. Hoy contamos con una masa de estudios sobre el anarquismo, el socialismo, el reformismo universitario, el comunismo, el antifascismo, el trotskismo, el peronismo revolucionario y las diversas expresiones de la nueva izquierda que se ha tornado prácticamente inabarcable. El espectro tradicional de las izquierdas se fue complejizando con la indagación focalizada en ciertos cruces, préstamos e hibridaciones poco antes impensados, como los "anarcobolcheviques" o los "comunistas liberales". A su vez, estas corrientes son atravesadas diagonalmente por estudios innovadores sobre los intelectuales revolucionarios, las políticas editoriales, la prensa y las revistas, el papel de las juventudes, el rol de las mujeres militantes, las micropolíticas, las prácticas sexuales y las biopolíticas de las organizaciones de izquierda. El CeDInCI acompañó y contribuyó a modelar este vasto proceso de producción con su acervo siempre enriquecido, con sus jornadas y sus seminarios de posgrado, con su revista Políticas de la Memoria, con sus ediciones de fuentes y sus diccionarios biográficos. Basta repasar los centenares de agradecimientos que muchos investigadores estampan en las primeras páginas de sus tesis o de sus libros para reconocer al menos el umbral más básico de esta deuda. Además, las obras que fueron elaborando los propios hacedores del CeDInCI se han ido instalando como referencias en el campo de estudios sobre las izquierdas en Argentina y América Latina. Ahora bien, el CeDInCI ha sido apenas un propiciador de este campo. El notable dinamismo desplegado en la Argentina de los últimos veinte años ha respondido a demandas múltiples y diversas. Una de las mayores fue la que podríamos llamar la "demanda de verdad" respecto de la militancia revolucionaria de los años '60 y '70 así como de las condiciones de su represión y su derrota. Poco antes, la "demanda de justicia" propia del movimiento de derechos humanos tendía a poner a los sujetos de la política en el lugar de víctimas de la represión. En un segundo momento, el periodismo de investigación y la historiografía académica después, vinieron a reponer a esos sujetos en su condición de militantes. El auge de estudios sobre la militancia de las dos décadas de gran movilización social y radicalidad política (1955-1976) tuvo un efecto dinamizador sobre otras experiencias y otras figuras militantes de pasados algo más remotos. Esta demanda social de "verdad" fue inicialmente satisfecha por un periodismo de investigación abiertamente tensado por sus posicionamientos políticos, desde las contribuciones de Isidoro Gilbert y María Seoane hasta las de Ceferino Reato y Tata Yofre. En el campo específicamente historiográfico, algunas de las primeras respuestas surgieron de una cierta perspectiva académico-militante, de espíritu defensivo y reivindicativo, cuyo afán por exhumar documentos o recabar testimonios que probaran las correctas posiciones de las izquierdas en el pasado, o bien su profunda implantación social e incluso la aprobación social de sus acciones militares, los empujaba de modo concomitante a invisibilizar sus límites, a desproblematizar sus dilemas y a sublimar sus fracasos. En buena parte de esta literatura, la perspectiva historiográfica quedaba, así, capturada por el sistema de creencias de los propios actores que estudiaba. Estas formas de teleología obrera y de sobrepolitización de la historia apenas si se vieron neutralizadas por las exigencias de profesionalización propias de fines del siglo XX. Ciertamente, el ciclo de estudios sobre las izquierdas coincidió con un profundo proceso de profesionalización de las ciencias sociales y las humanidades que tuvo lugar a lo largo de estos veinte años: esto es, la significativa ampliación de cupos de ingreso a carrera de investigador de CONICET; la gran expansión de becas de especialización e investigación en universidades y diversas entidades científicas y académicas; y la proliferación de espacios de formación, producción y circulación de saberes disciplinares. Este proceso significó, sin duda, una necesaria y justa democratización del universo académico, fundamentalmente en lo relativo al establecimiento de condiciones materiales para la producción intelectual. Sin embargo, la normativización y objetivación —la más de las veces cuantitativa— de los criterios de acreditación, evaluación y legitimación del quehacer intelectual implicaron en contrapartida una penalización a la historiografía más elaborada, crítica y original. La producción en serie de papers y artículos en los que prima la descripción —a veces minuciosa o erudita, otras no tanto— por sobre la interrogación y la construcción de objetos-problema; las escrituras que en su afán de productividad han abandonado todo debate, toda pretensión teórica o cuanto menos reflexiva, es la que predomina hoy en nuestros campos disciplinares. La cuestión excede con creces, por supuesto, a la historiografía de izquierdas, pero es ésta la que nos interesa aquí. Este sistema cuantitativo de evaluación y legitimación ha sido incluso perfectamente funcional para el crecimiento de esas versiones de la historia obrera tradicional o de la historia partidaria, permitiéndoles acomodarse perfectamente a unas reglas que exigen alta productividad antes que problematización de los objetos y avances reales en la construcción social del conocimiento histórico. El balance de conjunto de la producción de estos últimos veinte años sobre las izquierdas aún está por hacerse. Aquí sólo quisimos avanzar en algunos señalamientos que hacen al específico posicionamiento del CeDInCI, entre los riesgos de partidización de la historia reciente, por un lado, y ciertas derivas elitistas y despolitizadoras de la nueva historia intelectual, por otro. Nos propusimos incitar a un debate colectivo que sirva como balance de lo producido y como actualización de una agenda historiográfica para el estudio de las izquierdas, que tal como había sido formulada veinte años atrás, ya ha quedado en cierto modo realizada, y por lo tanto anticuada. El aniversario, además de la congratulación, puede ser una excelente oportunidad para barajar y dar de nuevo, para debatir colectivamente cuál es hoy el mapa de la historiografía de izquierdas; cuáles sus dispositivos teórico-metodológicos y sus redes conceptuales más destacadas; cuáles sus imbricaciones y apuestas político-intelectuales; cuáles son sus tensiones; qué tradiciones político-ideológicas se perpetúan en las escrituras actuales; cuáles han sido desechadas, cuáles olvidadas, cuáles actualizadas; cuáles son sus puentes, cuáles sus distancias con el espacio más general de la memoria. Incluso cabe preguntarse: ¿Puede hablarse de un campo de estudio de las izquierdas?, o incluso: ¿qué sería hoy una historiografía de izquierdas? Para ello, invitamos a colegas y amigos a participar de las próximas Xas Jornadas de Historia de las Izquierdas Dos décadas de historia de las izquierdas latinoamericanas. Aniversario y balance, los días 20, 21 y 22 de noviembre de 2019. Beba Balvé, Miguel Murmis, Juan Carlos Marín, Lidia Aufgang, Tomás J. Bar y Roberto Jacoby, Lucha de calles, lucha de clases. Elementos para su análisis (Córdoba, 1961-1969), Buenos Aires, La Rosa Blindada, 1973. ↑ Tan sólo a modo de ejemplo: en sentido opuesto a la expresa declaración de su autor, el enfoque de Oposición obrera a la dictadura (Buenos Aires, Contrapunto, 1988) de Pablo Pozzi era escasamente thompsoniano. Lejos de tomar la dimensión de la experiencia como constitutiva de la clase obrera, no hacía más que evaluar las prácticas de resistencia obrera construidas empíricamente con el rasero de una conciencia de clase previamente establecida (en un sentido, justamente, pre-thompsoniano). ↑ Programa de Estudios de Historia Económica y Social Americana. ↑ Juan Suriano, Trabajadores, anarquismo y Estado represor : De la Ley de Residencia a la Ley de Defensa Social (1902-1910), Buenos Aires, CEAL, 1988; y Anarquistas. Cultura y política libertaria en Buenos Aires. 1890-1910, Buenos Aires, Manantial, 2001. ↑ Leandro Gutiérrez, Luis Alberto Romero, "Los sectores populares y el movimiento obrero: un balance historiográfico", en Sectores populares. Cultura y política, Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 1995. ↑ Jeremy Adelman (ed.), Essays in Argentine Labour History 1870-1930, Londres, Macmillan Press, 1992, incluyó estudios de Juan Suriano, Hilda Sábato, Silvia Badoza, Mirta Lobato, Ofelia Pianetto, Ruth Thompson, Colin M. Lewis, Eduardo A. Zimmermann, Leandro H. Gutiérrez, Luis Alberto Romero y el propio Jeremy Adelman. ↑ Horacio Tarcus, El marxismo olvidado en la Argentina: Silvio Frondizi y Milcíades Peña, Buenos Aires, El Cielo por Asalto, 1996; Horacio Tarcus, Mariátegui en la Argentina, o las políticas culturales de Samuel Glusberg, Buenos Aires, El Cielo por Asalto, 2001; H. Tarcus, J. Cernadas y R. Pittaluga, "Para una historia de la izquierda en la Argentina. Reflexiones preliminares", en El Rodaballo nº 6/7, Buenos Aires, otoño/invierno 1997, pp. 28-38; Íbid., "La historiografía sobre el Partido Comunista de la Argentina: un estado de la cuestión", en El Rodaballo. Revista de política y cultura nº 8, Buenos Aires, otoño/invierno 1998, pp. 31-40. ↑ Horacio Tarcus, "La secta política. Ensayo acerca de la pervivencia de lo sagrado en la modernidad", en El Rodaballo. Revista de política y cultura, nº 9, Buenos Aires, verano 1998/99, pp. 13-33. ↑ Enzo Traverso, La historia como campo de batalla, Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2012, pp. 22; véase una crítica semejante en el estudio de Michael Heinrich que ofrecemos en este mismo número. ↑ Q. Edward Wang and Georg G. Iggers (eds.), Marxist historiographies. A global perspective, New York, Routledge, 2016. El estudio de Juan Maiguashca apareció inicialmente como "Latin American Marxist History: Rise, fall and resurrection", en Storia della Storiografia nº 62, Pisa, 2012, pp. 105-120. Hay una versión española de Isabel Mena: "Historia marxista latinoamericana: nacimiento, caída y resurrección", en Procesos. Revista ecuatoriana de historia nº 62, Quito, segundo semestre 2013, disponible en: http://revistaprocesos.ec/ojs/index.php/ojs/article/view/6/24 ↑ Juan Maiguashca , "Historia marxista latinoamericana: nacimiento, caída y resurrección", op. cit., p. 106. ↑
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Loet Leydesdorff on the Triple Helix: How Synergies in University-Industry-Government Relations can Shape Innovation Systems
This is the sixth and last in a series of Talks dedicated to the technopolitics of International Relations, linked to the forthcoming double volume 'The Global Politics of Science and Technology' edited by Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich
The relationship between technological innovation processes and the nation state remains a challenge for the discipline of International Relations. Non-linear and multi-directional characteristics of knowledge production, and the diffusive nature of knowledge itself, limit the general ability of governments to influence and steer innovation processes. Loet Leydesdorff advances the framework of the "Triple Helix" that disaggregates national innovation systems into evolving university-industry-government eco-systems. In this Talk, amongst others, he shows that these eco-systems can be expected to generate niches with synergy at all scales, and emphasizes that, though politics are always involved, synergies develop unintentionally.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is the most relevant aspect of the dynamics of innovation for the discipline of International Relations?
The main challenge is to endogenize the notions of technological progress and technological development into theorizing about political economies and nation states. The endogenization of technological innovation and technological development was first placed on the research agenda of economics by evolutionary economists like Nelson and Winter in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In this context, the question was how to endogenize the dynamics of knowledge, organized knowledge, science and technology into economic theorizing. However, one can equally well formulate the problem of how to reflect on the global (sub)dynamics of organized knowledge production in political theory and International Relations.
From a longer-term perspective, one can consider that the nation states – the national or political economies in Europe – were shaped in the 19th century, somewhat later for Germany (after 1871), but for most countries it was during the first half of the 19th century. This was after the French and American Revolutions and in relation to industrialization. These nation states were able to develop an institutional framework for organizing the market as a wealth-generating mechanism, while the institutional framework permitted them to retain wealth, to regulate market forces, and also to steer them to a certain extent. However, the market is not only a local dynamics; it is also a global phenomenon.
Nowadays, another global dynamics is involved: science and technology add a dynamics different from that of the market. The market is an equilibrium-seeking mechanism at each moment of time. The evolutionary dynamics of science and technology nowadays adds a non-equilibrium-seeking dynamics over time on top of that, and this puts the nation state in a very different position. Combining an equilibrium-seeking dynamics at each moment of time with a non-equilibrium seeking one over time results in a complex adaptive dynamics, or an eco-dynamics, or however you want to call it – these are different words for approximately the same thing.
For the nation state, the question arises of how it relates to the global market dynamics on the one side, and the global dynamics of knowledge and innovation on the other. Thus, the nation state has to combine two tasks. I illustrated this model of three subdynamics with a figure in my 2006 book entitled The Knowledge-Based Economy: Modeled, measured, simulated (see image). The figure shows that first-order interactions generate a knowledge-based economy as a next-order or global regime on top of the localized trajectories of nation states and innovative firms. These complex dynamics have first to be specified and then to be analyzed empirically.
For example, the knowledge-based dynamics change the relation between government and the economy; and they consequently change the position of the state in relation to wealth-retaining mechanisms. How can the nation state be organized in such a way as to retain wealth from knowledge locally, while knowledge (like capital) tends to travel beyond boundaries? One can envisage the complex system dynamics as a kind of cloud – a cloud that touches the ground at certain places, as Harald Bathelt, for example, formulated.
How can national governments shape conditions for the cloud to touch and to remain on the ground? The Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations can be considered as an eco-system of bi- and tri-lateral relations. The three institutions and their interrelations can be expected to form a system carrying the three functions of (i) novelty production, (ii) wealth generation, and (iii) normative control. One tends to think of university-industry-government relations first as neo-corporatist arrangements between these institutional partners. However, I am interested in the ecosystem shaped through the tri- and bilateral relationships.
This ecosystem can be shaped at different levels. It can be a regional ecosystem or a national ecosystem, for instance. One can ask whether there is a surplus of synergy between the three (sub-)dynamics of university-industry-government relations and where that synergy can generate wealth, knowledge, and control; in which places, and along trajectories for which periods of time – that is, the same synergy as meant by "a cloud touching the ground".
For example, when studying Piedmont as a region in Northern Italy, it is questionable whether the synergy in university-industry-government relations is optimal at this regional level or should better be examined from a larger perspective that includes Lombardy. On the one hand, the administrative borders of nations and regions result from the construction of political economies in the 19th century; but on the other hand, the niches of synergy that can be expected in a knowledge-based economy are bordered also; for example, in terms of metropolitan regions (e.g., Milan–Turin–Genoa).
Since political dynamics are always involved, this has implications for International Relations as a field of study. But the dynamic analysis is different from comparative statics (that is, measurement at different moments of time). The knowledge dynamics can travel and be "footloose" to use the words of Raymond Vernon, although it leaves footprints behind. Grasping "wealth from knowledge" (locally or regionally) requires taking a systems perspective. However, the system is not "given"; the system remains under reconstruction and can thus be articulated only as a theoretically informed hypothesis.
In the social sciences, one can use the concept of a hypothesized system heuristically. For example, when analyzing the knowledge-based economy in Germany, one can ask whether more synergy can be explained when looking at the level of the whole country (e.g., in terms of the East-West or North-South divide) or at the level of Germany's Federal States? What is the surplus of the nation or at the European level? How can one provide political decision-making with the required variety to operate as a control mechanism on the complex dynamics of these eco-systems?
A complex system can be expected to generate niches with synergy at all scales, but as unintended consequences. To what extent and for which time span can these effects be anticipated and then perhaps be facilitated? At this point, Luhmann's theory comes in because he has this notion of different codifications of communication, which then, at a next-order level, begin to self-organize when symbolically generalized.
Codes are constructed bottom-up, but what is constructed bottom-up may thereafter begin to control top-down. Thus, one should articulate reflexively the selection mechanisms that are constructed from the bottom-up variation by specifying the why as an hypothesis. What are the selection mechanisms? Observable relations (such as university-industry relations) are not neutral, but mean different things for the economy and for the state; and this meaning of the observable relations can be evaluated in terms of the codes of communication.
Against Niklas Luhmann's model, I would argue that codes of communication can be translated into one another since interhuman communications are not operationally closed, as in the biological model of autopoiesis. One also needs a social-scientific perspective on the fluidities ("overflows") and translations among functions, as emphasized, for example, by French scholars such as Michel Callon and Bruno Latour. In evolutionary economics, one distinguishes between market and non-market selection environments, but not among selection environments that are differently codified. Here, Luhmann's theory offers us a heuristic: The complex system of communications tends to differentiate in terms of the symbolic generalizations of codes of communication because this differentiation is functional in allowing the system to process more complexity and thus to be more innovative. The more orthogonal the codes, the more options for translations among them. The synergy indicator measures these options as redundancy. The selection environments, however, have to be specified historically because these redundancies—other possibilities—are not given but rather constructed over long periods of time.
How did you arrive where you currently work on?
I became interested in the relations between science, technology, and society as an undergraduate (in biochemistry) which coincided with the time of the student movement of the late 1960s. We began to study Jürgen Habermas in the framework of the "critical university," and I decided to continue with a second degree in philosophy. After the discussions between Luhmann and Habermas (1971), I recognized the advantages of Luhmann's more empirically oriented systems approach and I pursued my Ph.D. in the sociology of organization and labour.
In the meantime, we got the opportunity to organize an interfaculty department for Science and Technology Dynamics at the University of Amsterdam after a competition for a large government grant. In the context of this department, I became interested in methodology: how can one compare across case studies and make inferences? Actually, my 1995 book The Challenge of Scientometrics had a kind of Triple-Helix model on the cover: How do cognitions, texts, and authors exhibit different dynamics that influence one another?
For example, when an author publishes a paper in a scholarly journal, this may add to his reputation as an author, but the knowledge claimed in the text enters a process of validation which can be much more global and anonymous. These processes are mediated since they are based on communication. Thus, one can add to the context of discovery (of authors) and the context of justification (of knowledge contents) a context of mediation (in texts). The status of a journal, for example, matters for the communication of the knowledge content in the article. The contexts operate as selection environments upon one another.
In evolutionary economics, one is used to distinguishing between market and non-market selection environments, but not among more selection environments that are differently codified. At this point, Luhmann's theory offers a new perspective: The complex system of communications tends to differentiate in terms of the symbolic generalization of codes of communication because this differentiation among the codes of communication allows the system to process more complexity and to be more innovative in terms of possible translations. The different selection environments for communications, however, are not given but constructed historically over long periods of time. The modern (standardized) format of the citation, for example, was constructed at the end of the 19th century, but it took until the 1950s before the idea of a citation index was formulated (by Eugene Garfield). The use of citations in evaluative bibliometrics is even more recent.
In evolutionary economics, one distinguishes furthermore between (technological) trajectories and regimes. Trajectories can result from "mutual shaping" between two selection environments, for example, markets and technologies. Nations and firms follow trajectories in a landscape. Regimes are global and require the specification of three (or more) selection environments. When three (or more) dynamics interact, symmetry can be broken and one can expect feed-forward and feedback loops. Such a system can begin to flourish auto-catalytically when the configuration is optimal.
From such considerations, that is, a confluence of the neo-institutional program of Henry Etzkowitz and my neo-evolutionary view, our Triple Helix model emerged in 1994: how do institutions and functions interrelate and change one another or, in other words, provide options for innovation? Under what conditions can university-industry-government relations lead to wealth generation and organized knowledge production? The starting point was a workshop about Evolutionary Economics and Chaos Theory: New directions for technology studies held in Amsterdam in 1993. Henry suggested thereafter that we could collaborate further on university-industry relations. I answered that I needed at least three (sub)dynamics from the perspective of my research program, and then we agreed about "A Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations". Years later, however, we took our two lines of research apart again, and in 2002 I began developing a Triple-Helix indicator of synergy in a series of studies of national systems of innovation.
What would you give as advice to students who would like to get into the field of innovation and global politics?
In general, I would advise them to be both a specialist and broader than that. Innovation involves crossing established borders. Learn at least two languages. If your background is political science, then take a minor in science & technology studies or in economics. One needs both the specialist profile and the potential to reach out to other audiences by being aware of the need to make translations between different frameworks. Learn to be reflexive about the status of what one can say in one or the other framework.
For example, I learned to avoid the formulation of grandiose statements such as "modern economies are knowledge-based economies," and to say instead: "modern economies can increasingly be considered as knowledge-based economies." The latter formulation provides room for asking "to what extent," and thus one can ask for further information, indicators, and results of the measurement.
In the sociology of science, specialisms and paradigms are sometimes considered as belief systems. It seems to me that by considering scholarly discourses as systems of rationalized expectations one can make the distinction between normative and cognitive learning. Normative learning (that is, in belief systems) is slower than cognitive learning (in terms of theorized expectations) because the cognitive mode provides us with more room for experimentation: One can afford to make mistakes, since one's communication and knowledge claims remain under discussion, and not one's status as a communicator. The cognitive mode has advantages; it can be considered as the surplus that is further developed during higher education. Normative learning is slower; it dominates in the political sphere.
What does the "Triple Helix" reveal about the fragmentation of "national innovation systems"?
In 2003, colleagues from the Department of Economics and Management Studies at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam offered me firm data from the Netherlands containing these three dimensions: the economic, the geographical, and the technological dimensions in data of more than a million Dutch firms. I presented the results at the Schumpeter Society in Turin in 2004, and asked whether someone in the audience had similar data for other countries. I expected Swedish or Israeli colleagues to have this type of statistics, but someone from Germany stepped in, Michael Fritsch, and so we did the analysis for Germany. These studies were first published in Research Policy. Thereafter, we did studies on Hungary, Norway, Sweden, and recently also China and Russia.
Several conclusions arise from these studies. Using entropy statistics, the data can be decomposed along the three different dimensions. One can decompose national systems geographically into regions, but one can also decompose them in terms of the technologies involved (e.g., high-tech versus medium-tech). We were mainly relying on national data. And of course, there are limitations to the data collections. Actually, we now have international data, but this is commercial data and therefore more difficult to use reliably than governmental statistics.
For the Netherlands, we obtained the picture that would more or less be expected: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Eindhoven are the most knowledge-intensive and knowledge-based regions. This is not surprising, although there was one surprise: We know that in terms of knowledge bases, Amsterdam is connected to Utrecht and then the geography goes a bit to the east in the direction of Wageningen. What we did not know was that the niche also spreads to the north in the direction of Zwolle. The highways to Amsterdam Airport (Schiphol) are probably the most important.
In the case of Germany, when we first analyzed the data at the level of the "Laender" (Federal States), we could see the East-West divide still prevailing, but when we repeated the analysis at the lower level of the "Regierungsbezirke" we no longer found the East-West divide as dominant (using 2004 data). So, the environment of Dresden for example was more synergetic in Triple-Helix terms than that of Saarbruecken. And this was nice to see considering my idea that the knowledge-based economy increasingly prevails since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union. The discussion about two different models for organizing the political economy—communism or liberal democracy—had become obsolete after 1990.
After studying Germany, I worked with Balázs Lengyel on Hungarian data. Originally, we could not find any regularity in the Hungarian data, but then the idea arose to analyze the Hungarian data as three different innovation systems: one around Budapest, which is a metropolitan innovation system; one in the west of the country, which has been incorporated into Western Europe; and one in the east of the country, which has remained the old innovation system that is state-led and dependent on subsidies. For the western part, one could say that Hungary has been "europeanized" by Austria and Germany; it has become part of a European system.
When Hungary came into the position to create a national innovation system, free from Russia and the Comecon, it was too late, as Europeanization had already stepped in and national boundaries were no longer as dominant. Accordingly, and this was a very nice result, assessing this synergy indicator on Hungary as a nation, we did not find additional synergy at the national (that is, above-regional) level. While we clearly found synergy at the national level for the Netherlands and also found it in Germany, but at the level of the Federal States, we could not find synergy at a national level for Hungary. Hungary has probably developed too late to develop a nationally controlled system of innovations.
A similar phenomenon appeared when we studied Norway: my Norwegian colleague (Øivind Strand) did most of our analysis there. To our surprise, the knowledge-based economy was not generated where the universities are located (Oslo and Trondheim), but on the West Coast, where the off-shore, marine and maritime industries are most dominant. FDI (foreign direct investment) in the marine and maritime industries leads to knowledge-based synergy in the regions on the West Shore of Norway. Norway is still a national system, but the Norwegian universities like Trondheim or Oslo are not so much involved in entrepreneurial networks. These are traditional universities, which tend to keep their hands off the economy.
Actually, when we had discussions about these two cases, Norway and Hungary, which both show that internationalization had become a major factor, either in the form of Europeanization in the Hungarian case, or in the form of foreign-driven investments (off-shore industry and oil companies) in the Norwegian case, I became uncertain and asked myself whether we did not believe too much in our indicators? Therefore, I proposed to Øivind to study Sweden, given the availability of well-organized data of this national system.
We expected to find synergy concentrated in the three regional systems of Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö/Lund. Indeed, 48.5 percent of the Swedish synergy is created in these three regions. This is more than one would expect on the basis of the literature. Some colleagues were upset, because they had already started trying to work on new developments of the Triple Helix, for example, in Linköping. But the Swedish economy is organized and centralized in this geographical dimension. Perhaps that is why one talks so much about "regionalization" in policy documents. Sweden is very much a national innovation system, with additional synergy between the regions.
Can governments alter historical trajectories of national, regional or local innovation systems?
Let me mention the empirical results for China in order to illustrate the implications of empirical conclusions for policy options. We had no Chinese data set, but we obtained access to the database Orbis of the Bureau van Dijk (an international company, which is Wall Street oriented, assembling data about companies) that contains industry indicators such as names, addresses, NACE-codes, types of technology, the sizes of each enterprise, etc. However, this data can be very incomplete. Using this incomplete data for China, we said that we were just going to show how one could do the analysis if one had full data. We guess that the National Bureau of Statistics of China has complete data. I did the analysis with Ping Zhou, Professor at Zhejiang University.
We analyzed China first at the provincial level, and as expected, the East Coast emerged as much more knowledge intense than the rest of the country. After that, we also looked at the next-lower level of the 339 prefectures of China. From this analysis, four of them popped up as far more synergetic than the others. These four municipalities were: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing.
These four municipalities became clearly visible as an order of magnitude more synergetic than other regions. The special characteristic about them is that –as against the others – these four municipalities are administered by the central government. Actually, it came out of my data and I did not understand it; but my Chinese colleague said that this result was very nice and specified this relationship.
The Chinese case thus illustrates that government control can make a difference. It shows – and that is not surprising, as China runs on a different model – that the government is able to organize the four municipalities in such a way as to increase synergy. Of course, I do not know what is happening on the ground. We know that the Chinese system is more complex than these three dimensions suggest. I guess the government agencies may wish to consider the option of extending the success of this development model, to Guangdong for example or to other parts of China. Isn't it worrisome that all the other and less controlled districts have not been as successful in generating synergy?
Referring more generally to innovation policies, I would advise as a heuristics that political discourse is able to signal a problem, but policy questions do not enable us to analyze the issues. Regional development, for example, is an issue in Sweden because the system is very centralized, more than in Norway, for example. But there is nothing in our data that supports the claim that the Swedish government is successful in decentralizing the knowledge-based economy beyond the three metropolitan regions. We may be able to reach conclusions like these serving as policy advice. One develops policies on the basis of intuitive assumptions which a researcher is sometimes able to test.
As noted, one can expect a complex system continuously to produce unintended consequences, and thus it needs monitoring. The dynamics of the system are different from the sum of the sub-dynamics because of the interaction effects and feedback loops. Metaphors such as a Triple Helix, Mode-2, or the Risk Society can be stimulating for the discourse, but these metaphors tend to develop their own dynamics of proliferating discourses.
The Triple Helix, for example, can first be considered as a call for collaboration in networks of institutions. However, in an ecosystem of bi-lateral and tri-lateral relations, one has a trade-off between local integration (collaboration) and global differentiation (competition). The markets and the sciences develop at the global level, above the level of specific relations. A principal agent such as government may be locked into a suboptimum. Institutional reform that frees the other two dynamics (markets and sciences) requires translation of political legitimation into other codes of communication. Translations among codes of communication provide the innovation engine.
Is there a connection between infrastructures and the success of innovation processes?
One of the conclusions, which pervades throughout all advanced economies, is that knowledge intensive services (KIS) are not synergetic locally because they can be disconnected – uncoupled – from the location. For example, if one offers a knowledge-intensive service in Munich and receives a phone call from Hamburg, the next step is to take a plane to Hamburg, or to catch a train inside Germany perhaps. Thus, it does not matter whether one is located in Munich or Hamburg as knowledge-intensive services uncouple from the local economy. The main point is proximity to an airport or train station.
This is also the case for high-tech knowledge-based manufacturing. But it is different for medium-tech manufacturing, because in this case the dynamics are more embedded in the other parts of the economy. If one looks at Russia, the knowledge-intensive services operate differently from the Western European model, where the phenomenon of uncoupling takes place. In Russia, KIS contribute to coupling, as knowledge-intensive services are related to state apparatuses.
In the Russian case, the knowledge-based economy is heavily concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg. So, if one aims –as the Russian government proclaims – to create not "wealth from knowledge" but "knowledge from wealth" – that is, oil revenues –it might be wise to uncouple the knowledge-intensive services from the state apparatuses. Of course, this is not easy to do in the Russian model because traditionally, the center (Moscow) has never done this. Uncoupling knowledge-intensive services, however, might give them a degree of freedom to move around, from Tomsk to Minsk or vice versa, steered by economic forces more than they currently are (via institutions in Moscow).
Final question. What does path-dependency mean in the context of innovation dynamics?
In The Challenge of Scientometrics. The development, measurement, and self-organization of scientific communications (1995), I used Shannon-type information theory to study scientometric problems, as this methodology combines both static and dynamic analyses. Connected to this theory I developed a measurement method for path-dependency and critical transitions.
In the case of a radio transmission, for example, you have a sender and a receiver, and in between you may have an auxiliary station. For instance, the sender is in New York and the receiver is in Bonn and the auxiliary station is in Iceland. The signal emerges in New York and travels to Bonn, but it may be possible to improve the reception by assuming the signal is from Iceland instead of listening to New York. When Iceland provides a better signal, it is possible to forget the history of the signal before it arrived in Island. It no longer matters whether Iceland obtained the signal originally from New York or Boston. One takes the signal from Iceland and the pre-history of the signal does not matter anymore for a receiver.
Such a configuration provides a path-dependency (on Iceland) in information-theoretical terms, measurable in terms of bits of information. In a certain sense you get negative bits of information, since the shortest path in the normal triangle would be from New York to Bonn, and in this case the shortest path is from New York via Iceland to Bonn. I called this at the time a critical transition. In a scientific text for instance, a new terminology can come up and if it overwrites the old terminology to the extent that one does not have to listen to the old terminology anymore, one has a critical transition that frees one from the path-dependencies at a previous moment of time.
Thus, my example is about radical and knowledge-based changes. As long as one has to listen to the past, one does not make a critical transition. The knowledge-based approach is always about creative destruction and about moving ahead, incorporating possible new options in the future. The hypothesized future states become more important than the past. The challenge, in my opinion, is to make the notion of options operational and to bring these ideas into measurement. The Triple-Helix indicator measures the number of possible options as additional redundancy. This measurement has the additional advantage that one becomes sensitive to uncertainty in the prediction.
Loet Leydesdorff is Professor Emeritus at the Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR) of the University of Amsterdam. He is Honorary Professor of the Science and Technology Policy Research Unit (SPRU) of the University of Sussex, Visiting Professor at the School of Management, Birkbeck, University of London, Visiting Professor of the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (ISTIC) in Beijing, and Guest Professor at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou. He has published extensively in systems theory, social network analysis, scientometrics, and the sociology of innovation (see at http://www.leydesdorff.net/list.htm). With Henry Etzkowitz, he initiated a series of workshops, conferences, and special issues about the Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government Relations. He received the Derek de Solla Price Award for Scientometrics and Informetrics in 2003 and held "The City of Lausanne" Honor Chair at the School of Economics, Université de Lausanne, in 2005. In 2007, he was Vice-President of the 8th International Conference on Computing Anticipatory Systems (CASYS'07, Liège). In 2014, he was listed as a highly-cited author by Thomson Reuters.
Literature and Related links:
Science & Technology Dynamics, University of Amsterdam / Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
Leydesdorff, L. (2006). The Knowledge-Based Economy: Modeled, Measured, Simulated. Universal Publishers, Boca Raton, FL.
Leydesdorff, L. (2001). A Sociological Theory of Communication: The Self-Organization of the Knowledge-Based Society. Universal Publishers, Boca Raton, FL.
Leydesdorff, L. (1995). The Challenge of Scientometrics . The development, measurement, and self-organization of scientific communications. Leiden, DSWO Press, Leiden University.
http://www.leydesdorff.net/
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0 0 1 4814 27442 School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg 228 64 32192 14.0
In the 15-years I have served in the United States Army, the focal point of my tactical and academic study has been almost entirely centered on the Middle East and its unique cultural complexities. As an Infantryman, I was embroiled in the early efforts to prevent a Sunni-Shia civil war in post-invasion Iraq, while also hunting down al-Qaeda operatives under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A year later, during General Patraeus's troop surge, I was in the urban sprawl of Northwest Baghdad fighting not only a Sunni insurgency, but also the Iranian-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi, comprised of local Shia militia groups. In 2010, I led a battalion reconnaissance team in the Arghandab River Valley of Afghanistan against the Taliban near the very birthplace of their Salafi-jihadist movement. In subsequent years, following my graduation from the Special Forces Qualification Course, I served in the 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) on a variety of missions in support of Operation Inherent Resolve in Turkey and Syria. As a fluent Arabic speaker, I was heavily involved in early efforts to train and equip the Free Syrian Army for its fight against the Islamic State. Following this deployment, I served as a liaison officer to the United States Embassy and Turkish General Staff in Ankara, having daily interaction with foreign dignitaries, defense attachés, and military officials in strategic level planning and coordination efforts. I culminated my time with 5th SFG as the assistant operations sergeant of a detachment fighting the Islamic State in Syria. My understanding of the culture of jihad, the various jihadist groups operating throughout the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, and the intricacy of Middle Eastern problem sets as a whole, has come from years of dedicated cultural analysis, in-depth study of Sunni and Shia Islam, and field experience from the strategic to the tactical level. It is because of this experience that I am compelled to discuss the culture of jihad in the 21st Century. ; Winner of the 2020 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Degree Completion category. ; 1 The Culture of Jihad in the 21st Century Michael J. Bearden Norwich University SOCI401: Cultural and Anthropology Studies Dr. Timothy Maynard April 30, 2020 2 The Culture of Jihad in the 21st Century In the 15-years I have served in the United States Army, the focal point of my tactical and academic study has been almost entirely centered on the Middle East and its unique cultural complexities. As an Infantryman, I was embroiled in the early efforts to prevent a Sunni-Shia civil war in post-invasion Iraq, while also hunting down al-Qaeda operatives under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A year later, during General Patraeus's troop surge, I was in the urban sprawl of Northwest Baghdad fighting not only a Sunni insurgency, but also the Iranian-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi, comprised of local Shia militia groups. In 2010, I led a battalion reconnaissance team in the Arghandab River Valley of Afghanistan against the Taliban near the very birthplace of their Salafi-jihadist movement. In subsequent years, following my graduation from the Special Forces Qualification Course, I served in the 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) on a variety of missions in support of Operation Inherent Resolve in Turkey and Syria. As a fluent Arabic speaker, I was heavily involved in early efforts to train and equip the Free Syrian Army for its fight against the Islamic State. Following this deployment, I served as a liaison officer to the United States Embassy and Turkish General Staff in Ankara, having daily interaction with foreign dignitaries, defense attachés, and military officials in strategic level planning and coordination efforts. I culminated my time with 5th SFG as the assistant operations sergeant of a detachment fighting the Islamic State in Syria. My understanding of the culture of jihad, the various jihadist groups operating throughout the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, and the intricacy of Middle Eastern problem sets as a whole, has come from years of dedicated cultural analysis, in-depth study of Sunni and Shia Islam, and field experience from the strategic to the tactical level. It is because of this experience that I am compelled to discuss the culture of jihad in the 21st Century. 3 Since its beginning in circa 610 CE, when the prophet Muhammad ibn Abdullah was visited by the angel Gabriel in a cave near Mecca, Islam has shaken the foundations of the Middle East and remained in a state of near-perpetual conflict with the Western world. Islam is an Arabic term most closely relating to the English words submission or surrender. Mujahedeen, or holy warriors, spread this new religion by the sword throughout Asia, forcing the "submission" of thousands, and have hardly been at peace with their neighbors since. Centuries later, in the two decades following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States, radical Islam's stance against the West has altered the diplomatic landscape between the world's great powers, fundamentally changed the United States' national strategic direction, and caused youth from all walks of life to sacrifice the best years of their lives in holy war to protect the supra-national community of Islam. From the invasion of Afghanistan to the subsequent invasions of Iraq and Syria to the ongoing peace talks with the Taliban, diplomatic and military efforts to eradicate jihadists from the Middle East have to-date been nearly ineffectual. Not only have these efforts failed to contain or defeat jihad, but at times have served to strengthen Islamic extremists' resolve in their call to arms against the West. Because jihad is such a fundamental part of the Islamic faith, it can never be "defeated" in the sense of traditional military eradication of an enemy force, but it can be confronted, contained, or refocused, as this paper will address. I argue that enabling local solutions and promoting education, alongside tailored surgical strike and security cooperation operations where necessary, are the keys to confronting, containing, and countering jihad. 4 Background Defining Jihad and Salafism Jihad is a transliterated form of the Arabic word meaning to struggle or to strive. In the traditional teachings of the Islamic faith, jihad is broken into two distinct categories: Greater jihad and lesser jihad. Greater jihad includes the personal struggle against selfish desires, emphasizing discipline and morality, as well as the struggle against Satan and the forces of evil. It includes jihad of the heart, jihad of the mind, and jihad of the tongue, involving praise for those who follow the will of Allah and correction for those who have gone astray (Gorka, 2016). The second category, lesser jihad, is viewed as the struggle against the enemies of Islam and the defense of its people. Lesser jihad is commonly referred to as Jihad of the Sword. Gorka (p. 60) reveals that, over time, this category of jihad has been used as justification for at least seven different subsets of holy war: 1. Using holy war to build an empire 2. Going after apostate regimes or individuals 3. Revolting against non-pious Muslim leaders 4. Fighting against the forces of imperialism in Muslim lands 5. Countering the West's pagan influence 6. Guerrilla warfare against a foreign invader 7. Using jihad as justification for terrorist attacks against civilian targets In a broad sense, lesser jihad can be viewed as offensive or defensive martial action. On the offensive side, jihadists use religion to justify building an empire, such as the Islamic State, attack apostate regimes, like those of the Taliban against Afghan government forces, and use terrorism against civilians, like the attacks on the World Trade Center. This offensive action 5 often takes jihadists beyond the borders of the ummah, or the people of Islam, striking fear into hearts of unbelievers around the globe. The defensive variety, especially in recent history, has most often correlated directly with the use of guerrilla warfare against foreign invaders, such as al-Qaeda's attacks on the international military coalitions that invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. This radical view of Islam is mostly practiced by those who follow the way of the Salafi, or the pious predecessors from the time of Muhammad, who experienced Islam in its purest form. It is believed that the first three generations who practiced the teachings of the prophet Muhammad are the ones who all Muslims thereafter should try to emulate. Themes of Salafism focus on complete adherence to sharia law, the fight against apostate Muslim regimes, and the spread and protection of Islam and its followers. At its core, Salafism is a very traditionalist view of Islam and has been practiced by multiple 21st Century terrorist organizations. The terms jihad and Salafi have shared such a close relationship in the last few decades that they have become nearly synonymous, at times described as Salafi-Jihadism or Jihadi-Salafism (Gorka, 2016; Nilsson, 2019) What Cultural Influences Lead One to the Path of Jihad? Before the attacks on 9/11, the largest call to jihad answered by the international Muslim community was in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Stopping the spread of communism and defending the ummah against the atrocities of Russian ground forces was seen as a noble and just cause for young Muslim men, and not just among Muslims (Gorka, 2016; Nilsson, 2019). Many nations, including the United States, funded, equipped, and trained the Afghan mujahedeen (those who conduct jihad) for the fight against the Soviet empire. Jihad in the 21st Century has been viewed in a much different light, as it is most closely associated with acts of extreme violence against Western nations. While the piles of rubble that used to be the 6 World Trade Center smoldered, and a gaping hole scarred the wall of the Pentagon, people of the world were forced to ask themselves, "How could a person do this? Why would someone take their own lives and thousands of others in the name of Allah?" Religious Justification for Jihad. Though jihad has become almost entirely associated with Islamic holy war, the term itself is still simply the Arabic word for striving. Struggling against one's selfish desires, striving to maintain traditional values, and defending a community against a common enemy are not just Islamic concepts, they are universal to most tightly-knit cultures. Similarly, Christians and Jews are taught self-discipline, adherence to moral codes, and defending their belief against enemies of their faith. So, why has the Islamic flavor of this common cultural theme become so violent, causing deep unrest around the world in our modern era? Verses from the Qur'an can begin to unpack why horrific public executions, suicide bombings, and advocating for generalized violence against non-Muslims may be justifiable in jihadist culture. The Qur'an (2015) lays out the following decree in chapter 9, verse 29: Fight those from among the People of the Book who believe not in Allah, nor in the Last Day, nor hold as unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have declared to be unlawful, nor follow the true religion, until they pay the tax with their own hand and acknowledge their subjection (p. 208). My personal study of Islam and conversations with Muslims in the field revealed that this bit of prose has been used as motivation and justification for jihad by groups like al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State, and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham of our modern age. Some of the following themes are evident in the translation: 7 • Jews and Christians are recognized as People of the Book, but are required to accept the following—Allah as the one true god, sharia as the acceptable law, and Islam as the one true religion. • If Jews and Christians refuse to accept these statutes, they must pay a tax called the jizyah to show their subjugation. • If they refuse to do either of these, they are to be put to the sword (p. 208). Salafi-jihadist groups such as the Taliban and Islamic State have tried to revive the jizyah tax in areas under their control. Likewise, hundreds of Christians, Jews, and even Muslims who refuse to adhere to strict sharia law have been publicly executed. This vehement enforcement of arcane Islamic law is seen as a return to the purest form of Islam, as pious as the first few generations who followed the Prophet Muhammad. Another common religious cultural theme that ties these jihadist organizations together is a message of religious oppression. They preach to young Muslims that the Islamic world is under siege by the West and that their god, their value systems, and their way of life are being threatened by the evils of capitalism and democracy (Venhaus, 2010). In joining organizations like al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, young men from across the globe find a sense of purpose and direction in their cause to protect the ummah. This theme is manifested in the teachings of Anwar al-Awlaki, the spiritual leader of al-Qaeda and the father of home-grown terrorism in the United States. He calls on Muslims living among those in the West: How can your conscience allow you to live in peaceful coexistence with a nation that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters? How can you have your loyalty to a government that is leading the war against Islam and Muslims? Hence, my advice to you is this, you have two choices: either hijra [migration 8 to an Islamic land] or jihad. You either leave or you fight. You leave and live among Muslims or you stay behind and fight with your hand, your wealth, and your word. I specifically invite the youth to either fight in the West or join their brothers on the fronts of jihad: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia (as cited in Gorka, 2016). This way of thinking is also captured in chapter 9, verse 5 of the Qur'an (2015): Kill the idolaters wherever you find them and take them prisoners, and beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they repent and observe Prayer and pay the Zakat, then leave their way free (p. 204). When taken literally, as they are by followers of Salafi-jihad, scriptures such as these leave no choice. To these men who have committed themselves fully to the ways of the pious ones, they are compelled to become shahid, or martyrs in the protection of the ummah. The Qur'an promises paradise for those who do: Surely, Allah has purchased of the believers their persons and their property in return for the Garden they shall have; they fight in the cause of Allah, and they slay and are slain—a promise the He has made incumbent on Himself in the Torah, and the Gospel, and the Qur'an. And who is more faithful to his promise than Allah? Rejoice, then, in your bargain which you have made with Him; and that it is which is the supreme triumph (p. 222). The concept of becoming a martyr in the struggle for Islam is romanticized by jihadist groups, like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and even state governments in local programming. In Lebanon, Mothers of Martyrs are interviewed to share the stories of their sons' glorious end while fighting abroad against the infidels (Venhaus, 2010). The Qur'an itself calls this sacrifice the supreme triumph for a jihadist, striving for the glory of Allah. 9 Though enforcing the jizyah, publicly executing those who do not follow sharia law, and seeking opportunities to kill infidels through suicide attacks represent a very small, extremist cultural sect of Islam, each of these practices is still justifiable if one looks to the Qur'an. This could be viewed as no different than a rural Pentecostal church in the Deep South who maintains strict standards for how women must dress and act: it all comes down to interpretation and a community's willingness to subjugate themselves to these standards. Spiritual leaders of jihadist groups in the 21st Century have used the Qur'an as continued justification for a variety of cruel, inhumane, and brutal actions that served to shock the West. The holy book of Islam acts as the essential glue, binding together all facets of Arab and Islamic culture. Artistic Inspiration for Jihad. A far cry from the harsh proclamations of the Qur'an, Arabic poetry predates Islam by centuries and serves as a bedrock of Arabic culture across the Middle East. Early desert nomads composed poems mostly in mono-rhyme and in one of sixteen standard canonical measures, which made them easy to commit to memory (Creswell & Haykel, 2015). Naturally, this beautiful form of cultural expression has found a home in the modern jihadist movement, where it has become an inspiration for new recruits to join the cause and crucial in the sustainment of those already fighting infidels abroad. Creswell and Haykel assert that although analysts have generally ignored this facet of jihadist culture, it is woven deeply into the fabric of modern Islamic extremism. Osama bin Laden, most recognized as the former head of al-Qaeda, was also a highly-celebrated jihadist poet. Without question, his lyrical genius inspired young Arabs with stories of a return to the heroic and chivalrous past of Islam. One of his most famous works celebrates the martyrdom of the 9/11 hijackers. This is a theme among modern jihadist poetry, which preserves the tales of suicide bombers, the conquered apostate regimes of Iraq and Syria, and the glories of jihadist heroes (Creswell & Haykel). Likewise, in a 10 group of individuals who have each traveled far from home to defend Islam against the kuffar, these poems help to establish a sense of cultural identity, strengthening their wartime bond and solidifying their resolve. In seeing the videos of the Islamic State as they carved a path of destruction across large swathes of Iraq in early 2014, it may be difficult for one to believe that its members were motivated by the rhythmic lines of jihadist poetry. It is hard to accept that the same young fighter who is willing to behead an infidel for all the free world to see, could also be found passionately reciting lines celebrating the glorious return of an Islamic caliphate. During its rise, the Islamic State capitalized on the lyrical talent of a Damascus-born woman named Ahlam al-Nasr. In her first broadcast, called the Blaze of Truth, she sang each one of her 107 works a cappella, in accordance with the Islamic State's ban on musical instruments. The video was uploaded to Youtube, receiving thousands of views and further shares on multiple social media platforms (Creswell & Haykel, 2015). In the early days of the group's brutal campaign in Iraq, al-Nasr celebrated victory in Mosul as a new dawn for the country: "Ask Mosul, city of Islam, about the lions— how their fierce struggle brought liberation. The land of glory has shed its humiliation and defeat and put on the raiment of splendor" (as cited in Creswell & Haykel, 2015). Her choice of words helps one sense her deep passion for jihad, hidden within the lines. Mujahedeen are called lions and liberators. Mosul is called both a city of Islam and a land of 11 glory that, because of its liberation, has been released from the chains of shame and can now live in the splendor and pride of its former renown. Poetry has succored those serving in times of war for hundreds, even thousands of years. In the same manner, this key element of artistic cultural expression has helped bind together the modern jihadi movement, capturing the heroic deeds of martyrs who would otherwise remain nameless and unrecognized by the outside world. Serving in lands far away from home, young jihadists find inspiration, strength, and a renewed sense of identity in these haunting bits of rhyme. Social Pressure to Join Jihad. Abdullah Anas was an Algerian who served as one of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the 1980s and spent several years studying under Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian "Father of Resistance to the Soviets" (Gall, 2020). Working to help Algerians achieve nonviolent change in their government, Anas, now in his 60s, has spent a life living and working among jihadists. To Anas, jihad is a fundamental principle of Muslim culture through which mujahedeen receive rewards in heaven: "I will never denounce jihad. As a Muslim, I know this to be a noble deed—where man can be the most beastly" (Gall). In a study of three Swedish jihadists, with experiences ranging from 1980s Afghanistan to the modern fight in Syria, Nilsson (2019) suggests that one of the fundamental social justifications for joining jihad is the sense that Islam and Muslims are collectively under attack. This, again, is a theme that applies to more than just the modern jihadist movement: Americans lined up in droves outside recruiting stations following the attacks on Pearl Harbor and decades later after September 11, 2001. Following the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, many Muslims from around the world began to see this not as just the West going after the 9/11 conspirators, but as a global attack on Islam. Each day, fresh news stories of coalition soldiers' crimes against 12 Muslim civilians and pictures of burning villages continued to motivate men to join the fight to protect the ummah from the foreign invaders. Nilsson contends that since most jihadists are very young, in their teens and early twenties, they are very susceptible to the influences of close friends and social groups. Safet, a young Muslim living in Sweden, was pressured by a friend to join the Islamic State in Syria, saying that he became convinced by his friend Ahmed that the group was fighting to protect Muslims (Nilsson). However, after realizing that the Islamic State was actually killing other Muslims in a practice called takfir, or excommunication, Safet became disillusioned and returned to Sweden (Nilsson). From the fight against the foreign invaders in the early 2000s in Afghanistan and Iraq, to the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in 2015, it seems jihadists have most often been motivated by the need to protect the international Muslim community. Aside from the social responsibility of defending their faith and people, the need for adventure also seems to permeate the ideations of young men seeking to join a jihadist group. One of Nilsson's (2019) most interesting theories is that jihad is not the radicalization of Islam, but rather the Islamization of radicalism. Individuals who are already naturally predisposed to such adventurous or nihilistic behavior get caught up in the social dynamics of their time, ending up in a jihadist movement. Venhaus (2010) explains that in interviews with over 2,000 al-Qaeda prisoners from Iraq to Guantanamo Bay, he found that young Muslim men sought the cause of jihad for a number of normal social pressures felt by normal teens worldwide: "Revenge seekers need an outlet for their frustration, status seekers need recognition, identity seekers need a group to join, and thrill seekers need adventure" (Venhaus). The Effects of Social Media and Technology on Jihad. In the modern era, news is no longer bound by the time it takes for an article to be published, printed, and distributed across 13 great distance in a community. Social media platforms like Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, and Instagram have made sharing news instantaneous. Additionally, the advent of the smartphone, which acts simultaneously as a hand-held computer, high definition camera, and telephone with nearly world-wide coverage has forever changed the media landscape. In the era of modern jihad, one can post a single video that moves the minds of thousands in a matter of seconds. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein's regime, news stories of atrocity among the efforts of coalition troops over the next decade served to further the cause of local and foreign jihadists to protect the ummah from these invaders. Accidental bombing of civilians, mistreatment of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib, and a general ignorance toward Muslim culture were fueled by social media and smartphone technology. Venhaus (2010) claims that throughout this early phase of the war in Iraq, al-Qaeda very rarely had to actively recruit, their global brand was aggressively promoted through satellite television, internet chat rooms, and social media platforms; willing candidates sought them out. This use of media continued to be perfected by jihadist organizations like the Islamic State, who published a digital magazine called Dabiq, named for the ideological capital of the proposed caliphate, which rallied Muslims to jihad through stories of glory and heroism in the cause for Islam. The Islamic State also posted grisly execution videos, with stunning music and production value, including super high-definition shots of their brutality. Publications and videos such as these could be copied, saved, shared, and re-shared before any sort of government intervention could stop them. Creswell and Haykel (2015) reveal that jihadists were running a massive, secret network of social media websites and fake accounts that could be rapidly assembled and dissembled by hackers. The effects of social media and technology on modern jihadist culture are easy to understand, but challenging to measure in scope and reach. Just as easily as videos of Islamic 14 State propaganda or poetry can be shared, so too can stories of coalition force atrocities in Afghanistan and Iraq. This has put strategists in a unique position, where it is nearly impossible to control the narrative. Unfortunately, the story that breaks first is still the one that is liked and shared the most, even if the truth comes out after. Effects of Western Culture on Jihad. Rapid globalization, including the widespread diffusion of the internet and technology into the Middle East in the last two decades has continued to foment jihadist hatred for the West. Personal conversations with multiple Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan revealed that the decadence, lavish richness, and sinful lifestyles portrayed by Western movies and media served to fuel the fires of disdain among the pious Salafi-jihadists. Additionally, Muslim men living in Western nations following the attacks on the World Trade Center were ostracized and feared by society, often leading them to an eventual radicalization process. Being denied a peaceful coexistence because of continued Western misperception, caused many young Muslims to become angry and seek community and brotherhood among other Muslims experiencing the same problems. Venhaus (2010) notes that out of the over 2,000 captured jihadists interviewed, more than 30 per cent of them sought al-Qaeda because they were angry. Under the tutelage of local al-Qaeda mentors, the frustrations of these young men were then turned upon their neighbors through careful instruction and manipulation. They were taught to see the West as the enemy of Islam, with hundreds of the ummah being harmed by their military coalitions in Afghanistan and Iraq each day. They were instructed in the ways of the pious ones who came before them, inspiring them to turn from the sinfulness of their Western neighbors and take pride in their newfound self-discipline and righteousness in the eyes of Allah. Eventually, many of these young men would travel to their 15 ancestral homelands to join the struggle, or conduct terrorist attacks on their own Western communities. Analysis A Unique Challenge Given the litany of reasons one might join jihad, the incredibly complex cultural and social environment, and the fluidity of the modern jihadist movement, how can the United States begin to contain this problem? The reasons one individual might join a jihadist cause are as various and sundry as why one might choose to join any movement or profession over another. As Nilsson (2019) and Venhaus (2010) have detailed, there appears to be no singular marker: one could be an extremely religious or a passive Muslim, rich or poor, single or married with a family, have a completely stable social life or be isolated with no friends. Jihadists can be from any country, any walk of life, and usually do not widely broadcast their intentions prior to taking part in acts of violence for the cause of Islam. It is because of the near-impossibility of clearly identifying a pattern of distinguishable cultural markers that make it such a challenge for the United States government and its allies to address the threat of jihad. Targeting an individual before they become a jihadist or before they commit a terrorist act has been one of the most formidable challenges of our time for military and law enforcement professionals alike. Usually, the much simpler job is finding a jihadist who has allowed their communications discipline to slip before an act, or catching them in a pitched battle on foreign soil. In order to protect citizens of the West and East alike against jihadists' aims, the United States Government must be prepared to confront, contain, and counter the jihadist narrative "left of bang," before an attack occurs. 16 The Global War on Terrorism: Taking the Fight to the Jihadists. In the months that followed September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush deployed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary officers and US Special Operations Forces (SOF) to find, fix, and finish pockets of al-Qaeda militants being harbored by the Taliban in Afghanistan. A fierce campaign of relentless aerial bombardment and mounted assaults by the forces of the Afghan Northern Alliance led to a swift and decisive defeat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. With Kabul and Kandahar in allied hands, and an interim government established under the leadership of the Pashtun Hamid Karzai, the future of a free and prosperous Afghanistan seemed assured, but what came to be known as The Long War had only just begun. Trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and 19 years later, the United States and its allies have been forced to the negotiating table with the Salafi-jihadist Taliban. Likewise, after Saddam Hussein's continued disregard for international law, threats against the United States, and open violence against his own people, the administration of President Bush decided again to pursue a military option. Much like Afghanistan, the coalition was led by CIA operatives and SOF operators, coordinating airstrikes on key positions in a tactical display of American firepower affectionately titled Shock and Awe. However, unlike Afghanistan, a massive conventional invasion followed the bombing campaign, bent on toppling the Baathist regime and finding Saddam's chemical weapons stockpiles. What followed was a series of policy failures, leading to a steady influx of jihadists partnering with local insurgents seeking to oust the foreign invaders and protect the ummah from the atrocities of the kuffar. In my professional opinion, Iraq is still recovering from the decade-long military occupation, cleaning up the destruction left by the Islamic State, and on the brink of civil war due to concerns about being an Iranian puppet state. 17 Ineffective Military Methods to Combat Jihad Operation Iraqi Freedom. During my first combat rotation as an Infantryman in the Triangle of Death in southern Iraq in 2005-2006, I experienced the initial rumblings of a civil war between the Sunni and Shia Muslims in Iraq, each wrestling for power in a post-Saddam world. I was also witness to the inundation of foreign jihadists, joining the ranks of al-Qaeda in Iraq under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who at times headquartered in my area of operations. As I analyze our highly-kinetic and aggressive initial campaigns years later, I can see that the coalition's fight, first against Saddam, then against al-Qaeda, only bolstered jihadist motivation. In being a foreign invader, we inadvertently created a jihadist resistance movement, bent on the removal of their occupiers. Kilcullen (2010) explains this dilemma by explaining that focusing on the wrong metrics in a fight against insurgents can be deceptive: If you kill 20 insurgents, they may have 40 relatives who are now in a blood feud with your unit and are compelled to take revenge. Again in 2007-2008, I was deployed to Iraq as an Infantry squad leader to the sacred city of Khadimiyah in Northwest Baghadad. This was during the famous troop surge, meant to fix the ongoing problems with stability throughout the country. Being in the home of the beautiful Shrine of the Seventh Imam, it was a predominantly Shia area. Over the course of 15 months, my unit fought several engagements against Iranian-backed Shia militias and worked on project after project to strengthen local civil infrastructure, all while maintaining the utmost discretion against damaging homes or creating civilian casualties. Yet again, although we had conducted a nearly perfect counterinsurgency fight, it seemed that Kilcullen's insurgent math still applied: Fighting the jihadists only served to create more unrest within the population, no matter if we were restoring essential services and reducing damage to homes or not. 18 Operation Enduring Freedom. Nearly a decade after the fall of al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts, I was deployed to the mountains of Afghanistan from 2010-2011. Stationed along the Arghandab River, just north of Kandahar, we were in the heart of the Pashtun Taliban. Again, the same story remained true: We fought the Taliban jihadists almost daily, but could not seem to win over the true key terrain in a counterinsurgency fight: The hearts and minds of the people. The Taliban would harass our unit's base of operations with a few pop shots as we called them, which would unleash a massive response in firepower and resources. Thousands of rounds of machine gun ammunition would be fired into the farm fields surrounding our Combat Out Post (COP), squads would be sent in pursuit of the attackers, and helicopters would spend hours scouring the terrain in an attempt to heap justice on the insurgents. This massive effort against so few served to erode the unit's motivation, exhaust our supplies, and alienate the civilian population whose homes and fields had been damaged in the process. Reflections on Personal Combat Experience. After years of combat experience and deeply studying Muslim culture, I can now see how the mistakes the coalitions made early-on in both operations only fueled the fires of insurgency, resistance to foreign occupiers, and generalized hatred for the West. Porch (2013) argues brilliantly that US counterinsurgency doctrine made the same mistake as its imperialistic predecessors of centuries before: Believing that military action was a proper vehicle for providing Middle Easterners with Western values, as well as a foundation for governance, social programs, and economic transformation in a region. This became evident in my own experience, realizing that no matter what sort of social, infrastructure, or economic programs ran alongside our military efforts, the people of both Afghanistan and Iraq felt the enormous social weight of being occupied by a foreign power, rendering these efforts nearly ineffectual. On the contrary, local and foreign jihadist movements 19 capitalized on each and every mistake of coalition forces, increasing their recruitment and resolve against the West. Though our military may have been winning every major battle against the jihadists, our policy makers and field commanders made the fundamental mistake of believing that these non-Western nations lived in some sort of time-warp, in which the adoption of Western democracy, rule of law, and capitalism would allow them to thrive as a nation (Porch). Effective Military Methods to Combat Jihad Surgical Strike and Precision Targeting. A unique feature of the Global War on Terrorism was the US military's continued perfection of covert strike operations with surgical precision deep into enemy safe havens. This was put on display in the rout of al-Qaeda by CIA and SOF in Afghanistan, in the kill/capture missions against the Baathists in the deck of cards in Iraq, and later in the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and Sheik Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Iraq. Having the ability to appear out of nowhere in the middle of the night, kill or capture an intended target with zero damage to infrastructure or civilian casualties, and leave within minutes of arrival struck fear into the hearts and minds of jihadists across the globe. The success and efficacy of this type of operation was acknowledged in the 2015 National Military Strategy, which stated: "The best way to counter VEOs [violent extremist organizations] is by way of.military strengths such as ISR, precision strike [emphasis added], training, and logistical support" (p.11). Likewise, President Obama's massive expansion of the use of drones, which could watch individuals for days and execute a precise strike that only touched the intended target, has continued to sow fear and deny jihadists' freedom of maneuver on a global scale. The US military and its allies have only continued to master these types of operations throughout the 20 fights in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other locations. The jihadists know this, and realize that one wrong move at any time could mean disaster. Security Cooperation. An additional theme that has spelled the end for jihadists throughout the globe has been the training, advising, and equipping of security forces and partners within Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other nations. Enabling the host-nation military to handle jihadist movements on their own helps the United States military work itself out of a job. US Army Special Forces are uniquely suited to accomplish this mission: With specialized training, language capability, and cultural understanding, they are able to train foreign security forces through a variety of Principle Tasks. These tasks include Foreign Internal Defense, which focuses on a holistic approach to internal security and protection of citizens against lawlessness and insurgency, and Security Force Assistance, which can be focused internally or externally against threats to a nation's stability and security. The success of these mission sets was evident in 2014, during my own experience with the Afghan Commando Kandaks' continued fight against the Taliban and in closely following the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service's efforts against the Islamic State. Both of these forces, built from the ground-up by US Army Special Forces have continually fortified weak conventional military force operations against jihadist groups in their respective nations. Muslim Youth Efforts Against Jihad Globalization, though it has been proven to bolster the jihadists' narrative against the West, has also been beneficial to the movement against jihad itself. Because youth of the world have access to technology that allows them to see the atrocities and lies associated with global jihadist organizations, they are beginning to turn the tide. During the Islamic State's rise to power in Iraq and Syria, Muslim youth from across Europe travelled to join the jihadists in their 21 fight against the West. However, groups of Muslim youth also spoke up to counter this narrative. In 2015 the Muslim Youth League, an anti-Islamic State cultural movement, declared a holy war against all extremist organizations (Dearden, 2015). The group called on all Muslims to stand united against those who have hijacked Islam and misrepresented the faith. Through engagement work in schools and communities, as well as a robust online campaign, the Muslim Youth League is fighting back against jihadist propaganda that bids young Muslims join the Islamic State and other extremist groups (Dearden). Since the time of this publication, the Muslim Youth League has spread to several countries throughout the Middle East, Asia, and Europe, each with their own social media presence, outreach programs, community events, and websites. Local Government Efforts Against Jihad In the years following the Islamic State's spread across Iraq and Syria, the United Kingdom has developed a robust strategy to help at-risk Muslims avoid the radicalization process. The program itself is called Contest, and includes four distinct categories: Prevent, Prepare, Protect, and Pursue (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2017). Police departments and social organizations have built relationships with doctors, faith leaders, teachers and others, who are required to report suspicious persons to the proper authorities. In response to these reporting requirements and recommendations, over 7,500 reports were filed between 2015-2016, with one in 10 being actionable intelligence for government and police forces (BBC). In 2015 alone, over 150 people, including 50 children, were kept from traveling to conflict zones in Iraq and Syria (BBC). The strategy has of course drawn criticism, for fear that it will further alienate Muslims from their local communities, but it presents as an excellent plan of action for identifying individuals who are at risk beyond just using traditional signals intelligence and 22 surveillance techniques. It does more than just target the individual, it also seeks to reform them through education, outreach, and community programs. Counterarguments You Can Kill an Idea. I have heard the opinion throughout my time in the military that jihad and the idea of Islamic supremacy can be completely eradicated. The example most often given is that Nazism, including the idea that the Aryan race was superior to all others, was effectively destroyed by a global military campaign. This argument is weak. The Nazis represented a very small portion of German culture, including among those serving in the military, so it was relatively easy to contain once there was an overwhelming military victory by the Allies. However, although the German Army of the 1940s was defeated militarily, the idea of white supremacy lives on in small social groups throughout the world to this day. The Ongoing Taliban Peace Talks. I have colleagues throughout the military who are convinced that the current negotiations with the Taliban are a key indicator of success in our two decades at war against the Salafi-jihadist group. The issue with this is that temporary cease fires have already been violated several times, leading one to believe that the strategic level leadership's messages are simply not reaching their subordinates or that local factions are not adhering to the agreement. Trusting that radical Muslim extremists will not allow Afghanistan to become a future safe haven for other jihadists, as it has in the past, is simply unrealistic. Believing some sort of quasi peace deal is going to miraculously pacify an organization that hates everything the West stands for is misguided. My own experiences throughout the Middle East have proven that the spirit of jihad and hatred will live on in Afghanistan. The Islamic State is Nearly Defeated. Multiple global media outlets continue to run stories about the dismantling of the Islamic State, as though the battle is won. Though Sheik Abu 23 Bakr al-Baghdadi has been killed, and the proposed Islamic caliphate was never fully realized, it would be naïve to think that the Islamic State's jihad is over. The movement will metastasize and take on new forms in other parts of the globe: It is already happening. Jihadists are continually leaving the battlefields of Iraq and Syria, headed back to their former homes in mainland Europe. As these individuals reenter the diaspora, the concern is that they will radicalize other individuals and conduct terrorist attacks within the continent. Conclusion The reasons an individual seeks to join a jihadist movement are deeply rooted in personal social dynamics, the security situation of their country, and a multitude of other religious, cultural, and economic factors. I agree with Venhaus (2010) and Gorka (2016) who assert that there is no singular military operation or strategy that can bring about a decisive victory against something so intangible as why one might join the modern jihadist movement. Use of the US military as a vehicle for the establishment of Western democracy and nation-building efforts in tribal nations like Afghanistan and Iraq only served to invigorate the jihadists' call to arms. Jihad is not something that can be eradicated completely by military force. Jihad must be confronted, contained, and countered through a comprehensive approach that empowers state and non-state actors to develop local solutions and directs expeditious military applications only where completely necessary. Recommendations Promote and Protect the Muslim Youth Leagues In order to truly create a cultural paradigm shift in Muslim youth at risk of radicalization, groups like the Muslim Youth League (BBC, 2017) should be promoted by governments worldwide as a bastion of true and peaceful Islam. While they should no doubt be supported, 24 governments must also protect these organizations from becoming targets for violent acts of terrorism or influence operations by jihadists. Through a combination of deep cultural understanding and positive messaging, the Muslim Youth League has already shown its effectiveness in the United Kingdom and beyond. Because the youth of each nation understand the social pressures and cultural influences that may lead one to seek jihad, they can effectively develop tailored, local solutions to persuade at-risk individuals. The Muslim Youth Leagues are on the front lines of countering the jihadist worldview, taking a stand and declaring war on jihad and its misrepresentations of Islam. Enable Local Solutions for Local Problems This should be accomplished through unified government action that involves all the United States' instruments of national power including diplomacy, information sharing, military action where necessary, and economic stimulus as needed. The specific issue with efforts like these, is that they cannot be accomplished during what is perceived by locals as a military occupation. This was proven true in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. Despite massive efforts to rebuild infrastructure, aid in agricultural processes, build schools, and organize community projects, the United States and its allies were still viewed as pushing Western values and democracy on nations through military occupation. As much as possible, we must limit our military presence in areas that are ripe for developing a jihadist movement, or in ones that are recovering. I have seen firsthand that government efforts against jihadist organizations or at-risk communities have often been fragmented, poorly staffed, and uncoordinated. Venhaus (2010) suggests the creation of an agency that is staffed, trained, funded, enabled, and equipped for strategic communications, calling it the United States Strategic Communications Agency. An 25 agency like this could ensure that a comprehensive national communications strategy is developed and achieved, with a focus on enabling local community efforts to counter the jihadist narrative. By promoting social outreach, religious education, and community programs, this agency could bolster the efforts of community leaders and stifle jihadist aims in their areas. Support Religious Education and Reintegration Reintegration programs in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Singapore and elsewhere have successfully rehabilitated former jihadists through religious education (Venhaus, 2010). Countering the apocalyptic world view of jihadist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State requires local religious leaders who understand their community's issues to band together and refute the extremist narrative. Through careful, patient, and individually-tailored instruction, Muslim religious leaders can invalidate each and every one of the extremists' claims. Individuals who turn to jihad are often seeking this type of direction, they just find it in the wrong places. Counter Threats with Tailored Military Force Packages Continued themes among the military failures in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations during the early years of the Global War on Terrorism are indiscriminate use of force, lack of cultural understanding, and hyper-focus on tactical gains while failing at the strategic level. US government nation-building efforts on the backs of the military cost our country trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and years of frustration, bogged-down in an endless quagmire of misunderstanding. US Army Special Forces are selected, trained, equipped, and enabled to clandestinely handle complex problem sets in denied or politically-sensitive environments. Each Special Forces Group is regionally-aligned, with Operational Detachments developing deep cultural understanding through Area Studies and continuous relationship-building with regional state and 26 non-state actors. Special Forces operators understand the complex cultural and security situations in their areas of responsibility and have the language capability and strategic understanding to operate with complete independence of outside support. Frankly, if given the authority and autonomy to do their jobs, Special Forces can coerce, disrupt, or overthrow jihadist organizations unilaterally, or train, advise, and equip foreign security forces to accomplish this task on their own. This can all be done independent of a large, slow, and expensive conventional military occupation. Organizations like al-Qaeda must be kept in a state of constant fear and uncertainty. US Special Operations Forces are uniquely suited to this task. Through structured, rapid application of military force, SOF can find, fix, and finish intended targets with surgical precision. This has proven true in the capture of Saddam Hussein and the elimination of Osama bin Laden and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, among numerous other targets throughout the Global War on Terrorism. Continuing to deny safe havens through short, precise applications of combat power is crucial and does not rely on a conventional military occupation of the target area. Operations such as these, characterized by discriminate use of force and strategic impact, should be the main avenue for denying the relative safety, security, and freedom of maneuver of jihadist organizations. 27 References British Broadcasting Corporation (2017, June 4). Reality check: What is the prevent strategy? Reality Check. https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2017-40151991. Creswell, R., & Haykel, B. (2015, June 1). Battle lines: Want to understand the jihadis? Read their poetry. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/08/battle-lines-jihad-creswell-and-haykel. Dearden, L. (2015, March 21). Young British Muslims declare own jihad against ISIS and other terrorists who 'hijack' Islam. Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/young-british-muslims-declare-own-jihad-against-isis-and-other-terrorists-who-hijack-islam-10146534.html. Dempsey, M. (2015). The national military strategy of the United States of America 2015: The United States military's contribution to national security. The Joint Staff. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf. Gall, C. (2020, January 31). From armed struggle to peaceful protest, a road still to travel: A veteran of the Afghan jihad working for nonviolent change in Algeria. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/world/middleeast/from-armed-struggle-to-peaceful-protest-a-road-still-to-travel.html. Gorka, S. L. (2016). Defeating jihad: The winnable war. Regnery Publishing. Kilcullen, D. J. (2010). Counterinsurgency. Oxford University Press. Nilsson, M. (2019, 18 June) Motivations for jihad and cognitive dissonance: A qualitative analysis of former Swedish jihadists. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1626091. 28 Porch, D. (2013). Counterinsurgency: Exposing the myths of the new way of war. Cambridge University Press. Qur'an (M. Ali, Trans.; 7th ed.) (2015). Islam International Publications. (Original work published ca. 1537). Venhaus, J. (2010). Why youth join al-Qaeda. Special Report, 236(1), 1-12. https://www.usip. org/sites/default/files/SR236Venhaus.pdf.
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1. Einleitung Das Besondere an Wilhelm Heitmeyer ist, dass er uns empirisch erklärt, was wir vorher nur vermutet oder gesagt bekommen haben. Der Sozialwissenschaftler Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Jahrgang 1945, forscht seit Jahrzehnten zu gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit und Rechtsextremismus (Universität Bielefeld, o.J.). Bekannt geworden ist er als Gründungsdirektor des Instituts für interdisziplinäre Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung der Universität Bielefeld 1996, wo er bis zu seiner altersbedingten Emeritierung als Direktor fungierte. Seine Langzeitstudie "Deutsche Zustände" zu rechtsextremen Einstellungen in der Gesellschaft und zu gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit machen ihn zu einem der "wichtigsten Rechtsextremismus-Forscher der Bundesrepublik" (Laudenbach, 2023).Im folgenden Beitrag soll es um ausgewählte Arbeiten von Heitmeyer gehen. In seinen jüngeren Veröffentlichungen nimmt er die Mechanismen von Krisen und daraus resultierenden Kontrollverlusten als Treiber von autoritären Versuchungen in den Fokus. In Bezug darauf wird in der vorliegenden Arbeit genauer auf Heitmeyers Beitrag zur Erklärung des Erstarkens des "autoritären Nationalradikalismus" eingegangen. Hierunter fällt die Partei "Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)", die den Kern dieses Politiktypus in Deutschland ausmacht.Heitmeyer stellte um die Jahrtausendwende die These auf, der globalisierte Kapitalismus bringe vielfältige Schieflagen mit sich in Form von Desintegration, Abstiegsängsten und Kontrollverlusten. Damals ahnte er noch nichts von den Krisen, die in den folgenden "entsicherten Jahrzehnten" auf uns zukommen und uns vor erhebliche Herausforderungen stellen würden (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 89).Die aufgestellte These rund um soziale, politische und ökonomische Strukturentwicklungen wurde mit individuellen und kollektiven Verarbeitungsmustern gekoppelt und 2022 um Krisen der "Post-9/11"-Ära und Kontrollverluste als Krisenfolgen erweitert. Diese wiederum bilden einen Nährboden für autoritäre Versuchungen, für sogenannte rechte Bedrohungsallianzen als politische Folgen autoritärer Entwicklungen.Die Ergebnisse der Langzeitstudie eignen sich, um das Aufkommen und Erstarken einer autoritär nationalradikalen Partei wie der Alternative für Deutschland zu beleuchten. Heitmeyer ist es, der durch seine Sozialstrukturanalyse das vielzitierte Fünftel (19,6%) der Bevölkerung empirisch nachweisen konnte, das der rechtspopulistisch eingestellten Gruppe in der Bevölkerung mit Einstellungen der gruppenbezogenen Menschenfeindlichkeit zugeordnet werden kann (Schaefer, Mansel & Heitmeyer, 2002, S. 125 f.).Wahlpolitisch blieben diese Teile der Bevölkerung lange unbedeutend. Die Wähler:innen waren meist keiner Partei zugehörig, sie "vagabundierten" zwischen den Parteien von Wahl zu Wahl oder wählten gar nicht; viele harrten in einer "wutgetränkten Apathie". Bis zu dem Jahr, als die AfD auf die politische Oberfläche trat und ab 2015 eine radikale Entwicklung nahm; ein "politisches Ortsangebot" für diese Teile der Bevölkerung ist gefunden (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 113 ff.).Im folgenden wird zuerst eine begriffliche Rahmung des Politiktypus des "autoritären Nationalradikalismus" vorgenommen. Zentrale Schemata der Arbeiten von Wilhelm Heitmeyer sollen beleuchtet werden. Nach diesen Ausführungen wird der Blick auf Krisen und Kontrollverluste und ihre Funktion als Treiber autoritärer Entwicklungen gerichtet. Im letzten Schritt geht es um die Ausprägung des autoritären Nationalradikalismus in Form der AfD.2. Der autoritäre NationalradikalismusUm über Heitmeyers Arbeiten zu schreiben, bedarf es einer Konturierung der von ihm verwendeten Begriffe. Im Folgenden werden die Begriffe des Autoritarismus und der dichotomischen Welt- und Gesellschaftsbilder erklärt, um anschließend den politischen Typus des autoritären Nationalradikalismus von Rechtspopulismus und Rechtsextremismus abzugrenzen und entsprechend zu erläutern. 2.1 AutoritarismusDas Legitimations- und Strukturmuster politischer Macht des Autoritarismus gründet auf einer Beziehung zwischen "Machthaber:innen" in Regierungen, Parteien und anderen Organisationen und "Machtunterworfenen". Unter Machthaber:innen versteht man Amts-, Funktions- und Handlungsträger:innen, während Machtunterworfene Mitglieder, Gefolgsleute oder Anhänger:innen sind (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 31). Abhängig ist diese Beziehung in der sozialen Praxis von der Autorität der Machthabenden und der Reaktion der Unterworfenen.Autorität kann aus Bewunderung, begeisterter Unterstützung, Respekt, Ehrfurcht oder gleichmütiger Duldung aus freien Stücken zugeschrieben werden und gründet in Anerkennung. Jedoch wird Autorität dann autoritär, "[...] wenn Willfährigkeit aufgenötigt, Unterwerfung durch Täuschung bewirkt, Gehorsam durch Drohung oder handgreifliche Gewalt erzwungen wird" (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 32).Eine dominante Rolle spielen Grunderzählungen in der Entwicklung des Autoritären. Hierzu zählen die Bedrohung von Ordnung, die Auflösung von Identitäten, das Zerstören von Hierarchien und Dominanzen, Fantasien vom Untergang des (deutschen) Volkes sowie der Opferstatus aufgrund des Agierens feindlicher Mächte sowohl aus dem Inneren wie von außen (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 35). Diese Kennzeichen der Bedrohung, Auflösung, Zerstörung, des Untergangs etc. haben die Funktion, kollektive Ängste zu schüren. Zugleich sollen so Mobilisierungen in Gang gesetzt und autoritäre Bewegungen und Bestrebungen angetrieben werden (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 35).Frankenberg & Heitmeyer beschreiben die politische Rhetorik des Autoritären als Diskurslogik, die sich vor allem in Wahlpropaganda und programmatischen Erklärungen zeigt. Diese konstruieren manichäische Weltbilder, weisen eine dichotomische Struktur auf und manifestieren sich auf drei Ebenen, wie die folgende Abbildung zeigt. Häufig anzutreffen sind die Gegensätze von Volk vs. Elite, geschlossene vs. offene Gesellschaft, wir vs. die oder Ungleichwertigkeit vs. Gleichwertigkeit. Abbildung 1: Dichotomische Welt- und Gesellschaftsbilder (Quelle: eigene Darstellung nach Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 248)2.2 Dichotomische Welt- und GesellschaftsbilderDiese Gegensätze laufen auf "Entweder-Oder"-Konflikte hinaus, die sich immer aufs "Ganze" beziehen, da es um "Alles" geht (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 275). Der Streitgegenstand wird der Verhandlung oder dem Kompromiss entzogen, ein "Mehr-oder-Weniger" ist nicht möglich. Die von autoritären Bewegungen, Organisationen und Regimen geführten Konflikte zielen demnach nicht auf Verständigung oder Verhandlungen ab. Es geht um "[...] Entscheidungen zugunsten einer rigiden Machtdurchsetzung und Machtsicherung mit möglichst umfassender Verhaltenskontrolle in allen Lebensbereichen der Gesellschaft und den Institutionen des politischen Systems" (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 37).Gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen sind von immer höherer Komplexität und Ambivalenz geprägt. Ebenso nimmt ihre Unübersichtlichkeit zu und sie verändern sich mit zunehmender Geschwindigkeit. In diesem Zuge stehen politische Akteur:innen vor der Herausforderung, ihre Ambitionen und Machtansprüche für die jeweilige Wähler:innenschaft passend aufzubereiten. Hierzu gehört das Anbieten von Welt- und Gesellschaftsbildern, die Unübersichtlichkeit strukturieren, Entschleunigung versprechen und Komplexität reduzieren. Aus diesen Gründen werden von gemäßigten und extremen rechten Bewegungen und Parteien solche Dichotomien verwendet, die das Ordnen der eigenen Gefühlslagen, Erfahrungen und der eigenen Weltsichten erleichtern. 2.3 Populismus und RechtspopulismusPopulismus sieht Heitmeyer als Stil der Mobilisierung, der übergehen kann in eine "machiavellistische Strategie zur Erlangung oder Verteidigung der Macht" und auf marginalisierte Gruppen abzielt. Hinzu kommt häufig eine populistisch etikettierte Rhetorik und schlichte, aber einflussreiche Weltdeutungen, die dazu dienen, Ressentiments zu aktivieren, um eine imaginäre, kollektive Identität zu beschwören. Dies ganz im Sinne eines authentischen Volkes oder "der Nation" gegen Elit:innen, gegen "das System", Minderheiten oder die "Lügenpresse" (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 24).Nach Heitmeyer hat sich eine allgemein akzeptierte Definition von Populismus etabliert, wonach eine Bewegung dann als populistisch charakterisiert werden kann, "[...] wenn ihr die Unterscheidung zwischen dem "wahren" Volk einerseits und den ausbeuterischen, dekadenten, volksverräterischen Eliten andererseits zugrunde liegt" (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 231). Heitmeyer verwendet mittlerweile meist den Begriff autoritär anstelle von populistisch, im Folgenden wird ebenfalls diese Bezeichnung verwendet.Beim Rechtspopulismus prangert Heitmeyer eine "inflationäre Verwendung" ohne wirkliche Trennschärfe an, der keine einheitliche Definition hat, oftmals jedoch als Form des Autoritarismus mit "dünner Ideologie" und als Vergangenheitsorientierung beschrieben wird (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 231). Im Allgemeinen bezeichnet er den Rechtspopulismus als eine Ergänzung des populistischen Grundprinzips "Volk gegen Elite" um eine nationalistische Rhetorik (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 232).Zur These der "dünnen Ideologie" führt Heitmeyer an, dass sich populistische bzw. autoritäre Bestrebungen nicht nur durch ihren Politikstil und einer auf Machterwerb zielenden Strategie auszeichnen, sondern durch ein "Set von Ideen" und einem spezifischen Politik- und Demokratieverständnis, also ein Muster zur Deutung der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit anbieten, das sich nicht nur auf Kritik an Elit:innen und demokratischer Repräsentation beschränkt."Mit der ideologischen Kombination und politischen Handlungsagenda von Antielitismus und Antipluralismus, einer Kultur der unmittelbaren Kommunikation, einem xenophoben Nationalismus und dem Phantasma imaginärer Gemeinschaftlichkeit entfernt sich die Beschreibung des Populismus weit von demokratischen grass roots und nimmt die Deutungsangebote aus dem Lager des Autoritarismus an" (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 25). 2.4 Autoritärer NationalradikalismusDer Einheitsbegriff des Rechtspopulismus als "catch-all-term" wird nach Heitmeyer der sperrigen Realität nicht gerecht und hat viele alternative Benennungen verkümmern lassen. Zudem werden mit Nutzen dieses Begriffes durch Wissenschaft, Politik und Medien Vernebelungstaktiken der politischen Akteur:innen und Bewegungen bedient, da nicht die genauen ideologischen Komponenten ihrer jeweiligen Programme benannt werden. Das Abbilden der vielfältigen Realität muss auch begrifflich differenziert abgebildet werden, was notwendig ist, um "Gegengifte" zu entwickeln. Daher müssen die Begriffe "sperrig und unpoliert" sein (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 105).Der autoritäre Nationalradikalismus bewegt sich zwischen dem Rechtspopulismus und dem gewalttätigen Rechtsextremismus bzw. Neonazismus. Anzumerken ist, dass es sich nicht um eine faschistische Gesinnung handelt, da der italienische Faschismus nicht mit dem Nationalsozialismus identisch ist, in dem der Antisemitismus zentral ist (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 106). Der gewalttätige Rechtsextremismus schreckt viele Wähler:innen oder Sympathisant:innen ab, da er in öffentlichen Räumen situativen Schrecken verbreiten will.Im Gegensatz dazu weist der Rechtspopulismus eine "flache" Ideologie auf und ist mit der dramatisierten Konfliktlinie Volk vs. Elite auf kurzzeitige Erregungszustände ausgerichtet, die über klassische Massenmedien und die sozialen Medien verbreitet werden sollen, wie Abbildung 2 anschaulich darstellt (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 106). Der autoritäre Nationalradikalismus hingegen zielt auf die destabilisierende Veränderung gesellschaftlicher und politischer Institutionen. Zudem bedient er sich dichotomischer Welt- und Gesellschaftsbilder, um destabilisierende Veränderungen erreichen zu können. Abbildung 2: Die Erfolgsspur des autoritären Nationalradikalismus (Quelle: eigene Darstellung nach Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 236; Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 107)Drei markante Charakteristika des autoritären Nationalradikalismus werden in der Sozialforschung hervorgehoben. Diese werden im folgenden erklärt und in Kapitel 6 auf die AfD bezogen:Das Autoritäre zeigt sich in der Betonung einer hierarchischen sozialen Ordnung, in Forderungen nach rigider Führung politischer Institutionen und in einem fundamentalistischen Verständnis des Agierens und Opponierens auf politischer Ebene ohne Kompromisse. Politik und Gesellschaft sollen also entsprechend einem Kontrollparadigma organisiert werden. Dichotomische Gesellschaftsbilder sind maßgebend und operieren als Grundlage für kämpferisch initiierte "Entweder-oder-Konflikte" (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 105).Die Betonung der besonderen Stellung des deutschen Volkes bildet das Nationale des autoritären Nationalradikalismus. Formulierungen und Parolen wie "Deutschland den Deutschen" oder "Deutschland zuerst" unterstreichen eine Überlegenheit gegenüber anderen Völkern, Nationen, ethnischen und religiösen Gruppen und eine neue, "deutsche" Vergangenheitsdeutung wird reklamiert (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 105 f.).Das Radikale, vom ursprünglichen Wortsinn aus dem Lateinischen (radix = Wurzel) her bestimmt, richtet sich gegen die offene Gesellschaft und die liberale Demokratie, die trotz zahlreicher kritikwürdiger Defekte erst durch jahrzehntelange Entwicklungen und Freiheitskämpfe ermöglicht wurden. Ein rabiater und emotionalisierter Mobilisierungsstil wird dazu angewendet, der sich vor allem durch menschenfeindliche Grenzüberschreitungen auszeichnet (vgl. Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 106).Weiterhin ist auf acht Elemente hinzuweisen, die zum Instrumentarium des organisierten autoritären Nationalradikalismus zählen:""Deutsch-Sein" als Schlüsselkategorie und sicherheitsspendender Identitätsanker;Propagandierung dichotomer Weltbilder;Kontrollparadigma als Versprechen einer autoritären sozialen Ordnung;Emotionalisierung gesellschaftlicher Probleme als Kontrollverluste;eskalativer Mobilisierungsstil zur Wiederherstellung von Kontrolle;Forcierung sozialer Vergleichsprozesse zwecks Radikalisierung;Ausnutzen der "Gewaltmembran", um mit bestimmten Begriffen andernorts Gewalt freizusetzen und Legitimationen zu liefern;Konstruktion einer "Opferrolle", um Sympathisanten an sich zu binden und ein Recht auf "Notwehr" zu etablieren" (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 213-276; Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 111).Diese Elemente sind deshalb wichtig zu nennen, da sie als Grundlage für drei wichtige Ziele dienen, die autoritär nationalradikale Parteien verfolgen:Das Besetzen vakanter politischer Themenräume, die von etablierten Parteien in der Vergangenheit übersehen wurden,das Verschieben des Sagbaren, wobei Heitmeyer auf die Theorie des "Overton-Windows" hinweist, sowie drittensdie Normalisierung von Positionen und dadurch die Schaffung neuer Normalitätsstandards (vgl. Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 111 f.).Der autoritäre Nationalradikalismus wird ab Kapitel 5 ausführlich in Bezug auf die Partei "Alternative für Deutschland" dargestellt, die den Kern des autoritären Nationalradikalismus in Deutschland bildet. 2.5 Rechtsautoritär und rechtsextremDen Bezug von Autoritärem zu Rechtsautoritärem und Rechtsextremem begründen Frankenberg & Heitmeyer damit, dass "für die Übersetzung des Autoritären in die aktuellen gesellschaftlichen und politischen Zustände und Entwicklung [...] eine Fokussierung auf das rechtsautoritäre und rechtsextreme Spektrum angebracht" ist (2022, S. 40).In Ermangelung einer umfassenden Definition von Rechtsextremismus, die die Dimension der Gewalt beinhaltet, hat Heitmeyer ein eigenes Konzept vorgelegt (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 40). Dieses akzentuiert die "Kernverbindung" von Ideologie der Ungleichheit und Gewaltakzeptanz. Die Ideologie der Ungleichheit enthält zwei zentrale Dimensionen, wobei die erste gruppenbezogen auf Ungleichwertigkeit ausgerichtet ist und sich später als "gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit" ausgeprägt hat:"Sie zeigt sich in Facetten wie nationalistische bzw. völkische Selbstübersteigerung; rassistische Einordnung; soziobiologische Behauptung von natürlichen Hierarchien; sozialdarwinistische Betonung des Rechts des Stärkeren; totalitäre Normverständnisse im Hinblick auf Abwertung des "Anders-Sein" und die Betonung von kultureller Homogenität gegen Heterogenität" (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 40 f.).Diese erste Dimension lässt sich als Vorlage für die späteren Studien "Deutsche Zustände" von Wilhelm Heitmeyer verstehen. Die zweite Dimension der Ideologie der Ungleichheit hat sich als lebenslagenbezogen erwiesen und verweist auf Ausgrenzungsforderungen in Form von kultureller, politischer, rechtlicher, ökonomischer sowie sozialer Ungleichbehandlung von Fremden bzw. "Anderen".Die Gewaltakzeptanz haben Frankenberg & Heitmeyer in vier ansteigend eskalierende "Varianten der Überzeugung unabänderlicher Existenz von Gewalt" kategorisiert, hinter denen die Grundannahme steht, dass Gewalt als "normale Aktionsform zur Regelung von Konflikten" und demnach als legitim angesehen würde (2022, S. 41). Insofern überrascht die Tatsache nicht, dass etwa rationale Diskurse oder demokratische Regelungsformen von sozialen und politischen Konflikten abgelehnt und autoritäre oder gar militaristische Umgangsformen und Stile betont werden (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 41).Die politikwissenschaftliche Forschung zum Rechtsextremismus sieht Heitmeyer fixiert auf politische Symbole, historisch-politische Bezugnahmen, Parteiprogramme und Wahlerfolge. Jedoch reicht dieser Fokus nicht aus, um den Aufschwung rechter und rechtsextremer Kräfte in der Gesellschaft zu erklären – weshalb der "[..] Blick auf die Zusammenhänge zwischen ökonomischen, sozialen und politischen Strukturentwicklungen, den individuellen und kollektiven Verarbeitungen und den politischen Handlungskonsequenzen, wenn ein entsprechendes Handlungsangebot vorhanden ist", geweitet werden muss (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 41).Dies beschreibt das "Analyseschema" (siehe Abbildung 5) im folgenden Kapitel. Fürderhin sollen nicht einzelne Aspekte oder Ereignisse parzelliert betrachtet werden, sondern mittels des "konzentrischen Eskalationskontinuums" die "rechten Bedrohungsallianzen", die bis in die Mitte der Gesellschaft hineinreichen, sichtbar werden. Hierzu hat Heitmeyer 2018 ein weiteres Untersuchungsmodell entwickelt (siehe Abbildung 3). Die beiden Schemata werden folgend beschrieben. Vorangestellt finden sich die zentralen Ausgangspunkte und Thesen von Wilhelm Heitmeyer, auf denen die Schemata beruhen. 3. Heitmeyers Arbeiten: Zentrale Thesen und SchemataWilhelm Heitmeyers Studien knüpften ursprünglich an die mittlerweile vielzitierte Prognose Ralf Dahrendorfs aus 1997 an, dass wir uns "an der Schwelle zum autoritären Jahrhundert" befinden würden, da vieles auf solch eine Entwicklung hindeuten würde (Dahrendorf, 1997; Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 256). Dahrendorf wies vor über 25 Jahren auf das verhängnisvolle Zusammenwirken von Ökonomie, politischer Partizipation und sozialer Integration bzw. Desintegration hin und deutete dieses Spannungsverhältnis als eine "Quadratur des Kreises". Heitmeyer fragt in diesem Zusammenhang, "zu wessen Lasten diese Spannungen gehen würden" und "[...] wie sich unter dem Druck der kapitalistischen Kontrollgewinne die individuellen, kollektiven und institutionellen Kontrollverluste auswirken würden" (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 256).Insbesondere die Langzeitstudie "Deutsche Zustände" zur gruppenbezogenen Menschenfeindlichkeit hat ergiebiges Daten- und Analysematerial erbracht, welches Heitmeyer in seinen Arbeiten verwendet (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 28). Das Projekt mit seinen jährlichen repräsentativen Bevölkerungsbefragungen dient dazu, Langzeitverläufe sichtbar zu machen und eignet sich, um das Aufkommen und Erstarken der autoritär nationalradikalen AfD zu beleuchten.Heitmeyer konnte mit Hilfe der Resultate empirisch Zusammenhänge in zwei Richtungen nachweisen: "für die Unterstützung autoritärer Bewegungen sowie Parteien und gegen verschiedene Gruppen in der Gesellschaft (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 55). Je deutlicher man autoritäre Überzeugungen vertritt, desto eher stimme man fremdenfeindlichen und rassistischen Äußerungen zu, abgeschwächt auch Äußerungen zu Antisemitismus, Heterophobie und klassischem Sexismus sowie der These von Etabliertenvorrechten, also sozialer Dominanz in einem Hierarchiengefüge.So kam Heitmeyer auf das oben erwähnte und seither vielzitierte Fünftel der Bevölkerung (19,6%), das Einstellungen zu gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit hegt und als "Machtmaterial" für autoritäre Bewegungen, Parteien und Regime zur Etablierung und Sicherung von autoritären gesellschaftlichen und politischen Machtstrukturen dienen kann (Schaefer, Mansel & Heitmeyer, 2002, S. 125 f.; Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 56). 2001 formulierte Wilhelm Heitmeyer seinen Ausgangspunkt wie folgt:"Die zu verfolgende These geht davon aus, daß [sic] sich ein autoritärer Kapitalismus herausbildet, der vielfältige Kontrollverluste erzeugt, die auch zu Demokratieentleerungen beitragen, so daß neue autoritäre Versuchungen durch staatliche Kontroll- und Repressionspolitik wie auch rabiater Rechtspopulismus befördert werden" (Heitmeyer, 2001, S. 500).Der sogenannte "autoritäre Kapitalismus" entstand durch eine neoliberale Politik rund um die Jahrtausendwende. Weitreichende ökonomische Kontrollgewinne in einerseits gesellschaftlichen Lebensbereichen über soziale Standards von Verdiensten und soziale Absicherung sowie andererseits über Standortentscheidungen waren zu verzeichnen, ergo übergriffig eindringende Prozesse, sodass nun mehr ökonomische Dominanz als Quelle für Kontrolllosigkeit sowie für Anomie gilt.Diese weitreichenden Kontrollgewinne des Kapitals wurden begleitet von ebenso weitreichenden politischen Kontrollverlusten nationalstaatlicher Politik, verbunden mit sozialen Desintegrationsprozessen von Teilen der Bevölkerung. Diese Auswirkungen blieben auf politischer Ebene allerdings solange wahlpolitisch folgenlos, bis ein entsprechendes politisches Angebot auf den Plan trat. In Deutschland erschien dieses Angebot in Form des autoritären Nationalradikalismus der AfD, besonders anschaulich im Jahr 2015 durch die politisch-kulturelle Krise der Flüchtlingsbewegungen und die Spaltung der AfD auf Bundesebene (Heitmeyer, 2022 a, S. 301; Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 261).2018 schreibt Heitmeyer, dass sich dies tatsächlich so ereignet hat und sich empirisch nachweisen lässt: "Ein zunehmend autoritärer Kapitalismus verstärkt soziale Desintegrationsprozesse in westlichen Gesellschaften, erzeugt zerstörerischen Druck auf liberale Demokratien und befördert autoritäre Bewegungen, Parteien und Regime" (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 23). Nachfolgend werden das Modell des konzentrischen Eskalationskontinuums und das Untersuchungsschema beschrieben. 3.1 Konzentrisches EskalationskontinuumMit dem Schema des konzentrischen Eskalationskontinuums soll dargestellt werden, wie autoritäre Eliten auf Legitimation und Partizipation – unter anderem durch die Bürger:innen - angewiesen sind, zumindest so lange, wie sie ein "formales Demokratiesystem westlicher Prägung" aufrecht erhalten wollen oder auch durch soziale, politische und ökonomische Gegenkräfte dazu genötigt werden.Heitmeyer rückt somit die "[...] Entstehung von Eskalationsdynamiken ins Blickfeld, mit denen die zustimmende oder schweigend duldende Beteiligung von erheblichen Teilen der Bevölkerung zu erfassen ist" (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 43). Das konzentrische Eskalationskontinuum dient dazu, die Wucht rechter Bedrohungsallianzen herauszukristallisieren und soll helfen, Gewalt, Gewaltstadien und deren Ursachen besser verstehen zu können.Betrachtet werden Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen einzelner unverbunden nebeneinander lebender Personen sowie formelle Mitgliedschaften in politischen Parteien oder Vereinigungen. Dem Eskalationsmodell zugrunde liegt das Milieukonzept. Heute sind nicht mehr zwingend physische Kontakte notwendig, da Milieubildung auch im virtuellen Raum stattfindet. Heitmeyer weist darauf hin, dass in diesem Zusammenhang durch ein entstehendes "Wir"-Gefühl gleichzeitig eine abwertende, diskriminierende und ausgrenzende "Die"-Kategorie mitgeliefert wird.Das Schema stellt im "Zwiebelmodell" fünf Stufen dar, die als Einstellungsmuster der gruppenbezogenen Menschenfeindlichkeit in Teilen der Bevölkerung zu verstehen sind, die wiederum autoritären Versuchungen nachgeben und somit den Autoritären Nationalradikalismus der AfD in Deutschland, aber auch Fidesz in Ungarn oder der FPÖ in Österreich begünstigen (Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 43). Die jeweiligen eskalierenden Akteur:innengruppen in den Schalen des Modells werden kleiner, während die Gewaltorientierung im Inneren des Modells zunimmt.Als Kernmechanismus und verbindendes Element der Schalen zueinander werden die verschiedenen Legitimationsbrücken genannt. Fürderhin darf nicht unerwähnt bleiben, dass die Ideologie der Ungleichwertigkeit der kleinste gemeinsame Nenner aller Schichten des Eskalationskontinuums ist. Sie dient als Legitimationsfundus für personen- wie gruppenbezogene Diskriminierung, Ausgrenzung und Gewalt (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 20). Abbildung 3: Konzentrisches Eskalationskontinuum (Quelle: eigene Darstellung nach Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 356; Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 59) Nachfolgend werden die Schichten im Spektrum von rechtem Denken bis zum terroristischen Handeln kurz erläutert: Die äußerste Schicht repräsentiert die gesamte Bevölkerung, in der in unterschiedlichem Ausmaß Einstellungen vertreten werden, je nach gesellschaftlicher Debatte, die der gruppenbezogenen Menschenfeindlichkeit zugeordnet werden können. Diese Einstellungen in der Bevölkerung stellen individuelle Positionierungen dar, die parteipolitisch gebunden, "freischwebend" sein oder auch zwischen Parteien "vagabundieren" können. Diejenigen Teile der Bevölkerung mit menschenfeindlichen Einstellungen sympathisieren zwar maßgeblich mit der AfD, sind an sie jedoch nicht zwangsläufig gebunden und können auch andere Parteien präferieren und wählen (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 60).Das Milieu des autoritären Nationalradikalismus, insbesondere der AfD, das an diese erste Schicht anschließt, präsentiert und propagiert entsprechende Ausgrenzungsstrategien und konstruierte Feindbilder. Die AfD "saugt" die jeweiligen individuellen Einstellungen in der Bevölkerung auf und verdichtet sie zu kollektiven Aussagen, die sie dann wiederum auf die politische Agenda setzt. Sie konzentriert also potenzielle menschenfeindliche Einstellungen in der Bevölkerung, die bereits im Vorfeld durch andere Bewegungen, wie beispielsweise Pegida, verdichtet wurden und bildet für sie den parlamentarischen Arm.Ein weiteres Kennzeichen dieses Milieus ist eine gewisse ideologische Heterogenität, da die Einstellungen von "[...] rechtskonservativen bis hin zu "Übergangspositionen" in das systemfeindliche Milieu des völkischen "Flügels" der AfD" reichen" (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 62). Zudem bemüht sich die AfD um den Anstrich einer "bürgerlichen" Partei, um anschlussfähig an die Mitte der Gesellschaft zu sein.Im systemfeindlichen Milieu ist man parteipolitisch eindeutig im rechtsextremen Milieu verortet, Bezug genommen wird etwa auf die NPD, was auch für die extremistisch-modernistische Identitäre Bewegung gilt. Gemeint sind also rechtsextremistische Bewegungen und neonazistische Kameradschaften, die sich an einschlägigen historischen Vorbildern orientieren. Die gemeinsame Grundlage stellt die Ideologie der Ungleichwertigkeit dar. In diesem Milieu sind bereits Gewaltattitüden verbreitet, Gewalt wird akzeptiert und zur Ausübung ist man situativ bereit (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 62). Jedoch lässt man sich in Form von Parteien durchaus darauf ein, vorübergehend am demokratischen System teilzunehmen.An staatliche Vorgaben passt man sich nur aus strategischen Überlegungen an, indem beispielsweise Demonstrationen angemeldet werden; zugleich ist "Systemüberwindung" das zentrale Ziel: "In der "Parteifantasie" arbeitet man auf den "Volksaufstand" hin, mit dem die Vergangenheit wiederhergestellt werden soll. Es ist ein offener und weitgehend öffentlicher Kampf gegen das verhasste System" (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 64).Diese wenn auch nur vorübergehende Teilnahme am demokratischen System gilt als wesentlicher Unterschied zur vorletzten Schicht, dem klandestinen terroristischen Planungs- und Unterstützungsmilieu. Es schließt jegliche Teilnahme am demokratischen System aus und fasst jede partielle und temporäre Teilnahme als Verrat an der Bewegung auf (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 64). Dieses Milieu gilt als noch radikaler und agiert im Geheimen, oft mit eindeutiger Gewaltoption oder Gewalttätigkeit. Ziel ist der "Umsturz", wenn nötig mit Waffengewalt, weshalb dieser verdeckte Kampf auch aus dem Untergrund unterstützt wird – hier weist Heitmeyer auf die hohe Zahl untergetauchter rechtsextremistischer Straftäter:innen als aufschlussreiches Indiz hin (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 64).Den Kern der "Zwiebel" stellen terroristische Zellen oder Einzeltäter:innen dar. Den Unterschied zur vorherigen Eskalationsstufe stellt das alleinige Merkmal des "Grad(s) der Klandestinität und Vernichtungsrealisierung" dar: "Die einen führen zum Schein noch ein "normales" Alltagsleben, die anderen eine Existenz im Untergrund. Sie beschaffen Waffen, erstellen Todeslisten und bereiten sich auf den Tag X vor. Die einen planen die Vernichtungstaten, die anderen setzen sie um" (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 64).Die fünf Schichten des konzentrischen Eskalationskontinuums werden durch sogenannte "Legitimationsbrücken" zusammengehalten. Diese können dann entstehen, wenn es für gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen keine Lösungen zu geben scheint. Die Entwicklungen werden als Bedrohungen empfunden, für die die "Anderen", beispielsweise Geflüchtete oder Menschen mit anderen Lebensstilen, oder "die da oben", ergo der Staat als Ganzes, demokratische Institutionen oder demokratisch gewählte Entscheidungsträger:innen, verantwortlich gemacht werden. Diese kollektiven Schuldzuweisungen aus Teilen der Bevölkerung können sich dann in gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit übersetzen.Zum anderen können sich die Legitimationen aus Verschwörungsideologien, aus Anleihen bei gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen oder historischen ideologischen Konzepten, wie dem Regime des Nationalsozialismus, dessen Ordnung wiederhergestellt werden soll, ergeben. Diese beispielhaft aufgezeigten Legitimationsquellen werden dann im Eskalationskontinuum von den äußeren Schichten weiter nach innen "transportiert (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 65). Heitmeyer hat vier solcher Legitimationsbrücken jeweils zwischen den Stufen bestimmt, wie die folgende Abbildung zeigt:Abbildung 4: Legitimationsbrücken im Eskalationskontinuum (Quelle: eigene Darstellung nach Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 67)1. Das Einstellungsmuster gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit in Teilen der Bevölkerung stellt den Ausgangspunkt dar. Es dient dem autoritären Nationalradikalismus der AfD als Legitimation, entsprechende Feindbilder aufzubauen und zuzuspitzen. Wichtig anzumerken ist, dass auch Menschen mit diesen Einstellungen, die nicht die AfD wählen oder mit ihr sympathisieren, zu diesem Legitimationsfundus beitragen. Sie bestimmen das gesellschaftliche Klima mit, aus dem die AfD ihre politische Legitimation "saugt" (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 66 f.).2. Führende Vertreter:innen des autoritären Nationalradikalismus der AfD machen von einer "Gewaltmembran" Gebrauch, was bedeutet, dass eine aggressive Rhetorik die trennende Membran zur nächsten Stufe in gewissen Fällen durchdringen kann und den Weg freilegt für autoritär nationalradikale Bewegungen mit weiteren Aufheizungen – psychische Gewaltandrohungen können von gewalttätigen Akteur:innen in physische Gewalt umgesetzt werden, "[...] ohne dass diese Gewalt den sprachlichen Urhebern und Legitimationsbeschaffern direkt zuzurechnen wäre" (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 271). Durch diese Gewaltmembran werden dem systemfeindlichen Milieu Motive für entsprechende Gewalt geliefert. Zur aggressiven Rhetorik zählen beispielsweise Erzählungen von einem "Bevölkerungsaustausch", Parolen wie "Corona-Diktatur" oder das Beschwören von Untergangsszenarien von Führungskräften der AfD. Auch das Propagieren einer Reinterpretation der deutschen Geschichte insbesondere seitens des völkischen "Flügels" der AfD durch Begriffe wie "Umvolkung" bringt die Gewaltmembran zum Schwingen. Diese Rhetoriken und Untergangsfantasien erzeugen Handlungsdruck (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 67 f.).3. Das systemfeindliche Milieu ist geprägt von verschiedenen Akteur:innen, die sich auf der Schwelle zur Legitimation offener Gewalt gegen Vertreter:innen des Staates und gegen Minderheiten bewegen. Heitmeyer führt als Beispiel die Partei "Die Rechte" an, die den klandestinen terroristischen Planungsmilieus Motivation und Legitimation liefert (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 68).4. Im letzten Schritt stehen die klandestinen Planungsmilieus. Diese errichten im Gegensatz zu den vorherigen Eskalationsstufen keine zusätzlichen ideologischen Legitimationsbrücken. Ihr Ziel sind die "Brücken zur Tat" und das Abschirmen terroristischer Akteur:innen gegen staatliche Verfolgung (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 68).Hieraus resultiert die Schlussfolgerung, dass über verschiedene, eskalierende Stufen jene Teile der Bevölkerung, die explizite autoritäre Einstellungen oder Einstellungen der gruppenbezogenen Menschenfeindlichkeit aufweisen, an politischer Gewalt beteiligt sind; nicht zwangsläufig als Täter:innen im juristischen Sinne, aber als Gehilf:innen und Legitimationshelfer:innen, wie das konzentrische Eskalationskontinuum anschaulich darstellt (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 43). Das Modell des konzentrischen Eskalationskontinuums wird in Kapitel 6 in Bezug auf das Auftreten der AfD näher erläutert und an Beispielen untersucht.3.2 Analyseschema2018 hat Heitmeyer ein weiteres Analyseschema eingeführt. Ausgangspunkt für dieses soziologische Analysekonzept ist die Thematik, dass allein das Vorhandensein von autoritären Versuchungen in Teilen der Bevölkerung nicht ausreicht, um die entsprechenden Inhalte dann auch umgesetzt zu sehen. Hierzu ist es notwendig, dass diese Einstellungen in der Bevölkerung zusammen mit autoritären politischen Angeboten wirken. Insofern, formuliert Heitmeyer, "[...] wäre es zu kurz gegriffen, die Entstehung von autoritären Versuchungen nur aus Fehlentwicklungen des politischen Systems erklären zu wollen" (2018, S. 21).Die erste Ebene des Analyseschemas bildet Interdependenzen zwischen dem ökonomischen, sozialen und politischen Bereich ab. Diese sind als strukturelle Entwicklungen gekennzeichnet. Die unter "individuelle Verarbeitung" genannten Punkte sind von großer Bedeutung. Zentral ist hier, wie diese Erfahrungen bzw. Wahrnehmungen der ersten Ebene seitens der Bevölkerung subjektiv und individuell verarbeitet werden. Die individuellen Verarbeitungsmechanismen werden nach der Konzeption von Heitmeyer durch die "gesellschaftliche Integrations- und Desintegrationsdynamik" geprägt. Hierfür sind die folgenden Faktoren und Fragen von besonderer Bedeutung:"Sicherheit oder Unsicherheit der materiellen Reproduktion, der Anerkennung, des Statusaufstiegs, der Statussicherung bzw. des Statusabstieges, und ein Gefühl der Kontrolle über die eigene Biografie.Wird die eigene Stimme bzw. die Stimme der sozialen, ethnischen oder religiösen Gruppe, der Personen sich zugehörig fühlen, von den Regierenden wahrgenommen oder vielmehr ignoriert?Verlässlichkeit oder Erosion sozialer Beziehungen und Anerkennung der eigenen Identität bzw. der Identität der eigenen Gruppe durch Dritte, um emotionale Zugehörigkeit zu sichern" (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 22).Zentral in Heitmeyers Analyse sind der Kontrollverluste und die Defizite in der Wahrnehmung sowie der subjektive Begriff der Anerkennung. Diese Verarbeitungen haben Auswirkungen auf die Integrations- und Desintegrationsprozesse bzw. auf Anerkennungsverhältnisse, aus welchen im letzten Schritt politische Konsequenzen, also politische Handlungsfolgen, resultieren.Essenziell ist an dieser Stelle die Tatsache, dass die individuellen Verarbeitungen auch als Grund dafür angeführt werden können, weshalb nicht alle Teile der Bevölkerung, die unter einer Art von Desintegrationsdynamik leiden, zwangsläufig für autoritäre Versuchungen anfällig sind und sich wahlpolitisch entsprechend verhalten. Von einer Krisenfolge betroffen zu sein, hat also nicht zwangsläufig das Annehmen eines autoritär nationalradikalen Angebots zur Folge (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 269).Auch die autoritären Bewegungen, Parteien und Regime weisen autoritäre Versuchungen auf, die zu entsprechenden Einstellungen und Entscheidungen führen, die das gesellschaftliche Zusammenleben beeinflussen, da sie Bezug auf die ökonomischen, sozialen und politischen Systeme nehmen (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 21 f.). Dieses Schema wurde von Heitmeyer mit diversen theoretischen Ansätzen angelegt und ausgefüllt mit empirischen Daten (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 252).Das Theoriegeflecht aus mehreren sich ergänzenden disziplinären Zugängen besteht aus der Theorie Sozialer Desintegration von Anhut & Heitmeyer, der Konflikttheorie von Hirschman, der Theorie kapitalistischer Landnahme von Dörre, der Anomietheorie von Thome und dem kontrolltheoretischen Ansatz aus der Sozialpsychologie von Frey & Jonas. Die für das Analysekonzept wichtigsten Charakteristiken dieser Theorien werden in Heitmeyer 2018 und 2022 b ausführlich erklärt. Die genauere Betrachtung dieser Theorien würde den Rahmen der vorliegenden Arbeit sprengen, weshalb darauf an dieser Stelle verzichtet wird.Abbildung 5: Analyseschema (Quelle: eigene Darstellung nach Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 21)Erfolge rechter Parteien und Bewegungen wären demnach nicht möglich gewesen ohne bestimmte Entwicklungen im sozialen System der Gesellschaft, im politischen System der Demokratie und im ökonomischen System des globalisierten Kapitalismus (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 16). Durch das vorliegende Analyseschema soll verdeutlicht werden, wie autoritärer Kapitalismus in Zusammenwirken mit sozialen Desintegrationsprozessen und politischer Demokratieentleerung als "Ursachenmuster für die Realisierung autoritärer Sehnsüchte" fungiert (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 16 f.).Demokratieentleerung meint, dass ein Teil der Bevölkerung das Gefühl hat, nicht mehr wahrgenommen zu werden und gleichzeitig das Vertrauen schwindet, dass die herrschende Politik bzw. die Regierung willens und fähig ist, soziale Ungleichheit zu bekämpfen. Dies mündet bei Teilen der Bevölkerung in ein Gefühl, Bürger:innen zweiter Klasse zu sein (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 48). Heitmeyer hat 2022 das Analyseschema ergänzt; die Komponenten Krisen und Kontrollverluste wurden entsprechend ausdifferenziert (siehe Abbildung 6). Im Folgenden werden Krisen und Kontrollverluste als besondere Treiber autoritärer Entwicklungen und die dahingehende Erweiterung des Analyseschemas beleuchtet.4. Krisen und Kontrollverluste als Treiber autoritärer EntwicklungenEine Krise wird von Frankenberg & Heitmeyer durch drei Charakteristika definiert. Die bisherigen sozialen, ökonomischen und politischen Routinen zur Bewältigung von Ereignissen greifen nicht mehr und die bis dato vorhandenen Wissensbestände zur Problemlösung reichen nicht aus. Zusätzlich sind die Zustände, wie sie vor diesen Ereignissen herrschten, nicht wieder herstellbar. Darüber hinaus konkurrieren in solch krisenhaften Situationen verschiedene Möglichkeiten zu ihrer Bewältigung, was wiederum anomische Verhaltensunsicherheiten erzeugt (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 45).Die Kombination der drei Kriterien legt nahe, dass "Situationen mit notstandsähnlichem Zuschnitt" mit der Erfahrung von Kontrollverlusten verflochten sind (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 45; Heitmeyer, 2023, S. 253). Insofern verwundert die Tatsache nicht, wenn die These vertreten wird, dass krisenhaft zugespitzte Entwicklungen und Ereignisse nicht allein, jedoch in besonderem Maße als Treiber und Pfade des Autoritären sowie rechtsextremer Aktivitäten zählen (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 251).Von autoritären Regimen wird in Krisen oder notstandsähnlichen Situationen erwartet, dass sie Sicherheit und die Wiedergewinnung der Kontrolle gewährleisten können (2022, S. 44 f.). Zudem werden die Ereignisse von der Bevölkerung individuell je nach Betroffenheit und auch Resilienz unterschiedlich bearbeitet. Diese Verarbeitung wiederum wird unterschiedlich intensiv und nachhaltig in individuelle Befürchtungen sowie kollektive Ängste übertragen. Somit dienen sie dazu, Vorstellungen von Entsicherungen und Kontrollverlusten zu erzeugen, die sich identifizieren lassen als Treiber autoritärer Bestrebungen (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 45 f.).Eine weitere wichtige Unterscheidung in der Konzeption von Krise ist die Unterteilung in zwei Typen von Krise. Der erste Typus, sektorale Krisen, erfasst unterschiedliche Lebensbereiche und Funktionssysteme einer Gesellschaft schlagartig und mit massiven "Funktionsstörungen". Dazu gehören ein zeitlich entzerrtes Auftreten sowie die Lokalisierung in unterschiedlichen Teilbereichen der Gesellschaft. Zudem gab es verschiedene Instrumente, um diese Funktionsstörungen einzudämmen und gravierendere Auswirkungen zu verhindern.In der "Post-9/11"-Ära, in den sogenannten "entsicherten Jahrzehnten" seit Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, werden nach Heitmeyer vor allem drei – mit 9/11 als religiös-politische Krise vier - verschärfte Gefahrenlagen als sektorale Krisen identifiziert. Dazu zählt ab 2005 die Einführung von Hartz IV als eine sektorale, soziale Krise für gewisse Teile der Bevölkerung, die mit Statusängsten oder auch mit sozialem Abstieg konfrontiert waren. Weiter ist ab 2008/2009 die weltweite Banken- und Finanzkrise zu nennen, die die "systemrelevante" Finanzökonomie ins Wanken brachte mit Ausstrahlungseffekten auf das Gesamtsystem als ökonomisch-politische Krise. Fürderhin wird die sogenannte "Flüchtlingskrise" 2015/2016 als sozial-kulturelle bzw. kulturell-politische Krise angesehen, die das politisch-administrative System prägte (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 46; Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 255).Der zweite Typus bezieht sich auf systemische Krisen. Sie erfassen das gesamte Gesellschaftssystem in sich zuspitzenden Gefahrenlagen. Als langsame bzw. schleichende systemische Krise kann die Klimakrise angesehen werden, als "schnelle" systemische Krise die COVID-19 Pandemie. Hier werden die Potenziale für autoritäre Entwicklungen besonders offen sichtbar, da zahlreiche "Einhegungsinstrumente" nicht greifen, wodurch politische, individuell-biografische und kollektive Kontrollverluste auftreten, die politisch instrumentalisiert und mit Verschwörungstheorien und Wahnvorstellungen verbunden werden können (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 46 f.). Krisen lösen je nach Gefahrenlage individuelle und kollektive Befürchtungen aus, die sich in der Vorstellung einer "kollektiven Hilflosigkeit" verdichten können.In diesem Zusammenhang stellt sich die Frage nach Krisenängsten, ob und wie sie zu Treibern autoritärer Entwicklungen werden können. Ängste, unabhängig davon, ob eingebildet oder realistisch, ob auf Wissen oder Unwissen beruhend, lassen sich schwerlich von einer politischen Klasse, von Unternehmen oder dem freien Markt abfangen. Je mehr sich Gefahrenlagen häufen und sich Wahrnehmungen von Kontrollverlusten sowie Unsicherheiten ausbreiten, fallen auch Rechtsprechung und Verfassung als Orientierungsmedien aus und auch Wissenschaften können diese nicht mit der Lieferung von Begleitgewissheit neutralisieren.In solchen Situationen "[...] mutieren selbst Realängste, die vor greifbaren, konkreten Gefahren warnen, zu frei flottierenden, allfälligen Befürchtungen, die jede Risikoeinschätzung verhindern und irrationale Rettungsbedürfnisse wecken" (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 53). Diese Situationen können dann von autoritären Bewegungen, Organisationen und Regimen ausgebeutet werden, indem zunächst Ängste geschürt und im zweiten Schritt die Anhänger:innen mit wahnhaften Rettungsphantasien "versorgt" werden. Alexander Gaulands Aussage, "Wir werden uns unser Land und unser Volk zurückholen", liefert ein entsprechendes prominentes Beispiel für das Versprechen, die Kontrolle wieder herzustellen (Reuters Staff, 2017; Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 53; Nickschas, 2023).Eine Annahme von Heitmeyer & Heyder lautet hier, dass die Faktoren der Standortlosigkeit und Kontrollverluste Autoritarismus und gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit bestärken. Eine Variante zur Wiederherstellung von Stabilität stellt die Demonstration von Überlegenheit dar, die durch autoritäre Aggression ausgeübt werden kann. Um wirklich Überlegenheit demonstrieren zu können, muss diese möglichst risikoarm sein; dies ist dann gegeben, wenn besonders schwache, machtlose Gruppen als Gegner:innen ausgewählt werden (Heitmeyer & Heyder, 2002, S. 62). Empirisch stehen Abstiegsängste in einem signifikanten Zusammenhang mit einerseits Kontrollverlust-Situationen und andererseits der Abwertung schwacher Gruppen:"Wenn jemandem das eigene Leben außer Kontrolle gerät (oder zu geraten scheint), kann das Panik erzeugen. Zur Panikbekämpfung erfolgt dann eine Selbstaufwertung, die gleichzeitig die Abwertung von ungleichwertig markierten Gruppen bedeutet (Flüchtlinge, Migranten, Langzeitarbeitslose etc.)" (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 109).Die individuellen Verarbeitungsmuster von Krisen und (gefühlten) Kontrollverlusten lassen sich durch entsprechende autoritäre Angebote von "rechtspopulistischen Mobilisierungsexperten" – mittels scharf konturierter Feindbilder und Kontrollversprechen - politisch aufladen und bedienen zur vermeintlichen "Wiederherstellung von Ordnung" (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 106).2022 stützt Heitmeyer also die oben erwähnte These von Krisen als besondere Treiber autoritärer Entwicklungen und rechtsextremer Aktivitäten, indem er formuliert, dass der Blick auf Veränderungen in Richtung autoritärer Entwicklungen in gesellschaftlichen und politischen Verläufen geweitet werden soll, die unter verstärktem Einfluss zeitlich verdichteter Krisen stattfinden (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 251). Das soziologische Analysekonzept von 2018 wird entsprechend angepasst um die zwei zentralen Eskalationstreiber Krisen und Kontrollverluste bzw. "Kontrollverluste als Krisenfolgen" (siehe Abbildung 6).Dies geht aus der Abbildung insofern deutlich hervor, als in die Strukturentwicklungen der ökonomischen, sozialen und politischen Dimension "[...] verschiedene Krisen mit unterschiedlichen Auswirkungen "hineingewirkt" und Einfluss genommen haben auf die individuellen psychologischen und sozialen Verarbeitungen, die wiederum mit Kontrollverlusten durchsetzt waren – immer auch je nach Krisenbetroffenheit" (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 252 f.). Hierdurch entstanden durch das generelle Bedürfnis nach Realitätskontrolle Handlungsoptionen, die mehrfach variieren und auch autoritäre Versuchungen bzw. Gefahren beinhalten können.Abbildung 6: Analyseschema, erweitert und angepasst (Quelle: eigene Darstellung nach Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 21; Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 254)Fürderhin ist anzufügen, dass sich Kontrollverluste in Krisen verschiedenartig ausdrücken und sich Verhaltensmöglichkeiten zur Realitätskontrolle, also zur Lösung von Problemen, massiv verengen, insbesondere in systemischen Krisen. Individuelle Suchbewegungen setzen ein, um das grundlegende Bedürfnis nach Realitätskontrolle zu befriedigen. Diese Suchbewegungen schließen politische Suchbewegungen nach autoritären Akteur:innen mit ein, die die Wiederherstellung von Kontrolle durch Reduktion der Krisenkomplexität versprechen (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 256).Krisen und Kontrollverluste treten daher als Treiber autoritärer politischer sowie gesellschaftlicher Entwicklungspfade in Erscheinung, da indes eine kritische Masse entstanden ist, die nicht mehr in der Lage ist, ihr zentrale Bedürfnis nach Realitätskontrolle im "bisher gewohnten Maße" zu realisieren. Genau das bieten autoritäre Akteur:innen im Gegensatz zur abnehmenden Kapazität liberaler Demokratien, geeignete Lösungen schnell zu finden und die Kontrolle wiederherzustellen (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 257). Zudem ist diese versprochene Wiederherstellung keine Wiederherstellung des vorhergehenden Prä-Krisenzustandes, "[...] sondern eine autoritäre Veränderung von Kontrolle und damit auch veränderte ökonomische, soziale, kulturelle und politische Verhältnisse" (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 257).Als Indiz sieht Heitmeyer zwei Mechanismen, die besonders hervorstechen: Einerseits die Ambivalenz, dass zahllose Widersprüche zunehmen, und andererseits die Ambiguität, dass zunehmende Komplexität von modernen Gesellschaften gepaart sind mit uneindeutigen Situationen und Zukünften. Ambivalenz- und Ambiguitätstoleranz kristallisieren sich also als unabdingbar heraus, um autoritären Versuchungen nicht nachzugeben."Denn wenn Sitationen [sic] oder auch die Anwesenheit von fremden Menschen als unberechenbar oder unkontrollierbar wahrgenommen werden, dann reagieren Personen, deren Ambiguitätstoleranz niedrig ist, mit vereinfachten Weltsichten oder Stereotypen, um wieder Ordnung, Struktur und Kontrolle zu erreichen" (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 80).Hinzu tritt das Verschwimmen von gesellschaftlichen Koordinaten, die eigentlich als Vergewisserungen der jeweils eigenen Position in der Gesellschaft dienen, welches die Suchbewegungen nach politischen Akteur:innen aktiviert, die vorgeben, Widersprüche zu lösen, Unklarheiten in Klarheiten verwandeln und Kontrolle wiederherzustellen versprechen (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 109 ff.; Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 258 f.).Hieraus könnte die Folgerung gezogen werden, dass das Potenzial von autoritären Versuchungen in der Moderne angelegt sei: "Ambivalenzen und Ambiguitäten als Grundparadigma der Moderne entfalten unter dem Druck von Krisen und damit verbundenen Kontrollverlusten eine neue Wucht, die ins Autoritäre drängt" (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 259). Beispielsweise ist die erwähnte "Entweder-Oder" Logik im Vergleich zu "Mehr-oder-weniger" darauf angelegt, Ambivalenzen und Ambiguitäten zu beseitigen. "Das Autoritäre dient dann als Strategie zur Reduzierung von ökonomischer, sozialer und politischer Komplexität – und gleichzeitig von Freiheitsräumen" (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 259).Heitmeyers Analysen zeigen, dass die Fähigkeiten zum Aushalten von Ambiguitäten und zum Umgang mit Ambivalenzen über zukünftige soziale, politische und ökonomische Entwicklungspfade in Teilen der Bevölkerung abnehmen. Dies ist passgenau für das Angebot vonseiten der autoritär-nationalradikalen Akteur:innen mit ihren dichotomischen Welt- und Gesellschaftsbildern (siehe Kapitel 2.2); das Angebot eignet sich hervorragend für mobilisierende Ideologien und rhetorische Eskalation (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 246 f.).Erfolge rechter Parteien und Bewegungen wären demnach also nicht möglich gewesen ohne bestimmte Entwicklungen im sozialen System der Gesellschaft, im politischen System der Demokratie und im ökonomischen System des globalisierten Kapitalismus (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 16). Konkreter ist es das Zusammenwirken eines autoritären Kapitalismus, sozialer Desintegrationsprozesse und politischer Demokratieentleerung als Ursachenmuster für die "Realisierung autoritärer Sehnsüchte" (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 17).5. Die Partei "Alternative für Deutschland"Mit der inhaltlichen Neuausrichtung der vormals liberal-konservativen, eurokritischen Partei ab 2015 sowie mit dem immer weiter um sich greifenden Einfluss von rechtsextremistischen Akteur:innen innerhalb der AfD hält Heitmeyer es nicht mehr für angemessen, die AfD als rechtspopulistisch zu "verharmlosen", noch die Partei als vollständig rechtsextrem oder neonazistisch zu bezeichnen (Heitmeyer, 2022 a, S. 302; Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 265 f.; Heitmeyer & Piorkowski, 2023). Mit der herkömmlichen Typologie sei die AfD, als Typ einer neuen Partei, nicht zu beschreiben. Ebenso reichen die bisherigen Begriffe und Kategorien nicht aus, um "analytische Klarheit" über Zustand und Entwicklung der AfD zu gewinnen (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 233).Seit dieser Neuausrichtung zieht die AfD Teile der Bevölkerung an, die unter den oben beschriebenen Krisen Kontrollverluste wahrnehmen oder empfinden und eine Wiedererlangung der Kontrolle forcieren. Das Autoritäre ist dann ein Weg zur Realitätskontrolle. Insofern lässt sich deutlich machen, dass die AfD nicht der Grund für die Entstehung von autoritären Versuchungen in der Bevölkerung ist. Diese autoritären Einstellungsmuster "schlummern" in Teilen der Bevölkerung bereits über einen längeren Zeitraum als Gefahrenpotenzial für die offene Gesellschaft (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 113):"Ein Zwischenfazit zum Zusammenwirken von strukturellen Entsicherungen und individuellen Verunsicherungen zeigt, dass aufgrund der Krisen und ihrer Verarbeitungen, aufgrund von veränderten Lebensumständen und von Verschiebungen der gesellschaftlichen Koordinaten in entsicherten Zeiten bei Teilen der Bevölkerung ein erheblicher "Vorrat" an gruppenbezogen-menschenfeindlichen Einstellungen existiert, an die autoritäre politische Akteure bloß noch anzuknüpfen brauchten" (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 117).Dies bedeutet, dass die Erfolgsvoraussetzungen des autoritären Nationalradikalismus der AfD eine längere Vorgeschichte haben, die in den letzten Jahrzehnten geformt und vorangetrieben wurden durch neue Entwicklungen des kapitalistischen Systems. Die Wähler:innen der AfD waren zuvor Wechselwähler:innen oder wählten gar nicht (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 115). Sie verharrten dann in "wutgetränkter Apathie", was folgenlos blieb für die Politik, da diese Teile der Bevölkerung keinen wahlpolitischen Ausdruck fanden.Dieser in der Bevölkerung existierende Autoritarismus, der laut Heitmeyer "[...] vagabundierte, mal auf diese, mal auf jene im Bundestag vertretene Partei setzte oder aber gar nicht offen zutage trat, sondern in der politischen Apathie verharrte [...]" (2018, S. 237), hat durch das Aufkommen der Partei "Alternative für Deutschland" und ihren autoritären Nationalradikalismus ein neues politisches "Ortsangebot" bekommen. Hinsichtlich des oben beschriebenen Zwischenfazits lässt sich konstatieren, dass es der AfD offensichtlich gelungen ist, "[...] Personen aus ihrer individuellen Ohnmacht herauszuholen und mit kollektiven Machtfantasien auszustatten. Dazu gehört es auch, gruppenbezogen-menschenfeindliche Einstellungen zu kanalisieren und gegen schwache Gruppen zu richten" (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 116).In diesen Prozessen ist die Ideologie der Ungleichwertig eingelagert und wird genutzt, um sich selbst aufzuwerten durch Abwertung und Ausgrenzung der vermeintlich "Anderen". Für die sogenannte "rohe Bürgerlichkeit" entstehen neue Anschlussmöglichkeiten. Unter diesem Begriff verbirgt sich keine soziale Klassenzugehörigkeit, sondern es handelt sich um eine verachtende Haltung gegenüber Schwächeren, geäußert in einer rabiaten Rhetorik und gepaart mit einer Ideologie, in der bestimmte Gruppen als ungleichwertig angesehen werden, während sich die eigentlichen autoritären Haltungen hinter einer dünnen Schicht zivilisiert-vornehmen, also bürgerlichen äußeren Umgangsformen, verbergen (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 310; Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 273).6. Der autoritäre Nationalradikalismus der AfDSo folgert Heitmeyer, dass die AfD vorrangig für jenes Publikum attraktiv ist, "[...] das sich einerseits von den flachen Sprüchen rechtspopulistischer Akteure, die nur auf schnelle Erregungszustände fixiert sind, nichts verspricht, und sich andererseits von der Brutalität des Rechtsextremismus distanziert, um seine Bürgerlichkeit zu unterstreichen" (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 235). Er weist zurecht auf ihre "bürgerliche Patina" hin, die die AfD für viele gesellschaftliche Gruppen wählbar macht (Heitmeyer & Piorkowski, 2023).Vor diesem Hintergrund überrascht der empirische Befund nicht, dass die bereits benannten 19,6 % der Bevölkerung mit Einstellungen zu gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit sich selbst in der "politischen Mitte" einordnet, weshalb sich die "bürgerliche Patina" für die AfD als unentbehrlich erweist (Schaefer, Mansel & Heitmeyer, 2002, S. 132 f.).Die neue begriffliche Rahmung dient dazu, unterschiedliche inhaltliche und formale Ebenen zusammenzufassen, wie prägende Einstellungsmuster, der Mobilisierungsstil sowie zentrale programmatische Aussagen zu "bewegenden Themen" (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 234). Daher ordnet Heitmeyer die AfD als autoritäre nationalradikale Partei ein, die gleichzeitig als Kern des autoritären Nationalradikalismus in Deutschland fungiert. Im Folgenden wird das Agieren der Partei als Protagonistin des autoritären Nationalradikalismus anhand der in Kapitel 2.4 erklärten Charakteristika erläutert:Als autoritär wird sie charakterisiert, da das Kontrollparadigma grundsätzlich ihre Vorstellungen von Politik sowie Gesellschaft durchzieht. Beispiele sind Forderungen nach einer streng hierarchisch organisierten sozialen Ordnung sowie nach rigider Führung in politischen Institutionen. Auch beruht das Verständnis von Politik und Gesellschaft wesentlich auf den Kategorien "Kampf und Konflikt", womit dichotomische Gesellschaftsbilder und strenge Freund-Feind-Schemata einhergehen (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 234).Als national wird sie aufgrund der "[...] Betonung der außerordentlichen Stellung des deutschen Volkes" bezeichnet (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 234). Hinzu kommt auch die Beanspruchung einer "neuen deutschen" Vergangenheitsdeutung sowie eines Überlegenheitsanspruchs gegenüber anderen Nationen oder ethnischen und religiösen Gruppen (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 235).Das radikale Moment liegt in der Bekämpfung der offenen Gesellschaft und dem Ziel, die liberale Demokratie grundlegend umzubauen. Somit positioniert sich die Partei gegen zwei zentrale politisch-gesellschaftliche Errungenschaften. Hierzu dient ein rabiater und emotionalisierter Mobilisierungsstil der AfD, der mit menschenfeindlichen Grenzüberschreitungen arbeitet (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 235).Die AfD hat die Destabilisierung gesellschaftlicher und politischer Institutionen zum Ziel, was entscheidend für die Erfolgsgeschichte der Partei ist, es geht um Militär, Polizei, Gerichte, Gewerkschaften, Rundfunkräte, politische Bildung, Theater oder auch Feuerwehrverbände (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 107). Hierin besteht nach Heitmeyer die eigentliche Gefahr. Das Fiasko rund um die Wahl des Ministerpräsidenten in Thüringen 2020 zeigt, dass mittlerweile auch das parlamentarische System von der forcierten Destabilisierung betroffen ist (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 107). Der autoritäre Nationalradikalismus der AfD und das Agieren der Partei soll im folgenden exemplarisch an zwei Krisen der vergangenen Jahre behandelt werden.Die Fluchtbewegungen ab 2015 bezeichnete Alexander Gauland als "Geschenk" für seine Partei, die AfD (Decker, 2022). In der Tat diente sie AfD und PEGIDA, um Personen, die vorrangig unter Anerkennungsdefiziten litten, mittels dichotomischer Weltbilder und der Emotionalisierung sozial-kultureller Probleme zu instrumentalisieren. Der anhaltende Erfolgsmechanismus von Parteien und Bewegungen wie AfD und PEGIDA besteht demnach darin, Anerkennungsprobleme zu bearbeiten und so Selbstwirksamkeit erfahren zu lassen. Als (potenzielle) Wähler:in würde man wahrgenommen werden und dies ließ Handlungsbereitschaften entstehen, die einerseits autoritäre Ausrichtungen entwickelten und andererseits themengebunden immer wieder neu aktiviert werden können (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 275). Dies ist bei dem bereits genannten "Entweder-Oder"-Mechanismus der Fall, da es um "Alles" geht und Kompromisse von vornherein ausschließt.Weiter führt Heitmeyer aus, dass die Verbindungen von einem systemischen Krisentypus, wie beispielsweise der COVID-19-Pandemie, mit einer "Entweder-Oder"-Konfliktstruktur gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen begünstigen, die zwar nicht die Gesellschaft spalten, jedoch asymmetrisch polarisieren zwischen einer Bevölkerungsmehrheit und einer Minderheit (Beispiel: Geimpfte vs. Impfgegner:innen). In solchen Konstellationen enthüllt sich das Zusammenwirken und gemeinsame Auftreten der aufgeführten Mechanismen als äußerst gewaltanfällig (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 275 f.).Im Jahr 2015 war der "Kampf um die Opferrolle" ein zentraler Mechanismus der AfD, um die Mobilisierung gegenüber Geflüchteten und staatlicher sowie gesellschaftlicher Integrationspolitik voranzubringen. Entsprechend entstanden Kampfbegriffe wie "Umvolkung" oder das Propagieren des "Untergangs der deutschen Kultur". Die Opferrolle kann nach Heitmeyer als Schlüsselkategorie interpretiert werden, "[...] denn wer [sich] in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung glaubhaft als Opfer darstellen kann, schafft damit eine zentrale "moralgetränkte" Kategorie, um Widerstand als Notwehrrecht einschließlich Gewalt zu legitimieren" (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 266). Insofern gilt der Opferstatus als eines der wichtigsten Instrumente, um Anhänger:innen an sich zu binden.Im Verlauf der COVID-19-Pandemie verkehren sich die Verhältnisse in den digitalen Medien, auf radikalisierten Demonstrationen und in der öffentlichen Debatte, was auch darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass der Mechanismus einer veränderten "Täter-Opfer"-Konstruktion sich ausbreitet. Neue Gelegenheitsstrukturen und Mobilisierungsaktivitäten werden in Figuren von "Freiheitskämpfern" ausgebaut und radikalisiert.Während der sogenannten "Flüchtlingskrise" waren es vor allem männliche Geflüchtete, die in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung als bedrohliche Täter, die Verbrechen wie Vergewaltigungen und Tötungen begehen, dargestellt wurden. Staatliche Institutionen ließen sie "gewähren" im Sinne einer bevorstehenden "Umvolkung" (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 266). In der COVID-19-Krise trat der Staat als Haupttäter auf: Die Bevölkerung wurde in den Lockdown getrieben, massiven Freiheitsbeschränkungen unterworfen und Ungeimpfte – ob Gegner:in oder nur Zweifelnde – wurden durch eine "Corona-Diktatur" in die Knie gezwungen.In diesem Strukturwandel wirken Verschwörungstheorien passgenau auf ideologische Konzeptionen ein, die an Krisen sowie an Kontrollverluste andockt. Verschwörungstheorien bilden hier als quasi-religiöses, glaubensbasiertes Kampfinstrument eine Art Ersatzlösung für die in der Moderne verloren gegangenen Gewissheiten und markieren gleichzeitig Feindgruppen für autoritäre politische "Lösungen", meist auch antisemitisch aufgeladen.Im Sinne des angeführten konzentrischen Eskalationskontinuums sind es unter anderem solche Parolen und Kampfbegriffe, die als begrifflich "notwehrrelevante" Legitimationsbrücken dienen. So wurden während der COVID-19-Pandemie von parlamentarisch einflussreichen Positionen weitere eskalationsorientierte Handlungsweisen beflügelt (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 267). Die bisher aufgeführten Mechanismen und Strukturen fungieren demnach also als Bestandteile von Radikalisierungsprozessen. Diese wiederum bilden die Voraussetzungen für das Aufkommen von physischer Gewalt, von Körperverletzungen bis hin zu rechtsterroristischen Vernichtungstaten. Um diese Wirkung aufzuzeigen, soll folgend das Agieren der AfD anhand des oben beschriebenen Eskalationskontinuums verdeutlicht werden.In den "Schalen" des "Zwiebelmusters" wird, wie oben erläutert, die Gewaltorientierung größer, während die eskalierenden Akteur:innengruppen kleiner werden. Als Kernmechanismus werden die verschiedenen Legitimationsbrücken angeführt. In der äußersten, der größten Schale, finden sich feindbildliche autoritäre Einstellungsmuster in Teilen der Bevölkerung gegenüber dem Staat als Ganzes und generell demokratischer Politik. Diese liefern die entsprechenden Legitimationen für das Auftreten und Agieren des autoritären Nationalradikalismus der AfD.Zu Beginn der Pandemie forderte die AfD zunächst besonders harte Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung der Ausbreitung, sie blieb bei ihrem Stil der Emotionalisierung politischer und sozialer Probleme inklusive dem autoritären Kontrollparadigma. Da hiermit keine Zustimmungserweiterungen von potenziellen Wähler:innen gewonnen werden konnten, wurde eine radikale Richtungsänderung ins Gegenteil vollzogen. Dies führt Heitmeyer an, um zu verdeutlichen, "[...] dass es der Partei nicht um sachbegründete Prinzipien, sondern um opportunistische Nutzenkalküle zur Ausbreitung von Zustimmungen bzw. Verfestigungen der Wählerschaft geht – und um die Straße" (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 276). Insofern mussten Parolen geprägt werden, wie der Begriff der "Corona-Diktatur", dem Selbststilisieren als "Freiheitskämpfer:innen" oder dem Verbreiten von Verschwörungsideologien wie des "Great Resets" (Siggelkow, 2023).So trat die AfD im Herbst und Winter 2021/2022 als wesentlicher Treiber der Corona-Proteste auf und baute gleichzeitig mit diesen Parolen, wie bereits ab 2015 in Zusammenhang mit der Krise um die Flüchtlingsbewegungen, gezielt Legitimationsbrücken für ohnehin schon mit Gewalt operierende rechtsextremistische Gruppen (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 277). Diese Gruppierungen können sich durch diese Parolen auf eine Art gewaltlegitimierendes "Notwehrrecht" berufen, um gegen eine "Diktatur" zu agieren, verbunden mit "Umsturzfantasien".Heitmeyer führt weiter aus, dass diese Gruppen sich öffentlich in Demonstrationen bewegen und gleichzeitig klandestine rechtsterroristische Kleingruppen bedienen, "[...] die unter anderem aus Misserfolgen gegen die staatlichen Ordnungsmächte dann Legitimationen zum Umsturz des Systems ziehen" (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 277). Aus diesem Mechanismus eröffnet sich, was Heitmeyer durch das konzentrische Eskalationskontinuum eindrucksvoll darstellen kann, dass schlussendlich Teile der Bevölkerung durch die verschiedenen "Schalen" hindurch zu den Legitimationslieferant:innen zählen, auf die sich Gewaltakteur:innen berufen, wenn sie sich auf "das Volk" beziehen (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 277).Die Mechanismen verweisen insgesamt auf Bedrohungen der liberalen Demokratie und der offenen Gesellschaft. Weiter führt Heitmeyer an, dass staatliche Kontrollapparate sowie die Politik samt Appellen oder Ankündigungen der "wehrhaften Demokratie" nicht in der Lage sind, mehrere dieser Mechanismen in ihren Wirkungen "in den Griff zu bekommen". Die aufgezeigten Mechanismen, die bereits während der Krise der Flüchtlingsbewegungen und der Corona-Pandemie gewirkt haben, sind etabliert und werden auch weiterhin wirken.Die so genannte "3K-Trias" - Krisen, Konfliktstruktur und Kontrollverluste - gilt mittlerweile als etabliert und wirkt als wirkungsvoller Zusammenhang für autoritäre Entwicklungen. Die zukünftigen Krisenthemen werden wechseln, jedoch bleiben die gesellschafts- und demokratiezerstörerischen Mechanismen bestehen und können durch autoritär-nationalradikale Akteur:innen immer wieder neu themenbezogen aktiviert und emotional aufgeladen werden (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 277).7. Fazit & AusblickHeitmeyers Arbeiten bilden einen Meilenstein in der empirischen Forschung zu Einstellungen gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit und zu rechten Einstellungen in der Bevölkerung. Er wies bereits zu Beginn seiner Studien im Jahr 2001 darauf hin, dass ein globalisierter Kapitalismus zu politischen und sozialen Kontrollverlusten führen könne, die mit Demokratieentleerung und einem Erstarken des rabiaten Rechtspopulismus einhergehen.Anhand der Ergebnisse seiner langjährigen Forschung, unter anderem der Langzeitstudie zu den "deutschen Zuständen", konnte er empirisch nachweisen, dass knapp 20 % der Bevölkerung autoritäre Einstellungen haben (Schaefer, Mansel & Heitmeyer, 2002, S. 125 f.). Diese Einstellungen "schlummerten" in diesen Bevölkerungsteilen und fanden politisch bis zum Aufkommen der AfD keine sonderliche Beachtung. Sie "vagabundierten" zwischen den Parteien - meist zwischen den Volksparteien CDU/CSU und der SPD - oder verharrten in einer "wutgetränkten Apathie" und machten von ihrem Wahlrecht keinen Gebrauch (Schaefer, Mansel & Heitmeyer, 2002, S. 127 f.).Die strukturellen Ursachen des autoritären Kapitalismus, also Transformationsprozesse in ökonomischen Strukturen samt den Krisen in der "Post-9/11"-Ära führen zu Veränderungen im sozialen Bereich, wie individuelle Verarbeitungsprozesse der Krisenfolgen in Form von Abstiegsängsten oder Anerkennungsverlusten, also soziale Desintegrationserfahrungen bzw. Desintegrationsgefährdungen. In Kombination mit den damit einhergehenden Kontrollverlusten sehnen sich Teile der Bevölkerung nach einem krisensicheren, kollektiven kulturell-politischen Identitätsanker und nach der "Wiederherstellung der Ordnung" (Heitmeyer, 2022 a, S. 325). Dies schafft günstige Gelegenheitsstrukturen für die AfD, die sich 2015 inhaltlich radikal neu ausrichtete und als autoritär nationalradikales Angebot wahlpolitisch von diesen Entwicklungen profitierte. Durch ihre Fokussierung auf die kulturelle Dimension hat die Partei die Möglichkeit erhalten, "[...] soziale Kontrollverluste in Versprechungen zur Wiederherstellung von politischer Kontrolle zu übersetzen" (Heitmeyer, 2022 a, S. 325).Die Frage nach dem weiteren Verlauf liegt auf der Hand. Hier spricht Heitmeyer von "Zukünften" in einer Zeit, in der viele Menschen auf tiefgreifende Verunsicherungen seit 2001 mit einer Sehnsucht nach Ordnung, Kontrolle und Sicherheit reagiert haben, die von dem autoritären Nationalradikalismus der AfD bedient wird (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 281). Zu den Entsicherungen der sozialen Zustände der letzten Jahrzehnte gesellt sich nun eine "Unübersichtlichkeit möglicher Zukünfte". Klar ist, dass die Routinen zur Bewältigung politischer, ökonomischer und sozialer Probleme und Krisen nicht länger funktionieren und es kein Zurück zu den Zuständen davor geben wird.Nach Heitmeyer muss die Frage nach der Resilienz demokratischer Einstellungen und Gegenevidenzen zum grassierenden Autoritarismus auf der Ebene der Akteur:innen angesetzt werden, bei der Bürger:innenschaft. Jedoch beschreibt er sie, die in Krisen sonst durchaus wehrhaft und spontan auf Herausforderungen reagierten und heute mehr denn je gefragt seien, als erschöpft, auch wenn in der Mehrheit der europäischen Staaten bisher nur eine Minderheit der autoritären Versuchung vollends nachgibt (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 282; Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 277).Dennoch haben sich quer durch die Altersgruppen und unabhängig von der sozialen Lage unterschiedliche Teile der Bevölkerung "[...] statistisch signifikant und im Erscheinungsbild deutlich autoritären Versuchungen nachgegeben [...]" (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 74). Ebenso erschöpft seien auch die politischen Eliten, die eigentlich Visionen und Ideen für individuelle und gesellschaftliche Zukünfte, die Freiheit spenden und Sicherheit verheißen, entwickeln sollten. Es benötigt also mehr visionäre und zukunftssichernde Gesellschafts- und Politikvorstellungen gepaart mit neuen Beteiligungsformen, die von den Bürger:innen wahrgenommen werden (Heitmeyer, 2022 b, S. 278).Aktuelle empirische Befunde zu weiteren demokratischen Fortschritten geben wenig Anlass zu Optimismus (Frankenberg & Heitmeyer, 2022, S. 73 f.). Insofern folgert Heitmeyer, dass sich der Höhenflug autoritärer Politikangebote weiter fortsetzen wird, insofern sich der autoritäre Nationalradikalismus nicht selbst (von innen) zerlegt und es kein massives politisches Umsteuern mit gravierenden wirtschaftspolitischen Reformen gibt, wofür derzeit keine Anzeichen bestehen (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 368). Nach Heitmeyer müssten aus den folgenden Punkten ökonomische, soziale und politische Konsequenzen gezogen werden:"Der finanzialisierte Kapitalismus verfolgt weiter ungehindert seine globale Landnahme, ohne Rücksicht auf die gesellschaftliche Integration.Die nationalstaatliche Politik ist angesichts der ökonomischen Abhängigkeit nicht willens oder in der Lage, soziale Ungleichheit konsequent zu verringern.Ein Fortschreiten der sozialen Desintegration ist angesichts von Prozessen wie der Digitalisierung sehr wahrscheinlich.Kulturelle Konflikte entlang konfessioneller und religiöser Grenzen werden nicht dauerhaft befriedet; vielmehr ist davon auszugehen, dass sie – auch im Zusammenhang mit Migrationsbewegungen – immer wieder angefacht werden.Sozialgeografische Entwicklungen wie Abwanderung und das ökonomische Abdriften ganzer Regionen gehen ungebremst weiter" (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 283 f.).Die aufkommenden Probleme dieser auf Dauer gestellten Faktoren können von autoritär nationalradikalen Parteien und Bewegungen als "Signalereignisse" für sich ausgebeutet werden. Sie stellen also "stabile" günstige Voraussetzungen für ein weiteres Erstarken des autoritären Nationalradikalismus der AfD dar (Heitmeyer, Freiheit & Sitzer, 2021, S. 284). Es ist mittelfristig nicht abzusehen, dass die Themen, die die AfD mit ihrer eskalativen Rhetorik bearbeitet, in absehbarer Zukunft von der Bildfläche verschwinden werden.Zudem weisen die Strukturen der AfD und des sie unterstützenden Milieus mittlerweile einen hohen Organisations- und Institutionalisierungsgrad auf. Insofern ist davon auszugehen, dass die autoritär nationalradikalen Parteien und Bewegungen öffentliche Debatten weiterhin maßgeblich prägen und so das soziale Klima innerhalb der Gesellschaft dauerhaft in Richtung von mehr Aggressivität verschieben werden.Die Bedrohungen für die liberale Demokratie und die offene Gesellschaft durch den globalisierten Kapitalismus, durch Desintegrationsprozesse und dem autoritären Nationalradikalismus sind offensichtlich. Es hängt also viel von der Kraft konfliktbereiter und widerspruchstrainierter Gegenbewegungen ab, die für die offene Gesellschaft eintreten und sich nicht mit den Normalitätsverschiebungen, die aktuell bereits ablaufen, abfinden wollen (Heitmeyer, 2018, S. 372).LiteraturverzeichnisDahrendorf, R. (14. 11 1997). Die Globalisierung und ihre sozialen Folgen werden zur nächsten Herausforderung einer Politik der Freiheit. Von zeit.de: https://www.zeit.de/1997/47/thema.txt.19971114.xml/komplettansicht abgerufen am 21.10. 2023.Decker, F. (02. 12 2022). Etappen der Parteigeschichte der AfD. Von bpb.de: https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/parteien-in-deutschland/afd/273130/etappen-der-parteigeschichte-der-afd/ abgerufen am 21.10. 2023.Frankenberg, G., & Heitmeyer, W. (2022). Autoritäre Entwicklungen. Bedrohungen pluralistischer Gesellschaften und moderner Demokratien in Zeiten der Krisen. In G. Frankenberg, & W. Heitmeyer (Hg.), Treiber des Autoritären: Pfade von Entwicklungen zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts (S. 15-86). Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag GmbH.Heitmeyer, W. (2001). Autoritärer Kapitalismus, Demokratieentleerung und Rechtspopulismus. Eine Analyse von Entwicklungstendenzen. In D. Loch, & W. Heitmeyer (Hg.), Schattenseiten der Globalisierung (S. 497-534). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1. Auflage.Heitmeyer, W. (2018). Autoritäre Versuchungen. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag.Heitmeyer, W. (2022 a). Autoritärer Nationalradikalismus (2018). In K. Möller (Hg.), Populismus. Ein Reader (S. 300-328). Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1. Auflage.Heitmeyer, W. (2022 b). Krisen und Kontrollverluste - Gelegenheitsstrukturen für Treiber autoritärer gesellschaftlicher Entwicklungspfade. In G. Frankenberg, & W. Heitmeyer (Hg.), Treiber des Autoritären: Pfade von Entwicklungen zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts (S. 251-280). Frankfurt a. M.: Campus Verlag GmbH.Heitmeyer, W., & Heyder, A. (2002). Autoritäre Haltungen. Rabiate Forderungen in unsicheren Zeiten. In W. Heitmeyer (Hg.), Deutsche Zustände. Folge 1 (S. 59-70). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1. Auflage.Heitmeyer, W., & Piorkowski, C. (09. 10 2023). "Autoritärer Nationalradikalismus". Von bpb.de: https://www.bpb.de/themen/deutschlandarchiv/522277/autoritaerer-nationalradikalismus/ abgerufen am 21.10. 2023.Heitmeyer, W., Freiheit, M., & Sitzer, P. (2021). Rechte Bedrohungsallianzen. Bonn: Sonderausgabe für die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.Laudenbach, P. (09. 07 2023). Die Gründe des Aufstiegs der AfD: Soziologe Wilhelm Heitmeyer im Interview. Von sueddeutsche.de: https://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/wilhelm-heitmeyer-afd-analyse-1.6012038?reduced=true abgerufen am 21.10. 2023.Nickschas, J.-B. (06. 02 2023). Zehn Jahre AfD: Zunehmend radikal. Von tagesschau.de: https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/afd-zehn-jahre-103.html abgerufen am 21.10. 2023.Reuters Staff. (24. 09 2017). Gauland kündigt an - "Wir werden Regierung jagen". Von reuters.com: https://www.reuters.com/article/deutschland-wahl-afd1-idDEKCN1BZ0QJ abgerufen am 21.10. 2023.Schaefer, D., Mansel, J., & Heitmeyer, W. (2002). Rechtspopulistisches Potential. Die "saubere Mitte" als Problem. In W. Heitmeyer (Hg.), Deutsche Zustände. Folge 1 (S. 123-135). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1. Auflage.Siggelkow, P. (16. 01 2023). Verschwörungsmythen: Klaus Schwab, das WEF und der "Great Reset". Von tagesschau.de: https://www.tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/wef-schwab-101.html abgerufen am 21.10. 2023.Universität Bielefeld. (o.J.). Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Heitmeyer. Von ekvv.uni-bielefeld.de: https://ekvv.uni-bielefeld.de/pers_publ/publ/PersonDetail.jsp?personId=21765 abgerufen am 21.10. 2023.
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Robert Wade on Zombie Ideas, Being inside the World Bank, and the Death of Ethics in Economics after the Marginal Revolution
The global economy is at the core of some of the main issues in contemporary International Relations. But how do we understand the global economy and what impact does that have on how we deal with the power politics around it? A fault line seems to have emerged between those who take economic theory seriously and those who denounce it for being part of the problem. Informed by his training as an anthropologist, Robert H. Wade—professor at the LSE—takes a different tack: he bases his engagement with the way in which Adam Smith has been appropriated to advocate for a dominant view of 'free markets' on real-world economics and in-depth accounts of insiders. In this Talk, Wade—among others—discusses experimentation in international economic regimes, why the International Financial Institutions don't fight economic crises, and the powers and perils of being inside the World Bank.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current International Relations? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?
If we'd reframe your question as being more broadly about global studies, I think that one of the really fundamental questions is how and why it is that the precepts of neoliberalism have penetrated into every nook and cranny of Western societies, and have penetrated to a very large extent many non-Western countries.
This has happened especially, but not only, through the agency of the IMF and the World bank, which have imbued these neoliberal principles; through the mechanism of graduate education: children of the elites in developing countries go out to American, British, other Western universities, and they learn that this is 'true' economics, or 'true' IPE, or 'true' Political Science, and then they come back and implement these same principles and make them a reality back home. But across the globe, this even holds for the Nordic countries. In Iceland and other Nordic countries, from the 1980s, networks of people sharing a belief in neo-liberal precepts, began to form and sort of place each other in key positions within the state, and in politics, and built a momentum in this direction. These precepts have become understood as just natural, as in Margaret Thatcher's 'there is no alternative'.
I live in the UK, and the great bulk of the British public really does believe that the government is just like a household writ large, and the same rules of budgeting that apply to the household should apply to the state. That when times are tough the household has to tighten its belt, cut back on spending, and it is only fair that the government does the same, and if the government does not, if the government runs a deficit in hard times, then the government is being irresponsible. And this is a completely mistaken and pre-Keynesian idea, but it is a 'zombie idea'—that is, however much arguments and evidence may be mounted against it, it just keeps coming up and up and up, and governments come to power riding on this zombie idea and a flotilla of related ideas.
The persistence of this zombie idea is all the more amazing as we just had a global financial crisis in 2007/8, which would prompt a rethinking of these ideas. But these neoliberal precepts have been, if anything, more strongly reinforced. In previous hard times—and obviously the 1930s depression is the exemplary case—there has been a stronger move towards, what you could call, social democratic precepts. But not this time! Indeed, even after the crisis, the whole of the European Union with 500 million people is even more thoroughly structured on the basis of these ideas. I am thinking of what is popularly known as the Fiscal Compact signed by the EU Member States in 2012, which commits all governments to balance budgets all the time—that is, first, the structural deficit may not rise above 0.5 percent of GDP. Second, the public debt may not rise above 60 percent of GDP. Third, automatic financial sanctions are levied on governments that exceed these two thresholds. Fourth, the whole procedure is supervised by the European Commission, and this is presented as in the name of sound budgeting. This package is presented as justified by the proposition that government is a household writ large. The most elementary principles of Keynesian macroeconomics show why this is not simply mistaken, but a disaster, and will keep generating recessionary pressures. It is sold as a kind of excuse for avoiding to put in place the essential conditions for the monetary union, namely, a common budget and a sizable transfer mechanism to the regions just as exists in the United States. But they do not want to do that, but still they call this agreement 'cooperation', which is all about not cooperation, but about writing these dictates around this zombie idea written into the very basic architecture of the EU. Beyond EU politics, it materializes all the way down to, I don't know, the function of the privatization of the Post Office, it goes all the way down to the sort of capillaries of how universities are run, and the incentive systems that have placed upon academics, and there is very little pushback. The one reason, why I am almost completely delighted about Jeremy Corbyn's election as the leader of the Labour party, is that this is one small case of where there seems to be some concerted pushback against these zombie ideas. The point being that the established Labour party basically bought into this whole set of neo-liberal ideas. It combined maintaining the overall structure of inequality in society with more emphasis on providing some help to the poor, but they had to be hardworking poor.
Yet, one knows that there can be dramatic changes in the prevailing zeitgeist of norms. One knows that there can be big changes in the space of a few decades and the question is can one imagine a scenario in which they might be a big change in norms back to a more kind of social-democratic direction. So where will this take place? Because of technological change in the labor market, there is a real big crisis of employment with many middle-class jobs cut out and polarization in the labor market. This might then induce a political movement to have a much bigger change in income distribution than anybody with power is now talking about. Talk of re-distribution these days is really almost entirely around redistribution through the state, but the point I would make is that if there is to be any significant reduction of inequality, especially inequality at the top, there has to be more attention to changes in market-income distribution.
Let me explain. The share of profits in national income has been going up and the share of labor income has been going down. So we should harness the shareholder structure of the market to affect a more equal income distribution by enabling a much wider section of the population to buy into the profit share. At the moment the profit share goes to senior executives and equity holders, but equity holders are highly concentrating at the top of the income and wealth distribution. If equity earners could be spread much more equally, then a much wider section of the population would get income, while they sleep so to speak. We could institute something like trusts, whose members could be the employees of a company, the customers, the neighbors of the company, and the trust would borrow on capital markets and take out insurance against the repayment of the lending of loan and then it would buy shares, it would use that borrowed money to buy shares in the company, and the company would pay out dividends on the shares and then that dividend income coming out of profits would be distributed to the members of the trust. That would be a way of getting the rising share of profits in national income distributed out to the population at large. I particularly like this metaphor of "earning income while you sleep", since at the moment it is only the rich people, who are earning income while they sleep. Somehow that facility of earning income while you sleep has to be made much more widely and available—by using the market against itself, so to speak.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?
I suppose the starting point was really this; my father was a New Zealand diplomat, so we moved quite often. By that time I was twelve my parents were posted to Colombo, Ceylon as it was called then. After having lived just in Western countries, I suddenly encountered at this very formative age Colombo and Sri Lanka. I was just amazed by that experience; by the color, the taste, the exoticness, but I was also very struck by how the many boys at the same age as me, were walking around with no shoes. I particular remember this boy carrying a baby on his shoulder, the baby looked half-dead and covered in scabs, and I think it was then I got the idea of just how unequal the world was. Then at university I studied economics, but I also visited my parents in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and I got another sense of that great disparity in wealth and living standards. At this time I had come across Adam Smith and the wealth of nations question and that helped to encapsulate or to crystalize my interests. So I wanted to go the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex and got enrolled for a PhD in economics, but en route I spent several weeks in India and during that time I began to dwell upon just how boring and how useless everything I studied under the name of microeconomics. I kept thinking of these dreadfully dry textbooks of marginal cost curves and marginal revenue curves and utility function and difference curves etc., which I had forced myself to sit exams in. By this time I had done a little bit of fieldwork, living on Pitcairn Island in the middle of the Pacific.
When I got back to Sussex after fieldwork I announced that I wished to not do a PhD in economics, but to do one in anthropology thinking all the time, that this would actually be more use for understanding why for example India, where I had been, was so very poor. So that's what I did: a PhD in anthropology… In some ways I regard that as having been a mistake, because the sort of mainstream of anthropology is very far away from the Adam Smith questions. Having done the degree in anthropology, pretty soon I began to change direction and pay much more attention to the state, to the state bureaucracy. I went to India and I studied the Irrigation Department and other related departments. I went to South Korea and I studied state irrigation agencies and I went to Taiwan and I studied the state more broadly. So I was kind of moving up from my Italian village, moving kind of up the scale in terms of state agencies and then the state as a whole.
Then I went to work for the World Bank in the 1980s and my main reason for doing that was not to do the research the World Bank wanted me to do, but rather to study the World Bank from the inside as fieldwork. If in some ways switching to anthropology was a mistake, in other ways it was not, because I approached those kind of Wealth-of-Nations-questions in a way very different from how economists approached them. For example when I went to Taiwan and studied the trade regime, the first thing I did was to go and talk to people who operated through the trade regime, whereas I noticed that the published works by economists celebrating Taiwan's free trade regime was based on what the rules said and what certain government officials told them was the case. They had never actually talked to people who traded through the trade regime. If they would have, they would have learned about all the covert controls that went on such that there was quite a distinction between the liberal face of the trade regime and the reality of the trade regime. The reality was that the government was managing trade in line with industrial policy, but the government absolutely did not want the world to know that. So all this was kept hidden and I was really regarded as rather unwelcome visitor—and in fact to this day my book Governing the Market (1990, read the introduction here) is not well received in Taiwan. It says the government of Taiwan did a good job of managing the market, but they want the world to believe that Taiwan is a free trade country. So that is the kind of intellectual trajectory that I have been on.
So I think that the value of the anthropology PhD was that it really taught me, in practical terms, the meaning of the anthropological maxim, which is 'soaking and poking'. To put it another way—I love this—anthropologists are social scientists, who believe that the plural of anecdote is evidence. And indeed I place a lot of weight on anecdotes, on gossip, on the stories people tell, whereas economists would be much happier reducing, let us say, South Korea's trade regime to one data point in a matrix, and then compare that data point with, let us say, Malaysia's data point to see how the trade regimes are correlated with growth, or something like that, and that is really not my interest.
What would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
Despite what I've just said, I do think that a graduate training in economics is very useful, provided one does not believe it. And that is really difficult, because the socialization pressures are intense: if you do not say the right things—which are neoliberal type things on the whole—then you will likely not get a high grade. But I have noticed that economists tend to know how to think, how to make arguments, they tend to understand the idea of causality, and that may seem an astonishing thing to say on my part, because it implies that students coming from other disciplines are often weak in understanding the very basic ideas of causality, but that is my experience. I had many students coming from, who knows, IR or Political Science or Sociology or Anthropology, who clearly do not have much idea of causality; they can describe things, but they find thinking in terms of cause and effect, in terms of independent and dependent variables, in terms of left and right side, they just find it difficult. So I do think that there is a lot to be said for studying economics, and mastering the maths, provided that the critical facility is not lost. That is point number one.
Point number two is that I think that there is a huge premium on doing fieldwork, and the field work maybe in developing countries, but when I say field work, I don't just mean going out to villages, going out to see poor people 'over there'. I am talking of fieldwork inside bureaucracies: to try and understand the culture, the incentive systems that people are working under—fieldwork at home so to speak, in the countries one comes from. From the students' point of view, it is clearly much easier to sit in the LSE library to do the research. So in my marking I give quite a premium to a student actually doing fieldwork, going out and interviewing, and having the experience of writing up and interpreting the interviews and somehow fitting it back into a larger argument—but really few students actually do that, and I think that that is a real, real big mistake. Mind you, the same risk holds for fieldwork in economics as it does for studying economics: I encourage students to work for (do fieldwork in, experience) the World Bank; and several have—but to the best of my knowledge almost none of them has kept their critical perspective. They really come to buy into it.
The relations between states are settled either through diplomacy or warfare. Why would we have to focus on economics to understand IR?
Because economics—such as for example balances of payment, surpluses and deficits—set the constraints and incentives on countries in terms of their relationships with each other. A great deal of diplomacy is driven by economic pressures: diplomacy to get other countries to for example open their markets, or to cut deals with countries—'if you do this, we will do that'—deals that may relate to areas that are rather different, for instance if you buy more of these of our exports, we will help you fight such and such country, because the manufactures are in my constituency.
So, in a way, the way you framed the question is part of the reason why I react against the discipline of IR: because it tends to treat diplomacy, war, and so on, as somehow rather separate from economic pressures, and I see these economic pressures as very powerful drivers of both of the other two things. As another example, one of the drivers of the Syrian conflict was that there was an acute drought (like Weizman observed in Theory Talk #69, red), which meant that many people were rendered destitute; rural areas flooded into the cities, and the Assad regime just was—understandably—unable to cope; and large numbers of young men, concentrated in cities, rootless and with no jobs, just were recruiting fodder for the Wahhabi sect. I have always thought of economics—not so much as in the making choices in conditions of scarcity, that is sort of Lionel Robin's definition—in the sense of Alfred Marshal, about how people make a living, as a very fundamental driver of a lot of what happens in International Relations.
Pikkety recently published Capital in the 21st Century, causing quite the stir. But why would inequality between people matter for IR?
Let me comment by invoking a very contemporary exhibit—the migration crisis in Europe now. Maybe a decade ago I looked at the figures and if you took the average income of the EU-15 prior to latest extensions and then expressed the average income of countries outside of the EU—including sub-Sahara Africa—as a percentage, then there was a really dramatic falling away of income levels relative to the EU, in countries all around the EU and whether you took market exchange rates or purchasing power parity. If you went round to sub-Sahara Africa and took the average, it was more like two percent in market exchange rates and seven percent in purchasing power parity; and the 'problem' is that there is certainly here a rather thin slither of sea between Africa and the promised land of Europe and to the east there are these great open planes, where armies can go up and down to the speed of light, so to speak, but people can also move pretty quickly across these planes.
So all one has to do—and this might just be only a bit of an exaggeration—if one is on the poor end of this poverty pyramid is hop across the border and you have a chance at least of getting a very appreciable increase in living conditions and income, with which you can then get savings to remit back to home. So the migrations pressures are just huge. So that is one reason for linking inequality to issues in International Relations—really fundamental issues, and very very difficult to dissolve.
You've done anthropological fieldwork inside the World Bank—an institution drawing a lot of criticism from its detractors in IR. Can you shed some kind of light about what kind of 'animal' the World Bank is?
First of all, let me say that at the micro-level—the level of the people you know and the people I know inside the World Bank—I agree that there are people doing a lot of good work. But if you look at the organization more generally—the World Bank and also the IMF—they are clearly instruments mainly of US foreign policy—and any number of US senators, members of the House, have basically said that. When they are defending the International Financial Institutions (they often criticize them), they do so by saying they are important for US foreign policy. And you have to look at the governance structures to see how it is that the US in particular—but Western states more generally—have from the beginning, through the very Articles of Agreement, created a structure which locks in their power, and has made it very difficult for other countries (including Japan) to significantly increase their shareholdings. The US has kept the presidency of the Bank and the much less recognized Number Two position of the IMF, and has used these positions to have a very strong influence.
Just to illustrate what the Bank and the Fund do: at the time of the East-Asian crisis—specifically the Korean crisis in 1997-1998—the IMF mission was in Seoul. The negotiations were in a hotel there. David Lipton from the US Treasury (and a former student of Larry Summers who was by then Deputy Secretary) was just down the corridor of where the negotiations took place, and every so often the IMF people would walk out of the negotiations and consult with David Lipton, then come back in and—as Paul Blustein reports in his book called The Chastening—often said something rather different from what they had been saying before they consulted with David Lipton.
Just to take another example, the US being able to appoint the president of the Bank—to appoint a person known personally to the Treasury Secretary or to the Secretary of the State, or both—is really of great value: when there is a 'trustful relationship'—or a relationship of dependency, the president being dependent on those who appointed him in the Administration—it is possible for those people in the Administration, or people close to them, to just ring up the president of the Bank, and talk in a very informal, confidential, trustful way about what is happening in Latin America, or what is happening in the Middle East, and what the US thinks the Bank should or should not be doing in those places. Larry Summers appointed a protégé of his to one of the regional development banks, and this person—who is very senior in the bank—told me that Larry would frequently ring him, while he is being driven home in the evening from the Treasury, just to have a chat about how things were going in her region, and to pass on suggestions about what the Bank should be doing there, and to get intelligence from her about what was happening in the region, and so on. The point is that, making these personal connections is of immense value, but at the same time, the US Congress, in particular, is very much against having a big Bank against allowing a capital increase for the World Bank—so that the bank could, as it should be doing, increase its lending for infrastructure investment ten times. It is just a complete scandal how little the Bank has been lending for the past 20 years or more for infrastructure, for roads and power stations and so on. The US does not want the Bank providing socialistic competition with the private sector: it says these things are for the private sector to do, and the Bank has to take care of poverty, because the private sector is not interested in poverty.
So the US wants to keep the presidency of the Bank, it wants to keep, secondly, its unique veto right on the big decisions, such as decisions on whether to increase the capital base—but provided those two things are met it does not care that much about the Bank. In the case of the Fund, the US is also very powerful, but of course the Europeans have a bit more relative power. Right now I think the world is in an even more dangerous sort if financial condition than might appear, because the IMF is acutely short of secure or guaranteed lending resources, so if there is to be another round of crisis—as I think is entirely likely within the next five years—the Fund depends upon borrowing short-term from member countries, like on six months terms, but member countries can say 'no', and that means that the Fund's ability to fight crises is quite constrained. The Fund should implement what was agreed in 2010 by all the member countries represented on the board of the IMF: to roughly double the quote of the guaranteed lending resources, that is, resources the countries actually hand over to the Fund, over which they actually give up country control. All the relevant capitals ratified it with one exception—the US—because Congress refused because the individual barons, who are not under that much party discipline, each said to the Treasury: 'look, the question of the IMF is of zero significance to my electorate, so if you want my vote on the IMF, you have to give me things that I want like projects in my constituency and so on'. The Treasury added up the demands of the people, whose vote had to be won, and it considered those demands were just way, way, way over the top. As long as a Democrat is in the presidency, while the House is controlled by Republicans the world is sort of held hostage to this. Beyond this example, this actually entails a structural problem: the US blocking or producing a gridlock in international organizations, because the Congress is hostile to international organizations, because Congress sees it to imply a loss of US sovereignty. The only way to end this gridlock is to end the US veto in the Fund and the Bank, but the problem is that the US can veto any measures.
One response of the big developing countries is to create bypass organizations—such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Banks, such as the new Development Bank, such as the Contingent Reserve arrangement the BRICs have established, and then a growing number of sort of regional development banks. And I think that that is a good thing, but it does raise questions about coordination, about who is looking after, if you will, the global interests, global issues such as climate change. In short, we need a genuine World Bank, rather than the American-Bank-in-the-World we have today.
You engage thoroughly with economics and economic theory. Now there seem to be two kinds of critical approaches to economics in IPE: one criticizes its rationality as flawed, and another buys into its rationality but attempts to point out where actual policy gets it wrong. Where do you stand in this?
If you take the example of how the EU attempted to impose fiscal rules on Greece, you see a notion of rationality which draws upon these very primitive notions that I referred to right at the beginning, where the government is just a household writ large, and the same set of rules that apply to the budgeting of the household must apply to the government as well. Here, the assumption is that any macroeconomic proposition must have microeconomic foundations, that it must be derivable from propositions about microeconomic agents acting in this sort of self-maximizing way, and if you cannot derive macroeconomic propositions from those micro foundations, then there is something unreliable, un-rigorous about your macroeconomics. So what are then the sources of these micro-economic assumptions?
This leads us to one fundamental and almost completely unaddressed weaknesses of economics can be traced back to the Marginal Revolution in the late 19th century. From that moment onwards, there has been an attempt to model economics on physics, and that was very explicit on the part of people like Pareto and Walras, and Jevons, early Marginalist thinkers. They even drew up tables with terms of physics, like velocity, on one side, and then corresponding terms in economics on the other. That had a huge benefit in terms of the 'science' of economics, because it cut economics loose from Adam Smith's and other classical economists' preoccupations with issues of morality and ethics. Adam Smith thought his most important book was not the Wealth of Nations but his Theory of Moral Sentiments, on which he was working, revising yet again, when he died. For Smith, economics and morals were never separate worlds, but intimately related. So for him, the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations were just twins. The point about the marginalist revolution, and the embrace of physics as the model, was that it cut economics free of all that sort of subjective stuff about values. So economics after the marginalist revolution set off with the assumption that not production, but the movement of individuals in markets engaged in trading with each other became the center of gravity of economics. Making the study of exchange rather than the study of production central was analogous to, say, Boyle's Law in physics. Boyle's Law in physics explained the movement of molecules in gasses, as a function of the pressure applied to the gas. So why did they make that analogy?
The point of likening of individuals in microeconomic actions with molecules in gasses was the following. Everybody knows that we do not apply any consideration of ethics or moral sentiments to the movement of the molecules in gas, so neither should we apply any notions of ethics or moral sentiments to the movements of individuals in market exchanges. And that was the way that all considerations of ethics, of morality were just removed from economics. I for instance asked the question to well-known American growth theorist, as we were walking down the street in Providence at Brown University: 'is it moral for people to freeride?' And he said, 'yes of course, provided they do not break the law'. So ethics and questions of morality have been almost completely expunged from economics in a way that would horrify classical economists including Smith; and a particular idea of rationality has been an important part of cleansing economics from those moral considerations. George DeMartino, editor of the Oxford Handbook of Professional Economics Ethics which just appeared has a wonderful phrase to capture this—'econogenic harm': the harm built into the way that economics, professional economists work.
Haven't specific fields, like development economics—a field you engage with yourself—advanced to overcome these weaknesses in economic theory?
Let me root my answer again in observations about the linkages between theory and practice, for it is in practice that economic theory really does its work and its politics becomes visible. It always amazes me we have had a development industry in place for roughly the past 70 years with vast numbers of people, organizations, money all orchestrated underneath this umbrella of development; yet if you go back and read what the early writers about development and economic growth said—I am thinking of people like Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Myrdal, Hirschman, Prebisch, but also Moses Abramovitz. If you go back and look at what they were saying, it seems to me that we have not advanced all that much. Sure, we have advanced a lot in terms of econometric techniques, but in terms of substance we have not. One conclusion I draw from that is that it is really important that international regimes—for example, World Bank and IMF loan conditions, but also WTO regimes—give room for experimentation, because it is really not the case that 'there is no alternative'. This Washington Consensus agenda has clearly not been effective in accelerating production, upgrading it, and production diversification, or export upgrading, or export diversification. So, there should be written into the regimes a lot of room for experimentation. But this isn't there because of the political origin of these regimes; because of what western countries want for the rest world, namely, to open the rest of the world to their markets.
In the 80s there were a lot of experts in industrial development in the World Bank and they did good work, promoting industrial growth and investment in productive infrastructure. But then Anne Krueger came in as chief economist, and brought in a whole lot of people with her—who, like here, were arch-neoliberals. The industrial growth people were invited to find employment elsewhere, or to rebrand themselves as experts in who knows what, environmental assessment, primary education, or good governance. There was no room for them. This also fitted well with some bad experiences the Bank had had with investing in infrastructure. It had gotten into a lot of trouble with large-scale infrastructural interventions such as roads and dams and the like from, especially, US NGOs mobilizing Congress—which then put pressure on the Treasury and so on. My lament throughout this whole conversation has been that we seem to have become just locked into this direction that was set in the 1980s, and it is very difficult to see what kind of economic catastrophe would be necessary to give a sufficient shock to reroute the global system of economic governance.
So after the 1980s, the Bank sort of backed off and began saying that development, economic development, was about poverty reduction—the slogan of the Bank became, 'our dream is a world free of poverty'. You can understand that shift partly in terms of pulling out of the concern with production to get into safe territory, but also because poverty reduction seemed to sort of take care of inequality, because you reduced inequality to poverty—to the poor 'over there', and we can feel good about helping them; but we do not want talk about inequality, which involves us, because then there is the question of justice of our income.
But then the most recent turn is that we're seeing a renewed push for infrastructure in the World Bank and western development agencies. I think that you can link this recent infrastructure push to uncertainty about the sources of economic growth. In the West there is a real question about sustaining economic growth without housing bubbles and stock market bubbles—in other words, without endogenously building financial instability. There may well be a similar sort of issue in terms of the growth of developing countries.
Last question. Adam Smith seems to be constantly present in your work as a critical interlocutor. How come?
I kind of engage in a critical debate with Adam Smith, but especially with people today, who believe his ideas. I often start to frame arguments in terms of his famous 40 word summary of the causes of the relative wealth of nations, which he actually wrote in 1755, which is to say long before the first edition of the Wealth of Nations. I will just tell you what these 40 words say, and then I will tell you the significance of them. He said:
'Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism than peace, easy taxes, and tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things.'
So I am struck by how today many economists say or imply that this is essentially right; you need some qualifications of course, but essentially that is the nub of it. You might have to translate peace, easy taxes, tolerable administration of justice into more modern terms, but that is the essence of it. For example, Gregory Mankiw—Professor of economics at Harvard, former chair of the National Council of Economic Advisers during the Bush administration, and author of a very popular textbook in economics—said in the Wall Street Journal in 2006: Adam Smith was right to say that – and then he gave the 40 word quote. The renowned economists Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson wrote Pillars of Prosperity, which also begins with Smith's 40 words, and they even see the book as a kind of elaboration, but in that same kind of spirit, of Smith's basic idea. So my point is that these ideas are still current; they are still the sort of front of a lot of neoliberal thinking. I am just astonished these ideas all these centuries later remain so powerful. I have had at the back of my mind the idea of organizing an international competition to provide a contemporary 40 word statement, which is sort of equivalent to Smith's, which would obviously have to be of a more global character, encompassing the globalized world economy.
Robert Hunter Wade worked at the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, 1972-95, World Bank, 1984-88, Princeton Woodrow Wilson School 1989/90, MIT Sloan School 1992, Brown University 1996-2000. Fellow of Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton 1992/93, Russell Sage Foundation 1997/98, Institute for Advanced Study, Berlin 2000/01. Fieldwork in Pitcairn Is., Italy, India, Korea, Taiwan. Research on World Bank 1995-continuing. Author of Irrigation and Politics in South Korea (1982), Village Republics: The Economic Conditions of Collective Action in India (1988, 1994), Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asia's Industrialization (1990, 2003). Latter won American Political Science Association's award of Best Book in Political Economy, 1992.
Related links
Faculty profile at LSE Read Wade's The Piketty phenomenon and the future of inequality (2014, real-world economics review) here (pdf) Read Wade's Capitalism and Democracy at Cross-Purposes (2013, Challenge) here (pdf) Read Wade's Rethinking Industrial Policy for Low Income Countries (2007 ADB Conference paper) here (pdf) Read Wade's Bringing the State Back In (2005, IPG) here (pdf) Read Wade's Is Globalization Reducing Poverty and Inequality? (2004, World Development) here (pdf) Read Wade's Creating Capitalisms (Introduction to 2003 book 'Governing the Market') here (pdf)
The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Capstone Autumn 1862 The High Tide of the Confederacy Colin E. Zimmerman A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH562 Capstone Paper Dr. Wesley Moody 23-August-2020. 2 Thesis: The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? It will be necessary to answer this question through a multilayered approach. Instead of viewing the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns on the tactical level, which has already consumed most of the historiography on the topic, this study will instead find an explanation to this question through political, logistical, organizational, leadership personalities, and economic components and how they dictated the overall strategic picture and framework. When synthesizing all these components together, one potential answer generates: the grand Confederate offensive in the autumn of 1862, a direct result of botched Federal strategic measures and limitations, divided political policies, and the Union's struggling logistical capabilities; indicated the high tide of the Confederacy. Through battlefield victories and seizing the initiative in direct and indirect courses, Confederate leadership allowed the Southern field armies to exploit the Federal weaknesses culminating in the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns. 3 These campaigns offered the Confederacy its only realistic chance of ending the war on political and strategic terms that favored the South. An examination of each specific component and its relation to the Confederate high tide's theory is therefore essential to back this new interpretation. Political Factors of the North, South, and Europe; and its Benefit to the Confederacy in 1862: All wars, especially civil wars, are political in their foundation, influence, and execution. In "On War," Carl von Clausewitz states that "the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and the amount of effort to be made." 1 This axiom applies to events in the autumn of 1862 since political factors dominated the motivation of strategy. The Confederacy's legitimacy resided within its field armies continued existence. Their ability to gain military victories that supported both the strategic and political realms was the essential component that needed to be sustained if the South was to remain independent. The North was in a completely different predicament, as the rival political factions, Republican's and Democrat's, each with its own opinion on the objective goals and the conduct of the war, could not in the early phase of the war come to common ground as to what the specific nature, cause, plan, and purpose of the Civil War was. The North was a nation at war without complete unification of mind, and purpose, which presented a weakness that could ultimately undo its efforts. Complicating matters for President Abraham Lincoln, and his party's agenda, was the fact the Northern Democratic party held just over 45% of the popular vote of free and border states in the 1860 election. 2 In short, the President and his administration existed only in a 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 2004. 10. 2 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 506. 4 narrow margin and needed to conduct the war in a way suitable to keep the two very different mindsets exhibited by both the Republicans and Democrats in agreement. The Kentucky and Maryland campaigns occurred while changing Republican ideas on the persecution of the war and mid-term congressional elections, which proved to be a significant juncture in Northern and foreign politics. To be sure, the summer and fall of 1862 were extremely delicate times for Lincoln and the Republicans, and they could not afford any negative setbacks. Lacking any precedent to draw on, the Lincoln Administration delicately approached the rebellion by seeking the destruction of Confederate armies and exempting the Southern population from the burdens of war by respecting the civilians' constitutional rights and property. Historian Mark Grimsley captured the conviction of the policy by pointing out that the Lincoln administration renounced any intention of attacking slavery; and the government's assumption that most white Southerners were lukewarm about secession, and if handled with forbearance, would withdraw their allegiance from the Confederacy once Union armies entered their midst. 3 This policy known as conciliation, therefore, served as the beat to which Union forces marched off to war. Not all Northern generals and radical Republicans embraced this; however, the policy served as the first step in an evolutionary process that would eventually culminate in "hard-war." The effects of conciliation created favorable conditions for the Confederacy from which they were able to exploit the "limited war" shortcomings of the Union and surge forward into the fall offensive and their high tide. These shortcomings manifest in several different forms: leadership, strategic limitation, and foreign and domestic political pressure. Unfortunately for the 3 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 3. 5 Union, the combination of these factors exposed themselves in a negative light nearly all simultaneously, creating a perfect opportunity for the Confederates to take advantage of the drawbacks and pursue victory. Fueling the fire was the Lincoln Administration's policy regarding the appointment of military governors in captured territory. The issue arose when these cities, such as Nashville, were turned into massive supply centers for Union armies, resulting in intense rivalries between city and country, neighboring communities, and whites and blacks as they competed for jobs and dominance. 4 Henry Halleck, George McClellan, Don Carlos Buell, the key leaders of the Federal armies in 1862, generated the most immediate consequences stemming from the shortcomings of conciliation from as these three adherents to firm Democratic principles and military strategy are most responsible for creating the opportunity for a Confederate offensive. Generals Halleck, McClellan, and Buell are often portrayed by historians as lacking the "killer instinct," especially when compared to Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Phil Sheridan. However, a more accurate analysis finds them as men who followed the conciliation policy almost to the letter for political, personal, or logistical reasons. Halleck himself wrote the Elements of Military Art and Science, where he harped on the capture of strategic points, incurring the least number of casualties and damage as possible as the primary strategy of winning a war. Ironically, Halleck, the most influential Union general in 1862, believed that warfare was unjustifiable in most cases and should only be conducted with the utmost caution. 5 As General in Chief, Halleck had a significant influence on the conduct of operations of the Union forces. Each of these three 4 Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 35-36; Scott Nelson and Carol Sheriff, A People of War: Civilians and Soldiers in America's Civil War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 88. The reference to negative leadership refers to the actions of Nathaniel Lyon and Francis Blair; who introduced "harsh" measures in 1861 prematurely which led to a brutal guerilla war and other political ramifications. 5 Henry Wagner Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science: Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battle, Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers, Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia, Third Edition, New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1862. 7-9. 6 commanders prescribed to similar variants of Halleck's theory, whose universal core value of caution above all else acted as the catalyst to create the conditions for the Confederacy to crest in the fall of 1862. While the reigns of military success were in McClellan's and Buell's hands during the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns; Halleck made two major errors in 1862 that are directly responsible for igniting the Confederate offensives. The first was his overabundance of caution in taking Corinth, allowing the Confederates to slip away and then failing to retain the initiative by pushing to Vicksburg while simultaneously failing to capture Chattanooga. The second major failure was his inability to harness his granted power and force McClellan to speedily and effectively send his army to the aid of John Pope, eliminating any opportunity for a combined assault on Lee's smaller army. 6 The Democratic principles these generals prescribed to differed in many respects from Lincoln and the Republican agenda on the idea of the war. Each strongly believed in the preservation of the Union yet favored winning the war by the least drastic measures, the least number of casualties, and on a platform acceptable to their Democratic party beliefs. 7 For instance, McClellan wrote Buell, upon the latter's elevation to command of the Army of the Ohio: "bear in mind that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and to uphold the power of General Government….be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us & the rebels." 8 Additionally, Generals Pope, Grant, and Rosecrans, who likely weren't as politically polarized as the former three, contributed to the growing political dissension in 1862 in their own right. Therefore, by their actions, federal military leadership did more to subvert the Union military from ending the war quickly and 6 Russel F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000. 135-136. It is arguable whether or not the Army of the Potomac could have arrived in its entirety rapidly enough to join with Pope. However, personal and in-house political agendas did not move the efficiency along any faster. 7 Weigley, A Great Civil War, xix-xxi. 8 Grimsley, 64. 7 dividing political tension based on faction theology more than any other public figures in 1862. One of the more notable incidents that fit into the framework of subversion was Grant's debacle at Shiloh, which brought strong opposition from anti-war Democrats, causing cautious leaders such as Halleck and McClellan to tighten their grip and fear repeat attacks. Most detrimental in this respect was the administration's and Halleck's decision to temporarily bench Grant during the Corinth episode, then subsequently leaving him in a position where he could not act with his usual aggressiveness against Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. Before his removal as General in Chief, George McClellan wrote Halleck then in charge of western forces, "The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant's should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of service requires it, & place CF Smith in command." 9 Grant's "recklessness" at Shiloh created quite the stir on the home front, which as a result, political rivals of the Lincoln Administration, sought to break down Grant as a way to spread discontent and fit the anti-war platform. They harped on the high number of casualties, the surprise of the Confederate attack, and the black eye to the seemingly unstoppable Union war machine. The backlash reached Washington, prompting a response from the Administration. In a telegram to Halleck, Secretary of War Stanton wrote, "The President desires to know why you have made no official report to this department respecting the late battles of Pittsburg landing. And whether any neglect or misconduct of General Grant or any other officer contributed to the sad casualties that befell our forces on Sunday." 10 The battle of Shiloh became the first political debacle that militarily opened the door for the Confederacy to take the offensive in the fall of 1862. 9 Nancy Scott Anderson and Dwight Anderson, The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee, Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. 230. 10 Anderson, The Generals, 241. 8 The most immediate politically charged consequence materialized in Halleck's handling of the advance on Corinth, which exemplified his standard cautiousness with added paranoia of avoiding another repeat of Shiloh. 11 The delicate politically charged caution continued even after the successful capture of Corinth in Halleck's decision to send Buell, over Pope or Grant to seize Chattanooga. Halleck's snail-like cautious advance on Corinth, and the decision to send Buell to Chattanooga, allowed the disorganized Confederate army to withdraw from Corinth, establish a new commander in the form of Braxton Bragg, who in turn brought reorganization, discipline, and professionalization to the Army of Mississippi; which proved to be the genesis of Bragg and Smith having the ability to advance into Tennessee and Kentucky. 12 Military shortcomings turned political disasters in the Eastern Theater during the summer of 1862, soon overshadowed Shiloh, and added dramatic momentum and opportunity to the rise of the Confederate high tide in the war's primary theater. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac, having suffered political harassment in late 1861 into the spring of 1862, began their downward political spiral with the Army of the Potomac's loss of initiative and strategic defeat during the Seven Days Battles on the Peninsula. The setbacks along the James River coupled with the black eye at Shiloh, and the defeat of Federal forces in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 had devastating political effects, which left the North and European powers believing that all hope for the Union resided with McClellan and his Army of the Potomac. The proximity of the Union and Confederate capitals made the Eastern theater a hot spot for journalists and policymakers on both sides, who saw the region as the deciding factor in the Civil War's outcome. This army's setback at the gates of Richmond did more to influence how events 11 Larry J. Daniel, Days of Glory: The Army of the Cumberland, 1861-1865, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006. 85. 12 Thomas Lawrence Connelly, Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001. 188-194. 9 unfolded in the east in 1862 in both the strategic and political sense, both foreign and domestic. 13 The shortcomings on the Peninsula stymied the Union's hope to quickly end the war while making the voices of "Peace Democrats" louder and the political situation even more delicate. As if the Lincoln Administration did not already have enough burdens, both England and France, whose neutrality was necessary for the Union war effort, began to openly question the North's ability to subdue the South and end the rebellion. 14 Stonewall Jackson's brilliant campaign in the Valley, coupled with the Army of Northern Virginia's ferocious performance on the Peninsula elevated Southern patriotism, and simultaneously dampened Northern morale, convincing many on both sides that Southern victory was achievable. 15 Colonel Charles Marshall, Lee's Assistant Adjutant General believed that Robert E. Lee's emergence onto the scene was the greatest benefit to the Southern cause. He equated Lee's leadership on the Peninsula to that of a color bearer bravely advancing his banner towards the enemy. On political matters Marshall correctly believed that the Northern people were impatient for a speedy victory and that the Federal Government expressed this sentiment in its policy on conducting the war. However, this policy was forcefully and forever altered with the aggressive Lee's emergence onto the scene, whose plan called for carrying on the war indefinitely until the Confederacy achieved victory. Marshall outlined this plan as designed to, "frustrate the enemy's designs; to break up campaigns undertaken with vast expense and with confident assurance of success; to impress upon the minds of Northern people the conviction that they must prepare for a protracted struggle, great sacrifices of life and treasure, with the possibility that all might at last be of no 13 Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992. 355. 14 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 554-555. 15 Peter Cozzens, Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. 507-508. 10 avail; and to accomplish this at the smallest cost to the Confederacy." 16 This leadership change at such a critical moment proved to be the dawn of turning Confederate fortunes in the east. Public opinion and political reactions to the Union failure on the Peninsula were mixed; however, strong opposition towards McClellan emerged and created discord among the rival Democrats and Republicans, each of whom found outlets to accuse the other of the responsibility of the campaign's failure. 17 Amid this political turmoil, Lincoln, in an effort to offset the discord introduced Major General John Pope, who only managed to escalate political dissension to a fever pitch with his disastrous Northern Virginia campaign. 18 In the Western Theater, the emergence of Braxton Bragg also came at a critical juncture in juxtaposition with the events occurring in the east. Bragg took command of the Army of Mississippi at one of its darkest hours, and through exemplary organizational skills, reshaped the Army of Mississippi into a professional, disciplined force capable of delivering a lethal blow. With such a force, Bragg was able to look to more risky opportunities that would offset the Union strategic gains in the west and regain Tennessee and perhaps set the stage for Kentucky.19 Private Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee recorded the positive change in morale from the melancholy atmosphere at Corinth to when new lifeblood in the army emerged. "We were in an ecstasy akin to heaven. We were happy; the troops were jubilant; our manhood blood pulsated more warmly; our patriotism was awakened; our pride was renewed and stood ready for any emergency; we felt that one Southern man could whip twenty Yankees. All was lovely and 16 Charles Marshall, Lees Aide-De-Camp: Being the Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall Sometime Aide-De-Camp, Military Secretary, and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee, 1862-1865, Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, and Frederick Maurice, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. 74. 17 Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 346-347. 18 John J. Hennessy, Return to Bull Run: The Battle and Campaign of Second Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. 468-472. 19 Earl J. Hess, Banners to the Breeze: the Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River, Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2010. 19-22. 11 the goose hung high." 20 Although the Confederates had suffered initial setbacks early in 1862, the advantages afforded by conciliation, cautious Federal leadership, and the emergence of Lee and Bragg allowed for a reversal of fortunes. In 1862 Southern patriotism was running high; the idea of independence and the Confederate soldier's superiority was at its wartime peak. 21 Lee's decision to invade Maryland was political in nature. Maryland Campaign historians, Joseph Harsh, Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears, James Murfin, and Ezra Carman while differing on strategic matters, all agree that Lee's primary purpose was to secure a decisive victory which would gain the South the political victory; either in the form of Northern domestic politics or international recognition and or intervention. The application of political pressure to Lee's offensive outweighs all the deficiencies faced by his army in the logistical realm, and further illustrated his grasp on the delicacy of Northern political division. Clearly, he understood this division and had faith that his smaller, ill-supplied force had a chance to deliver a blow that would fracture the Northern populace and produce an outcome that favored the South. General Lee suggested his understanding of such matters in a letter to President Jefferson Davis while in Dranesville on September 3. "The present seems to be the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate Army to enter Maryland.….if it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her and opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable." 22 The domestic and foreign political objectives acting as primary motives for the "invasion," were in that instant equal to the strategic goals which accompanied them when 20 Samuel R. Watkins, Company Aytch or A Side Show of the Big Show: A Memoir of the Civil War. Edited by Ruth Hill Fulton McAllister. Nashville, TN: Turner, 2011. 45. 21 Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse, New York: Free Press, 2008. 207; James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 263. 22 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 19. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 590. 12 defining the military value of the campaign; this is a unique feature to the Maryland Campaign and its condition for victory, while only a secondary task in Kentucky. In contrast historian Edwin Coddington paints a different picture for Lee's purposes in the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863. Coddington outlined that Lee, in this part of the war, contended with the new Federal doctrine of "hard war" and emancipation, eliminating the decisive battle matched with the political advantage that existed in 1862. Therefore, Lee's only real option was to defeat the Army of the Potomac in detail, earning a strategic victory rather than a political one. 23 Such a task required adequate logistics, and a complete and total battlefield victory, two factors that eluded the Confederacy during the war. Such victory conditions presented to Lee in 1862 were unique and would never materialize again in any substantial form. Political division in the North was at fever pitch in the late summer of 1862; evidence of the discord's depth is apparent in everything from personal letters through Northern news outlets. Robert E. Lee, an avid reader of Northern papers, understood this notion and sought to exploit it. Domestically, Northern Democrats maintained a loud voice in critical regions and states, which only grew more robust and more resilient with each military shortcoming and failure. August and early September saw a heightened level of panic and discouragement in the North, with Pope's defeat and Lee's invasion of Maryland, while at the same time Kirby Smith's Confederate Army of Kentucky demonstrated against Cincinnati. Pennsylvania was understandably the most unnerved due to its proximity to Maryland and vital war infrastructure, and its Republican governor Andrew Curtin's demand for 80,000 troops to defend his state embodied it. Additionally, the mayors of the influential northern cities of Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and 23 Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, New York: Simon and Schuster. 1968. 6-7. 13 Baltimore were alarmed, fearing their respective city was the target of Lee's advancing legions.24 In Cincinnati, the situation turned somewhat drastic. After destroying the Union forces at Richmond, Kentucky on August 30, Kirby Smith as a result had a clear road to the Ohio River. Understandably Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio all worried what Smith's next move would be while they scrambled to organize bodies of troops. General Lew Wallace arrived in Cincinnati, declared martial law and quickly set about organizing a defense. 25 With panic to the extremity of declaring martial law, the Northern population began to question their ability to win the war openly. Prominent figures such as George Templeton Strong, Samuel Galloway, Reverend Robert Laird Collier, and Senator Garrett Davis, spoke not only for themselves but also for the majority of the people by openly challenging President Lincoln and his administration on their ability to conduct the war. The accusations included Lincoln's unfitness for the Presidency, the constant change of military leadership in the east, which showed instability and was severely hurting morale in the North. Demands also arose that there be a complete reorganization of the Administration. 26 The Lincoln Administration's threat of a draft, unless an additional 300,000 volunteers could be raised created further tension. The idea of a draft disgusted many Northerners; however, with "patriotic" spirit enticed by bounties, nine-month service, and the threat of draft, the ranks of new regiments began to fill in late summer of 1862, only hitting forty-five percent of the intended quota. 27 The Union soldiers themselves cast a gloomy mood over the situation and expressed their views with varying levels of disgust. Lieutenant Elisha Hunt Rhodes of the 2nd 24 David H. Donald, Lincoln, New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996. 373. 25 Vernon L. Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground": Major General Lew Wallace Commands Cincinnati, September 1862." Indiana Magazine of History 85, no. 2 (1989): 139. 26 Donald, Lincoln, 373. 27 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 492. 14 Rhode Island expressed in his diary that: "I fear we are no nearer the end of the war than we were when we first landed at Fortress Monroe five months ago." 28 Captain Francis Donaldson of the 118th Pennsylvania captured the mood in Washington: "We are constant witness of the sad plight of the Army of the Potomac, as thousands of Genl. Pope's troops in great demoralization are ever passing the Fort in retreat to Washington. The poor old Army of the Potomac, how I pity it." 29 Captain Henry Pearson of the 6th New Hampshire also expressed his views in the aftermath of Second Manassas: "You need not be surprised if success falls to the rebels with astonishing rapidity." 30 Brigadier General Marsena Patrick's opinion bordered on insurrection: "There is a general feeling that the Southern Confederacy will be recognized & that they deserve recognition." 31 Lieutenant Charles Seton Fleming of the 2nd Florida Infantry, in a letter home to his mother describing the aftermath of the Second Manassas campaign, echoed Patrick's views when he wrote: "Our victory is complete, even the Yankee prisoners acknowledge it." 32 Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hubbell of the 3rd New York wrote in August 1862: "I am not sure that it would not be a good thing to have the rebels get possession of Washington however, as it might waken up the north to the fact that we are having a war in earnest, and not merely playing soldier…. We have got men & means enough in the north to put an end to this war in 90 days, if they would only go at it in earnest and let politics & the nigger alone." 33 28 Elisha Hunt Rhodes, All for the Union: A History of the 2nd Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Great Rebellion. Edited by Robert Hunt Rhodes. Lincoln, RI: A. Mowbray, 1985. 69. 29 Francis Adams Donaldson, Inside the Army of the Potomac: The Civil War Experience of Captain Francis Adams Donaldson. Edited by J. Gregory Acken. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998. 104. 30 D. Scott Hartwig, To Antietam Creek: the Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019. 134-135. 31 Ibid., 134-135. 32 Francis P. Fleming, A Memoir of Captain C. Seton Fleming: of the Second Florida Infantry, C.S.A., Reprint 1985: Jacksonville: Times-Union Publishing House, 1884. 66. 33 Simon P. Newman, "A Democrat in Lincoln's Army: The Civil War Letters of Henry P. Hubbell." The Princeton University Library Chronicle 50, no. 2 (1989): 155-68. 157. 15 Hubbell eluded to the growing discord of racial issues that many Democrats saw as an unnecessary and politically charged motive to a war that was supposed to be strictly for preserving the Union. Nevertheless, this issue began to transform the cause of the war in the summer of 1862, adding only more weight to a very delicate political situation. Hubbell's feelings weren't isolated; instead, the sense that the war was taking on a new front to end slavery infuriated many Northerners. Hubbell's views on racial matters and slavery were not limited to himself, in fact, the stiffest opposition to war that had anything to do with freeing slaves came from the Midwest states; where racism was an epidemic culturally, especially in the Army of the Ohio. The talk of national emancipation led hundreds of men to desert and, in some cases, join the Confederacy. 34 Sentiments similar to these echoed across the Union armies and, undoubtedly, were shared by family and friends on the home front. Some individuals turned bitter, and perhaps extreme, which reflected political, ideological, and sectional differences in the North, which under the pressure of a seemingly collapsing system reared its ugly head. The term "invasion" has been used several times thus far, especially by the Union's most publicized general, George McClellan. This term and others related to it divided the minds of many of those who had significant power to dictate the war. Abraham Lincoln, at no point, recognized the Confederacy as a legitimate entity. He always maintained that the Southern States were in rebellion and needed to be brought back into the Union. Interestingly, his senior generals in 1862, mostly Democrats, saw the Confederate offensives as invasions, insinuating their conscious or subconscious recognition that Confederate armies were "foreign invaders" intent on doing harm, which helped fuel the panic, frustration, and seemingly lost Union cause ideology. 35 34 Daniel, Days of Glory, 101. 35 Andrew Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese: Lincoln and the Army of the Potomac, 1862-1863." Australian Journal of American Studies 21, no.2 (2002): 86-100. 86-87. 16 Jefferson Davis, the Confederate cabinet, Robert E. Lee, Braxton Bragg, and all the other high-ranking Confederate officers comprehended the growing Northern political disunion. This is evident in the decision to approve a Confederate offensive and the string of strategic goals associated with it. The Army of Northern Virginia, for example, fulfilled its duty of defeating the Federals time and again, completely reversing the tide of the war in the east. As Robert E. Lee sat at his headquarters in the aftermath of Chantilly, it had become abundantly clear that he now possessed the opportunity to strike the decisive blow against whatever Union army would oppose him in Maryland or Pennsylvania, which would likely result in some sort of peace talks. 36 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Porter Alexander Chief of Ordnance in the Army of Northern Virginia saw the picture as clear as Lee. Referring to the army, we wrote: "His [Lee's] army had, that magnificent morale which made them equal to twice their numbers, & which they never lost even to the surrender at Appomattox. And his confidence in them, & theirs in him, were so equal that no man can yet say which was greatest. And no old soldier need ask a prouder record than is implied in that fact. By going into Maryland Gen. Lee could at least subsist his army for a while upon the enemy, & he doubtless hoped, too, for a chance to force the Federal army to come out & fight him under favorable conditions." 37 Confederate officer William Allan, reverberated Alexander's sentiments when he wrote of the Army of Northern Virginia: "its spirit at this time was high. A series of brilliant successes had given it unbounded confidence in itself and its leaders, and the ragged dirty soldiers hailed with joy the advance across the Potomac." 38 The comparison of the Federal and Confederate views as indicated from primary sources, on 36 Hartwig, To Antietam Creek, 52-53. 37 Edward Porter Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 139. 38 William Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, Reprint: Middletown: DE, 2020. 273. 17 leadership and the progress of the war at the beginning of the Maryland Campaign were clearly in favor of the South. The leadership of Don Carlos Buell is a prime example of political dissatisfaction, both on the home front and in the army. While McClellan was unpopular with the Administration, he still held favor with most of his officers, and certainly the rank and file of the army and the nation. Buell, however, faced contention on three similar fronts – The Indiana bloc, the general and field officers of the First Division, and the supporters of Alexander McCook, one of his corps commanders. Much of the disgust with Buell occurred during the Kentucky Campaign. This break in unified efforts favored the Confederate cause, particularly in swaying popular opinion in Kentucky. Republican Indiana newspapers ripped into Buell's leadership, declaring that he was completely mishandling the pursuit of two Confederate armies that were ripping up Kentucky and potentially heading towards Indiana, Ohio, or Illinois. Some newspapers called for his immediate dismissal, and a few even demanded he be shot. 39 When comparing Lee and his army to Buell and his, there formulates a fascinating dissection of the polar extremes in popular and political opinion. Lee and his men were on the top of their game, while Buell's forces were at a low ebb. Using these two examples as the basis of measurement, it becomes apparent that overall, the Confederate forces enjoyed a much higher sense of public support and favorability then their Union counterparts did at that particular moment in the war. Scholars have hotly debated the prospect of European powers, particularly England and France intervening and mediating an end to the conflict. The idea of such a prospect was undoubtedly the primary goal for the Confederate strategy in the autumn of 1862. It is essential to view the idea of European intervention in the simplest of forms. The Southern strategy partly 39 Daniel, 128-129. 18 hinged on it, as can be observed via strategic decisions and public opinion, the North, however, feared the prospect. Intervention and mediation on any level would, in the end, be more beneficial to the South, and the Lincoln Administration would appear as incapable; in short, it would be a disaster for the North and Republicans. 40 The onset of a "cotton famine" and the scandal of the Trent affair occurred amid all the politically charged events in 1862, resulting in the British sending an additional 11,000 men to Canada and forcing Lincoln to tread lightly in foreign political matters. 41 Historian Max Beloff believed that the possibility of British intervention was extremely likely in 1862, mainly due to the North's refusal to make anti-slavery sentiments the basis of their cause, instead still focusing on the preservation of the Union, which only supported the pro-Southern faction in Parliament. 42 An examination of Southern newspapers and other editorials, shows public opinion in the South at the beginning of the war was universal in the belief that Great Britain would be forced, through the power of cotton, to intervene either by raising the blockade or by recognizing the Confederate States as an independent nation or perhaps both. 43 Regardless of the likelihood of actual intervention or recognition, the idea of it greatly influenced Confederate leaders, particularly Lee, who notated such objective goals in his correspondence with Davis. Davis agreed outlining his desires in a communication to Lee on September 7. He reminded Lee that the Confederacy was waging war solely for self-defense. Through the eight points he outlined as the guiding principles for the field armies to abide by, Davis continually revolved his doctrine around political objectives whose chief purpose were to achieve peace with the United States. If the South maintained a self- 40 McPherson, 444. 41 Nelson, A People at War, 166. 42 Max Beloff, "Historical Revision No. CXVIII: Great Britain and the American Civil War." History, New Series, 37, no. 129, (1952): 40-48. 42. 43 Schuyler Dean Hoslett, "The Richmond Daily Press on British Intervention in the Civil War: A Brief Summary." The William and Mary Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1940): 79-83. 80. 19 defense posture, with the objective of peace through battlefield victory; then the likelihood of positive European intervention on their behalf had a much higher probability, which in turn could possibly bring a speedy end to the war with terms that favored the Confederacy. 44 Logistical Concerns and Organizational Components: While the South always lagged behind the North in terms of finance, economy, manufacturing, manpower, and many other logistical concerns, the disparity was narrower in 1862 than in the coming years. As a point of contention, several trends and circumstances in the Union war effort benefited the South more than it aided the Union on the grand stage. Concerning logistics, Clausewitz's maxim states: "The dependence on the base increases in intensity and extent with the size of the Army, which is easy to understand. An Army is like a tree. From the ground out of which it grows it draws it's nourishment; if it is small it can easily be transplanted, but this becomes more difficult as it increases in size….When therefore, we talk of the influence of the base on the operations of an Army, the dimensions of the Army must always serve as the scale by which to measure the magnitude of that influence." 45 This axiom is precisely the predicament of the Northern war effort in the first two years of the war. The logistical portion of this study will examine the condition and availability of uniforms and equipment, quality of weaponry then in circulation, training and experience of soldiers, and finally the ability of each government to produce and supply its troops effectively. A logistical understanding is crucial for understanding the obstacles and conditions faced by the armies and how it dictated their effectiveness on campaign and immediate tactical ability on the battlefield in 1862. The South, as previously stated from the very beginning of the war, was behind its 44 OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 45 Clausewitz, On War, 353-354. 20 opponent in logistical matters; however, the North in 1862 was not at the climax in its ability of production and supply, and therefore lacked significantly in certain areas. However, it is essential to note that the limitations of the Federal logistical system by the fall of 1862 were only a few months shy of efficiently supplying the vast number of troops in the field. The first evidence of a marked change in the Union's logistical ability emerged in the Chancellorsville Campaign's genesis, after the winter of 1862-63. 46 Accepting the notion that the Confederate armies were in rough shape logistically; it is important to note that the primary leadership in the field was acutely aware of the shortages. However, the unfolding opportunity demanded a military strike that outweighed logistical concerns. Therefore, an examination into the Federal system's shortcomings is necessary to show the benefits it offered toward the Confederacy. The United States Army in the Antebellum period contained roughly 15,000 men of all arms. Compared with an army of 600,000 men in 1862, it is understandable that there would be significant shortcomings and hurdles to overcome in a nation that, as a rule, did not trust professional armies nor want to foot the bill for one. Nevertheless, the North had a clear advantage when it came to industrialization and manufacturing. Over one million Northerners worked in industrial jobs, ten times more than their Southern counterparts. Furthermore, the North contained roughly 100,000 factories compared to the South's 20,000. 47 Yet, as already pointed out, the prewar army was tiny and supplied with uniforms and equipment solely from the Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia. Additionally, the arsenals producing firearms were limited, with all those existing in the South subsequently seized upon secession, having fewer firearms available to Northern regiments. 48 The North, therefore, would have to raise and equip an army 46 Stephen Sears, Chancellorsville, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996. 71-75 47 Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich, Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge, 2018. 174-175. 48 Joseph E. Chance, The Second Texas Infantry, From Shiloh to Vicksburg, Austin: Eakin Press, 1984. 16, 24. 21 primarily with outdated weapons and with an industrial system that wasn't geared toward war manufacturing. The North's only saving grace was its economic might. 49 Economically it is crucial to understand that the Union that won the war in 1865, was not the same financial institution nor economy in 1861 and 1862. It was in major part due to the Legal Tender Act of 1862 and the National Currency Act of 1863, that the North was able to pay for the sustainment of the war; yet it took time for these acts to take effect. Therefore, in 1862 financially, the North was undoubtedly at its weakest; many of the state and municipal banks, especially those in border states, had closed their doors, while millions of businesses and private civilians hoarded gold. 50 The Union was only able to field the armies it did in 1861-1862 because of its ability to pay for the conversion and development of machinery needed for equipment, weaponry, and uniforms while relying initially on its prewar militia. Faced with arming a massive army overnight, the United States was forced to arm many of its regiments with outdated firearms, such as the M-1842 Smoothbore musket, and the M-1816 Flintlocks that were converted to percussion, in addition to supplementing itself with foreign weapons, from Britain, Belgium, France, Austria, and others. These weapons except those from Britain, proved to be severely outdated compared to the technology available in the 1860s. The importance of recognizing the sub-standard firearms is their effectiveness on the battlefield and the potentiality of changing the outcome in a crucial moment in a battle. In an era of the rifled musket that was accurate from 250-300 yards, a typical smoothbore musket ranged from 80-100 yards. A significant portion of Federal troops were armed with outdated weapons in the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. A focus on any of the principal engagements in that time frame will show that regiments armed 49 McPherson, 442-445. 50 Nelson, 132-133. 22 with such weapons were in certain circumstances ineffective on the immediate tactical plane, and perhaps beneficial to their adversary. The disparity of weapons had begun to improve for the North in 1862; however, the infusion of nearly 300,000 volunteers during the summer of 1862 created a logistical gap once again. Many of the existing regiments in the army still shouldered outdated weapons, and now with legions of new men forming, these troops found themselves supplied with weapons that were unequal to the rigors of Civil War combat. Of this second wave of new recruits, the 12th New Jersey Volunteers serve as an excellent microcosm to examine the Union's logistical deficiencies in the rush to arm new recruits in 1862. Initially, the Jerseymen expected to receive the celebrated Enfield rifle; instead, they ended up with the inferior Austrian Lorenz, which was later exchanged in Washington for the equally outdated 1842 Springfield musket, although they saw this as an improvement over the detested Austrian rifle. 51 While every regiment's experience is different, the new wave and veterans alike in 1862 experienced some level of logistical deficiency that impacted their abelites on campaign or in battle. Aside from weapons, much of the equipment in the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the Ohio at the beginning of the Confederate offensives were at the end of its serviceable life span, due to months of active campaigning, and the inability to properly re-muster the army on a large scale because of the continuity of Confederate aggressiveness, which certainly affected their performance as a cohesive fighting force. Brigadier General Abner Doubleday who commanded a brigade at Second Manassas submitted requisitions to replace equipment and clothing just before the onset of the Maryland Campaign, noted in disgust: "owing to the great number [of other officers] making requisitions, mine were not filled and we were soon obliged to 51 Edward G. Longacre, To Gettysburg and Beyond: The Twelfth New Jersey Volunteer Infantry, II Corps, Army of the Potomac, 1862-1865, Hightstown: Longstreet House, 1988. 24. 23 take the field deficient in everything." 52 This sentiment was backed up by Captain James Wren of the IX Corps, who wrote that the men in his division "looked very bad, being Lousey, Dirty & Almost naked & worn out." 53 The soldiers in the Army of the Ohio were in equally if not worse shape. The vast distances covered by the Western Theater's armies created long supply lines, which fell victim to frequent raids from rebel cavalry. T.J. Wright of the 8th Kentucky Infantry noted in his diary that the Army of the Ohio was: "the hungriest, raggedest, tiredest, dirtiest, lousiest and sleepiest set of men the hardships of this or any other war ever produced." 54 While it is certain that the Confederates were in equally bad situations logistically, they had the benefit victory behind them in the east, and in Bragg's army's case, high morale. Another major struggle for the Federals in 1862 was the ability to get the supplies to its armies. The reason is not one specific aspect, but rather a compilation of bureaucracy, corruption, and lack of precedent to draw off. McClellan's army on the Peninsula had to be supplied from the sea, Pope in command of the Army of Virginia never took the time to ensure his troops had everything they needed, and Buell's army along with the rest of the western forces contended with long supply lines originating in Cairo Illinois, that were frequently raided by Confederate cavalry. The 16th Maine Infantry is a classic example of the suffering that occurred in a system that was outside its capabilities in 1862. The regiment's adjutant and historian Abner Small wrote: "How those men suffered! Hunger, daily felt, was nothing compared with it. Men of education, of refinement, and wealth, who willingly and cheerfully gave up home, with all its love and comfort, for country, made to feel degraded for want of clothing!" Small then describes 52 Hartwig, 137. 53 Ibid., 137. 54 Kenneth W. Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011. 89. 24 the horrendous conditions: "…without shelter, without overcoats, shoeless, hatless, and hundreds without blankets; and through all that long, sad, and weary tramp, we were jeered at, insulted, and called the "Blanket Brigade!" 55 While examples like this are on the extreme, the narrative fits when assessing the entire logistical picture of the Army of the Potomac in September 1862. The term logistics also dovetails into organizational tables. Aside from sharing similar shortcomings in the area of supply and outdated weaponry, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was by far the superior force in leadership, experience, and organization when compared with McClellan's force. By September 2, 1862, nearly 61 percent of Lee's infantry had fought in three or more major battles, and 81 percent fought in two or more. All of his 184 infantry regiments were veterans of at least one battle. Not only were Lee's regiments superior in this regard, but his brigade commanders were highly efficient as well. Twenty-seven of Lee's forty brigades were veterans of two or more major battles, while the remaining thirteen had fought in either the Seven Days or Second Manassas. On the divisional level, the highest official level of organization at that point for the A.N.V.; all of the eleven divisions had seen at least one battle. 56 The Union leadership backed this notion up as well. It was widely accepted, and a point still argued amongst historians, that the Southern fighting man was superior. This mythology has far back as the American Revolution corroboration has its roots in early Confederate victories, particularly at First and Second Manassas, the Shenandoah Valley, and the Seven Days battles. These victories generated an aura of invincibility around the Army of Northern Virginia that transcended into the minds of the Federal troops. 57 In fact Lee, true to form was in the first days of September 1862, the living epithet of Baron De Jomini's maxims, "the general should do 55 Abner Ralph Small, The Sixteenth Maine Regiment in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865. London: Forgotten Books, 2015. 38. 56 Joseph L. Harsh, Taken at the Flood Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Ashland: The Kent State University Press, 2013. 39-40 57 Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese", 88. 25 everything to electrify his own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he endeavors to repress his adversaries….in general, a cherished cause, and a general who inspires the confidence by previous success, are powerful means of electrifying an army and conducing to victory." 58 In contrast, McClellan's forces reformed into the Army of the Potomac, could not boast anything near the statistics of the Army of Northern Virginia could. September 1862 was the most disorganized and weakest the Army of the Potomac would find itself in the duration of the war. This school of thought canceled out, at least temporarily, any deficiencies faced by Lee's forces. When George B. McClellan rode out of Washington to take command, he found three very different organizations, each with its own command, divisional, brigade, artillery, cavalry, transportation, and quartermaster structures. Additionally, the newly formed regiments, many of whom were only a few weeks old, were rushed to the front and infused into the disorganized mess. Organizing these separate organizations into one effective command would weeks if not months, McClellan would be forced to do it in a matter of days, while in motion, in addition to planning a short-term strategy to deal with Lee. 59 The chaos of the reorganization is apparent in the 5th New York Volunteers' experience. Historian Brian Pohanka related an instance of the 5th as they passed McClellan on the march toward western Maryland: "As they marched, General McClellan reined up beside the troops of Warren's brigade. 'Well, and how is the Old Fifth this evening?' he asked. 'First rate, General, but we'd be better off if we weren't living so much on supposition." 60 Even though he had the bigger force, the disorganization and confusion associated with the rapidity of the Maryland Campaign denied the general his army's full might 58 Baron De Jomini, The Art of War, Translated by Capt. G.H. Mendell, and Lieut. W.P. Craighill, Radford: Wilder Publications, 2008. 30-31. 59 Hartwig, 133-136. 60 Brian C. Pohanka, Vortex of Hell: History of the 5th New York Volunteer Infantry. Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder Publications, 2012. 369. 26 on the battlefield. In different circumstances these obstacles may have been overcome had McClellan had time to prepare. Robert E. Lee sensed his enemy's weakness and used it as part of his foundation to seek permission from President Davis to invade Maryland. "The two grand armies of the United States that have been operating in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I understand 60,000 men have already been posted in Washington, are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field." 61 Lee identified that his logistical situation was terrible, however, he recognized the unfolding opportunity in front of him. "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. Still, we cannot not afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipment's, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. I am aware that the movement is attended with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible, and shall endeavor to guard it from loss." 62 The amount of stock Lee put into the Federals logistical organization is apparent. In fact, if taken as a whole, his reliance on the overall Federal weakness is one of his only justifications for his ill-supplied and smaller force to go on the offensive. Additionally, these logistical matters, both of his own and the Federal weakness, coincide directly with Lee's desire to deliver a decisive blow to the Federals quickly. There was not a better opportunity to do it and expect fruitful results, then while the Army of Potomac was at its weakest moment, structurally, organizationally, numerically, and logistically. 61 OR, vol 19, 1: 590-591. 62 Ibid., 590-591. 27 Lee's conclusion of the ill-preparedness of the new Union regiments applies not only to the troops in his sector but also to those in the Western Theater. Much like Lee's army within reach of Washington, Kirby Smith's small army in Kentucky created a panic and proved Lee's theory on the reliability of new soldiers. Kirby Smith successfully and thoroughly destroyed an equally sized Federal force of raw recruits at Richmond, Kentucky, on August 30, 1862, eliminating them from the military equation. Historian Kenneth Noe termed the battle of Richmond as "the most lopsided Confederate victory of the war, as Kirby Smith's men inflicted casualties so staggering that entire Union brigades ceased to exist." 63 With Smith's incursion into Kentucky, a vacuum of chaos erupted in the region, in particular, Ohio. The microcosm of Cincinnati infuses both the political and the serious logistical problems faced by the North in 1862. Historian Vernon Volpe pointed out, "Although the influx of [Union] volunteers was inspiring, with it came a shortage of arms, ammunition, and other equipment needed to outfit the troops properly." 64 This example was echoed across the entire Kentucky region in 1862. Although McClellan's army outnumbered Lee with a total of roughly 87,000 men, twenty percent of his infantry were raw, having been in the army just a handful of weeks and had not even come close to mastering the level of proficiency needed in drill and tactics to be effective on a Civil War battlefield. 65 Even though the Federals were able to put fresh regiments into the field, it became an issue of quantity versus quality. The unfortunate story of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers is a classic case in point of these raw troops' ineffectiveness. Arriving to the Army of the Potomac just a few days before the battle of Antietam, the men prepared to enter their first engagement on September 19 at Shepherdstown. Their regimental historian 63 Noe, Perryville, 39. 64 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 146. 65 Hartwig, 139. 28 wrote: "The teachings of the battalion-drill near Sharpsburg on the previous day [September 18] now had practical application." The 118th's Colonel stated in his official report that: "We returned their fire as fast as possible, but soon found that our Enfield rifles were so defective that quite one-fourth of them would not explode the caps." 66 The 118th's story, while extreme is not unique, another raw Federal regiment the 128th Pennsylvania found itself in an even worse circumstance, owing to its lack of training. The 128th Pennsylvania arrived at the army just days before as well and were assigned to the newly organized XII Corps, which itself contained some of the highest proportions of raw troops. During the battle of Antietam, the new regiment found itself in Miller's Cornfield and due lack of basic drill unable to maneuver itself back onto its brigade in the face of onrushing Confederates. Officers and sergeants from experienced neighboring outfits were sent to try and move the bewildered regiment all to no avail. In the end, the 128th was left to its fate and was nearly destroyed, having no effect on the enemy and only weakening their own brigades' position. 67 Stories similar in nature can be found across the Army of the Potomac on every sector of each battlefield during the Maryland Campaign, each in the midst of their own mishaps allowing the Confederates a level of superiority while hindering their supporting elements an opportunity to exploit any gains. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio experienced similar circumstances with green regiments as its eastern counterpart. In a letter to Kirby Smith, Bragg detailed his understanding that Buell's men were in rough shape and utterly demoralized. These circumstances, Bragg believed, offered the South a greater benefit of success. 68 The raw, ill-trained, ill-equipped, and completely unprepared 105th Ohio, 123rd Illinois, and 21st Wisconsin infantry regiments were 66 Survivors' Association 118th (Corn Exchange) Regt., P.V., History of the Corn Exchange Regiment 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers,62. 67 Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1994. 206. 68 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 16: Part 2. Correspondence, Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 754. 29 all glaring examples of this shortcoming. The 123rd Illinois found itself in a similar predicament as the 128th Pennsylvania at Antietam, exposed and on its own, and fell victim to veteran Confederate troops bearing down on them. The 105th Ohio, equally as green, found itself thrown into the breach in the midst of the 123rd Illinois collapse. Private Ayre of the 105th remarked: "…could not form into a proper line and after going through several maneuvers in order to do so we became mixed and confused." In similar fashion to the 123rd Illinois, the 105th Ohio was quickly stampeded by their Confederate attackers. 69 Much like the inferiority of outdated weapons, untrained, raw troops could not perform to a tactically sufficient level to keep par with the rapid pace and constantly changing conditions of a Civil War battlefield. While plenty of experienced units did exist in the Union armies, it is clear the inexperienced ones created more problems, affording the Confederate forces golden opportunities to exploit immediate tactical advantages they likely would not have had, had they been fighting experienced, or even trained troops. On the other side of the coin, the copious amounts of raw units severely hampered any notion gaining a decisive victory or rapidly following up a pursuit. This is evident in the in the results of Antietam and Perryville, both of which were Confederate tactical victories, and the speed at which Lee and Bragg's armies were pursued. The armies' organization is important when looking to understand the advantages and disadvantages and how this affected a particular side's likelihood of victory. The experience level and the amount of subpar weaponry in both the armies of the Potomac and Ohio was only one issue, their organizational structure in both leadership and how its units were grouped confounded their problems and offered the Confederates another edge over their opponent pushing the scale further in favor in the equation of obtaining a victory. As previously stated, the 69 Stuart W. Sanders, Maney's Confederate Brigade at the Battle of Perryville, Charleston: The History Press, 2014. 53-54. 30 Army of the Potomac during the Maryland Campaign was a conglomeration of several different organizations. It contained the II, V, and VI Corps the original Army of the Potomac, the re-designated I and XII Corps, the Army of Virginia, and the newly dubbed IX that had served on the North Carolina coast. Although there were certainly experienced troops and leaders in each of these components, they each spoke a different organizational "language." 70 George McClellan certainly had the most difficult task of any field commander regarding the organization of his army. Not only did he have three different organizations to mold together as a cohesive fighting force, but he also had the additional struggle of doing it on the fly in a military and national emergency. Therefore, although the Army of the Potomac was a potent fighting force, and managed to engage the Confederates, its capabilities in terms of operational effectiveness were severely limited. Buell's circumstances were much more appealing. His Army of the Ohio had remained intact as a cohesive fighting force since its formation; however, he received additional reinforcements from Grant, and a host of new regiments, diluting its effectiveness as an organization. The Army of the Ohio's real organizational issues manifested in the senior leadership's quirks, rivalries, and lack of cohesion. 71 The use of cavalry in both McClellan and Buell's forces paled in comparison to the South. This issue stemmed from the Federal government's inability to recognize the importance of that specific branch early in the conflict. Overwhelmingly, the cavalry found its commands broken apart and scattered across the army, acting in various guard and staff related duties. Those commands retained to perform the primary tasks of nineteenth-century, reconnaissance, screening, and raids were too few and spread out to have any significant impact on the outcome 70 Hartwig, 133-135. 71 Steven E. Woodworth, Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Vintage, 2005. 216. 31 of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. 72 Although they lacked in cavalry ability the Federals were unquestionably superior in artillery. Union guns, although far superior to that of the South were severely flawed organizationally in 1862. Circling back to the theme of different organizational structures in McClellan's force, the arrangement of this branch varied, causing communication issues, and leadership vacuums. In common with the cavalry, the prominent artillery structure in 1862 in both the Army of the Potomac and Army of the Ohio, lacked a unified system of command; instead, most batteries were the responsibility of brigade commanders or divisional commanders. Therefore, at critical moments batteries could only take orders from infantry commanders and were presented with the difficult task of coordinating mass firing on specific targets. 73 While it may seem trivial, such inefficiency in employment and "bureaucratic red tape" of military organization prevented the cavalry and artillery from performing at its maximum potential which no doubt contributed to the shortcomings of the Union armies in 1862. The Confederate military organization also had its flaws; however, as previously noted, the experience level of Confederate forces as a whole were much higher and able to adapt to a situation more efficiently. Partly this had to do with the smaller size of the forces overall, and the Confederate authorities' choice to disperse recruits and conscripts across seasoned units rather than raise new organizations. The cavalry of J.E.B. Stuart, John Hunt Morgan, and Nathan Bedford Forrest for instance were vastly superior to their Federal counterparts in every respect. These commands were led well, centralized, and overall contained extremely efficient horsemen, which had proven themselves time and again on the battlefield. 74 Confederate artillery was 72 Hartwig, 155-158. 73 Curt Johnson and Richard C. Anderson, Jr., Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. 53; Daniel, 146, 148-150. 74 Hartwig, 88-90; Hess, Banners to the Breeze, 24. 32 generally inferior in respect to quality of mechanics, yet, the branch retained a slight advantage over its foes in its organization. Lee's artillery was organized on the divisional level, allowing for easier deployment, and concentrated fire, as the Army of Northern Virginia, did not have a corps structure during this time, division commanders held greater authority in placement and employment of artillery. Furthermore, several groups of divisions fell under an unofficial "wing" structure, allowing Jackson and Longstreet to concentrate guns further. 75 Bragg organized his army different than Lee's army. Bragg operated with two wings or corps, broken down into several divisions. His army maintained an organized and effective cavalry force; however, their weakest point was the artillery. Only fifty-six guns accompanied the Army of Mississippi into Kentucky compared to Buell's 147 guns. These Confederate guns like the Federals were assigned to individual brigades, same as its Federal counterpart, eliminating opportunities to converge fire effectively. 76 Understanding the organizational structure of an army allows for a realistic understanding of what that force is capable of; how it moves in the larger scheme of a campaign; and the benefits and challenges of its employment on the tactical level. Assuming the forces involved were all organized in the same fashion, with identical structures is detrimental in interpreting the ebb and flow of battles and campaigns. A clear picture of how a field army operates through an organizational table is, therefore, paramount. Using Lee and McClellan as examples illustrate the nature of this point. In the Maryland Campaign, Lee was able to give more direct orders to independent division commanders, therefore reducing somewhat the natural confusion begot of transferring and disseminating orders through multiple tiers of officers. On the other hand, McClellan had to give orders to "wing" commanders, who then cut the orders to corps 75 Johnson, Artillery Hell, 41-47. 76 Noe, 370-373, 381-382. 33 commanders then down to the divisional level, doubling the amount of personalities the orders had to go through compared to Lee's forces. It is clear from watching the battles of Antietam and Perryville's tactical evolution that the commanding generals' intent was time and again ineffectually carried out due to communication breakdown and misinterpretation of orders on both sides. Having only scratched the surface of the organizational components of only four of the principal armies involved in the fall of 1862, it becomes clear that each differed in how it chose to conduct its internal operations. However, it is equally apparent from this brief examination, that Confederate forces in the fall of 1862 were better organized and tactically more efficient than their Federal counterparts in Maryland and Kentucky, therefore lending an edge to overall Confederate success and perhaps victory. Strategic Considerations: The strategic components are unquestionably the most important when ascertaining why the fall of 1862 was the Confederacy's high tide. Having looked at the political, logistical, and organizational components and internalizing how each affected the grand design of Confederate strategy in 1862, this section will now tie these components together and shed light on how each influenced strategic decision and guided the final results of the campaigns. A clear understanding of what strategy is necessary to further examine this section. Clausewitz defines strategy as: "the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the War." 77 The "attainment of the object" is the crucial cog in accepting the purpose and direction of operations in Maryland and Kentucky. The strategic composition of these campaigns was different in what they sought to obtain as their achievable goal. Lee's objective was political in its foundation; his 77 Clausewitz, 133. 34 campaign didn't revolve around the occupation of land or control of any specific feature; instead, it sought a climactic battle with a decisive battlefield victory in which Lee was willing to risk his army in a desperate gamble. 78 Bragg and Smith's Kentucky incursions were much more multilayered on an operational platform. While some sort of showdown battle was necessary for the west, it was not the immediate goal, only a potentiality; instead, the relief and re-establishment of Tennessee was paramount with a secondary objective of the "liberation" of Kentucky. The second tier of goals included the control of rail and river systems as a means to eliminate the Union's ability to supply its forces and occupy any portion of the Upper or Deep South. The most significant strategic gain for the South in 1862 existed in Tennessee and Kentucky. Proof of this importance is shown through the fact that six of the seven Confederate field armies would make this region their primary objective in the fall of 1862. These six armies included the commands of Generals' Braxton Bragg, Kirby Smith, Earl Van Dorn, Stirling Price, William Loring, and Humphrey Marshall. Confederate control and or occupation of Tennessee and Kentucky offered benefits and a platform for victory that the remaining Confederate states collectively couldn't offer. Having been the first state to fall under Federal control, Tennessee's recapture would be a major morale boost for the Confederacy nationally and particularly to the large amount of Tennessee regiments that made up Bragg's army. The most significant benefit, however, resided in Tennessee's industrial capability, as it contained the ability to produce more raw items for the war effort then the rest of the Confederacy combined. 79 Confederate control 78 Harsh, 25; OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 79 Connelly. 5-15. The importance of Tennessee to the Confederacy is undeniable. Connelly argues that the region was the largest concentrated area for the production of war materials in the Confederacy. The region by 1864 had produced 22,665 pounds niter. Additionally, the area contained a significant source of lead, and was the chief producer of gunpowder in 1861. Tennessee also contained a vast number of factories that repaired old weapons, manufactured new small arms, cartridges, percussion caps, and other equipment. By the fall of 1861, Nashville plants alone turned out 100,000 percussion caps daily, with some 1,300,000 caps produced weekly. The region boasted on the two major Confederate sources of livestock, the other being 35 would, therefore, help in stabilizing the struggling logistical and economic constraints faced in the South. Additionally, the state's rail system would allow for the re-establishment of a direct connection to North Carolina and Virginia and the ability to ship supplies and material to the Confederate forces in the east. Conversely, the loss of Tennessee would be a major blow to Union morale, as its loss would have undone and nullified the Federal campaigns in 1861 and early 1862. 80 Kentucky also offered significant gains for the South. It was generally believed, particularly by the Confederate government's higher echelons, that the majority of Kentuckians were sympathetic to the Southern cause and would rally to Confederate banners if field armies were able to move into the region and strategically hold it. Logistically Kentucky offered a substantial increase for the South, particularly in animals, forage, and transportation options. Like Tennessee, Kentucky contained major river systems and rail lines that would drastically increase movement for the South and partially cut off the mid-west states from the rest of the Union. Politically, Kentucky, a vital border state under Confederate control, could be crippling to Northern domestic and foreign political views. In theory, this political aspect played on a successful campaign in Maryland, another vital border state. More immediately, Kentucky offered the western Confederate armies an opportunity to turn the war from one of defense to one poising them on the edge of invasion of critical Northern states, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. Such a turn in the circumstances would be devastating for the Union, particularly politically. The Illinois town of Cairo on the Mississippi River, in 1862 was serving as the logistical launch point for the Union armies in the west; prolonged Confederate control of Kentucky would likely force the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia. More pork was raised in Tennessee save Missouri than any other state. Agriculturally, Middle Tennessee in 1860 produced an average of more than a million bushels of corn making it a leader amongst its sister states. 80 Connelly, 3-6. 36 the Federals to find an alternative method of supplying the troops in Corinth and other points in the Southern heartland. As long as the Federals controlled these regions, they would continue to pin the Confederacy in the Deep South denying them of access to vital infrastructure, maneuvering room, and favorable victory conditions. Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith had to go on the offensive if they were to alleviate the situation by the very nature of the circumstances. As Lee's army with Richmond, their backs were on the doorstep of the Deep South, and they had no room to maneuver. Fortunately for the South, the western offensive was born out of an opportune moment of Halleck's caution that was strategically seized upon by Confederate commanders. In the necessity of the moment, launching an offensive like Lee during the Seven Days battles was the only beneficial option and a necessary risk if the war was going to be taken off the doorstep of the Deep South. Robert E. Lee on the other end of things saw himself and his army as the most important entity in the Confederacy at that moment. In his mind, the only scenario for Confederate victory rested in his hands alone. He showed this belief in dispatches and letters throughout the campaign in an effort to orchestrate movements across the Confederacy to complement his objective. In a letter to Jefferson Davis, he noted his desire to see his suggestion on what he felt Loring's command should do in the Kanawha Valley, in an effort to support his operation. 81 Lee did not stop with Loring; however, days prior, he communicated his victory at Manassas and planned offensive to Braxton Bragg and requested that Bragg pass the information along to Kirby Smith for further coordination. It was Lee's desire that these western armies gain similar victories to his at Manassas, that when added together may be enough to secure Southern 81 OR, vol 19, 1: 594. 37 victory.82 Lastly, he demonstrated his understanding of the confused state of Federal forces in Washington and the need to seize the initiative before the opportunity was lost. Like Kentucky, Maryland was a vital border state, not for its potentiality in resources, but rather for its geographic relation to Washington. Any serious Confederate incursion into the state would be life-threatening to the Union, and therefore demanded desperate measures on the part of Northern armies to repel such an advance. 83 Lee's leadership has been often criticized during the Maryland Campaign from historians and even shocked his subordinates, Jackson, and Longstreet. 84 Lee was certainly aggressive and was known for taking risks; however, he was not a foolish man, and never committed his army to a disaster, at least not one he foresaw. Comparing his stratagem throughout the rest of the war, it's probable to conclude that his movements were well thought out, with the least amount of risk generated from the objective demands of the campaign. Even in moments of reaction to McClellan, Lee always retained the initiative in Maryland. In the aftermath of Seconded Manassas and Chantilly, it was the opinion of many in both military and civilian leadership that a final showdown somewhere north of the Potomac River was all that was needed for Confederate victory. 85 If Lee was a poker player, he was taking his hand and going all in, he could only hope the Federals floundered. General Longstreet understood the gravity of the moment when he wrote: "When the Second Bull Run campaign 82 OR, vol 19, 1: 589. 83 Ezra A. Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I: South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 19-21. Carman was present at the battle of Antietam and dedicated his life to research and study of the Maryland Campaign in the post war years. Carman's work was able to capture not only the historical timeline of events, but offered an emotional aspect not seen in other works. This emotional component while subtle is an important tool in internalizing the mindset of Union soldiers and perhaps the North itself. 84 James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 265. Longstreet claims that aside from himself, that General Jackson was also taken back from the boldness of Lee's designs on the Maryland Campaign, while at a meeting in Frederick MD, September 9th. 85 Harsh, 60-63. Multiple historians have agreed on this point. James Murfin considered the battle of Antietam to be the most important battle in American history, and one of the most decisive in world history. Ezra Carman portrays the campaign as requiring desperate action for the North, while Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears and James McPherson center on the political undertone. 38 closed, we had the most brilliant prospects the Confederates ever had. We then possessed an army which, had it been kept together, the Federals would never have dared attack." 86 Lee's confidence in his army was surely the determining factor in his choice to assume the offensive into Maryland, and no doubt behind his reasoning to push the army as hard as he did in the maneuvering and fighting that took place in Maryland. The General expressed his confidence in the men and the importance of the offensive in General Order No. 102. on September 4: "This army is about to engage in most important operations." He further outlines the necessity of respecting private property, and the desire for his commands to lighten their supply encumbrance to allow them to move quickly and efficiently. 87 When coupling the logistical and organizational shortcomings, the political factors reinforced by his troops' confidence and his in them proved to be the energy from which the Maryland Campaign was executed. The offensives themselves presented each of these commanders a complicated set of obstacles and decisions to overcome while ensuring they offered the best possible benefit to their cause with the least amount of risk towards their army. This is certainly one of the most challenging aspects of being a commander in charge of any offensive-minded campaign. Johnston at Shiloh, Burnside at Fredericksburg, Hooker at Chancellorsville, and Hood in Tennessee all failed to capitalize on this principle. The fact that Lee and Bragg achieved the scale of operational measures they did is a testament to their leadership and ability to seize control and direction of a developing situation. If the argument is to be maintained that the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns provided the South the best chance the South had of winning the war, then proof of this claim must lay within the strategic composition of the campaigns themselves. If taken in this context, then it must be understood that every move Lee, Bragg, and 86 Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 263. 87 OR, vol 16, 2: 592. 39 Smith, along with the supporting roles of Loring, Marshall, Price, and Van Dorn were calculated if not on a grand scale, certainly on an individual level. Unlocking the purpose of the maneuvers, and their relation to strategic success will illustrate the continually changing dynamics and environment of each campaign, and how these generals continually altered their designs to fit the goals of their strategic objectives. The evolving strategic situation in the months leading up to the campaigns created the conditions under which the operations in Maryland and Kentucky were governed. Understanding the Confederate forces' strategic focus for needing to assume the offensive will outline the gravity and weight they placed on the outcome of these fall campaigns. The most measurable strategic potential in 1862 existed in the Western Theater. As already stated, the economic and logistical importance of this region necessitated an aggressive action on behalf of the South if the Confederacy was to survive. The first attempt at recovering control of Tennessee occurred in April with the battle of Shiloh. While tactically a Confederate failure, the aftermath of the fighting created adverse reactions from the Northern press and transposed into Halleck's overall cautious and slow pursuit towards Corinth. Halleck, after taking Corinth, was faced with limited choices on where to move next. Due to political and doctrinal restrictions of conciliation and Halleck's theory on war, the massive Union army was not able logistically to move into the Deep South. The only real move available to the Federal forces in the summer of 1862, was a lateral one east towards Chattanooga. 88 With Bragg at Tupelo and Kirby Smith's small command at Chattanooga, the path of success for an aggressive officer to take Chattanooga, a major supply hub for the South, was wide open. Halleck foiled this opportunity by sending Buell's command to accomplish the task. The slow-moving cautious Buell initially created consternation among 88 Daniel, 86. 40 Confederate leadership, yet once the pace of his progress was realized, the same trepidation turned into an opportunity. 89 Clausewitz described the potential for a reciprocal effect to take place should an army go on the offensive; however, he counterweighs that thought with pointing out that an army in a precarious position with the opportunity to gain a substantial amount should jump on the opportunity if one should be presented. 90 Certainly, Bragg and Smith applied a variation of this maxim into their decision to go on the advance. The term "invasion" is the defining ideology that bound both major theaters of war and other Confederate objectives in the fall of 1862. Clausewitz wrote that even if the complete overthrow of the enemy is impossible, which it was for the Confederacy, then the only other real option of winning a war is to conquer a portion of the enemy territory. In conquering the enemy territory, the invader has the opportunity to weaken the enemy's resources, crippling their ability to sustain an army. By carrying the war in enemy territory, the conditions will further the enemy's expense and ultimately lead to peace negotiations. 91 The term "invasion" generates a delicate question concerning what an invasion actually is, and how it fits into the American context, particularly in the political spectrum in 1862. Baron De Jomoni, whose military maxims were dominant in nineteenth-century America, distinguished what an "invasion" actually is. Breaking down the idea of an offensive, he wrote that: "…an invasion occurs against a great state whose whole or significant portion of territory is attacked. If only a province or moderate line of defense is attacked, then it is an offensive, and if such actions are limited only to a confined operation, then it is termed an initiative." 92 Indeed then, if taken in this context, 89 Connelly, 200-201. 90 Clausewitz, 707. 91 Clausewitz, 706. Neither of the primary Confederate armies had the ability to "conquer" Federal territory. However, the last part in reference to Clausewitz maxim was the adaptation applied by the Confederacy in its strategic goals. 92 Jomini, The Art of War, 54. The difference in the definition in understanding the purpose of the Confederate objective is critical. Many historians point to the Army of Northern Virginia's strategic goals as fitting into the framework of an 41 Confederate efforts militarily were an offensive and an invasion only in the political spectrum. Although the press and even the top military minds used the term invasion quite frequently in the North, there is nothing in the Confederate strategic framework of 1862, that fit the definition of invasion, Lee himself in a letter to Jefferson Davis on September 4, used the term expedition implying that his foray had a specific purpose and would be short. 93 Due to logistics alone, Confederate forces across the board could not sustain the long-term goals of an invasion. However, the Clausewitzian maxim of a "strategical attack" was within reach and achievable according to the conditional logistical framework. Much of the success for the Confederates relied on the superiority of its troops, and the avoidance of exhausting itself with an over achievement of objectives. 94 The window of opportunity was narrow, operationally because of logistics, but more importantly, because of politics. The two most significant benefits afforded to the Southern cause in 1862 were the Congressional fall elections and European superpowers. If Confederate forces could score a major political victory in the east, and both a strategic reversal coupled with a political coup in the west, then perhaps Northern voters would come to resent the war and vote for "Peace Democrats" in November, and more advantageously draw England and France in as mediators or some other influential role, to end the war. It is apparent that the pressure to act decisively if not at least aggressively before November was of paramount importance. While it is debated as to how far the European powers would intercede, what is certain is that the Confederacy banked part of its strategic decisions both politically and militarily on intervention. 95 Just as apparent was the frustration and delicate invasion, yet when looking at that particular army's logistics and Lee's strategic goals only the Jominian maxim of offensive fits the framework. 93 OR, vol 16, 2: 591-592. 94 Clausewitz, 601. 95 McPherson, 534-535. 42 statesmanship which had to be executed on behalf of the Union to convince the English mainly that the war was nothing more than a rebellion that the Republic could put down on its own. 96 However, this did not appear to be the scene in the late summer of 1862 with Union defeats and setbacks continually piling up. Lee retained the initiative by keeping the enemy guessing what his next move and true objective was. According to Henry McClellan, J.E.B. Stuart's adjutant, that as late as September 13, Federal forces maintained the: "utmost uncertainty regarding Lee's movements and intentions." 97 Lee designed his army's movements to draw out the Federals from Washington. By crossing at Leesburg, his army was initially east of the Catoctin Mountains and a direct threat to Washington and Baltimore, it was this crossing point that directly forced the disorganized Army of the Potomac to leave the defenses prematurely, and more importantly to force Lincoln's hand in placing McClellan back in overall command. 98 The key to the Army of Northern Virginia's movements was speed and mobility, thus the reasoning for Lee's series of orders, which included provisions for shoeless Confederates to remain at Winchester, a lightening of supplies, and an insistence that straggling be strictly forbidden. Lee's next major objective after crossing the Potomac River was to move on Frederick. A Confederate presence in a substantial pro-Union area was a direct insult to the North, and would only further press the Army of the Potomac to hurry faster in order to "repel the invasion" and "save the nation"; while most importantly for the Confederates, continually limit the progress of McClellan organizing his army into a capable force on the battlefield. 96 Nelson, 163-168. 97 H.B. McClellan, The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J.E.B. Stuart: Commander of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia, Edison: The Blue & Grey Press, 1993. 113. 98 Harsh, 98; OR, vol 16, 2: 604-605. Letter from Lee to Davis on September 12 justifying is reasoning for crossing his army east of the mountains. 43 Lee's grand strategy was working so far; his movements northward from Richmond had stripped the Atlantic states of their Union occupiers to concentrate on Lee's Confederate force, while at the same time sending the Federal strategy of war into complete chaos as they scrambled to deal with the offensive. Lee believed that if he launched an unrelenting offensive, the Federals would be compelled to abandon their widely scattered smaller campaigns, which were gradually eating away the frontiers of the Confederacy; and, as a result, be forced to concentrate their columns in response to his initiatives. 99 Lee's movement into the western part of the state, via Frederick and into the Middleton and Pleasant valleys, opened the Shenandoah Valley up momentarily, which assisted Loring's advance in western Virginia, by isolating the small Federal commands in that region. In addition to freeing up Loring to make an offensive, Lee's army in western Maryland split the Federal war effort in half. The Army of the Potomac was now confined in environs around Washington, while Federal forces in the Western Theater had no direct route to reinforce McClellan. 100 The simultaneous advance of Lee, Loring, Marshall, Smith, and Bragg effectively drove a wedge between the Union field armies, while Price and Van Dorn's forces kept Grant fixed at Corinth. 101 Bragg and Smith's columns made their march through eastern and middle Tennessee and into Kentucky at an incredible speed, leaving Buell's army to have to hustle to catch up. 102 Kirby Smith realized the opportunity in front of him early on and moved his men forward roughly the same time Lee's men were preparing to destroy John Pope's forces near Manassas, beginning the Kentucky Campaign. Union Brigadier General George W. Morgan's command held the vital Cumberland Gap, which historian Earl Hess christened the "Gibraltar of the West." 99 Harsh, 116. 100 Hartwig, 162-163. 101 Harsh, 96-97; Hess, 31-35. 102 Hess, 57,62,64. 44 The Gap itself served as a platform for the Federals to invade East Tennessee, and as long as it remained in Federal hands, the Deep South, particularly Chattanooga and Atlanta, would be under constant threat. 103 Reducing this garrison was the first lynchpin in breaking Federal control and regaining Tennessee for the South. Smith, now free to maneuver feinted around the gap and threatened the supply lines, forcing a Federal withdrawal; he then turned his legions northward and moved into Kentucky. Smith moved through the eastern part of the state and pushed Heth's division as far as Covington, directly across from Cincinnati, sending that city and southern Ohio into a panic. 104 With Smith's small army running almost unmolested in Kentucky, Bragg's larger army moved through Middle Tennessee via Sparta feinting towards Nashville, forcing the Federals to concentrate there, while strategically widening the gap between Buell's command and Southern forces in Kentucky. Bragg, before departing to Chattanooga, left behind roughly 35,000 men in two separate commands under generals Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. These commands had a twofold objective. Their primary objective was to contain the Army of the Tennessee at Corinth, and once Bragg and Smith were in position, launch an offensive of their own against Grant, defeat him, and then rapidly march to connect with Bragg's army. 105 Bragg and Smith exposed the weakness in the Federal policy of limited war with its preoccupation of taking landmarks and reliance on cumbersome supply lines and within less than a months' time-reversed almost a year of Union progress in the west, in respect to subjugating the Upper South. Unlike John Bell Hood's offensive into Tennessee in late 1864, which, while certainly an emergency, did not deviate Sherman from his plans of marching to the sea. 106 In 103 Hess, 7-8. 104 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 141. 105 Noe, 29. 106 Eric A. Jacobson and Richard A. Rupp, For Cause and for Country: A Study of the Affair at Spring Hill and the Battle of Franklin, Eric A. Jacobson, 2013. 42. 45 1862, this simply was impossible for Federal forces. Sherman operated under a "hard war" doctrine that allowed him to subsist off the land and changed his objective from key city centers to making war on the Southern people, through the destruction of their local economy, food subsistence, and ability subsist in a normal capacity. 107 Sherman effectively narrowed the war to the immediate doorstep of the Southern People. As a result the individual citizen was forced to deal with their own survival, and naturally the bigger picture of the Confederacy became less important. Union forces in 1862 did not have the same conditional framework, and by default, would be forced to pursue any Confederate force and meet it on the battlefield. Even though the fall of 1862 didn't produce the hoped-for victory conditions, strategically, the Confederates were more successful in this period than at any other part of the war. The results of this success were more apparent in the Western Theater than in the east. However, certain components in the Eastern Theater changed as well. The most significant measurable success emerged in time bought for the Confederacy, and a prolonged timetable for the Northern plan of war. In the summer, Federal plans in the west called for the capture of Vicksburg and Chattanooga, the latter of which was in progress when the offensive started. 108 It is highly probable that if able, the Federal forces would have moved on Vicksburg in the summer of 1862, and perhaps forced its capitulation much sooner. 109 However, this is only speculation, yet, the reality is this operation was certainly delayed by the events that occurred in Kentucky and the aggressive nature of Price and Van Dorn. Kentucky was only one variable in stymieing the Federal drive toward Vicksburg. Just as important were the aggressiveness of Price and Van Dorn at the battles of Iuka and Corinth in October. Although Confederate defeats, the outcome of 107 Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 321-328. 108 McPherson, 511-512. 109 Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 243-244. 46 these battles managed to temporarily check the Federals, prompting an end to any realistic campaign season in Mississippi. At least for the foreseeable future, the Mississippi River remained open by way of Vicksburg, and Union strategy incomplete, in which case was Price and Van Dorn's big contribution. 110 Bragg and Smith failed to hold Kentucky and or convert her into a Confederate state. However, as the logistic concerns show, the state's complete occupation, with the available forces, was genuinely impossible. In all the engagements that had taken place, the Southerners had the better day. Kirby Smith's army completely routed Federal forces at Richmond in August, and Bragg's army captured the garrison at Munfordville. Before and during the campaign John Hunt Morgan's cavalry had wreaked havoc in Kentucky, capturing supplies, disrupting communications, and pushing to the Ohio River virtually unchallenged. 111 Even Kentucky's principle battle at Perryville was the better day tactically for the Confederates. More than anything, Kentucky showed the weakness of Buell, limited war, and the Union's inability to protect vital territory adequately under a conciliation policy. While in the end Bragg and Smith left, they did so generally unmolested, which showed Buell's unwillingness to fight another pitched battle. Therefore, this aftermath was certainly nothing for the Union to be proud of. In truth Buell did not drive Bragg and Smith out of Kentucky, rather the limitations of logistics and the realization of strategic objectives forced the Confederates back to Tennessee. 112 Although Braxton Bragg is surrounded by much controversy and sharp opinions on his leadership capabilities, one must look past emotion and see the facts as they present in the strategic element. While indeed, the Confederates failed to hold Kentucky, they did succeed in 110 Woodworth, 239-240. 111 Hess, 12. 112 Noe, 333. 47 regaining portions of Tennessee. In particular, Middle Tennessee by way of Murfreesboro, which sat astride the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and was seen as the key to the wealthy Stone, Duck, and Elk River valleys. 113 Historian Thomas Connelly pointed out, which was already previously noted, that Tennessee was by far the most critical state in terms of manufacturing to the South. Although the entire state wasn't in Confederate hands, over two-thirds of it was, and most importantly, the opportunity to secure the very vital Nashville and Mississippi River corridor remained a possibility for a future campaign. 114 The primary focal point in the interpretation of the Kentucky Campaign is the Confederate failure to remain within that state. However, the key phrase narrows down to opportunity and potential. If taken in this context, the Confederate forces in July were backed into a corner. However, come October, these same forces had managed to throw the Federal forces off balance and regain a significant portion of lost territory, changing the entire atmosphere and flow of the Western Theater. In short, the success of the Kentucky Campaign is that it allowed the Confederates to move from the verge of defeat to a position where the fate of the Western Theater was up in the air, which only a decisive campaign would bring to a conclusion. 115 The fall of 1862 was the last chance the Confederates had at securing Tennessee permanently during the war. While the Western Theater was more significant in terms of strategic gain and leverage, the Eastern Theater added its own momentous shift in the flow of events. Unlike the west, the Eastern Theater was very narrow, as it existed in the space between Richmond and Washington. In strategic terms, the region was harrowing regarding maneuvering room and logistical sustainment. In one sense, Lee and his army were successful in pushing the Army of the Potomac 113 Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, Chicago: University of Illinois, 1990. 8. 114 Connelly, 16-22. 115 Cozzens, No Better Place to Die, 12-14; Hess, 116. 48 away from the gates of Richmond, along with wrecking the Army of Virginia, while lastly temporarily clearing the smaller theaters, such as the coast and Shenandoah Valley of Federal forces. 116 While this situation may have provided an opportunity in the west, it meant little or nothing in the east. The fact is, Lee understood his primary objective either consisted of breaking the Northern will to fight through battlefield victory or by the complete destruction of the Union army. 117 Lee's primary objective in Maryland was to bate the Federal forces into a showdown fight. He was successful in this mission by just crossing over the Potomac River. The location of Washington in the southern portion of Maryland across from Alexandria made an incursion in Maryland a threat for the Federal government. 118 Unlike the west, where a fair amount of effort was required for Bragg and Smith to march their armies the distance required to Kentucky, the Army of Northern Virginia did not have to move far to accomplish its mission. Another key component to Lee's strategic objective was the lack of overhead in its long-term goal. Unlike the Western Theater, there was no pressure for Lee to specifically secure any particular region, as the Confederacy in the east had not lost any of its production capabilities nor any significant amount of land to Federal occupation. Therefore, the Confederate movements' direction wasn't necessarily guided by a specific purpose, but rather by the necessity of strategic gains which were designed to draw out the Army of the Potomac in a state of haste and unpreparedness. However, whereas the Kentucky Campaign had different aspects of measurable success, the 116 Harsh, 19-20. 117 Murfin, 63-64. 118 Harsh, 23; Murfin, 36-40; McPherson, 555-556. All the major historians who focus on the Maryland Campaign point to this as a major component to deterring the outcome and purpose of Lee's strategy. 49 Maryland Campaign had none, only a single purpose that demanded a climactic clash to determine its outcome. 119 At no other point in the war did Lee have such an advantage and control of the initiative. Arguably, his combination of subordinate officers was the best in their position as a whole than at any other point. His army was operating off a long track of victory, the length of which they would not experience again. 120 And most importantly, the Maryland Campaign was truly the only time in which Lee would have direct control of the flow of events; in Richmond, he had acted out of desperation, in Northern Virginia, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the Overland Campaign and Petersburg he counteracted his opponents moves, and at Gettysburg, he committed to a battle that was dictated by the Federals. In September of 1862, Lee was the composer of the campaign and the master of ceremonies, he and he alone decided when and where the climactic battle would be fought. 121 All too often, the argument arises that the Army of the Potomac moved quicker than Lee expected, and caught him off guard, forcing him to settle and fight an unprepared battle at Sharpsburg. This theory would make sense if Lee's strategic objectives were multilayered like Bragg or Smith. Nevertheless, this theory doesn't match up to his sole objective of a decisive engagement. As seen with logistical circumstances, Hagerstown was likely the limit for the army in terms of range, Lee, therefore, had decided to make the principle stand somewhere in that area. 122 Two factors make this apparent, the choice to reduce Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg, which are necessary for military doctrine, and the choice to have the army lay around Frederick 119 OR, vol 16, 2: Correspondence between Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, September 8, 1862; Harsh, 119; Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy, 139. 120 Hartwig, 126-127. 121 Harsh, 57-59. 122 Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I ,108-111; Harsh, 190; Hartwig, 116-117; Murfin, 113. All of these sources for reasons ranging from realistic logistical concerns to Lee's strategic initiative point towards the area of Hagerstown as the realistic goal of the Confederate offensive. 50 for several days. 123 If the plan had been to fight somewhere else or keep the Federals at a distance, these two factors fit the mold. The truth is that Lee wanted a fight, and he wanted it quick, the geography of Western Maryland affords a great opportunity to a defending army, which was Lee's primary tactical vision. 124 Looking at the scope of the Army of Northern Virginia's movements in the campaign, there a few abundantly clear facts that warrant Lee's strategic designs. It's already been stated that Lee's intention was to draw out the Army of the Potomac, which he did by simply crossing into Maryland, and ushered the emergency by crossing east of the mountains. 125 The next key was the layover or taunting of the Federals by having his army remain in Frederick for several days. The decision to reduce the Harpers Ferry garrison, while militarily necessary, also doubly acted as part of the "national emergency" which further put pressure on McClellan and his army to move with haste. 126 The battle of South Mountain, while a Confederate defeat, opened the way for the Federals to move over the range and meet Lee on the ground of his choosing. 127 South Mountain is interesting, particularly for strategic reasons. The choice to leave one division under D.H. Hill to hold the three passes stretched over ten miles indicates that Lee didn't intend to stop the Federals there and expected them to take the position. A decisive battle along the South Mountain range would not have been beneficial for Lee to meet his objectives. His army would not have been able to counterattack effectively due to terrain, and maneuvering room would have been limited. Although Lee initially considered scrapping the campaign due to the longer than expected siege of Harpers Ferry, once the garrison did fall, he was able to 123 Harsh, 147-150; Hartwig, 211-212, OR, vol 16, 2, 603 (Special Orders 191) 605-608. 124 Allan, 201-205; Harsh, 98-99; Marshall, 148-150. 125 Marshall, 146. 126 Brian Matthew Jordan, Unholy Sabbath: The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory September 14, 1862, New York: Savas Beatie, 2012. 80-85. 127 Jordon, Unholy Sabbath, 301. 51 concentrate his forces in the area of Sharpsburg. 128 It may not be that Lee specifically wanted to fight at Sharpsburg, but the lay of the land and the tactical and strategic components of it, offered natural terrain on which to fight a decisive battle. 129 The Antietam battlefield offered several very strong defensive opportunities. First was the Antietam Creek, which was wide and deep enough to stop infantry from crossing unless over a bridge. The terrain, particularly on the southern end of the battlefield, is very suitable for a defending force, along with the ground near the center of the battlefield. On the northern end, the terrain is its weakest for defense; however, the entire battlefield, especially the northern end, is very suitable for artillery employment. Lee's position at Antietam Creek was without question formidable. 130 Whereas the events in Kentucky were one of maneuver, Maryland hinged on the tactical climax. Therefore, both forces needed to clash and soundly defeat the other to end the campaign. The battle of Antietam itself ended in a draw, and the opposing lines virtually remained the same. 131 Having realized the day after the engagement that McClellan wasn't likely to attack again, and understanding that his position offered no benefits for his army to attack, Lee promptly withdrew back into Shepherdstown, Virginia, (West Virginia) intending to regroup his army and re-crossing the Potomac River near Williamsport to again sue for a decisive battle. The Confederate's were blocked by several determining factors though, the two primary factors being McClellan's choice to move the VI Corps north towards Hagerstown to block a crossing, and a large amount of straggling that has taken place since the start of the 128 Allan, 320. 129 Harsh, 301-303. 130 Phillip Thomas Tucker, Burnside's Bridge: The Climatic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000. 47-54. 131 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. 2: Antietam. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 501. 52 campaigning that had severely reduced Lee's army from upwards of 70,000 men down to roughly 45,000. 132 While Lee did not thrash McClellan's army at Antietam to the extent his strategic objectives called for, the opportunity for a Confederate political victory was not entirely gone. In fact, Lee's offensive convinced Britain and France that Northern armies could never restore the Union, and they contemplated mediation, which would have constituted de facto recognition of the Confederacy. 133 Moving away from the narrow view of Lee and Maryland it is important to note that Bragg's army had achieved a significant victory on September 17 at Munfordville the same day the battle of Antietam was raging. While Lee's army was more or less locked in a stalemate in Maryland, the western Confederate forces still very much retained the initiative in Kentucky. If a successful outcome in Kentucky occurred, perhaps that would be enough to enhance the stalemate at Antietam into a negative outcome for the Union. 134 Lee did not wait in position along Antietam Creek, for events to develop in Kentucky, he didn't have to. By simply moving back across the river and McClellan's inability to pursue for logistical reasons, Lee still very much posed a serious threat, especially with re-crossing into Maryland if need be. Looking at the outcome of the Maryland Campaign and the factors involved in the forces' genetic composition, Lee's army achieved all that could reasonably be expected of it. Certainly, due to its size, it would be impossible to annihilate the Army of the Potomac, yet, by remaining together and gaining the tactical victory, that would have to be enough. 135 132 Murfin, 306. 133 McPherson, 546. 134 Earl J. Hess, Braxton Bragg: The Most Hated Man in the Confederacy, University of North Carolina Press, 2016. 63. 135 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 20-21. 53 Truly then the lynchpin of the 1862 Confederate offensive rested on the shoulders of Bragg and Smith. 136 Lee's offensive and climatic battle of Antietam would have held little or no importance if the events west of the Appalachian's hadn't been taking place in the manner they were. The ultimate failure of Bragg and Smith in Kentucky was their inability to link their armies together. The process involved in making this happen didn't occur until it was too late. 137 Regardless of why this juncture of uniting these armies didn't occur, the important point was that they retained the initiative until the battle of Perryville. Unlike Lee, Bragg and Smith didn't necessarily have to defeat Buell or Wright's local forces, but rather they just needed to exist in Kentucky. Smith's forces had cleared out Morgan and what pitiful resistance Wright was able to scrape together. Buell's army lingered exhausted and timidly in the western part of the state. Bragg and Smith controlled in theory over two-thirds of the state in the last weeks of September into October. 138 The high tide of the Confederacy occurred not at Antietam, but in the days before Perryville. Up until this date, the South had been successful in relieving Richmond, Chattanooga, Vicksburg, the Carolina coast, Shenandoah Valley, western Virginia, and Northern Virginia of any significant Federal occupation, or military operations. The Confederate armies were at its maxim of manpower, at least in theory, if not in actual employment and contained men who were wholly more experienced than their counterparts. Most importantly, the South had been successful universally of maintaining a Confederate wide offensive initiative. When looking at the battles of South Mountain, Richmond, Munfordville, Antietam, and Harpers Ferry, only 136 Hess, Braxton Bragg, 64. 137 Noe, 328-329. 138 Daniel, 128-129; Hess, 62-64; Noe, 104. 54 South Mountain had been a Federal victory and Antietam a draw, while the rest were complete decisive Confederate victories. The battle of Perryville long considered the principal battle of the Kentucky Campaign was neither decisive nor climatic. 139 The battle itself was fought only by portions of the armies, on ground that held no real strategic value to the overall goals of the campaign. However, the legacy of Perryville resides in Bragg's choice to withdraw his army from Kentucky in its aftermath. Leaving aside Bragg's personality, leadership issues, and his subordinates, the important aspect to look at is what was actually accomplished by his army. It's already been stated that Bragg and Smith's offensive knocked the Federal plan of war back a few pegs and opened up at two-thirds of Tennessee for the foreseeable future. Confederate goals upon entering Kentucky were unclear and varied in design between Bragg and Smith. 140 Perhaps the largest draw was establishing the state as Confederate, which they quickly understood wasn't a popular option amongst the people. That being the case, Confederate field armies could only subsist for so long in hostile territory until they would, by necessity, be forced to withdraw to friendly Tennessee. 141 Therefore, without the support of the majority of Kentuckians to endorse a Confederate government, the continuation of a Southern army within the state offered no benefit to the Confederacy. 142 Bragg and Smith's only true strategic failing was their inability to link together and deliver a decisive blow against Buell. If looked at in the context of the genetics of an ocean wave, the advance into Kentucky was the last little bit of the wave that rolls into the edge of the beach. It neither has the momentum nor the power to damage anything of significant strength. However, the break or 139 Noe, 343. 140 Hess, 56-57. 141 Connelly, 228; Noe, 334. 142 Noe, 336. 55 impact of the wave that occurs just before hitting shore tends to denote the power of the temporary effects inflicted within that particular wave's life span. Sticking with the ocean wave analogy, the Confederate wide offensive in the fall of 1862 was the last ocean wave before the tide changed. The lifespan of the Confederacy would perish in the calm time between the next high tide. Conclusion: The interpretations of the Civil War, its key moments, critical players, and even the purpose of the conflict, vary in many different extremes, platforms, and algorithms. Surely there were other critical moments of the war, in which the Confederacy could have theoretically changed the outcome or moments in which Union forces could have ended the war much sooner. The progress of the war is a fascinating storyline of complete unpreparedness through a series of excruciating growing pains that led to the high efficiency of conducting war. Looking at the grand scope of the conflict, particularly the logistics of the opposing sides, even the most novice student of the struggle can recognize that the Confederacy was severely behind in every aspect and shouldn't have waged war. 143 However, the fact remains they did, and the reality is any Southern hope for victory resided in the slowness, unpreparedness, and political deadlock of the North's ability to wage war. The true window in which to view why the fall of 1862 was the Southern high tide occurs in the aftermath of the campaigns themselves. The first and most critical component was the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. The bold political move forever changed the direction and intent of the war. For the South, it had devastating consequences, as it eliminated 143 McPherson, 312-316. 56 any dream of European intervention, and essentially made the Confederacy an island left to its own. The proclamation also bled into the second crucial component, which truly had its roots at the beginning of 1862; however, it had become fully developed by the closing days of 1862, and that is the abandonment of "limited war" principals and the acceptance of "hard war" doctrine. 144 Militarily the South would never mount such a broad offensive again nor one with so much potential to gain from it. Lee's Pennsylvania Campaign in 1863, while more famous, did not have the potential as nine months prior when he crossed into Maryland. 145 Lee in June of 1863 was acting independently, while Confederate armies in the west were giving ground rapidly and losing Vicksburg. 146 Even with Confederate victory at Chickamauga, Bragg nor his predecessors could ever mount an effective counterthrust to regain vital Tennessee. 147 Hood's Tennessee Campaign in 1864 offered the closest opportunity; however, his cause was pyrrhic and traded the destruction of Georgia for the hope of gaining Tennessee. 148 The commencement of the Overland Campaign in 1864 saw the end of Lee's ability to mount a counterattack that had won for him on previous battlefields. With his numbers dwindling, and the Union's production capabilities at its height, continuing supply of reinforcements, and Grant's power to coordinate multiple armies upon Lee, forced the Confederate leader to dance to the tune of Grant's strategy. 149 144 McPherson, 567. 145 Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, 4-8. 146 Edwin C. Bearss and J. Parker Hills, Receding Tide: Vicksburg and Gettysburg the Campaigns that Changed the Civil War, National Geographic Society, 2010. 266. 147 Steven Woodworth, Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. 144. 148 Jacobson, For Cause and for Country, 524. 149 Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. 9-10, 12-13, 22. 57 The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns were episodes that the Union could not afford to lose. Certainly, Union armies, especially in the east, met multiple setbacks, defeats, and disasters throughout the war; however, a loss at this critical juncture in each theater would have produced devastating consequences from which the North could not recover. The brilliance of these campaigns resides in the fact that neither side could afford a negative outcome, and a victorious outcome for either side had the power and capabilities to change the entire trajectory of the war. The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns do not have a true decisive victor in respect to the definition, yet, the rate at which the Union declared victory and the rapidity with which it instituted new measures both politically and militarily showed the emergency the events in the fall of 1862 produced for the North. 150 An acceptance of that notion coupled with political density, logistical pitfalls, organizational hurtles, and strategic objectives, will clearly indicate that the fall of 1862 in the course of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns, along with their supporting offenses was the high tide of the Confederacy, and the moment the Civil War changed trajectory in both political and military senses, which was the beginning of the Confederacy's defeat. 150 Muehlbauer, Ways of War, 197-200. 58 Bibliography Secondary Sources: Anderson, Nancy Scott and Dwight Anderson. The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. Bearss, Edwin C. and J. 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INTRODUCCIÓN Esta Investigación está motivada por mi práctica profesional en un centro de secundaria con población gitana. En el año 2010 presenté el trabajo fin de Máster en Relaciones de Género "Absentismo y abandono escolar: una aproximación desde la perspectiva de género al estudio de las alumnas de etnia gitana del IES María Moliner" , en el que analizaba algunas de las dificultades que atraviesan las chicas gitanas para enfrentar la escolaridad en Secundaria y que están relacionadas por los mandatos de género de su etnia. Analizábamos el absentismo y una escolaridad irregular, en torno a una serie de ejes, que tenían que ver con la adscripción fundamentalmente de las chicas gitanas al ámbito doméstico y la escasa valoración que se realizaba en las familias gitanas hacia la formación reglada. Nuestros datos hablaban, del amplio abandono escolar de las chicas al cumplir los dieciséis años, sin haber obtenido la titulación en ESO y sin continuar con otros itinerarios formativos reglados, a pesar de las orientaciones y esfuerzos de la Comunidad Educativa del siglo XXI. Es decir, el único objetivo que se planteaba para estas alumnas, era el que habían tenido sus madres: recluirse en el hogar para satisfacer las necesidades de los hombres de la familia. Creo firmemente que la Educación es el camino hacia la libertad de las personas, y que la Formación posibilita su Empoderamiento. La finalización del trabajo de 2010 me dejó un sabor agrio, amargo. Por ello, la Tesis Doctoral tenía que ser un elemento esperanzador, positivo, y que contribuyera a crear futuro. Tenía que ser un trabajo que ayudara a mis alumnas gitanas y a todas las chicas, a ver que hay otras realidades y otros horizontes vitales. Este trabajo tenía que explorar precisamente los recorridos diferentes a los tradicionales, que otras Mujeres Gitanas de Zaragoza hubieran ya realizado, para que mis propias chavalas y las alumnas gitanas de todos los centros de la ciudad, tuvieran sus propios modelos de acción, que las pudiera sacar de la inercia de unas vidas trazadas con un compás, que dibuja siempre el mismo círculo, donde tan solo cabe un proceso vital: el de ser esposas y madres. Serry Ortner explica que se siente emocionalmente implicada en su objeto de investigación y que su conciencia de pertenencia al grupo dominado la empuja a cuestionarse el porqué de las relaciones de dominación entre hombres y mujeres. Por mi parte debo añadir, que mi implicación con mi objeto de investigación no solo me ha llevado durante todos estos años a preguntarme lo anterior, sino cómo mi contribución personal y profesional, desde mi compromiso y profundo respeto, puede incrementar la promoción de la sociedad gitana. Por tanto en mi Declaración de Intenciones planteo realizar un trabajo de investigación sobre Mujeres Gitanas, en el que se puedan estudiar aquellas, que a través de sus historias personales, sus experiencias vitales, y sobre todo sus historias educativas de éxito, están contribuyendo a romper barreras, a crear nuevos modelos culturales para todas las mujeres y en especial para las de su propia comunidad. De este modo pretendemos visibilizar mujeres gitanas que luchan de algún modo por su propia emancipación humana y cuyas vidas se puedan ofertar como modelos performativos, o en sus propios términos, como referentes positivos para el resto de mujeres de su comunidad. DESARROLLO TEÓRICO El posicionamiento teórico con que enfrentamos la investigación, basado en la Perspectiva de Género, parte de la valoración de la existencia de mujeres y grupos de mujeres que a través de reconocerse en las otras, apoyarse y darse autoridad, pueden generar un incremento de la autoestima de género, combatir la misoginia y encontrar un posicionamiento social y personal más igualitario. Entendemos que a través de la sororidad se produce una trasgresión política y social importante, por lo que es necesario emprender iniciativas que supongan el crecimiento personal de las mujeres gitanas y de todas las mujeres, el empoderamiento personal y colectivo , y la creación de un autoconcepto identitario sano y fuerte que nos permita ser protagonistas de nuestras propias vidas y de nuestros destinos. Metodología El desarrollo de la presente investigación se ha basado en la Metodología Cualitativa. Para entender los fundamentos que sustentan una comunidad gitana ha sido necesario partir de la lectura de textos escritos por diferentes gitanólogas y gitanólogos como Teresa San Román, Juan de Dios Ramírez Heredia, Juan Gamella, Mariano Fernández Enguita, o Jean Paul Liégeois (1998), Kirsten Wang, Paloma Gay Blasco, Isabel Crespo García. Hemos delimitado la Población Objeto de Estudio de la presente Investigación, que son Mujeres gitanas de Zaragoza que destacan por presentar algún tipo de fisura con la tradición patriarcal de la cultura gitana, a través de determinados aspectos de sus costumbres y de sus tradiciones o que han salido al Ámbito Público a través de alcanzar niveles educativos, cuotas laborales o del asociacionismo.¿ En este marco las Hipótesis Generales que planteaba eran: Que en la sociedad española las relaciones entre los géneros están basadas en premisas patriarcales ya que el Patriarcado sigue plenamente vigente en la actualidad. La segunda plantearía que la sociedad gitana mantiene las estructuras patriarcales fuertemente arraigadas y condiciona en mayor o menor medida, el destino de las Mujeres hacia el Ámbito Doméstico. La tercera hipótesis general es que existen Mujeres Gitanas en Zaragoza que han transitado las fronteras del Ámbito Doméstico y han penetrado en el Público a través de alguna de las modalidades que este supone, educativas, asociativas, laborales. Y en relación a esta hipótesis y para su oportuno desarrollo parto de hipótesis secundarias: que tienen que ver con relaciones entre los géneros desiguales lo que dificulta el acceso a la esfera pública y que esta situación puede corregirse a través de la concienciación, la educación y en definitiva el empoderamiento de las mujeres gitanas, y que no obstante parto de la existencia de estas mujeres que a través de sus discursos están transformando la sociedad gitana. Para confirmar o desterrar estas hipótesis nos planteamos los siguientes Objetivos: 1º Identificar los elementos identitarios que caracterizan la Comunidad Gitana de Zaragoza desde la Perspectiva de Género, que afectan a las Mujeres en el Ámbito Doméstico. 2º Identificar Mujeres Gitanas de Zaragoza que han penetrado en la esfera pública través de la Educación, de la Inserción Laboral, del Asociacionismo, de la Intervención Social, etc. 3º Visibilizar a estas Mujeres gitanas que luchan por su propia emancipación y cuyas vidas se puedan ofertar como modelos de referencia. 4º Estudiar, analizar, describir las Asociaciones u Organizaciones Gitanas que contribuyen a la promoción de la Mujer Gitana en Zaragoza. Referido al Trabajo de Campo, la investigación se ha centrado en diecisiete que en los resultados finales se han reducido a dieciséis Mujeres Gitanas, quienes aportan sus Testimonios y sus Voces para informarnos, tanto de sus trayectorias vitales, como de distintos aspectos significativos de las tradiciones, o claves culturales gitanas. Estas situadas en el universo Público por sus recorridos vivenciales en el Asociacionismo Gitano, en el mundo laboral, o a través de la adquisición de unos objetivos formativos. Para que pudiera comprenderse las barreras que ellas mismas han debido afrontar en ocasiones, y que algunas de ellas nos refieren en sus testimonios, hemos investigado, las claves culturales de la sociedad gitana que fundamentalmente remiten y designan a las mujeres al Ámbito Privado. En esta parte nos hemos servido igualmente del testimonio, de algunas de ellas, pero también, de las aportaciones de un amplio número de mujeres y hombres gitanos, que generosamente han contribuido a ilustrar el modo y funcionamiento de la Comunidad Gitana de Zaragoza. Nuestro trabajo se completa con la información recogida y la experiencia acumulada en los más de treinta años que en el campo educativo y social, llevo en contacto con Población Gitana. El intervenir en prácticamente todas las zonas de la ciudad en distintas épocas, me ha permitido conocer distintas realidades de este Pueblo, tanto de Asentamientos Chabolistas, como de zonas integradas. De este modo he participado, en procesos de Inserción, Realojo, y he compartido procesos de Escolarización de niñas y niños gitanos desde sus inicios. Varias son las limitaciones, dificultades encontradas en el transcurso de esta investigación, al igual que errores cometidos que debo mencionar para evitar en futuros trabajos. El error fundamental ha sido un planteamiento de investigación extremadamente ambicioso pretendiendo abarcar todo Aragón. Por ello debí realizar una redimensión y restringir el ámbito de estudio a Zaragoza capital y pueblos cercanos. Mi idea inicial era investigar el mapa de Aragón con todas las Mujeres Gitanas universitarias y sus Organizaciones, en la creencia que existiría un panorama similar al andaluz donde Organizaciones como Fakali:Amuradi, tenían gran trascendencia. La primera decepción llegó cuando encontré un panorama desolador y desértico, donde la excepcionalidad era la diferencia. El Trabajo de Campo para seleccionar Mujeres Gitanas Objeto de Estudio ha sido muy dificultoso. No contar finalmente con algunas otras mujeres universitarias gitanas existentes cuyo testimonio hubiera resultado altamente valioso, ha resultado frustrante. Un aspecto que hemos valorado como muy positivo, es el estar inmersa en una situación en contacto directo con población gitana y que ha favorecido el acercamiento, las sinergias y dinámicas relacionales. Igualmente, la confianza, la cercanía, la intimidad, han permitido una mayor profundidad en el tratamiento del objeto de investigación. Sin embargo, en ocasiones me ha supuesto saturación o desbordamiento. Cuando la práctica profesional ha supuesto días o semanas complicadas resulta muy complicado superar el deseo de abandono, retomar la creencia de que la promoción del pueblo gitano es posible, y volver a pensar que esta Tesis no es un espejismo. Un problema ético que se me plantea es el salvaguardar el grado de confidencialidad de la información, por lo que aquellos aspectos que supongan un cierto grado de riesgo legal o emocional para las personas informantes, no aparecen en el informe de investigación. Marco Conceptual Nuestro Marco Conceptual está basado en una perspectiva feminista y de género, entendiendo ésta como una teoría crítica que analiza las relaciones entre los géneros. Estas relaciones estarían condicionadas por un ideario simbólico basado en preceptos patriarcales, androcéntricos, y discriminatorios hacia las mujeres. Estos elementos están analizados en profundidad en el texto completo y apoyo mis afirmaciones en autoras de prestigio como Seyla Benhabid, Celia Amorós, Gerda Lerner, Amelia Valcárcel, Purificación Mayorbe, Guadalupe Gómez Ferrer, Judith Butler, Aurelia Martín Casares, Simone de Beauvoir, Marian Larumbe, Alicia Puleo, Victoria Sau, Ana de Miguel, o Kate Millet, entre otras. En los últimos años se están observando grandes cambios en el marco de las relaciones entre hombres y mujeres en nuestra sociedad. Se están redefiniendo las concepciones de masculinidad y femineidad, de tal manera que incluso se habla de una crisis de identidades a medida que los roles tradicionales se tambalean para adaptarse a las demandas de los nuevos tiempos. La incorporación de la mujer a los espacios públicos, durante siglos confinada al ámbito privado y dedicada a tareas de procreación, de crianza y de cuidados de la prole y de los miembros de la familia extensa y nuclear, es un fenómeno que trae consigo la redefinición de nuevos papeles para ambos géneros. La socialización de nuevos seres que tiene lugar fundamentalmente en la familia, en la escuela y a través de los medios de comunicación, pasa igualmente por periodos de reajuste que deben ser analizados y tenidos en consideración. Por otra parte, a pesar de que en las últimas décadas se han observado avances referidos a estrategias marco contra discriminaciones en función del origen racial o étnico o por motivos de género, recientes informes de ONU Mujeres, Beijing 20, revelan altos porcentajes de discriminación en diferentes esferas, donde se ven afectados los valores fundamentales de igualdad y el Estado de Derecho. Es así que nos encontramos con la situación que viven grupos, colectivos o víctimas de segregación que se pueden ver afectados por varios rasgos asociados a estereotipos negativos hondamente arraigados en la sociedad. A lo largo de estas páginas trataremos de reflexionar sobre uno de los grupos que tradicionalmente se ha encontrado con grandes discriminaciones en nuestra sociedad como es el pueblo gitano. Estamos encontrando que las mujeres gitanas serían objeto de una discriminación múltiple: la declaración de Beijing de 1995 en el Marco de la Cuarta Conferencia Internacional sobre Mujeres, en su párrafo 32, se refería a las múltiples barreras que impiden a algunos grupos de mujeres avanzar en la igualdad real: ¿Nosotros los Gobiernos participantes estamos determinados a intensificar los esfuerzos para asegurar el igual disfrute de todos los derechos humanos y la libertades fundamentales para todas las mujeres que sufren múltiples barreras en su empoderamiento y progreso a causa de factores tales como su raza, edad, lengua, grupo étnico, cultura, religión, discapacidad, o pertenecer a una comunidad indígena¿. Así podríamos hablar de una múltiple discriminación de este colectivo: 1.- por ser mujeres 2.- por el bajo nivel educativo del colectivo 3.- por pertenecer a una minoría étnica, la gitana 4.- y por ser mujer dentro de su propia etnia o cultura En los últimos años se ha observado un cambio significativo en cuanto a los valores, expectativas de futuro e incluso roles de las mujeres gitanas, sin embargo, sólo un porcentaje ínfimo de la población gitana residente en España, que agrupa a unas 650.000 personas, llega a la Universidad, pero ocho de cada diez son mujeres. En numerosos foros se habla de que el cambio empieza o debe empezar por las mujeres gitanas porque ellas se han convertido en las impulsoras de la transformación en esta comunidad. Sin embargo, las resistencias que ellas deben enfrentar son formidables. Las obstrucciones provienen de los varones de su propio grupo, que no quieren perder los privilegios adquiridos durante siglos de dominación, pero también existe un alto número de mujeres que se oponen a estos cambios. A pesar de ello, afortunadamente cada vez se escuchan más voces por parte de las propias mujeres gitanas que están reclamando sus espacios de participación, su protagonismo en la sociedad. Reclaman para sí, una visibilización que les ha sido negada por la sociedad por una parte, y por su propia etnia por otra. Historia de la Población Gitana en España y Aragón Hemos considerado interesante el realizar un breve recorrido por la Historia de la Población Gitana en España, con mención expresa a la Historia en Aragón, y observar la situación de los últimos años en Zaragoza, que nos permita acercarnos a la actualidad. La razón fundamental es comprender el momento histórico en que nos encontramos a día de hoy y fundamentalmente con la finalidad de diferenciar la Población Gitana que describimos en Zaragoza, de otras etapas históricas que se han podido producir en la ciudad u otras Comunidades Gitanas, que han podido ser estudiadas o descritas en otras zonas geográficas españolas en investigaciones anteriores. Ante todo queremos dejar claro que la Comunidad Gitana Objeto de Estudio de nuestra investigación carece de las connotaciones de exclusión de otras investigaciones consultadas. De este modo podemos aproximarnos a las Características Generales Culturales de la Población Gitana e ideales Culturales de Mujeres y Hombres. Perspectiva Educativa La Educación es uno de nuestros mayores intereses, como hemos mencionado anteriormente: porque consideramos que la Promoción de cualquier Sociedad va unida inexorablemente a la Educación de su Pueblo, porque nuestra práctica profesional es en el campo educativo y porque creemos que la Educación debe y puede ser conciliada con el Ser Mujer y Gitana. Por todo ello y porque la Educación continúa siendo un reto para la Población Gitana, dedicamos un capítulo a la misma. Comenzamos con los Inicios de la Educación de la Población Gitana en Zaragoza, vista desde los ojos de sus protagonistas docentes. Conviene reflexionar en ocasiones desde los puntos de partida para darse cuenta del camino recorrido. Continuamos con datos globales de Educación y Alumnado Gitano según datos estatales, y en toda la geografía española, y la planificación prevista según la Estrategia Nacional para la Inclusión de Población Gitana 2012-2020. Incorporamos algunos elementos que dificultan una escolaridad de éxito y que convendría revisar y principios educativos que consideramos deberían ser incorporados desde una práctica educativa desde la Perspectiva de Género. Por último añadimos algunas Propuestas Educativas que realizan diversos Asociaciones de Mujeres Gitanas. Es entendible, que la igualdad de oportunidades y un acceso a la Ciudadanía de pleno derecho podrán hacerse más efectivas cuanto mayores son los niveles educativos de la población. Es necesario por tanto, conocer la situación en la que se encuentra la Comunidad Gitana, con la finalidad de poner en marcha medidas eficaces que garanticen un derecho básico como es la educación. La Promoción de cualquier Sociedad va unida inexorablemente a la Educación de su Pueblo. Los Principios educativos básicos de donde partimos suponen una educación integral, inclusiva, empoderadora, coeducadora, intercultural, y cívica, que eduque en los cuidados a los demás y en las emociones, entre otros. Hago referencia a que la igualdad de oportunidades debe garantizar el acceso a la Ciudadanía de pleno derecho, potenciando mayores niveles educativos de la población, y que la diversidad debe ser entendida desde la inclusión y desde su potencial enriquecedor y no como elemento legitimador de la exclusión social de determinados colectivos y minorías como la gitana, o colectivos migrantes de países empobrecidos. Con el mismo principio reivindico la necesidad de incorporar la perspectiva de género en la educación, tanto para corregir las desigualdades de partida como para conseguir un acceso integro a la sociedad de todas personas. Asumimos igualmente, una de las reivindicaciones históricas de la Comunidad Gitana en España, y es la incorporación de su Historia y sus Claves Culturales al Currículo Educativo como una práctica inclusiva. El reconocimiento de la diversidad cultural del Pueblo Gitano puede suponer una pequeña contribución a colaborar con el aumento del Éxito Escolar en la Población Gitana. La Estrategia Nacional para la Inclusión Social de la Población Gitana en España 2012-2020, habla de "qué" incrementar respecto a la educación en la Población Gitana pero no hace referencia al "modo", y nos parece fundamental desde nuestro ámbito, el aportar algunos apuntes importantes para toda educación en género y para todo tipo de población que se plantee la superación de las desigualdades entre mujeres y hombres. Para nosotras es fundamental crear un modelo educativo estratégico que gestione la formación de alumnas y alumnos libres. Hay que dar al alumnado y a sus familias la posibilidad de reflexionar, exponer, comunicar y manifestar sus deseos, expectativas, frustraciones y aspiraciones, y establecer un diálogo donde se clarifiquen los intereses de las y los integrantes de la comunidad educativa que permitan diseñar objetivos comunes que encaucen la acción educativa y docente. Aproximación a los inicios de la escolarización de la población gitana en Zaragoza: Esta aproximación a los inicios de la escolarización de la población gitana en Zaragoza está sin recoger a nivel escrito, por lo que cobran especial relevancia los testimonios de sus protagonistas a quienes agradezco sus aportaciones. Este retazo de historia ha sido realizado pues, con las aportaciones de diferentes personas, que pusieron empeño en que niñas y niños gitanos tuvieran acceso a la educación y opción a un futuro distinto al de sus familias. Etapa de voluntariado. Hacia el año 1965, la escolarización en Zaragoza de niñas y niños gitanos se produce a instancias de ciertos grupos religiosos y personas voluntarias, que fueron creando aulas en las zonas donde se agrupaba la población gitana. Figuras como la Hermana Milagros, o Ester Giménez, sin apenas recursos llevaron la lectura y escritura a los primeros gitanos. Escuelas Puente. En 1978 se firma un Convenio entre la Conferencia Episcopal Española y el Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia para la creación en diversas ciudades españolas, de Escuelas Puente que afrontaran la escolarización de la minoría de etnia gitana. Son Centros Especiales de transición en régimen especial, según el art. 51 de la Ley General de Educación, y pretenden preparar a niñas y niños gitanos en situaciones de marginalidad para que puedan incorporarse a la escuela ordinaria. Durante los seis o siete años de duración, (según cursos y lugares) tuvieron una media de 182 aulas con 5.988 niñas y niños por año. Esta Etapa denominada por uno de los informantes como Etapa Institucional por la implicación de las Instituciones, abarcaría un periodo entre 1978 y 1987. Para Zaragoza se concreta en la creación de una escuela graduada Mixta con 9 unidades donde la Iglesia se compromete a ceder locales y el Ministerio aporta el profesorado y el resto de recursos. Esta escuela se ubica en dos lugares distintos: La Paz, para los alumnos del barrio de la Paz y otra ubicación en la Cartuja Baja para el resto de barrios, alumnos que iban transportados. Se les denomina Escuelas Puente en toda España porque su finalidad era preparar a los niños gitanos para que pasasen a un escuela ¿normalizada con garantías¿. En ellas se debe partir prácticamente de la alfabetización de todo el alumnado. La Quer Majarí Calí era una única escuela, con un claustro único de profesorado y con dos localizaciones diferentes La Paz y la Cartuja Baja con 120 niños y niñas en Zaragoza capital. Tal como aparece en las gráficas de la documentación que se nos ha aportado y hemos consultado, existe mayor número de niñas escolarizadas en los cursos iniciales, dándose un abandono progresivo en los cursos superiores. Andrés Alonso recuerda que las niñas manifestaban mayor motivación e interés que los chicos por la escuela, aunque a medida que iban creciendo iban desapareciendo de la escuela requeridas para ayudar en las tareas domésticas. Las funciones del Profesorado en los inicios trascendían necesariamente las paredes de la escuela. La educación era concebida desde ámbitos integrales que incluía trabajar diferentes hábitos en el terreno y la realidad de las chavalas y chavales. Yo trabajé en la concentración de La Cartuja Baja y nosotros tuvimos los primeros días dos autobuses llenos, unos ciento veinte niños y al cabo de dos meses desaparecieron casi todos Educación Compensatoria. El cambio en la política educativa general que supuso la puesta en funcionamiento de la Ley Orgánica del Derecho a la Educación (LODE) en 1983, comenzó a desarrollar principios y valores de igualdad y no discriminación contenidos en la Constitución Española. Así mismo el Real Decreto sobre Educación Compensatoria (1.174/83) ayudó a incorporar progresivamente la población gitana a los centros ordinarios. En él se indicaban una serie de acciones tendentes a paliar las desventajas de acceso y permanencia de determinado alumnado, en función de condiciones socio-económicas o de proveniencia desfavorecidas. Presente y futuro comunidad gitana y educación. Reto pendiente en el mundo gitano: la Educación. Históricamente la población gitana ha padecido altas tasas de analfabetismo, debido a circunstancias como la exclusión social o su tradicional cultura nómada. Sin embargo, la modificación de las circunstancias sociales y la política educativa hacen que progresivamente la plena escolarización del alumnado gitano se vaya consiguiendo en diversas Comunidades como la Aragonesa. El Presente y Futuro de la Educación de la Comunidad Gitana en nuestro país, está unido inexorablemente a los planteamientos de la Estrategia Europea 2020 y a la Estrategia Nacional para la Inclusión Social de la Población Gitana en España 2012-2020. La educación es una de las áreas clave de ambas y por ello se esperan avances significativos en los próximos años. Según los datos que se aportan en la citada Estrategia Nacional en relación con la Situación Educativa de la Población gitana, se destacan claros progresos en cuanto a la escolarización de los niños y niñas gitanas en la Educación Infantil y Primaria. A pesar de que las tasas de escolarización en Educación Infantil son más bajas que para el conjunto de la población, estas han aumentado significativamente en los últimos años. Entre 1994 y 2009 se ha producido un avance de casi 30 puntos en el porcentaje de niñas y niños gitanos que han asistido a Educación Infantil previamente a su escolarización obligatoria (87% en 2009) según los datos de la FSG (2010) En el caso de la Educación Primaria, la escolarización de las niñas y niños gitanos está prácticamente normalizada, aunque sigue siendo preocupante la alta tasa de absentismo escolar y el abandono prematuro. Estos fenómenos, continúa la Estrategia, se intensifican en el primer ciclo obligatorio de Educación Secundaria, en el que la situación se agrava en el caso de las niñas gitanas, ya que todavía existe un cierto porcentaje que ni siquiera accede a Secundaria. No es el caso de Zaragoza donde los diferentes protocolos de Prevención del Absentismo Escolar han hecho que la escolarización hasta los 16 años hasta años recientes haya sido un hecho, según mis propios estudios. La presencia de jóvenes gitanos en estudios postobligatorios, aunque se percibe como una tendencia en aumento, es aún poco frecuente y la brecha con respecto al conjunto de la población es profunda. En el caso de la Graduación en Estudios Superiores, la diferencia era superior: 0,3% de la población gitana frente al 22,3% de la población total. No obstante, se hace la mención a que posiblemente la población gitana con mayor nivel de estudios esté infrarrepresentada en las muestras de las encuestas. Este dato es importante y puede estar en relación con una de nuestras conclusiones, que nosotras denominamos las gitanas invisibles. La población gitana adulta presenta niveles de estudios más bajos, incluyendo una tasa de analfabetismo más alta que la de la población en su conjunto. Ante este panorama se reconoce en la citada Estrategia Nacional para la Inclusión, que uno de los mayores retos que tiene planteados la Sociedad Gitana supone el alcanzar mayores cotas formativas. Estrategia Nacional para la Inclusión 2012-2020: líneas de actuación: En la Estrategia Nacional para la Inclusión 2012-2020 se establecen distintas Líneas fundamentales de actuación en materia de Educación en las Etapas: Infantil, Primaria, Secundaria, y Postobligatoria en con la finalidad de incrementar el nivel educativo de la Población Gitana una vez reconocido que efectivamente es uno de los grandes desafíos que esta etnia tiene pendientes. En cada provincia se están estableciendo reuniones de coordinación entre las Organizaciones Gitanas y las Instituciones para estableces las medidas a desarrollar. La persona que les habla está trabajando en la comisión pertinente en Zaragoza, y al final del curso escolar se deben de aportar en Madrid las conclusiones anuales para unificar criterios. Estudio Estatal sobre la situación educativa del alumnado gitano en la etapa secundaria. Conclusiones y recomendaciones para la intervención. Con la finalidad de desarrollar medidas que pongan en funcionamiento esta Estrategia Nacional, el Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia a instancias de la Fundación Secretariado Gitano y en colaboración con otras entidades, ha realizado un estudio de ámbito estatal, sobre la situación educativa del alumnado gitano en la Etapa Secundaria, que fuesen comparables con los datos oficiales existentes para el conjunto de la población. Así pues El alumnado gitano en Secundaria. Un estudio comparado y según el mismo, este estudio nace como respuesta a la necesidad de contar con datos actualizados. Los datos actualizados en 2014 por la Fundación Secretariado Gitano respecto a la Situación Educativa de la Población Gitana en España (alrededor de 725.000 personas) habla de una notable mejoría, gracias al esfuerzo de las familias gitanas , de las administraciones públicas , de los profesionales de la educación, de los centros, y de las organizaciones no gubernamentales. Tras reconocer la mejora progresiva del nivel educativo de la población gitana en las últimas décadas, debido a una generalización de su escolarización y una visión más positiva de la escuela, se observa que la juventud gitana, supera al de sus progenitores, `pero se halla por debajo de los niveles del conjunto de la población en cuanto a su nivel de educación y formación La brecha comienza a abrirse antes incluso de la finalización de la enseñanza secundaria obligatoria, ya que tan solo 24,8% logra el título de Graduado en ESO y que se ensancha progresivamente con el comienzo de la educación secundaria post-obligatoria. Las conclusiones informe hablan del fracaso escolar como un problema manifiesto en la población gitana joven, ya que los resultados establecen que 64 de cada 100 jóvenes gitanos con edades comprendidas entre los 16 y 24 años no tienen la ESO. Respecto al conjunto de la población joven, el total asciende al 87 sobre 100 jóvenes con titulación ESO. Y contrastaría con los datos siguientes, ya que el informe continúa diciendo que "este panorama se traduce en un patente desfase en términos formativos de la población gitana, pues la mayoría se queda estancada en la educación primaria, de forma que hay un importante número que ni siquiera consigue completar la educación obligatoria." Otras recomendaciones para fomentar la formación de la población gitana De todas las recomendaciones que se establecen en la Estrategia para fomentar la formación de la población gitana he querido destacar, aparte de una implicación real de toda la comunidad educativa entendiendo como tal a todo el personal del centro escolar, familias, alumnado, agentes sociales, administración y todas personas implicadas en un desarrollo integral del alumnado. En la línea de recomendaciones establecidas, las participantes del I Congreso Internacional de Mujeres gitanas: Las Otras Mujeres, en las Conclusiones del Sueño relativas a Educación, hacían referencia a las actuaciones de éxito que mejoran la educación, y concretamente a aquellas en las que las familias participan en las escuelas implicándose en todo el proceso educativo de sus hijas e hijos. Las experiencias docentes con Escuelas Inclusivas o las Escuelas de Aprendizaje con el aprendizaje cooperativo, son buena prueba de ello. Incorporamos su propio testimonio puesto que nos parece altamente significativo, a la par que sugieren distintas actividades altamente atractivas como las tertulias literarias que estamos tratando de poner en funcionamiento en nuestro propio centro. Estas mujeres a su vez están sugiriendo una medida de discriminación positiva que nosotras apoyamos firmemente y que junto a las Organizaciones Gitanas de Zaragoza estamos planteando demandar: la reserva de plazas para población gitana en Ciclos Formativos y en Universidad. Por otra parte, la filosofía que entraña el "Ejercicio del Sueño" que es propio de metodologías activas como las mencionadas con anterioridad en Aprendizajes Inclusivos, han sido igualmente incorporados y mantenidos en la actualidad en Campañas de la Fundación Secretariado Gitano para promover la Educación y la consecución de objetivos académicos y formativos, como en los Programas "Promociona" o "De Mayor Quiero Ser". Estos elementos igualmente los incorporamos en la metodología activa de nuestro centro para tratar de estimular el incremento del éxito escolar en la población gitana fundamentalmente. Actuaciones de Éxito: Entre las actuaciones consideradas de éxito se incluyen, la participación de las familias en los procesos educativos de hijas/hijos; escuelas inclusivas; escuelas de aprendizaje; aprendizaje cooperativo; discriminación positiva en formación; campañas de la Fundación Secretariado Gitano como De Mayor Quiero Ser, Referentes Positivos, Programa Promociona, etc. Situación actual en Zaragoza. La finalización de la escolaridad en Zaragoza, no supone en la mayoría de los casos, la obtención del Graduado en ESO, ya que las cifras distan de acercarse al 24,8 % que establece el Estudio para la población gitana en general. Se halla pendiente de estudio el establecer cifras reales y exactas de alumnado gitano que obtiene la titulación en ESO en la ciudad en ambos géneros. La mayoría del alumnado queda estancado en 2º de la ESO, y de aquellos que promocionan a 3º de la ESO un amplio número es por imperativo legal debido a edad y cursos repetidos. El promocionar arrastrando desfases curriculares importantes, unido a la desmotivación, falta de hábitos de estudio y otros factores, hace muy difícil la posibilidad de alcanzar los objetivos exigidos para titular en ESO, por lo que el alumnado debe ser derivado a otros itinerarios formativos. La puesta en funcionamiento de la LOMCE con la eliminación de los Programas de Cualificación Profesional Inicial y su substitución con los actuales de Formación Básica, ha disminuido las posibilidades formativas para alumnado con desfases curriculares significativos disminuyendo sus alternativas regladas. A estas dificultades debemos añadir los factores de género que hemos visto en el Ámbito Doméstico en forma de ejes y que, en nuestra investigación de 2010 establecimos a su vez como elementos condicionantes de la escolaridad. Ciertas tradiciones y factores culturales suponían impedimentos u obstáculos para promover la educación obligatoria y postobligatoria en las chicas gitanas Las tres Organizaciones Gitanas mayoritarias de Zaragoza tienen entre sus Objetivos fundamentales la promoción de la educación en la Comunidad Gitana. Tanto en la Asociación de Promoción Gitana como en la Federación de Asociaciones Gitanas, a través de los Programas de Mediación para la Prevención del Absentismo Escolar en los Centros Escolares tanto de Primaria como de Secundaria. La Fundación Secretariado Gitano en el Área de Educación invierte gran esfuerzo y realiza distintas campañas y actividades, consciente que la Formación es básica en la Promoción de la Sociedad Gitana. Una de ellas es el Encuentro Anual de Jóvenes Gitanos que tiene lugar en Zaragoza, y al que puntualmente asistimos con chicas y chicos de nuestro centro. Programas: De Mayor quiero ser. Asomate a tus sueños, Mentoring. Promociona. Las Mujeres Gitanas que han trascendido las fronteras del Ámbito Privado al Ámbito Público a través de la Educación, superando las barreras de su propia cultura en ocasiones y las de la sociedad mayoritaria en otras, pueden convertirse en Referentes Positivos para otras Mujeres, y están creando las condiciones para una sociedad en transformación. Sin desprenderse de su identidad gitana, de sus costumbres o de sus tradiciones, defienden elementos de su cultura sin atavismos, desde la libertad que les ofrece su capacidad crítica y la posibilidad de elegir. Establecen sus prioridades, determinan lo que para cada cual es importante, y ejercen su gitaneidad desde sus propios valores. No renuncian a sus orígenes, ni a su presente, ni a su futuro, solo renuncian a la exclusión, a los estereotipos y a los prejuicios. Son Gitanas con Estudios y son Gitanas con Futuro. Son Gitanas del Siglo XXI. Todas ellas han declarado que la Educación es el reto pendiente de la sociedad gitana. Todas han luchado por superar sus propios límites formativos tratando de mejorar en ellas mismas o en sus hijas o hijos el nivel educativo, conscientes de que la educación es libertad. En prácticamente todos los discursos de estas mujeres se repite el deseo de que la Educación forme parte del Presente y el Futuro de la Sociedad Gitana. Algunas de ellas han conseguido alcanzar cotas formativas superiores, como Isabel, Carmen, Vanesa. Otras han continuado y continúan todavía formándose. Otras formulan cambios que se deben producir en su sociedad para que esté adaptada al siglo XXI, y todas son Referentes Positivos, objetivo principal de este trabajo que es visibilizar otras realidades, unas realidades de mujeres gitanas de consecución positiva, de alternativas positivas, tanto para mujeres de su etnia como para la cultura paya. La sociedad mayoritaria debe conocer la existencia de otras realidades, como la de mujeres que están haciendo vidas alternativas a la marginación, a los estereotipos, a los prejuicios, a los aspectos degradados de la sociedad gitana. Y romper precisamente esos prejuicios a base de visibilizar y demostrar versiones distintas de ser mujer y gitana. Porque ellas ya son referentes: son modelos para muchas chicas que todavía tienen que llegar donde han llegado ellas, que ni se plantean la existencia de esas otras posibilidades vitales.¿ Begoña Dual Clavería. Formación Adulta. Presenta sus deseos de cambio dirigidas a las mujeres, a las Instituciones y a las familias en general. De la mujer gitana lo que cambiaría es que tendría que estudiar más. Que se tendría que formar más. Motivar más a las familias para estudiaran y que terminaran la ESO o que se siguieran formando. Las Instituciones que apoyaran a los Gitanos para que pudieran estudiar. Desde pequeños a mis hijos les vengo motivando para que les guste estudiar y el día de mañana estudien los dos una carrera. Begoña. Carmen Dual Clavería. Formación Adulta. Envía su mensaje a la Población Gitana desde la Organización donde trabaja, FAGA. A la sociedad gitana, las personas que valoren más la Educación, que los padres gitanos matriculen a los niños a los tres años, que se preocupen en asistir a las reuniones de padres, que pertenezcan a las Asociaciones de las APAS, y que hagan todo lo posible por el futuro de sus hijos. Que no quieran que sus hijos lleven la vida, que a lo mejor han llevado ellos. Carmen Jiménez Dual. Diplomada en Trabajo Social. Es una de las mujeres con titulación Universitaria. Diplomada en Trabajo Social Aragón, no tiene nada que ver con Andalucía en donde nos llevan mucho adelanto en la formación. Hay gitanos de todas las profesiones. Ester Giménez. Máster Universidad Navarra. El mayor cambio que Ester desearía para la población gitana es que se perdiera ese recelo hacia el mundo laboral y la educación como una forma de pérdida identitaria gitana. Yo creo que hay muchas chicas jóvenes que todavía siguen teniendo ese sentimiento de desarraigo el decir: Yo quiero estudiar, yo quiero salir de de esto¿, se sienten mal. Creo que muchas veces, ellas no piensan que no están haciendo nada que la ley gitana diga que no lo hagas, nuestras leyes, es al contrario. Debería haber un cambio en la sociedad gitana en que pierdan el temor a que esos jóvenes y esas chicas o porque entren a trabajar o porque se formen van a perder su identidad gitana, que no la van a perder, al contrario la van a reforzar Ester plantea dar oportunidades de acceso a minorías en Universidades o en enseñanzas regladas: el tema de cuotas para minorías, un problema que en países como en Estados Unidos está ya regulado. Isabel Jiménez. Maestra La mujer hasta ahora ha visto que los hijos podían ganarse la vida en los oficios tradicionales y aquellas ocupaciones que planteaba el marido o planteaba toda la familia y entonces, cedían ante esto en cierto modo el tiempo les daba la razón. Ahora, los oficios tradicionales ya no dan de sí; hay poco margen para ganarse la vida de forma autónoma, entonces, jugarse el futuro de los hijos, solamente por claudicar en cosas que no tienen ya mucho sentido, eso yo creo que va a ser el aliciente para la mujer para decir: ¿No, no, los hijos tienen que estudiar y los hijos tienen que decidir en qué quieren trabajar, es su vida en realidad." Pilar Clavería Mendoza. Autodidacta. Pilar, que los varones gitanos no impidan que las niñas estudien y se formen, a la par que reivindica el que las mujeres compartan la autoridad y poder de decisión. Lorena Clavería Giménez. Formación adulta. Dentro de mi cultura, de la cultura gitana, yo creo que todavía queda un gran paso para que todo el mundo esté formado, para que la escolarización sea algo normal, para tener tus amigos fuera de la etnia gitana y que sea normal, yo creo que aún queda un poco de trabajo con eso. Marta Dual Clavería. Formación Adulta. Que puedan estudiar tanto las mujeres como los hombres. Hay que abrir puertas, en conocimientos cara a los chicos y a las chicas también. Hay que concienciar a los padres, de que eso no es así, que podría ser como los payos, un matrimonio, un arquitecto y el otro médico, una parejica, o médico, o lo que sea, pero que tengan sus estudios terminados también, completos con licenciatura o diplomatura, nada de grado medio o bachiller, que terminen todo. Vanesa Gabarre Giménez. Grado Superior en Animación Sociocultural. El tener formación, te abre los ojos y te da oportunidades¿ si tu vida es así, es como se hiciera así (imita con las manos un abanico). Algunas reflexiones a modo de conclusiones frente a la escolaridad de la población gitana El estudio que hemos visto con anterioridad ha ofrecido ciertos resultados para incorporar a las acciones en Educación la Estrategia para la Inclusión de la Población Gitana 2012-2020. Corresponde ahora a las distintas administraciones desarrollar planes anuales que especifiquen los compromisos y las diversas implementaciones. En mi opinión faltan reflexiones entre la Comunidad Educativa, Organizaciones Gitanas y Administración, que analicen en profundidad las razones de fondo por las que se llega a los resultados obtenidos en escolaridad, éxito escolar y niveles alcanzados. Es decir reflexionar sobre las necesidades educativas de la comunidad gitana desde una perspectiva de género, integral, sistémica, micro y macrosocial y subscribir compromisos de acción en y con todos los ámbitos implicados en la Educación, Familias, Alumnado, Centros Escolares, Agentes Sociales, Organizaciones Gitanas, Administraciones, etc., y que no supongan únicamente declaración de intenciones. Reflexiones o recomendaciones que entendemos deben presidir una práctica educativa inclusiva y correctora de desigualdades de género. La situación de escolarización gitana ha ido mejorando progresivamente a lo largo de los últimos años y se van dando pasos hacia la normalización educativa del alumnado pero se observan en muchos casos ciertas dificultades en la plena incorporación de los niños y niñas gitanos a la escuela; son escasos todavía los logros en cuanto a la asistencia continuada, la finalización de los estudios obligatorios y el acceso a la educación secundaria post-obligatoria y superior. Para conseguir una escolarización plena, entre otras vemos necesarias las siguientes medidas. Basándonos en la línea establecida en materia coeducativa realizada por diversas/os autoras y autores entre las/los que se cuentan Pilar Laura Mateo (2004), Marina Subirats (1988, 2007), María José Díaz Aguado (2001), Santos Guerra (2009), establecemos los objetivos que consideramos deben contemplarse en una práctica educativa que intente contribuir a superar las desigualdades entre los géneros. Entendemos que una práctica educativa que dé respuesta a las necesidades de la comunidad gitana debe ser inclusiva y reconocer el enriquecimiento que la diversidad cultural supone para toda la sociedad. Sin embargo, como mujeres feministas y defensoras de los derechos individuales y colectivos, no podemos avalar prácticas religiosas o culturales que atenten contra la libertad o la dignidad de las mujeres, sean del signo que sean. Por ello defendemos la necesidad de que las mujeres de todo el mundo sean educadas y formadas bajo criterios de empoderamiento personal, y no adoctrinadas, y puedan decidir y elegir sus opciones en libertad. Esto supondría una educación basada en la igualdad real de oportunidades y la superación de desigualdades de género. Para que una educación inclusiva, intercultural y realmente superadora de las diferencias entre los géneros sea posible, se hace indispensable una implicación real de toda la Comunidad Educativa y la voluntad explícita de los responsables de las administraciones para que la labor de los centros educativos pueda tener alguna posibilidad de éxito. Y ya hemos mencionado que como Comunidad Educativa entendemos, al Alumnado, a las Familias, al Profesorado, a las Organizaciones Gitanas, a Agentes y Organismos Sociales, Administración y a todas aquellas personas implicadas directa o indirectamente en el desarrollo de chicas y chicos. Como conclusión final hacemos alusión a la reflexión que realiza Consuelo Flecha en 2008, y que citando a Amelia Valcárcel, refiere que las mujeres españolas de la postguerra pasaban de la dependencia económica del padre a la del marido, siendo la universalización de la Educación y la incorporación al mundo laboral de estas lo que les facilitó una elección en libertad de sus biografías de vida. Han pasado cincuenta años desde que esas situaciones se producían, y en España, igual que en el resto de países de su entorno sociocultural, contamos con una escolaridad primaria generalizada entre las niñas, y una enseñanza secundaria en la que las jóvenes son mayoría, lo cual ha proporcionado condiciones nuevas a las mujeres, con incidencia evidente en toda la sociedad, y al menos algunas de las transformaciones que la filósofa Amelia Valcárcel ha destacado: "La natalidad desciende, la democracia empieza a ser un sistema apreciado y las mujeres quieren tener una cosa que se llama vida". Tres dimensiones que hablan de itinerarios biográficos en los que es posible decidir más allá de la riqueza que el cuerpo sexuado en femenino ofrece; que garantizan la participación en primera persona en las formas de convivencia social igualitaria asumidas por las sociedades modernas, que vuelve la democracia más auténtica, menos deficitaria; que preparan para llevar los hilos de la propia vida, para cultivar deseos sabiendo que se podrán alcanzar. Consuelo Flecha, (2008, pp. 50-51) Las mujeres gitanas se encuentran en ese proceso reivindicativo. Conscientes de que será la formación, la que las capacitará para romper el yugo dependiente que las mantiene atadas a los hombres de su etnia. Serán ellas las que lleven la democracia a su sociedad, las que un día elegirán los hilos violeta que las irán conduciendo por los caminos de la educación, de la inmersión laboral y finalmente los que les permitirán asumir las riendas de su vida. Ámbito Privado versus Ámbito Público Nuestra Tesis Doctoral basada en la Comunidad Gitana de Zaragoza consta de dos partes fundamentales que hemos denominado Ámbito Privado versus Ámbito Público. Hemos considerado imprescindible definir ciertas condiciones identitarias de la Población Gitana apoyándonos en autoras y autores como San Román, Lagarde, Liégeois, Fernández Enguita, Rincón Atienza, Gamella, Wang, entre otras autoras y autores, para explicar determinadas prácticas rituales o tendencias endogámicas que puedan condicionar sus tradiciones y modos de proceder. El aproximarnos a las Características Generales Culturales de la Población Gitana e ideales Culturales de Mujeres y Hombres nos permite encontrar los modelos referenciales a los que deben ajustarse las mujeres Gitanas y los riesgos que deben de asumir en caso de apartarse de las normas. Si las protagonistas absolutas del trabajo de investigación son las dieciséis Mujeres Gitanas y sus testimonios correspondientes, a través de ellas podremos analizar el panorama en que se encuentran las Mujeres Gitanas de Zaragoza en el Ámbito Público. Para ello previamente hemos delimitado los mandatos culturales que la Comunidad Gitana de Zaragoza establece para las Mujeres respecto al Ámbito Privado. De este modo se puede entender en los discursos individuales de cada mujer que se presenta, las barreras que cada una ha debido traspasar, si procede, y los costes personales o grupales que le ha supuesto para alcanzar su posicionamiento en el Ámbito Público. La población gitana en nuestro país está conviviendo desde hace siglos con la mayoritaria, sin embargo, siguen siendo sus costumbres, tradiciones, sus claves culturales, las grandes desconocidas para la inmensa mayoría de la población general. Las gitanas, cansadas de ser prejuzgadas, victimizadas, marginadas, discriminadas, se aferran a sus rasgos distintivos y diversos como elementos identitarios significativos, y como defensa al hostigamiento a que han sido sometidas por centurias. Nos acercamos a la cultura gitana desde el respeto y con deseo de conocer parte de la diversidad cultural que caracteriza la comunidad y la convivencia cotidianas. En cualquier sociedad de fuerte signo patriarcal, existe un imaginario colectivo que hace creer que otro tipo de formación y de tarea social, que no sea la tradicional, conlleva para el orden establecido riesgos ante los que se deben permanecer alerta: la institución escolar supone peligros por los que se trasmiten ideas, que rompen con el equilibrio establecido que supone la sumisión del género femenino. Se trata de situar a las mujeres ante horizontes tan excesivamente limitados para desenvolverse en la vida, que aquellos deseos y expectativas que pretenden romper esta estructura, choca con de la existencia de mujeres y grupos de mujeres que a través de reconocerse en las otras, apoyarse y darse autoridad, pueden generar un incremento de la autoestima de género, combatir la misoginia y encontrar un posicionamiento social y personal más igualitario. Entendemos que a través de la sororidad se produce una trasgresión política y social importante, por lo que es necesario emprender iniciativas que supongan el crecimiento personal de las mujeres gitanas y de todas las mujeres, el empoderamiento personal y colectivo , y la creación de un autoconcepto identitario sano y fuerte que nos permita ser protagonistas de nuestras propias vidas y de nuestros destinos. La incorporación de la mujer a los espacios públicos, durante siglos confinada al ámbito privado y dedicada a tareas de procreación, crianza, de cuidados de la prole, de la familia nuclear y de los miembros de la familia extensa, es un fenómeno que trae consigo la redefinición de nuevos papeles para ambos géneros. Analizamos así diversas claves culturales de la población gitana de Zaragoza, que hemos considerado pertinente asociar a este Ámbito Privado y que hemos agrupado en torno a diversos ejes. Eje 1. Ideal de mujer Eje 2. Ética de los cuidados Eje 3. Mito de la virginidad Eje 4. Ritos relacionales: roneo, pedimiento, noviazgo Eje 5. Matrimonio y divorcio Eje 6. Función reproductiva: maternidad. interrupción del embarazo Eje 7. Culto a los muertos Eje 8. Ley gitana: mediación versus castigos y sanciones Eje 9. Organización familiar. Familia nuclear. Familia extensa. Sistema jerárquico de género. Autoridad del varón. Rol de las mujeres. Revisión de roles. Esta aproximación descriptiva del Papel de las Mujeres Gitanas en diferentes realidades, nos permitirá entender los testimonios de las mujeres entrevistadas, se podrá comprender los obstáculos, dificultades que ellas han tenido que enfrentar para alcanzar los objetivos que se habían planteado , o para recorrer los caminos que ellas querían trazar y el coste personal y familiar que en algunos casos implicaba. Ámbito Público Nos introducimos en lo que hemos denominado Ámbito público con la presentación individualizada de las 16 Mujeres Gitanas de Zaragoza, protagonistas indiscutibles de este trabajo. Son ellas las que con su voz y su discurso, valoran la evolución y los deseos de cambio para su etnia. Analizaremos qué tienen de excepcional las mujeres estudiadas, qué parte de sí mismas mantienen aferrada a los valores, normas, y exigencias de su cultura y cuáles son los elementos con que ellas están contribuyendo al cambio o a la evolución de su etnia. Interpretaremos con ellas si estas fracturas suponen evolución, estancamiento o retroceso respecto del papel de la mujer en la cultura gitana. Sus voces manifestarán igualmente los cambios deseables en aspectos que se les exigen como mujeres gitanas. De este modo la investigadora pretende no contaminar el Objeto de Investigación y respetar el ritmo establecido estableciendo una línea dialógica, independientemente de sus criterios ideológicos. Estas mujeres enfatizan el acceso a la cultura como medio para la superación de las barreras sociales, puesto que entienden que la educación tiene un enorme potencial emancipatorio. Ellas analizan y definen los elementos diferenciados con la mayoría de las mujeres de su etnia, es decir los elementos de ruptura con la tradición gitana o con lo esperado de las mujeres por parte de la comunidad, ello nos llevará a desvelar posibles elementos de cambio que se están produciendo en la cultura gitana y que supondrán el denominado Motor de Cambio que se atribuye precisamente a las Mujeres Gitanas. Estas Mujeres generosamente nos hacen partícipes de sus itinerarios vitales. Nos han expuesto los distintos niveles de adecuación de sus vidas con las tradiciones, con las costumbres, con las expectativas de ellas esperadas, o con los designios familiares. Han compartido con nosotras las barreras que han tenido que superar dentro y fuera de su etnia para alcanzar cuotas de representatividad en el ámbito público, en una sociedad donde las mujeres se las destina fundamentalmente al hogar y a la crianza, o para obtener asignaciones de poder en un universo regido por los varones, o para conseguir inserción laboral en un mundo donde difícilmente se acepta su independencia económica, o para adquirir niveles de estudios en una población donde todavía existen amplias tasas de analfabetismo. Ellas han abierto caminos para otras mujeres gitanas, bien por sus consecuciones individuales o colectivas, convirtiéndose en Referentes Positivos para su colectividad y para toda la sociedad. A su vez las fracturas en la tradición que ellas han generado, han supuesto cambios en la cultura que van permitiendo que está se vaya volviendo más permeable, más abierta a opciones, a situaciones diversas, y a costumbres con mayor riqueza de elección. La libertad, lema de vida de la población gitana, se convierte de este modo, en una facultad más alcanzable para el resto de mujeres gitanas. Al referirnos a las Mujeres Gitanas de Zaragoza, no se pueden establecer categorías absolutas puesto que encierran una realidad múltiple, plástica, rica, diversa, permeable, y en transformación. En la heterogeneidad que supone ser Mujer y Gitana en Zaragoza en nuestros días, hemos encontrado un amplio espectro de identidades y formas de desarrollar la gitaneidad. Desde aquellas que se aferran al cumplimiento de la tradición más ortodoxa en materia de género, en aspectos como el ejercicio de autoridad masculina, a aquellas que se manifiestan claramente en favor de la superación generalizada de las desigualdades de género. Nos han mostrado relatos de infancias robadas debiendo contribuir al sustento familiar desde una niñez apenas existente. Historias sin oportunidad de acceder a la educación en esa infancia irreal, pero hemos descubierto la fortaleza y resiliencia de esas mujeres, que no supieron ni quisieron resignarse a su destino y esa voluntad de engañar a la vida es lo que las ha hecho excepcionales. En todas las mujeres estudiadas se observa el deseo de Promoción del Pueblo Gitano, siendo la Educación el factor predominante que se valora en todos sus discursos. Tres de ellas han alcanzado titulaciones universitarias, dos se han Graduado en Formación Profesional superior y el resto han superado distintos niveles de formación en su etapa adulta lo que habla de sus deseos de mejora y superación personal. Cada una de ellas es un ejemplo de vida. La mayoría de ellas no se definen a sí mismas como feministas, si bien siempre está presente el deseo de superar el machismo existente en la sociedad gitana desde sus posicionamientos individuales o colectivos. Los términos empoderamiento, autorrealización, crecimiento y superación personal, han aparecido igualmente en sus testimonios. Cabe destacar que dos de las tres Organizaciones mayoritarias dedicadas a la Promoción de la Población Gitana existentes en Zaragoza, están dirigidas por mujeres y en la tercera, una mujer se encuentra en una Junta mayoritariamente masculina. La Unión Territorial de la Fundación Secretariado Gitano de Aragón está dirigida por Isabel Jiménez. La Federación de Asociaciones Gitanas de Aragón está dirigida por Pilar Clavería. En la Junta Directiva de la Asociación de Promoción Gitana se encuentra como Vocal Ester Giménez Doya. Detectamos cómo la religión tiene una presencia importante en la vida y condiciona el pensamiento de algunas de estas mujeres. Pero a pesar de que el Culto como forma ideológica, puede servir para afianzar y mantener ciertas tradiciones que afecten las relaciones de género, debemos reconocer que no hemos estudiado esta variable, quedando abierta para futuras investigaciones. Mujeres Gitanas de Zaragoza La presentación de las Mujeres Gitanas siguientes está encabezada por las tres dirigentes de las Organizaciones Gitanas de Zaragoza en orden alfabético: Pilar, Ester e Isabel. Seguidamente aparecen el resto de las Mujeres hasta las dieciséis siguiendo el orden alfabético que indican sus apellidos. Pilar Clavería Mendoza "la Rona" Autodidacta. Su ejercicio como Mujer Gitana en el Asociacionismo gitano de amplia representación masculina le ha otorgado crecido reconocimiento nacional e internacional. Presidenta de la Federación Nacional de Asociaciones de Mujeres Gitanas "Kamira" de 1999 a 2005. Presidenta de la Federación de Asociaciones Gitanas de Aragón. Ester Giménez Doya Mujer Gitana Soltera, activista de la Pastoral Gitana, Educadora de Gitanos, única mujer en Junta Directiva de Organización Gitana. Trabajadora autónoma. Isabel Jiménez Cenizo Maestra. Educadora Social. Directora Unión Territorial Fundación Secretariado Gitano Aragón.¿ Rosa Carbonell Dual Auxiliar de residencia. Auxiliar de ayuda domiciliaria. Cocinera. Tras una infancia dedicada al trabajo y sin asistir a la escuela, se formó en su vida adulta. Trabajadora por cuenta ajena. Vanesa Carbonell Escudero Licenciada en Derecho. Máster Universitario en Especialización e Investigación en Derecho en el área de empresa. Diploma de intervención con la comunidad gitana. Trabaja en la Fundación Secretariado Gitano de Zaragoza. Lorena Clavería Giménez Formación Profesional Superior en Integración Social. Trabaja como Mediadora Social en la Asociación de Promoción Gitana en el Programa de realojo e inserción social Ayuntamiento de Zaragoza y la Diputación General de Aragón. Mª Jesús Dual Clavería Educadora Social. Formación de adulta. Vida laboral en el Asociacionismo Gitano. Marta Dual Clavería Mujer gitana soltera. Formación de adulta. Mediadora Intercultural. Trabajadora Venta Autónoma. Gestión administrativa Cooperativa de Vendedores. Begoña Dual Clavería Matrimonio Intercultural. Formación de adulta. Agente de desarrollo. Mediadora intercultural. Ayudante de cocina. Auxiliar geriátrica. Carmen Dual Clavería Mujer gitana soltera. Formación de adulta. Ostenta distintos cargos en el Asociacionismo gitano al que se dedica profesionalmente. Rebeca Dual Giménez Matrimonio Intercultural. Graduada en E.S.O. Mediadora Intercultural de la Asociación de Promoción Gitana.¿ Vanesa Gabarre Giménez Grado Superior de Formación Profesional en Animación Sociocultural. Ha sido durante unos años una mujer referente para el Pueblo Gitano desde su trabajo en la Fundación Secretariado Gitano Sheila Giménez Pérez Matrimonio Intercultural. Mediadora Intercultural erradicación chabolismo de Asociación de Promoción Gitana. Curso de mediación. Ana Belén Hernández Clavería Vocal Asociación Mujeres Romí Calí. Mediadora Intercultural Pilar Hernández Seba Mediadora Intercultural. Formación de adulta. Carmen Jiménez Dual Matrimonio Intercultural. Diplomada en Trabajo Social. Trabaja como Educadora Social en el Centro de Prevención y Tratamiento de Adicciones del Ayuntamiento de Zaragoza. Ámbito Público. Mujeres y Organizaciones Gitanas Relevantes de España. Con la finalidad de comprender mejor el recorrido evolutivo que están realizando las Mujeres Gitanas españolas y profundizar en el tema Mujeres Gitanas y Ámbito Público, ofrecemos un capítulo general de Organizaciones, y Momentos Clave de Presencia Gitana, donde asimismo están implicadas algunas de las Mujeres Protagonistas de este trabajo. Igualmente, se presentan en esta parte otras Mujeres relevantes del Asociacionismo Estatal u Organizaciones que consideran la Educación fundamental en la Promoción de todas las Mujeres Gitanas. Conceptos como educación, desarrollo, igualdad, cultura y feminismo, comienzan a integrarse en las diversas asociaciones de mujeres gitanas como medio de promoción y recuperación de una historia propia. Jóvenes gitanas, integrantes de diferentes Organizaciones, consideran importante favorecer la promoción de las mujeres, puesto que son ellas las que sufren la mayor carga cultural, al ser transmisoras de los valores y costumbres que las identifican.¿ CONCLUSIONES La estructura de presentación que he seguido para presentar las mismas en el informe final es el corresponder cada Objetivo planteado y cada hipótesis con una serie de hallazgos o aproximaciones que configuran estas conclusiones: Mi Planteamiento al elaborar estas conclusiones, al igual que mi preocupación constante durante todo el trabajo de investigación, ha sido el situarme en un posicionamiento dialógico, y de respeto, y tratar de substraerme a tentaciones etnocéntricas. Con ellas pretendo contribuir humildemente a la Promoción del Pueblo Gitano. Los datos que hemos obtenido a lo largo del presente trabajo confirmarían nuestras Hipótesis generales de partida y creemos haber cumplido los objetivos que nos planteábamos. Este primer grupo de conclusiones pertenecen a las voces de las 16 mujeres que presentamos y definen el presente y futuro de la sociedad gitana. No se pueden establecer categorías absolutas en la forma de ejecutar la tradición gitana sino que existen múltiples variaciones en la manera de interpretar la norma. La primera planteaba que nos encontramos en una sociedad donde las relaciones entre los géneros están basadas en premisas patriarcales ya que el Patriarcado sigue plenamente vigente en la actualidad. Creemos haber situado esta hipótesis a partir de la teoría y los ejemplos expuestos en el Marco Conceptual y a lo largo de los diferentes capítulos de la Tesis. Así mismo, sugeríamos que la sociedad gitana mantiene las estructuras patriarcales fuertemente arraigadas y condiciona, en mayor o menor medida, el destino de las Mujeres hacia el Ámbito Doméstico. Esto quedaría demostrado por el número reducido de Mujeres que hemos encontrado en Zaragoza inmersas en la Esfera Pública y por los Condicionantes de Género que hemos descrito en el Ámbito Doméstico. La tercera hipótesis general quedaría confirmada por la Presentación de las dieciséis Mujeres Gitanas de Zaragoza que han transitado las fronteras del Ámbito Doméstico y que han penetrado en el Ámbito Público a través de alguna de las modalidades que este supone, educativas, asociativas, o laborales. Si bien como hemos mencionado en las limitaciones de esta Investigación, esperábamos encontrar un número significativamente supe
