An important task for all scientists is the understanding how to summarize and how to use the debates of different schools of IR for their own project. How different do theories used by practitioners relate to IRT (International Relations Theory)? Some of them come from other areas – economics (game theory and neoliberal institutionalism), cultural studies (postcolonialism), philosophy (poststructuralism), political economy (Marxism), and some even oppose the traditional concept of "IR". Finally, it is important to know which debate will become key in the future. The aim of the work is to assess the state of development of the discipline "International Relations" through the prism of the main scientific discussions of its most famous theoristsamong which Ole Wæver and Knud Erik Jorgensen stand out. Today, we can state the absence of heated discussion, as it was in the late 1980s – early 1990s. This can be interpreted as the fact that each school of scientific thought is trying to optimize its achievements through internal debate. And it is possible on the contrary that today's theories' pluralism is temporary, because some schools can win. But there are three objections to the last statement. First, the traditions of IRT remain different in the USA and in Europe, and the world. Secondly, pluralism wins even within the United States. Thirdly, recently, quantitative studies have become an increasingly desirable format of research, and they have begun to dominate in the main journals, competing with the traditional theories of IR on the status of the discipline based on methods. Mainstream walked back to the empirical point of view on the theory. When theoretical debates are fainting, like today, fewer new scientists are positioning themselves as "theorists". However, there is indications lead to the conclusion about endlessness of theoretical debate in IRT. So, since 2009 the journal "International Theory" is published, which means the continuation of discussions of leading theorists about the basic principles of building IR research. In all, the liberal theorists and especially realists complain about the decline of theory and attempt to update their approaches. Thus, just as the idea of the "end of history" was premature, the thoughts about the "end of theory" are premature: the end always means a new step forward, which can re-customize IRT. ; Важной задачей для всех ученых является понимание, как суммировать и как использовать дебаты разных школ «МВ» для собственного проекта. Насколько разные теории, которые используются практиками, относятся к ТМО? Некоторые из них происходят из других областей – экономики (теория игр и неолиберальный институционализм), культурологии (постколониализм), философии (постструктурализм), политической экономии (марксизм), а некоторые противостоят традиционной концепции «МО». Наконец важно знать, какие дебаты станут ключевыми в будущем. Целью работы является оценка состояния развития дисциплины «Международные отношения» сквозь призму основных научных дискуссий ее наиболее известных теоретиков, среди которых выделяются Оле Вейвер и Кнут Эрик Йоргенсен. На сегодня можно констатировать отсутствие бурной дискуссии, как это было в конце 1980-х – начале 1990-х гг. Это можно интерпретировать как то, что каждая школа научной мысли пытается оптимизировать свои достижения с помощью внутренних дебатов. А можно, наоборот, как то, что сегодняшний плюрализм теорий является временным, поскольку какая-то школа может победить. Но есть три возражения против последнего утверждения. Во-первых, остаются различными традиции ТМО в США и в Европе и мире. Во-вторых, плюрализм побеждает даже внутри США. В-третьих, в последнее время все более желанным форматом исследований стали исследования количественные, и они же начали преобладать в основных журналах, конкурируя с традиционными теориями МО по основанному на методах статусу дисциплины «МО». Мейнстрим отошел назад к эмпирической, индуктивистской точке зрения на теорию. Когда ослабевают теоретические дебаты, как сегодня, все меньше новых ученых позиционируют себя как «теоретики». Однако есть признаки, позволяющие сделать выводы о нескончаемости теоретических дебатов в ТМО. Так, с 2009 г. выходит журнал «International Theory», что означает продолжение дискуссий ведущих теоретиков по основным принципам построения исследований МО. Все более ощутимыми становятся жалобы теоретиков либерализма и особенно реализма на упадок теории и попытки обновить свои подходы. Таким образом, как преждевременной была мысль о «конце истории», так преждевременны размышления о «конце теории»: конец всегда означает новый шаг вперед, который может перенастроить ТМО. ; Важливим завданням для всіх науковців є розуміння, як підсумувати та як використати дебати різних шкіл «МВ» для власного проекту. Чи ці теорії кидають одна одній виклик, чи вони підтримують одна одну? Наскільки різні теорії, що наразі використовуються практиками, належать до ТМВ? Деякі з них походять із інших галузей – з економіки (теорія ігор та неоліберальний інституціоналізм), культурології (постколоніалізм), філософії (постструктуралізм), політичної економії (марксизм), – а деякі теорії протистоять традиційній концепції «МВ». Нарешті важливо знати, які дебати стануть ключовими у майбутньому. Метою роботи є оцінка стану розвитку дисципліни «Міжнародні відносини» крізь призму основних наукових дискусій її найбільш знаних теоретиків, серед яких виділяються Оле Вейвер та Кнут Ерік Йоргенсен.У результаті аналізу їх праць можна дійти висновку, що мейнстрім ТМВ відійшов назад до емпіричного, індуктивістського погляду на теорію. Але це не означає закінчення великих дебатів; міркування про «кінець теорії» передчасні: кінець завжди означає новий крок уперед, який може пере-настроїти ТМВ.
Imajući u vidu skorije kritike 'nerazvijenosti', 'pozitivizma', 'metodološke nazadnosti' i drugih nedostataka pripisanih nekakvoj 'američkoj antropologiji' od strane autora iz Beogradske strukturalno-semiološke škole analiziram situaciju u kojoj kolege i studenti mogu da dođu u iskušenje da zdravorazumsku političku vezu polifone etnografije, neoromantizma i nacionalizma tumače kao kontraintuitivnu istoriju discipline. Već sam nagovestio da su značajne transformativne razlike po pitanju odnosa prema strukturalizmu između evropskih antropologija, posebno Beogradske strukturalno-semiološke škole antropologije folklora, i tzv. 'američke' antropologije, rezultat puke slučajnosti - činjenice da su francuski strukturalizam i francuski poststrukturalizam na američku interdisciplinarnu intelektualnu scenu ('Teorija') lansirani istovremeno, na zajedničkoj konferenciji). Ova ironična kontigencija ne bi bila mnogo više do još jedna zabavna epizoda za studente, istoričare antropologije i istoričare ideja, da ne postoje pokušaji, sve artikulisaniji i sve frekventiji, da se intelektualne tradicije porede kao da su elementi jednolinijske evolucije discipline. Beogradska strukturalno-semiološka škola (u daljem tekstu SS), a posebno njen spiritus movens i najcitiraniji predstavnik I. Kovačević poslednjih godina kritikuje nekakvu celinu tzv. 'američke antropologije' čiji se 'dometi' (termin je autorov) procenjuju u komparativnoj perspektivi pri čemu se za jedinicu analize uzimaju neargumentovanom generalizacijom označene nesamerljive tradicije ('postmoderna antropologija' s jedne odnosno'antropologija' s druge strane). Beogradska SS škola jeste razvila globalno originalnu, mada ne plasiranu i zapravo nikada iskorišćenu bateriju za sinhronu analizu folklornih fenomena, ali je to učinila pošto su Lič Nidam, Snajder, etnonauka i kognitivna antropologija Levi-Strosove ideje o duhu i nauci već prilagodili etnografskoj fenomenologiji. Transformacija levi-strosovske analize i njen ograničeno uspešan projekat prilagođavanja analizi fenomena od uobičajenog interesa za antropologiju dogodila se uporedo razvoju kritike strukturalizma kao teorije kulture na američkoj interdisciplinarnoj sceni, pa predstavlja pre dokaz teorije po kojoj i u antropologiji postoji makar jedan 'atlantski jaz' analogan onom u filozofiji nego relevantan kontekst za uporednu analizu 'dometa' specifičnih i međusobno nezavisnih disciplinarih tradicija. Tekst indirektno dokazuje i da Levi-Stros u istoriji antropoloških ideja ima i dijametralno suprotne funkcije - od 'postmoderne' neo-romantičarske pozitivističke kritike imperijalnog realizma (u SAD) do 'prosvetiteljske' realističke anti-tribalističke kritike etnologije kao pozitivističke nacionalističke i nacionalne nauke (u Srbiji). Poseban naglasak u radu stavlja se na lokalni kontekst, u kojem je strukturalizam kao zasnivajući diskurs antropologije kao nauke nasuprot etnologiji kao nacionalnoj prozi, imao potpunu drugačiju funkciju u odnosu na strukturalizam u a) istoriji američke antropologije i b) istoriji inter-disciplinarne/postmoderne Teorije. ; Taking into account recent critiques of 'underdevelopment', 'positivism' 'methodological backwardness' and other failings attributed to so-called 'American Anthropology' by some of the authors from the Belgrade Structural-semiotic School of Anthropology of Folklore, I analyse the context in which colleagues and students may be tempted to explain common sense political connection between polyphone ethnography, neo-romanticism and nationalism as counter-intuitive history of the discipline. I already pointed that the important transformative differences in the attitudes towards structuralism between European anthropologists, especially Belgrade Structural-semiotic School of Anthropology of Folklore and so called 'American Anthropology', are the consequence of a pure coincidence -the fact that French structuralism and French poststructuralism were launched simultaneously at the American interdisciplinary intellectual scene ('Theory') at the same conference. This ironic concurrence would not be much more than one entertaining episode for students, historians of anthropology and historians of ideas, if there were no attempts (more and more frequent and increasingly fluently articulated) to compare different intellectual traditions as they were elements of the same unilineal evolution of the discipline. Belgrade Structural-semiotic School (further called only SS) and especially its spiritus movens and most prominent representative Prof. Kovačević started in recent years to criticise some 'American Anthropology' measuring its academic 'achievement' (the author's term) in comparative perspective and taking as an analytical unit uncritically generalized traditions marked with a single term of 'postmodern anthropology' on the one hand, and 'anthropology' on the other. Belgrade SS School did develop globally original, although badly promoted and never fully used, battery for the synchronic analysis of the folklore phenomena, but this was done only after Leach, Needham, Schneider and representatives of ethnoscience and cognitive anthropology had already adapted Levi-Strauss's ideas about mind and science to ethnographic phenomenology. Transformation of Levi-Strauss's analysis and limited success of its adaptation to the analysis of phenomena that usually concern anthropology happened simultaneously with the development of the critique of structuralism as a theory of culture in the American academic scene. This proves a theory that there is at least one 'Atlantic split', analogue to that in philosophy, more than it makes a relevant context for measuring of the comparative 'academic achievements' of the specific and unconnected disciplinary traditions. Indirectly, this paper explains that Levi-Strauss's work has contradictory functions in the history of ideas in anthropology, serving as a starting point for 'postmodern' neo-romantic and positivistic critique of imperial realism (in USA), as well as 'enlightened', realistic and anti-tribal critique of ethnology as positivistic, nationalistic and national science (in Serbia). In this paper special emphasis is placed on the local context in which structuralism as a founding discourse of anthropology is opposed to ethnology as national prose. As such it had completely different role in comparison to structuralism in a) the history of American anthropology and b) in the history of interdisciplinary/postmodern Theory.
Johtajat ja heidän kognitiot ovat kriittisessä roolissa yrityksen kansainvälistymisprosessissa ja sen muotoutumisessa ajan myötä. Vaikka keskeisimmät kansainvälistymistä koskevat teoriat tiedostavat tämän, ymmärrys ja aiempi tutkimus johtajien ja heidän kognitioiden roolista yrityksen kansainvälistymisprosessissa on yllättävän vähäistä. Aikaisempi tutkimus on keskittynyt tarkastelemaan yrityksen kansainvälistymisprosesseja erityisesti yrityksen ja toimialan tasoilla. Johtajat on nähty rationaalisina toimijoina eikä päätöksentekoa olla nähty merkityksellisenä osana yritysten kansainvälistymisprosesseja. Tutkimukset, jotka ovat huomioineet johtajien päätöksenteon roolin, ovat lähestyneet kysymystä hyvin rajallisista tieteenfilosofisista ja metodologisista lähtökohdista. Tämä on johtanut kapeaan ja yksipuoleiseen ymmärrykseen aiheesta, minkä vuoksi päätöksentekijöiden rooli on jäänyt epäselväksi. Puutteellinen ymmärrys päätöksentekijöiden roolista vaikeuttaa yrityksen kan-sainvälistymisprosessin ymmärtämistä kokonaisuutena, koska kansain-välistymisprosessia ohjaavat päätökset syntyvät lopulta aina johtajien toimesta. Tämä väitöskirja pyrkii avaamaan johtajien päätöksentekoprosessien roolia yrityksen kansainvälistymisessä ensiksi tutkimalla, kuinka kognitiiviset perustat vaikuttavat yrityksen kansainvälistymiseen ja toiseksi esittämällä keinoja, kuinka yrityksen kansainvälistymisen kognitiivisia perustoita voidaan tutkia tulevaisuudessa entistä paremmin. Näitä kysymyksiä lähestytään hyödyntämällä kahden kirjallisuuskatsauksen ja kahden tapaustutkimuksen tuloksia, jotka tarkastelevat yrityksen kansainvälistymisen kognitiivisia perustoita erilaisista teoreettisista tulokulmista. Ensimmäinen kirjallisuuskatsaus avaa kognitiivisesti suuntautuneen kansainvälistymis- tutkimuksen tilaa selvittämällä sekä tutkittuja että vähemmälle huomiolle jääneitä tutkimusalueita näin luoden yhtenäisempää ymmärrystä aiheesta. Toinen kirjallisuuskatsaus tutkii, miten aikaisempi kirjallisuus kansainvälisestä liiketoiminnasta on tarkastellut niitä kognitiivisia eroja, jotka nousevat johtajien kulttuurillisista, kansallisista, etnisistä ja geografisista taustatekijöistä. Kirjallisuuskatsaus integroi nämä löydökset osaksi laajempaan johtajien ja organisaatioiden kognitioihin liittyvää kirjallisuutta. Väitöskirjan ensimmäinen tapaustutkimus tarkastelee heuristisen päätöksenteon kehittymistä yrityksen kansainvälistymisen aikana sekä kontekstisidonnaisen kokemuksen roolia tässä prosessissa. Tutkimuksen löydökset osoittavat, että johtajat pystyvät valjastamaan heuristiikkojen hyödyt päätöksenteossa vasta, kun he ovat kerryttäneet riittävän määrän kontekstisidonnaista kokemusta ja kun sopiva ärsyke laukaisee kertyneen kokemuksen muutoksen käyttökelpoisiksi heuristiikoiksi. Toinen tapaustutkimus puolestaan käsittelee eri historiantutkimuksen menetelmien hyödyntämistä yritysten kansainvälistymisprosessien ja markkinoilta poistumisten temporaalisuuden ymmärtämisessä ja tutkimisessa. Tämä väitöskirja edistää kognitiivisesti suuntautunutta yrityksen kansainvälistymiskir-jallisuutta laaja-alaisesti. Se syventää ymmärrystä siitä, miten johtajien kognitiot muovaavat yrityksen kansainvälistymistä organisoimalla ja tuomalla yhteen aikaisemman tutkimuksen löydöksiä. Erilaisia tieteenfilosofisia tulokulmia hyödyntävät tapaustutkimukset puolestaan edistävät tutkimusta tuomalla esiin uusia piirteitä kognitioiden roolista yrityksen kansainvälistymisessä. Tämän lisäksi väitöskirja tarjoaa jatkotutkimukselle ideoita ja keinoja edistää alan tutkimusta tuomalla esiin kehityskohteita nykyisessä ymmärryksessä sekä havainnollistamalla, kuinka (1) subjektiiviset tutkimusotteet, (2) historialliset tutkimusmenetelmät ja (3) mikroperusteinen tulokulma tarjoavat hyödyntämättömiä mahdollisuuksia edistää alan tutkimusta. ; Individual managers and their cognitions play a crucial role in how a firm's internationalization process unfolds over time. While this is acknowledged in foundational theories of firm internationalization, our understanding of how managers and their cognitions shape the internationalization process remains surprisingly incomplete. This is because prior literature on firm internationalization mainly operates at the firm, industry, or national levels and assumes a relatively high level of managerial rationality, with few studies focusing on how managers and their decision-making processes shape firm internationalization. In addition, the studies that have addressed the cognitive foundations of firm internationalization have done so by drawing on a relatively narrow set of philosophical and methodological alternatives, thus generating a one-sided understanding of the matter. Consequently, scholarship on decision makers' roles in firms' internationalization processes remains underspecified and incomplete, which hampers the field's capacity to fully understand firms' international operations. This dissertation aims to unpack the black box of managers' roles in firm internationalization processes by investigating how cognitive foundations influence firm internationalization and showing how we can further advance the research on the cognitive foundations of firm internationalization in the future. The dissertation approaches these questions through two review studies and two case studies that explore the cognitive foundations of firm internationalization from different perspectives. The first review study investigates the current state of the research field by describing the research domains that have been studied and those that have been underexplored and thus provides an integrative understanding of the research on the cognitive foundations of firms' internationalization processes. The second review study explores how the existing literature has approached the cognitive differences that stem from decision makers' cultural, national, ethnical, and geographical characteristics and the influence that such differences have on firm internationalization processes and integrates these findings into the broader literature on managerial and organizational cognition. The first case study examines heuristic decision-making in firm internationalization and the role of context-specific experience in this process. It advances a theoretical model indicating that managers become able to harness the positive impact of heuristics in internationalization-related decision-making only after they have accumulated a certain level of context-specific experience and when this experience is triggered to transform into usable heuristics by a stimulus of an unexpected event. The second case study explores how different historical approaches can be used to analyze the temporal embeddedness of firms' internationalization and de-internationalization processes unfolding over time. This dissertation contributes to the literature on the cognitive foundations of firm internationalization in two ways. First, it improves the existing understanding of how cognitive foundations shape firm internationalization by reviewing the existing literature to generate integrative understanding of the topic and by empirically explicating novel ways of how cognitions drive internationalization via three philosophical perspectives— qualitative positivism, interpretivism, and poststructuralism. Second, it outlines ways to further advance the research on the cognitive foundations of firm internationalization by pointing out the research gaps that warrant further attention and by proposing that subjective approaches, historical research methods, and the microfoundational approach constitute productive avenues for future research.
'A map on which you cannot find the land Utopia is not even worth looking at.' Ernst Bloch In the following article, I analyze sociopolitical and economic developments in post-Rose Revolution Georgia in the context of two theories: The first originates from the German school of memory studies and the other represents the most recent breakthrough in the Georgian school of social studies. The analysis of the transformations that followed the Revolution of Roses transgresses sociopolitical and economical dimensions and stretches into much larger extent that is time and historical age; that being the case, I will be also examining the altering understanding of time and history against the backdrop of Aleida Assmann's theory of the Time Regimes and Emzar Khvichia's theory of Relativistic-Quantum Noology.
In diesem Beitrag kommen kunstbasierte Analysestrategien zum Einsatz, um die subjektive Involviertheit von Lehramtsstudent/innen in ihren künftigen Beruf nachzuvollziehen. Rückgreifend auf poststrukturalistische Positionen werden idealisierende Repräsentationen des Lehrberufs aufseiten der Studierenden reflektiert und Möglichkeiten kritischer und kunstbasierter Auseinandersetzungen in der Lehrer/innenausbildung thematisiert. Individuelle Stimmen und unterschiedliche Genres werden dabei ineinander verwoben, um die Komplexität des Selbstausdrucks werdender Lehrer/innen zu illustrieren und Freiräume für Dialog und Interpretation kenntlich zu machen.
Tämän työn yleinen tavoite on tuoda käsitteellisesti yhteen diskurssin ja identiteetin jälkistrukturalismin teoreettinen näkökulma, sekä rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuksen kenttä. Työn kontribuutio koostuu siitä, että tämä lähentäminen avaa erilaisia käsitteellisiä ja analyyttisiä näkökulmia niiden poliittisten ulottuvuuksien ymmärtämiseksi, jotka sijoittuvat diskursseja ja identiteettejä konstruoivien diskursiivisten ja visuaalisten referenssien taakse. Vastatakseni tähän tavoitteeseen analysoin väitöskirjatutkimuksessani sosiaalisen todellisuuden järjestäytymistä (social objectivity configuration) kolmen viitepisteen kautta. Nämä viitepisteet sisältävät jälkifoundationalismin teorian, Ernesto Laclaun ja Chantal Mouffen työn eri elementtejä, sekä jälkistrukturalismin strategiat. Laclaun ja Mouffen teoreettinen näkökulma tunnetaan diskurssiteoriana. Analyyttisen kontekstin avulla toteutettu pohdinta ja analyysi on konstruoitu erityisesti erilaisten sosiaalista todellisuutta koskevien selontekojen tarkastelua varten. Ensimmäisessä osassa kontekstualisoidaan hegemonia, antagonismi ja heterogeenisyys kuten käsitteelliset asetukset (conceptual settings). Näitä kolmea asetusta tarkastellaan mahdollisuuksina järjestää identiteettejä ja yhteiskunnallisia organisaatioita koskevia käsityksiä. Ehdottamani analyyttinen viitepiste on maailman diskursiivinen ja visuaalinen esittäminen erilaisten toimijoiden sosiaalista todellisuutta koskevissa selonteoissa. Tällainen representaatio toimii analyyttisenä viitepisteenä, joka mahdollistaa kirjoitettujen lähteiden ottamisen tutkimusmateriaaliksi. Työn analyyttinen tavoite on tarkastella, miten sosiaalista todellisuutta koskevat selonteot on konstruoitu diskursiivisesti erilaisten toimijoiden toimesta ja edellä mainittujen asetuksien sisällä. Analyysin kriittinen ulottuvuus on kyseenalaistaa sekä merkityksen ja representaation välinen yhteismitallisuus, että tämän yhteismitallisuuden käyttö sosiaalista todellisuutta koskevien väitteiden rakentamisessa. Ensimmäisessä asetuksessa hegemonia kontekstualisoidaan tilanteena, joka tarkoittaa kaikkien diskurssien ja identiteettien yhdistämistä kollektiiviseksi kokonaisuudeksi. Hegemonia tarkoittaa hajanaisten elementtien järjestämistä sellaiseksi kokonaisuudeksi, joka pyrkii stabilisoimaan merkityksen sen omilla ehdoilla. Analyyttisenä viitepisteenä toimii Yhdistyneet Kansakunnat, joka esitetään maailmaa yhdistävänä hegemonisena toimijana. Tämän jälkeen antagonismi toimii jakautuneen sosiaalisen kentän viitepisteenä, jossa kaksi vastakkaista elementtiä pyrkivät saavuttamaan hallitsevan aseman tietyssä diskurssissa. Tässä asetuksessa tavoitteena on ymmärtää diskurssin ja identiteetin järjestäytyminen binäärioppositioiden kautta ja selvittää negativiteetin konstitutiivinen aspekti. Tätä kontekstia varten analyyttinen viitepiste koostuu maailmanrauhan temaattisesta esittämisestä bipolaarisessa ja antagonistisessa maailmassa. Viimeiseksi heterogeenisyys kontekstualisoidaan sellaisena asetuksessa, jossa sosiaalinen ja poliittinen toimija on suljettu ulkopuolelle. Tärkein tehtävä tässä kontekstissa on seurata niitä tapoja, joilla toimija artikuloi diskurssin ja identiteetin laiminlyödystä asemastaan käsin. Analysoituna referenssinä toimii Zapatistinen liike, jonka maailmaa koskevia näkemyksiä tarkastellaan sekä lokaalilla että globaalilla tasolla. Näiden käsitteiden kontekstualisoinnin yhteydessä harjoitettu pohdinta ja analysoidut tapaukset havainnollistavat eriäviä maailmankuvia sekä paljastavat erilaisia diskurssin ja identiteetin sosiaalisen järjestäytymisen tapoja, kuten diskurssiteoria on osoittanut. Pohdinta ja analyysi sisältää diskurssiteorian käsitteet, kuten yhtäläisyyden logiikka (logic of equivalence), erityisyyden logiikka (logic of difference), kiinnekohtat (nodal points), sekä tyhjä merkitsijä ja kelluva merkitsijä (empty and floating signifiers). Analyysissa käytetään jälkistructuralismin käsitettä, kuten dekonstruktio, tekstualisuus ja intertekstualisuus, sekä Gillian Rosen visuaaliset metodologiat. Tämä väitöskirjatutkimus haluaa muistuttaa sanojen ja kuvien vaikutusvallasta jokapäiväiseen elämäämme. Sanojen ja kuvien mosaiikin analysointi esittää kuinka paljon paradokseja on rauhan ja konfliktin ymmärtämisessä. ; The general objective of this dissertation is to outline a conceptual approximation that links Peace and Conflict Research with a poststructuralist theorising and analysis of discourse and identity. The argument is that this theoretical perspective is very limited and not fully acknowledged in this field of studies. Thus, understanding approximation as the 'act of coming near', the objective is particularly developed by proposing different points of reference that put forward this perspective to the conceptual resources in Peace and Conflict Research. The approximation is developed with the aim to open different theoretical and analytical angles to comprehend the political dimension behind the discursive and visual references that construct discourses and identities. The points of reference develop through an ontological-theoretical-analytical framework. The first point includes a post-foundational understanding of the social. This understanding considers the multiple and contingent foundations constituting the social and the political dimension behind this. The second point includes an analytical context based on the perspective developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, known as discourse theory. Specifically, the analytical context is based on the contextualisation of discourse theory's noti ons of hegemony, antagonism and heterogeneity as conceptual settings. The conceptual settings are the frame in which the analysis takes place and they exemplify different configurations of discourse and identity. This is what is regarded as exploring social objectivity. Finally, the third point displays different 'poststructural strategies' used in the analysis. With reference to the analytical context, the first conceptual setting displays hegemony as a configuration that involves the conjunction of all-encompassing discourse and identities into a collective one. This contextualisation entails the creation of a configuration from a dispersion of elements trying to stabilise meaning in its own terms. The analytical reference in this first setting portrays the United Nations as a hegemonic actor uniting the world. In the second conceptual setting, antagonism works as a reference of a divided social field where two opposite elements try to achieve a dominant position in a given discourse. In this scenario the aim is to understand the composition of discourse and identity though binary oppositions and to consider the constitutive aspect of negativity. For this setting, the analytical reference consists of the thematic representation of world peace in a bipolar antagonist context. Finally, in the last conceptual setting, heterogeneity is contextualised as a situation wherein a socio-political actor has been neglected or overlooked. The significant issue in this context is to follow the ways the actor articulates a discourse and identity from a disregarded position. The reference analysed is the Zapatista movement and their visions of the world from the local to the global level. These three seemingly unrelated settings, along with the analysis of images and written sources, find common ground with the contextualisation that happens at the conceptual level. The articulation of images and quotations, that together form a mosaic of contingent identities and discourses, illustrate contrasting worldviews and show the different social configurations of discourse and identity as argued by discourse theory. Conceptually, the discussion develops considering discourse theory's concepts such as the logics of equivalence and difference, nodal points, empty and floating signifiers, myths, and social imaginaries. These concepts are analytically complemented with the notions of discursivity, deconstruction, textuality and intertextuality, politics of visual representation, and with particular proposals of Gillian Rose's visual methodologies. The conceptual approximation provides insight into theoretical and analytical references based on poststructuralism with new lines, difficulties and openings in Peace and Conflict Research. Peace and conflict convey simultaneous contradictions and paradoxes that are necessarily mediated within words and images. This dissertation, thereby, intends to be a reminder of the dimension of power comprised by words and images in our everyday lives. The mosaic of contingent identities and discourses analysed in this work makes evident the need to think about the many foundations making the social and in the possibility of coexisting peace(s).
[spa] La presente tesis aborda el tema de la identidad femenina y las relaciones de poder que la determinan en los relatos de Luisa Valenzuela. Se analizan dos grupos de relatos de la autora que subvierten los modelos dominantes y opresivos de la feminidad. El primer grupo abarca las reescrituras de los cuentos de hadas, mientras el segundo trata la construcción de la feminidad en el ambiente de la última dictadura militar argentina. Los dos grupos de relatos presentan una suerte de crítica respecto a la formación discursiva de la mujer como sujeto. La tesis presenta en los capítulos introductorios varios problemas teóricos que se reflejan en la obra ensayística y narrativa de Valenzuela. Se analizan las relaciones entre el posmodernismo, el posestructuralismo y el feminismo, especialmente en lo que concierne al problema del sujeto femenino. También se presentan las teorías de Luce Irigaray y Hélène Cixous sobre la escritura femenina que guardan muchas similitudes con las de Valenzuela. Estas autoras realizan ante todo el análisis deconstructivo del discurso psicoanalítico sobre la sexualidad femenina y la señalan como el lugar de la represión discursiva falocéntrica, pero también como el instrumento de la conquista de la libertad. Las dos teorizan sobre un lenguaje femenino, a veces fundándose en ciertas ideas esencialistas sobre la identidad femenina. El concepto clave en la poética de Valenzuela es el de "escribir con el cuerpo". Valenzuela se reafirma en la existencia de una escritura específicamente femenina, que tiene su origen en una sexualidad y experiencia históricas únicas de la mujer. Escribir con el cuerpo significa oponerse a la unión del logos con la cultura falocéntrica, hablar desde una posición de marginalización de las mujeres en la cultura y la sociedad patriarcales. Los cuentos de hadas de Perrault y de los hermanos Grimm representan un tipo de discurso marcadamente falocéntrico y las reescrituras de la autora sirven para deconstruir la arbitrariedad sociocultural que está en base de los textos que pretenden presentarse como transcendentales y cercanos a la mitología, el folklore y los contenidos universales de la psique humana. Se trata de la crítica de los modos más sutiles de la normativización del sujeto femenino a través de las ideas de la belleza, la virtud, la humildad y la pasividad de las heroínas, en contraste con las brujas y las madrastras. Las rescrituras de Valenzuela devuelven la voz narrativa a las heroínas y subvierten las dicotomías entre las construcciones normativas y estigmatizadas de la feminidad. Los relatos que tratan la vida de las mujeres bajo la dictadura militar argentina comparten algunas características importantes con las reescrituras de los cuentos de hadas, pero también presentan diferencias importantes que exigen otro tipo de análisis y una contextualización sociohistórica adicional. El libro de Diane Taylor, Disappearing Acts: Spectacles of Gender and Nationalism in Argentina's "Dirty War", analiza las estrategias discursivas y performativas de la propaganda oficial del régimen dictatorial a partir de las ideas posestructuralistas y proporciona instrumentos críticos muy importantes para acercarse a este grupo de relatos. Taylor demuestra de qué manera los discursos y las prácticas autoritarias militares participaron en la construcción simbólica de la feminidad. El "relato maestro" de la dictadura argentina exhibe características más siniestras que los cuentos de hadas, puesto que presenta a las mujeres no sumisas como un Otro deshumanizado, lo que justifica los castigos más brutales. Los dos grupos de relatos analizados en la tesis expanden la idea de la identidad femenina más allá de su construcción dominante. La liberación femenina se persigue principalmente a través de la reapropiación del lenguaje; las heroínas toman la voz narrativa para oponerse a las narraciones canónicas que crean y oprimen a los sujetos femeninos. Valenzuela no propone ningún modelo hegemónico de la feminidad, más bien quiere ampliar el horizonte de las posibilidades para la mujer a través de la subversión de los discursos y las estructuras sociales dominantes. ; [eng] This thesis attempts to analyze from a feminist perspective the concept of female identity and the depiction of power relations in selected stories of the Argentinian writer Luisa Valenzuela. The study aims to show in which ways the author subverts oppressive models of femininity created in canonical fairy tales which she is rewriting, as well as the manner in which some of her stories denounce the construction of femininity during the last Argentinian dictatorship. In her essays, Luisa Valenzuela has developed a theory about the specificity of women's writing and the role of a woman in subversion of existing social, cultural and political orders. I tried to establish a theoretical framework about female identity with regard to poststructuralist theories of the subject and their relations to feminism. I also presented the ideas of French feminists, Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous, about women's writing and female desire which bear a strong resemblance to the ideas developed by Valenzuela. Moving between poststructuralism and essentialism, Valenzuela's poetics and politics propose the idea of a woman as a privileged subject of social change, deriving the strength from her historical oppression. She is thus able to reinvent her identity in a freer manner than a man, and even able to access the obscure knowledge, suppressed by the dominant, falogocentric culture. In her rewritings of fairy tales, Valenzuela tries to subvert the traditional discourse about femininity. The tales of Perrault and Grimm created the normative model of femininity, in accordance with the social conception of appropriate women's behavior of their time. As such, this literary tradition is reflecting and further establishing the patriarchal oppression of women. The traditional heroines of fairy tales have no voice of their own, are submissive, passive and obedient, their primary ambition being to get married. The narrative voice is omniscient, and the very specific, falocentric view is presented as a universal, objective truth. Valenzuela's rewritings give voice back to women, subvert the dichotomies between normative and stigmatized constructions of femininity, and give agency and autonomy to the heroines who take charge of their destinies. Valenzuela also subverts dominant discourses of femininity in her stories about the ultimate Argentinian dictatorship. The grand narrative of the dictatorial regime constructs femininity as fragile and submissive. These stories describe physical abuse in conjunction with symbolic acts of gendered oppression and as such exhibit more obvious modes of control of women and their bodies and identities, but also denounce the more subtle, discursive and performative ways by which the regime enforces femininity to their political enemies as a means of degrading them. The question of female sexuality and of writing with the body obtains special meaning in this sociohistorical context. The bodies that write are to be interpreted as tortured, abused and stigmatized bodies and are conceptualized as parts of discursive and performative reality rather than natural bodies who try to subvert the system by their connection with mythical or ahistorical essence. The two groups of stories analyzed in the thesis subvert the dominant, falogocentric discourses of femininity and expand the idea of a female identity beyond its canonical production. The main proposition of Valenzuela's stories is reappropriation of female language, primarily by giving the narrative voice to the heroines who challenge the traditional and dominant narratives by which the female subjects are constructed and subjugated. She does not aim to create any hegemonic model of femininity but rather to question the existing social structures and discourses which stand on a woman's way to liberation.
The article aims to describe and analyse international relations debates, focusing on the contributions that feminisms make to the field as one of the dissident currents and reflectivist approaches -especially in its postcolonial/decolonial formulations. The methodology used is qualitative, and a specific bibliography is reviewed in order to examine the current discussions in the discipline, the confrontations within feminisms in IR, as well as their contributions. Moreover, we will look at the revision that Latin American and Caribbean decolonial feminism has instigated, considering the importance of intersectionality for expanding disciplinary boundaries. The text is articulated around the following questions: What debates run through the contemporary disciplinary field? What do the approaches of feminisms, within this framework, question and propose? What methodologies and notions do they introduce in IR studies? Which contributions are made by Latin American and Caribbean feminism? Thus, specific methodological and epistemological issues illuminated by feminisms in IR, such as the body politics,the micropolitics approach, and the focus on everyday practices,are given particular consideration. Solomon & Steele (2016) affirm that it "is only now — with increasing shifts to the micro — that academic IR has begun to (re)discover the lives and people of global politics, and to breathe life back into a field that grand theory mostly neglected". Every life of any person around the world should be recognized; there is no international system or society without the actions and practices of ordinary people. In this regard, feminisms have been key introductions into the field of IR, along with poststructuralism and postcolonialism, which are regular research instruments in disciplines like anthropology or sociology. For instance, ethnographic studies or participant observation are techniques that support the turns and innovations mentioned above. This framework is fundamental to make gender differences visible from an intersectional perspective. Postcolonial/decolonial feminism concentrates their studies on that difference, especially considering its links with other inequalities and concrete oppressions: e.g. in relation to race, ethnicity, religion, class, and nationality. In Latin America and the Caribbean, this perspective takes on an added relevance, and gives rise in this text to the problematization of its entanglement with human rights; the relationship between women, work and racialization; inequalities and violence; together with their links with global neoliberalism. In this respect, the article gives a comprehensive account of the main issues tackled by feminisms in the region, such as women's positions during the colonization period, and the multiple forms of violence related to their role. For instance, there is the importance of state responsibility in femicides, and the internal colonization and the neglect of diversity in national (plurinational) societies. These are performed by academia and social movements, particularly so in Western (white) feminist perspectives. The text is divided into three sections. Firstly, the framework of current IR debates is established, the differences between feminisms in IR and their classifications are described, and the theoretical contributions that these approaches have made to the discipline through methodological instruments such as micropolitics, corporeality and the practices of everyday life are elaborated. In the words of Enloe (2007, p.100) "Feminism is a multidimensional yet coherent worldview. Feminism is an achieved mosaic of understandings, yet it is still unfolding. […] feminism is a complex set of understandings about how power operates, how power is legitimized and how power is perpetuated". Regardless of which perspective within feminism is being highlighted, some fundamental common issues will appear: neoliberalism and patriarchy are two of them, but also violence against women, gender identities and rights, exploitation, public and private spheres distinctions, etc. Then, the particularities of decolonial feminisms in Latin America and the Caribbean, along with their intersectional look at the field, are discussed: the question of subalternity, difference and neoliberalism, the concrete forms they acquire in the Global South and in the region. Moreover, the relevance of the link between neoliberalism and patriarchy is brought into consideration as a research topic shared by different feminist perspectives. In this respect, we name some authors form the region that propose feminist genealogic studies (Ciriza, 2015; Parra, 2021). As Marchand (2013, p.64) explains, the opportunities of a young middle-class woman with a university education are greater than those of a 65-year-old indigenous man with little formal education and a peasant life. While obviously not in a dominant position in society and the labour market, the young woman still has a privileged position with respect to the indigenous. These differences are invisible in the rational mainstream, and also in liberal -and some socialist or poststructuralist- feminisms. Some particular research is mentioned to show how the body politics, micropolitical approaches, and the practice turn are effectively used in IR studies, with innovative techniques oriented towards ethnographic studies and participated action. For instance, the examination of global women (and gender diversities), migration and mobility are illuminated by focusing in particular case: women from Guerrero in Texas (Muñoz y Mendoza, 2018). Also, the incidences of sexual violence in the conflict in Guatemala is brought to light through the voices of the Maya women survivors and thanks to the research of Fulchiron (2016). This research emphasises the use of the femininized body as a war instrument. In addition, this paper mentions the contribution that Latin American and Caribbean feminisms have made to the field of human rights, especially through the participation in international organizations such as OAS and UN. (Barrancos, 2021; Chiarotti Boero, 2021) Considering all the above mentioned, we state that critical and intersectional feminisms allow us to think IR as a diverse field, with true planetary scope, and capable of recovering the importance of the well-being and daily lives of people. Finally, the conclusions are presented with possible relevant lines for future research (ecofeminism and the Latin American approaches to it). Dissident contributions in IR, in general, call into question the mainstream, giving rise in recent years to alternative, peripheral and silenced voices through postcolonial studies (decoloniality) and the feminisms, amongst others. These voices of difference generate discussion beyond hegemonic perspectives, producing key contributions for the continued interrogation of the discipline. These voices, for instance from Latin America and the Caribbean, draw on their own worldviews, along with traditional and popular knowledge. This assists in the promotion of new approaches and value situated, plural, intersectional and corporeized knowledges. ; El artículo se propone describir y analizar los debates en la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales (RRII), focalizando en los aportes que los feminismos hacen al campo como corriente disidente, y en especial, en sus vertientes postcoloniales/decoloniales. Con una metodología cualitativa, se revisa bibliografía específica que permite dar cuenta de las discusiones actuales en la disciplina, las confrontaciones al interior de los feminismos en RRII y sus contribuciones, y, en ese plano, se repasan los aportes propios del feminismo decolonial latinoamericano y caribeño, considerando el señalamiento sobre la interseccionalidad realizada por este. Así, se examinan cuestiones metodológicas y epistemológicas concretas como la cuestión del cuerpo, los estudios desde la micropolítica y el foco en las prácticas cotidianas de las personas, iluminadas por los feminismos en las RRII. Ese marco es fundamental para visibilizar las diferencias de género desde una perspectiva interseccional, que desde el feminismo postcolonial/decolonial se concentra en sus vínculos con otras desigualdades y opresiones (raza, origen, clase social, entre otras). En América Latina y el Caribe esta mirada adquiere una relevancia distintiva y da lugar en este escrito a la problematización de sus vínculos con los derechos humanos, con las desigualdades y las violencias, y sus articulaciones con el neoliberalismo transnacionalizado. El texto se divide en tres apartados: primero, en el marco de los debates actuales del campo de estudio, se revisan los aportes de los feminismos en las RRII y se describen las diferencias al interior de estos. En particular, se indican como contribuciones teórico-metodológicas de los enfoques feministas a las RRII aquellos estudios basados en la micropolítica, la corporeidad y las prácticas de la vida cotidiana. Luego, se tratan las particularidades de los feminismos decoloniales en América Latina y el Caribe y su mirada interseccional en el campo: la cuestión de la subalternidad, la diferencia, la inequidad y el neoliberalismo, las formas concretas que adquieren en el Sur Global y en la región. Por último, se presentan las conclusiones con posibles líneas relevantes para futuras investigaciones. Los aportes disidentes en las RRII, en general, ponen en cuestión la corriente principal, dando lugar en los últimos años a voces alternativas, periféricas y silenciadas a través de los estudios postcoloniales (decolonialidad) y los feminismos, entre otros. Son esas voces de la diferencia las que presentan discusión a las perspectivas hegemónicas, produciendo contribuciones claves para continuar pensando la disciplina; en América Latina y el Caribe esto se realiza desde cosmovisiones propias, que buscan amalgamar saberes tradicionales y populares, propiciar nuevos enfoques y valorizar un conocimiento situado, interseccional, plural y corporeizado.
Romantisme : pro et contra Qu'est-ce que le romantisme ? Le titre de l'ouvrage d'Henri Peyre pose en 1971 une question qui n'a cessé d'agiter les critiques tout au long du XXe siècle et à laquelle aucune réponse n'a jamais fait consensus. Plutôt que d'ajouter aux essais de définition et aux tentatives de description exhaustive, nous souhaiterions ici proposer un autre regard sur ces interrogations et nous demander, au miroir de la critique française et étrangère du siècle passé, non pas ce qu'est le romantisme, mais, dans la lignée du renversement proposé par Raymond Immerwahr, ce qui se passe quand on appelle un objet « romantique » ou quand l'on donne une définition à « romantisme » . Ce volume invite donc à une réflexion historique sur la manière dont les différents courants de critique et de théorie littéraire ont lu et appréhendé le romantisme dans le courant du XXe siècle. Pourquoi se pencher sur la réception critique du romantisme en particulier ? D'abord parce que, parmi les différents courants littéraires, le romantisme s'est régulièrement trouvé au cœur des débats théoriques tout au long du XXe siècle, et que les principaux paradigmes critiques l'ont érigé tour à tour en modèle et en contre-modèle. On trouve aux deux extrémités du siècle des moments de valorisation du romantisme : au début du XXe siècle, il constitue le corpus par excellence des premières approches comparatistes formalisées, destinées chez un Fernand Baldensperger ou un Paul Van Tieghem à dégager des traits littéraires transversaux communs à l'ensemble des littératures européennes . Vers la fin du siècle, le romantisme est également remis à l'honneur : dans le contexte français actuel, le paradigme critique qui invite à relire les textes littéraires à la lumière de l'histoire culturelle s'est développé à partir de l'étude du Zeitgeist romantique, et considère le corpus romantique comme un lieu privilégié pour penser les processus littéraires et esthétiques. Mais entre les deux, c'est une vaste zone troublée qui se déploie à une époque considérée comme l'âge d'or de la critique française : dans les courants théoriques des années 1960 et 1970, le rapport au romantisme se fait plus ambivalent et les différents paradigmes critiques sont amenés à se définir par rapport à lui – souvent par rejet radical. Le structuralisme, par exemple, avec son approche formelle et sa conception du texte autotélique, qui se réclame ouvertement de la double tradition flaubertienne et mallarméenne, discrédite l'aspiration des « mages romantiques » à faire de l'art la relève de la philosophie et de l'écrivain le dépositaire d'un sacerdoce moral. Et ce n'est que lorsque son emprise commence à se relâcher un peu qu'un Barthes revient à Balzac pour mesurer jusqu'à quel point il ouvre déjà partiellement vers le pluriel du « Texte », ou qu'un Todorov s'intéresse aux « théories du symbole » des premiers romantiques allemands, rompant ainsi avec l'arbitraire du signe saussurien cher à Lévi-Strauss et à l'ensemble du structuralisme . En revanche, le poststructuralisme tel que défini entre autres par une Julia Kristeva affiche d'abord une méconnaissance offensée du romantisme, et ne fait commencer les « révolutions du langage poétique » que passé le temps de son hégémonie . Enfin, si elle se place en théorie dans la lignée de la polysémie romantique, tout un pan de la théorie de la « déconstruction » française continue de manifester une certaine méfiance pour le courant : ainsi, la « déconstruction » tend parfois à condamner la littérature romantique, héritière des théories du langage de Rousseau et Herder, en la soupçonnant d'une foi naïve en la « métaphysique de la présence » qui la confinerait dans une posture nostalgique et aveuglée. Jacques Derrida reconnaît par exemple de sa part un rapport « un peu raide » à certains romantiques allemands et français, pour qui le sacre de l'écrivain ne semble pouvoir se faire que dans une fétichisation de la voix charismatique de l'auteur, ce qui pour le penseur français est l'aveu d'une croyance erronée dans le caractère secondaire de l'écrit par rapport à la parole vive. Un objet critique sensible : archaïsme ou modernité ? Ce statut ambivalent met en lumière l'enjeu particulier que constitue l'interprétation du romantisme pour la théorie littéraire du XXe siècle. En effet, beaucoup de critiques s'accordent pour le considérer comme une ligne de partage entre archaïsme et modernité en littérature, mais sans pour autant trancher si l'avènement d'une littérature dans laquelle les contemporains se reconnaissent se fait avec le romantisme, ou au contraire après lui. Le romantisme fait-il partie de cette modernité dont il serait l'avant-poste, ou constitue-t-il au contraire la dernière étape avant les « révolutions du langage poétique » ? La question reste plus ouverte qu'on ne le soupçonnerait. Dès la fin des années 1940, un Jean-Paul Sartre garde le romantisme en point de mire quand il récrit sous le nom d'« engagement » une nouvelle partition de la « fonction du poète » ; et il l'a toujours en vue lorsque, plus tard, il remonte aux « frères aînés » de « l'idiot de la famille » pour mieux comprendre la radicale rupture que signifie la tentation flaubertienne de l'impersonnalité. De même, à l'époque même où le structuralisme paraît dénier aux romantiques un rôle dans la production de la littérature moderne en faisant de Flaubert et Mallarmé les fondateurs d'une littérature de l'intransivité, d'autres penseurs tout aussi importants estiment que c'est au romantisme que l'on doit cette révolution. Lorsque Foucault traque dans Les Mots et les choses la métaphore de la transparence qui dévoile la grande utopie d'un « langage […] où les choses elles-mêmes seraient nommées sans brouillage », il valorise par contre-coup une littérature qui « s'enferme dans une intransivité radicale » et « devient pure et simple affirmation d'un langage qui n'a plus pour loi que d'affirmer […] son existence escarpée » : or, pour Foucault, « le mode d'être moderne du langage », amené à lutter tout au long du XIXe siècle avec une forme de réalisme cratylien, s'inaugure bien avec « la révolte romantique contre un discours immobilisé dans sa cérémonie ». Chez Maurice Blanchot, toute la littérature moderne trouve sa source dans le romantisme, moment où le rêve d'une adéquation parfaite du langage cède la place à la recherche d'une intransivité radicale : pour ce critique, l'art de l'époque romantique est marqué par une perte externe de souveraineté, mais se trouve compensée par la conquête d'une nouvelle fonction interne, celle de « l'art comme recherche ». De Hölderlin à Kafka, c'est un autre modèle littéraire qui s'impose alors, celui d'une œuvre toujours à la recherche de sa propre origine. Avant même le retour de l'auteur dans les « biographèmes » du Barthes tardif ou la préférence accordée au « figural » par Jean-François Lyotard au détriment des signes discursifs , le romantisme est loin d'être le mouton noir de la critique des années 1960 et 1970 : il apparaît comme un objet profondément pluriel, dont l'appréciation varie en fonction des romantiques et des romantismes que l'on sélectionne. On constate ainsi que l'influence méthodologique et certains modes concrets d'appropriation du romantisme diffèrent parfois du discours critique global porté sur lui : dans la critique du XXe siècle, le romantisme est souvent là où on ne l'attend pas. Pourrait-on même voir, à la suite de Jean-Marie Schaeffer ou Denis Thouard, des généalogies secrètes qui iraient des romantiques allemands à Bakhtine et au structuralisme ou des héritages cachés du romantisme dans les pensées contemporaines ? « Situations » des lectures du romantisme : moments et espaces de la réception critique Au-delà de l'interprétation du romantisme en lui-même, c'est donc une lecture de ses lectures qui devient possible. En replaçant les réceptions critiques dans leur cadre conceptuel, on fait en effet apparaître des effets de perspective, qui permettent de situer dans le temps et dans l'espace les différentes lectures du romantisme, mais aussi de mettre en relief les éventuelles lacunes ou mésinterprétations qu'ont pu engager des analyses pourtant devenues canoniques. Ainsi, plusieurs ouvrages récents soulignent que l'appropriation du romantisme par toute une tradition critique au nom du principe d'intransivité repose en réalité sur une lecture biaisée par des préoccupations propres au contexte dans lesquelles elle se fait jour : ainsi des tenants d'une littérature close sur elle-même, qui revendiquent la tradition de « l'art pour l'art », mais sans reprendre la conception romantique qui lie autonomie et efficacité et veut que l'œuvre sublime conquière de fait un pouvoir renforcé sur le monde . Le même type d'appropriation subjective paraît à l'œuvre dans la théorie de « l'Absolu littéraire », qui s'inspire des premiers romantiques allemands et de leur art clos sur lui-même comme un hérisson, mais laisse de côté le programme politique et social présent dans la philosophie de Fichte ou la « nouvelle mythologie » des frères Schlegel . Dans les deux cas, le romantisme se trouverait promu autour d'un malentendu, ou au moins d'une vision partielle, qui évacuerait une ambition messianique jugée surannée à l'époque du Nouveau Roman ou un programme politique qui investit les notions de Nation et de race devenues profondément suspectes. L'idée que les moments de la lecture romantique sont profondément informés par leur contexte historique se prolonge avec les nuances en termes d'espace que la réception critique du romantisme fait apparaître. Si, pour les déconstructionnistes français, le romantisme apparaît comme une littérature périmée, l'école de Yale d'un Paul de Man et aujourd'hui d'un Harold Bloom a totalement renouvelé l'étude des romantiques britanniques, à laquelle elle se consacre presque exclusivement. De même, dans le monde anglo-saxon, la littérature romantique, loin d'être exclue de la modernité, s'est trouvée au cœur de la constitution des principaux paradigmes critiques contemporains, des postcolonial studies qui prennent naissance dans les analyses d'Edward Said sur l'image de l'Orient chez les romantiques , à la notion de world literature qui revendique l'héritage de la Weltliteratur de Goethe et des romantiques allemands , en passant par la critique féministe dont la figure tutélaire, la « folle du grenier », est empruntée à un roman de Charlotte Brontë . Pour revenir à notre point de départ, on notera également que la promotion initiale du romantisme par les premiers spécialistes de littérature comparée est l'œuvre d'universitaires issus de la tradition allemande de la romanistique : le Belge Paul Van Tieghem, le Français Fernand Baldensperger, créateur en 1928 du Cours Universitaire de Davos (Davoser Hochschulkurse), et plus tard le Suisse Albert Béguin voient dans le romantisme un signe de l'unité de la culture européenne, à une époque où déjà, en France, l'accent mis sur l'aspect poétique d'une littérature qui, selon Paul Valéry, « est et ne peut être autre chose qu'une sorte d'extension et d'application de certaines propriétés du langage », lance une tradition critique de soupçon envers le romantisme. La réception souvent heurtée du romantisme dans la critique du XXe siècle nous incite donc à proposer une historicisation du regard critique. Cet ouvrage, issu d'une journée de réflexion menée en février 2015 dans le cadre hospitalier du Musée de la Vie romantique, que nous remercions pour son généreux accueil, ne vise pas à dégager une vision synthétique du romantisme – on s'est souvenu que le titre du premier numéro de la revue Romantisme, « L'Impossible unité » – et il ne prétend pas non plus à l'exhaustivité : il propose une série de perspectives dans cette histoire complexe et gigantesque, que d'autres livres auront soin de venir compléter . Le chemin qu'il propose s'articule en plusieurs temps : d'abord, on reviendra aux commencements du problème romantique dans la critique européenne – les articles de Matthieu Vernet et de Victoire Feuillebois montrent ainsi que, de manière très différente et avec des visées critiques diverses, les années 1900 voient l'entrée en scène du romantisme comme problème critique fondamental, que l'on cherche à en donner une vision historicisée ou qu'il fonctionne comme un miroir des problématiques de l'esprit du temps. On soulignera ensuite le caractère fatalement kaléidoscopique des réceptions du romantisme à travers l'exemple du romantisme allemand : Patrick Marot, Philippe Forget et Éric Lecler soulignent à la fois le caractère productif de ces appropriations, leur éloignement relatif par rapport à l'original et les résultats très différents auxquels amène la lecture d'un même texte. Mais au-delà des lectures individuelles, ce sont bien des tentatives d'interprétation générales du romantisme qui caractérisent le siècle – soit, comme le montre José-Luis Diaz pour la génération 1970 et Mark Sandy dans son riche panorama des études romantiques ango-saxonnes, qu'elles tentent de dégager une image structurée et conceptualisée du romantisme, soit, ainsi que le souligne Yvon Le Scanff, qu'elles tendent à isoler des concepts pour penser le romantisme, comme celui de sublime qui apparaît paradoxalement opératoire. On se proposera enfin de clôre cette réflexion en mettant en valeur la place du romantisme dans les questionnements à la frontière entre le littéraire et le culturel : Serge Zenkine, Michael Löwy et Robert Sayre rendent sensibles le caractère singulier de la notion, qui excède de loin la dimension purement poétique, tout en continuant de porter une interrogation théorique forte, ce qui explique à la fois la variété de ses échos et la pérennité de la sensibilité dans d'autres espaces et d'autres temps. Nous espérons que ce panorama puisse contribuer à préciser le statut et la place des études sur le romantisme dans le champ intellectuel contemporain et à réfléchir aux outils épistémologiques légués par ces différentes approches pour penser le romantisme au début du XXIe siècle. José-Luis DIAZ et Victoire FEUILLEBOIS
Romantisme : pro et contra Qu'est-ce que le romantisme ? Le titre de l'ouvrage d'Henri Peyre pose en 1971 une question qui n'a cessé d'agiter les critiques tout au long du XXe siècle et à laquelle aucune réponse n'a jamais fait consensus. Plutôt que d'ajouter aux essais de définition et aux tentatives de description exhaustive, nous souhaiterions ici proposer un autre regard sur ces interrogations et nous demander, au miroir de la critique française et étrangère du siècle passé, non pas ce qu'est le romantisme, mais, dans la lignée du renversement proposé par Raymond Immerwahr, ce qui se passe quand on appelle un objet « romantique » ou quand l'on donne une définition à « romantisme » . Ce volume invite donc à une réflexion historique sur la manière dont les différents courants de critique et de théorie littéraire ont lu et appréhendé le romantisme dans le courant du XXe siècle. Pourquoi se pencher sur la réception critique du romantisme en particulier ? D'abord parce que, parmi les différents courants littéraires, le romantisme s'est régulièrement trouvé au cœur des débats théoriques tout au long du XXe siècle, et que les principaux paradigmes critiques l'ont érigé tour à tour en modèle et en contre-modèle. On trouve aux deux extrémités du siècle des moments de valorisation du romantisme : au début du XXe siècle, il constitue le corpus par excellence des premières approches comparatistes formalisées, destinées chez un Fernand Baldensperger ou un Paul Van Tieghem à dégager des traits littéraires transversaux communs à l'ensemble des littératures européennes . Vers la fin du siècle, le romantisme est également remis à l'honneur : dans le contexte français actuel, le paradigme critique qui invite à relire les textes littéraires à la lumière de l'histoire culturelle s'est développé à partir de l'étude du Zeitgeist romantique, et considère le corpus romantique comme un lieu privilégié pour penser les processus littéraires et esthétiques. Mais entre les deux, c'est une vaste zone troublée qui se déploie à une époque considérée comme l'âge d'or de la critique française : dans les courants théoriques des années 1960 et 1970, le rapport au romantisme se fait plus ambivalent et les différents paradigmes critiques sont amenés à se définir par rapport à lui – souvent par rejet radical. Le structuralisme, par exemple, avec son approche formelle et sa conception du texte autotélique, qui se réclame ouvertement de la double tradition flaubertienne et mallarméenne, discrédite l'aspiration des « mages romantiques » à faire de l'art la relève de la philosophie et de l'écrivain le dépositaire d'un sacerdoce moral. Et ce n'est que lorsque son emprise commence à se relâcher un peu qu'un Barthes revient à Balzac pour mesurer jusqu'à quel point il ouvre déjà partiellement vers le pluriel du « Texte », ou qu'un Todorov s'intéresse aux « théories du symbole » des premiers romantiques allemands, rompant ainsi avec l'arbitraire du signe saussurien cher à Lévi-Strauss et à l'ensemble du structuralisme . En revanche, le poststructuralisme tel que défini entre autres par une Julia Kristeva affiche d'abord une méconnaissance offensée du romantisme, et ne fait commencer les « révolutions du langage poétique » que passé le temps de son hégémonie . Enfin, si elle se place en théorie dans la lignée de la polysémie romantique, tout un pan de la théorie de la « déconstruction » française continue de manifester une certaine méfiance pour le courant : ainsi, la « déconstruction » tend parfois à condamner la littérature romantique, héritière des théories du langage de Rousseau et Herder, en la soupçonnant d'une foi naïve en la « métaphysique de la présence » qui la confinerait dans une posture nostalgique et aveuglée. Jacques Derrida reconnaît par exemple de sa part un rapport « un peu raide » à certains romantiques allemands et français, pour qui le sacre de l'écrivain ne semble pouvoir se faire que dans une fétichisation de la voix charismatique de l'auteur, ce qui pour le penseur français est l'aveu d'une croyance erronée dans le caractère secondaire de l'écrit par rapport à la parole vive. Un objet critique sensible : archaïsme ou modernité ? Ce statut ambivalent met en lumière l'enjeu particulier que constitue l'interprétation du romantisme pour la théorie littéraire du XXe siècle. En effet, beaucoup de critiques s'accordent pour le considérer comme une ligne de partage entre archaïsme et modernité en littérature, mais sans pour autant trancher si l'avènement d'une littérature dans laquelle les contemporains se reconnaissent se fait avec le romantisme, ou au contraire après lui. Le romantisme fait-il partie de cette modernité dont il serait l'avant-poste, ou constitue-t-il au contraire la dernière étape avant les « révolutions du langage poétique » ? La question reste plus ouverte qu'on ne le soupçonnerait. Dès la fin des années 1940, un Jean-Paul Sartre garde le romantisme en point de mire quand il récrit sous le nom d'« engagement » une nouvelle partition de la « fonction du poète » ; et il l'a toujours en vue lorsque, plus tard, il remonte aux « frères aînés » de « l'idiot de la famille » pour mieux comprendre la radicale rupture que signifie la tentation flaubertienne de l'impersonnalité. De même, à l'époque même où le structuralisme paraît dénier aux romantiques un rôle dans la production de la littérature moderne en faisant de Flaubert et Mallarmé les fondateurs d'une littérature de l'intransivité, d'autres penseurs tout aussi importants estiment que c'est au romantisme que l'on doit cette révolution. Lorsque Foucault traque dans Les Mots et les choses la métaphore de la transparence qui dévoile la grande utopie d'un « langage […] où les choses elles-mêmes seraient nommées sans brouillage », il valorise par contre-coup une littérature qui « s'enferme dans une intransivité radicale » et « devient pure et simple affirmation d'un langage qui n'a plus pour loi que d'affirmer […] son existence escarpée » : or, pour Foucault, « le mode d'être moderne du langage », amené à lutter tout au long du XIXe siècle avec une forme de réalisme cratylien, s'inaugure bien avec « la révolte romantique contre un discours immobilisé dans sa cérémonie ». Chez Maurice Blanchot, toute la littérature moderne trouve sa source dans le romantisme, moment où le rêve d'une adéquation parfaite du langage cède la place à la recherche d'une intransivité radicale : pour ce critique, l'art de l'époque romantique est marqué par une perte externe de souveraineté, mais se trouve compensée par la conquête d'une nouvelle fonction interne, celle de « l'art comme recherche ». De Hölderlin à Kafka, c'est un autre modèle littéraire qui s'impose alors, celui d'une œuvre toujours à la recherche de sa propre origine. Avant même le retour de l'auteur dans les « biographèmes » du Barthes tardif ou la préférence accordée au « figural » par Jean-François Lyotard au détriment des signes discursifs , le romantisme est loin d'être le mouton noir de la critique des années 1960 et 1970 : il apparaît comme un objet profondément pluriel, dont l'appréciation varie en fonction des romantiques et des romantismes que l'on sélectionne. On constate ainsi que l'influence méthodologique et certains modes concrets d'appropriation du romantisme diffèrent parfois du discours critique global porté sur lui : dans la critique du XXe siècle, le romantisme est souvent là où on ne l'attend pas. Pourrait-on même voir, à la suite de Jean-Marie Schaeffer ou Denis Thouard, des généalogies secrètes qui iraient des romantiques allemands à Bakhtine et au structuralisme ou des héritages cachés du romantisme dans les pensées contemporaines ? « Situations » des lectures du romantisme : moments et espaces de la réception critique Au-delà de l'interprétation du romantisme en lui-même, c'est donc une lecture de ses lectures qui devient possible. En replaçant les réceptions critiques dans leur cadre conceptuel, on fait en effet apparaître des effets de perspective, qui permettent de situer dans le temps et dans l'espace les différentes lectures du romantisme, mais aussi de mettre en relief les éventuelles lacunes ou mésinterprétations qu'ont pu engager des analyses pourtant devenues canoniques. Ainsi, plusieurs ouvrages récents soulignent que l'appropriation du romantisme par toute une tradition critique au nom du principe d'intransivité repose en réalité sur une lecture biaisée par des préoccupations propres au contexte dans lesquelles elle se fait jour : ainsi des tenants d'une littérature close sur elle-même, qui revendiquent la tradition de « l'art pour l'art », mais sans reprendre la conception romantique qui lie autonomie et efficacité et veut que l'œuvre sublime conquière de fait un pouvoir renforcé sur le monde . Le même type d'appropriation subjective paraît à l'œuvre dans la théorie de « l'Absolu littéraire », qui s'inspire des premiers romantiques allemands et de leur art clos sur lui-même comme un hérisson, mais laisse de côté le programme politique et social présent dans la philosophie de Fichte ou la « nouvelle mythologie » des frères Schlegel . Dans les deux cas, le romantisme se trouverait promu autour d'un malentendu, ou au moins d'une vision partielle, qui évacuerait une ambition messianique jugée surannée à l'époque du Nouveau Roman ou un programme politique qui investit les notions de Nation et de race devenues profondément suspectes. L'idée que les moments de la lecture romantique sont profondément informés par leur contexte historique se prolonge avec les nuances en termes d'espace que la réception critique du romantisme fait apparaître. Si, pour les déconstructionnistes français, le romantisme apparaît comme une littérature périmée, l'école de Yale d'un Paul de Man et aujourd'hui d'un Harold Bloom a totalement renouvelé l'étude des romantiques britanniques, à laquelle elle se consacre presque exclusivement. De même, dans le monde anglo-saxon, la littérature romantique, loin d'être exclue de la modernité, s'est trouvée au cœur de la constitution des principaux paradigmes critiques contemporains, des postcolonial studies qui prennent naissance dans les analyses d'Edward Said sur l'image de l'Orient chez les romantiques , à la notion de world literature qui revendique l'héritage de la Weltliteratur de Goethe et des romantiques allemands , en passant par la critique féministe dont la figure tutélaire, la « folle du grenier », est empruntée à un roman de Charlotte Brontë . Pour revenir à notre point de départ, on notera également que la promotion initiale du romantisme par les premiers spécialistes de littérature comparée est l'œuvre d'universitaires issus de la tradition allemande de la romanistique : le Belge Paul Van Tieghem, le Français Fernand Baldensperger, créateur en 1928 du Cours Universitaire de Davos (Davoser Hochschulkurse), et plus tard le Suisse Albert Béguin voient dans le romantisme un signe de l'unité de la culture européenne, à une époque où déjà, en France, l'accent mis sur l'aspect poétique d'une littérature qui, selon Paul Valéry, « est et ne peut être autre chose qu'une sorte d'extension et d'application de certaines propriétés du langage », lance une tradition critique de soupçon envers le romantisme. La réception souvent heurtée du romantisme dans la critique du XXe siècle nous incite donc à proposer une historicisation du regard critique. Cet ouvrage, issu d'une journée de réflexion menée en février 2015 dans le cadre hospitalier du Musée de la Vie romantique, que nous remercions pour son généreux accueil, ne vise pas à dégager une vision synthétique du romantisme – on s'est souvenu que le titre du premier numéro de la revue Romantisme, « L'Impossible unité » – et il ne prétend pas non plus à l'exhaustivité : il propose une série de perspectives dans cette histoire complexe et gigantesque, que d'autres livres auront soin de venir compléter . Le chemin qu'il propose s'articule en plusieurs temps : d'abord, on reviendra aux commencements du problème romantique dans la critique européenne – les articles de Matthieu Vernet et de Victoire Feuillebois montrent ainsi que, de manière très différente et avec des visées critiques diverses, les années 1900 voient l'entrée en scène du romantisme comme problème critique fondamental, que l'on cherche à en donner une vision historicisée ou qu'il fonctionne comme un miroir des problématiques de l'esprit du temps. On soulignera ensuite le caractère fatalement kaléidoscopique des réceptions du romantisme à travers l'exemple du romantisme allemand : Patrick Marot, Philippe Forget et Éric Lecler soulignent à la fois le caractère productif de ces appropriations, leur éloignement relatif par rapport à l'original et les résultats très différents auxquels amène la lecture d'un même texte. Mais au-delà des lectures individuelles, ce sont bien des tentatives d'interprétation générales du romantisme qui caractérisent le siècle – soit, comme le montre José-Luis Diaz pour la génération 1970 et Mark Sandy dans son riche panorama des études romantiques ango-saxonnes, qu'elles tentent de dégager une image structurée et conceptualisée du romantisme, soit, ainsi que le souligne Yvon Le Scanff, qu'elles tendent à isoler des concepts pour penser le romantisme, comme celui de sublime qui apparaît paradoxalement opératoire. On se proposera enfin de clôre cette réflexion en mettant en valeur la place du romantisme dans les questionnements à la frontière entre le littéraire et le culturel : Serge Zenkine, Michael Löwy et Robert Sayre rendent sensibles le caractère singulier de la notion, qui excède de loin la dimension purement poétique, tout en continuant de porter une interrogation théorique forte, ce qui explique à la fois la variété de ses échos et la pérennité de la sensibilité dans d'autres espaces et d'autres temps. Nous espérons que ce panorama puisse contribuer à préciser le statut et la place des études sur le romantisme dans le champ intellectuel contemporain et à réfléchir aux outils épistémologiques légués par ces différentes approches pour penser le romantisme au début du XXIe siècle. José-Luis DIAZ et Victoire FEUILLEBOIS
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John M. Hobson on Eurocentrism, Historical Sociology and the Curious Case of Postcolonialism
International Relations, it is widely recognized, is a Western discipline, albeit one that claims to speak for global conditions. What does that mean are these regional origins in and by themselves a stake in power politics? This Eurocentrism is often taken as a point of departure for denouncing mainstream approaches by self-proclaimed critical and postcolonialist approaches to IR. John Hobson stages a more radical attack on Eurocentrism, in which western critical theories, too, are complicit in the perpetuation of a dominantly western outlook. In this extensive Talk, Hobson, among others, expounds his understanding of Eurocentrism, discusses the imperative to historicize IR, and sketches the outline of possible venues of emancipation from our provincial predicament.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is, according to you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current International Relations? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?
In my view, there are two principal inter-related challenges that face IR. The first is the need to deal with the critique that the discipline is constructed on Eurocentric foundations. This matters both for critical and conventional IR. The latter insists that it works according to value-free positivistic/scientifistic principles. But if it is skewed by an underlying Western-centric bias, as I have contended in my work, then the positivist mantra turns out to constitute a smokescreen or veil behind which lies the dark Eurocentric face of conventional IR. And of course, if Eurocentrism in various forms infects much of critical IR, then it jeopardizes its critical credentials and risks falling back into problem-solving theory. For these reasons, then, I feel that the critique of Eurocentric IR and international political economy (IPE) poses nothing short of an intellectually existential challenge to these disciplines.
The second inter-related challenge is that if we accept that the discipline is essentially Eurocentric then we need to reconstruct IR's foundations on a non-Eurocentric basis and then advance an alternative non-Eurocentric research agenda and empirical analysis of the international system and the global political economy. This is a straightforward challenge vis-à-vis conventional IR/IPE theory but it is more problematic so far as critical IR/IPE is concerned (which is why my answer is somewhat extended). The more postmodern wing of the discipline would view with inherent skepticism any attempt to reconstruct some kind of (albeit alternative) grand narrative. And the postmodern postcolonialists would likely concur. It is at this point that the thorniest issue emerges in the context of postcolonial IR theory. For however hard this is to say, I feel that simply proclaiming the Eurocentric foundations of the discipline does not hole its constituent theories deep beneath the waterline; a claim that abrades with the view of most postcolonialists who view Eurocentrism as inherently illegitimate either because it renders it imperialist (which I view as problematic since there are significant strands of anti-imperialist Eurocentrism and scientific racism) or because they conflate Eurocentrism with the unacceptable politics of (scientific) racism (which I also find problematic notwithstanding the point that there are all manner of overlaps and synergies between these two generic Western-centric discourses, all of which is explained in my 2012 book, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics). The key point—one which will undoubtedly get me into a lot of trouble with postcolonialists—is that I feel we need to recognize that in the end Eurocentric IR (and IPE) theory constitutes a stand-point approach, just like any other, and its merits or de-merits can ultimately only be evaluated against the empirical record, past and present (notwithstanding the points that I find Eurocentrism to be deeply biased and that what I find so deeply galling about it is its dismissive 'put-down' modus operandi of all things non-Western, wherein all non-Western achievements are dismissed outright, alongside the simultaneous (re)presentation of everything that the West does as progressive and/or pioneering).
So the second principal challenge facing the discipline—one which will no less get me into trouble with many postmodern/poststructuralist thinkers—is the need to reconstruct an alternative non-Eurocentric set of disciplinary foundations, which can then generate fresh empirical narratives of the international system and the global political economy. For my view is that only by offering an alternative research agenda and empirical analysis of the world economy can IR and IPE be set free from their extant Eurocentric straitjackets and the Sisyphean prison within which they remain confined, wherein IR and IPE scholars simply re-present or recycle tired old Eurocentric mantras and tropes in new clothing ad infinitum. For if nothing else, the absence of an alternative reconstruction and empirical analysis means that IR and IPE scholars are most likely simply to default to, or retreat back into, their Eurocentric comfort zone. Accordingly, then, the battle between Eurocentrism and non-Eurocentrism needs to be taken to the empirical field and away from the high and rarified intellectually mountainous terrain of metanarratival sparring contests.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about International Relations?
Another way of asking this question would be: what influenced you to become a non-Eurocentric thinker? I get asked this question a lot, especially by non-white people. A good deal of this is related to my life-experience, much of which is sub-conscious of course and both too personal and too detailed to openly reflect upon here (sorry!) More objectively, the initial impetus came around 1999 when I came across a book on Max Weber by the well-respected Weberian scholar, Bryan Turner, in which he argued inter alia that Weber's sociology had Orientalist properties; none of which had occurred to me before. Following this up further I became convinced that Weber was indeed Eurocentric, as was Marx. More importantly, I came to see this as a huge problem that infected not just Marx and Weber but pretty much all of historical sociology (which was reinforced in my mind when I came to read James Blaut's books, The Colonizer's Model of the World (find it here), and Eight Eurocentric Historians). So I set out to develop an alternative non-Eurocentric approach to world history and historical sociology as a counter (which resulted in my 2004 book, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation).
Two further key IR texts that I became aware of were L.H.M. Ling's seminal 2002 book, Postcolonial International Relations and Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney's equally brilliant 2004 book International Relations and the Problem of Difference, both of which led me to explore further the Eurocentric nature of IR and later IPE. But it would be remiss of me not to mention the influence of Albert Paolini; a wonderful colleague whom I had the pleasure to know at La Trobe University in Melbourne back in the early 1990s before his exceedingly unfortunate and premature death (and who, I must say, was way ahead of the game compared to me in terms of developing the critique of Eurocentrism in IR (see his book, Navigating Modernity (1997)). However, it would be unfair to the many others who have influenced me in countless ways to single out only these books and writers, though I hope you'll forgive me for not mentioning them so as to avoid providing yet another overly extended answer!
What would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?
This is an excellent but very challenging question and I want to try and make a succinct answer (though I shall build on it in some of the answers I will provide later on). The essential argument I make about 'thinking inter-culturally' is that while the more liberal side of the discipline thinks that its cosmopolitanism does just this, its Eurocentrism actually prevents it from fulfilling this. Because ultimately, cosmopolitanism wants to impose a Western standard of civilization upon the world, thereby advancing cultural monism rather than cultural pluralism. And this is merely the loudest expression of a spectre that haunts much of the discipline. But I guess that in the end, to achieve genuine cultural pluralism and to think inter-culturally requires us to take seriously how other non-Western peoples think of what their cultures comprise and what it means to them, and how their societies and states work along such lines. Dismissing them, as Eurocentrism always does, as inferior, backward and regressive denies this requirement outright. Interestingly, my great grandfather, J.A. Hobson flirted with this idea in his book, Imperialism: A Study (though this has largely escaped the notice of most people since few have read the more important second part of that book where all this is considered). But this is merely a first step, for as I will explain later on in the interview, ultimately thinking inter-culturally requires an analysis of the dialogical inter-connections and mutual co-constitutive relations between West and non-West which, in turn, presupposes not merely the presence of Western agency but also that of non-Western agency in the making of world politics and the global political economy.
All of which is clearly a massive challenge and I am certainly not advocating that the discipline of IR engage in deep ethnographical study and that it should morph into anthropology. And in any case I think that there are things we can do more generally to transcend Eurocentrism while learning more about the other side of the Eurocentric frontier without going to this extreme. I shall talk about such conceptual moves later on in this interview. One such theoretical move that I talk about later is the need to engage historical sociology (albeit from a non-Eurocentric perspective) or, more precisely global historical sociology. Again, though, I'm not advocating that the discipline should morph into historical sociology. And I'm aware that one of the biggest obstacles to IR making inroads into historical sociology is the sheer size of the task that this requires. It has always come naturally to me because that is where I came from before I joined the IR academic community. But there is quite a bit of historical sociology of IR out there now so I do think it possible for new PhD students to enter this fold. All of this said, though, I'm unsure if I have answered your question adequately.
The west is often seen as the source of globalization and innovation, which have historically radiated outwards in a process without seeming endpoint. What is wrong with this picture, and, perhaps more interestingly, why does it remain so pervasive?
In essence I believe this familiar picture—one which is embraced by conventional and many critical IR/IPE and globalization theorists—is wrong because this linear Western narrative brackets out all the many inputs that the non-West has made (which returns me to the point made a moment ago concerning the dialogical relations that have long existed between West and non-West). In my aforementioned 2004 book I argued that the West did not rise to modernity as a result of its own exceptional rational institutions and culture but was significantly enabled by many non-Western achievements and inventions which were borrowed and sometimes appropriated by the West. In short, without the Rest there might be no modern West. Moreover, while the West has been the principal actor in globalization since 1945, the globalization that preceded it (i.e., between 1492 and c.1830) was non-Western-led (as was the process of Afro-Eurasian regionalization that occurred between c.600 and 1492 out of which post-1492 globalization emerged). And even after 1945 I believe that non-Western actors have played various roles in shaping both globalization and the West, all of which are elided in the standard Eurocentric linear Western narrative of globalization.
But why has this image remained so persistent? This is potentially a massive question though it is a very important one for sure. Conventional theorists are most likely to disagree outright with my alternative picture in part because they are entirely comfortable with the notion that the 'West is best' and that the West single-handedly created capitalism, the sovereign inter-state system and the global economy. Critical theorists are rather more problematic to summarize here. But one that springs to mind is the type of argument that Immanuel Wallerstein (Theory Talk #13) made in a1997 article, in which he insisted that it be an imperative to hold the West accountable for everything that goes on in the world economy so that we can prosecute its crimes against the world. Arguments that bring non-Western agency in, as I seek to do, he dismisses as deflecting focus away from the West and thereby diluting the nature of the crimes that the West has imparted and therefore serves merely to weaken the case for the critical prosecution. I fundamentally disagree with him for reasons that I shan't go into here (but will touch upon below). But in my view it is (or should be) a key debate-in-the-making not least because I suspect that many other critical theorists might agree with him and, more importantly, because it brings fundamentally into question of what Eurocentrism is and of what the antidote to it comprises. Either way, though, critical theorists, at least in my view, often buy into the Western linear narrative, albeit not by celebrating the West but by critiquing it. All of which means that both conventional and many critical IR scholars effectively maintain the hegemony of Eurocentrism in the discipline though for diametrically opposed reasons; and which, at the risk of sounding paranoid, suggests a deeply subliminal conspiracy against the introduction of non-Eurocentrism.
Nevertheless one final but rather obvious point remains. For the biggest reason why Eurocentrism persists is because it makes Westerners feel good about themselves. And at the risk of sounding like sour grapes (notwithstanding very decent sales for my non-Eurocentric books), I have been struck by the fact that there seems to be an insatiable appetite—particularly among the Western public readership—for high profile Eurocentric books that celebrate and glorify Western civilization; though, to be brutally frank, many of these rarely add anything new to that which has been said countless times in the last 50 years, if not 200—notwithstanding Ricardo Duchesne's recent avowedly Eurocentric book The Uniqueness of Western Civilization as constituting a rare exception in this regard. All of which means that writing non-Eurocentric books is unlikely to get your name onto the bestseller list (though granted, the same is true for many of the Eurocentric books that have been written!)
International theory and political theory originates mainly from Europe, but makes universal claims about the nature of politics. How does international theory betray its situated roots and how do these roots matter for how we should think about theory?
I'm not sure that I can answer this question in the space allowed but I'll try and get to the broad-brush take-home point. I guess that when thinking about modern IR theory we can find those theorists who in effect advocate a normative Western imperialist posture even if they claim to be doing otherwise. Robert Gilpin's work on hegemonic stability theory is perhaps the clearest example in this respect. Anglo-Saxon hegemony, he claims, is non-imperialist because it always seeks to help the rest of the world, not exploit it. But the exercise of hegemony, it turns out, returns us to the old 19th century trope of the civilizing mission where Western practices and principles are transferred and imposed on non-Western societies in order to culturally convert them along Western lines. And this in turn issues from the assumption that the British and American interests are not selfish but are universal. This mantra is there too in Robert Keohane's (Theory Talk #9) book, After Hegemony, where cultural conversion of non-Western societies to a neoliberal standard of civilization by the international financial institutions through structural adjustment is approved of; an argument that is developed much more expansively in his later work on humanitarian intervention. And this trope forms the basis of cosmopolitan humanitarian interventionist theory more generally, where state reconstruction, which is imposed once military intervention has finished, is all about re-creating Western political and economic institutions across the world. I don't doubt for a moment the sincerity of the arguments that these authors make. But they can make them only because they believe that the Western interest is truly the universal. In such ways, then, IR betrays its roots.
Ultimately, Western IR theory constructs a hierarchical conception of the world with the West standing atop and from there we receive an image of a procession or sliding scale of gradated sovereignties in the non-Western world. For much of IR theory that has neo-imperialist normative underpinnings, it is this construction which legitimizes Western intervention in the non-Western world, thereby reproducing the legal conception of the (imperialist) standard of civilization that underpinned late 19th century positive law. Nevertheless, there has been a significant strand of anti-imperialist Eurocentrism within international theory (and before it a strand of anti-imperialist scientific racism, as in the likes of Charles HenryPearson and LothropStoddard). But once again, as we find in Samuel Huntington's famous 1996 book, The Clash of Civilizations—which comprises a modern equivalent of Lothrop Stoddard's Eugenicist texts, The Rising Tideof Color (1920) and Clashing Tides of Color (1935)—the West is held up as the highest expression of civilization, with non-Western societies viewed as socially inferior such that the West's mandate is not to imperially intervene across the world but to renew its uniquely Western civilized culture in the face of regressive and rampant non-Western regions and countries (particularly Middle Eastern Islam and Confucian China). Hedley Bull's anti-imperialist English School argument provides a complementary variant here because, he argues, it is the refusal of non-Western states to become Western wherein the source of the (unacceptable) instability of the global international society ultimately stems. All of which, as you allude to in your question, rests on the conflation of the Western interest with the universal. It is for this reason, then, that the cardinal principle of critical non-Eurocentrism comprises the need to undertake deep (self) reflexivity and to remain constantly vigilant to Eurocentric slippages.
In turn, this returns me to the point I made before: that IR theory does not think inter-culturally because it denies the validity of non-Western cultures. Because it does so, then it ultimately denies the full sovereignty of non-Western states. For one of the trappings of sovereignty is what Gerry Simpson usefully refers to as 'existential equality', or 'cultural self-determination'. It seems clear to me that the majority of IR theory effectively denies the sovereignty of non-Western states because it rejects cultural pluralism and hence cultural self-determination as a function of its intolerant Eurocentric monism. The biggest ironies that emerge here, however, are two-fold; or what I call the twin self-delusions of IR. First, while conventional IR theory proclaims its positivist, value free credentials that sit comfortably with cultural pluralist tolerance, nevertheless as I argued in my answer to your first question, this positivist mantra turns out to constitute a smokescreen or veil behind which lies the face of intolerant Eurocentric cultural monism. And second, it means that while IR proclaims that its subject matter comprises the objective analysis of the international system which focuses on anarchy and the sovereign state, nevertheless it turns out that what it is really all about is narrating an analysis of Western hierarchy and the 'hyper-sovereignty' of Western states versus the 'conditional sovereignty/gradated sovereignty' of non-Western states.
Linking your work to Lizée's as a critique of extrapolating 'universals' on the basis of narrow (Western) experiences, Patrick Jackson (Theory Talk #44) wrote as follows: 'Perhaps the cure for the disease that Hobson and Lizée diagnose is a rethinking of what "theory" means beyond empirical generalizations, so that future international theorists can avoid the sins of the past.' What is your conception of what theory is or should be?
As noted already, I am all in favor of developing non-Eurocentric theory. To sketch this out in the most generic terms I begin with the proposition that Eurocentric IR/IPE theory is monological, producing a reductive narrative in which only the West talks and acts. It is essentially a 'winner/loser' paradigm that proclaims the non-West as the loser or is always on the receiving end of that which the West does, thereby ensuring that central analytical focus is accorded to the hyper-agency of the Western winner. And its conception of agency is based on having predominant power. We find this problem particularly within much of critical IR theory, where because the West is dominant so it qualifies as having (hyper) agency while the subordinate position of the non-West means that it has little or no agency. In turn, particularly within conventional IR and IPE we encounter a substantialist ontology, where the West is thought to occupy a distinct and autonomous domain. From there everything else follows. And even in parts of critical IR and IPE where relationalism holds greater sway we often find that the West still occupies the center of intellectual gravity in the world.
My preference is for a fully relationalist approach which replaces the monologism of Eurocentrism and its reification of the West with the aforementioned conception of dialogism that brings the non-West into the discussion while simultaneously focusing on the mutually constitutive relations between Western and non-Western actors. It also allows for the agency of the non-West alongside the West's agency (even though clearly after c.1830 the West has been the dominant actor). This in effect replaces Eurocentrism's either/or problematique with a both/and logic, enabling us to reveal a space in which non-Western agency plays important roles without losing focus of Western agency, even when it takes a dominant form as it did after c.1830. In this way then, to reply to Wallerstein's argument discussed earlier, one does not have to dilute the critique of the West when bringing non-Western agency in for both can be situated alongside each other. While I could of course say much more here, these conceptual moves are paramount to me and inform the basis of my empirical work on the international system and the global political economy.
All in all, IR theory needs to take a fully global conception of agency much more seriously; structuralist theory in its many guises is necessary but is ultimately insufficient since it diminishes or dismisses outright the prospect or existence of non-Western agency. Moreover, I seek to blend materialism and non-materialism, which means that neither constructivism nor poststructuralism can quite get us over the line. Even so, blending materialism and non-materialism is not an especially hard task to achieve though IR's preferred ontologically reductionist stance certainly makes this a counter-intuitive proposition.
You combine historical sociology with international relations. What promises does this interdisciplinary approach hold? Why do we need historical sociologies of IR?
Following on from my previous answer I argue that a relationalist non-Eurocentric historical sociology of IR is able to problematize the entities that IR takes for granted—states, anarchy (as well as societies and civilizations)—in order to reveal them, to quote from the marvelous introduction that Julian Go and George Lawson have written for their forthcoming edited volume Global Historical Sociology, as 'entities in motion'. Indeed such entities are never quite complete but change through time. Here it is worth quoting Go and Lawson further, where they argue that
'social forms are "entities-in-motion": they are produced, reproduced, and breakdown through the agency of historically situated actors. Such entities-in-motion, whether they are states, empires, or civilizations often appear to be static entities with certain pre-determined identities and interests. But the relational premise, and perhaps promise, of GHS is its attempt to denaturalize such entities by holding them up to historical scrutiny'.
It is precisely this global historical sociological problematique that underpins the approach that I develop in a forthcoming book, provisionally entitled Reorient International Political Economy where inter alia, I show how many of the major processes of the global economy are never complete but are constantly mutating as they are shaped by the multiple interactions of Western and non-Western actors. To take the origins of capitalism or globalization as an example, I show how these have taken not a Western linear trajectory but a highly discontinuous path as West and non-West have interacted in complex ways.
A good number of IR historical sociologists have focused specifically on particular historical issues—especially that of the rise of the sovereign state in Europe. Such analyses have in my view proven to be extremely valuable because they allow us to puncture some of the myths that surround 'Westphalia' that populate standard or conventional IR reportage (particularly that found in undergraduate text-books). But ultimately I feel that the greatest worth of the historical sociology of IR project lies in using history (understood in historical-sociological terms rather than according to traditional historians' precepts) as a means of problematizing our understanding of the present international system and global political economy. Thus, for me, historical sociology is ultimately important because it can disrupt our understanding and explanations of the present. And I believe that this kind of inter-disciplinarity can bear considerable fruit (notwithstanding the difficulty that this task poses for IR scholars).
You famously criticized IR's Eurocentrism and argued for the need for inter-cultural thinking. What is inter-cultural thinking and how can it benefit IR?
As I already discussed what inter-cultural thinking is a bit before, I shall consider how it might benefit IR and indeed the world in various ways. First, if the rise of the West into modernity owes much of this achievement to the help provided by non-Western ideas, institutions and technologies, then acknowledging this debt could go a long way to healing the wounds that the West has inflicted upon the non-West's sense of self-esteem. Moreover, the hubristic claim ushered in by Eurocentrism, that the West made it to the top all by itself and that the very societies which helped it get there are then immediately denounced as inferior and uncivilized, significantly furnishes the West with the imperialist mandate to intervene and remake non-Western societies in the image of the West. So in essence, the help that the once-more advanced non-Western societies that the West benefited from is rewarded by 150 years of imperial punishment! Of course, IR scholars do not really study the rise of the West, but it is implicit in so much of what they write about. So acknowledging this debt could challenge the West's self-appointed mandate to remake the world in its own image as well as problematize many of the historical assumptions that lie either explicitly or implicitly within IR.
Second, and flowing on from the previous point, thinking inter-culturally means recognizing the manifold roles that the non-West has played in shaping the rise of Western capitalism and the sovereign state system as well as the global economy, as I have just argued, but also appreciating their societies and cultures on their own terms rather than simply dismissing them as unfit for purpose in the modern world. Less Western Messianism and Western hubris, more global understanding and empathy, is ultimately what I'm calling for. But none of this is possible while Eurocentrism remains the go-to modus operandi of IR and IPE. And this is important for IR not least because significant parts of it have informed Western policy, most especially US foreign policy.
Third, a key benefit that inter-cultural thinking could bring to IR is that while the discipline presumes that it furnishes objective analyses of the international system, the upshot of my claim that the discipline is founded on Eurocentrism is that all the discipline is really doing is finding ways to reaffirm the importance of Western civilization in world politics, defending it and often celebrating it, rather than learning or discovering new things about the world and world politics. I believe that only a non-Eurocentric approach can deliver that which IR thinks it's doing already but isn't.
You've said that 'what makes an argument [institutionally] Eurocentric…lies with the nature of the categories that are deployed to understand development. And these ultimately comprise the perceived degree of 'rationality' that is embodied within the political, economic, ideological, and social institutions of a given society.' In order to think inter-culturally, does IR needs new conceptions of rationality, or standards other than rationality altogether?
What an extremely interesting and perceptive question which has really got me thinking! Again, it's something that I've been aware of in the recesses of my mind but have never really thought through. Certainly the essence of Eurocentrism lies in the reification of Western rationality (or what Max Weber called Zweckrationalität) and its simultaneous denial to non-Western societies. But what with all the revelations that have happened in Britain in the last decade, where a seemingly never ending series of fraudulent practices have been uncovered within British public life—whether it be MPs' expenses scandals, banking scandals, newspaper scandals and the like—then one really wonders about the extent to which the West operates according to the properties of Zweck-rationality that Weber proclaimed it to have. Corruption and fraud happen in the West but clearly they are much more hidden than in those instances where it occurs in non-Western countries (notwithstanding the revelations mentioned a moment ago). But if one were to open the lid of many large Western companies, for example, and delve inside one might well find all sorts of 'rationality-compromising' or 'rationality-denial' practices going on. To mention just two obvious examples: first, promotions are often tainted by personal linkages rather than always founded on merit; and second, managers often mark out and protect their own personal position/territory even when it (frequently) goes against the 'rational' interests of the said organization.
To return to your question, then, one could conclude that many Western institutions are far less rational than Eurocentrism proclaims, which in turn would challenge the foundations of Eurocentrism. Of course, corruption and fraud are not unique to the West, but it is the West that proclaims its unique 'rational standard of civilization'. Whether, therefore, we need to abandon the term (Zweck) rationality on the grounds that it is an impossibly conceived ideal type remains the question. Right now I don't have an answer though I'll be happy to mull over this in the coming years.
You've written that engaging with the East 'creates a genuinely global history' and articulate a 'dream wherein the peoples of the Earth can finally sit down at the table of global humanity and communicate as equal partners'. Do you consciously operate with an 'ontology' of 'peoples' and 'civilizations' as opposed to 'individuals'? How do you conceive of the relationship between global humanity and plural peoplehood? Is there an underlying philosophical or anthropological view that you are drawing on in these and similar passages?
Certainly I prefer to think of peoples and even of civilizations rather than individuals and states, though I'll confess right now that dealing theoretically with civilizations and articulating them as units of analysis is extraordinarily challenging. At the moment I leave this side of things to better people than me, such as Peter Katzenstein (Theory Talk #15) and his recentpioneering work on civilizations. The term 'global humanity' concerns me insofar as it is often a politically-loaded term, particularly within cosmopolitanism, where its underbelly comprises the desire to define a single civilizational identity (i.e., a Western one) for 'global humanity'. In essence, cosmopolitanism effectively advances the conception of a 'provincial (i.e., Western) humanity' that masquerades as the global. So I prefer the notion of plural peoplehood, so as to allow for difference. I wouldn't say that I am operating according to a particular philosophical view although it strikes me that such a notion is embodied in Johann Gottfried Herder's work which, on that dimension at least, I am attracted to. But to be honest, this is generally something that I have not explored though it is something that I've thought that I'd like to research for a future book (notwithstanding the point that I'll need to finish the book that I have started first!).
In your reply toErik Ringmar, you draw on psychoanalytic metaphors to discuss the benefits of overcoming Eurocentrism, writing that, 'Eurocentrism leads to the repression and sublimation of the Other in the Self. Thus, doing away with Eurocentrism can end the socio-psychological angst and alienation that necessarily occurs through such sublimation.' How do you envision what we now call the West (or Europe) after its socio-psychological transformation? What does a world after angst and alienation look like? Is it possible, and is that the goal you think IR theory should aim at?
Another massively challenging and fascinating question, let me have a go. Since you raised the issue of socio-psychological/psycho-analytical theory (though it is something that I am no expert on), it has always struck me that Eurocentrism itself is not simply a construct designed to advance Western power and Western capitalist interests in the world. This seems too mechanistic. For recall that it was a series of largely independent sojourners, travel-writers, novelists, journalists and others rather than capitalists who played such an important role in constructing Eurocentrism. Something more seems to be at play. One can think of the battles between 'Mods and Rockers' or Skinheads and heavy metal fans in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s, who detested each other simply because they held different identities and prized different cultural values. Most importantly, I feel, the constant need to denounce, put down and dismiss the Other as inferior seems reminiscent of those kinds of people we sometimes meet who, in constantly putting down others to falsely elevate themselves to a position of superiority, ultimately reveals merely their own insecurities. The same issues, of course, underpin racism and Eurocentrism. The West rose to prominence in my view as a late-developer and having got to the top it very quickly came to view its duty as one of punishing all others for being different – all done, of course, in the name of helping or civilizing the very 'global humanity' that had done so much to help the West rise to the top in the first place! And to want to culturally convert everyone in the world according to the Western standard of civilization seems to be symptomatic of a deeply insecure mindset. A secure person or society for that matter does not feel threatened by, but openly embraces, difference.
Can we move beyond this stand-off given that such a mentality has been hard-wired within Western culture for at least three centuries? And ten if you count the sometimes terse relations between Europe and Middle Eastern Islam that emerged after 1095! We need to move beyond an identity that is based only on putting others down. It's 'bad karma' and, like all bad karma, damages the Western self, not just the non-Western other. But to transcend this identity-formation process requires us to do away with logocentrism; clearly a very big task. Nevertheless, that is exactly what my writings are all about. And it is something that I think IR theory needs to strive to achieve. Because IR theory is to an extent performative then I live in the hope, at least, that such a mentality might, just might somehow seep into international public life, though if it were to happen I strongly suspect that I would not be around to see it. Still, your question—what would a world beyond Eurocentrism look like?—though very important is nevertheless perhaps too difficult to answer without seeming like a hopeless idealist… other than to say that it could be rather better than the current one.
You write that 'IPE should aim to be an über-discipline, drawing on a wide range of disciplines in order to craft a knowledge base that refuses to become lost in disciplinary over-specialization and the depressing academic narcissism of disciplinary methodological differentiation and exclusion.' Why do you prefer that IPE should be the überdiscipline, instead of IR (or something else altogether), with IPE as a subset?
My degree was in Political Economy, my Masters in Political Sociology and my PhD in Historical Sociology and (International) Political Economy. Despite the fact that the majority of my academic career to date has been in IR research, I have always returned at various points to my old haunting ground, IPE (as I have most recently). I have always found IR a little alienating for its reification of politics, divorced from political economy. I'm not a Marxist, but I share in the view that political economy, if not always directly underpinning developments and events in the international system is, however, never far away.
The quote that you took for this question came from the end of my 2-part article that came out in the 20th anniversary edition of Review of International Political Economy. This was partly responding to Benjamin Cohen's (Theory Talk #17) 2008 seminal book, International Political Economy: A Intellectual History. One of the challenges that I issued to my IPE readership, echoing Cohen, is the need for IPE to return to 'thinking big' (in large part as a reaction to the massive contraction of the discipline's boundaries that has been effected by third wave American IPE, which labors under the intellectual hegemony of Open Economy Politics). In that context, then, I argued that IPE needs to expand its boundaries outwards not only to allow big or macro-scale issues to return to the discipline's research agenda but also to incorporate insight from other disciplines. For in my view IPE has the potential to blend the insights of many other disciplines that can in turn transcend the sometimes myopic or tunnel-vision-based nature of their particular constituent specialisms.
One of the implications of 'thinking big' is that IPE should be able to cover much of that which IR does… and more. Like Susan Strange, who expressed her exasperation with IR for its exclusion of politico-economic matters, so I feel that the solution lies not with IR colonizing IPE (which is not likely for the foreseeable future!) but with IPE expanding its currently narrow remit. If it could achieve this it could become the 'über-discipline', or the 'master discipline', of the Social Sciences, notwithstanding the point that my postcolonial and feminist friends will no doubt upbraid me for using such terrible terms!
Final question. Beyond the East outside the West, Greece is now being remade as the 'East' within the West, with a range of measures applied to it that had hitherto been the preserve for the 'East' or Global South. How can your work help to make sense of the stakes?
Your question reminds me of a similar one that I was asked in an interview for Cumhurieyet Strateji Magazine concerning Turkey's ongoing efforts to join the EU, the essence of my answer comprising: 'be careful what you wish for'. One of the things that I have felt uneasy about is the way, as I see it (and I might not be quite right in saying this), that European Studies (as a sub-discipline) sometimes appears as rather self-affirming, thereby reflecting the core self-congratulatory modus operandi of the EU. I am not anti-European or in any way ashamed to be Western (as some of my critics might think). But I'm deeply uneasy about the EU project, specifically in terms of its desire to expand outwards, not to mention inwards as we are seeing in the case of Greece today. For this has the whiff of the old civilizing mission that had supposedly been put to rest back at the time of the origins of the European Economic Community. Although Greece is a member of the EU (notwithstanding its non-European roots), it seems clear that what is going on today is a process of intensified internal colonization under the hegemony of Germany, wherein Greece is subjected to the German standard of civilization. All of which brings into question the self-glorification of the self-proclaimed 'socially progressive' EU project. And to return to my discussion of Turkey I recognize that candidate countries have their reasons for wanting to join the EU. But I guess that what my work is ultimately about is restoring a sense of dignity to non-Western peoples, in the absence of which they will continue to self-deprecate and live in angst in the long cold shadow of the West. All of which brings me back to the answers I made to quite a few of the earlier questions. So I would like to close by saying how much I have enjoyed answering your extremely well-informed questions and to thank you most sincerely for inviting me to address them.
Professor Hobson gained his PhD from the LSE (1991), joined the University of Sheffield as Reader and is currently Professor of Politics and International Relations. Previously he taught at La Trobe University, Melbourne (1991–97) and the University of Sydney (1997–2004). His main research interest concerns the area of inter-civilizational relations and everyday political economy in the context of globalization, past and present. His work is principally involved in carrying forward the critique of Eurocentrism in World History/Historical Sociology, and International Relations.
Related links
Faculty Profile at the University of Sheffield Read Hobson's The Postcolonial Paradox of Eastern Agency (Perceptions 2014) here (pdf) Read Hobson's Is critical theory always for the white West and for Western imperialism? (Review of International Studies 2007) here (pdf)
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