Suchergebnisse

Despite a growing body of literature on how environmental degradation can fuel civil war, the reverse effect, namely that of conflict on environmental outcomes, is relatively understudied. From a theoretical point of view this effect is ambiguous, with some forces pointing to pressures for environmental degradation and some pointing in the opposite direction. Hence, the overall effect of conflict on the environment is an empirical question. We study this relationship in the case of Colombia. We combine a detailed satellite-based longitudinal dataset on forest cover across municipalities over the period 1990-2010 with a comprehensive panel of conflict-related violent actions by paramilitary militias. We first provide evidence that paramilitary activity significantly reduces the share of forest cover in a panel specification that includes municipal and time fixed effects. Then we confirm these findings by taking advantage of a quasi-experiment that provides us with an exogenous source of variation for the expansion of the paramilitary. Using the distance to the region of Urab´a, the epicenter of such expansion, we instrument paramilitary activity in each cross-section for which data on forest cover is available. As a falsification exercise, we show that the instrument ceases to be relevant after the paramilitaries largely demobilized following peace negotiations with the government. Further, after the demobilization the deforestation effect of the paramilitaries disappears. We explore a number of potential mechanisms that may explain the conflict-driven deforestation, and show evidence suggesting that paramilitary violence generates large outflows of people in order to secure areas for growing illegal crops, exploit mineral resources, and engage in extensive agriculture. In turn, these activities are associated with deforestation.

This paper develops a simple model to investigate how resource-driven economic booms shape the equilibrium political institutions of resource-rich societies and influence the likelihood of experiencing civil war. In our model a strong government apparatus favors property rights protection but also makes the state more powerful and hence may induce predatory autocratic regimes over democracy. We characterize the parameter space of each political outcome in terms of the type of the available natural resources. Economic booms based on resources that are privately exploited empower the citizens and tend to ease democratic transitions. In contrast, booms based on resources exploited by the state tend to favor more dictatorial regimes. Finally, economic booms based on resources that can be exploited either by the state or by private citizens incite preemptive actions by both parties that may result in civil war. We discuss the predictions of the model using historical and contemporary examples.

We process the main written output of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch on Colombia covering the period 1988-2004, recording all numerical conflict information and accounts of specific conflict events. We check for internal consistency and against a unique Colombian conflict database. We find that both organizations have substantive problems in their handling of quantitative information. Problems include failure to specify sources, unclear definitions, an erratic reporting template and a distorted portrayal of conflict dynamics. Accounts of individual events are fairly representative and much more useful and accurate than the statistical information. We disprove a common accusation that Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch rarely criticize the guerrillas, but do find some evidence of anti-government bias. The quantitative human rights and conflict information produced by these organizations for other countries must be viewed with scepticism along with cross-country and time series human rights data based on Amnesty International reports.

"A Modern Guide to the Economics of Crime discusses the evolution of a field, whose growing relevance among scholars and policymakers is partly related to the persistence of crime and violence around the world and partly to the remarkable progress made in recent years in the economic analysis of individual and organised crime. Such progress is related to the so-called 'credibility revolution' as well as to the cross-fertilization of economics and other social sciences such as criminology, sociology and political science. With contributions from some of the leading scholars in the economics of crime, the volume highlights a variety of topics, conceptual frameworks and empirical approaches, thus providing a comprehensive overview of the most recent developments of the field. Emphasising the importance of designing crime-reducing policies that are guided by rigorous empirical analyses, the contributions leverage the availability of novel and administrative micro-data, the use of research designs that unveil causal relationships, and the interdisciplinarity of approaches and theoretical frameworks. The Modern Guide moves through four parts: first investigating the role of the police and their effectiveness, then moving on to look at the distinct socio-economic factors that may induce individuals to commit crimes, followed by issues related to crime in specific groups including migrants, women and racial minorities, and finally turning from individual to organized crime. This Modern Guide will be an invigorating read for economics and criminology students and scholars looking at the relationship between the two fields. Policy makers will also benefit from the application of interdisciplinary theory to empirical research in the chapters"--

Este artículo evalúa uno de los componentes fundamentales de la política más icónica del gobierno de Álvaro Uribe: la Seguridad Democrática. En particular, se evalúa el impacto sobre la intensidad del conflicto armado de los despliegues y refuerzos de policía en municipios con poca o nula presencia policial antes de agosto de 2002. Para ello se utiliza el estimador de diferencia en diferencias, que compara el cambio en la dinámica del conflicto una vez asignados los nuevos efectivos a los municipios receptores, relativo al cambio ocurrido simultáneamente en los municipios no receptores. Nuestros resultados, que son robustos a estimar los modelos sobre una muestra emparejada, sugieren que los ataques de la guerrilla aumentan con los despliegues (instauración de inspecciones de policía en municipios que carecían de estas), y aumentan y luego disminuyen con los refuerzos (envío de nuevos efectivos a municipios con poca presencia policial previa). Estos resultados son consistentes con un modelo sencillo que describe la lucha por el control de territorios valiosos en el contexto de un conflicto armado. ; This article assesses one of the fundamental components of the most iconic policy of the government of Álvaro Uribe: the Democratic Security. In particular we assess the impact on the intensity of the armed conflict, of police deployment and reinforces in municipalities with little or no police presence before August 2002. We use the difference in differences estimator to compare the change in the dynamics of the armed conflict after the allocation of new police forces in the receiving municipalities, relative to the simultaneous change in municipalities that did not receive police. Results are robust to using a matched sample and suggest that guerrilla attacks increase with police deployments and first increase and then decrease with police reinforcements. These results are consistent with a simple model that describes the fight for the control of valuable territories in the context of an internal armed conflict.

Este artículo evalúa uno de los componentes fundamentales de la política más icónica del gobierno de Álvaro Uribe: la ´ Seguridad Democrática. En particular, se evalúa el impacto sobre la intensidad del conflicto armado de los despliegues y refuerzos de policía en municipios con poca o nula presencia policial antes de agosto de 2002. Para ello se utiliza el estimador de diferencia en diferencias que compara el cambio en la dinámica del conflicto una vez se asignan los nuevos efectivos a los municipios receptores, relativo al cambio ocurrido simultáneamente en los municipios no receptores. Nuestros resultados sugieren que tanto los despliegues (instauración de inspecciones de policía en municipios que carecían de ´estas) como los refuerzos (envío de nuevos efectivos a municipios con poca presencia policial previa) generan incrementos en el número de ataques guerrilleros. Por otro lado, también hay evidencia que en los casos en los que la asignación de efectivos policiales estuvo acompañada de la movilización de tropas del ejército el conflicto disminuyó en las áreas afectadas, lo que sugiere que la coordinación de las fuerzas armadas resulta clave para el éxito de iniciativas regionales de seguridad. ; This article assesses one of the fundamental components of the most iconic policy of the government of Alvaro Uribe: the Democratic Security. In particular we assess the impact on the intensity of the armed conflict, of police deployment and reinforces in municipalities with little of no police presence before August 2002. We use the difference in differences estimator to compare the change in a dynamics of the armed conflict after the allocation of new police forces in the receiving municipalities, relative to the simultaneous change in municipalities that did not receive police. Results suggest that both deployments and reinforces increase the number of guerrilla attacks. On the other hand there is evidence that in the cases in which the allocation of police forces was accompanied by the mobilization of army troops the intensity of the conflict decreased in the affected areas. This suggests that the coordination between armed state forces is key for the success of local security initiatives.