Suchergebnisse

Between 1964 and 1971 China carried out a massive programme of investment in the remote regions of south-western and western China. This development programme – called "the Third Front" – envisaged the creation of a huge self-sufficient industrial base area to serve as a strategic reserve in the event of China being drawn into war. Reflecting its primarily military orientation, the programme was considered top secret for many years; recent Chinese articles have discussed the huge costs and legacy of problems associated with the programme, but these discussions have been oblique and anecdotal, and no systematic appraisal has ever been published.2 Since Chinese analysts have avoided discussion of the Third Front, western accounts of China's development have also given it inadequate emphasis, and it has not been incorporated into our understanding of China during the 1960s and 1970s. It is common to assume that the "Cultural Revolution decade" was dominated by domestic political conflict, and characterized by an economic system made dysfunctional by excessive politicization, fragmented control, and an emphasis on small-scale locally self-sufficient development. The Third Front, however, was a purposive, large-scale, centrally-directed programme of development carried out in response to a perceived external threat with the broad support of China's national leaders. Moreover, this programme was immensely costly, having a negative impact on China's economic development that was certainly more far-reaching than the disruption of the Cultural Revolution.

Between 1964 and 1971 China carried out a massive programme of investment in the remote regions of south-western and western China. This development programme - called the "Third Front" - envisaged the creation of a huge self-sufficient industrial base area to serve as a strategic reserve in the event of China being drawn into war. The article describes and evaluates the origin, development and legacy of the Third Front. (DÜI-Sen)

Writings by Wu Jinglian map not only China's path to economic reform but also the intellectual evolution of China's most influential economist. For more than thirty years, Wu Jinglian has been widely regarded as China's most celebrated and influential economist. In the late 1970s, Wu (b. 1930) was one of a small group of economic thinkers who broke with Marxist concepts and learned the principles of a market economy. Since then he has been at the center of economic reform in China, moving seamlessly as an "insider outsider" between academic and policy roles. In recent years, Wu has emerged as a prominent public intellectual fighting not just for market reform but also for a democratic society backed by the rule of law. This book presents many of Wu's most important writings, a number of them appearing in English for the first time. Each section offers an informative introductory essay by Barry Naughton, the volume's editor and an expert on China's economy. The book begins with Wu's most recent articles, which make clear his belief that gradual marketization combined with institutional development will make Chinese society fairer and less corrupt. Biographical writings follow, accompanied by a richly insightful text by Naughton on Wu's life and career. Writings from the 1980s and 1990s, written originally for a small audience of policy makers, demonstrate how Wu shaped China's early reform path; essays and articles from the late 1990s and early 2000s reflect Wu's new role as an advocate for broader reforms. Taken together, these texts map not only China's path to economic reform but also Wu's own intellectual evolution.

China's economic success derives from the co-evolution of the political and economic systems. There is no single 'China model'. Rather, three successive generations of China model can be identified, corresponding to 'growth equilibria' that emerged when policy responded effectively to specific economic challenges. The structure of interaction between economic and political is determined by the basic governance strategy of the Chinese Communist Party. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

Le modèle économique et social qui a résulté de la crise politique de juin 1989 est profondément différent de celui qui avait été envisagé avant les événements. La Chine a opéré une transition vers un modèle de développement caractérisé par une forte croissance et des investissements importants. Le consensus, assez largement partagé par les manifestants, en faveur de réformes à la fois économiques et politiques a disparu avec le développement de l'économie et l'amélioration de la situation économique d'une partie de la population. Dans la période post-Tiananmen, une logique économique forte a coïncidé avec une logique politique qui l'était également afin de produire un ensemble de politiques remarquablement constantes.