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Relative deprivation (RD) theory postulates that when sharp reversals in objective conditions are combined with continually rising expectations, the resulting frustration felt by individuals can, under certain conditions, evolve into a revolutionary state of mind. Here, the question of why people's expectations continue to rise in the face of such a sharp decline in their actual ability to satisfy needs is addressed by locating the dynamics of relative deprivation in the context of a broader paradigm of the links between hierarchically ordered human needs & corresponding stages of political development. A four-stage model of the political development process is presented, with each stage corresponding to the regime's efforts to institutionalize the satisfaction of one of four hierarchically ordered levels of individual needs. In this context, it is argued that expectations will adjust downward with respect to the currently dominant level of needs in society, but that when the decline in capabilities threatens the ability of people to satisfy lower levels of needs, needs whose satisfaction has already been institutionalized, they will not adjust their expectations downward, resulting in civil violence. This refinement of RD theory is illustrated by applying it to the Russian Revolution & to the question of why a revolution did not occur in the US during the Great Depression. 5 Figures, 59 References. Modified AA

Previous research has shown that the outcome of a civil war is related to conflict duration: military victory by either the government or the rebels occurs early if it occurs at all, and the longer a civil war lasts, the more likely it is to end in a negotiated settlement. The models of civil war duration and outcome that have produced these findings are built on characteristics of the civil war and less on attributes of the state itself, other than where the state lies on the Polity autocracy-democracy scale. We propose that how civil wars end varies not only between democracies and authoritarian regimes but among the different authoritarian regime types identified by Geddes, Wright, and Franz. The distinguishing attributes of these regime types—democracy, one-party, personalist, military, monarchical—should lead to different likelihood in defeating a rebel movement, being defeated by a rebel movement, and negotiating a peace agreement with a rebel movement. Results from a series of competing-risk models using the Uppsala–Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset demonstrate support for our claim that how civil wars end is partly a function of the characteristics of the regime.

Though European colonialism had a profound and lasting impact on the development of contemporary Africa, there are few studies that assess these effects empirically. This study explores one facet of the colonial legacy: ethnic conflict. Despite the pervasiveness of ethnic strife across the continent, grievance-based approaches have had only limited success in modeling ethnic conflict in Africa. Using a structural approach, we argue that the distinctive colonial styles of the British and French created fundamentally different systems of ethnic stratification, which left contrasting legacies for post-colonial ethnic conflict. Specifically, the indirect, decentralized rule of the British fostered an unranked system of ethnic stratification, while the legacy of the centralized French style approximated a ranked system. Because unranked systems foster competition between ethnic groups - which can readily spiral into conflict - we posit that the British colonial legacy is positively related to both the frequency and intensity of ethnic conflict. French colonies, on the other hand, were left with a centralized bureaucratic power structure that impeded ethnic mobilization and suppressed nonviolent ethnic challenges. Using the Minorities at Risk III dataset, we first compare the ethnic struggles faced across former British and French colonies. Next we test the impact of this colonial legacy on two facets of ethnic conflict, rebellious actions and civil war. Results indicate that, after controlling for other salient factors, a British colonial legacy is positively associated with ethnic conflict.

Civil war outcome studies have used expected utility logic to identify factors that affect actors' estimates of the probability of victory, the payoffs from victory vs defeat, and the accumulated costs of fighting until victory is achieved. Tests have used static measures of national attributes and war characteristics, measured prior to the war or at its end. We use UCDP Georeferenced Event Data from 73 civil conflicts in Africa to estimate how changes in government and rebel tactical choices on where and when to fight battles affect expected utility estimates and, therefore, civil war outcomes.

Civil war outcome studies have used expected utility logic to identify factors that affect actors' estimates of the probability of victory, the payoffs from victory vs defeat, and the accumulated costs of fighting until victory is achieved. Tests have used static measures of national attributes and war characteristics, measured prior to the war or at its end. We use UCDP Georeferenced Event Data from 73 civil conflicts in Africa to estimate how changes in government and rebel tactical choices on where and when to fight battles affect expected utility estimates and, therefore, civil war outcomes.

Since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, there have been no national protest movements in the People's Republic of China (PRC). This is the longest period in the history of the PRC without a major national protest movement. Nonetheless, the number of small, local protests or "mass incidents" (as they are termed by the Chinese government) has increased from 9,000 a year in 1994 to over 180,000 in 2010. Most of these incidents target local party and government agencies and/or local firms. Protests by peasants are often motivated by land confiscation by local governments, while worker protests are often over firm treatment of works (including pay, benefits, and job security). More general protests arise over what participants perceive as unfair and illegal extractions of fines, fees, and other payments by local government and party units. We present a theoretical argument on how grievances and mobilization capacity affect the likelihood of protests occurring in a locale. We then test propositions derived from this theory with provincial level data for the period 1995-2010. This study represents one of the first to test predictors of the frequency of mass incidents at the province level. (Asian Aff/GIGA)