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View the Executive SummaryWhat should the United States do about Afghanistan? After nearly 13 years and substantial U.S. national commitment in a country on the other side of the world, much has changed in Afghanistan, the United States, Afghanistan's region, and the globe. To prepare policy and strategy recommendations on Afghanistan for U.S. leaders, this monograph answers six key questions: 1. Did the United States have or develop critical national interests in Afghanistan and its immediate neighborhood on or because of the events of September 11, 2001? 2. Was overall U.S. strategy to pursue those interests successful and appropriate? 3. What outside conditions shaping U.S. involvement in Afghanistan exist now? 4. Do new vital and/or important national interests not met by our earlier strategies exist in this region? 5. What strategy(s) should the United States adopt or emphasize to achieve critical national interests in/around Afghanistan? 6. What risks and challenges are associated with new policies and/or strategies? ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1478/thumbnail.jpg

In "No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier," Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason argue that Pashtun tribal identities explain the lure of the Taliban and the shortcomings of the initial U.S. approach to the war in Afghanistan. 1 They carry this argument too far, however, and engage in cultural reductionism by portraying the Pashtun tribal code as the determining factor behind politics and preferences in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Johnson and Mason make the following errors: (1) treating Pashtun identity as if it were set in stone; (2) failing to consider that today's radical Islamists rely on different sources of support than did the mullahs (Islamic religious leaders) who led jihads against the British Empire; and (3) misinterpreting the role of the ofªcial maliks (tribal and village leaders) in the FATA.

To the Editors (Kimberly Marten writes): In "No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan- Afghanistan Frontier? Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason argue that Pashtun tribal identities explain the lure of the Taliban and the shortcomings of the initial U.S. approach to the war in Afghanistan. They carry this argument too far, however, and engage in cultural reductionism by portraying the Pashtun tribal code as the determining factor behind politics and preferences in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Johnson and Mason make the following errors: (1) treating Pashtun identity as if it were set in stone; (2) failing to consider that today's radical Islamists rely on different sources of support than did the mullahs (Islamic religious leaders) who led jihads against the British Empire; and (3) misinterpreting the role of the official maliks (tribal and village leaders) in the FATA.

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the theoretical understanding of African military coups d'etat. We begin by replicating a well-known model (Jackman, 1978) that purports to identify the structural determinants of coups d'etat within the states of Sub-Saharan Black Africa. When the research problem is changed slightly to focus exclusively on military coups, we find major weaknesses in the original Jackman model. We then extend and refine this model and thereby account in a theoretically meaningful fashion for 91% of the variation in military coups within 35 Black African states from 1960 through 1982. Our major substantive findings indicate that Black African states with relatively dynamic economies whose societies were not very socially mobilized before independence and which have maintained or restored some degree of political participation and political pluralism have experienced fewer military coups, attempted coups, and coup plots than have states with the opposite set of characteristics.

Moran, Daniel ; Russell, James A.: Introduction: the militarization of energy security. - p. 1-18 Moran, Daniel: The battelfield and the marketplace: two cautionary tales. - p. 19-38 Klare, Michael T.: Petroleum anxiety and the militarization of energy security. - p. 39-61 Haynes, Peter: Al-Quaeda, oil dependence, and US foreign policy. - p. 62-74 Chapman, Duane: Gulf oil and international security: can the world's only superpower keep teh oil flowing? - p.75-94 Rahim, Saad: Regional issues and strategic responses: the Gulf states. - p. 95-111 Myers Jaffe, Amy; Soligo, Ronald: Energy security: the Russian connection. - p. 112-134 Johnson, Thomas H.: Central Asia: energy resources, politics, and security. - p. 135-154 Boucek, Christopher: Maintaining Gazpromistan: the politics of Turkmen gas exports. - p. 155-174 Trinkunas, Harold A.: Energy security: the case of Venezuela. - p. 175-187 Newmyer, Jacqueline A.: Chinese energy security and the Chinese regime. - p. 188-210 Leverett, Flynt: Resource mercantilism and the militarization of resource management: a rising Asia and the future of American primacy. - p. 211-242

Comparative political analysts seek empirical generalizations which will hold water across systems and over a period of time. Yet, modeling important political phenomena over more than a handful of countries is still rather unusual. One focus for substantial comparative research has been the coup d'état—an irregular change of governmental leadership by force—in African countries. Scholars who have engaged in this research find they have various conceptual and methodological differences of opinion. In thisControversy, Robert Jackman and Rosemary O'Kane raise the issues in dispute. Their contentions are answered by Thomas Johnson, Pat McGowan, and Robert Slater. The exchange highlights important research issues without necessarily resolving them.