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Previous studies aimed at explaining populist support emphasize the crucial role of populist attitudes and ideology among the general population. With respect to the role of discontent and grievances as drivers of populist support - often at the heart of theoretical work on populism - however, empirical results are rather mixed. We argue that the apparent contradictions are partly due to insufficient conceptualization of discontent. We distinguish between societal-centered discontent, which is more based on a general, negative subjective assessment of society, and self-centered discontent that expresses a negative assessment of one's personal situation. In line with our expectations, regression results for Germany confirm that society-centered discontent, but not self-centered discontent, is important for populist party support. Moreover, we find that society-centered discontent also moderates the relation between populist attitudes and populist support. We conclude that beyond ideologies, populism capitalizes on the cultivation of collective - but not individual - discontent.

Previous studies aimed at explaining populist support emphasize the crucial role of populist attitudes and ideology among the general population. With respect to the role of discontent and grievances as drivers of populist support—often at the heart of theoretical work on populism—however, empirical results are rather mixed. We argue that the apparent contradictions are partly due to insufficient conceptualization of discontent. We distinguish between societal-centered discontent, which is more based on a general, negative subjective assessment of society, and self-centered discontent that expresses a negative assessment of one's personal situation. In line with our expectations, regression results for Germany confirm that society-centered discontent, but not self-centered discontent, is important for populist party support. Moreover, we find that society-centered discontent also moderates the relation between populist attitudes and populist support. We conclude that beyond ideologies, populism capitalizes on the cultivation of collective—but not individual—discontent.

"Während viele Studien auf der Individualebene eine fragmentierte, mehrdimensionale und nicht-kumulative Struktur politischer Partizipation aufzeigen, kommt dieser Vergleich von 22 Nationen Europas auf der Makroebene zum Ergebnis, dass verschiedene Formen politischer und sozialer Beteiligung sowohl kumulativ als auch eindimensional sind. So können im Hinblick auf die Partizipation Länderfamilien definiert werden. Da diese weitgehend mit jenen Länderfamilien übereinstimmen, die sich aus anderen Studien ergeben haben, eröffnet sich die Möglichkeit einer weiter reichenden Generalisierung, die vielfältige soziale, ökonomische und politische Ländercharakteristika umfasst. Darüber hinaus werden verschiedene theoretische Ansätze zur Erklärung von Ländergruppen und Partizipationsmustern überprüft mit dem Ergebnis, dass dies am besten mit einem Netz eng verwandter Indikatoren gelingt, namentlich der demokratischen und ökonomischen Entwicklung, der Regierungseffizienz, niedriger Korruption, hohen öffentlichen Ausgaben in den Bereichen Bildung und Gesundheit sowie Rechtstaatlichkeit. Diese Faktoren bilden ein sich gegenseitig verstärkendes System von Ursache und Wirkung, das in einer engen Verknüpfung mit dem Ausmaß an Beteiligung in verschiedenen Bereichen steht." (Autorenreferat)

The success of right-wing populist parties (RPPs) is often attributed to their deployment of the rhetoric of fear that capitalizes on societal crisis and corresponding anxieties. However, empirical evidence on the relationship between anxiety and support for RPP (RPP support) remains inconclusive. We argue that right-wing authoritarian (RWA) and populist attitudes imply contradicting views on authority. Anti-elitism, a subdimension of populist attitudes, implies rebellion against established authorities; however, RWA submission relates to the inclination to obey authorities. These contradictory attitudes may account for the mixed results. In relation to anxiety, both rebellion and submission are conceived as defensive responses, but their relation to RPP support is different because the reactions to authority they induce are antithetical. Moreover, we differentiate between two forms of anxiety as sources of RPP support, which are often conflated in empirical studies: situational anxiety arising in response to specific threats and diffuse anxiety or a general sense of anxiety. We draw on mass survey data, including a survey experiment, that examines how anxiety drives support for the German right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD) via attitudes toward authority. The path analyses support our hypotheses and reveal that anti-elitism mediates the positive relationship between anxiety and voter support for the AfD. At the same time, authoritarian submission increases with anxiety, but—unlike anti-elitism—it is negatively associated with AfD support. Furthermore, the two paths are confirmed for situational and diffuse anxiety, with the relative importance of authoritarian submission and anti-elitism varying according to the form of anxiety.

Ziel dieses Artikels ist die Präsentation eines neuen Demokratieindex – des Demokratiebarometers. Das Demokratiebarometer versucht, die konzeptionellen und methodologischen Schwächen bisheriger Demokratiemaße zu überwinden, um so die Qualitätsunterschiede von etablierten Demokratien messen und analysieren zu können. Der Index basiert auf einem ausdifferenzierten Demokratiekonzept, aus dem in mehreren transparenten Schritten die Messindikatoren abgeleitet werden: Aus den drei konstituierenden Prinzipien Freiheit, Gleichheit und Kontrolle werden zunächst neun grundlegende Funktionen deduziert, aus denen dann Komponenten und daraus wiederum Subkomponenten und schließlich Indikatoren abgeleitet werden. Dieses Konzept wird in einem ersten Schritt dargelegt. Danach werden die methodologischen Grundlagen – die Messung und Aggregierung – des Demokratiebarometers erläutert. Die Präsentation erster Resultate sowie die Ergebnisse verschiedener Validitätstests zeigen schließlich die Plausibilität und das Potenzial dieses neuen Messinstruments auf.

Considering gender inequality in time as a resource for political participation and using Wave 5 of the European Social Survey data on 24 European countries, this study examines: (1) the relationship of both long working hours and unsociable work schedules to participation in national elections in Europe before or during 2010; (2) factors that may mediate this association; and (3) gender differences in this relationship and occupation-specific patterns. The findings show that both working more than 45 hours per week and working evenings, nights or weekends are associated with lower national electoral participation in women with both high and low occupational status. Among men with the lowest occupational status, working long hours is also linked to lower participation. These findings are robust against controlling for important confounders. Political interest seems to partially mediate the negative effect of unsociable work schedules on voting in women. Neither health nor social engagement plays a mediation role.

Rossteutscher, S. ; Faas, T. ; Arzheimer, K.: Voters and voting in multi-level systems : an introduction. - S. 1-7

Under what conditions are people prepared to accept restrictions on their personal freedoms in order to protect their own well-being and health, but above all the well-being and health of others? What do decision-making processes have to look like in order to be regarded as legitimate by citizens? Are there freedoms that people do not want to give up under any circumstances? What role does the democratic quality of a political regime play in these questions, and what is the role of various cultural characteristics?

These questions, which refer to the area of tension between individual liberties and collective welfare, arise with particular urgency in view of the worldwide Corona pandemic, but also with a view to future crises, such as the impending climate catastrophe.

To study these questions, DAPEK surveyed 9,000 respondents from six countries (Germany, Hungary, Japan, Poland, South Korea, and Spain – 1,500 respondents each) in November 2021. Core of the data collection are two survey experiments. First, a conjoint experiment is designed to analyze which restrictions in pandemic countermeasures affect citizen support. Second, a combination of a best-worst-scaling approach with a framing experiment scrutinizes which political decision-making procedures citizens prefer and whether that varies by different societal challenges. The experimental data are flanked by extensive individual-level data, a.o. on demographics, as well as political and cultural value orientations.

DAPEK is a short-term project of the DFG-funded Cluster of Excellence "Contestations of the Liberal Script", which is located at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center, among others.

Keywords: covid-19, value orientations, societal challenges, decision-making process, freedom