Tax morale and (de-)centralization: An experimental study
In: Public choice, Band 125, Heft 1-2, S. 171-188
ISSN: 1573-7101
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In: Public choice, Band 125, Heft 1-2, S. 171-188
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 125, Heft 1, S. 171-188
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Band 159, Heft 1, S. 16
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 205-220
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
The implementation of a new kidney allocation algorithm by Eurotransplant was a 'rule choice' with serious ethical, legal, and political implications. Eurotransplant made that choice in view of a careful analysis of empirically predictable consequences of alternative rule specifications. This paper studies in a stylized way how the decision on the allocation algorithm emerged. Hopefully an understanding of central features of the described successful case of initiating improvements may be helpful in other cases with a similar structure.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 45, Heft 4, S. 453-469
ISSN: 1552-8766
Retributive responses play a role in human behavior. Are they triggered primarily by supposed intentions or by observed consequences of actions? Experimental studies were conducted of retributive responses in situations in which the individual actor may inflict harmful consequences without intending to and intend harmful consequences without inflicting them. Results indicate that retributive responses are more strongly influenced by observed consequences than ascribed intentions. However, individual retributive motivations seem to be overshadowed by concerns that are nonretributive altogether, in that they focus on end-state distributions independently of who brought them about.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 45, Heft 4, S. 453-469
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the 'information technology' of individual decision makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally by players who differ in their informational as well as in their preference type. Relative success of alternative decisions feeds back on the type composition of the population which in turn influences rational decision making. An indirect evolutionary analysis of an elementary yet important basic game of trust shows that under certain parameter constellations the population dynamics of the evolutionary process specify a unique completely mixed rest point. However, as opposed to previous studies of preference formation in the game of trust there is no convergence to but only cycling around the rest point if the informational status of individuals evolves rather than being chosen strategically.
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In: Power, Freedom, and Voting, S. 209-226
In: Journal of risk and uncertainty, Band 66, Heft 3, S. 233-260
ISSN: 1573-0476
AbstractWe experimentally study a class of pie-sharing games with alternating roles from a decision-making perspective. For this, we consider a variant of a two-stage alternating-offer game which introduces an imbalance in the protagonists' bargaining powers. This game class enables us to investigate how exposure to risk and strategic ambiguity affects one's bargaining behaviour. Two structural econometric models of behaviour, a naïve and a sophisticated one, capture remarkably well the observed deviations from the game-theoretic benchmark. Our findings indicate, in particular, that a higher exposure to strategic ambiguity leads to a behaviour that is less responsive to the game's parameters and to distorted, yet consistent, beliefs about other's behaviour. We also find evidence of a backward-reasoning whereby first-stage decisions relate to the second-stage ones but which do not call for the counterfactual reasoning that characterises rationality in such settings.
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Working paper
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 34, S. 206-221
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 169, Heft 3, S. 433
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: British journal of political science, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 181
ISSN: 0007-1234
In: British journal of political science, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 181-191
ISSN: 1469-2112
In multi-party democracies, several parties usually have to join together in coalition to form government. Many aspects of that process have been fairly fully investigated, others less so. Among the latter is the timing of the formation and announcement of coalitions.While the dominant popular image may be one of parties meeting together after the election to hammer out a coalition agreement, pre-election coalitions of one sort or another are actually quite common. In almost half of the elections in OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries since the Second World War, at least one pair of parties had pre-announced their intention to join together in government. A quarter of governments formed were based wholly (and another quarter in part) on pre-election agreements.To date, such studies as there have been of pre-election coalitions have concentrated primarily on system-level explanations – features of the electoral system (majoritarian or proportional, and so on) that make such arrangements more or less likely.3 Here we shall instead look more at the agent-level logic of 'early' (pre-election) versus 'late' (post-election) coalition formation, from the point of view of voters and parties.hypotheses concerning coalition timingIn the tradition of Downs and Riker and their coalition-theorist progeny, we shall assume that voters are interested primarily in getting policies adopted which are close to their 'ideal points' in policy space, and that parties are interested primarily in winning office to implement policies as close as possible to their 'ideal points' in policy space. That leads parties to strive for 'minimal connected winning coalitions': 'connected' in the sense that they link parties adjacent in policy space; 'minimal' in the sense that they involve the party's sharing power with the fewest parties backed by fewest voters that it can and still win.
In: Revue économique, Band 49, Heft 3, S. 785-794
ISSN: 1950-6694
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