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AbstractThe EU has become increasingly responsible for the state of national economies over the last decades. Meanwhile, many observers have claimed that this increased responsibility has not translated into more accountability. In this article, we revisit this literature and analyse vote‐popularity functions before and after accession because it provides a situation when the EU is an incumbent and when it is not. Using Eurobarometer surveys from 2001 to 2011, which were carried out in the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, we first show that individuals do not hold the EU accountable for macroeconomic performances before accession, but that they do after accession. Using European Election Studies surveys, we also indicate that the incumbent European Peoples' Party is held accountable for the state of the economy in countries that are ruled by the EU, but not in countries that have just become EU members.

Rejection of the market economy is widespread in academia. This fact has often been observed, but rarely explained. Using a large survey on French academics which replicates questions used in international surveys, this article confirms that French academics are hostile to market economy principles in comparison with the French population. Two explanations are tested: the first posits that academics—as knowledge providers—are likely to experience a "public good" market failure. Their rejection of the market economy is thus linked to their specific positioning vis-à-vis the market economy itself. The second hypothesis assumes that academics are not involved in market activities. Consequently, this lack of familiarity leads academics to be more suspicious towards an institution they barely experience. Both hypotheses are consistent with our data.

Rejection of the market economy is widespread in academia. This fact has often been observed, but rarely explained. Using a large survey on French academics which replicates questions used in international surveys, this article confirms that French academics are hostile to market economy principles in comparison with the French population. Two explanations are tested: the first posits that academics—as knowledge providers—are likely to experience a "public good" market failure. Their rejection of the market economy is thus linked to their specific positioning vis-à-vis the market economy itself. The second hypothesis assumes that academics are not involved in market activities. Consequently, this lack of familiarity leads academics to be more suspicious towards an institution they barely experience. Both hypotheses are consistent with our data.

Economic-voting literature has shown that support for the EU depends on macroeconomicvariables - mainly unemployment and inflation - just like support for national governments. This suggests that citizens reward or punish the EU according to the state of the economy, as if EU was deemed responsible for it. In order to test this hypothesis, we need to prove that EUsupport depends on the state of the economy only when the EU is actually in charge. Based on Eurobarometer surveys which were carried out three years before and after the 2004 wave of accession, we analyze economic support for the EU in the ten countries which joined European institutions on this occasion. We find that macroeconomic variables did not affect support for the EU before accession and that they considerably altered it after 2004, which confirms that citizens attribute responsibility to the EU for the state of the economy.

Economic-voting literature has shown that support for the EU depends on macroeconomicvariables - mainly unemployment and inflation - just like support for national governments. This suggests that citizens reward or punish the EU according to the state of the economy, as if EU was deemed responsible for it. In order to test this hypothesis, we need to prove that EUsupport depends on the state of the economy only when the EU is actually in charge. Based on Eurobarometer surveys which were carried out three years before and after the 2004 wave of accession, we analyze economic support for the EU in the ten countries which joined European institutions on this occasion. We find that macroeconomic variables did not affect support for the EU before accession and that they considerably altered it after 2004, which confirms that citizens attribute responsibility to the EU for the state of the economy.

Economic-voting literature has shown that support for the EU depends on macroeconomicvariables - mainly unemployment and inflation - just like support for national governments. This suggests that citizens reward or punish the EU according to the state of the economy, as if EU was deemed responsible for it. In order to test this hypothesis, we need to prove that EUsupport depends on the state of the economy only when the EU is actually in charge. Based on Eurobarometer surveys which were carried out three years before and after the 2004 wave of accession, we analyze economic support for the EU in the ten countries which joined European institutions on this occasion. We find that macroeconomic variables did not affect support for the EU before accession and that they considerably altered it after 2004, which confirms that citizens attribute responsibility to the EU for the state of the economy.

Cet article propose une analyse en termes d'économie politique de l'adhésion des populations des Pays d'Europe centrale et orientale (PECO) à l'intégration européenne. En particulier, il se concentre sur les effets économiques de l'adhésion, qui ont été plusieurs fois observés dans la littérature. Les modèles économiques supposent que la raison pour laquelle la conjoncture économique affecte le soutien à l'Union européenne (UE) est que les citoyens pensent que l'UE est responsable de cette conjoncture. En utilisant les enquêtes Eurobaromètres avant et après l'entrée des PECO dans l'UE, nous testons une idée simple : si les citoyens des PECO considèrent l'UE comme responsable de la conjoncture économique, alors une mauvaise situation macroéconomique produit un rejet de l'Europe uniquement après leur entrée en 2004. Cette hypothèse n'est vérifiée que pour le taux de chômage, et infirmée pour le taux de croissance et d'inflation.

We examine regularities and differences in public budgeting in comparative perspective. Budgets quantify collective political decisions made in response to incoming information, the preferences of decision makers, and the institutions that structure how decisions are made. We first establish that the distribution of budget changes in many Western democracies follows a non-Gaussian distribution, the power function. This implies that budgets are highly incremental, yet occasionally are punctuated by large changes. This pattern holds regardless of the type of political system—parliamentary or presidential—and for level of government. By studying the power function's exponents we find systematic differences for budgetary increases versus decreases (the former are more punctuated) in most systems, and for levels of government (local governments are less punctuated). Finally, we show that differences among countries in the coefficients of the general budget law correspond to differences in formal institutional structures. While the general form of the law is probably dictated by the fundamental operations of human and organizational information processing, differences in the magnitudes of the law's basic parameters are country- and institution-specific.

We examine regularities and differences in public budgeting in comparative perspective. Budgets quantify collective political decisions made in response to incoming information, the preferences of decision makers, and the institutions that structure how decisions are made. We first establish that the distribution of budget changes in many Western democracies follows a non-Gaussian distribution, the power function. This implies that budgets are highly incremental, yet occasionally are punctuated by large changes. This pattern holds regardless of the type of political system—parliamentary or presidential—and for level of government. By studying the power function's exponents we find systematic differences for budgetary increases versus decreases (the former are more punctuated) in most systems, and for levels of government (local governments are less punctuated). Finally, we show that differences among countries in the coefficients of the general budget law correspond to differences in formal institutional structures. While the general form of the law is probably dictated by the fundamental operations of human and organizational information processing, differences in the magnitudes of the law's basic parameters are country- and institution-specific.