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While comparative politics has been dominated by macro-approaches, relatively little comparative scholarship has focused on understanding the behavior of individuals. However, recent years have seen increased attention to integrating what we know about individual citizens with what we know about macro-level contexts that vary across countries. This research examines how people's interpretations, opinions, and actions are shaped by and embedded in variable contextual parameters (structural, institutional, cultural). This article discusses the growing literature on the nexus of macro-level context and individual behavior and the potential for integrating existing knowledge, as well as some of the challenges inherent in multilevel analyses. It also provides a novel substantive application. Using surveys conducted in 2002-03 in 20 European democracies, we examine the effect of income inequality on people's attitudes about the functioning of the political system and trust in public institutions. We find that citizens in countries with higher levels of income inequality express more negative attitudes toward public institutions. Moreover, we show that the negative effect of inequality on attitudes toward the political system is particularly powerful among individuals on the political left. In contrast, inequality's negative effect on people's faith in the system is muted among those on the right.

Recent years have seen increased attention to integrating what we know about individual citizens with what we know about macro-level contexts that vary across countries. This article discusses the growing literature on how people's interpretations, opinions, and actions are shaped by variable contextual parameters and provides a novel substantive application. Using surveys conducted in 20 European democracies, the authors examine the effect of income inequality on people's attitudes about the functioning of the political system and trust in public institutions. They find that citizens in countries with higher levels of income inequality express more negative attitudes toward public institutions. Moreover, they show that the negative effect of inequality on attitudes toward the political system is particularly powerful among individuals on the political left. In contrast, inequality's negative effect on people's faith in the system is muted among those on the right.

This article examines a model of the domestic political economy of subjective employment insecurity in advanced industrial societies. Based on data on people's attitudes toward their job as well as levels of and kinds of social protection collected in 15 OECD countries, it shows that there are distinct manifestations of job insecurity that are affected differently by distinct aspects of social protection programs. While the analysis shows that social protection measures reduce employment insecurity, it also reveals that overall levels welfare state generosity do not have any systematic effect on whether workers feel secure. The article's findings suggest the need to decompose the different components of employ- ment insecurity as well as disaggregate national systems of social protection when examining the impact of welfare states on job insecurity.

Do democratic elections & experience with democracy affect citizens' propensity to engage in political protest? If so, how? A model of protest potential based on the incentives election winners & losers face in new & established democratic systems is presented. Using surveys conducted by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) in seventeen democracies around the globe, the effect on political protest potential of being in the political minority or majority after an election is compared. Being in the political minority heightens citizens' political protest potential. Moreover, the effect on protest potential of losing is significantly greater in new democracies compared with established ones. These findings provide systematic evidence that election outcomes should be considered important indicators of political protest potential, & they imply that this effect is particularly salient in countries whose democratic institutions are relatively new & potentially more unstable.

Do democratic elections and experience with democracy affect citizens' propensity to engage in political protest? If so, how? A model of protest potential based on the incentives election winners and losers face in new and established democratic systems is presented. Using surveys conducted by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) in seventeen democracies around the globe, the effect on political protest potential of being in the political minority or majority after an election is compared. Being in the political minority heightens citizens' political protest potential. Moreover, the effect on protest potential of losing is significantly greater in new democracies compared with established ones. These findings provide systematic evidence that election outcomes should be considered important indicators of political protest potential, and they imply that this effect is particularly salient in countries whose democratic institutions are relatively new and potentially more unstable.

Do democratic elections and experience with democracy affect citizens' propensity to engage in political protest? If so, how?We develop amodel of protest potential based on the incentives election winners and losers face in new and established democratic systems. Using surveys conducted by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) in seventeen democracies around the globe, we compare the effect of being in the political minority or majority after an election on political protest potential. We find that being in the political minority heightens citizens' political protest potential. Moreover, we find that the effect of losing on protest potential is significantly greater in new democracies relative to established ones. These findings provide systematic evidence that election outcomes should be considered important indicators of political protest potential, and they imply that this effect is particularly salient in countries whose democratic institutions are relatively new and potentially more ...

On the basis of cross-national survey data collected in 12 European democracies, we argue and demonstrate empirically that people who have experienced economic hardship are less satisfied with their lives and the performance of the political system. Moreover, we show that different kinds of economic hardship (financial and job-related difficulties) have separable effects on people's levels of happiness and political satisfaction. Finally, we hypothesize and show that economic distress that is personally experienced has a greater impact on life satisfaction than on satisfaction with the political system. Conversely, evaluations of the national economy affect political satisfaction more strongly than attitudes about one's life. ; Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia ...

Using surveys conducted in sixteen mature and newly established democracies around the globe, this study examines the effect of corruption on people's attitudes toward government. The analysis demonstrates that citizens in countries with higher levels of corruption express more negative evaluations of the performance of the political system and exhibit lower levels of trust in civil servants. However, the results also show that the negative effect of corruption on evaluations of the political system is significantly attenuated among supporters of the incumbent political authorities. These findings provide strong and systematic evidence that informal political practices, especially those that compromise important democratic principles, should be considered important indicators of political system performance. Moreover, they imply that, while corruption is a powerful determinant of political support across widely varying political, cultural, and economic contexts, it does not uniformly diminish support for political institutions across all segments of the electorate.

We examine the effects of voting for the winners and losers of presidential and congressional elections on political trust. On the basis of survey and electoral data for 1972 and 1996, we argue and demonstrate empirically that presidential winner–loser status systematically affects citizens' trust in government. We find that voters for the losers of the presidential contest show lower levels of trust. Moreover, we find that voting for the congressional winners does not attenuate this effect. Political trust is highest among voters who voted either for both the presidential and congressional winners or the presidential winner and congressional losers; trust is lowest among those who voted for both the presidential and congressional losers or congressional winners and the presidential loser.

We examine the effects of voting for the winners and losers of presidential and congressional elections on political trust. On the basis of survey and electoral data for 1972 and 1996, we argue and demonstrate empirically that presidential winner-loser status systematically affects citizens' trust in government. We find that voters for the losers of the presidential contest show lower levels of trust. Moreover, we find that voting for the congressional winners does not attenuate this effect. Political trust is highest among voters who voted either for both the presidential and congressional winners or the presidential winner and congressional losers; trust is lowest among those who voted for both the presidential and congressional losers or congressional winners and the presidential loser. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)