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The Politics of Justification is an investigation of welfare retrenchment in Denmark and the Netherlands, 1982-1998. Welfare retrenchment is politically highly controversial, but still governments do retrench. This book argues that governments can implement retrenchment if they can achieve a party political consensus allowing them to frame retrenchment in a way that makes it seems justified to the electorate. In the Netherlands, such a consensus emerged in the mid 1980s due to the power of the CDA. It has allowed Dutch government to implement a number of welfare retrenchments. In Denmark, a consensus did not emerge until the Social Democratic Party re-entered government in 1993 explaining why the Danish welfare state has seen less retrenchment than the Dutch one. With its focus on the strategies of the political parties, the book differs from many other studies of the subject focusing on the role of political institutions.

In the article, I am concerned with the epistemic justification of democracy: what does the epistemic justification of democracy consist of, and how can we assure that democracy indeed generates decisions of the highest epistemic quality? However, since it is impossible to speak about the epistemic justification of democracy without considering its relation to political justification, and their tension, this article will also question the relationship between epistemic and political justification. I endorse a position called the hybrid stance, not only because I think that, when justifying democracy, we need to consider both the political value of fairness and the epistemic values of truth-sensitivity and truthconduciveness, but because I believe we should appropriately harmonize them. While the advocates of epistemic proceduralism hold that it best harmonizes the political and epistemic values of democracy, I argue that they do not separate epistemic values as intrinsically different from the political. On the other hand, even if we accept that epistemic justification is tied to intrinsically truth-respecting practices, the question remains which decision-making processes best satisfy this demand. In simpler terms, we must inquire how to divide epistemic labor between citizens and experts. I will try to show that the optimal model needs to preserve both the epistemic potential of the diversity present in the collective intelligence of citizens, and the epistemic potential of the factual knowledge embodied by the individual intelligence of experts.

Penultimate version accepted for publication ; Whistleblowing is the act of disclosing information from a public or private organization in order to reveal cases of corruption that are of immediate or potential danger to the public. Blowing the whistle involves personal risk, especially when legal protection is absent, and charges of betrayal, which often come in the form of legal prosecution under treason laws. In this article we argue that whistleblowing is justified when disclosures are made with the proper intent and fulfill specific communicative constraints in addressing issues of public interest. Three communicative constraints of informativeness, truthfulness and evidence are discussed in this regard. We develop a 'harm test' to assess the intent for disclosures, concluding that it is not sufficient for justification. Along with the proper intent, a successful act of whistleblowing should provide information that serves the public interest. Taking cognizance of the varied conceptions of public interest, we present an account of public interest that fits the framework of whistleblowing disclosures. In particular, we argue that whistleblowing is justified inter alia when the information it conveys is of a presumptive interest for a public insofar as it reveals an instance of injustice or violation of a civil or political right done against and unbeknown to some members of a polity. ; Project: 'Change of Direction. Fostering Whistleblowing in the Fight against Corruption' co-funded by the Internal Security Fund of the European Union (Grant Agreement Number: HOME/2014/ISFP/AG/EFCE/7233); SFRH/BPD/108669/2015 ...

Many institutions in a democratic society wield important power by virtue of the decisions they make. These decisions may concern individuals or have a more general impact on society. It goes without saying today that this exercise of power must be accounted for. A supreme court's reasoning is given in its judgements. A central bank's reasoning is given in the decision-making body's minutes. In this paper, we develop criteria for what constitute good written justifications for a decision, not what makes a good decision per se. We look at the two institutions we know best: supreme courts and central banks. Of course, these are not the only institutions that exercise power on behalf of the state, and we also ask whether our criteria could be applied more generally. We assess a selection of supreme court judgements and monetary policy decisions in various countries qualitatively against our criteria, and find that practice largely conforms to the criteria. There are some common features between supreme courts and central banks. In recent years there has been a development in the way the judgments are written in the UK Supreme Court. Earlier, each judge wrote his votum. Now they are writing a common text. With individual writing, there were many different formulations of the normative text. It is easier for the public to relate to one legislative text. The UK Supreme Court, under the presidency of Lord Neuberger, has therefore gradually moved towards writing a joint text. John Roberts, the US Chief Justice, thought that judges should be worried when they are writing separately about the effect on the court as an institution. What about the minutes of the central banks? Professor Alan Blinder at Princeton argues that a central bank that speaks with a cacophony of voices has no voice at all. Professor Otmar Issing, the former Chief Economist and Member of the Board of the ECB, believes that there is a danger that individual minutes provide an incentive for individual members to put themselves ahead of the institution We also test empirically whether the institutions' decisions and the justifications for these decisions are communicated in clear language. Our analysis is inspired by Bank of England chief economist Andrew Haldane's speech "A little more conversation, a little less action", and by the report "Bankspeak: The Language of World Bank Reports 1946-2012" by Franco Moretti and Dominique Pestre at Stanford Literary Lab. We analyse more than 6,000 central bank and supreme court decisions from the past decade and find considerable differences in length and readability across countries and institutions. The grand chamber decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are by far the longest, while the European Court of Justice employs the most complex language. The Danish central bank keeps things briefest and uses the clearest language, but also has the simplest regime to explain. The Swedish central bank's minutes stand out as both long and complex, while the Norwegian central bank is unusually concise. Moretti and Pestre analysed the text of all World Bank reports and found quantitative indications that the language of the reports had moved in the wrong direction in terms of readability. We perform the same tests on central banks and supreme courts and find that these institutions' language has not moved in the same negative direction. Former Bank of England governor Mervyn King argued that the design of an institution "must reflect history and experience", and there is no doubt that each institution's way of writing is influenced by its own history. This is what economists refer to as "path dependence". We wonder, however, whether there is rather too much path dependence in many cases, and whether the institutions in question might benefit from looking at trends and learning from other institutions both at home and abroad. In our work on this paper, we have been particularly wary of phrases along the lines of "based on a general assessment". Alarm bells sound whenever we see them, especially with any frequency, as they are liable to conceal rather than illuminate the true rationale. ; publishedVersion

Many institutions in a democratic society wield important power by virtue of the decisions they make. These decisions may concern individuals or have a more general impact on society. It goes without saying today that this exercise of power must be accounted for. A supreme court's reasoning is given in its judgements. A central bank's reasoning is given in the decision-making body's minutes. In this paper, we develop criteria for what constitute good written justifications for a decision, not what makes a good decision per se. We look at the two institutions we know best: supreme courts and central banks. Of course, these are not the only institutions that exercise power on behalf of the state, and we also ask whether our criteria could be applied more generally. We assess a selection of supreme court judgements and monetary policy decisions in various countries qualitatively against our criteria, and find that practice largely conforms to the criteria. There are some common features between supreme courts and central banks. In recent years there has been a development in the way the judgments are written in the UK Supreme Court. Earlier, each judge wrote his votum. Now they are writing a common text. With individual writing, there were many different formulations of the normative text. It is easier for the public to relate to one legislative text. The UK Supreme Court, under the presidency of Lord Neuberger, has therefore gradually moved towards writing a joint text. John Roberts, the US Chief Justice, thought that judges should be worried when they are writing separately about the effect on the court as an institution. What about the minutes of the central banks? Professor Alan Blinder at Princeton argues that a central bank that speaks with a cacophony of voices has no voice at all. Professor Otmar Issing, the former Chief Economist and Member of the Board of the ECB, believes that there is a danger that individual minutes provide an incentive for individual members to put themselves ahead of the institution We also test empirically whether the institutions' decisions and the justifications for these decisions are communicated in clear language. Our analysis is inspired by Bank of England chief economist Andrew Haldane's speech "A little more conversation, a little less action", and by the report "Bankspeak: The Language of World Bank Reports 1946-2012" by Franco Moretti and Dominique Pestre at Stanford Literary Lab. We analyse more than 6,000 central bank and supreme court decisions from the past decade and find considerable differences in length and readability across countries and institutions. The grand chamber decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are by far the longest, while the European Court of Justice employs the most complex language. The Danish central bank keeps things briefest and uses the clearest language, but also has the simplest regime to explain. The Swedish central bank's minutes stand out as both long and complex, while the Norwegian central bank is unusually concise. Moretti and Pestre analysed the text of all World Bank reports and found quantitative indications that the language of the reports had moved in the wrong direction in terms of readability. We perform the same tests on central banks and supreme courts and find that these institutions' language has not moved in the same negative direction. Former Bank of England governor Mervyn King argued that the design of an institution "must reflect history and experience", and there is no doubt that each institution's way of writing is influenced by its own history. This is what economists refer to as "path dependence". We wonder, however, whether there is rather too much path dependence in many cases, and whether the institutions in question might benefit from looking at trends and learning from other institutions both at home and abroad. In our work on this paper, we have been particularly wary of phrases along the lines of "based on a general assessment". Alarm bells sound whenever we see them, especially with any frequency, as they are liable to conceal rather than illuminate the true rationale.

This paper investigates the conditions of political argument with regard to welfare legislation. It connects to the discussion on the role of ideas in political change but develops a new approach by investigating arguments in light of theories of public justification in a democratic society. The paper uses a recent Norwegian law as the case for studying how politicians frame their arguments for "mandatory activation," meaning the policy that requires recipients to participate in work-oriented activities. The paper finds that Norwegian advocates of activation use a "justificatory narrative" that presents the new law as a form of paternalistic concern for the benefit recipients. It is argued that this justification can be understood as shaped by certain basic conditions of political viability. ; This work was supported by Norges Forskningsråd: [Grant Number 257603]. Norges forskningsråd 257603. ; acceptedVersion

Kant's arguments for the reality of human freedom and the normativity of the moral law continue to inspire work in contemporary moral philosophy. In this ground-breaking study, Owen Ware defends the controversial view that Kant's mature writings on ethics share a unified commitment to the primacy of the moral law.

Drug decriminalization calls for reduced control and penalties compared to existing laws. Proponents of drug decriminalization generally support the use of fines or other punishments to replace prison terms, and often propose systems whereby illegal drug users who are caught would be fined, but would not receive a permanent criminal record as a result. A central feature of drug decriminalization is the concept of harm reduction.
Drug decriminalization is in some ways an intermediate between prohibition and legalization, and has been criticized as being "the worst of both worlds", in that drug sales would still be illegal, thus perpetuating the problems associated with leaving production and distribution of drugs to the criminal underworld, while also failing to discourage illegal drug use by removing the criminal penalties that might otherwise cause some people to choose not to use drugs.
In 2001 began treating use and possession of small quantities of drugs as a public health issue. This also decreases the amount of money the government spends fighting a war on drugs and money spent keeping drug users incarcerated. A number of countries have similarly moved to reduce the penalties associated with drug use and personal possession.