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Using a simple two-region model where local or central regulators set bank capital requirements as risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios, we demonstrate the importance of capital requirements being set centrally when cross-region spillovers are large and local regulators suffer from substantial regulatory capture. We show that local regulators may want to surrender regulatory power only when spillover effects are large but the degree of supervisory capture is relatively small, and that bank capital regulation at central rather than local levels is more beneficial the larger the impact of systemic risk and the more asymmetric is regulatory capture at the local level.

We propose a new approach for comparing Loss Given Default (LGD) models which is based on loss functions defined in terms of regulatory capital charge. Our comparison method improves the banks' ability to absorb their unexpected credit losses, by penalizing more heavily LGD forecast errors made on credits associated with high exposure and long maturity. We also introduce asymmetric loss functions that only penalize the LGD forecast errors that lead to underestimate the regulatory capital. We show theoretically that our approach ranks models differently compared to the traditional approach which only focuses on LGD forecast errors. We apply our methodology to six competing LGD models using a sample of almost 10,000 defaulted credit and leasing contracts provided by an international bank. Our empirical findings clearly show that models' rankings based on capital charge losses differ from those based on the LGD loss functions currently used by regulators, banks, and academics.

We propose a new approach for comparing Loss Given Default (LGD) models which is based on loss functions defined in terms of regulatory capital charge. Our comparison method improves the banks' ability to absorb their unexpected credit losses, by penalizing more heavily LGD forecast errors made on credits associated with high exposure and long maturity. We also introduce asymmetric loss functions that only penalize the LGD forecast errors that lead to underestimate the regulatory capital. We show theoretically that our approach ranks models differently compared to the traditional approach which only focuses on LGD forecast errors. We apply our methodology to six competing LGD models using a sample of almost 10,000 defaulted credit and leasing contracts provided by an international bank. Our empirical findings clearly show that models' rankings based on capital charge losses differ from those based on the LGD loss functions currently used by regulators, banks, and academics.

We propose a new approach for comparing Loss Given Default (LGD) models which is based on loss functions defined in terms of regulatory capital charge. Our comparison method improves the banks' ability to absorb their unexpected credit losses, by penalizing more heavily LGD forecast errors made on credits associated with high exposure and long maturity. We also introduce asymmetric loss functions that only penalize the LGD forecast errors that lead to underestimate the regulatory capital. We show theoretically that our approach ranks models differently compared to the traditional approach which only focuses on LGD forecast errors. We apply our methodology to six competing LGD models using a sample of almost 10,000 defaulted credit and leasing contracts provided by an international bank. Our empirical findings clearly show that models' rankings based on capital charge losses differ from those based on the LGD loss functions currently used by regulators, banks, and academics.

In this paper, we use U.S. commercial banks' data to investigate whether the effect of unexpected deposit flows on loan production depends on banks' exposure to off-balance sheet funding liquidity risk. We find that lending is sensitive to deposit shocks at small banks but not at large ones. Furthermore, for small banks, the increase in lending explained by unexpected deposit inflows depends on how much they are exposed to funding liquidity risk stemming from their off-balance sheets, as measured by the level of unused commitments. Small banks more exposed to such funding liquidity risk tend to extend fewer new loans. Our results indicate that unexpected deposit inflows from, for instance, the failure of other banks or market disruptions might not as easily be fueled again to borrowers.

In this paper, we use U.S. commercial banks' data to investigate whether the effect of unexpected deposit flows on loan production depends on banks' exposure to off-balance sheet funding liquidity risk. We find that lending is sensitive to deposit shocks at small banks but not at large ones. Furthermore, for small banks, the increase in lending explained by unexpected deposit inflows depends on how much they are exposed to funding liquidity risk stemming from their off-balance sheets, as measured by the level of unused commitments. Small banks more exposed to such funding liquidity risk tend to extend fewer new loans. Our results indicate that unexpected deposit inflows from, for instance, the failure of other banks or market disruptions might not as easily be fueled again to borrowers.

The Basel III Accord imposes minimum liquidity standards on bank balance sheets that are already constrained by minimum capital standards. It is not clear whether or how banks' behaviors will change in this new joint-constraint regime. To gain some insight, we study the balance sheet liquidity behavior of U.S. banking companies in response to negative equity capital shocks prior to the implementation of Basel III. Our 1998-2012 data indicate that banks treated regulatory capital and balance sheet liquidity (e.g., net stable funding ratios, core deposits-to-loans, liquid assets-to-assets) as substitutes rather than complements. This main finding is limited to so-called 'community banks' with assets less than $1 billion; equity capital and liquidity were neither substitutes nor complements at larger banks. In the course of rebuilding their capital ratios, shocked community banks substituted away from loans and loan commitments and reduced their dividend payouts, actions that resulted in greater balance sheet liquidity. Thus, in the state of nature that has traditionally most concerned bank regulators (i.e., stress to bank equity capital), community banks increase their liquidity buffers. Given that these lenders do not pose systemic risk, and that they have historically exceeded the Basel III liquidity minimums by wide margins, our findings suggest that imposing minimum liquidity thresholds on small banks will likely yield little prudential benefit.

The Basel III Accord imposes minimum liquidity standards on bank balance sheets that are already constrained by minimum capital standards. It is not clear whether or how banks' behaviors will change in this new joint-constraint regime. To gain some insight, we study the balance sheet liquidity behavior of U.S. banking companies in response to negative equity capital shocks prior to the implementation of Basel III. Our 1998-2012 data indicate that banks treated regulatory capital and balance sheet liquidity (e.g., net stable funding ratios, core deposits-to-loans, liquid assets-to-assets) as substitutes rather than complements. This main finding is limited to so-called 'community banks' with assets less than $1 billion; equity capital and liquidity were neither substitutes nor complements at larger banks. In the course of rebuilding their capital ratios, shocked community banks substituted away from loans and loan commitments and reduced their dividend payouts, actions that resulted in greater balance sheet liquidity. Thus, in the state of nature that has traditionally most concerned bank regulators (i.e., stress to bank equity capital), community banks increase their liquidity buffers. Given that these lenders do not pose systemic risk, and that they have historically exceeded the Basel III liquidity minimums by wide margins, our findings suggest that imposing minimum liquidity thresholds on small banks will likely yield little prudential benefit.

The transparency of credit institutions is currently an issue of crucial importance not only with regard to the adaptation of regulatory tools (Basle II, IAS-IFRS international norms etc.)but also to the banking, financial and economic consequences. The current crisis places the importance of information about all banking activities centre stage in any debate. At a time when banks are controlled more than ever before, it is surprising to see them being swamped with criticism about their opaqueness and their reluctance to communicate, especially about the risks they are taking. This paper therefore, presents state of the art works on disclosure and bank transparency.It deals with questioning whether it is beneficial or not to increase disclosure levels in order to improve the discipline that the regulators and the markets exert on the banks.

The transparency of credit institutions is currently an issue of crucial importance not only with regard to the adaptation of regulatory tools (Basle II, IAS-IFRS international norms etc.)but also to the banking, financial and economic consequences. The current crisis places the importance of information about all banking activities centre stage in any debate. At a time when banks are controlled more than ever before, it is surprising to see them being swamped with criticism about their opaqueness and their reluctance to communicate, especially about the risks they are taking. This paper therefore, presents state of the art works on disclosure and bank transparency.It deals with questioning whether it is beneficial or not to increase disclosure levels in order to improve the discipline that the regulators and the markets exert on the banks.

The transparency of credit institutions is currently an issue of crucial importance not only with regard to the adaptation of regulatory tools (Basle II, IAS-IFRS international norms etc.)but also to the banking, financial and economic consequences. The current crisis places the importance of information about all banking activities centre stage in any debate. At a time when banks are controlled more than ever before, it is surprising to see them being swamped with criticism about their opaqueness and their reluctance to communicate, especially about the risks they are taking. This paper therefore, presents state of the art works on disclosure and bank transparency.It deals with questioning whether it is beneficial or not to increase disclosure levels in order to improve the discipline that the regulators and the markets exert on the banks.

The transparency of credit institutions is currently an issue of crucial importance not only with regard to the adaptation of regulatory tools (Basle II, IAS-IFRS international norms etc.)but also to the banking, financial and economic consequences. The current crisis places the importance of information about all banking activities centre stage in any debate. At a time when banks are controlled more than ever before, it is surprising to see them being swamped with criticism about their opaqueness and their reluctance to communicate, especially about the risks they are taking. This paper therefore, presents state of the art works on disclosure and bank transparency.It deals with questioning whether it is beneficial or not to increase disclosure levels in order to improve the discipline that the regulators and the markets exert on the banks.

International audience ; Using detailed data on control chains of 710 European commercial banks, we test whether the presence of some categories of controlling shareholders affects product diversification performance. We find that when banks have no controlling shareholder or have only family and state shareholders activity diversification yields diseconomies. However, as long as the control chain involves banking institutions, institutional investors, industrial companies or any other combination of these shareholder categories, banks benefit from diversification economies: they display higher profitability, lower earnings volatility and lower default risk. This is potentially because such categories of shareholders bring additional skills to manage diverse activities. A further exploration shows that such mitigating roles are greater for domestic and diversified shareholders. Our findings provide insights on why banks suffer from greater activity diversification and have several policy implications.

International audience ; Using detailed data on control chains of 710 European commercial banks, we test whether the presence of some categories of controlling shareholders affects product diversification performance. We find that when banks have no controlling shareholder or have only family and state shareholders activity diversification yields diseconomies. However, as long as the control chain involves banking institutions, institutional investors, industrial companies or any other combination of these shareholder categories, banks benefit from diversification economies: they display higher profitability, lower earnings volatility and lower default risk. This is potentially because such categories of shareholders bring additional skills to manage diverse activities. A further exploration shows that such mitigating roles are greater for domestic and diversified shareholders. Our findings provide insights on why banks suffer from greater activity diversification and have several policy implications.

International audience ; Using detailed data on control chains of 710 European commercial banks, we test whether the presence of some categories of controlling shareholders affects product diversification performance. We find that when banks have no controlling shareholder or have only family and state shareholders activity diversification yields diseconomies. However, as long as the control chain involves banking institutions, institutional investors, industrial companies or any other combination of these shareholder categories, banks benefit from diversification economies: they display higher profitability, lower earnings volatility and lower default risk. This is potentially because such categories of shareholders bring additional skills to manage diverse activities. A further exploration shows that such mitigating roles are greater for domestic and diversified shareholders. Our findings provide insights on why banks suffer from greater activity diversification and have several policy implications.