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This dissertation develops and applies empirical methods to find policy-relevant answers regarding financial stability and network effects, predicting food insecurity risks, and understanding the financial relevance of natural capital. Chapter 2 proposes a dynamic network effect (DNE) model to study network effects, which refer to entities affecting their neighbors due to the proximity to each other. The smooth marginalized particle filter (SMPF) is shown to be a well-suited estimator in Monte Carlo simulations. Chapter 3 applies the DNE model to explain contagion among the largest Eurozone banks. Supervisory asset holding data allow the construction of a bank business model similarity network. The associated time-varying network effects help resolve the credit spread puzzle, especially during turbulent times. Chapter 4 proposes a stochastic framework to forecast food insecurity risks using LASSO variable selection, a panel vector-autoregression and Bayesian priors to incorporate expert opinions. The model is stochastic and can inform vulnerability and risk assessments. Chapter 5 asks how 1% growth in natural capital affects a country's government bond yields. Comparisons across countries lead to problematic insights, due to the ingrained income bias. Instead, within-country comparisons over the recent past, estimated using interactive fixed-effects, are unaffected by the bias and show that renewable natural capital tend to lower borrowing costs.

Racialization is a concept that is theoretically underdeveloped. Although there has been an increased interest in Islamophobia since 9/11, it is very rarely discussed as racial in its nature. In this special issue on Islamophobia and the Racialization of Muslims scholars connect racism to Islamophobia. This issue situates racialization as a way to explain and understand Islamophobia, as racism towards a Muslim population. Through empirical studies, this issue uncovers the processes of racialization of Muslims and the rise of Islamophobia in both Europe and the USA. Case studies include the experiences of middle-class US Muslims; of white British converts to Islam; of young working-class British-Pakistani men; policing practices in Ireland; and the construction of Muslim identities through online comments about a reality television show. As well as identifying some issues specific to the nation, each case study also reveals the intersection of the racialization process with class and gender experiences.

Sustainable decision making is a key element in the fight against natural disasters, shrinking habitats, famine, and poverty. In western economies, such as the social market economy, all players – i.e., consumers, businesses, and governments – must be responsible for sustainable decision making. Examining consumer choices, this dissertation comprises three empirical studies to analyze decision making in shopping situations. The studies aim to provide new insights into predisposing factors of sustainable consumer decision making. These insights are used to deduce recommendations for policymakers to foster sustainable consumption. Study 1 focuses on the effect of the Big Five personality traits, delay-discounting tendencies, and materialism on the consideration of sustainability in buying decisions. Study 2 builds on Study 1 by adding altruism and general self-efficacy as potential predictors and decision-making abilities as possible moderators. The assessment of considering sustainability in buying decisions (by means of choice-based conjoint tasks) is complemented by measures of attitudes toward sustainability (by means of questionnaires) in Study 2. Since Studies 1 and 2 reveal a considerable influence of materialistic and altruistic tendencies, Study 3 was designed to examine the interplay of these two characteristics in the prediction of considering environmental, social, and economic sustainability in more general buying decisions. Results indicate high potential of unequivocal sustainability information in shopping situations. Further, discounting tendencies and materialism affect the consideration of sustainability in buying decisions negatively, while conscientiousness, openness to experience, and altruism have a positive effect. Decision-making abilities moderate the effect of altruism on attitudes toward sustainability, while general self-efficacy has no effect on the consideration of sustainability in buying decisions or attitudes toward sustainability. It is recommended to increase the availability of unambiguous sustainability information in stores and online shops to enable consumers to make an informed decision. Further, materialistic reinforcements in society (e.g., in media and public communication) should be limited to stop persuading consumers to buy unneeded products. Instead, altruistic tendencies should be strongly reinforced in society. Future studies are advised to examine nudge strategies to promote sustainable buying decisions in consumers with personality structures that do not favor a sustainable lifestyle. Furthermore, the role of situational factors of consumer decision making that have not been investigated should be addressed in future research, such as consumer knowledge and understanding. ; Nachhaltiges Entscheidungsverhalten ist ein Schlüsselelement im Kampf gegen Naturkatastrophen, schwindende Lebensräume, Hungersnot und Armut. In westlichen Volkswirtschaften, wie der sozialen Marktwirtschaft, müssen alle Akteure – d.h. Konsumenten, Unternehmen und Regierungen – Verantwortung für nachhaltiges Entscheidungsverhalten übernehmen. Durch die Untersuchung von Konsumentscheidungen umfasst diese Dissertation drei empirische Studien, um Entscheidungsverhalten in Kaufsituationen zu analysieren. Die Studien zielen darauf ab, neue Erkenntnisse über prädisponierende Faktoren von nachhaltigen Konsumentscheidungen zu gewinnen. Diese Erkenntnisse werden genutzt, um Empfehlungen für politische Entscheidungsträger abzuleiten, um nachhaltigen Konsum zu fördern. Studie 1 befasst sich mit dem Effekt der Big-Five-Persönlichkeitsfaktoren, Diskontierungstendenzen und Materialismus auf die Berücksichtigung von Nachhaltigkeit in Kaufentscheidungen. Studie 2 baut auf Studie 1 auf, indem Altruismus und allgemeine Selbstwirksamkeitserwartung als potentielle Prädiktoren und Entscheidungsfähigkeiten als mögliche Mediatoren analysiert werden. Die Erhebung der Berücksichtigung von Nachhaltigkeit in Kaufentscheidungen (durch wahlbasierte Conjointaufgaben) wird in Studie 2 durch die Messung von Einstellungen zu Nachhaltigkeit (durch Fragebögen) ergänzt. Da Studie 1 und 2 einen bemerkenswerten Einfluss von materialistischen und altruistischen Tendenzen offenlegen, wurde Studie 3 konzipiert, um das Zusammenspiel dieser beiden Eigenschaften in der Vorhersage der Berücksichtigung ökologischer, sozialer und ökonomischer Nachhaltigkeit in allgemeinen Kaufentscheidungen zu beleuchten. Die Ergebnisse deuten ein hohes Potential unmissverständlicher Nachhaltigkeitsinformationen in Kaufentscheidungen an. Des Weiteren beeinflussen Diskontierungstendenzen und Materialismus die Berücksichtigung von Nachhaltigkeit in Kaufentscheidungen negativ, während Gewissenhaftigkeit, Offenheit für Erfahrungen und Altruismus einen positiven Effekt haben. Entscheidungsfähigkeiten moderieren den Effekt von Altruismus auf Einstellungen zu Nachhaltigkeit, während allgemeine Selbstwirksamkeitserwartung keinen Effekt auf die Berücksichtigung von Nachhaltigkeit in Kaufentscheidungen hat. Es wird empfohlen, die Verfügbarkeit von eindeutigen Nachhaltigkeitsinformationen in Geschäften und Onlineshops zu erhöhen, um Konsumierende zu befähigen, eine informierte Entscheidung zu treffen. Des Weiteren sollten materialistische Verstärkungen in der Gesellschaft (z. B. in Medien und öffentlicher Kommunikation) begrenzt werden, um zu verhindern, dass Konsumierende dazu verleitet werden, unnötige Produkte zu kaufen. Altruistische Tendenzen sollten stattdessen deutlich verstärkt werden. Künftigen Studien wird empfohlen, Nudge-Strategien zu untersuchen, um nachhaltige Kaufentscheidungen in Konsumierenden zu födern, deren Persönlichkeitsstrukturen einen nachhaltigen Lebensstil nicht begünstigen. Außerdem sollte die Rolle situationaler Faktoren von Konsumentscheidungen adressiert werden, die hier nicht untersucht wurden, wie Vorwissen und Verständnis der Konsumierenden.

The Ethics of Bribery: An Introduction -- Religious Attitudes toward Bribery: A Comparative Study -- Christian Attitudes toward Bribery -- Muslim Attitudes toward Bribery -- "Atheist Attitudes toward Bribery" -- Hindu Attitudes toward Bribery -- Jewish Attitudes toward Bribery -- Buddhist Attitudes toward Bribery -- Gender and Attitudes toward Bribery -- Social Class and Attitudes toward Bribery -- Education Level and Attitudes toward Bribery -- Income Level and Attitudes toward Bribery -- Age and Attitudes toward Bribery -- Do Urban Dwellers View Bribery Differently than Rural Dwellers? An Empirical Study of Views in 76 Countries -- Are Some Forms of Bribery Worse Than Others? -- How Prevalent Is Bribery? A Ranking of 52 Countries -- Corruption and Bribery in Ottoman Tax Management: An Evaluation of the Period 1876-1909 -- Fighting against Corruption and Bribery in Public Procurements during the Covid-19 Pandemic -- Crunching Numbers in the Quest for Spotting Bribery Acts: A Cross-Cultural Rundown -- Primum Non-nocere: How to Fight the 'Pandemic' of Healthcare Corruption -- How Often Are Voters Bribed? A Ranking of 82 Countries -- How Risky Is It to Give or Receive a Bribe? A Ranking of 56 Countries -- To What Extent is the Government Working to Crack Down on Corruption and Root Out Bribes? -- The Rothbard-Block Theory of Bribery -- Helping Hand v. Greedy Hand Bribery -- The Ethics of Bribery: Summaries of 28 Studies -- The Ethics of Bribery: Summaries of 24 Studies -- Gender and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 31 Studies -- Age and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 26 Studies -- Education Level and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 23 Studies -- Income Level and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 18 Studies -- Social Class and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 20 Studies -- Ethnicity and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 8 Studies -- Marital Status and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 20 Studies -- Employment Status and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 17 Studies -- Sector of Employment and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 14 Studies -- Political Viewpoint and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 16 Studies -- Religious Denomination and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 19 Studies -- Religiosity and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 12 Studies -- Happiness and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 19 Studies -- Health and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 11 Studies -- "Confidence in Government and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 15 Studies" -- Confidence in the Police and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 7 Studies -- Confidence in the Justice System and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 6 Studies -- Size of Town and Attitudes toward Bribery: Summaries of 10 Studies.

While most people assume that all bribery is unethical, the literature provides examples and philosophical arguments to support the proposition that some bribery may actually be ethical, based on utilitarian grounds. This book provides a theoretical and empirical examination of bribery from an ethical perspective. It examines empirical data from over 80 countries and reports on attitudes toward bribery examining demographic variables such as gender, age, ethnicity, education, income level, religion and social class. Multi-country comparisons are provided to determine whether views toward bribery differ by geographic location.

Banks perform important functions for the economy. Besides financial intermediation, banks provide information, liquidity, maturity- and risk-transformation (Fama, 1985). Banks ensure the transfer of liquidity from depositors to the most profitable investment projects. In addition, they perform important screening and monitoring services over investments hence contributing steadily to the efficient allocation of resources across the economy (Pathan and Faff, 2013). Since banks provide financial services all across the economy, this exposes banks (as opposed to non-banks) to systemic risk: the recent financial crisis revealed that banks can push economies into severe recessions. However, the crisis also revealed that certain bank types appear far more stable than others. For instance, cooperative banks performed better during the crisis than commercial banks. Different business models may reason these performance-differences: cooperative banks focus on relationship lending across their region, hence these banks suffered less from the collapse of the US housing market. Since cooperative banks performed better during the crisis than commercial banks, it is quite surprising that research concerning cooperative banks is highly underrepresented in the literature. For this reason, the following three studies aim to contribute to current literature by examining three independent contemporaneous research questions in the context of cooperative banks. Chapter 2 examines whether cooperative banks benefit from revenue diversification: Current banking literature reveals the recent trend in the overall banking industry that banks may opt for diversification by shifting their revenues to non-interest income. However, existing literature also shows that not every bank benefits from revenue diversification (Mercieca et al., 2007; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Goddard et al., 2008). Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that large commercial banks (US Financial Holding Companies) perceive decreasing performance by shifting revenues towards non-interest income. Revenues from cooperative banks differ from those of commercial banks: commercial banks trade securities and derivatives, sell investment certificates and other trading assets. Concerning the lending business, commercial banks focus on providing loans for medium-sized and large companies rather than for small (private) customers. Cooperative banks rely on commission income (fees) from monetary transactions and selling insurances as a source of non-interest income. They generate most of their interest income by providing loans to small and medium-sized companies as well as to private customers in the region. These differences in revenues raise the question whether findings from Stiroh and Rumble (2006) apply to cooperative banks. For this reason, Chapter 2 evaluates a sample of German cooperative banks over the period 2005 to 2010 and aims to investigate the following research question: which cooperative banks benefit from revenue diversification? Results show that findings from Stiroh and Rumble (2006) do not apply to cooperative banks. Revenue concentration is positive related to risk-adjusted returns (indirect effect) for cooperative banks. At the same time, non-interest income is more profitable than interest income (direct effect). The evaluation of the underlying non-interest income share shows that banks who heavily focus on non-interest income benefit by shifting towards non-interest income. This finding arises due to the fact, that the positive direct effect dominates the negative indirect effect, leading in a positive (and significant) net effect. Furthermore, results reveal a negative net effect for banks who are heavily exposed to interest generating activities. This indicates that shifting to non-interest income decreases risk-adjusted returns for these banks. Consequently, these banks do better by focusing on the interest business. Overall, results show evidence that banks need time to build capabilities, expertise and experience before trading off return and risk efficiently with regard on revenue diversification. Chapter 3 deals with the relation between credit risk, liquidity risk, capital risk and bank efficiency: There has been rising competition in the European banking market due to technological development, deregulation and the introduction of the Euro as a common currency in recent decades. In order to remain competitive banks were forced to improve efficiency. That is, banks try to operate closer to a "best practice" production function in the sense that banks improve the input – output relation. The key question in this context is if banks improve efficiency at a cost of higher risk to compensate decreasing earnings. When it comes to bank risk, a large strand of literature discusses the issue of problem loans. Several studies identify that banks hold large shares of non-performing loans in their portfolio before becoming bankrupt (Barr and Siems, 1994; Demirgüc-Kunt, 1989). According to efficiency, studies show that the average bank generates low profits and incorporates high costs compared to the "best practice" production frontier (Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Williams, 2004). At first glance, these two issues do not seem related. However, Berger and DeYoung (1997) show that banks with poor management are less able to handle their costs (low cost-efficiency) as well as to monitor their debtors in an appropriate manner to ensure loan quality. The negative relationship between cost efficiency and non-performing loans leads to declining capital. Existing studies (e.g. Williams, 2004; Berger and DeYoung, 1997) show that banks with a low level of capital tend to engage in moral hazard behavior, which in turn can push these banks into bankruptcy. However, the business model of cooperative banks is based on the interests of its commonly local customers (the cooperative act: § 1 GenG). This may imply that the common perception of banks engaging in moral hazard behavior may not apply to cooperative banks. Since short-term shareholder interests (as a potential factor for moral hazard behavior) play no role for cooperative banks this may support this notion. Furthermore, liquidity has been widely neglected in the existing literature, since the common perception has been that access to additional liquid funds is not an issue. However, the recent financial crisis revealed that liquidity dried up for many banks due to increased mistrust in the banking sector. Besides investigating moral hazard behavior, using data from 2005 to 2010 this study moves beyond current literature by employing a measure for liquidity risk in order to evaluate how liquidity risk relates to efficiency and capital. Results mostly apply to current literature in this field since the empirical evaluation reveals that lower cost and profit-efficiency Granger-cause increases in credit risk. At the same time, results indicate that credit risk negatively Granger-causes cost and profit-efficiency, hence revealing a bi-directional relationship between these measures. However, most importantly, results also show a positive relationship between capital and credit risk, thus displaying that moral hazard behavior does not apply to cooperative banks. Especially the business model of cooperative banks, which is based on the interests of its commonly local customers (the cooperative act: § 1 GenG) may reason this finding. Contrary to Fiordelisi et al. (2011), results also show a negative relationship between capital and cost-efficiency, indicating that struggling cooperative banks focus on managing their cost-exposure in following periods. Concerning the employed liquidity risk measure, the authors find that banks who hold a high level of liquidity are less active in market related investments and hold high shares of equity capital. This outcome clearly reflects risk-preferences from the management of a bank. Chapter 4 examines governance structures of cooperative banks: The financial crisis of 2007/08 led to huge distortions in the banking market. The failure of Lehman Brothers was the beginning of government interventions in various countries all over the world in order to prevent domestic economies from even further disruptions. In the aftermath of the crisis, politicians and regulators identified governance deficiencies as one major factor that contributed to the crisis. Besides existing studies in the banking literature (e.g. Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Erkens et al., 2012) an OECD study from 2009 supports this notion (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Public debates increased awareness for the need of appropriate governance mechanisms at that time. Consequently, politicians and regulators called for more financial expertise on bank boards. Accordingly, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision states in principle 2 that "board members should remain qualified, individually and collectively, for their positions. They should understand their oversight and corporate governance role and be able to exercise sound, objective judgement about the affairs of the bank." (BCBS, 2015). Taking these perceptions into consideration the prevailing question is whether financial experts on bank boards do really foster bank stability? This chapter aims to investigate this question by referring to the study from Minton et al. (2014). In their study, the authors investigate US commercial bank holding companies between the period 2003 and 2008. The authors find that financial experts on the board of US commercial bank holding companies promote pro-cyclical bank performance. Accordingly, the authors question regulators view of more financial experts on the board leading to more banking stability. However, Minton et al. (2014) do not examine whether their findings accrue due to financial experts who act in the interests of shareholders or due to the issue that financial experts may have a more risk-taking attitude (due to a better understanding of financial instruments) than other board members. Supposed that their findings accrue due to financial experts who act in the interests of shareholders. Then financial experts on the board of banks where short-term shareholder interests play no role (cooperative banks) may prove beneficial with regard on bank performance during the crisis as well as in normal times. This would mean that they use their skills and expertise to contribute sustainable growth to the bank. Contrary, if this study reveals pro-cyclical bank performance related to financial experts on the board of cooperative banks, this finding may be addressed solely to the risk-taking attitude of financial experts (since short-term shareholder interests play no role). For this reason, this chapter aims to identify the channel for the relation of financial experts and bank performance by examining the following research question: Do financial experts on the board promote pro-cyclical bank performance in a setting where short-term shareholder interests play no role? Results show that financial experts on the board of cooperative banks (data from 2006 to 2011) do not promote pro-cyclical bank performance. Contrary, results show evidence that financial experts on the board of cooperative banks appear to foster long-term bank stability. This suggests that regulators should consider ownership structure (and hence business model of banks) when imposing new regulatory constraints for financial experts on the bank board. ; Banken nehmen wichtige Funktionen innerhalb einer Volkswirtschaft wahr. Innerhalb ihrer Rolle als Finanzintermediär stellen sie Liquidität bereit und übernehmen elementare Aufgaben der Fristen- und Risikotransformation (Fama ,1985). Sie stellen sicher, dass die Liquidität der Depotinhaber den profitabelsten Investitionsprojekten zukommt. Darüber hinaus übernehmen Banken wichtige Prüfungs- und Überwachungsfunktionen über ihre Investitionsprojekte und sorgen damit für eine stetig effiziente Ressourcenallokation innerhalb einer Volkswirtschaft (Pathan and Faff, 2013). Da jedoch Banken ihre Finanzdienstleistungen der gesamten Volkswirtschaft zur Verfügung stellen, erzeugen sie damit auch (im Gegensatz zu Firmen) ein gewisses Systemrisiko: die Finanzkrise 2007 – 2008 hat gezeigt, dass Banken ganze Staaten in eine Rezession ziehen können. Gleichzeitig hat die Krise allerdings auch gezeigt, dass bestimmte Banktypen deutlich stabiler sind als andere. So sind beispielsweise die genossenschaftlichen Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken deutlich besser durch die Krise gekommen als nahezu alle Universalbanken. Genossenschaftsbanken existieren in allen größeren westlichen Volkswirtschaften und nehmen innerhalb dieser oft eine bedeutende Rolle ein. Aufgrund der einerseits hohen Bedeutung von Genossenschaftsbanken in den genannten Volkswirtschaften und der andererseits vergleichsweise geringen Beachtung in der Literatur, ist es das Ziel dieser Dissertation mit den folgenden drei empirischen Studien die bestehende Forschung der Genossenschaftsbanken voranzutreiben. Die drei empirischen Studien beschäftigen sich mit jeweils unabhängigen Forschungsfragen, die für den Bankensektor in jüngster Zeit von hoher Relevanz sind. Kapitel 2 beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, welche Genossenschaftsbanken von einer Einnahmendiversifikation profitieren können: bestehende Literatur offenbart den Trend innerhalb des Bankensektors, wonach Banken nach Diversifikation streben, indem sie ihre Einnahmen immer stärker im zinsunabhängigen Geschäft generieren. Jedoch zeigt sich in der Literatur ebenfalls, dass längst nicht alle Banken durch die Einnahmendiversifikation profitieren (Mercieca et al., 2007; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Goddard et al., 2008). Bei der Untersuchung von Genossenschaftsbanken ergibt sich folgendes Bild: es profitieren diejenigen Banken von einer weiteren Einnahmendiversifikation, welche bereits einen hohen Anteil ihrer Einnahmen durch das zinsunabhängige Geschäft generieren. Des Weiteren zeigt die Untersuchung einen negativen Nettoeffekt für diejenigen Banken, welche den Großteil ihrer Einnahmen durch das Zinsgeschäft generieren. Insgesamt deuten die Hinweise der empirischen Untersuchung darauf hin, dass Banken eine gewisse Zeit benötigen um entsprechende Expertise und Erfahrung aufzubauen damit eine Einnahmendiversifikation eine konkurrenzfähige risikoadjustierte Rendite erzeugt. Kapitel 3 beschäftigt sich mit der Beziehung zwischen dem Risiko, der Kapitalausstattung und der Effizienz einer Bank. Das Geschäftsmodell von Genossenschaftsbanken beruht auf der Förderung der Interessen der Mitglieder (§ 1 GenG). Das legt die Vermutung nahe, dass die in der Literatur weit verbreitete Ansicht des moralischen Risikoverhaltens nicht auf Genossenschaftsbanken zutrifft. Darüber hinaus könnten die besonderen Governance-Strukturen von Genossenschaftsbanken diese These stützen: kurzfristige Eigentümerinteressen als mögliche Ursache für moralisches Risikoverhalten spielen bei Genossenschaftsbanken keine Rolle. Die Ergebnisse der empirischen Untersuchung von Genossenschaftsbanken zeigen, dass eine niedrigere Kosten- und Gewinneffizienz zu einem höheren Kreditrisiko führt. Gleichzeitig bestätigen die Ergebnisse, dass ein negativer Zusammenhang zwischen dem Kreditrisiko von Banken und deren Kosten- und Gewinneffizienz besteht. Als zentraler Unterschied zu bestehenden Studien zeigt sich jedoch, dass ein positiver Zusammenhang zwischen der Eigenkapitalposition und dem Kreditrisiko besteht. Das bedeutet, dass moralisches Risikoverhalten ("moral hazard") bei Genossenschaftsbanken, wie bereits vermutet, nicht stattfindet. Insbesondere der Zweck der Genossenschaftsbanken (§ 1 GenG) und die damit einhergehenden besonderen Governance-Strukturen sind nach Ansicht der Autoren die wesentliche Begründung für diese Erkenntnis. Kapitel 4 widmet sich den Governance-Strukturen von Genossenschaftsbanken. Speziell wird in diesem Kapitel die Forschungsfrage behandelt, ob Finanzexperten im Aufsichtsrat von Genossenschaftsbanken zu einer prozyklischen Bankperformance führen. Dieser Zusammenhang wurde in der Studie von Minton, Taillard und Williamson (2014) bei kapitalmarktorientierten Banken aufgezeigt. Die Ergebnisse der Genossenschaftsbanken hingegen zeigen, dass Finanzexperten in den Aufsichtsräten von Genossenschaftsbanken im Zeitraum von 2006 bis 2011 keine prozyklische Bankperformance erzeugen. Im Gegenteil, die Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass Finanzexperten in den Aufsichtsräten von Genossenschaftsbanken eine langfristige Stabilität der Banken gewährleisten. In der Konsequenz bedeutet das, dass Regulatoren die Eigentümerstrukturen (und damit das Geschäftsmodell) von Banken berücksichtigen sollten, wenn sie neue regulatorische Anforderungen hinsichtlich Finanzexperten in den Aufsichtsräten von Banken einführen.