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This paper considers farmland conversion for the purpose of urban development as a series of transactions and discusses the determinants of appropriate governance structures for governing farmland conversion in terms of process efficiency. Towards this end, the paper develops a theoretical framework for analysing the process of farmland conversion based on transaction cost economics. The framework covers transactions, transaction attributes, governance structures and performance with the aim of minimising transaction costs. The paper also demonstrates the usability of the framework by creating a corresponding quantitative model for a case study in China. Furthermore, it identifies factors that influence the transaction costs associated with farmland conversion in China and explains why the related governance structures are chosen.

Transaction cost economics is applied in this paper to social impact bonds to explore how public service commissioners could improve outcomes-based contracts. The authors supply a framework for assessing the quality of outcomes specifications and clarify the trade-off between a robust value case for government and the transaction costs associated with specifying such a deal. Illustrated by two examples, the authors suggest that commissioners aim for a 'requisite' contract: one that minimizes opportunism while balancing the costs of developing a more robust outcomes specification. Policy-makers and managers are increasingly looking to outcomes-based contracts, including social impact bonds, as a way to improve social outcomes. The success of these contracts is predicated on how well-specified the outcomes are within them. This paper provides practitioners with an easy-to-use framework for assessing outcomes specifications. They need to consider the definition of the eligible cohort; the alignment of payable outcomes to the policy intent; and the accuracy of prices for attributable outcomes. Practitioners should aim for a 'requisite' contract—a contract that minimizes service provider and investor opportunism while balancing the costs associated with developing a more robust outcomes specification.

A transaction cost economics explanation of buyer-seller relationships Analysis of flexibility in buyer-seller relationships from a transaction cost economics perspective Rational flexibility in buyer-seller relationships - A real options approach Real flexibility in buyer-seller relationships - An Austrian economics perspective

In the mid-70s, the US antitrust jurisprudence finally embraced the economic approaches developed at the University of Chicago on the 30s.The Chicago School of Economics has as its main characteristic the defence of the private economy and of a limited intervention of the government, which underlies the idea that individual freedoms depend on the existence of a system based on private initiative and market economy, affirming the interdependence of capitalism and democracy.This School was fiercely against the excessive intervention of competition authorities and courts in competition, to which attributed as final goal purpose efficiency maximization.From a methodological point of view, Chicago School will be renowned by the importance of neoclassical price theory and empirical analysis.Later, within New Institutional Economics, will rise another economicanalysis, such us Transaction Costs Economics and Property Rights Theory, that even though receiving minor attention from the literature, being until now strangely excluded from the economic and legal mainstream of thecompetition, will also inspire Antitrust Law.The Transaction Costs Economics will demonstrate that the transactions that make up the market are conditioned by the constraints of behaviour and information, giving rise to transaction costs that make markets imperfect.The institutions in thisSchool are, therefore, structures that, by influencing individuals' behaviour, mitigate market imperfections, becoming indispensable in economic analysis.The analysisofthese economic approaches will reveal that both gave the utmost importance to transaction costs, as Chicago School,without explicitly mentioning transaction costs, also considered it in antitrust analysis.In this paper, we aim at demonstrating that this proximity between Chicago School and Transaction Costs Economics is reflected in US antitrust jurisprudence.Therefore, it is pertinent to begin by summarizing the main arguments developed by these economictheories, which later received merits by the courts, thus making more evident the effect they had on US antitrust jurisprudence, often ignored by literature.As we will conclude the US antitrust analysis is performed by the Courts through lens of Chicago School and Transaction Costs Economics.

PurposeReverse factoring (RF) is one of the most prevalent supply chain finance (SCF) solutions. This study challenges the view that suppliers accept financially attractive reverse factoring offers (RFOs) and reject financially unattractive ones. Specifically, it focuses on small and medium enterprise (SME) suppliers and how transaction cost economics (TCE) factors affect their decision.Design/methodology/approachThe authors study eight cases of RFOs, interviewing suppliers, buyers and financial service providers (FSPs) and using several sources of private and publicly available secondary data.FindingsIn five out of eight RFOs, suppliers either accepted unattractive offers or rejected attractive ones. Bounded rationality and opportunism seem to explain such misalignment, while asset specificity and frequency play a minor role in decisions.Research limitations/implicationsThe study shows the need for further investigation linking analytical assessment of SCF benefits with qualitative factors.Practical implicationsSME suppliers cannot assume an RFO will benefit them. They must critically evaluate their buyers' offers, ideally with self-awareness towards how the abovementioned factors might affect their decisions. For buyers and banks, this study gives clear insights on how to approach SME suppliers to avoid rejection of financially attractive RFOs.Originality/valueThis contribution analyses financial attractiveness of RFOs in conjunction with qualitative factors, including rejected RFOs and without assuming that RFOs are financially attractive for suppliers. This is original and relevant for both research and practice, since it extends the understanding of the supplier response to RFOs, thanks to the consideration of TCE factors.

PurposeThe German banking sector has recently been facing high real estate loan default rates resulting in the accumulation of a high volume of distressed real estate debt in the banks' balance sheets. As a consequence, German banks are confronted with the workout of their non‐ and sub‐performing real estate loans to proactively solve the problem. When doing so, banks have to decide whether they want to conduct the loan workout in their own workout departments (integrative approach) or whether they prefer to outsource the workout to a third party servicer or even sell their bad loan exposure to an external investor (disintegrative approach). This paper aims to investigate this issue.Design/methodology/approachA bank's decision to employ an integrative or a disintegrative approach can be transferred into a make‐or buy‐decision as described by the transaction cost economics. The transaction between the bank and the workout manager is analysed by the transaction characteristics of the transaction cost economics. The specificity of the human capital required for the loan workout of real estate loans is a key consideration for answering the question of integration or disintegration. Assuming highly specific investments for both, the workout manager and the bank, a formal model compares the aggregated pay offs for the bank and the workout manager to determine the optimal control structure for the specific assets.FindingsFollowing the assumptions of the transaction cost economics, the specificity of the investment of the workout manager (and also the bank) is crucial for the decision of integrating or disintegrating the workout of real estate loans. The degree of specificity required to perform the workout tasks depends on the status of underlying credit engagement and the characteristics of the collateral (the real estate). The formal analysis shows that the bank and the workout manager both under‐invest in integration and disintegration scenarios. However, if the degree of specificity of the investments is equal, nonintegration is superior to integration. Forward integration is superior to nonintegration, if the bank's investment is more specific than the workout manager's investment.Originality/valueThis research paper approaches the problematic from an academic stand point, integrating both the banking and the real estate perspective and aims to provide a recommendation for banks on the integration or disintegration of the workout unit for a certain real estate secured loan portfolio.

The transaction cost economics (TCE), in the field of New Institutional Economics, have been shown as one of the most elaborate theoretical and explanatory constructs of arrangements existing in organizational reality. However, recent studies have sought on the Resource Based View (RBV) approach the theoretical foundations about setting these arrangements, in addition to highlighting a required complementarity between TCE and the RVB in understanding how they are formed. In this sense, the objective in this article was to understand how the complementarity theory TCE and RBV explain the configuration of the governance structures in the context of New Institutional Economics. The discussion presented in the form of essay, demonstrated that resources and differentiated capabilities could provide the basis for the proper choice of governance structures. These structures, in turn, are chosen in order to protect and achieve sustainable competitive advantages from these resources. Thus, that the complementary view of TCE with RBV is able to encompass more fully the aspects related to the choice of firm boundaries, minimizing the individual limitations of these approaches in terms of strategic analysis.

Transaction cost economics (TCE) theory predicts that features of institutional arrangements determine the intensity of their governance instruments. Consequently, institutional features link to transaction costs, but the linkages have received little attention in the public health literature. This study sought to address this gap. It examined the governance features of institutional arrangements and their transaction cost implications for providing HIV prevention and social support services in Uganda. The analysis was based on 4 proposed TCE governance instruments: administrative controls, adaptation, incentives and contract laws. These governance instruments were assessed in 3 modes of delivery( institutional arrangments) for HIV and AIDS Services in Uganda: Contracting-Out – the case of DREAMS (Determined, Resilient, Empowered, AIDS-free, Mentored and Safe); a Public-Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) partnership – the case of the CHAI (Community-led HIV/AIDS Initiative); and direct Public Sector Delivery. These assessed delivery modes follow Williamson's TCE framework of 3 institutional arrangements to deliver goods and services, notably market, hybrid (partnership) and internal (hierarchy) delivery, with related governance features. Within this framework, the discriminating alignment hypothesis guided the analysis. According to the hypothesis, the delivery modes of goods and services result in smaller transaction costs when their governance features are as predicted by TCE. The hypothesis was assessed by analysing, with qualitative methods, the differences in HIV and AIDS services characteristics across the 3 arrangements and their differences with theory prediction, and hence the difference in transaction cost implications. The study found that the delivery arrangements that minimised cost are those whose HIV and AIDS services were aligned with the TCE theory prediction. The aligned 'public-NGO partnership' arrangement (CHAI) had fewer sources of transactional costs than the misaligned arrangements – 'contracting-out' (DREAMS) and 'public sector'. The analysis revealed that the DREAMS and public sector delivery models suffered some flaws in efficiencies. DREAMS had high administrative controls, high-powered tangible incentive intensity and intensive monitoring mechanisms for performance adaptation due to the lack of 'trust' on the part of the financing agency, contrary to the TCE prediction. In contrast with the TCE prediction, low administrative controls in the public sector arose from the failure to invest in performance monitoring systems. The high-powered incentive intensity and low administrative controls observed in the CHAI arrangement primarily stemmed from the reliance on informal institutions (trust, social expectations and reputation) rather than principal-agent arms-length sanctions. These results suggest that the level of transaction costs is associated with features of institutional arrangements. The valuable insights from TCE could contribute to policymaking during the design of institutional arrangements to efficiently deliver HIV and AIDS services.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate how buying firms manage their lower tier sustainability management (LTSM) in their supply networks and what contextual factors influence the choice of approaches. As most of the environmental and social burden is caused in lower tiers, the authors use the iceberg analogy.Design/methodology/approachFindings from 12 case studies and 53 interviews, publicly available and internal firm data are presented. In an abductive research approach, transaction cost economics (TCE) conceptually guides the analytical iteration processes between theory and data.FindingsThis study provides eight LTSM approaches grouped into three categories: direct (holistic, product-, region-, and event-specific) indirect (multiplier-, alliance- and compliance-based) and neglect (tier-1-based). Focal firms choose between these approaches depending on the strength of observed contextual factors (stakeholder salience, structural supply network complexity, product and industry salience, past supply network incidents, socio-economic and cultural distance and lower tier supplier dependency), leading to perceived sustainability risk (PSR).Research limitations/implicationsBy depicting TCE's theoretical boundaries in predicting LTSM governance modes, the theory is elevated to the supply network level of analysis. Future research should investigate LTSM at the purchasing category level of analysis to compare and contrast PSR profiles for different purchase tasks and to validate and extend the framework.Practical implicationsThis study serves as a blueprint for the development of firms' LTSM capabilities that suit their unique PSR profiles. It offers knowledge regarding what factors influence these profiles and presents a model that links the effectiveness of different LTSM approaches to resource intensity.Originality/valueThis study extends the application of TCE and adds empirically to the literature on multi-tier and sustainable supply chain management.