"Campus-Report" heißt die Radiosendung der Universitäten Heidelberg, Mannheim, Karlsruhe und Freiburg. Die Reportagen über aktuelle Themen aus Forschung und Wissenschaft werden montags bis freitags jeweils um ca. 19.10h im Programm von Radio Regenbogen gesendet. (Empfang in Nordbaden: UKW 102,8. In Mittelbaden: 100,4 und in Südbaden: 101,1) Uni-Radio Baden: ein gemeinsames Projekt der Universitäten Freiburg, Heidelberg, Karlsruhe und Mannheim in Zusammenarbeit mit Radio Regenbogen – unterstützt von der Landesanstalt für Kommunikation. Sendung vom 09. Mai 2012
The paper critically examines the status of the sustainability discourse and sustainability politics against the backdrop of considerations about the meaning of justice in the context of sustainability. We argue that the preservation of the natural basis of life is by itself a requirement of justice. However, the crucial role of the ecological dimension of sustainability has been neglected due to a problematic interpretation of the economic dimension, a limited understanding of justice, and an overemphasis of economic growth and growth politics. We propose to reposition the sustainability discourse and sustainability politics by prioritizing the long-term protection of the natural basis of life as the essential foundation of future development, welfare, and justice.
Does economic freedom increase the utility of an average citizen? Public choice theory in particular has emphasized the shortcomings of governments and voting processes, and the advantages of relying on markets and individual decision making. However, an increasing amount of people are refusing to accept classical measures like GDP as signs of improvements in welfare. Data on subjective well-being allow economists to test if economic freedom really does improve the overall quality of life. However, existing studies have either failed to control for necessary control variables or lacked theoretical foundation. This paper explains economic and psychological reasons why the influence of economic freedom reaches beyond material well-being. Empirical results from a panel of 86 countries over the 1990-2005 period suggest that economic freedom indeed has a positive effect on happiness. Specifically legal security and property rights, access to sound money, and freedom from excessive regulation are significantly positive throughout the analysis. Regarding freedom to trade, the results show that particularly regulatory trade barriers have a significant negative effect. The positive effect depends on socio-demographic characteristics and is, on average, stronger for poorer countries and left-wing voters, and varies with age.
It is puzzling that India, which has a large domestic constituency of people suffering from underdevelopment, chronic poverty and mal-governance, is emerging as an important aid donor. With the intension of understanding why poor countries provide foreign aid, this article is the first to econometrically analyze India's aid allocation decisions. First, we utilize cross-sectional data on aid commitments by the Ministry of External Affairs to 125 developing countries, obtained in US dollars from AidData for the 2008-2010 period. Second, we compare India's aid allocation with that of other donors. Our findings show that India's aid allocation is partially in line with our expectations of the behavior of a "needy" donor. Commercial and political self-interests dominate India's aid allocation. We find the importance of political interests to be significantly larger for India than for all donors of the Development Assistance Committee. Moreover, we find that countries which are closer geographically are favored, and that countries at a similar developmental stage are more likely to enter India's aid program.
This thesis consists of five essays in the field of political economy. The first part of the thesis includes three essays covering various aspects of the political economy of globalization and economic reforms, which are linked in several ways. The second part of the thesis includes two essays on the political economy of development in India. The aim of this introductory section is to give a brief and non-technical overview of the essays, as well as to explain the links between them. The discussion of the contribution of the research to the existing literature will be carried out separately in each essay. Globalization and economic reforms are two important concepts in the international political economy field. Explaining the social effects of both has been at the center of the international political economy literature for an extensive period of time. Much has been written about the effects of globalization on social outcomes (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008, Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch 2003) and there are at least two distinct trains of thought in academia and the public discourse. One view is that the structural changes towards more liberal economic policy can positively transform the economy and polity, increasing economic growth and welfare, as well as bringing much required modernization (Bhagwati 2004, Wolf 2004, Friedman 1999). On the other hand, more pessimistic voices, which include mainstream economists such as Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, and Marxist critical theorists, believe that globalization can simultaneously promote a 'race to the bottom' in social standards that degrades communitarian bases of social stability and welfare (Rodrik 1997, Stiglitz and Charlton 2006). In fact, the global financial crisis of 2008, where people took to the streets in both developing and developed countries, has made the issue of whether or not globalization and economic reforms create socially undesirable consequences, ever more crucial. The first part of the thesis sheds new light on various aspects of the social effects of globalization and economic reforms, reviewing findings in the literature to date and extending existing theories. A major contribution of the thesis is the rigorous and thorough empirical evaluation of the human rights effects of economic reforms, and to what extent globalization has induced a race to the bottom in labour standards, while also contributing new empirical findings to extend the research surrounding the side effects of participating in IMF programs. The thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 1, we focus on the impact of economic reforms and economic freedom on human rights. It is argued that economic policy reforms will benefit most people in terms of better access to goods, lower inflation, and better economic opportunities (Murphy et al. 1991). However, critics of market reforms see the majority as losers from such reforms, expecting resistance that would lead to political repression (Przeworski 1991). Using the change in the Index of Economic Freedom as a measure of market liberalization reforms, employing data from a panel of 117 countries for the 1981–2006 period, the results show a strong positive association between reforms towards more free markets and governments' respect for human rights, controlling for a host of relevant factors, including the possibility of endogeneity. These results lend support to those who argue that freer markets generate better economic conditions and higher levels of social harmony. In fact, halfhearted measures at implementing reforms could be dangerous to human rights. After exploring the impact of economic reforms on human rights, we continue by linking economic liberalization policies prescribed by international organizations such as the IMF to the outbreak of civil war in chapter 2. As the global economic downturn has heightened concerns over intervention by international financial institutions, as well as political stability, a prominently published work by Hartzell, Hoddie and Bauer (2010) purports to show that signing on to an IMF Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) increased the risk of civil war during the 1970–1999 period. They claim that the IMF's SAPs push economic liberalization to the point where some people are so negatively affected as to foment civil war. We advance this debate by critically examining their theoretical and empirical evidence, particularly questioning their crucial assumptions about the impact of IMF programs on the economic environment in terms of the actual winners and losers from economic liberalization, and who might be in a position to rebel. Separating the effects of crises from IMF interventions is crucial since crises also generate losers in their own right. With only minor adjustments to their study, we find the exact opposite of what they conclude. We show that their measure of signing on to an IMF program remains consistently insignificant in explaining the outbreak of civil war, using the threshold of 25 battle deaths when defining the onset of a civil war. These results suggest that their operationalization of the IMF variable, as well as the utilization of large-scale civil wars (1000 deaths and above), captures the effect of ongoing war rather than the effects of liberalization. After extending the time period under study from 1970–1999 to 1970–2008, as well as making some minor changes to operationalization, again we find that IMF involvement is at worst a poor predictor of conflict, and at best, an alleviator of the risk. The next chapter turns to a topic which is currently the focus of both politicians and the labour unions in general. We analyze whether inter-country competition for investment has adverse effects on labour standards. Among the many concerns over globalization is that as nations compete for international firms, they will relax labour standards as a method of lowering costs and attracting investment. Using spatial econometric estimation on panel data for 148 developing countries over 18 years, we find that the labour standards in one country are indeed positively correlated with labour standards elsewhere (i.e., a reduction in the labour standards of other countries reduces the labour standards of the country in question). This interdependence is more evident in labour practices (i.e., enforcement) than in labour laws. Furthermore, competition is most fierce in those countries which already have low standards. Since there has been a decline in the labour practices and laws across all three groups, this is possible evidence of a race to the bottom as nations compete for investment. The second part of the thesis focuses on essays on the political economy of development in India. India is often hailed as one of the success stories of globalization (Basu 2008). Indeed, after the inception of market economic reforms in 1991, economic growth has been both sustained and impressively robust in terms of national economic indicators (Basu 2008). However, despite rapid economic growth during the post-1990 period, the benefits of economic growth are unevenly distributed, and some areas and groups of people have seen their living standards decline (Banerjee 2010). One could argue that this is somewhat surprising given the rapid surge in economic growth in recent years (Bardhan 2010). In connection with this, two critical issues have attracted a lot of attention, both within and outside India. First is the issue of corruption which is seen as a hindrance to prosperity and development, and the second is the emergence of India as one of the major donors of development aid. In chapter 4, we focus particularly on the influence of the timing of elections on controlling corruption. Firstly, we develop a conceptual framework that extends theories of political budget cycles to corruption, where an incumbent government considers controlling corruption based purely on political considerations. More specifically, we investigate whether the timing of elections affects the responsiveness of the incumbent government to control corruption. Secondly, we empirically test the predictions of the conceptual framework using 30 Indian states during the 1988–2009 period. Consistent with the conceptual framework developed, i.e., an incumbent politician might exert greater effort in an election year to control corruption, the findings show that scheduled elections (and not unscheduled elections) are associated with an increase in the number of corruption cases registered. In addition, we find that corruption cases registered tend to increase as a scheduled election year draws closer. Furthermore, the effects are found to be stronger in 'swing states' (where the margin of victory of the incumbent in the previous election was 5% or less), and in state scheduled election years which coincide with national elections. On the other hand, there is no effect of scheduled elections on corruption cases being investigated by anti-corruption agencies. The following chapter examines a puzzling question about India. Here, we analyze what determines Indian development aid. It is indeed puzzling to note that India, which has a large domestic population suffering from underdevelopment, chronic poverty and mal-governance, is emerging as an important aid donor. With the intension of learning why poor countries provide foreign aid, this is the first work to econometrically analyze India's aid allocation decisions. We utilize cross-sectional data on aid commitments to 128 developing countries by the Ministry of External Affairs and the Export-Import Bank of India, obtained in US dollars from AidData for the 2008-2009 period. We then compare India's bilateral aid allocation with that of other donors to examine if India is any different regarding the motivation behind its allocation decisions. The findings show that India's aid allocation decisions are largely driven by commercial and political self-interest. While recipient need does not seem to be a key determinant, neighboring countries receive considerable attention.
China und Indien sind sowohl wirtschaftlich als auch politisch die wichtigen Märkte und Akteure der Zukunft, meint Stefan Klonner, der auf dem Gebiet der Entwicklungsökonomie forscht. Campus-Report" heißt die Radiosendung der Universitäten Heidelberg, Mannheim, Karlsruhe und Freiburg. Die Reportagen über aktuelle Themen aus Forschung und Wissenschaft werden montags bis freitags jeweils um ca. 19.10h im Programm von Radio Regenbogen gesendet. (Empfang in Nordbaden: UKW 102,8. In Mittelbaden: 100,4 und in Südbaden: 101,1)
We quantify all statements by major European politicians reported by Reuters during the August 2011 to December 2011 period and show that political communication significantly affects European stock and bond markets as well as the EUR-USD exchange rate. Communication with respect to Italy induces the strongest market reactions. Financial markets consider the German bondmarket a safe haven.
Am Mittwoch, den 15. Juni 2011, fand in der Alten Aula der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität die achte Alfred-Weber-Lecture statt. Der Referent, Professor Dr. Dr. h.c. Claus Leggewie, ist Direktor des Kulturwissenschaftlichen Instituts in Essen und Professor für Politikwissenschaft an der Justus-Liebig-Universität in Gießen. Seit 2008 berät er die Bundesregierung zu Fragen der globalen Umweltveränderung. Als Autor zahlreicher Bücher und Herausgeber der "Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik" nimmt Professor Leggewie engagiert an gesellschaftlichen und politischen Debatten teil. Als Gastgeber möchte das Alfred-Weber-Institut den Studierenden, den MitarbeiterInnen des Instituts und der Universität sowie einem interessierten Publikum aus der Metropolregion Rhein-Neckar das Zusammenspiel von Wirtschaft, Politik und Gesellschaft durch Vorträge namhafter Referenten näher bringen.
In this paper, we analyze the effect of the criminal justice system on juvenile recidivism. Using a unique sample of German inmates, we are able to disentangle the selection into criminal and juvenile law from the subsequent recidivism decision of the inmate. We base our identification strategy on two distinct methods. First, we jointly estimate selection and recidivism in a bivariate probit model. In a second step, we use a discontinuity in law assignment created by German legislation and apply a (fuzzy) regression discontinuity design. In contrast to the bulk of the literature, which mainly relies on US data, we do not find that the application of criminal law increases juvenile recidivism. Rather, our results suggest that sentencing adolescents as adults reduces recidivism in Germany.
This paper introduces a democratic voting process into an OLG economy in order to analyze the e ffects of a rising old-age dependency ratio on the composition of government spending and endogenous economic growth. Forward-looking agents vote each period on the public policy mix between productive government expenditure and public consumption spending that benefi ts the elderly. Population aging shifts political power from the young to the old. While this does not aff ect public productive expenditure, it leads to an increase in public spending on the elderly and a slowdown in economic growth. However, the overall e ffect on long-term economic growth is positive. This is due to reduced capital dilution or increased saving.
In the climate policy debate, a rhetoric has evolved that attributes a high potential to "voluntary climate action". We turn to the population of Germany, the fourth largest cumulative GHG emitter, to obtain an Internet-)representative estimate of the individual willingness to abate one ton of CO2, the equivalent of 10 percent of annual per-capita CO2 emissions. The estimate derives from a large-scale (n=2,440) framed field experiment in which subjects choose between a guaranteed reduction of one ton of EU CO2 emissions and a randomly drawn cash award between €2 and €100. At €6.30, estimated mean WTP is considerably lower than prior hypothetical or non-representative estimates. Median WTP is non-positive. The almost bimodal nature of WTP in the population has important policy implications.
Sick-pay is a common provision in labor contracts. It insures workers against a sudden loss of income due to unexpected absences and helps them smooth consumption. Therefore, many governments find sick-pay socially desirable and choose to mandate its provision. But sick-pay is not without its problems. Not only it suffers from moral hazard but more importantly it is subject to a potentially serious adverse selection problem (higher sick-pay attracts sicker workers). In this paper we report results of an experiment which inquires to the extend and the severity of the adverse selection when sick-pay is voluntary versus when it is mandatory. Theoretically, mandating sick-pay may be effective in diminishing adverse selection. However, our data provide clean evidence that counteracting effects are more salient. Mandatory sick pay exacerbates moral hazard problems by changing fairness perceptions and, as a consequence, increases sick pay provision far above the mandatory levels.
Sollen in Zukunft ambitionierte Ziele der nachhaltigen Flächennutzung erreicht werden, wie zum Beispiel das 30-Hektar-Ziel aus der Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie der rot-grünen Bundesregierung aus dem Jahre 2002, dann müssen politische Strategien gefunden werden, die es erlauben, weitgehende institutionelle Reformen zu verwirklichen. Die Voraussetzung dazu ist, vorhandene institutionelle Persistenzen und damit Reformblockaden zu identifizieren. Aufbauend auf theoretische Überlegungen widmet sich der Aufsatz einer Erörterung der Persistenz von Institutionen der Flächennutzung, um daraus politische Handlungsbeschränkungen und -spielräume ableiten zu können.
In this paper we model the adjustment process of European Union Allowance (EUA) prices to the releases of announcements at high-frequency controlling for intraday periodicity, volatility clustering and volatility persistence. We find that the high-frequency EUA price dynamics are very well captured by a fractionally integrated asymmetric power GARCH process. The decisions of the European Commission on second National Allocation Plans have a strong and immediate impact on EUA prices. On the other hand, our results suggest that EUA prices are only weakly connected to indicators about the future economic development as well as the current economic activity.
Teil 1: Einleitung der Lecture durch Prof. Dr. Andreas Irmen Teil 2: Alfred-Weber-Lecture mit Prof. Karl Homann Teil 3: Abschliessende Publikumsdiskussion Am 25. Mai 2010, fand in der Alten Aula der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg die sechste Alfred-Weber-Lecture statt. Referent war diesmal Herr Professor em. Dr. Dr. Karl Homann, der einer der bedeutendsten Vordenker der Wirtschaftsehtik in Deutschland ist. Zuletzt hatte er den Lehrstuhl für "Philosophie unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der philosophischen und ethischen Grundlagen der Ökonomie (Wirtschaftsethik)" der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München inne. Seine Alfred-Weber-Lecture griff insbesondere die, durch die Wirtschaftskrise neu entbrannte, Debatte um das moralische Verhalten in einer Marktwirtschaft auf. Prof. Dr. Andreas Irmen, Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Wirtschaftspolitik und Direktor des Alfred-Weber-Instituts, hat die Alfred-Weber-Lecture Ende 2007 ins Leben gerufen. Als Gastgeber möchte er den Studierenden, den MitarbeiterInnen des Instituts sowie einem interessierten Publikum aus der Metropolregion Rhein-Neckar das Zusammenspiel von Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Politik durch Vorträge namhafter Referenten näher bringen.
