Suchergebnisse

The Indonesia economic quarterly reports on and synthesizes the past three months' key developments in Indonesia's economy. It places them in a longer-term and global context, and assesses the implications of these developments and other changes in policy for the outlook for Indonesia's economic and social welfare. Its coverage ranges from the macro economy to financial markets to indicators of human welfare and development. It is intended for a wide audience, including policy makers, business leaders, financial market participants, and the community of analysts and professionals engaged in Indonesia's evolving economy. Economic developments over the past quarter bear some strong similarities with the situation seen in the first half of 2008. Most notably, rises in domestic and international commodity prices have again brought with them a variety of risks, both positive and negative, at the macroeconomic and household level. While oil prices increased sharply with political developments in the Middle East and North Africa, strong price rises have been seen across global commodities. Non-energy commodities, including food, were up 30 percent in the six months to February 2011, similar to the increases seen in the first half of 2008. The experiences of other countries through the 2008 food price crisis suggest a range of potential policies which can provide well-targeted protection for vulnerable households and maintain and create incentives for producers to help limit future price volatility.

The global financial crisis severely affected economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA). Currencies depreciated across the region. Government tax revenues declined sharply leading to high budget deficits and rising levels of public debt. Tightening credit supply and deteriorating financial conditions have limited the ability to borrow in the public and private sector. The financial crisis slowed demand enough to delay an imminent energy shortage by a few years. In this sense, the financial crisis bought ECA countries some time. This report analyzes the impacts of the global financial crisis on power sectors in five countries in the ECA region: Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine. It estimates the investment gap and proposes a prioritization of critical investments in each country. The report also proposes actions needed to mobilize financing for the sector, including a continued commitment to legal, regulatory and policy reform in the sector. The global financial crisis has created a window of opportunity to meet investment needs and avert a potential power shortage, but Governments need to recognize and act on this opportunity. This report serves as a starting point to facilitate further World Bank engagement in the region that can help Governments make timely, critical investments and foster sustainable investment in the sector over the long-term.

Indonesia has enjoyed a demographic dividend over the last forty years. The working population has been growing faster than the population of non-working dependents. This presents a major opportunity for economic growth and poverty reduction, provided that more jobs and better jobs are created to employ a workforce, which will grow by an estimated 20 million workers over the next ten years. Today's policy makers in Indonesia face a strategic challenge in identifying which policies and programs will spur the creation of good jobs while, at the same time, ensuring that workers are better protected from risks threatening their income security. Decisions about labor policies are particularly difficult because they can directly affect the well-being of workers, both inside and outside the formal jobs market, and the firms that are the main engines of job growth. Sound empirical data will help guide the debate around labor reform. The Indonesia jobs report, prepared by the World Bank in cooperation with the Government of Indonesia and local research partners, is the most comprehensive assessment of the country's labor market that has been carried out in the last decade. The report uses the most up-to-date data available to examine the performance of the labor market, changes in the supply of workers, and the effects of labor policies. The findings will help inform future policy directions and contribute towards evidence-based decision making. Stimulating the growth of better jobs requires a multi-pronged approach. This report recommends much needed reforms of labor policies and programs. Equally important, however, are reforms that accelerate job creation by improving infrastructure and the investment climate, alongside reforms that aim at improving the quality of education. Success will depend on working partnerships between the government, employer associations, labor unions and other civil society groups, with the support of Indonesia's think tanks and international development partners. This report helps reinvigorate policy dialogue about job creation and worker security. Learning from experiences and international best practices, Indonesia will be better prepared to navigate a course towards 'win-win' solutions that accelerate the creation of better jobs without sacrificing adequate protection for workers.

The purpose of this handbook is to provide policy makers with a framework to assess a tax system in its entirety, measure its various parameters and how it is administered, and defines best practices for tax policy and administration that will yield a tax system that is simple and predictable and does not create an undue burden on private enterprise. This handbook is primarily designed for policy makers and tax practitioners. The goal is to analyze the impact of income tax, the value added tax (VAT), and other local taxes that are imposed on business. This handbook does not analyze the effects of trade and labor taxes such as social security. The administration of the customs duty is unique and has been addressed extensively in the literature on customs modernization. Labor taxes primarily imposed on salaried individuals are not covered by this handbook, even though their incidence affects business. VAT has been included even though it is a tax on consumption because the administrative burden to comply with it is primarily on business.

This joint working paper lays out a rationale and strategic framework for improving food security and managing food-price shocks in the Arab countries. The paper does not provide country specific policy and project recommendations. Such recommendations will follow from the country by country application of the framework, taking into account each country's political and cultural preferences, resource endowments, and risk tolerance. In 2007 and the first half of 2008, a sharp rise in agricultural commodity and food prices triggered grave concerns about food security, malnutrition and increased poverty throughout the world. While the threat of a prolonged food-price shock receded with falling energy and commodity prices and a weakening global economy in the second half of 2008, many factors underlying the volatility in food prices appear here to stay and will require careful management if the world is to avoid future food-price shocks. This paper suggests three critical strategies that, together, can serve as pillars to help offset future vulnerability to price shocks: a) strengthen safety nets, provide people with better access to family planning services, and promote education; b) enhance the food supply provided by domestic agriculture and improve rural livelihoods by addressing lagging productivity growth through increased investment in research and development; and c) reduce exposure to market volatility by improving supply chain efficiency and by more effectively using financial instruments to hedge risk.

Arguing that a relatively high cost of deposit insurance indicates that a bank takes excessive risks, this article estimates the cost of deposit insurance for a large sample of banks in 14 economies to assess the relationship between the risk-taking behavior of banks and their corporate governance structure. The results suggest that banks with concentrated ownership tend to take the greatest risks, and those with dispersed ownership engage in a relatively low level of risk taking. Moreover, as a proxy for bank risk, the cost of deposit insurance has some power in predicting bank distress

This paper aims to discuss how institutional racism plays a part in the continued criminalisation of cannabis in the United Kingdom. I will start with a short history of usage and attitudes toward cannabis in the United Kingdom, mainly England. I will then assess the relationship that the criminal justice system has with cannabis and its users, and delve into how racial bias operates within law enforcement, using stop and search as a point of focus. This paper will explore how these biases lead to a disproportionate application of the law on certain groups of people. It will be argued while using Canada as point of comparison, that cannabis is being used in the United Kingdom as a political tool to favour voters of certain demographics, and that while more research is needed to fully assess the effects of cannabis, the reasoning behind maintaining cannabis' status as a dangerous substance is both absurdly hypocritical and entirely no longer necessary. Medicinal, recreational, and the law The United Kingdom first listed cannabis as a prohibited drug in 1928 by adding it to the Dangerous Drugs Act 1920 in accordance with the International Opium Convention 1912. For an immeasurable amount of time the cannabis plant has been used recreationally, medicinally, and industrially across the planet, including many former British colonies and overseas territories.[1] The Misuse of Drugs Act currently lists cannabis and cannabis derivatives as Class B controlled drugs.[2] This classification means that it is a criminal offence in the United Kingdom to possess, grow, or supply cannabis to others. Section 6 of the act outlines the cultivation of any species of cannabis plant as a specific offence. Cannabis related offences are punishable through schedule 4 of the act. On indictment production or supplying of cannabis could result in up to fourteen years in prison, whilst possession alone, up to five years in prison, (an unlimited fine, or both). In 2004 cannabis was moved from Class B to Class C, which holds less prison time for possession while retaining the same fourteen years penalty for production and supply.[3] This was done after the Advisory Council claimed that even though cannabis was harmful, it was not as harmful as other Class B drugs; amphetamines, methylamphetamine, barbiturates, and codeine.[4] Another driving point was to take the pressure off arrests for possession of small amounts of cannabis to shift the focus of law enforcement toward other more dangerous drugs and crime.[5] This reclassification only stood for five years as cannabis returned to Class B in 2009 against the advice of the Advisory Council.[6] Currently in the United Kingdom a person can get a warning or Penalty Notice for Disorder (PND) for possession of small amounts instead of being arrested.[7] The United Kingdom was once the world's largest exporter of cannabis for medical and scientific use, producing around 95,000 kilograms of cannabis in the year 2016.[8] In 2015, that production was at 41,706 kilograms.[9] For a country so determined to prohibit the use and supply of cannabis within its borders, it is quite ironic that businesses are being licensed for production for export, and that production doubled in that year. Law and Enforcement: stop and search and racial bias Canada, having legalised recreational cannabis in October 2018, will be used as a point of comparison to explore the UK's complex legal and political relationship with cannabis. While recreational cannabis is still considered illegal in most of the world, many countries seem to not strictly enforce their laws. In pre-legalised Canada, cannabis use became increasingly socially acceptable. The enforcement of possession laws became less and less important to society, which was reflected in the prioritisation used by the police.[10] While unregulated sales remained illegal post the legalisation of medical cannabis in 2001, there still existed brick and mortar dispensaries where the public was able to purchase cannabis illegally. For the most part, law enforcement would leave them to their business unless they suspected a connection to gang violence, sale to minors, or other crime. It was common to see them reopen after being raided and shutdown.[11] Law enforcement in the United Kingdom has a lot of say about the way that perpetrators of cannabis-related crimes are dealt with. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in the UK released an official policing guideline for cannabis possession for personal use in 2009 following the substance's return to a Class B status in the UK.[12] This document outlines whether a warning or PND should be issued in place of an arrest and explains the 'escalation policy' used to determine which of the three the perpetrator will receive. To determine the severity of the possession they look at 'aggravating factors' such as whether they were caught in a public place, whether a young person is involved or could be exposed to drug use, and repeat offences.[13] This document states the purpose of these 'aggravating factors' as 'The circumstances of the offence form part of the consideration in determining whether an arrest can be made and justified'.[14] So in theory as per this document an adult over the age of 18 with no prior history caught in possession of cannabis for personal use and not falling under any of the aggravating factors should be let off with a warning (which would not show up on a standard criminal record check) even though it is a Class B illicit drug. There are two important points regarding these guidelines. The first is that even though cannabis at this point had returned to Class B status, it was not being treated the same as other Class B substances – it is now being treated more leniently by law enforcement in comparison to other Class B substances. These more forgiving rules send a message to the public that even though cannabis was moved back to Class B status, it is accepted to be not as 'sinister' as the others. It begs the question of whether moving the drug back to Class B even had any bearing or real practical purpose. Herein lies an interesting unsynchronized relationship between the statute regarding the legality of cannabis and the approaches taken by law enforcement. Law enforcement is seemingly doing a better job than legislature at keeping up with public opinion by relaxing their approaches. Secondly, while they cover England, Wales, and Northern Ireland in a uniform manner, they are just that: guidelines. Each local policing authority has the prerogative of deciding how they may deal with a case of cannabis possession.[15] What is evident is that this prerogative is used, to varying degrees. Some policing authorities, such as Durham, have made public statements in which they have announced they will not be targeting individuals for possession for personal use.[16] An article in the Canterbury Journal interviews a resident that describes the city as 'weed central', indicating the city even has its own cannabis club (the Canterbury Cannabis Collective) that lobbies politicians at Westminster.[17] It would suffice to say that being affiliated with this cannabis club would be enough to fulfil the 'reasonable belief' that law enforcement needs to target someone. They are lobbying openly for the legalisation of cannabis, which indicates that law enforcement is largely just allowing it to happen. So, if the people want recreational cannabis legalised (or are indifferent to it), and law enforcement has begun acknowledging that it is not a priority for them to police, why has Westminster not caught up? Interestingly, in the same article another interviewee who is opposed to legalisation said she thinks, 'it'll increase the number of people smoking it by making it socially acceptable, like areas of Canada where people started smoking it openly and regularly once it had been legalised.'[18] This is statistically not true. According to Statistics Canada, self-reported cannabis use amongst Canadians rose from 14.9% before legalisation to 16.8% after legalisation. However, most of that difference of 1.9% could simply be accounted for by less hesitation to admit usage once it was not a criminal offence since results are self-reported. Additionally, respondents were to only report on whether they used in the three months prior to being surveyed.[19] So this is evidence of some apparent misconceptions about legalisation, and while a lax attitude from law enforcement may make cannabis users in those areas very happy, it is arguable that this prerogative in law enforcement's hands is a detriment to equal treatment of perpetrators of the same crime from different backgrounds. There are many facets to consider when discussing the United Kingdom's relationship to cannabis. For one, it is not a plant native to the country and its use was introduced during the colonial period mostly through the Indian subcontinent.[20] In South Asia, cannabis was widely used medicinally and recreationally and is considered in Hindu Ayurveda to be one of five sacred plants that relieve anxiety.[21] While many may think of cannabis in the context of a relaxed Caribbean stereotype (or even particularly Jamaican), the plant was first introduced to the Caribbean through the movement of Indian indentured workers brought there by the British regime.[22] The origins of this plant are culturally and socially connected to (but not exclusively) two racial groups, people of South Asian and of African descent. Its history plays a part in the way that it is viewed socially. It is no secret that both of these racial groups have faced tribulations at the hands of British colonialism, the legacy of which still lingers. One of these tribulations that has spilt into our modern existence is the entrenched racism that plagues the criminal justice system in the United Kingdom, of which law enforcement plays a huge part. The demonisation of dark skin leads to a disproportionate treatment of people of colour by law enforcement, and a disproportionate number of arrests and convictions. Crimes involving cannabis are one of the ways in which this disproportionality is manifested, but it is in no way the only one. Stop and Search, and the Macpherson Report The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, which in 1999 generated the Macpherson Report, followed the racially motivated murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993.[23] It was an important conversation-starter on the processes used when investigating a racially charged crime, in this case the murder of a black British teenager by a group of white youths. Under 'stop and search' police officers can search you if they have 'reasonable grounds' to suspect you are carrying illegal drugs (or similar), or without reasonable grounds if it was approved by a senior officer.[24] According to the Home Office, as of the 2011 census, persons of black ethnicity comprise about 4% of the population of the UK, yet the Ministry of Justice reports that they are involved in about 20% of all drug stop and searches as well as prosecutions for cannabis.[25] With people of black ethnicity there is also a higher number of prosecutions than there are stop and searches in comparison with people of white ethnicity. The racial element of these statistics is clear. If only 4% of the population is represented by black ethnicity, why are they involved in 20% of the searches? There is no correlation to suggest people of black ethnicity consume more cannabis in the UK. According to statistics on drug misuse available through the UK Government's website, in the 2018/2019 findings of adults aged 16 to 59, 8% of the white respondents versus 6.7% of the 'Black or Black British' respondents reported use of cannabis in the previous year.[26] Stop and search gives individual police officers the power to use their own judgement to decide whether a person may be involved in a crime of some sort without seeing a crime being committed (in this case, in possession or planning to supply illicit drugs). Stop and search methods have been thoroughly scrutinised and continuously reformed as many do believe that they are not effective or an efficient use of law enforcement's time and resources.[27] The idea of law enforcement being able to search anyone they feel necessary could lead to a gross misuse of power. Figure 1[28] Figure 1 illustrates the bias that exists within this system of law enforcement. The dotted flat line represents the likelihood of a person of white ethnicity being stopped within the years 2014-2016. Every non-white group surveyed had a higher probability of being involved in a stop and search. The black community does not consume more cannabis, and therefore should not be any more likely than someone of white ethnicity to be in possession of cannabis. Yet black individuals are still 6.5 times more likely to be stopped. According to the same data bank, people of black ethnicity used all surveyed drugs (powder cocaine, ecstasy, hallucinogens, amphetamines, mephedrone, ketamine and cannabis) less commonly than those of white ethnicity.[29] The obvious link: racial bias. By this logic, police officers are, even unconsciously, under the impression that a black person is more likely to be involved in something illegal. The result of that is that the black population are being disproportionally affected by the law – a gross miscarriage of justice. We as citizens may want to believe that these statistics are an improvement, that the racial bias in the United Kingdom is a work in positive progress. However, 'figures for 1997/98 show that "black people were, on average, five times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police than white people." Black people are also "more likely to be arrested than white or other ethnic groups."'[30] Many of these statistics are also based on self-identified ethnicity, where as to clearly see a bias or prejudice, one must know what others assume that person's ethnicity to be. What they identify themselves as, may be a useful indicator of how others view them, but it does not necessarily facilitate an understanding of the exact impact of racial identity on law enforcement. The Macpherson Report is arguably one of the most important modern documents outlining the racial biases within the UK's criminal justice system. What it found was astonishing evidence exposing racial bias within the response and investigation of the death of Stephen Lawrence. No police officer on the scene performed any form of first aid after finding him, nor did they check his vitals to see if he was still alive.[31] The victim's parents reported being treated unprofessionally with insensitivity and were deprived of information regarding the case which they were entitled to. There was evidence suggesting that the perpetrators were not arrested for the crime, because they were white even though they were suspects with sufficient evidence to procure a warrant. In general, they found that there was a lack of enthusiasm to find the murderers of a black man by white suspects.[32] While murder is beyond the scope of this essay, the findings of this report solidify the notion that in multiple ways people of black ethnicity are victims to the institutional racism present in the criminal justice system. Cannabis and politics The current Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau and his Liberal Party's political crusade to legalise recreational cannabis use in Canada sat on two very important points: to make it harder for minors to access cannabis, and to tackle gang violence associated with cannabis sales.[33] Legalisation of cannabis was just one of the ways in which Justin Trudeau managed to rally two unlikely voter demographics: people of colour, and young voters between the age of 18-25. This won him two consecutive federal elections, while remaining at the time relatively appealing to the older voters.[34] With the changing demographic in Canada, rallying these voters was, and remains, a key political tool to holding power. He, like his father, former Prime Minister the late Pierre Elliott Trudeau, prized multiculturalism in his political platform – a concept very important to the Canadian identity and society. The Canadian Multiculturalism Act is a law passed in 1985 by the late Trudeau outlining all the ways in which it is expected that multiculturalism is to be upheld by the federal government. This includes, but is not limited to, 'ensur[ing] that all individuals receive equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while respecting and valuing their diversity.'[35] This policy of upholding diversity is part of the Canadian constitution. The closest comparable statute existing in the United Kingdom is the Equality Act 2010. This piece of legislation covers a wider breadth of demographical information that may lead to discrimination, including, but not limited to, race, religion, gender, and age. Section 1 of the Act outlines the duty that public figures such as ministers, courts, police, and councils have toward socio-economic inequalities: An authority to which this section applies must, when making decisions of a strategic nature about how to exercise its functions, have due regard to the desirability of exercising them in a way that is designed to reduce the inequalities of outcome which result from socio-economic disadvantage.[36] What is compelling is that Section 3 states that any breach of section 1 'does not confer a cause of action at private law,'[37] which limits how these public bodies are held accountable for breaching the Act and is realistically mostly just applicable to employers' relations with employees. The purpose of this act reads like a guide on what your legal options are if you feel that you were wrongly discriminated in the workplace by any of the protected demographics. The purpose of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act is to focus much more on the acts and efforts that are expected of the Federal Government to uphold the integrity of diversity by recognising differences and adopting practices to accommodate them. This also includes promoting the use of languages other than English and French, the two official languages.[38] The entrenchment of this Act into the Canadian constitution, and the language used within it, shows just how important it is to Canadian society, run by a liberal government, as it holds everyone, including federal bodies, accountable for nurturing diversity in Canada. Whether or not it always plays out that way is beyond the scope of this paper. There is a political connection with the way in which cannabis is 'officially' viewed versus the way that it is socially viewed when comparing Canada and the United Kingdom. Dalhousie University in Halifax published a study suggesting that 68% of Canadians (another 6.9% were indifferent) supported the legalisation of recreational marijuana in September 2017.[39] In a poll by YouGov for the Conservative Drug Policy Reform Group in the UK, 48% supported legalisation while only 24% opposed.[40] If that was not enough, a government survey found in 2017/2018 that 30% of adults aged 16 to 64 have tried cannabis at least once.[41] If the majority of the country is supportive or indifferent to the legalisation of recreational cannabis, why are the two governments approaching the idea so differently? This puts into question the strength of democracy in the United Kingdom as well, since the existing legislation does not reflect public opinion. In 2019 three Members of Parliament from three parties visited Canada in order to evaluate the legal cannabis sector first-hand. Not surprisingly, the Liberal Democrat and Labour MPs later declared that they would support a change in 'cannabis legislation in the next five to ten years'. Only the Conservative MP did not show support for cannabis legalisation following the visit.[42] The Conservative Party of the UK has historically maintained that cannabis should remain an illegal substance.[43] There have also been allegations of racism linked to the Conservative Party and its leaders. One such point is the commentary on Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech in 1968 which, riddled with racist undertones, was aimed against the 1968 Race Relations Bill.[44] This bill made it illegal to refuse employment, public services, or housing to any person based on colour, race, or ethnic origin.[45] More recently, the current Prime Minister Boris Johnson has been quoted numerous times making racist comments. An article for the Guardian mentions that in articles written by Johnson before becoming Prime Minister he has referred to black people as 'piccaninnies with watermelon smiles' as well as claiming that the police were 'cowed' by the Macpherson Report.[46] While these claims were not made while he was in office, they are a glimpse into the rhetoric that has been accepted by the Conservative Party. An NHS study suggested that while around 10% of cannabis users may develop an addiction to cannabis, 32% of tobacco users and 15% of alcohol users will become addicted to tobacco and alcohol, respectively. There is also no recorded case of death caused by cannabis in the United Kingdom.[47] Alcoholchange.org has compiled statistics from the government showing that 24% of adults in England and Scotland regularly drink more than what is considered low-risk[48]; they found that in 2016 there were 9,214 alcohol-related deaths.[49] The Office for National Statistics found that 14.7% of adults over 18 years of age smoked cigarettes in the UK in 2018. In the same year there were 77,800 deaths attributed to smoking tobacco in the UK.[50] So, on the basis of death and addiction, cannabis seems to be relatively low risk compared to two substances that are legal and regulated. Yet, it is health concerns that are repeatedly cited when officials are asked about why there has been no significant movement toward legalisation of cannabis.[51] Conclusion: A long road to legalisation There is a worldwide shift happening in terms of social views of cannabis use. In Canada, while cannabis was still illegal it was clearly not a major concern of law enforcement, and there seems to be a similar attitude in the United Kingdom where other forms of crime take a greater importance. There is a complex web of connection between institutionalised racism, parliament, law enforcement, and politics regarding cannabis. There is a visible lag when it comes to legislation and law enforcement being up to date with social attitudes and there is clearly a disconnect between them. It seems even law enforcement does not stand on the same side of legalisation as current legislation. They seem to be shifting toward polled public attitudes that possession of cannabis and personal recreational use should not be criminalised. Talking about the impact of a law moves far past the wording of the provision or the sentencing for the crime. Law enforcement is a key piece of the system that perpetuates this racial oppression. Even with the public support for cannabis legalisation, changing social attitude, and the prevalence of usage it does not necessarily look like the English Parliament will be pushing any bills forward to make that a reality anytime soon, especially not under a Conservative government. By looking at two multicultural countries we are able to see how political differences impact the legality of cannabis. The uses of cannabis in many other countries are tied to cultural significance as well as social tolerance such as in India, mentioned previously. Cannabis is not the problem; it is the connection to organised crime and violence which can be tackled through government regulation. This has been shown in the data gathered by statistics Canada showing that in every province and territory, legalisation has brought at minimum a 26% decrease in police reported cannabis offences.[52] It is important that we continue to question the legitimacy of the claims the government makes about why they refuse to legalise and regulate cannabis as well as the institutionalised racism involved. There is evidence to suggest that the government has been using cannabis as a proverbial 'garden tool' to weed-out groups that they choose to target, or they believe are less important, and there is plenty of evidence showing that it is the black community that received the short end of that stick. All should be equal before the law, but this is virtually impossible to uphold when the law is represented through people, because people make judgements based on their inherent biases. There is no one statistic, statute, or study that will conclusively prove that politicians through the ages have used cannabis to paint a target on the backs of the black community, but there is evidence of it everywhere. With the information that we do have in consideration, cannabis is no more dangerous to human health than alcohol and tobacco. Continuing to demonise cannabis and insist that it should have no place in the UK's society is hypocritical. Based on the attitudes of the public, as well as law enforcement, its criminal status is also completely unnecessary. There are better things for the justice system to be focusing on, and worse things to be keeping out of society. [1] Mohamed Ben Amar, 'Cannabinoids in Medicine: A Review of Their Therapeutic Potential' (2006) 105 Journal of Ethnopharmacology 1. [2] Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, Schedule 2 Part II. [3] ibid Schedule 4. [4] Patrick McCrystal and Kerry Winning, 'Cannabis Reclassification: What is the Message to the Next Generation of Cannabis Users?' (2009) 15 Child Care in Practice 57. [5] 'Cannabis Reclassification' (Press Releases, 28 January 2005) accessed 20 April 2020. [6] McCrystal and Winning (n 4). [7] Simon Byrne, 'ACPO Guidance on Cannabis Possession for Personal Use: Revised Intervention Framework' (Association of Chief Police Officers, 28 January 2009). [8] '420: Seven Charts on How Cannabis Use Has Changed' (BBC News, 20 April 2019) accessed 12 March 2020. [9] 'Comments on the Reported Statistics on Narcotic Drugs' (International Narcotics Control Board, 18 October 2012) accessed 28 April 2020. [10] Marc I D'Eon, 'Police Enforcement of Cannabis Possession Laws in Canada: Changes in Implementation by Street-Level Bureaucrats' (Master's thesis, University of Saskatchewan 2017) accessed 28 April 2020. [11] Zach Dubinsky and Lisa Mayor, 'Who's Really behind Toronto's Chain of Illegal Pot Shops That Won't Quit?' (CBC News, 19 July 2019) accessed 28 April 2020; Robert Benzie, 'Trudeau urges police to "enforce the law" on marijuana' (The Star, 3 December 2016) accessed 4 May 2020. [12] Byrne (n 7). [13] ibid 4. [14] ibid 9. [15] Tom Harper, 'Police "Going Soft" on Cannabis Users' (The Times, 6 April 2019) accessed 2 May 2020. [16] Damian Gayle, 'Durham Police Stop Targeting Pot Smokers and Small-Scale Growers' (The Guardian, 22 July 2015) accessed 25 April 2020. [17] Pub Spy, 'Canterbury is "weed central" so why don't we just legalise it, say potheads' (The Canterbury Journal, 2 March 2018) accessed 28 April 2020. [18] ibid. [19] Michelle Rotermann, 'What has changed since cannabis was legalized?' (Statistics Canada, 19 February 2020) accessed 28 April 2020. [20] Leslie L Iversen, The Science of Marijuana (OUP 2008). [21] Chris Conrad, Hemp for Health: The Medicinal and Nutritional Uses of Cannabis Sativa (Healing Arts Press 1997). [22] Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege (Pennyslvania State UP 1997). [23] William MacPherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (The Stationery Office 1999). [24] Government Digital Service, 'Police Powers to Stop and Search: Your Rights' (GOV.UK, February 23, 2017) accessed 28 April 2020. [25] Benzie (n 11). [26] 'Drug Misuse: Findings from the 2018 to 2019 Crime Survey for England and Wales' (Home Office, 19 September 2019), 18. Available at . See Figure 3.1 'Proportion of 16 to 59 Year Olds Reporting Use of Illicit Drugs in the Last Year by Personal Characteristics'. [27] 'Stop and Search: How successful is the police tactic?' (BBC News, 4 April 2018) accessed 28 April 2020. [28] Jodie Hargreaves, Chris Linehan, and Chris McKee, 'Police powers and procedures, England and Wales, year ending 31 March 2016' (Home Office, 27 October 2016), 26. [29] 'Stop and Search…' (n 28). [30] MacPherson (n 23). [31] ibid. [32] ibid. [33] Benzie (n 11). [34] 'Youth Voter Turnout in Canada' (Publication No. 2016-104-E, Library of Parliament, Canada, 13 October 2016). Available at . [35] Canadian Multiculturalism Act 1985 s3(1)(e). [36] Equality Act 2010 s1(1). [37] ibid s3. [38] ibid s3(1)(i). [39] Sylvain Charlebois and Simon Somogyi, 'Marijuana-infused food and Canadian consumers' willingness to consider recreational marijuana as a food ingredient' (September 2017) accessed 28 April 2020. [40] Elena Mazneva, 'U.K. Legalizing Cannabis Supported by Near-Majority of Voters' (Bloomberg, 14 July 2019) accessed 28 April 2020. [41] 'Drug Misuse: Findings from the 2017/18 Crime Survey for England and Wales' (Home Office, July 2018). Available at . [42] Emily Ledger, 'Cannabis Policy of the Political Parties – the Conservatives' (The Cannabis Exchange, 30 November 2019) accessed 26 April 2020. [43] ibid. [44] Michael Savage, 'Fifty Years on, what is the legacy of Enoch Powell's "rivers of blood" speech?' (The Guardian, 15 April 2018) accessed 26 April 2020. [45] Race Relations Act 1968. [46] Frances Perraudin, 'New controversial comments uncovered in Historical Boris Johnson articles' (The Guardian, 9 December 2019) accessed 27 April 2020. [47] Maria Correa, 'How Close Is the UK to Legalising Cannabis?' (The Lawyer Portal, 8 January 2019) accessed 26 April 2020. [48] 'Alcohol Statistics' (Alcohol Change UK, 2 March 2020) accessed 27 April 2020. [49] Melissa Bennett, 'Dataset: Alcohol-related deaths in the UK' (ONS, 7 November 2017) accessed 26 April 2020. [50] Danielle Cornish and others, 'Adult smoking habits in the UK: 2018' (ONS, 2 July 2019) accessed 26 April 2020. [51] Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, 'Cannabis: Classification and Public Health' (Home Office, April 2008) accessed 27 April 2020. [52] Gregory Moreau, 'Police-reported cannabis offences in Canada, 2018: Before and after legalization' (Statistics Canada, 24 July 2019) accessed 27 April 2020.

Striking, overtime bans and refusing to carry out certain tasks[1] are collective forms of actions that can arise from workplace disputes. These industrial actions are of fundamental importance: the temporary halt in work production leverages a demand to enforce workers' rights. Despite this, the UK does not recognise the legal right to withdraw labour. Instead, the UK's "right to strike" is said to depend on a complex statutory scheme[2]. This article will analyse a variety of sources, "statutes such as TULRCA 1992, the common law, Convention rights, and relevant case law[3]", to determine whether the UK's "right to strike" "is a classic instance of a 'legislated' right[4]" or if it is merely a "slogan/legal metaphor[5]". [1] Hugh Collins, Aileen McColgan and Keith D Ewing,Labour Law(2nd edn, Cambridge University press 2019) pg.706. [2] Alan Bogg and Ruth Dukes, 'Statutory Interpretation and The Limits of a Human Rights Approach: Royal Mail Group Ltd V Communication Workers Union' (2020) 49(3) Industrial Law Journal pg.478. [3] Ibid, pg.478. [4] Ibid, pg.478. [5] Metrobus v UNITE [2009] EWCA Civ 829 (Maurice Kay LJ). - 'In truth, the "right to strike" in the UK depends for its realisation on a complex statutory scheme. Even in jurisdictions where the right to strike is specified textually in a constitutional document, such a complex right must be operationalised through labour statutes. It is a classic instance of a "legislated" right. Since the enactment of the Human Rights Act, and the evolving jurisprudence of the ECtHR, UK law may now be described as protecting a right to strike albeit one that is pieced together from a variety of sources: statutes such as TULRCA, the common law, Convention rights, and relevant case law.'[1] Does this statement accurately encapsulate the UK law on the 'right to strike'? How do the different sources of law interact and what factors determine the correct balance to be reached between competing interests in regulating industrial action? Use case law, statute, legal commentary and social science material in your answer and provide illustrations to support your analysis. In line with socialism and Professor Beverly Silver's assertions, capitalism is established upon 'two contradictory tendencies': 'crises of profitability and crises of social legitimacy'.[2] This 'inherent labour-capital'[3] struggle is reflected within the UK's hostile regulation of industrial action. The courts' and legislature's ideological approaches towards the collective right to withdraw labour unanimously and substantially favours economic growth above social welfare.[4] Striking, overtime bans, and refusing to carry out certain tasks are collective forms of actions that can arise from workplace disputes.[5] These disputes typically occur because employers are unwilling to negotiate with employees and workers about their working terms or conditions. Undeniably, the duration – and the aftermath – of the collective action results in financial losses to the business and affect innocent third parties (i.e. the general public).[6] Therefore, in order to appease and 'bring the labour under control', the capital would 'have to make concessions [i.e. comply with the strikers' new terms], which provoke crises of profitability'.[7] However, the loss suffered by a business[8] during and after industrial action is justified on two persuasive grounds. The first ground identified by Gwyneth Pitt is the human right aspect.[9] To restrict the right to strike would be akin to the horrific period of slavery,[10] where man had no power to withdraw his labour. This justification is recognising the inequalities in bargaining power between employer and employee.[11] This inequality has been further escalated by the growth of the modern-day unstable gig economy; one in nine UK workers are in precarious work.[12] This form of work has limited protection and much lower salaries.[13] Hence, a subsequent ground for the justification of withdrawal of labour is the equilibrium argument. The power of the employer and their actions can only be matched and questioned by a 'concerted stoppage of work'.[14] Essentially, the right to strike is more than the withdrawal of labour: it is also the encompassing 'right to free expression, association, assembly and power'.[15] Yet there is 'no positive legal right to strike in the UK'.[16] Instead, 'the "right to strike" in the UK depends for its realisation on a complex statutory scheme'.[17] In contrast to its neighbouring European countries' (Spain and Italy) jurisdictions 'where the right to strike is specified textually in a constitutional document', the UK law 'protects a right to strike … from a variety of sources: statutes such as TULRCA, the common law, Convention rights, and relevant case law'.[18] The accuracy of Bogg and Dukes' encapsulation of the UK law on the 'right to strike' and how the different sources of law interact will be subsequently discussed. Common Law Judiciary While Spain[19] and Italy[20] protect the right to strike by suspending the contract of employment during industrial action, this contract is broken under English law.[21] This is because the English common law does not confer a right to strike,[22] hence 'the rigour of the common law applies in the form of a breach of contract on part of the strikers and economic torts … [for] the organisers and their union'.[23] It is tortious and indefensible[24] to induce an individual to breach their contract of employment.[25] This principle was established in Lumley v Gye,[26] and this liability extends to trade unions in the context of industrial action.[27] Additionally, there are two further economic torts trade unions can be held liable for: liability for conspiracy to injure (Quinn v Leathem)[28] and causing loss by unlawful means. UntilOBG Ltd v Allan, Douglas, and others v Hello! Ltd,[29] the 'tort of procuring a breach of contract had been ["blurred"[30] and] extended [to be a wider] tort of unlawful interference with contractual relations'.[31] These torts were later distinguished and separated in the House of Lord's (HoL) judgment of OBG v Allan. While it is not often, the courts are encouraged to distinguish and introduce new torts. The HoL in OBG v Allan subsequently outlined the distinguishing elements between unlawful means and the tort of procuring a breach of contract. The tort of procuring a breach of contract is an accessory liability. Whilst the tort of unlawful means is a 'primary liability that is not dependent on the third party having committed a wrong against the claimant'.[32] Yet, despite the tort differences, the HoL confirmed that the same act could give rise to liability under both unlawful interference and procuring a breach of contract.[33] This clarification and the development of unlawful interferences as a separate liability has notably accommodated employers in holding trade unions liable for more than one tort. The OBG v Allan judgment is significant for discussing industrial action for two notable reasons. The first is that it confirms the judiciary's 'uncontrolled power'[34] in developing and 'defining torts boundaries on a case-to-case basis.[35] This power is 'ensur[ing] that trade unions cannot provide a lawful excuse or justification for their actions'[36]; trade unions are ultimately 'stood naked and unprotected at the altar of the common law'.[37] The insufficiency of protection for trade unions under the common law exhibits the judiciary's biased and hostile ideology towards industrial action.[38] This subsequently aligns with the following observation: the courts favour economic profits. This is discerned by the extent to which the contemporary judiciary extends protection for commercial bodies.[39] The primary function of English tort law was to protect physical integrity and property rights; tort law was never concerned with the protection of economic interests.[40] Nor had the common law ever been historically exercised to 'legitimately control aspects of the economy'[41] and yet OBG v Allan demonstrates the extent to which this has now changed. The judiciary has extensively and needlessly stretched the common law and its torts[42] to protect 'already powerful organisations'.[43] Hence, from the perspective of trade unions and their members, the common law's (inadequate) protection for the 'right to strike' has been, undeniably, very disappointing. Statutes Legislature One of the major problems facing trade unions was the 'exposure of their funds to legal action by employers'[44]; in 1901, Taff Vale Railway Co successfully sued the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants union for £42,000.[45] This sum is equivalent to £5,196,328.39 today. This verdict, in effect, eliminated 'the strike as a weapon of organized labour'.[46] Naturally, workers turned to political parties for redress. The concern and advocacy for trade union reform accounted for 59% of the winning Liberal party's election manifesto.[47] The Liberal government, led by Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman, provided unions with wide immunity against any tortious liability arising from trade disputes under The Trade Disputes Act (TDA) 1906. Although this Act did not introduce a 'legislated right' for industrial action,[48] this statute effectively recognised the vulnerability of unions under the common law by 'secur[ing] a [statutory] freedom' instead. [49] The TDA is one of the 'mostimportantpieces oflabour legislationever passed by a British Parliament'[50]; it effectively 'kept the courts at a minimum'[51] and neutralised the most obvious adverse effects of the Taff Vale judgment. The 'sympathetic politicians' were 'periodically reconstructing' the role of the 'class-conscious', profit-favouring judiciary.[52] The outcome of the 1906 general election 'served the unions' interests well'[53] and it continued to for 65 years. The 'long enjoyed'[54] immunity of trade unions for liability in tort was reduced to partial immunity under the Thatcher government (1979-90). There is a 'scale of government ideology' which ranges from 'fully participative' to 'fully authoritative',[55] and the Thatcher government was the undoubtable latter. The Conservative ideology and economists, such as FA Hayek, viewed trade unions as an obstacle to economic growth.[56] This perception was heightened by the Winter of Discontent (1978-79): a period characterised by widespread of strikes in response to the Labour government's wage cap (to maintain falling inflation).[57] Subsequently, Thatcher's government further justified the re-introduction of liability for trade unions upon the succeeding Green Papers: the 1981 Trade Union Immunities[58] and the 1989 Trade Unions and their Members.[59] Both papers outlined concerns regarding democracy, rights, and freedom of trade union members; 'too often in recent years it has seemed that employees have been called out on strike by their unions without proper consultation and sometimes against their express wishes'.[60] Accordingly, the Thatcher government introduced legislation that prior Conservative governments were afeard of passing: the Employment Act 1980, Trade Union Act 1984, and Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993. These re-introduced vulnerability and high costs for unions. Under the Employment Rights Act 1980, 'trade-dispute' was re-defined, statutory liabilities were introduced and unions were exposed to injunctions and claims for damages. However, upon complying with the stringent balloting requirements (from secret ballot to the requirement for all ballots to be postal) in the 1984 and 1993 Acts, the dispute would be deemed lawful.[61] It is expensive for unions to comply and evidence the fulfilled balloting requirements, but if lawful union members are statutorily protected from unfair dismissals and injunctions.[62] While this is a brief summary of the Acts, these restrictive measures offer an insight into the Thatcher government's success in exercising its agenda of restricting the lawfulness of industrial action by limiting its previously protected scope and purposes. Subsequently, the process of placing further controls on trade unions continued into the 21st century.[63] The 2015 Conservative government introduced the 'draconian'[64] Trade Union Act 2016 (TUA) – the most significant union legislation since the Employment Act 1980. The TUA introduced a minimum threshold of eligible members to vote in the ballot (at least 50% turnout and 50% voting in favour).[65] Moreover, in the instance the members are engaged in 'important public services',[66] 40% of all members entitled to vote must have voted in support of the industrial action. These stringent procedural requirements have to be strictly followed for a strike to be lawful.[67] Oddly, there was no pressing need to introduce these restrictive measures.[68] There were no significant problems in industrial relations at the time (ie, Winter of Discontent) nor any significant 'pressure from business for further laws on strikes',[69] but the Conservative government justified these 2016 measures through the findings of Bruce Carr QC and Ed Holmes.[70] The Government submitted the Carr Review to indicate a consistent pattern of union bullying workers, and yet Carr himself 'did not contend his findings to be a sufficient basis' for influencing the TUA.[71] Instead, the true motivations behind the government's 2016 legislative programme are observed by the 'striking resemblance'[72] to Ed Holmes Modernising Industrial Relations (MIR) paper.[73] The policy paper daringly questioned the necessity of protecting industrial action by reflecting on the development of employment tribunals and discussing the economic consequences of strikes. The same 'free-market economic theory' that underpinned the MIR's recommendations 'drove' the pragmatically restrictive and economically influenced 2016 statute developments.[74] The substance of today's statute in protecting trade unions 'is far removed and much weaker than the position established in 1906'.[75] Since the Henry Campbell-Bannerman leadership, trade union membership has declined by more than half due to the 'three successive Conservative governments [who] have enacted labour legislation opposed by unions'.[76] It appears the deep-rooted ideology of the political party in power influences the legislative steps for protecting trade unions.[77] Therefore, the extent of the Conservative government's 'authoritarian, class-biased and oppressive'[78] industrial action policies will be exemplified and 'more evident than they are today when a Labour government is elected again'.[79] Judiciary While the likes of Maurice Kay LJ and Lord Neuberger MR 'characterised the statutory immunities as limited exceptions to the common law' to justify interpreting the statute provisions 'strictly against the trade union', the court's overall response to industrial action 'has been more mixed'.[80] The court in Merkur Island Shipping v Laughton[81] developed a three-part test to examine the legality of industrial action. This test encapsulates the substantive and procedural requirements for a lawful strike whilst observing the intertwined and 'uneasy' relationship between the common law and statute.[82] If the industrial action is unlawful at common law, the judiciary asks whether there is a 'prime facie statutory immunity' for the commission of torts.[83] This substantive question considers whether the action was 'in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute'[84] before questioning whether the immunity had been procedurally lost by one of the three specified statutory reasons in TULRCA 1992.[85] The union's partial immunity could be lost for minor 'inconsequential breaches of the statutory rules'[86]; there is a series of High Court instances of injunctions being granted to 'ever more powerful and well-resourced employers'[87] owing to invalid strike ballots.[88] The readily available labour injunctions continued to be the "key piece[89]" of suppressing collective action until the minor development in 2011. In RMTv Serco Ltd;ASLEFv London and Birmingham Railway Limited (RMT and ASLEF),[90] the Court of Appeal approved and applied Millett LJ's 1996 observation in London Underground Limited v National Union of Railwaymen, Maritime and Transport Staff:[91] 'the democratic requirement of a secret ballot is not to make life more difficult for trade unions … but for the protection of the Union's own members'.[92] Owing to this proposed democratic aim, the court in RMT and ASLEF confirmed it was 'to interpret the statutory provisions somewhat less stringently'.[93] This interpretation is a stark contrast to Maurice Kay LJ's understanding of parliament's intentions. The court furthered Millett LJ's aim by recommending a neutral, 'without presumptions one way or the other',[94] interpretation of TULRCA. Upon the fact TULRCA is premised on the existing common law framework, the court's 'judicial creativity' could have easily 'outflank[ed] the intentions of Parliament'.[95] Instead of a 'neutral' approach, the courts have the power to mitigate unions disproportionate vulnerability against injunctions, damages, and unfair dismissals by encouraging and favouring social legitimacy. Although, the RMT and ASLEF court 'only indicated a change in emphasis rather than substance'[96] (since unions are still burdened with the challenges of exercising a 'lawful' strike),[97] this judgment enhanced union's ability to resist injunction applications (as observed by Balfour BeattyEngineering Services Limitedv Unitethe Union).[98] The unbiased interpretation encouraged in RMT and ASLEF continues to be the leading approach to interpreting domestic statutes regarding industrial action. ECHR Judiciary Admittedly, the scope of Maurice Kay LJ's strict interpretation was narrowly limited by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).[99] The ECtHR confirmed, in Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey,[100] that Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights included protection of the right to strike. This Article, and Article 6 of the European Social Charter[101] bestow the right to strike for their member states members and due to the UK Human Rights Act 1998, 'British workers are understood to enjoy a right to strike'.[102] This, unlike the mere domestic statutory immunities, is the only instance of a 'legislated' right to strike in the UK.[103] Under section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, 'statutory provisions must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Conventionrights'[104] – 'the opportunity to test this line of argument'[105] in the English courts arose in Metrobus Ltd v Unite the Union (Metrobus).[106] The Court of Appeal rejected the Enerji arguments; the Court denied the authority's relevance for the interpretation of UK statutory provisions. This judgment continues to be the leading precedent on the UK's provisions of Article 11,[107] despite the RMT and ASLEF judgment. In RMT and ASLEF, the UK courts acknowledged the 'clearly protected'[108] right to strike under ECHR Article 11. However, the court emphasised the importance of a 'fair balance to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and the community as a whole'.[109] The emphasised interests of the 'community' motivated the court's justification for the ban on secondary action owing to its 'potential to … cause broad disruption within the economy and to affect the delivery of services to the public'.[110] Subsequently, the court confirmed that this ban aligns with Article 11(2) 'on the basis of a wide margin of appreciation accorded to the State'.[111] While the court is correct to recognise their bestowed margin of appreciation, the court rationalised the granting of the injunction, 'which itself cost the union a substantial sum',[112] upon economic factors. This factor is not only 'wholly irrelevant to the specific facts of the application' but it disregarded and postponed 'the exercise of what was acknowledged to be a convention protected right'.[113] The court effectively and 'successfully prevented industrial action on the basis of legal' human rights provisions 'which are intended to benefit workers'.[114] In short, there 'is no point creating rights' or passing human rights legislation if the 'court is not prepared to defend them'.[115] There will continue to be an erosion of human rights protection until there is greater coordination between the domestic courts and the ECtHR. It is credible to conclude that the UK judiciary is more concerned with profitability, self-preservation of UK powers, and 'in appeasing political forces'[116] above the interests of the individuals it and the Convention Rights was established to serve. Legislature The RMT and ASLEF court's 'blessing of a wide margin of appreciation' in the 'encompassment' of Article 11 offered a 'green light for further restrictive legislation on industrial action' by the 'only too happy Government'.[117] Here, Boggs and Ewing detect 'the crude politics of power'.[118] Upon observing the Court of Appeal's reluctance to exercise EU conventions, and the UK courts' developments that continue to be 'very much in line with the political approach of the Conservative government',[119] it materialises that the court and government are not 'looking to open a third (ECtHR) front'.[120] The Government has recently launched an 'independent review' of the Human Rights Act.[121] The review aims to evaluate 'the duty to take into account' ECtHR case law and assess 'whether dialogue between our domestic courts and the ECtHR works effectively and if there is room for improvement'.[122] It is worth highlighting that this 'independent' review will be led by former Court of Appeal Judge, Sir Peter Gross – the same judge who remarked that 'the more that controversial areas are "outsourced" … the greater the challenge for … judicial leadership'.[123] The former judge is a notable advocate for greater domestic judicial leadership.[124] This advocacy hints the likelihood of the review condemning the relevance and precedence of the ECtHR (and Human Rights Act 1998) in 'controversial' matters such as industrial action. This review has the powerful ability to eliminate the only instance of a legislated right to strike in the UK.[125] Ultimately 'The notion of lawful industrial action is restrictive', the procedural requirements are 'onerous' and the consequences of unions liability for unlawful strikes are 'serious'.[126] Nearly two decades after the European Social Charter's review,[127] the UK still does not guarantee the right to strike. The precedent in Metrobus still stands. There continues to be a 'poorly reasoned and barely consistent' series of judgments 'by what looks like a weak, timid'[128] and politically influenced[129] judiciary. The enactment of the 'Human Rights Act and the evolving jurisprudence of the ECtHR'[130] will not prescribe a right to strike in the UK until the Supreme Court or ECtHR rule UK's current provisions as incompatible with Article 11. In truth, 'the right to strike [in the UK] has never been much more than a slogan or a legal metaphor'.[131] This 'slogan' is a regime of immunities that are purposely designed upon an overly complex and expensive statutory system.[132] These immunities are not adequately or proportionately protecting workers, unions, and one in nine vulnerable, precarious workers against the 'pitfalls'[133] of damages, injunctions, and unfair dismissals.[134] This system was successfully underlined with the political agenda of deterring trade disputes; the UK's worker strike total has fallen to its 'lowest level since 1893'.[135] The 'unanimous and hostile'[136] approach of the legislature and the judiciary towards industrial action exhibits the UK's covert 'culture of routinely disregarding'[137] social legitimacy in favour of profits. [1] Alan Bogg and Ruth Dukes, 'Statutory Interpretation and The Limits of a Human Rights Approach: Royal Mail Group Ltd v Communication Workers Union' (2020) 49 ILJ 477, 478. [2] Nicholas Pohl,'Political and Economic Factors Influencing Strike Activity During the Recent Economic Crisis: A Study of The Spanish Case Between 2002 And 2013' (2018) 9 Global Labour Journal 19, 21. [3] ibid, 21. [4] Harry Smith, 'How Far Does UK Labour Law Provide for The Effective Exercise of a Right to Strike?' (2014) 6 The Student Journal of Law accessed 15 December 2020. [5] Hugh Collins, Aileen McColgan and Keith D Ewing,Labour Law(2nd edn, CUP 2019) 706. [6] Gwyneth Pitt,Cases and Materials on Employment Law(1st edn, Pearson Education Limited 2008) 570. [7] Pohl (n 2), 21. [8] Beverly J Silver,Forces of Labor Workers' Movements and Globalization Since 1870(CUP 2003) 17. [9] Pitt (n 6), 570. [10] Manfred Davidmann, 'The Right to Strike' (Solhaam, 1996) accessed 15 December 2020. [11] Adam Smith,An Inquiry into The Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations(Cofide 1776). [12] Bethan Staton, 'The Upstart Unions Taking on The Gig Economy and Outsourcing' (Financial Times, 20 January 2020) accessed 16 December 2020 [13] Employment Rights Act 1996,s212. [14] Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act (TULRCA)1992, s246. [15] Brian Smart, 'The Right to Strike and The Right to Work' (1985) 2 Journal of Applied Philosophy 31. [16] 'Industrial Action' (UNISON National) accessed 7 December 2020 [17] Bogg and Dukes (n 1), 478. [18] ibid, 478. [19] Article 18 of the Spanish Constitution and regulated by Royal Decree-Law 17/1977 of 4 March on Labour Relations ('RDLLR') and Article 4.1.e) of the Spanish Workers' Statute. [20] Article 40 of theItalianRepublic Constitution of 1948. [21] Collins, McColgan, and Ewing (n 5), 714. [22] RMT v Serco; ASLEF v London and Birmingham Railway [2011] EWCA Civ 226, [2011] ICR 848 [2]. [23] Metrobus Ltd v Unite the Union [2009] EWCA Civ 829, [2010] ICR 173 [118]. [24] South Wales Miners' Federation v Glamorgan Coal Co [1905] AC 239. [25] Collins, McColgan, and Ewing (n 5), 714. [26] (1853) 118 ER 749. [27] Taff Vale Railway Co vAmalgamated Society ofRailwayServants [1901] AC 426. [28] [1901] AC 495. [29] [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1. [30] 'House of Lords Overhaul Economic Torts' (Herbert Smith Freehills, 17 May 2007) accessed 9 December 2020 [31] ibid. [32] OBG v Allan (n 29). [33] ibid, [37]. [34] Hazel Carty, 'The Economic Torts and English Law: An Uncertain Future' (2007) 95 Kentucky LJ 849. [35] Lonrho v Fayed [1990] 2 QB 479, 492-93. [36] Collins, McColgan, and Ewing (n 5), 714. [37] ibid, 714. [38] ibid, 849. [39] ibid, 848. [40] ibid, 847. [41] ibid, 847. [42] Cartey (n 34), 847. [43] ibid, 849. [44] Richard Kidner, 'Lessons in Trade Union Law Reform: The Origins and Passage of The Trade Disputes Act 1906' (2018) 2 Legal Studies 37. [45] Taff Vale (n 27). [46] Merriam-Webster,Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Encyclopedia(Merriam-Webster 2000) 1157. [47] Kidner (n 44), 47. [48] Bogg and Dukes (n 1), 478. [49] RMT and ASLEF (n 22) [2]. [50] Keith Ewing, 'The Right to Strike: From the Trade Disputes Act 1906 To A Trade Union Freedom Bill 2006' (Institute of Employment Rights, March 2013) accessed 11 December 2020. [51] The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, 'Trade Disputes Act' (Encyclopedia Britannica, 20 July 1998) accessed 11 December 2020. [52] Ewing (n 50). [53] Encyclopedia Britannica (n 51). [54] FA Hayek, 'Trade Union Immunity Under the Law' The Times (London, 21 July 1977) 15 accessed 11 December 2020 [55] Davidmann (n 10). [56] Hayek (n 54). [57] Alex Kitson, '1978-1979: Winter of Discontent' (Libcom.org, 24 January 2007) accessed 11 December 2020. [58] Cmd, 8128, 1981. [59] Cmd 821, 1989. [60] Trade Union Immunities (n 58), para 247. [61] Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993, s238A. [62] TULRCA 1992, ss237-38. [63] Michael Ford and Tonia Novitz, 'Legislating for Control: The Trade Union Act 2016' (2020) 45 ILJ 227. [64] Bart Cammaerts, 'The Efforts to Restrict the Freedom to Strike and To Deny A Right to Strike Should Be Resisted Fiercely' (LSE Blogs, 14 September 2015) accessed 11 December 2020. [65] TUA 2016, s226(2)(a) (ii). [66] ibid, s226(2)(e). [67] ibid, s238A. [68] Ford and Novitz (n 63), 291. [69] ibid, 291. [70] ibid, 291. [71] ibid, 291. [72] ibid, 279. [73] Modernising Industrial Relations n.7. [74] Ford and Novitz (n 63), 279. [75] Ewing (n 50). [76] Brian Towers, 'Running the Gauntlet: British Trade Unions Under Thatcher, 1979-1988' (1989) 42 ILR Rev 163. [77] Gareth Thomas and Ian K Smith,Smith & Thomas' Employment Law(9th edn, OUP 2007), 737. [78] Davidmann (n 10). [79] Bogg and Dukes (n 1), 492. [80] Ruth Dukes, 'The Right to Strike Under UK Law: Not Much More Than A Slogan? NURMT v SERCO, ASLEF v London & Birmingham Railway Ltd' (2011) 40 ILJ 302, 309. [81] [1983] ICR 490. [82] Collins, McColgan, and Ewing (n 5), 847. [83] TULRCA 1992, s219. [84] ibid. [85] ibid, ss222, 224, and 226. [86] Dukes (n 80), 309. [87] Kalina Arabadjieva, 'Royal Mail Group Ltd v Communication Workers Union (CWU): Injunctions Preventing Industrial Action and The Right to Strike' (UK Labour Law, 6 March 2020) accessed 12 December 2020. [88] TULRCA 1992, s226. [89] Arabadjieva (n 87). [90] n 22. [91] [1996] ICR 170. [92] ibid, [180]-[182]. [93] Dukes (n 82), 309. [94] RMT and ASLEF (n 22), [2]. [95] Smith (n 4). [96] Ford and Novitz (n 63), 281. [97] Arabadjieva (n 87). [98] [2012] EWHC 267 (QB). [99] Keith Ewing and Alan Bogg, 'The Implications of The RMT Case' (2014) 40 ILJ 221, 222. [100] [2009] ECHR 2251. [101] 'The right to bargain collectively.' [102] Keith Ewing and John Hendy, 'The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara' (2010) 39 ILJ 2. [103] Bogg and Dukes (n 1), 478. [104] ibid. [105] Dukes (n 82), 303. [106] n 23. [107] Dukes (n 82), 310. [108] Ewing and Bogg (n 99), 221. [109] RMT and ASLEF (n 22), [77]. [110] ibid, [82]. [111] ECHR Art 11 (2). [112] Ewing and Bogg (n 99), 251. [113] ibid, 221. [114] Arabadjieva (n 87). [115] Ewing and Bogg (n 99), 223. [116] ibid, 251. [117] Ford and Novitz (n 63), 282. [118] Ewing and Bogg (n 99), 223. [119] Thomas and Smith (n 77), 737. [120] Ewing and Bogg (n 99), 223. [121] Ministry of Justice, 'Government Launches Independent Review of the Human Rights Act' (Gov.uk, 7 December 2020) accessed 15 December 2020. [122] ibid. [123] Jamie Susskind, 'Jamie Susskind Comments on Sir Peter Gross' Lecture on Judicial Leadership' (Littleton Chambers) accessed 15 December 2020. [124] ibid. [125] ECHR Art 11. [126] Ruth Dukes, The Right to Strike Under UK Law: Something More Than A Slogan? Metrobus v Unite The Union [2009] EWCA Civ 829' (2010) 39 ILJ 1, 7. [127] ESC, Report of the Committee of Experts 2002. [128] Ewing and Bogg (n 99), 251. [129] Thomas and Smith (n 77), 737. [130] Bogg and Dukes (n 1), 478. [131] Metrobus (n 23) (Maurice Kay LJ). [132] Bogg and Dukes (n 1), 478. [133] Dukes (n 125), 9. [134] ibid, 7. [135] Richard Partington, 'UK Worker Strike Total Falls to Lowest Level Since 1893' (The Guardian, 30 May 2018) accessed 15 December 2020 [136] Smith (n 4). [137] ibid.

UNTEILBAR UND UNTRENNBAR Die Geschichte des Weltkrieges (-) Unteilbar und untrennbar (1,1919) ( - ) Einband ( - ) [Abb.]: Kaiser Franz Josef. ( - ) Titelseite ([I]) Mit höchster Genehmigung ehrfurchtsvoll gewidmet Seiner k. und. k. Hoheit dem durchlauchtigsten Herrn Feldmarschall Erzherzog Friedrich. ([III]) [Vorwort] ([V]) Verzeichnis der Kunstbeilagen. ([VII]) Geleitwort. ([IX]) Inhaltsverzeichnis. ([XIII]) Beilagen. (XVI) Verzeichnis der Mitarbeiter. (XVI) Vor dem Sturm. ([1]) Europa zur Jahrhundertwende. ([3]) [Abb.]: ([3]) [Abb.]: Der Friedenszar Nikolaus II., Kaiser von Rußland. (4) [Abb.]: Königin Viktoria von Großbritannien und Irland, Kaiserin von Indien. (5) [2 Abb.]: (1)Die europäische Familie. Zar Nikolaus II. Herzog Alfred von Koburg-Gotha. Kaiser Wilhelm II. Prinz Eduard von Wales. Königin Viktoria. Kaiserin Friedrich. (2)Leopold II., König der Belgier. (6) [Abb.]: Der Friedenspalast in Haag. (7) Serbien und der Panslawismus. (7) [2 Abb.]: (1)Königin Draga von Serbien. (2)König Alexander von Serbien. (8) [Abb.]: Peter Karageorgievic als Prätendent. (9) [Abb.]: Nikola Pašić [Pasic], der serbische Ministerpräsident. (10) [2 Abb.]: (1)Das Offizierskasino in Belgrad, der Hauptsitz der großserbischen Bewegung. (2)Das kaiserliche Jagdschloß Mürzsteg. (11) [Abb.]: Abzeichen der "Narodna odbrana". (12) Beginn der Einkreisung der Zentralmächte. (13) [Abb.]: König Eduard VII. von Großbritannien und Irland, Kaiser von Indien. (13) [Abb.]: Der Hafen von Port-Arthur. (14) [Abb.]: Blick auf Rabat. (Marokko.) (15) [3 Abb.]: (1)Delcassé, der französische Minister des Auswärtigen. (2)Clémenceau, der einflußreiche Politiker Frankreichs. (3)Jaurès, der französische Sozialistenführer. (16) [Abb.]: Herzog Freidrich ( - ) [Abb.]: Die Erneuerung der franco-russischen Allianz (Zarenbesuch in Cherbourg am 31. Juli 1909). (17) Von Mürzsteg bis zur türkischen Revolution (1903 - 1907). (18) [Abb.]: Graf Goluchowski, österreichisch-ungarischer Minister des Auswärtigen. (18) [2 Abb.]: (1)General Kuropatkin, der russische Kriegsführer. (2)Graf Witte, der russische Ministerpräsident. (19) [2 Abb.]: (1)Das Gebäude der Duma. (2)Zarskoje Selo, die Residenz des Zaren. (20) Die Annexion 1908. (21) [Abb.]: Graf Ährenthal, der österreichisch-ungarische Minister des Auswärtigen. (22) [Abb.]: Iswolski, der russische Minister des Auswärtigen. (23) [Abb.]: Bosnisch-Herzegovinisches Infanterieregiment bezieht die Burghauptwache in Wien. (24) [2 Abb.]: (1)Tunneleinfahrt in der Pracaschlucht. (2)Kronprinz Georg von Serbien. (25) [2 Abb.]: (1)Drinabrücke der bosnischen Ostbahn. Der rechte Tunnel führt nach Uvac, der linke nach Višegrad [Visegrad]. (26) [2 Abb.]: (1)Das Landesspital in Sarajewo. (2)Die Eisenwerke in Zenica. (27) [2 Abb.]: (1)Weinbau-Versuchsstation bei Mostar. (2)Kohlengruben an der Kreka. (28) [Abb.]: Straße im Vrbastal. (29) Die vollendete Einkreisung Deutschlands und Österreich-Ungarns. 1908 - 1912. (29) [2 Abb.]: (1)Fürst Bernhard Bülow, deutscher Reichskanzler. (2)Der "Imperator" der Hamburg-Amerika-Linie. (30) [2 Abb.]: (1)Kiderlen-Wächter, deutscher Stattssekretär des Auswärtigen. (2)Raymond Poincaré, Ministerpräsident und später Präsident Frankreichs. (31) [Abb.]: Bethmann Hollweg, der deutsche Reichskanzler. (32) [Abb.]: Erzherzog Karl. ( - ) [2 Abb.]: (1)Grey, englischer Minister des Auswärtigen. (2)König Georg V. von Großbritannien und Irland, Kaiser von Indien. (33) Tripolis und der Balkankrieg. 1912 - 1913. (34) [Abb.]: König Viktor Emanuel III. von Italien mit dem Kronprinzen. (35) [2 Abb.]: (1)Perabrücke in Konstantinopel. (2)Enver Pascha, der türkische Kriegsminister. (36) [Abb.]: Die Fürsten des Balkanbundes. König Peter. König Nikita. König Ferdinand. König Georg. (37) [2 Abb.]: (1)Graf Berchtold, der österreichisch-ungarische Minister des Äußeren. (2)Ansicht von Cetinje. (38) [Abb.]: Regierungsgebäude in Cetinje. (39) Die Balkankriege, die Londoner Konferenz und Albanien. 1913. (39) [Abb.]: Plevlje im Sandschak. (40) [Abb.]: Durazzo. (41) [3 Abb.]: (1)Skutari mit dem Tarabosch. (2)Essad Pascha, der albanische Kondottiere.(3)Danew, der Ministerpräsident Bulgariens. (42) [2 Abb.]: (1)König Carol I. von Rumänien. (2)Saloniki. (43) [2 Abb.]: (1)König Konstantin von Griechenland. (2)Fürst Wilhelm von Albanien. (44) Die Ermordung des Thronfolgers. 1914. (45) [Abb.]: Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von Österreich-Este (46) [Abb.]: Das Belvedere in Wien, Residenz des Thronfolgers Franz Ferdinand. (47) [Abb.]: Das Thronfolgerpaar in Sarajewo, kurz vor der Ermordung. (48) [Abb.]: Erzherzog Eugen. ( - ) [2 Abb.]: (1)Die Festnahme des Attentäters Princip. (2)Hartwig, der russische Gesandte in Belgrad. (49) [Abb.]: Konopischt [Konopiště), das Schloß des Erzherzog-Thronfolgers. (50) [2 Abb.]: (1)Geburtshaus des Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand in Graz. (2)Schloß Artstetten (die Grabstätte des Thronfolgerpaares). (51) Die Kriegserklärung. 1914. (51) [Abb.]: Kronprinz Alexander von Serbien. (52) [Abb.]: Baron Giesl, der österreichisch-ungarische Gesandte in Belgrad. (53) [Abb.]: Der Besuch Poincarés in Petersburg. (55) [2 Abb.]: (1)Sassonow, der russische Minister des Äußeren. (2)Marchese die San Giuliano, der italienische Minister des Äußeren. (56) [Brief]: "An meine Völker" (57) [Tabelle: Uebersicht der wichtigsten politischen Ereignisse der letzten zehn Jahre (1903 - 1914.) (59) Die Welt in Waffen. ([63]) Sinn und Wesen der modernen Kriegskraft. ([65]) [Abb.]: ([65]) [Abb.]: Englische Rekruten werden nach Anwerbung beeidet. (66) [Abb.]: Radfahrerkompagnie im Gefecht. (68) [Abb.]: Skipatrouille. (69) Waffen, Munition, Kriegsbauten, -mittel und -maschinen der Landmacht. (70) [Abb.]: Dum-Dum-Geschosse. (70) [Abb.]: Maschinengewehr. (71) [Abb.]: Feldgeschütz. (72) [3 Abb.]: Artilleriemunition (1) I. Schrapnell. II. Brandgranate. (2)III. Einheitsgeschoß (Granatschrapnell). IV. Stahlgranate (Bombe). (3)Französischer Lufttorpedo. (73) [Abb.]: Minenwerfer. (74) [2 Abb.]: (1)Soldat, durch Maske gegen giftige Gase geschützt, wirft eine Handgranate. (2)Minen und Gegenminen. (75) [2 Abb.]: (1)Schützengraben mit schrapnellsicheren Unterständen. (2)Wallspiegel. Zielvorrichtung am Gewehr zum gedeckten Schhießen. (76) [5 Abb.]: (1)Wolfsgruben und Drahtverhau. (2)Fliegerpfeil. (3)Fliegerbombe. (4)Scheinwerfer. (5)Kampfflugzeug. (77) [3 Abb.]: (1)Feldtelegraphenstation. (2)Telephonzentrale im Felde. (3)Pferdefeldbahn. (78) [2 Abb.]: (1)Fesselballon. (2)Panzerzug. (79) [Abb.]: Maschinengewehr mit Hundebespannung. (80) Ausrüstung, Verpflegung und Uniformierung der Landmacht. (80) [Abb.]: Kavalleristen beim Übersetzen eines Flußes auf Schwimmsäcken. (80) [Abb.]: Österreicher und Ungarn. 1. Tiroler-Landesschütze. 2. Ulanen-Offizier. 3. Infanterist. 4. Pionier. 5. Dragoner. 6. Reitende Artillerie. ( - ) [Abb.]: Pontonbrücke. (81) [2 Abb.]: (1)Fahrküche. (2)Feldbäckerei in Betrieb. (82) Sanitätswesen, Verbindung mit der Heimat. (83) [Abb.]: Sanitätswagen, offen zur Aufnahme der Verwundeten. (83) [Abb.]: Operation im Feldspital. (84) Heerführer. (84) Die Seemacht. (85) [Abb.]: "Dreadnought." (86) [Abb.]: Kreu (87) [Abb.]: Torpedoboot. (88) [Abb.]: Unterseeboot. (89) [2 Abb.]: (1)Das Innere eines Unterseebootes. (2)Turmanlage eines Schlachtschiffes. (90) [2 Abb.]: (1)Seemine. (2)Wasserflugzeug. (91) Österreich-Ungarn. (92) [Abb.]: Lazarettschiff. (92) [Abb.]: Generaloberst Alexander Frh. v. Krobatin, k. und k. Kriegsminister. (94) [Abb.]: General der Infanterie Friedrich Frh. von Georgi, k. k. Minister für Landesverteidigung. (95) [3 Abb.]: (1)G. d. I. Samuel Frh. v. Hazai, k. ung. Landesverteidigungsminister. (2)Generaladjutant Seiner Majestät: Generaloberst Eduard Graf Paar. (3)Generaladjutant Seiner Majestät und Chef der Militärkanzlei: Generaloberst Artur Frh. v. Bolfras. (96) [Abb.]: Österreicher und Ungarn. 1. Husar. 2. Bosnisch-Hercegowinischer Hornist. 3. Jägeroffizier. 4. Marineoffizier. 5. Matrose. 6. Honvéd-Infanterist. ( - ) [Abb.]: Generalmajor Ferdinand von Kaltenborn, Chef der Detailabteilung. (97) [Abb.]: Generaloberst Franz Freiherr Conrad von Hötzendorf, Chef des Generalstabes für die gesamte bewaffnete Macht. (98) [Abb.]: F.M.L. Franz Höfer v. Feldsturm, Stellvertreter des Chefs des Generalstabes. (99) [2 Abb.]: (1)GM. Joseph Metzger, Chef der Operationsabteilung. (2)GM. Maximilian Ritter v. Hoen, Kommandant des Kriegspressequartiers. (100) [2 Abb.]: (1)FZM. Erzherzog Leopold Salvator, Generalartilleriedirektor. (2)FML. Franz Kanik, Generalquartiermeister. (101) [Abb.]: GdR. Erzherzog Joseph. (102) [2 Abb.]: (1)GdR. Erzherzog Franz Salvator, Generalinspektor der freiwilligen Sanitätspflege. (2)Admiral Erzherzog Carl Stephan. (103) [Abb.]: Generaloberst Erzherzog Joseph Ferdinand. (104) [Abb.]: Großadmiral Anton Haus, Marinekommandant. (105) [Abb.]: Tiroler Landesschützen. (106) [2 Abb.]: (1)Infanterie. (2)Ulanen. (107) [2 Abb.]: (1)Husaren. (2)Feldartillerie im Feuer. (108) [2 Abb.]: (1)Gebirgsartillerie auf dem Marsche. (2)Schwere Haubitze in Feuerstellung. (109) Das Deutsche Reich. (110) [2 Abb.]: (1)Deutsche Militärmusik. (2)Deutsche Infanterie im Gefecht. (111) [Abb.]: Deutsche Kürassiere. (112) [Abb.]: Rekrutentypen aus Österreich-Ungarn. 1. Pole. 2. Ungar. 3. Ruthene. 4. Steirer. 5. Ungar. 6. Dalmatiner. 7. Egerländer. 8. Hanake. 9. Tiroler. 10. Kroate. 11. Rumäne. ( - ) [2 Abb.]: (1)Deutsche Garde-Maschinengewehr-Abteilung. (2)Deutsche Feldartillerie. (113) [Abb.]: Eine Pionierkolonne führt Pontons heran. (114) [Abb.]: Friedrich Wilhelm, Kronprinz des Deutschen Reiches und Kronprinz von Preußen. (115) [4 Abb.]: (1)Generaloberst Freiherr v. Hausen, Sächsischer Kriegsminister. (2)G. d. R. Frh. Kreß v. Kressenstein, Bayerischer Kriegsminister. (3)Generaloberst v. Moltke, Chef des Deutschen Generalstabes. (4)Generalleutnant v. Stein, Generalquartiermeister. (116) [2 Abb.]: (1)Generaloberst Erich v. Falkenhayn, Preußischer Kriegsminister. (2)Generalfeldmarschall Graf v. Häseler (117) [2 Abb.]: (1)Prinz Heinrich von Preußen, Generalinspekteur der deutschen Marine. (2)Großadmiral v. Tirpitz. (118) Rußland. (119) [Abb.]: Zar Nikolaus II. und Großfürst Nikolaj Nikolaewitsch. (120) [2 Abb.]: (1)General Suchomlinow, russischer Kriegsminister zu Beginn des Krieges. (2)Kriegs- und Marineministerium in Petersburg. (121) [2 Abb.]: (1)Russische Infanterie. (2)Sibirische Schützen. (122) [2 Abb.]: (1)Russisches Maschinengewehr. (2)Kosaken. (123) [Abb.]: Russische Feldartillerie. (124) [Abb.]: Reiterkunststück der Kosaken. (126) [Abb.]: Russische Offiziere. (127) [Abb.]: General Januschkewitsch, Chef des russischen Generalstabes. (130) Serbien. (131) [Abb.]: Serbische Infanterie. (131) [2 Abb.]: (1)Serbische Regimentsmusik der Garde. (2)Serbisches Maschinengewehr. (132) [Abb.]: Serbische Kavallerie. (133) [Abb.]: Serbische schwere Artillerie. (134) [Abb.]: Serbische Bandenführer. - Komite. (136) [2 Abb.]: (1)Vojvode Putnik, Führer der serbischen Armee. (2)General Stefanovic, serbischer Kriegsminister. (137) Montenegro. (138) [Abb.]: König Nikola fährt zur Front. (138) [2 Abb.]: (1)Danilo, Kronprinz von Montenegro. (2)General Vukotic, montenegrinischer Kriegsminister. (139) [Abb.]: Montenegrinische Infanterie. (140) [Abb.]: Montenegrinischer Landsturm. (141) Frankreich. (142) [2 Abb.]: (1)Französische Infanterie. (2)Millerand, französischer Kriegsminister zu Beginn des Krieges. (143) [2 Abb.]: (1)Französische Kürassiere. (2)Französische schwere Artillerie. (144) [Abb.]: Franzosen. 1. Infanterie-Korporal (neue Felduniform). 2. Infanterist (alte Uniform). 3. Kürassier. 4. Marokkanischer Spahi. 5. Algerischer Schütze. 6. Marine-Füsilier. ( - ) [2 Abb.]: (1)Französische Alpenjäger. (2)Turkos. (145) [3 Abb.]: (1)General Joffre, Generalissimus der französischen Armee. (2)Senegalschütze mit Weib und Kind. (3)General Pau. (146) Großbritannien. (147) [Abb.]: Englisch-indisches Maschinengewehr. (147) [3 Abb.]: (1)Englische Infanterie. (2)Gurthas. (3)Englische Feldartillerie. (148) [Abb.]: Schottische Dudelsackpfeier. (149) [2 Abb.]: (1)Feldmarschall Lord Kitchener of Chartum, engl. Kriegsminister. (2)Feldmarschall French. (150) [2 Abb.]: (1)Flottenschau bei Spithead. (2)Admiral Jellicoe, erster Seelord der englischen Flotte. (151) [2 Abb.]: (1)Winston Churchill. (2)Herbert Henry Asquith, Premierminister. (152) Belgien. (152) [2 Abb.]: (1)Belgische Infanterie. (2)Belgische Ulanen. (153) Japan. (154) [2 Abb.]: (1)Japanische Festungsartillerie. (2)Japanische Infanterie. (155) Schlußwort. (156) Militärgeographie. ([157]) Der südöstliche Kriegsschauplatz. ([159]) [Abb.]: ([159]) [2 Abb.]: (1)Belgrad. (2)Der Kazan. (160) [Abb.]: Engländer. 1. Bengalischer Lanzenreiter. 2. Kavallerist. 3. Schottländer. 4. Infanterist. 5. Matrose. 6. Seeoffizier. ( - ) [4 Abb.]: (1)Zvornik. (2)Die Drinaschlucht, aufwärts von Bajinabasta [Bajina Bašta]. (3)Visegrad mit der Straße nach Rogatica. (4)Die Drinabrücke bei Megjegja. (161) [2 Abb.]: (1)Kragujevac. (2)Foca [Foča]. (162) [Abb.]: Die Taraschlucht. (163) [2 Abb.]: (1)Semendria. (2)Der Metalkasattel. (164) [3 Abb.]: (1)Podgorica. (2)Aus dem Durmitorgebirge. (3)das Volujakgebirge. (165) [2 Abb.]: (1)Cehotinaschlucht. (2)Oberer Teile des alten Weges von Cattaro nach Njegos ein typischer Karstweg. (166) [Abb.]: Cattaro mit dem Lovcen [Lovćen]. (167) [Abb.]: Montenegrnische Grenzforts bei Virpazar. (168) [3 Abb.]: (1)Aus Mostar, an der Bahn Sarajewo - Ragusa - Cattaro. (2)Das Sudjeskadefilee. (3)Gorazde [Goražde]. (169) [2 Abb.]: (1)Blick von der Romanja planina gegen Mokro. (2)Neu Bileca [Bileća]. (170) Der russische Kriegsschauplatz. (170) [2 Abb.]: (1)Die Dreikaiserecke bei Myslowitz (österreichisch-deutsch-russische Grenze). (2)Lötzen am Mauersee, typische masurische Landschaft. (171) [Abb.]: Aus den Rokitnosümpfen. (172) [Abb.]: Zaleszczyki am Dniestr. (173) [2 Abb.]: (1)Biala mit dem Panorama der Beskiden. (2)Panorama der Tátra. (174) [2 Abb.]: (1)Durchbruch des Dunajec am Pieniny. (2)Polnischer Bauer. (175) [2 Abb.]: (1)Der Lupkowerpaß. (2)Delatynpaß bei Körösmezö. (176) [2 Abb.]: (1)Przemysl. (2)Lemberg. (177) [2 Abb.]: (1)Ruthene. (2)Czernowitz. (178) [2 Abb.]: (1)Czenstochau. (2)Das Narewtal, südlich Pultusk, kurz vor dem Zusammenfluß mit dem Bug. (179) [Abb.]: Blick auf Tilsit. (180) [2 Abb.]: (1), (2)Russische Volkstypen. (181) Der Seekrieg 1914. ([183]) Die Aktionen der k. u. k. Kriegsmarine. ([185]) [Abb.]: ([185]) Die Kriegsereignisse in der Adria. (186) Die maritime Lage im Mittelmeer zu Anfang 1914. (186) [2 Abb.]: (1)Der russische Torpedobootszerstörer "Novik". (2)Blick auf Gibraltar mit den Schützengalerien oberhalb des ersten Felsabhanges. (187) [Abb.]: die französische Mittelmeerflotte in der Adria. (188) [Abb.]: Das Stärkeverhältnis der Mittelmeerflotten Anfang 1914. (189) [Abb.]: Pola: Kriegshafen I. (190) [Abb.]: Pola: K. u. k. Hafenadmirats- und Seearsenalskommando-Gebäude. (191) [2 Abb.]: (1)Treist vom Leuchtturm aus. (2)Kontreadmiral Souchon. (192) [Abb.]: "Hamidite". (193) Die Mittelmeer-Situation unmittelbar vor dem Kriegsausbruche. (193) [Abb.]: "Reschad V". (193) [Abb.]: "Indefatigable". (194) [2 Abb.]: (1)Vizeadmiral Karl Kailer von Kaltenfels, Stellvertreter des Marinekommandanten. (2)Marinekommando-Jacht "Lacoma". (195) [Abb.]: Großkampfschiff "Viribus Unitis". (196) Die Flottenmobilisierung bei Kriegsausbruch. (197) [Abb.]: Großkampfschiff Typ "Tegetthoff". (197) [2 Abb.]: (1)Rapidkreuzer "Admiral Spann". (2)Torpedofahrzeug "Magnet". (198) [2 Abb.]: (1)Torpedozerstörer in Fahrt. (2)Panzerkreuzer "St. Georg". (199) [2 Abb.]: (1)Torpedofahrzeug "Huszár". (2)Turmschlachtschiff "Erzherzog Carl" feuernd. (200) [2 Abb.]: (1)Turmschlachtschiff "Monarch". (2)Turmschlachtschiff "Habsburg". (201) [Abb.]: Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère, Kommandant der französischen Mittelmeerflotte. (202) [Abb.]: Das Tegetthoff-Denkmal in Pola. (203) [Abb.]: Panorama von Pola. (204) [2 Abb.]: (1)Madonna del Mare. (2)Die Arena von Pola. (205) [Abb.]: Blick gegen Catene. (207) [Karte]: Plan eines befestigten Hafens. (209) [Abb.]: Französische Seemine. (210) [Abb.]: Auffischen verankerter Seeminen durch Schlepper. (211) Die Kriegsereignisse in der Adria (Bis Ende des Jahres 1914.) (212) [2 Abb.]: (1)Torpedo im Augenblick des Abfeuerns. (2)Der Hafen von Antivari. (212) [2 Abb.]: (1)Kleiner Kreuzer "Breslau". (2)Schlachtkreuzer "Goeben". (213) [Abb.]: Der österreichische Lloyddampfer "Baron Gautsch". (215) [Abb.]: S. M. S. "Zenta". (216) [Abb.]: Torpedofahrzeug "Ulan". (217) [Abb.]: Fregattenkapitän Paul Pachner. (218) [Abb.]: Panzerkreuzer "Kaiser Karl VI." (220) [Abb.]: Punta d'Ostro. (222) [Abb.]: Turmschlachtschiff "Radetzky". (224) [Abb.]: "Zenta" und "Ulan" im Kampfe. ( - ) [Abb.]: Im Kesselraum eines Schlachtschiffes. (225) [Abb.]: Leuchtturm der Insel Pelagosa. (226) [Abb.]: Turmschlachtschiff "Zrinyi". (227) [Abb.]: K. u. k. Seeflugzeug vor dem Aufstieg. (229) [2 Abb.]: (1)Seeflugzeug im Aufstieg. (2)Seeflugzeug im Fluge. (231) [Abb.]: Torpedofahrzeug "Tátra". (233) [Abb.]: Ragusa. (235) [Abb.]: Das französische Tauchboot "Eurie". (237) [Abb.]: Österreichisch-ungarisches Unterseeboot. (238) [Abb.]: Das französische Flaggschiff "Courbet". (239) [Abb.]: Torpedierung des französischen Flaggenschiffes duch S. M. U-Boot XII am 21. Dezember 1914. ( - ) [Abb.]: K. u. k. Linienschiffsleutnant Egon Lerch der heldenmütige Kommandant des "U 12". (241) [2 Tabellen]: (1)Österreichische Handelsmarine. (2)Ungarische Handelsmarine. (243) [Abb.]: Seespitalschiff "Tirol". (244) Die Aktionen der k. u. k. Donauflottille. (246) [3 Abb.]: Unsere gepanzerten Flußfahrzeuge. (1)S. M. S. "Maros", "Leitha", 310 T Deplacement. (2)S. M. S. "Szamos", "Körös", 448 T Deplacement. (3)S. M. S. "Temes", Bodrog", 448 T Deplacement. (247) [Abb.]: Fliegerabwehr (249) [Abb.]: Geschützwechsel auf Monitor "Körös". (250) [Abb.]: Donaumonitor "Szamos". (251) [Abb.]: Patrouillenboot "C". (253) [Abb.]: 12 cm-Geschützturm auf Donaumonitor "Bodrog". (255) [Abb.]: Aufgefischte serbische Flußmine. (256) [Abb.]: Donaumonitore "Temes" und "Bodrog". (257) [Abb.]: "Körös" mit Abstreifvorrichtung gegen Treibminen. (259) S. M. S. "Kaiserin Elisabeth" bei der Verteidigung von Tsingtau. (261) Die Vorgeschichte von Japans Teilnahme am Weltkrieg. (261) [Abb.]: Panorama von Tsingtau. (261) Das deutsche Schutzgebiet in Tsingtau - Kiautschau. (262) [Abb.]: Linienschiffskapitän Richard Makoviz. (262) Beschreibung S. M. S. "Kaiserin Elisabeth". (263) [2 Abb.]: (1)Matrosen der "Elisabeth" in Tsingtau. (2)Deutsche Matrosen in Tsingtau. (263) [Karte]: Plan von Tsingtau. (264) Die Aufgabe S. M. S. "Kaiserin Elisabeth" und des deutschen Verteidigungsaufgebotes. (264) [Abb.]: Torpedo-Rammkreuzer "Kaiserin Elisabeth". (265) Der Verlauf der Belagerung bis zum Fall der Seefestung. (266) [Abb.]: Kapitän zur See v. Meyer-Waldeck kaiserlich deutscher Gouverneur in Tsingtau. (266) Berichte von Mitkämpfern. (267) [Abb.]: Kanonenboot "Jaguar". (267) [Abb.]: Der japanische Kreuzer "Takachito". (269) Die maritimen Kriegsereignisse außerhalb der Adria. (272) [Abb.]: Der kleine Kreuzer "Augsburg". (273) Der Seekrieg in den nordeuropäischen Gewässern. (273) [2 Abb.]: (1)"Königin Luise". (2)Der englische Kreuzer "Amphion". (274) [2 Abb.]: (1)Der deutsche Kreuzer "Straßburg" vernichtet ein englisches Unterseeboot. (2)Der englische Schlachtschiffkreuzer "Lion". (275) [Abb.]: Deutscher Passagierdampfer "Kaiser Wilhelm der Große". (276) Die Handelssperre Englands durch deutsche Unterseeboote. (277) [Abb.]: Der britische Hilfskreuzer "Oceanic". (277) [Abb.]: Deutsche Unterseeboote im Hafen. (278) [Abb.]: Englisches Torpedofahrzeug "Swift", Geschwindigkeit 36 Seemeilen. (279) [Abb.]: Kapitänleutnant Weddigen, Kommandant des "U 9". (280) [Abb.]: Das deutsche "U 9". (281) [Abb.]: Torpedierung eines Dampfers durch ein deutsches U-Boot. (282) [Abb.]: Der "Audacous" im Sinken. (283) [2 Abb.]: (1)Der deutsche Panzerkreuzer "Yorck". (2)Das englische Linienschlachtschiff "Bulwark". (284) [Abb.]: Der englische Panzerkreuzer "Hawke" (285) [Abb.]: Englisches U-Boot größter Type. (286) Der Kreuzer- und der Kolonialkrieg in den Weltmeeren. (287) A) Der Kreuzer- und Kolonialkrieg in den westlichen Weltmeeren. (287) [Abb.]: Vizeadmiral Graf Spee. (288) [Abb.]: Panzerkreuzer "Scharnhorst". (289) [Karte]: Situationsplan der Schlacht bei Santa Maria. (290) [Abb.]: Panzerkreuzer "Good Hope". (290) [Abb.]: Panzerkreuzer "invincible". (291) [2 Abb.]: (1)Kleiner Kreuzer "Leipzig". (2)Kreuzer "Nürnberg". (292) [Abb.]: Panzerkreuzer "Gneisenau". (293) [Abb.]: Kleiner Kreuzer "Dresden". (294) [Karte]: Situationsplan der Seeschlacht bei den Falklands-Inseln. (295) [2 Abb.]: (1)Fregattenkapitän Köhler. (2)Kreuzer "Karlsruhe" versenkt einen Dampfer. (296) [Abb.]: Der Kreuzer "Emden". (297) B) Der Handelsdampferfang im Stillen Ozean. (297) [Abb.]: Fregattenkapitän Karl v. Müller, Kommanadant der "Emden". (298) [2 Abb.]: (1)Das Wrack der "Emden" bei den Kokosinseln. (2)Der englische Kreuzer "Minotaur". (299) [Abb.]: "Ayesha". (300) [2 Abb.]: (1)Die Königsberg im Rufidschifluß. (2)Kapitänleutnant von Mücke. (301) Schlußwort. (302) Die Verlustlisten des Jahres 1914 ergaben folgende Einbuße an Kriegsschiffen: Auf Feindesseite: (303) Krieg gegen Rußland 1914. ([305]) Einleitungs-Feldzug. (August und erste Hälfte September.) ([307]) Mobilisierung und Aufmarsch. ([307]) [Abb.]: ([307]) [Abb.]: Landsturm auf dem Marsche. (308) [2 Abb.]: (1)Sanitätskolonne. (2)Kavallerie im Aufklärungsdienste durchschreitet einen Fluß. (309) [Abb.]: Zeltlager einer Pionierkompagnie. (310) [Abb.]: Infanterielager im Walde. (311) Grenzkämpfe. (312) [2 Abb.]: (1)Hauptmann Max von Merten. (2)Russischer Grenzwachturm bei Chwalowice [Chwałowice]. (313) [3 Abb.]: (1)Rittmeister Isidor Petrovic. (2)Gendamerieoberleutnant v. Manovarda. (3)Die Grenzstation Podwoloczynska [Podwołoczyska]. (314) [Abb.]: Sandomierz. (315) Vorstoß gegen Lublin. (316) Einmarsch der Armeegruppe Kummer in Russisch-Polen. (316) [Abb.]: Gd.R. Heinrich Kummer, Ritter von Falkenfehd. (316) [2 Abb.]: (1)GdI. Remus von Woyrsch. (2)Der Ringplatz in Kalisch. (317) [2 Abb.]: (1)Gd.K. Ignaz Edler von Korda. (2)Kielce. (318) [Abb.]: Die Eidesleistung am 18. August in Padew Nadworna. (319) [Abb.]: Die erste Kompagnie der polnischen Legion beim Abmarsch von Wien. (320) [Abb.]: Russen. 1. Sibirischer Schütze. 2. Tscherkesse. 3. Infanterist. 4. Artillerieoffizier. 5. Kosak. 6. Infanterieoffizier. ( - ) Sieg der Armee Dankl bei Krasnik. (321) [Abb.]: GdR. Viktor Dankl. (321) [Abb.]: Oberst Anton Rada. (322) [Abb.]: Oberleutnant Erzherzog Karl Albrecht. (324) [2 Abb.]: (1)FML. Adolf Ritter von Brudermann. (2)Transport auf der Weichsel bei Annopol. Aufnahme von Oblt. v. Cunz. (325) [2 Abb.]: (1)Rittmeister Karl Frh. von Handel. (2)Grenzgefecht bei Borów südöstl. Zawichost am 21. August. Aufnahme von Oblt. v. Cunz. (327) [Abb.]: Rammbrunnen zur Wassergewinnung in wasserarmen Gegenden. (328) [2 Abb.]: (1)Oberst Johann Boerin. (2)GM. Rudolf Ritter von Willerding. (329) [Abb.]: GdR. Karl Freiherr von Kirchbach auf Lauterbach. (331) [2 Abb.]: (1)Bei Annopol am 23. August gefangene Russen. (2)FML. Paul Kestranek. (332) [2 Abb.]: (1)FZM. Paul Puhallo von Brlog. (2)Aushebung von Deckungen bei Ksiezomiesz [Księżomiesz]. Aufnahme von Oblt. v. Cunz. (333) [2 Abb.]: (1)GM. Richard Kutschera. (2)GdI. Hugo Meixner von Zweienstamm. (334) [Abb.]: Russische Geschütze; erobert von den österreichisch-ungarischen Truppen in den Kämpfen bei Krasnik [Kraśnik], vor dem Wiener Arsenal aufgestellt. (335) [Abb.]: Rallierung der 23. Infanterie-Brigade zum Vormarsch gegen Lublin am 27. August. Aufnahme von Oblt. v. Cunz. (336) Das Ringen um Lublin. (26. August bis 3. September.) (336) [Abb.]: Gefechtsfeld vor Lublin. Am Hang links Infanterieregiment Nr. 100, rechts anschließend im Walde Infanterieregiment Nr. 56, über die Höhe rechts die Straße nach Borzechów. (337) [Abb.]: Maschinengewehrabteilung I./56 im Gefecht bei Klodnica [Kłodnica] am 26. August. Aufnahme von Oblt. Cunz. (338) [2 Abb.]: (1)GM. Ernst Wossala. (2)FML. Georg Schariczer von Rény. (339) [Abb.]: GM. Joseph Lieb. (340) [Abb.]: Oberst Karl Magerl von Kouffheim. (341) [Abb.]: GM. Augustin von Rochel. (344) [Karte]: Skizze zum Gefechte bei Tarnawka und Wysokie am 27. August 1914. ( - ) [Abb.]: Lublin. (345) Vorstoß der Armee Auffenberg zwischen Wieprz und Bug. (346) Einleitungskämpfe. (346) [Abb.]: GdI. Moritz von Auffenberg. (347) [2 Abb.]: (1)FML. Rudolf Strauß, Generalstabschef der 4. Armee. (2)Rawa Ruska. (348) [Abb.]: Oberst Ludwig Freiherr von Holzhausen. (349) Der Sieg bei Zamosc [Zamość]. (349) [Abb.]: GdJ. Blasius Schemua. (350) [2 Abb.]: (1)Gen. Obst. Svetozar Boroevic v. Bojna. (2)GM. Oskar Bolberitz von Bleybach. (351) [Karte]: Skizze zu den Kämpfen der 4. Armee Auffenberg 1914. ( - ) [2 Abb.]: Die russische Grenze wird überschritte (353) [2 Abb.]: Aufnahmsstation für drahtlose Telegraphie. (354) [Abb.]: GM. Kletus Pichler. (355) [Abb.]: FML. Emmerich Hadfy von Livno. (357) [Abb.]: Russische Stellung. (359) [Abb.]: FZM. Johann Freiherr von Friedel. (360) [2 Abb.]: (1)Oberst Oskar Esch. (2)Oberst Karl von Stöhr. (361) [Abb.]: FML. Erzherzog Peter Ferdinand. (362) [Abb.]: FML. Eduard Edler von Kreysa. (363) Der Sieg bei Komarów. (364) [Abb.]: Oberst Adolf Sterz von Ponteguerra. (365) [Abb.]: GdI Erzherzog Joseph Ferdinand. (367) [Abb.]: Von den Kaiserjägern erstürmte Stellung. (369) [Abb.]: GM. Otto Gößmann. (371) [Abb.]: Russische Gefangene in Zamosc [Zamość]. (372) [Abb.]: Leichtverwundete. (373) [Abb.]: GdI. Johann Freiherr von Kirchbach auf Lauterbach. (374) [Abb.]: GM. Emil Herzberg. (375) [Abb.]: Artilleriestellung an der Huczwa. (377) [Abb.]: Russische Kriegsgefangene und Heimatlose. (379) [Abb.]: Oberst Franz Hill. (380) [2 Abb.]: (1)GM. Gregor Miscevik. (2)Oberst Johann Reyl-Hanisch, Ritter von Greiffenthal. (381) [Abb.]: Oberst Arthur Iwanski von Iwanina. (382) [Abb.]: FML. Ferdinand Kosak. (383) [Abb.]: Oberst Franz Hassenteufel. (385) [Abb.]: Kampfflugzeug. (387) [Abb.]: Oberst Dr. Karl Bardolff. (388) [Abb.]: Korps-Generalstabschef am Telephon während des Gefechtes. (389) [Abb.]: Oberleutnant Wladimir Terbojevic. (391) [Abb.]: Abfertigung eines Feldpostwagnes. (392) [Abb.]: Munitionskolonne. (393) [Abb.]: GM. Alfred Edler von Schenk. (394) [Abb.]: Ordonanzauto auf dem Schlachtfelde. (395) [Abb.]: Feldbäckerei im Betrieb. (396) [Abb.]: GM. Karl Englert. (397) [Abb.]: Russische Fahrküche. (399) [Abb.]: GM. Hugi Reymann. (400) [Abb.]: Wirkung einer Fliegerbombe. (401) Kämpfe in Ostgalizien. Schlachten bei Zlozów und Przemyslany. (402) [Abb.]: Tarnopol. (403) [Abb.]: GdR. Rudolf Ritter v. Brudermann. (404) [2 Abb.]: (1)Brzejany. (2)GdI. Emil Colerus v. Geldern. (405) [Abb.]: GdI. Hermann Köves v. Kövessháza. (407) [Abb.]: Von den Russen mitgeführte Lokomotive für unsere Spurweite. (408) Schlacht bei Lemberg. (409) Bereitstellung der k. u. k. Streitkräfte. (409) [2 Abb.]: (1)Die gesprengte Eisenbahnbrücke bei Zaleszczyki. (2)Der Nordostrand von Lemberg gegen Kulików. (410) [Abb.]: GdI. Artur Arz v. Straußenburg. (411) Entreten der 4. Armee GdI. v. Auffenberg in die Schlacht. (411) [Abb.]: GdI. Karl Kritek [Křitek]. (413) [2 Abb.]: (1)Oberst Karl Brosch v. Aarenau. (2)Brücken bei Jozesow [Józefów&. (414) [2 Abb.]: Feldspital bei Radlin. (415) [2 Abb.]: Transport gefangener Russen durch Lemberg. (417) Das Ringen um den Sieg. (418) [Abb.]: GO. Eduard v. Böhm-Ermolli. (419) [Abb.]: GdR. Oskar v. Wittmann. (421) Organisation der Karpathenverteidigung. Abweisung des ersten russischen Einfalles in Oberungarn. (24. September bis 8. Oktober.) (423) [Abb.]: FML. Wilhelm Graf Attems-Petzenstein. (424) [Abb.]: Der Hauptplatz in Máramos Sziget. (425) [Abb.]: FML. Karl Durski von Trzasko. (426) Die Bukowina im Kriege. (Bis zur ersten Befreiung von Czernowitz.) (427) [Abb.]: Oberst Eduard Fischer. (427) [Abb.]: Auszug der Russen aus Czernowitz. (429) [Abb.]: Dr. Rudolf Graf Meran. (431) [Abb.]: Russischer Munitionspark auf dem Elisabethenplatz in Czernowitz, der nach dem Abzug der Russen von uns erbeutet wurde. (434) [Abb.]: Oberst Arintinow beim Einmarsch der Russen in Czernowitz. (435) [Abb.]: Erzbischöfliche Residenz in Czernowitz. (436) [Abb.]: Vom Magistrat der Stadt Czernowitz ausgegebenes Notgeld. (437) [2 Abb.]: Das Schloß in Panka vor und nach der Brandschatzung. (439) Die erste Belagerung von Przemysl. (441) [Abb.]: FZM. Daniel Freiherr von Salis-Soglio. (441) [Abb.]: Panorama von Przemysl. (442) [Abb.]: Panorama von Przemysl. (443) [Abb.]: FML. Hermann Kusmanek von Burgneustädten. (444) [Abb.]: Fliegerpost für Przemysl. (445) [Abb.]: Hauptmann Janko Svrljuga. (446) [Abb.]: General Radko Dimitriew. (447) [Abb.]: Mit Drahtverhau gesperrte Straße im Festungsgebiet. (448) [Abb.]: Nach dem Entsatz von Przemysl. Kundgebung der Bevölkerung vor dem Festungskommando; FML. Kusmanek bringt ein Hoch auf den Kaiser aus. ( - ) [Abb.]: FML. Arpád Tamásy von Fogaras. (451) Herbstfeldzug 1914 am San und an der Weichsel. (12. September bis 5. November.) (453) Neugruppierung der Verbündeten nach dem Einleitungsfeldzug. (12. September bis 3. Oktober.) (453) [Abb.]: GM. von Lilienhoff-Adelstein. (453) [Abb.]: Bosnisch-Hercegovinische Infanterie auf dem Marsche bei Eisna. (454) [Abb.]: FML. Peter Hofmann. (455) [Abb.]: Das Ungtal vom Uzsoker Paß. (456) [Abb.]: GdR. Erzherzog Joseph. (457) Vormarsch der Verbündeten an den San und die Weichsel (4. bis 9. Oktober). (458) [Abb.]: Ringplatz in Rzeszów. (459) [Abb.]: Ringplatz in Turka nach Abzug der Russen. (461) Einleitung der großen Kämpfe an der Front Stary Sambor - Warschau. (10. bis 12. Oktober.) (461) [Abb.]: Haubitzenbatterie vor der Magiera-Höhe an der Straße Hermanowice - Drozdowice am 16. Oktober 1914. (463) [Abb.]: GdK. Karl Tersztyánszky von Rádas. (464) [Abb.]: General v. Morgen. (Phot. R. Mohrmann, Lübeck.) (465) Schlacht bei Chyrów. (466) Abwehr des russischen Durchbruchsversuches. (13. bis 20. Oktober.) (466) [Abb.]: Flugzeug im Schrapnellfeuer (Fliegeraufnahme). (467) [Abb.]: Die gesprengte Eisenbahnbrücke bei Nowe Miasto. Infanterie passiert die Notbrücke im Artilleriefeuer am 16. Oktober 1914. (468) [Abb.]: Unterstände der Tiroler Landesschützen bei Tyszkowice. (469) Russische Flankenangriffe gegen die 2. Armee. (16. bis 20. Oktober.) (470) [Abb.]: FML. Johann Freiherr Karg von Bebenburg auf der Magurahähe im Gefecht bei Podbuz am 15. Oktober 1914. (471) Offensive des Karpathenkorps Hofmann (9. bis 22. Oktober.) (471) [Abb.]: Marktplatz in Stryi. (Phot. Leipziger Presse-Büro, Leipzig.) (472) Krise am Südflügel. (21. bis 27. Oktober.) (473) [Abb.]: Dorf Uzsok in Brand. (474) [Abb.]: Verwundetentransport auf der Legionenstraße im Pantyr-Paß. (475) [Abb.]: Der Jablonica- oder Tataren-Paß. (476) Kämpfe am San. Vorstöße der 4. Armee über den San (13. bis 17. Oktober.) (477) [Abb.]: Österreichisch-ungarische und deutsche Infanterie im Vormarsche. (477) Kämpfe in Russisch-Polen. Bereitstellung der 1. Armee zum Vorstoß gegen Iwangorod. (13. bis 21. Oktober.) (478) Kämpfe am San. Gegenangriffe der Russen. (18. bis 27. Oktober.) (480) [Karte]: Skizze zu den Kämpfen der 2. und 3. Armee im Raume um Chyrów (Schlacht bei Chyrów) 1914. ( - ) [Abb.]: Batterie-Telephonstelle im Gefecht. (481) Kämpfe in Russisch-Polen. Schlacht bei Iwangorod. (22. bis 27. Oktober.) (482) [Abb.]: Mühsamer Nachschub von Munition. (483) Schlacht bei Chyrów. Siegreiches Vordringen des Südflügesl der 2. Armee. (28. Oktober bis 2. November.) (485) [Abb.]: Eine Proviantkolonne vor Przemysl. (Phot. Ed. Frankl, Berlin-Friedenau.) (486) [Abb.]: FML. Vinzenz Fox. (487) Kämpfe in Russisch-Polen. (28. Oktober bis 5. November.) Schlacht an der Opatówka. (31. Oktober bis 2. November.) (487) [Abb.]: Sulejów, wo die Russen den Übergang über die Weichsel versuchten. (488) [Abb.]: Hauptplatz in Piotrków. (489) Abbrechen der Kämpfe in Galizien. (3. bis 5. November.) (490) [Abb.]: Husaren in Infanterie-Ausrüstung auf dem Marsche durch Delatyn. (492) Der Feldzug von Krakau. (6. November bis 17. Dezember 1914.) (493) Bereitstellung zum neuen Angriff. (493) [Abb.]: GdR. Leopold Freiherr von Hauer. (494) [Abb.]: Das Schloß in Krakau. (495) Schlacht bei Krakau. (15. bis 24. November.) (497) [Abb.]: Ruine Smolen [Smoleń] (Westseite) südlich von Pilica. Am Fuße russische Schützengräben. (498) [Abb.]: GdI. Josef Ritter Roth von Limanowa - Lapanów. (500) [Abb.]: FZM. Stephan Freiherr von Ljubicic [Ljubičić] mit seinem Generalstabschef Oberst Franz Riml. (501) [Abb.]: Oberst Viktor Severus Edler von Laubenfeld. (502) [Abb.]: Höhe 470 südwestlich Kotowice, Angriffsfeld der Kopal-Jäger. (503) Eingreifen der russischen 3. Armee in die Schlacht bei Krakau. (16. bis 24. November.) (505) [Abb.]: Blick auf Tarnów, (Phot. Stern & Schiele, Berlin.) (506) [Abb.]: Zusammenfluß der Weichsel und des Dunajec bei Opatowice. (507) [Abb.]: Major Karl Hauska. (508) Zweiter russischer Einbruch in Nordungarn. (15. November bis 2. Dezember.) (508) [Abb.]: Das Schloß in Homonna. (509) [Abb.]: FML. Alexander Szurmay. (511) Umgruppierung der k. u. k. 4. Armee. (25. November bis 2. Dezember.) (512) [Abb.]: Regimentskommandant J. Piludski. (513) Die Schlacht bei Limanowa - Lapanów. (3. bis 14. Dezember.) (514) [Abb.]: Platz in Limanowa. (516) [Abb.]: Eine 30,5 cm-Mörserbatterie auf dem Vormarsch. (519) [Abb.]: Maschinengewehr-Abteilung der I. Brigade der polnischen Legion. (525) [Abb.]: FZM. Karl Kuk. (528) [Karte]: Skizze zur Schlacht bei Limanowa - Lapanów 1914. ( - ) [Abb.]: Das Birkenwäldchen bei Limanowa. (529) [Abb.]: Oberst Othmar Muhr von Limanowa. (532) [Abb.]: GM. Desiderius Molnár von Péterfalva. (535) [Abb.]: Ordnen der Beute auf dem Schlachtfelde von Limanowa - Lapanów. (Welt-Preß-Photo, Wien.) (536) Vertreibung der Russen aus Nordungarn. (8. bis 12. Dezember.) (537) Treffen bei Belchatów. (1. bis 14. Dezember.) (540) [Abb.]: FML. Kasimir Freiherr von Lütgendorf. (541) Allgemeine Verfolgung der Russen. (15. bis 27. Dezember.) (542) [Abb.]: GdA. v. Gallwitz. (542) [Abb.]: Unterstände in einem Hohlwege bei Zaklicyn. (543) Die Kämpfe der Armeegruppe GdK. Freiherr v. Pflanzer-Baltin. Anfang November bis Ende Dezember 1914. (544) [Abb.]: GdK. Karl Freiherr v. Pflanzer-Baltin. (545) [Abb.]: Schützengräben der polnischen Legion bei Nadwórna. (546) Feldzug 1914 gegen Serbien und Montenegro. ([549]) Kriegsvorbereitungen. ([551]) [Abb.]: ([551]) [Abb.]: FZM. Oskar Potiorek. (552) [2 Abb.]: (1)GdI. Liborius Ritter v. Frank. (2)Die Eisenbahnbrücke Zemun - Belgrad, am 29. Juli von den Serben gesprengt. (553) Erste Offensive gegen Valjevo. (12. bis 23. August.) (554) [Abb.]: GdK. Freiherr Giesl von Gieslingen. (554) [Abb.]: Schwebender Steg über einen 7 Meter tiefen Sumpf in der Macva. (555) [Abb.]: Offiziere des Warasdiner Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 16, vor der Abreise auf den Kriegsschauplatz. (557) [Abb.]: General Petar Bojovic. (558) [Abb.]: Kriegsbrücke zwischen Sabac und Klenak; ein Dampfer wird durchgelassen. (559) Vorstoß der 6. Armee über den Lim und die Drina. (12. bis 22. August.) (559) Treffen bei Visegrad [Višegrad]. (20. und 21. August.) (560) [Abb.]: Rudo in Bosnien. (560) [Abb.]: Brücke von Visegrad [Višegrad], im Hintergrund der Panos. (561) Treffen bei Priboj. (20. bis 22. August.) (562) Einbruch der Serben in Syrmien und in das Banat. (6. bis 14. September.) (562) [2 Abb.]: (1)FML. Alfred Krauss. (2)Gefangene Serben. (563) [Abb.]: Gebirgsbatterie übersetzt die Drina am 8. September. (564) [Abb.]: Bataillon IV/8I der 6. Gebirgsbrigade durchfurtet die Drina am 8. September. (565) [Abb.]: Lipnicko brdo und Jagodnja. (567) Schlacht an der Drina. (14. bis 25. September.) (568) [Abb.]: Vlasenica. (569) [Abb.]: Serbische Uferbefestigung an der Save bei Sabac - von rückwärts gesehen. (570) [Abb.]: Fliegeraufnahme. 1. Straße nach Ravnje. 2. Vorbereitete zweite Linie. 3. Straße nach Vrbovac. 4. Laufgraben. 5. Hohlweg mit serbischer Infanterie. 6. Eigene Infanteriedeckungen. 7. Sumpf. 8. Eigene Sappen und Infanteriedeckung. 9. Straße nach Zasavica grn. (571) [Abb.]: In den Kämpfen um die Jagodnja zieht die Geschützbedeckung die Geschütze auf die Anhöhe. (572) [Abb.]: Erobertes serbisches Geschütz wird gegen den Feind verwendet. (573) Einbrüche der Serben und Montenegriner in Bosnien und in die Hercegovina. (7. August bis 17. Oktober.) (574) [Abb.]: Kampfgelände der 3. Gebirgsbrigade bei Avtovac. (575) [Abb.]: GM. Heinrich Pongrácz de Szent-Miklós et Ovár. (576) [Abb.]: Serben. 1. Kavallerist. 2. Infanterist. 3. Artillerie-Offizier. 4. und 5. Komitatschi. ( - ) [Abb.]: Der erbeutete "Lange Tom" in Bileca; die Offiziere und Mannschaft von der Einwohnerschaft mit Tüchern geschmückt. (577) [Abb.]: Ustipraca [Ustiprača]. (578) [Abb.]: Montenegrinische Gefangene von bosnischem Landsturm bewacht. (579) [Abb.]: Kalinovik. (580) [Abb.]: Krbljina. (581) Vertreibung des Feindes aus Bosnien. (18. bis 30. Oktober.) (582) [Abb.]: GdI. Michael Edler von Appel. (582) [2 Abb.]: (1)Vom 3. Bataillon des 6. k. ung. Landsturm-Infanterieregiments am 28. September bei Surcin [Surčin] zurückeroberte Geschütze. (2)Der Kalimegdan in Belgrad nach der Beschießung. (583) [2 Abb.]: Von den eigenen Truppen zerstörte Gendameriekaserne bei Gat. (584) Schlacht auf der Romanja planina. (585) [Abb.]: FZM. Wenzel Wurm. (585) [Abb.]: Bei Slap. Blick flußabwärts. (586) [Abb.]: Eine originelle "Ausräucherung". Um den Feind aus dem Walde zu vertreiben, wird der Boden mit Petroleum bespritzt und angezündet. (587) Siegreiche Beendigung der Schlacht an der Drina. (Mitte Oktober bis 9. November.) (589) [Abb.]: Befestigung bei Glusci [Glušci] in den Bitvasümpfen. (590) [Abb.]: Unterstände an der Drina bei Ernabara. (591) [Abb.]: Zerschossene Kirche von Sabac. (592) [Abb.]: Die Drina bei Staribrod. Blick flußaufwärts. ( - ) [Abb.]: Monitoren bei Petrovaradin. (593) [Abb.]: Drinaübergang bei Drinjaca. (594) [Abb.]: Proviantkolonne auf dem Marsche durch Sabac. (595) Einnahme von Valjevo. (10. bis 15. November.) (596) GdI. Adolf Freiherr von Rhemen zu Barensfeld. (597) [Abb.]: GL. Paul Jurisic (Sturm). (598) [Abb.]: Brücke über die Kolubara in Valjevo. (599) Einleitung zur Schlacht an der Kolubara. (16. bis 22. November.) (600) [Abb.]: Visegrad [Višegrad]. (601) [Abb.]: Von den Serben gesprengte Brücke über die Kolubara bei Slovac. (602) [Abb.]: Brückenschlag über die Kolubara. (603) Die Schlacht an der Kolubara. (23. bis 29. November.) (603) [Abb.]: Die 6. Gebirgsbrigade im Anmarsch auf den Rajac. (605) [Abb.]: Wald auf dem Rajac im Rauhreif am 25. November. (606) [Abb.]: Gefechtsfeld am Silijak [Šiljak] am 26. und 27. November. (607) [Abb.]: Montenegriner. 1. Infanterie-Hauptmann und Soldat. 2. Fahnenträger. 3. Leibgarde. 4. Landsturm. ( - ) Die Einnahme von Belgrad. (30. November bis 2. Dezember.) (609) [Abb.]: Dekorierung ungarischer Feldgendarmen im Hofe des Konaks in Belgrad. (610) [Abb.]: Petrovaradin. (611) Schlacht bei Arangjelovac. (3. bis 9. Dezember.) (611) [Abb.]: Kronprinz Alexander mit General Pau und Minister Pasic [Pašić]. (613) [Abb.]: Husaren auf dem Marsche auf grundlosen Wegen. (Phot. Ed. Frankl, Berlin-Friedenau.I (615) Zurücknahme der k. u. k. Balkanstreitkräfte hinter die Save. (10. bis 15. Dezember.) (617) [Abb.]: Sümpfe bei Obrenovac. (617) [Abb.]: Zemun. (618) Appendix ([621]) 1) Handschreiben Seiner Majestät des Kaisers und Königs anläßlich der Ermordung des Thronfolgers. ([623]) 2) Die Note an Serbien nebst dem beigefügten Memoire an die Großmächte. ([623]) 3) Das Kriegsmanifest des Kaisers und Königs Franz Joseph I. (626) 4) Notifizierung der österreichisch-ungarischen Kriegserklärung an die Mächte. (626) 5) Kriegssitzung des ungarischen Abgeordneten- und Magnatenhauses. (627) 6) Sitzung des Wiener Gemeinderates. (629) 7) Reden des deutschen Kaisers und des deutschen Reichskanzlers an die Berliner Bevölkerung. (629) 8) Telegrammwechsel zwischen Kaiser Wilhelm und dem Zaren. (630) 9) Thronrede des Deutschen Kaisers und Parlamentstagung. (631) 10) Kriegserklärung Österreich-Ungarns an Rußland. (635) 11) Armee- und Flottenbefehl des Kaisers und Königs Franz Joseph I. (635) 12) Armee- und Flottenbefehl des Deutschen Kaisers. 13) Kaiser Wilhelm an das deutsche Volk. 14) Aufruf an die Polen beim Ueberschreiten der Grenze. (636) 15) Telegrammwechsel zwischen Kaiser und König Franz Joseph I. und der Armee. (636) 16) Armeebefehl des Gen. d. R. Dankl nach der Schlacht bei Krasnik. 17. Depeschenwechsel zwischen Kaiser und König Franz Joseph I. und der Armee (anläßlich des a. h. Namensfestes 4. Oktober). (637) 18) Wochenbericht der Gemeinde Wien. (638) 19) handschreiben des Kaisers und Königs Franz Joseph I. an Graf Stürgkh anläßlich der Invasion in Galizien. (638) 20) Handschreiben des Kaisers und Königs Franz Joseph I. an Graf Tisza. (639) 21) Briefwechsel zwischen Graf Tisza und dem Metropoliten Metianu. (639) 22) Telegramm zwischen Kaiser und König Franz Joseph I. und dem Sultan. (640) [Abb.]: Kaiser Wilhelm ( - ) 23) Kriegserklärung des Sultans. (641) 24) Sitzung des ungarischen Magnatenhauses. (641) 25) Telegrammwechsel zwischen Erzherzog Friedrich und Hindenburg. (642) 26) Ungarischer Reichstag. (642) 27) Sitzung des Deutschen Reichstages. (644) 28) Depeschenwechsel zwischen dem deutschen Reichstagspräsidenten und dem ungarischen Angeordnetenhaus. 29) Depeschenwechsel zwischen Graf Berchtold und Bethmann Hollweg. (650) 30) Ansprache Kaiser Wilhelms. (650) 31) Dank und Armeebefehl des Feldmarschalls Erzherzog Friedrich. 32) Handschreiben des Kaisers und Königs an Gd I. Franz Frhr. Conrad von Hötzendorf. (651) 33) Thronrede des Sultans. (651) 34) Armee- und Flottenbefehl des Kaisers und Königs zum Jahresbeginn 1915. (652) [Abb.]: Waffensegen bei der Ausmusterung der neuernannten Offiziere aus der k. u. k. Franz Joseph-Militärakademie. Oktober 1914. (652) Kämpfe der Deutschen. ([653]) Deutsche. 1. Ulan. 2. Generalstabsoffizier. 3. Gardeinfanterist. 4. Garde-Maschinengewehr-Abteilung. 5. Matrose. 6. Landsturm. ( - ) [Abb.]: Das durch 42 cm-Mörser zerschossene Fort Loucin. (657) Im Westen. (658) Die ersten Kämpfe. (658) Die Ereignisse in Elsaß-Lothringen. (659) [Abb.]: Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern. (659) [Abb.]: Gen. Oberst von Kluck. (660) "Das Marne-Wunder." (660) [Abb.]: Gd I. von Beseler. (661) Der Fall Antwerpens. (661) Die Argonnen. (662) Die Kämpfe nach der Marneschlacht. - Um Calais! - Die Flut. (662) [Abb.]: Nach Abzug der belgischen Besatzung aus Antwerpen. (663) Der flandrische Wasserkrieg. - Dixmuden. - Gebirgskämpfe. - Joffres Offensivbefehl. (664) [Abb.]: Zerschossener Panzerturm vor Manbeuge. (665) Die ringenden Fronten bis Jahresschluss 1914. (665) Im Osten. (Bis Ende des Jahres 1914.) (666) [Abb.]: Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg und Generalleutnant Ludendorff. (667) [Abb.]: General Rennenkampf im "Dessauer Hof" in Insterburg. (669) [Abb.]: Das Schlachtfeld von Tannenberg mit dem Gedenkstein an die Schlacht vom 15. Juli 1914. (670) [Abb.]: G d K. von Mackensen. (673) In den Kolonien. (Bis Ende des Jahres 1914.) (674) [Tabelle]: Zu Beginn des Krieges umfaßten die deutschen Schutzgebiete die nachstehenden Flächeninhalte bzw. Bevölkerungsziffern: (674) [Abb.]: Deutsche Schutztruppe. (675) Togo. (676) [Abb.]: Teilansicht von Lome, der Hauptstadt der deutschen Kolonie Togo, die von den Engländern vorläufig besetzt wurde. (677) Kamerun. (678) [Abb.]: Deutsche Kamelreiter. (Photogr. Aufnahme von Gebrüder Haeckel, Berlin.) (680) Deutsch-Ostafrika (682) [Abb.]: Dar-es-Salam, die Hauptstadt von Deutsch-Ostafrika. (Photgr. Aufnahme von Gebrüder Haeckel, Berlin.) (683) [Abb.]: Oberleutnant von Lettow-Vorbeck. (684) [Abb.]: Oberleutnant von Heydebreck. (685) Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika (686) In der Südsee (687) [Abb.]: Patrouille im Swakoprevier. (Photogr. Aufnahme von Gebrüder Haeckel, Berlin.) (688) Krieg der Türkei. ([691]) [Abb.]: ([693]) [Abb.]: Verlesung des Fetwa im Hofe der Fath-Moschee. (695) [Abb.]: Abmarsch türkischer Infanterie aus Konstantinopel. (696) [Abb.]: Türkische Kavallerie, (699) [Abb.]: Türkisches Maschinengewehr. (700) [Abb.]: Kameltrain. (703) [Abb.]: Enver Damai Pascha. (705) Wien im Kriege. ([707]) Kriegserklärung. ([709]) [Abb.]: ([709]) [Abb.]: Kaiser und König Franz Joseph I. nach der Rückkehr von Ischl mit dem Erzherzog-Thronfolger Karl Franz Joseph. (710) [Abb.]: Armee-Oberkommandant FM. Erzherzog Friedrich nimmt vor dem Kriegsministerium die Defilierung eines ausmarschierenden Infanterie-Regiments ab. (711) Mobilisierung. (712) Das Gerücht. (712) Die Frauen und der Krieg. (713) [Abb.]: Erzherzogin Zita. (Phot. H. Kosel, Wien.) (714) [Abb.]: Erzherzogin Maria Josepha. (Phot. K. Pietzner, Wien.) (715) Kriegsfürsorge. (715) Das Rote Kreuz. (715) Das Reservespital. (716) Kriegshilfsbüros. (716) Kriegsfürsorgeamt. (717) [Abb.]: Erzherzogin Maria Theresia (Kilophot, Wien.) (717) Wohltätigkeit. (718) Beim Kader. (719) [Abb.]: Erzherzogin Marie Valerie, (Phot. K. Pietzner, Wien.) (719) [Abb.]: Das kaiserliche Luftschloß Schönbrunn. ( - ) Finanzwirtschaft. Kriegsanleihe. (721) [Abb.]: Wiener Pfadfinder sammeln Liebesgaben. (722) [Abb.]: Ausmarsch des k. u. k. Infanterie-Regiments Hoch- und Deutschmeister Nr. 4 aus Wien. (723) Die Jugend. (723) Feldpost. (724) Abmarsch ins Feld. (725) Bestellschein. ( - ) [3 Karten]: (1)Übersichtskarte zum Krieg gegen Rußland 1914 mit 2 Detailskizzen. (2)Skizze zur Schlacht bei Krakau (Südflügel) 1914. (3)Umgebung des Uzsoker Passes. ( - ) Einband ( - ) Einband ( - )

Inhaltsangabe: Introduction: Ghettos of poor and unemployed people, homeless people, families relying on food banks, sick people without health insurance. There is a long list of people which comes into our minds when we think about poverty and people who are affected by it. If we search for an exact definition of poverty we will not find a single, universally accepted standard definition of it. Poverty is hardly measurable. Every interpretation is affected by credos of value. The ethical correctness of these trails to valuate poverty is scientifically not concluding appraised. The European Union's working definition of poverty is: 'Persons, families and groups of persons whose resources (material, cultural and social) are so limited as to exclude them from the minimum acceptable way of life in the Member State to which they belong'. This definition is the basis of the valuations of poverty in this assignment. The variety of poverty shows how many groups of people in particular are at risk of becoming poor. In Germany the gap of income and the number of poor people in the society increased from the year 2000 to the year 2005 faster than in any other country of the OECD. Causes are the high unemployment rate in the year 2005 and a significant gap of income. Nobody can be excluded if we talk about the poor ones in future. High income during employment does not mean that there is enough money for times of unemployment or old-age-pension. When thinking about poverty we should never forget of what advantage it is to have a high old-age pension when you are lonesome and you have to pay for every help you need? Policy options have to be divided in to groups: Actions to prevent poverty. Actions to help people out of poverty. From a scientific point of view there is only one thing needed to stay out of poverty: enough money to sustain your expenditures. Therefore a well paid job is necessary. Minimum wages are a controversially discussed topic during the last months. Only an occupation with an adequate salary is good for covering all costs. Another crucial point is to secure the old age pensions. Due to this the Federal Government promotes a 3-layer programme. The tax policy is also a point which can be influenced by the state. Prevention of excessive indebtness and a adequate asset accumulation are also important topics. Proper education is a crucial point to prevent poverty and likewise the core measure to get out of poverty. Only good education opens the doors to the well paid jobs. Some social groups are usually not able to get out of poverty on their own. Therefore help is needed. Especially for single parents, families with many children, drug addicts and disabled people as well. Proper programmes for social housing or for improving language skills are often helpful for the poor. Here, the government has countless options to help people, but the realty is often different. In the fight against poverty the Federal government starts several actions to avoid and to help people out of poverty. The central statements behind these actions are: Every person should secure his life by gainful employment at first. Furthermore specific social transfer benefits should help to secure basic needs, especially for families. They directly stress the responsibility of the successful fight against poverty lying in the hands of everyone. Especially one aspect implied in the first statement is important for every citizen: Gainful employment, everyone himself is responsible for, gives the chance to secure life. In the past poverty and employment were inseparably connected and mutual exclusive. As employment was taken poverty was banned, in case of unemployment poverty threatened. Today especially the first statement is no longer true without restrictions. The effectiveness of employment as major driver in avoiding and helping out of poverty was weakened. The reason is the increase of low-wage employees. The belief gainful employment can always secure life is no longer true. The actual problem in Germany is a high amount of fully-employed people becoming poor. The expression 'working poor' describes working full-time in one and even more jobs earn wages under the existence minimum. Labour unions claim legal minimum wages in the different lines of business. The Confederation of German Employers BDA demands the negotiation of minimum wages by the bargaining parties, employer associations and labour unions. The free social market economy of Germany may not be influenced by law. The Federal Government established and renewed the 'Mindestarbeitsbedingungsgesetz' and 'Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz', which do not give legal minimum limits. The laws ease the establishment of minimum wages in business lines. Low wages and the difference of income are one reason of the gap between rich and poor. To even this income differences the federal government introduce the progressive income tax rate. It attenuates the inequality of the gross incomes. But the gap between rich and poor is only less affected by the tax policy. The other reason for the gap between rich and poor is the difference of assets. The gap increases because the middle-class decreases. More and more people become poor. Poor people are not able to establish coverage by accumulating asset. People who are able to accumulate asset need the right strategy. Capital investments offer different strategies to accumulate asset, from conservative to risky. In the actual financial crises many people and companies have lost much asset. The trust of savers in the banking system and especially in shares hits the rock bottom. Today every possibility to accumulate asset is questioned. The coverage in old-age was formerly granted by legal pensions. But legal pensions are no longer safe, as it was belief for a long time. The 'three-layer-concept' of retirement provision offers possibilities to close the increasing gap. The intention is to support the conventional public old-age pension by two additional layers. Nevertheless every layer and every kind of provision has its own particularities which should be considered. Poor and unemployed people are often threatened by indebtedness. Especially unemployed people are not able to pay back their bills and become excessively indebted soon. To leave this hopeless way debt relief and employment are the best means. In insolvency proceedings the debt relief is pronounced. From the year 2002 until now the annual increase of insolvency proceedings decreases. Additionally the average amount of indebtedness decreases in these years too. The basic requirement for employment and therefore a central driver to avoid and to help out of poverty is education. Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel proclaimed the 'Educational Republic of Germany'. One reason for her reaction is secondary general schools are in trouble. After graduation many youngsters stay in the transitional system for too long. They don't find a vocational education. Another reason is even the vocational education has a problem. The participation in the Dual System in the vocational education decreases from 51.2 percent to 42.6 percent in 2005. This is an alarming development. Although the tendency is declining in the year 2005 to 2006 the efficiency of the Dual System should be improved even more. Forecasts of the employment market show a growing demand for highly qualified employees between 2003 and 2020. The demand for low qualified people will reduce. According this forecast qualification and competence become the securing means of future, for everyone at anytime. This can only be granted by lifelong learning. Besides the stated major effects of policy options affecting the whole society there are some groups of people, which need special support: Single parents, families with many children, people addicted to drugs, homeless, disabled and migrated people are treated in detail.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: Executive SummaryI Table of contentsVI List of AbbreviationsIX List of FiguresX List of TablesXII 1.Introduction1 2.Problem Definition2 3.Objectives3 4.Methodology4 5.The Fight Against Poverty5 5.1Poverty – A Definition5 5.2How to Measure Poverty7 5.3The Variety of Poverty7 5.3.1Key Factors of the Risk of Becoming Poor7 5.3.2Poverty Among Poor Educated People8 5.3.3Child Poverty9 5.3.4Poverty of Seniors10 5.3.5Poverty Among Handicapped People12 6.The International Day for the Eradication of Poverty14 7.Poverty in Germany15 7.1The Risk-of-Poverty-Line in Germany15 7.2The Present Situation in Germany17 8.Prospective Poor People19 8.1Outsiders of Today are the Poor of Tomorrow19 8.2An Income Above the Average is No Relaxing Situation20 9.Policy Options Against Poverty21 9.1Actions to Avoid Poverty22 9.1.1Minimum Wages22 9.1.2Securing Pensions23 9.1.3Tax Policy27 9.1.4Asset Accumulation27 9.1.5Prevent Excessive Indebtedness28 9.1.6Education28 9.1.7Basic Education29 9.1.8Vocational Education29 9.1.9Lifelong Learning30 9.2Actions to Help People Out of Poverty30 9.2.1Education30 9.2.2Help for Single Parents31 9.2.3Language Skills32 9.2.4Aid for Families with Many Children32 9.2.5Help People Out of Drug-Addiction32 9.2.6Social Housing33 9.2.7Disabled People33 10.Reality – How Political Options Impact on Life The Status Quo – Facts35 10.1Policy Options to Avoid Poverty Impact Reality36 10.1.1Effects of the Policy Option 'Minimum Wages'38 10.1.2Effects of Policy Options to Secure Pensions41 10.1.3Effects of the Tax Policy45 10.1.4Effects of Asset Accumulation46 10.1.5Effects of Policy Options to Prevent Indebtedness48 10.1.6Effects of Policy Options to Improve Education50 10.1.7Basic Education in Reality51 10.1.8Vocational Education in Reality54 10.1.9Lifelong Learning in reality55 10.2Policy Options to Help out of Poverty Impact Reality56 10.2.1Education56 10.2.2Effects of Policy Options to Support Single Parents56 10.2.3Effects of Policy Options to Improve Language Skills57 10.2.4Effects of Policy Options to Support Families with Many Children59 10.2.5Effects of Policy Options Against Drug-Addiction60 10.2.6Effects of the Policy Option 'Social Housing'63 10.2.7Effects of Political Options to Support Disabled People65 11.Results68 12.Conclusion69 13.Integral Total Management (ITM) – Checklist70 13.1General Economics70 13.2Strategic Management70 13.3Marketing70 13.4Financial Management70 13.5Human Resources Management70 13.6Business Law70 13.7Research Methods/Management Decision Making70 13.8Soft Skills/Leadership71 14.Bibliography72Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 9.1.3, Tax Policy: Tax policy is the whole of tax actions of a state with policy objectives. Through tax policy the state pursuits the aim to generate income to cover all expenditures. The state is able to pursuit socio-political aims through tax reduction or tax increase. An effective instrument to even the income differences is in particular a progressive in-come tax rate. Within the tax reform of 2000 the Federal Government decreased the in-come tax rate radically. According to the judgement of the Federal Constitutional Court that the minimum living wage must be tax free, the German government increased the tax free level virtually every year. This goes along with a decrease of the marginal tax rate from 25.9% in 1998 to 15.0% in 2005. 9.1.4, Asset Accumulation: Having savings in the bank is a good way to avoid poverty. In times of unemployment citizens are able to draw money from the bank and cover the financial gaps without being dependent on public benefits. The Federal government offers mainly two types of investment: Savings. Acquisition of shares. These are both appropriate to accumulate assets on a long range. 9.1.5, Prevent Excessive Indebtedness: Debts are always a fast way to cross the poverty line! Therefore is very important to prevent indebtedness before it begins. In 2002 approx. 9% of all households in Germany were over-indebted. Debtors are often not able to solve the problem on their own. For that reason they need help. The government financed debt counselling and measures for debt relief. This came along with a programme to educate indebted people. 9.1.6, Education: The significance of education to prevent poverty is indisputable. School education and vocational qualification are the best way to participate on the job market as well as the best protection against unemployment and poverty. The European Union regards a graduation from secondary school as minimum qualification to participate in modern knowledge society and for the best prospects on the job market. In January 2008 the Federal Cabinet approved the draft law for the qualification initiative (i. e. Qualifizierungsinitiative). It mainly contains actions to: Improve education opportunities for children younger than six years of age. Improve the permeability in the education system. Improve the way to be promoted. Improve the options of further education. 9.1.7, Basic Education: Education does not start in school. Potentials of children should in fact be developed earlier and dependent on their age. Kindergartens, beside the family, have as places for infantile education a particular duty. In kindergartens talents – even from children of underprivileged families – may foster at an early stage and learning difficulties may be discovered early. Primary schools cover the first four years of schooling (in Berlin and Brandenburg six years). They are attended by all children and provide basic education, preparing children for secondary schools. At the end of primary school parents and teachers have to decide which type school the pupils should attend further on. Available are: Secondary general schools (i. e. Hauptschulen). Intermediate schools (i. e. Realschulen). Grammar schools (i. e. Gymnasien). Comprehensive schools (i. e. Gesamtschulen). Special schools (i. e. Förderschulen). This affects the life and future job options of the child profoundly. Therefore promotion of primary school pupils is essential. One out of eleven pupils in a grammar school lives in poverty, but every second in a secondary general school. Poverty is one causal reason for bad education. Out of 100 children who were considered to be poor during kindergarten only four manage to archive the entry qualification for grammar school – compared to 30 in well-off families. These are the results of a long term study by the Workers Welfare Federal Association from 1997 to 2005. 9.1.8, Vocational Education: A Certificate of Education (minimum: Certificate of Secondary Education / Hauptschulabschluss) is necessary to get a proper chance on the apprenticeship market. The Federal Government takes actions to educate juveniles in the dual system of vocational education to decrease the number of untrained youngsters. Because a qualified apprenticeship is crucial for partaking and fulfilment in the community and the best protection against the risk of unemployment and income poverty. 9.1.9, Lifelong Learning: Learning will not end after school, vocational training or university degree. Learning is an essential mean to shape an individual's chances in life. Lifelong learning is the keyword for coping with the job market, to finally get a school's or a vocational qualification or just for further training. Once archived qualifications are less and less sufficient to cope with the challenge of business and community. Continuing learning all lifelong is becoming more and more important to secure the participating on the job market permanently. The partaking in further education is low in Germany - compared to other countries. In particular, people with lower qualification do not take part in further qualification sufficiently. 9.2, Actions to Help People Out of Poverty: 13.5 % citizens of the total population live below the poverty line. These need help to become better off and – even more important – stay below the line. 9.2.1, Education: As stated in chapter 9.1.6 proper education is the best way to prevent poverty, but it's also a lasting way to get out of it. People with no or only basic education have a strictly limited access to well paid jobs or no access jobs at all. In 2006 7.9 % of all pupils left school without any graduation. However, without any graduation the prospects of an apprenticeship are very small. Thereby the vicious circle of poverty starts turning. The government provides different measures to help juveniles and adults to improve their education: Help to get the Certificate of Secondary Education (i. e. Hauptschulabschluss). Help to get an apprenticeship. Help to make the change from Secondary Education to higher education entrance qualification easier. Olaf Scholz (Secretary of State for Employment) even recommended a legal claim to achieve a Certificate of Secondary Education. This should be financed by the Federal Employment Office. But he wasn't able to convince the CDU-parliamentary group.

Plus d'une décennie après son adoption dans les universités de l'Afrique francophone, la réforme Licence-Master-Doctorat (LMD) n'a pas résolu les difficultés d'insertion professionnelle des diplômés tant espérée (Qachar et al., 2020). Malgré la professionnalisation des offres de formation, le problème d'insertion professionnelle des diplômés de l'enseignement supérieur demeure préoccupant (Pari et al., 2020). La situation met au cœur des débats trois paradoxes importants soulignés par l'OCDE (2016). D'abord, le taux de chômage des diplômés de l'enseignement supérieur connait un accroissement vertigineux alors que les entreprises se plaignent du manque de main-d'œuvre qualifiée. Ensuite, l'observation des secteurs d'enseignement au Togo montre que, plus on avance dans la scolarité, plus le taux de chômage augmente. Enfin, à l'étude on découvre que les diplômés des universités privées s'insèrent relativement mieux que leurs homologues des universités publiques. Ces paradoxes soulèvent la question de l'adéquation formation-emploi, la valorisation des compétences professionnelles des diplômés de l'enseignement supérieur et semblent mettre aussi en exergue l'influence du type d'université fréquentée par rapport à l'insertion professionnelle des diplômés sur le marché de l'emploi. Quels sont les facteurs qui expliquent ces paradoxes et influencent l'insertion professionnelle des diplômés des universités du Togo? Telle est la question qui était au cœur de cette recherche. Plusieurs avenues s'offraient à nous pour y répondre. Dans une approche méthodologique mixte, nous avons choisi en premier lieu d'examiner d'abord l'effet de l'université de provenance comme facteur prédictif de l'insertion professionnelle inégalitaire des diplômés des universités du Togo. Ensuite, nous avons analysé les facteurs relatifs au capital humain et au capital social et les caractéristiques individuelles des diplômés. Enfin, nous avons comparé l'insertion professionnelle des diplômés de l'université de Lomé et de l'université catholique du Togo. En deuxième lieu nous avons interviewé les diplômés et les employeurs. Selon les résultats de nos analyses, il existe un lien statistiquement significatif entre le capital humain et social dont disposent les diplômés et la probabilité d'avoir un emploi dans leur domaine d'étude. Ce lien se remarque aussi par rapport au contrat plus ou moins sécuritaire que les diplômés des deux universités signent dans leur emploi avec le salaire qu'ils reçoivent mensuellement. Les caractéristiques sociales individuelles, le capital humain et social des diplômés de l'UL et de l'UCAO-UUT influencent leur insertion professionnelle sur le marché de l'emploi du Togo. Mais c'est le domaine d'étude qui semble mieux expliquer le type de contrat de travail et le salaire des diplômés. Si les résultats indiquent que la fréquentation d'une université est fortement liée à l'origine sociale du diplômé surtout à la catégorie socioprofessionnelle du père, ceux-ci n'indiquent pas suffisamment le lien associatif direct entre l'établissement de provenance et l'insertion professionnelle des diplômés. Cependant, les résultats révèlent une forte relation entre le capital humain, notamment le niveau d'étude et le domaine d'étude sur le salaire. Les diplômes de Licence et de Master de l'université catholique du Togo sont majoritairement plus valorisés du point de vue salarial que les diplômes de Licence et de Master de l'université de Lomé. Cette différence est davantage liée à l'origine sociale des diplômés et, par ricochet, à l'influence de leur capital social mobilisé qu'à l'effet de l'établissement de provenance. Ces résultats confirment les deux hypothèses à l'étude. ; More than a decade after its adoption by Universities in French speaking Africa, the Bachelor, Master, and Doctorate education reform has not resolved the challenges University graduates face in joining the workforce as expected (Qachar et al., 2020). Despite the professionalization of the training programs offered, the problem of workforce integration by higher education graduates remains worrying (Pari et al., 2020). It (the problem) puts at the center of the debate, three important paradoxes, as indicated by the OCDE (2016). First, unemployment rate of higher education graduates is dramatically increasing, when at the same time businesses are complaining of lack of qualified labor. Moreover, a look at the education sector in Togo reveals that, the more schooling rate increases, the more unemployment rate increases. Finally, this study discovers that graduates from private universities are fairly doing better at integrating the workforce than their public university counterparts. Those paradoxes not only raise the problem of training not matching employment, but also that of how the skills of higher education graduates are valued and it seems to shine a light on the issue of the type of university attended determining the integration of graduates into the workforce. What are some of the factors that explain these paradoxes and are influencing the Togo university graduates' integration into the workforce? That was the question at the center of this research. There were many avenues we could take to respond to it. However, we chose to first examine the effect of the university attended as a predictive factor of the Togo university graduates' unequal integration into the workforce. According to the results of our analyses, there's a statistically significant correlation between the human and social capital that the graduates possess and the probability of them getting a job in their are of specialization. This correlation is demonstrated by the more or less safe employment contract that graduates from the two universities sign and the monthly salary they receive. The individual and social characteristics and the human and social capital of the graduates of the public Lome University and the UCAO-UUT influence their integration into the Togo workforce. But the area of specialization seems to better explain the type of employment contract and monthly salary the graduates receive. If the results indicate that the university attended is closely related to the social origin of the graduate, especially the career type of the father, it does not however clearly indicate the direct link between the university attended and the graduates' workforce integration. However, the results reveal a strong influence of the human capital, especially the level of education and major, on the salary received. The Bachelor's and Master's degrees of graduates from the Togo Catholic University are more valued in terms of salary than the Bachelor's and Master's degrees of Lome University. The said difference is more related to the social origin of the graduates, and indirectly the social capital they brought, than the influence of the university attended. Those results support the two hypotheses of this research. ; Seit mehr als zehn Jahren, wurde die Hochschulreform LMD (Licence, Master, Doctorat) in den französischsprachen Ländern Afrikas eingeführt. Die dadurch erhoffte Erleichterung des Einstiegs im Berufsleben von Absolventen hat nicht stattgefunden (Qachar et al., 2020). Trotz der praktischen Orientierung der Bildungsangebote, bleibt das Problem des Berufseinstiegs von Absolventen besorgniseregend (Pari et al., 2020). Das Problem bring drei wichtige Gegensätze ins Licht, die 2016 von der OECD hervorgehoben wurden. Erstens, steigt die Zahl der arbeitslosen Hochschulabsolventen an, während Unternehmen qualifizierte Arbeitskräfte suchen. Eine genaue Beobachtung des Bildungssektors in Togo zeigt, dass je hocher der Bildungsstand ist, umso grösser wird die Zahl der Arbeitslosen. Schließlich stellt die Arbeit fest, dass Absolventen privater Universitäten sich relativ besser ihren Weg in den Arbeitsmarkt finden als Absolventen staatlicher Universitäten. Diese Erkenntnisse werfen die Frage nach dem Einklang zwischen Bildung und Beschäftigung, und der Verbesserung der beruflichen Kompetenzen von Hochschulabsolventen auf. Sie heben gleichzeitig den Einfluss der besuchten Universität auf den Einstieg in den Arbeitsmarkt von Absolventen hervor. Diese Arbeit geht daher folgender Frage nach: wie lassen sich diese Gegensätze erklären und welche Faktoren beeinflussen den Einstieg ins Berufsleben von Hochschulabsolventen in Togo? Um dieser Frage nachzugehen, standen uns mehrere Möglichkeiten zur Verfügung. Wir haben uns jedoch entschieden, zunächst die Auswirkungen der Universität von der der Absolvent kommt als vorherrsehbarer ungleicher Einstieg ins Berufsleben von Hochschulabsolventen in Togo zu untersuchen. Ferner erörterten wir Faktoren in Bezug auf Human- und Sozialkapital und die persönlichen Fähigkeiten von Absolventen. Anschließend haben wir den Einstieg ins Berufsleben von Absolventen der université de Lomé und université catholique du Togo verglichen. Die Ergebnisse unserer Untersuchung zeigen, dass es statistisch gesehen ein signifikanter Zusammenhang zwischen dem Human- und Sozialkapital, das den Absolventen zur Verfügung steht, und der Wahrscheinlichkeit, eine Stelle zu finden, die ihrem Studienabschluss entspricht, gibt. Dieser Zusammenhang lässt sich ebenfalls zwischen dem relativ unsicheren Arbeitvertrag, die die Absolventen beider Universitäten unterschreiben und ihrer monatlichen Vergütung, beobachten. Die sozialen Eigenschaften und das Human- und Sozialkapital der Absolventen von université de Lomé (UL) und université catholique du Togo (UCOA-UUT) haben einen Einfluss auf ihren Einstieg in den Arbeitsmarkt in Togo. Die Art des Arbeitsvertrags und des Gehalts hängen jedoch mit dem Studienfach der Absolventen zusammen. Unsere Untersuchung konnte zeigen, dass der Besuch einer Universität stark von der sozialen Herkunft des Absolventen, insbesondere von der Berufsgruppe des Vaters abhängt. Sie deutet aber nicht ausreichend auf den direkten Zusammenhang zwischen der besuchten Hochschule und dem Einstieg ins Berufsleben hin. Die Ergebnisse zeigen jedoch, dass es einen starken Zusammenhang zwischen dem Humankapital, besonders dem Bildungsniveau und dem Studienfach gibt, der das Gehalt beeinflusst. Die Licence - und Master-Abschlüsse der université catholique du Togo werden auf dem Arbeitsmarkt meist höher bewertet als dieselben von université de Lomé, wenn es um das Gehaltsniveau geht. Dieser Unterschied hängt mehr mit der sozialen Herkunft der Absolventen, und zwar mit dem Einfluss ihres mobilisierten Sozialkapitals zusammen als mit der Wirkung ihrer Herkunftsinstitution. Die beiden untersuchten Hypothesen werden von den Ergebnissen bestätigt. ; Más de una década después de su adopción en universidades de África francófona, la reforma Licencia-Maestría-Doctorado (LMD) no ha resuelto las dificultades de integración profesional tan esperada de los graduados (Qachar et al., 2020). A pesar de la profesionalización de la oferta de formación, el problema de la integración profesional de los graduados de la educación superior sigue siendo preocupante (Pari et al., 2020). El problema coloca en el centro del debate tres paradojas importantes destacadas por la OCDE (2016). Primero, la tasa de desempleo de los graduados de educación superior se está disparando a medida que las empresas se quejan de la falta de mano de obra calificada. Luego, la observación de los sectores educativos en Togo muestra que cuanto más avanzamos en la educación, más aumenta la tasa de desempleo. Finalmente, el estudio encuentra que los graduados de universidades privadas se integran relativamente mejor que sus contrapartes de universidades públicas. Estas paradojas plantean la cuestión de la correspondencia entre formación y empleo, la mejora de las competencias profesionales de los graduados de educación superior y también parecen poner de relieve la influencia del tipo de universidad frecuentada en relación con la integración profesional de los graduados en el mercado laboral. ¿Cuáles son los factores que explican estas paradojas e influyen en la integración profesional de los graduados universitarios en Togo? Esta es la pregunta central de esta investigación. Contamos con varias vías para responder a esta pregunta. Sin embargo, decidimos examinar primero el efecto de la universidad de origen como predictor de la integración profesional desigual de los graduados universitarios en Togo. A continuación, analizamos los factores relacionados con el capital humano y social y las características individuales de los graduados. Luego comparamos la integración profesional de los graduados de la Universidad de Lomé y de la Universidad Católica de Togo. Según los resultados de nuestros análisis, existe una asociación estadísticamente significativa entre el capital humano y social disponible para los graduados y la probabilidad de tener un empleo en su campo de estudio. Esta asociación también ha destacado en relación al contrato más o menos seguro que los graduados de las dos universidades firman en sus puestos de trabajo con el salario mensual. Las características sociales individuales, el capital humano y social de los graduados de UL y UCOA UUT influyen en su integración profesional en el mercado laboral en Togo, pero el campo de estudio parece explicar mejor el tipo de contrato laboral y el salario de los graduados. Si los resultados indican que la formación en una universidad está fuertemente ligada al origen social del graduado, especialmente a la categoría socioprofesional del padre, no indica suficientemente el vínculo asociativo directo entre la universidad de origen y la integración profesional de los graduados. Pero los resultados revelan una fuerte relación entre el capital humano, especialmente el nivel educativo y el campo de estudio, sobre el salario. Los diplomas de licenciatura y maestría de la Universidad Católica de Togo son en su mayoría más valorados en términos de salario que los diplomas de licenciatura y maestría de la Universidad de Lomé. Esta diferencia está más relacionada con el origen social de los graduados y por extensión con la influencia de su capital social movilizado que con el efecto de la institución de origen. Estos resultados confirman las dos hipótesis en estudio. ; Più di un decennio dopo la sua adozione nelle università dell'Africa francofona, la riforma Laurea-Master-Dottorato (LMD), non ha risolto le difficoltà di inserimento professionale dei laureati tanto sperato (Qachar et al., 2020). Nonostante la professionalizzazione delle offerte di formazione, il problema dell'inserimento professionale dei diplomati dell'istruzione superiore resta preoccupante (Pari et al., 2020). Questa situazione mette al centro dei dibattiti tre paradossi importanti sottolineati dall'OCSE (2016). In primo luogo, il tasso di disoccupazione dei diplomati dell'istruzione superiore registra un aumento vertiginoso, mentre le imprese si lamentano della mancanza di manodopera qualificata. In secondo luogo, l'osservazione dei settori d'insegnamento in Togo mostra che più si avanza nella scolarità più alto è il tasso di disoccupazione. Infine, lo studio scopre che i laureati delle università private si inseriscono relativamente meglio dei loro omologhi delle università pubbliche. Questi paradossi sollevano la questione dell'adeguatezza della formazione.L'Istituto di Studi Professionali, che si occupa della valorizzazione delle competenze professionali dei diplomati dell'Istruzione Superiore, sembra porre in evidenza anche l'influenza del tipo di università frequentata rispetto all'inserimento professionale dei diplomati sul mercato del lavoro. Quali sono i fattori che spiegano questi paradossi e influenzano l'inserimento professionale dei laureati delle università del Togo? Questa è la domanda che era al centro di questa ricerca. Diverse strade si offrivano a noi per rispondervi. Tuttavia, abbiamo scelto di esaminare in primo luogo l'effetto dell'università di provenienza come fattore predittivo dell'inserimento professionale diseguale dei laureati delle università del Togo. In secondo luogo, abbiamo analizzato i fattori relativi al capitale umano e al capitale sociale e le caratteristiche individuali dei laureati. Infine abbiamo confrontato l'inserimento professionale dei laureati dell'Università di Lomé e dell'Università cattolica del Togo. Secondo i risultati delle nostre analisi, esiste un'associazione statisticamente significativa tra il capitale umano e sociale di cui dispongono i diplomati e la probabilità di avere un impiego nel loro campo di studio. Questa associazione ha anche notato in relazione al contratto più o meno sicuro che i laureati delle due università firmano nel loro lavoro con lo stipendio che ricevono mensilmente. Le caratteristiche sociali individuali, il capitale umano e sociale dei diplomati dell'UL e dell'UCAO-UUT influenzano il loro inserimento professionale sul mercato del lavoro del Togo. Ma il campo di studio sembra meglio spiegare il tipo di contratto di lavoro e lo stipendio dei laureati. Se i risultati indicano che la frequentazione di un'università è fortemente legata all'origine sociale del laureato soprattutto alla categoria socio-professionale del padre, non indica a sufficienza il legame associativo diretto tra lo stabilimento di provenienza e l'inserimento professionale dei diplomati. Ma i risultati rivelano una forte relazione tra il capitale umano, in particolare il livello di studio e il campo di studio sul salario. I diplomi di Laurea e di Master dell'Università cattolica del Togo sono in maggioranza più valorizzati dal punto di vista salariale rispetto ai diplomi di Laurea e di Master dell'Università di Lomé. Questa differenza è più legata all'origine sociale dei diplomati e all'influenza del loro capitale sociale mobilitato che all'effetto dello stabilimento di provenienza. Questi risultati confermano le due ipotesi in esame. Parole chiave: inserimento professionale; laureati, LMD; capitale umano; capitale sociale, caratteristiche sociali individuali, mercato del lavoro, Togo, università, istruzione superiore.

Full list of authors: Akiyama, Kazunori; Algaba, Juan Carlos; Alberdi, Antxon; Alef, Walter; Anantua, Richard; Asada, Keiichi; Azulay, Rebecca; Baczko, Anne-Kathrin; Ball, David; Baloković, Mislav; Barrett, John; Benson, Bradford A.; Bintley, Dan; Blackburn, Lindy; Blundell, Raymond; Boland, Wilfred; Bouman, Katherine L.; Bower, Geoffrey C.; Boyce, Hope Bremer, Michael; Brinkerink, Christiaan D.; Brissenden, Roger; Britzen, Silke; Broderick, Avery E.; Broguiere, Dominique; Bronzwaer, Thomas; Byun, Do-Young; Carlstrom, John E.; Chael, Andrew; Chan, Chi-kwan; Chatterjee, Shami; Chatterjee, Koushik; Chen, Ming-Tang; Chen, Yongjun; Chesler, Paul M.; Cho, Ilje; Christian, Pierre; Conway, John E.; Cordes, James M.; Crawford, Thomas M.; Crew, Geoffrey B.; Cruz-Osorio, Alejandro; Cui, Yuzhu; Davelaar, Jordy; De Laurentis, Mariafelicia; Deane, Roger; Dempsey, Jessica; Desvignes, Gregory; Dexter, Jason; Doeleman, Sheperd S.; Eatough, Ralph P.; Falcke, Heino; Farah, Joseph; Fish, Vincent L.; Fomalont, Ed; Ford, H. Alyson; Fraga-Encinas, Raquel; Freeman, William T.; Friberg, Per; Fromm, Christian M.; Fuentes, Antonio; Galison, Peter; Gammie, Charles F.; García, Roberto; Gentaz, Olivier; Georgiev, Boris; Goddi, Ciriaco; Gold, Roman; Gómez, José L.; Gómez-Ruiz, Arturo I.; Gu, Minfeng; Gurwell, Mark; Hada, Kazuhiro; Haggard, Daryl; Hecht, Michael H.; Hesper, Ronald; Ho, Luis C.; Ho, Paul; Honma, Mareki; Huang, Chih-Wei L.; Huang, Lei; Hughes, David H.; Ikeda, Shiro; Inoue, Makoto; Issaoun, Sara; James, David J.; Jannuzi, Buell T.; Janssen, Michael; Jeter, Britton; Jiang, Wu; Jimenez-Rosales, Alejandra; Johnson, Michael D.; Jorstad, Svetlana; Jung, Taehyun; Karami, Mansour; Karuppusamy, Ramesh; Kawashima, Tomohisa; Keating, Garrett K.; Kettenis, Mark; Kim, Dong-Jin; Kim, Jae-Young; Kim, Jongsoo; Kim, Junhan; Kino, Motoki; Koay, Jun Yi; Kofuji, Yutaro; Koch, Patrick M.; Koyama, Shoko; Kramer, Michael; Kramer, Carsten; Krichbaum, Thomas P.; Kuo, Cheng-Yu; Lauer, Tod R.; Lee, Sang-Sung; Levis, Aviad; Li, Yan-Rong; Li, Zhiyuan; Lindqvist, Michael; Lico, Rocco; Lindahl, Greg; Liu, Jun; Liu, Kuo; Liuzzo, Elisabetta; Lo, Wen-Ping; Lobanov, Andrei P.; Loinard, Laurent; Lonsdale, Colin; Lu, Ru-Sen; MacDonald, Nicholas R.; Mao, Jirong; Marchili, Nicola; Markoff, Sera; Marrone, Daniel P.; Marscher, Alan P.; Martí-Vidal, Iván; Matsushita, Satoki; Matthews, Lynn D.; Medeiros, Lia; Menten, Karl M.; Mizuno, Izumi; Mizuno, Yosuke; Moran, James M.; Moriyama, Kotaro; Moscibrodzka, Monika; Müller, Cornelia; Musoke, Gibwa; Mejías, Alejandro Mus; Michalik, Daniel; Nadolski, Andrew; Nagai, Hiroshi; Nagar, Neil M.; Nakamura, Masanori; Narayan, Ramesh; Narayanan, Gopal; Natarajan, Iniyan; Nathanail, Antonios; Neilsen, Joey; Neri, Roberto; Ni, Chunchong; Noutsos, Aristeidis; Nowak, Michael A.; Okino, Hiroki; Olivares, Héctor; Ortiz-León, Gisela N.; Oyama, Tomoaki; Özel, Feryal; Palumbo, Daniel C. M.; Park, Jongho; Patel, Nimesh; Pen, Ue-Li; Pesce, Dominic W.; Piétu, Vincent; Plambeck, Richard; PopStefanija, Aleksandar; Porth, Oliver; Pötzl, Felix M.; Prather, Ben; Preciado-López, Jorge A.; Psaltis, Dimitrios; Pu, Hung-Yi; Ramakrishnan, Venkatessh; Rao, Ramprasad; Rawlings, Mark G.; Raymond, Alexander W.; Rezzolla, Luciano; Ricarte, Angelo; Ripperda, Bart; Roelofs, Freek; Rogers, Alan; Ros, Eduardo; Rose, Mel; Roshanineshat, Arash; Rottmann, Helge; Roy, Alan L.; Ruszczyk, Chet; Rygl, Kazi L. J.; Sánchez, Salvador; Sánchez-Arguelles, David; Sasada, Mahito; Savolainen, Tuomas; Schloerb, F. Peter; Schuster, Karl-Friedrich; Shao, Lijing; Shen, Zhiqiang; Small, Des; Sohn, Bong Won; SooHoo, Jason; Sun, He; Tazaki, Fumie; Tetarenko, Alexandra J.; Tiede, Paul; Tilanus, Remo P. J.; Titus, Michael; Toma, Kenji; Torne, Pablo; Trent, Tyler; Traianou, Efthalia; Trippe, Sascha; van Bemmel, Ilse; van Langevelde, Huib Jan; van Rossum, Daniel R.; Wagner, Jan; Ward-Thompson, Derek; Wardle, John; Weintroub, Jonathan; Wex, Norbert; Wharton, Robert; Wielgus, Maciek; Wong, George N.; Wu, Qingwen; Yoon, Doosoo; Young, André; Young, Ken; Younsi, Ziri; Yuan, Feng; Yuan, Ye-Fei; Zensus, J. Anton; Zhao, Guang-Yao; Zhao, Shan-Shan; Event Horizon Telescope Collaboration.--Original content from this work may be used under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 licence. Any further distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the title of the work, journal citation and DOI. ; In 2017 April, the Event Horizon Telescope (EHT) observed the near-horizon region around the supermassive black hole at the core of the M87 galaxy. These 1.3 mm wavelength observations revealed a compact asymmetric ring-like source morphology. This structure originates from synchrotron emission produced by relativistic plasma located in the immediate vicinity of the black hole. Here we present the corresponding linear-polarimetric EHT images of the center of M87. We find that only a part of the ring is significantly polarized. The resolved fractional linear polarization has a maximum located in the southwest part of the ring, where it rises to the level of ∼15%. The polarization position angles are arranged in a nearly azimuthal pattern. We perform quantitative measurements of relevant polarimetric properties of the compact emission and find evidence for the temporal evolution of the polarized source structure over one week of EHT observations. The details of the polarimetric data reduction and calibration methodology are provided. We carry out the data analysis using multiple independent imaging and modeling techniques, each of which is validated against a suite of synthetic data sets. The gross polarimetric structure and its apparent evolution with time are insensitive to the method used to reconstruct the image. These polarimetric images carry information about the structure of the magnetic fields responsible for the synchrotron emission. Their physical interpretation is discussed in an accompanying publication. © 2021. The Author(s). Published by the American Astronomical Society. ; The authors of the present Letter thank the following organizations and programs: the Academy of Finland (projects 274477, 284495, 312496, 315721); the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung; Agencia Nacional de Investigacion y Desarrollo (ANID), Chile via NCN19_058 (TITANs), and Fondecyt 3190878; an Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship; Allegro, the European ALMA Regional Centre node in the Netherlands, the NL astronomy research network NOVA and the astronomy institutes of the University of Amsterdam, Leiden University and Radboud University; the black hole Initiative at Harvard University, through a grant (60477) from the John Templeton Foundation; the China Scholarship Council; Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia (CONACYT, Mexico, projects U0004-246083, U0004-259839, F0003-272050, M0037-279006, F0003-281692, 104497, 275201, 263356); the Delaney Family via the Delaney Family John A. Wheeler Chair at Perimeter Institute; Direccion General de Asuntos del Personal Academico-Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (DGAPA-UNAM, projects IN112417 and IN112820); the EACOA Fellowship of the East Asia Core Observatories Association; the European Research Council Synergy Grant "BlackHoleCam: Imaging the Event Horizon of Black Holes" (grant 610058); the Generalitat Valenciana postdoctoral grant APOSTD/2018/177 and GenT Program (project CIDEGENT/2018/021); MICINN Research Project PID2019-108995GB-C22; the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (grants GBMF-3561, GBMF-5278); the Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (INFN) sezione di Napoli, iniziative specifiche TEONGRAV; the International Max Planck Research School for Astronomy and Astrophysics at the Universities of Bonn and Cologne; Joint Princeton/Flatiron and Joint Columbia/Flatiron Postdoctoral Fellowships, research at the Flatiron Institute is supported by the Simons Foundation; the Japanese Government (Monbukagakusho: MEXT) Scholarship; the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Research Fellowship (JP17J08829); the Key Research Program of Frontier Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS, grants QYZDJ-SSW-SLH057, QYZDJSSW-SYS008, ZDBS-LY-SLH011); the Leverhulme Trust Early Career Research Fellowship; the Max-PlanckGesellschaft (MPG); the Max Planck Partner Group of the MPG and the CAS; the MEXT/JSPS KAKENHI (grants 18KK0090, JP18K13594, JP18K03656, JP18H03721, 18K03709, 18H01245, 25120007); the Malaysian Fundamental Research Grant Scheme (FRGS) FRGS/1/2019/STG02/UM/02/6; the MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI) Funds; the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) of Taiwan (105-2112-M-001025-MY3, 106-2112-M-001-011, 106-2119-M-001-027, 1072119-M-001-017, 107-2119-M-001-020, 107-2119-M-110-005, 108-2112-M-001-048, and 109-2124-M-001-005); the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA, Fermi Guest Investigator grant 80NSSC20K1567 and 80NSSC20K1567, NASA Astrophysics Theory Program grant 80NSSC20K0527, NASA NuSTAR award 80NSSC20K0645, NASA grant NNX17AL82G, and Hubble Fellowship grant HST-HF251431.001-A awarded by the Space Telescope Science Institute, which is operated by the Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy, Inc. , for NASA, under contract NAS5-26555); the National Institute of Natural Sciences (NINS) of Japan; the National Key Research and Development Program of China (grant 2016YFA0400704, 2016YFA0400702); the National Science Foundation (NSF, grants AST-0096454, AST-0352953, AST0521233, AST-0705062, AST-0905844, AST-0922984, AST1126433, AST-1140030, DGE-1144085, AST-1207704, AST1207730, AST-1207752, MRI-1228509, OPP-1248097, AST1310896, AST-1337663, AST-1440254, AST-1555365, AST1615796, AST-1715061, AST-1716327, AST-1716536, OISE1743747, AST-1816420, AST-1903847, AST-1935980, AST2034306); the Natural Science Foundation of China (grants 11573051, 11633006, 11650110427, 10625314, 11721303, 11725312, 11933007, 11991052, 11991053); a fellowship of China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (2020M671266); the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC, including a Discovery Grant and the NSERC Alexander Graham Bell Canada Graduate Scholarships-Doctoral Program); the National Research Foundation of Korea (the Global PhD Fellowship Grant: grants 2014H1A2A1018695, NRF2015H1A2A1033752, 2015-R1D1A1A01056807, the Korea Research Fellowship Program: NRF-2015H1D3A1066561, Basic Research Support grant 2019R1F1A1059721); the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) VICI award (grant 639.043.513) and Spinoza Prize SPI 78-409; the New Scientific Frontiers with Precision Radio Interferometry Fellowship awarded by the South African Radio Astronomy Observatory (SARAO), which is a facility of the National Research Foundation (NRF), an agency of the Department of Science and Innovation (DSI) of South Africa; the South African Research Chairs Initiative of the Department of Science and Innovation and National Research Foundation; the Onsala Space Observatory (OSO) national infrastructure, for the provisioning of its facilities/observational support (OSO receives funding through the Swedish Research Council under grant 2017-00648) the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics (research at Perimeter Institute is supported by the Government of Canada through the Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development and by the Province of Ontario through the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Science); the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion (grants PGC2018-098915-B-C21, AYA2016-80889-P; PID2019108995GB-C21, PGC2018-098915-B-C21); the State Agency for Research of the Spanish MCIU through the "Center of Excellence Severo Ochoa" award for the Instituto de Astrofisica de Andalucia (SEV-2017-0709); the State Agency for Research of the Spanish MCIU through the "Center of Excellence Severo Ochoa" award for the Instituto de Astrofisica de Andalucia (SEV-2017-0709); the Toray Science Foundation; the Consejeria de Economia, Conocimiento, Empresas y Universidad of the Junta de Andalucia (grant P18-FR-1769), the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (grant 2019AEP112); the US Department of Energy (USDOE) through the Los Alamos National Laboratory (operated by Triad National Security, LLC, for the National Nuclear Security Administration of the USDOE (Contract 89233218CNA000001); the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No 730562 RadioNet; ALMA North America Development Fund; the Academia Sinica; Chandra TM6-17006X; Chandra award DD7-18089X. This work used the Extreme Science and Engineering Discovery Environment (XSEDE), supported by NSF grant ACI-1548562, and CyVerse, supported by NSF grants DBI-0735191, DBI-1265383, and DBI1743442. XSEDE Stampede2 resource at TACC was allocated through TG-AST170024 and TG-AST080026N. XSEDE JetStream resource at PTI and TACC was allocated through AST170028. The simulations were performed in part on the SuperMUC cluster at the LRZ in Garching, on the LOEWE cluster in CSC in Frankfurt, and on the HazelHen cluster at the HLRS in Stuttgart. This research was enabled in part by support provided by Compute Ontario (http://computeontario.ca), Calcul Quebec (http://www.calculquebec.ca) and Compute Canada (http://www.computecanada.ca).We thank the staff at the participating observatories, correlation centers, and institutions for their enthusiastic support. This paper makes use of the following ALMA data: ADS/JAO.ALMA#2016.1.01154.V. ALMA is a partnership of the European Southern Observatory (ESO; Europe, representing its member states), NSF, and National Institutes of Natural Sciences of Japan, together with National Research Council (Canada), Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST; Taiwan), Academia Sinica Institute of Astronomy and Astrophysics (ASIAA; Taiwan), and Korea Astronomy and Space Science Institute (KASI; Republic of Korea), in cooperation with the Republic of Chile. The Joint ALMA Observatory is operated by ESO, Associated Universities, Inc. (AUI)/NRAO, and the National Astronomical Observatory of Japan (NAOJ). The NRAO is a facility of the NSF operated under cooperative agreement by AUI. This paper has made use of the following APEX data: Project ID T-091.F-0006-2013. APEX is a collaboration between the Max-Planck-Institut fur Radioastronomie (Germany), ESO, and the Onsala Space Observatory (Sweden). The SMA is a joint project between the SAO and ASIAA and is funded by the Smithsonian Institution and the Academia Sinica. The JCMT is operated by the East Asian Observatory on behalf of the NAOJ, ASIAA, and KASI, as well as the Ministry of Finance of China, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the National Key R&D Program (No. 2017YFA0402700) of China. Additional funding support for the JCMT is provided by the Science and Technologies Facility Council (UK) and participating universities in the UK and Canada. The LMT is a project operated by the Instituto Nacional de Astrofisica, Optica, y Electronica (Mexico) and the University of Massachusetts at Amherst (USA), with financial support from the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia and the National Science Foundation. The IRAM 30-m telescope on Pico Veleta, Spain is operated by IRAM and supported by CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France), MPG (MaxPlanck-Gesellschaft, Germany) and IGN (Instituto Geografico Nacional, Spain). The SMT is operated by the Arizona Radio Observatory, a part of the Steward Observatory of the University of Arizona, with financial support of operations from the State of Arizona and financial support for instrumentation development from the NSF. The SPT is supported by the National Science Foundation through grant PLR-1248097. Partial support is also provided by the NSF Physics Frontier Center grant PHY-1125897 to the Kavli Institute of Cosmological Physics at the University of Chicago, the Kavli Foundation and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation grant GBMF 947. The SPT hydrogen maser was provided on loan from the GLT, courtesy of ASIAA. The EHTC has received generous donations of FPGA chips from Xilinx Inc., under the Xilinx University Program. The EHTC has benefited from technology shared under open-source license by the Collaboration for Astronomy Signal Processing and Electronics Research (CASPER). The EHT project is grateful to T4Science and Microsemi for their assistance with Hydrogen Masers. This research has made use of NASA's Astrophysics Data System. We gratefully acknowledge the support provided by the extended staff of the ALMA, both from the inception of the ALMA Phasing Project through the observational campaigns of 2017 and 2018. We would like to thank A. Deller and W. Brisken for EHT-specific support with the use of DiFX. We acknowledge the significance that Maunakea, where the SMA and JCMT EHT stations are located, has for the indigenous Hawaiian people. ; Peer reviewed

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY SMALL-SCALE FARMERS' STRATEGIES IN DEALING WITH CRISES: AN ANALYSIS OF HOUSEHOLD RESPONSES TO CRISIS IN FOUR VILLAGES IN RURAL ZIMBABWE Crises caused by natural and human-induced disasters have always been part of farmers' lives, but recently they have proliferated through the emergence of new economic, political and environmental challenges. Generally, it is the ordinary poor people, many of them living in the vulnerable contexts of the rural tropics, who are bearing the brunt of these changes. This is particularly true for many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, where more than two-thirds of the population still depend on agriculture, and a large proportion of rural households suffer from poverty, food insecurity and social unrest. In such contexts, national governments and numerous NGOs, often supported by international donors, become active in supporting small farmers with training programs, the diffusion of technology, credits, social payments, subsidies and infrastructural investments. These efforts have had a remarkable success, except in stopping a general process of local marginalization and environmental degradation. In the end, the vast majority of small-scale farming families are left on their own to face the challenge of sustaining their livelihoods and guarantee food for their families under precarious conditions. More effective measures to support poor rural farmers in Africa are urgently needed that take better account of and stimulate their adaptive capacity to find responses to the manifold challenges. The research in this thesis aimed to generate empirical insights into farmers' responses to crises as a basis to supporting small-scale farmers more effectively, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, in times of crisis. This includes three specific objectives: (1) to describe how crises changes the conditions for small-scale farmers' activities; (2) to learn how small-scale farmers are responding to these changes; and (3) to find out what factors are driving farmers' 'decisions. To comply with these objectives, the study analyzed in depth the dynamics in four rural villages in Zimbabwe, which represent three typical agricultural contexts in Sub-Saharan Africa: (1) communal agricultural lands with traditional social configurations; (2) agricultural landscapes formed by individualized settlers; and (3) areas resettled in the course of land redistribution programs. Zimbabwe was chosen because it is a prime example of a crisis that brought about severe multi-layered political, economic, social and environmental challenges, especially during the presidency of Robert G. Mugabe between 2000 and 2017. Data were gathered, processed and analyzed using a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach. Household surveys were conducted with lead farmers and extension agents to gain an understanding of the factors and conditions that influence farmers' behavior and choices and to establish categories of farmers. Households were surveyed to determine their characteristics at the personal level (family size, head, level of education, financial situation, and farm experience), the farm level (assets, size, land tenure, remoteness) and the institutional level (extension services, financial support, social organization). Besides, farmers' households that represented the strategies typically used to cope with the situation of crisis were selected for in-depth interviews to learn about the operational details, underlying rationalities and effects of the strategies they had adopted. Expert interviews and participatory mapping exercises with local experts and leaders were conducted to gain an understanding of how the Zimbabwean crisis changed the conditions under which the farmers live and to grasp the range and spatial relevance of strategies adopted by the farmer in response to the changed conditions. Also, secondary sources were systematically explored for relevant information, including reports from international organizations, non-governmental agencies, local NGOs, public research organizations, farmers' groups, dairy associations, Internal Savings and Lending Clubs (ISACs) and government agencies. The study made three principal findings: (1) crises strongly affected farming households; (2) most farmers managed to respond effectively to crisis situations; and (3) support and resource endowments are critical to overcoming crises. The crises strongly affected farmers. More than fifteen years of political and economic crises in Zimbabwe, in combination with frequent droughts, profoundly changed the conditions under which rural farmers live and produce. Most strikingly, the manifestation of this complex situation of crises was the breakdown of public services, including progressive reductions of public services providing farmers with technical and financial assistance and, partly related to this, increases in corruption. For example, although the ruling party announced million-dollar tractor and farm mechanization programs during elections, not one of the farmers from the four case studies received anything. Most critical was also the fact that the state-driven Grain Marketing Board failed to continue offering support to maize farmers with regard to pricing and payment patterns, which led to a massive decline in the production of maize, the key business of many farmers at that time. This withdrawal of the state was further compounded by a massive distortion of markets, which for the farmers made the profitable marketing of their own production considerably more difficult or even impossible, as well as making agricultural input prices unaffordable. The latter development forced a majority of farmers to skip using fertilizers, certified seeds and pesticides. Some few only managed to apply sub-optimal amounts of fertilizers occasionally on smaller parts of their fields. Devastatingly, farmers also suffered animal losses to drought (especially the extreme drought of the 2015/2016 season) and animal diseases that hampered their practice of using manure to maintain soil fertility. In parallel, farmers were heavily affected by climate change, manifested through an increase in dryness, soil erosion and unpredictable rainfall. This was especially hard for farmers acting in the dry conditions that are typical of large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, where water is the limiting factor of production and where agricultural activities depend on the predictability of rainfall during the sowing period and the availability of groundwater or water reservoirs in the mountains during the growing period. This critical situation was, at least partly, mitigated for more than a third of farmers (38%) through the intervention of donors, NGOs and private companies, who, in contrast to the government's initial strategy of diffusing technical packages, promoted low-cost technologies in the case of development organizations and contract farming in the case of private companies. Nevertheless, the situation of crisis resulted in considerable losses of harvests, plants and animals, particularly in very dry years (2002-2003, and 2015-2016), when some crops were a complete write-off, but also due to political violence, when livestock and harvests were looted, for example, in the aftermath of the 2008 election. Despite these difficulties, the vast majority of families remained on their properties and tried to cope with the challenging situation. In the resettlement area too, where the government distributed the land of expropriated white farmers, all those farmers who had settled there at the beginning of 2000 remained on their farms and in 2015were joined by new farmers settling on grazing land. Roughly a third of households (29%), however, decided to send a member or two to urban centers, abroad or other farms to search for remunerative employment off the family farm. As it was mostly young male adults who were drawn into leaving the farm for jobs, across all case studies it was common for women, children and the elderly to be left with the task of managing farm operations. Effective responses of the farmers. In response to the situation of crisis, the farmers in the case studies employed a wide range of strategies. Responses included orientation towards livestock, the reduction of the land area under cultivation, the adoption of low-input farming systems, intensification, and on and off-farm diversification, as well as migration, a re-orientation to subsistence farming and the unsustainable exploitation of common resources. Most farmers combined two or more of these responses. Where possible nearly all households (84%) started to buy livestock when a crisis broke, whether cattle or small livestock, the latter being seen as resistant to drought and more easily convertible into cash. To improve food security, many farmers (71%) reduced and concentrated inputs on the most suitable parcels of land to optimize the application of scarce resources. Upon realizing surpluses, some farmers (15%) then included tobacco as a cash crop, or even diversified their production portfolios more strongly (20%). Only traditional dairy farmers (10 %) mostly continued their production because, often belonging to the second or third generation of farmers, they had the knowledge and experience to continue and even intensify production. Also, migration and, relatedly, the transfer of remittances became a central resource for many families (29%). Accordingly, concentration and diversification were closely linked with an orientation to the market. The farmers who produced for markets were well connected with relevant platforms and networks (e.g., tobacco auction floors, milk collection points, the Grain Marketing Board, millers, etc.) and used their surpluses to invest in the farm and grow their asset base. Those farmers who received remittances also invested in farming, often accompanied by a diversification of production. The switch to low-cost technologies and the concentration of production on the most suitable parcels of land massively reduced the dependence on government subsidies. In parallel, many farmers managed to significantly enhance their areal productivity, so that overall production remained stable, despite a significant reduction in the land area under cultivation. Some farmers even managed to increase their gross incomes by intelligently combining on-farm with non-farm strategies. The concentration of farming activities on the most fertile land parcels also allowed fields to be left fallow and promoted other ecologically valuable land-use resources, such as woodlots. This effect was particularly visible in contexts that already showed a high level of degradation. Only 7% of farmers became engaged in unsustainable exploitative activities, but, every tenth household was forced to re-orient itself towards subsistence farming. However, about 75% of households in the case-study sites had somehow found effective ways to cope with crises, implying that the vast majority of farmers substantially changed or strongly adapted their livelihood strategies. While in 2000 most farmers were dedicated to the production of maize and dairy for income generating purposes, in 2016 livelihood strategies were diversified and included the production of food, dairy and cash crops, as well as off-farm employment. Support and resource endowments are critical. The specific choice and quality of farmers' responses varied strongly in accordance with institutional, farm and personal features, except the consistent orientation towards livestock across all farmers and case studies. In particular, a set of four factors had a highly significant positive influence on the successful actions of farmers, based on concentration, market orientation and diversification, namely the availability of farm assets (particularly ownership of cattle), financial support, the level of social organization and formal tenure arrangements. Market orientation was also favored by accessibility. Other factors had a comparatively low influence on farmers' responses, except a preference for diversification by older and female-headed households. Concerning remittance support, higher educational levels and the good financial situation of the households played a moderately positive role. The picture was less clear concerning factors that influenced responses with questionable livelihood outcomes, such as re-orientation towards subsistence farming (lack of assets, low level of education, households headed by females without husbands) and exploitative strategies (male-headed households and households headed by females without husbands). There were also large differences between the case studies in respect of the factors listed above, partly due to important contextual differences. Most strikingly, the better the situation of a case study with regard to accessibility, water availability and social organization, the stronger the external support. In response, more farmers in the favored case studies exploited the opportunities offered to them mainly by tobacco companies and development organizations (irrigation and dairy farming). One exception was the resettlement case study, which, as a contested area, was disregarded by development organizations, despite favorable environmental conditions. Accordingly, in the least favorable case study, "community in impoverished landscape", households were largely left to face their difficult situations alone. They were more likely to re-orient themselves to subsidence farming and switched to small livestock, thereby managing at least to secure their food basis. In particular, these results provide three important suggestions for how farmers can be better supported in crises. First, effective water management is key. There is an urgent need to diffuse in- field water-harvesting techniques and to further optimize appropriate agricultural practices, such as mulching and gravity-fed irrigation. Second, farmers are creative in finding solutions. This includes farming responses, as well as off-farm strategies. Both are effective from a local perspective. However, only the better-off farmers may have the means and capacities for the necessary investments, whereas the challenges may exceed the possibilities of poorer farmers. The proper management of livestock and the use of manure in agricultural production is another important requisite. Third, support measures are critical. However, rather than distributing of costly technology packages, support should take advantage of and promote capacity of farmers to take meaningful decisions. Thus, support should build on the resources and capacities that are available locally and accordingly highlight low-cost strategies and efficient water-use management, stimulate financially attractive options for diversification, and develop existing market opportunities further rather than creating new ones. In this regard, in particular, the frequently observed strategy of farmers to reduce and concentrate inputs on the most suitable land shows an immense potential for optimization. Supporting such promising attempts by farmers to build robust farming systems following their capacities and interests can help achieve development, social equality and sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa. To operationalize such an approach requires well-trained extension agents working in well-equipped organizations. Also, the provision of tenure security plays a critical role in motivating farmers to invest and develop the land, as well as to turn land into a bankable asset and collateral that enables farmers to secure bank loans for farm improvements. Equally important is investment in research and development regarding basic infrastructure, particularly the maintenance of public infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, which have largely been neglected due to economic hardships. The government can also assist farmers by providing market facilities for small livestock and small grains whose markets are still limited. The private sector has and continues to play an important role in supporting farmers through contract farming arrangements. But they need to consider more intensively weaker farmers who are located far from markets and have to cope with unfavorable situations. Farmers' associations should prioritize programs and actions that support the frequent and most common response of concentration, as well as market participation and diversification of production. Through the local sharing of information and knowledge, they can guide farmers in reducing their dependence on government subsidies and the use of costly inputs such as fertilizers, certified seeds and pesticides. The farmers themselves need to organize themselves better in order to lobby collectively and campaign for technical assistance, credits and secure tenure arrangements. Farmers should intensify crop–livestock integration with livestock, thus equipping farmers with the means to produce much needed inexpensive animal manure to improve soil fertility and to opt for long-term strategies that protect their resource base. Finally, research also has its part to play. More knowledge is needed about farmers' actions and rationalities as a basis for finding more effective ways of consolidating the socio- ecological diversity of Zimbabwe, Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, despite the political, economic and climatic challenges that are to be expected in the future.

European legal systems have long encompassed the concept of the "general clause", particularly in contract and labor law. The general clause includes unwritten legal norms such as good faith and public morality, and these principles are duly incorporated in the process of construing civil and labor contracts. While the general clause itself is formally absent in common law systems, its principles have found their way into modern British and American law. Two primary examples include the doctrines of good faith and unconscionability. In a broader sense, the idea of introducing rather indeterminate legal norms to be construed and interpreted by judges appears to be well‑ suited to a common law system. However, as applied to American labor law, the very indeterminacy of these terms has had rather negative effects on the rights of employees and the labor unions that represent them. 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The COVID-19 pandemic restrictions introduced in 2020 in many countries on economic activity and gainful employment have in many cases, reduced the incomes of individual households. As a result, the actual ability to meet credit obligations has declined, particularly for those who have lost their jobs or livelihoods. The COVID-19 pandemic has become a significant challenge for economies, national authorities, and entrepreneurs, including borrowers. This article aims to analyse the legal regulations in Poland, and Vietnam, introducing instruments to support borrowers, consumers, and entrepreneurs, in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. The authors will present the legal basis for the instruments to support borrowers provided in the studied countries, indicate their legal nature, forms, and conditions of using them. They also compare legal solutions introduced in connection with the pandemic aimed at mitigating its adverse effects on borrowers in Poland, and Vietnam, to indicate whether cultural differences and differences in legal systems, as well as individual approaches to the domestic credit market, affected the choice of legal instruments for supporting borrowers in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic, or not. ; Edyta Rutkowska-Tomaszewska: edyta.rutkowska-tomaszewska@uwr.edu.pl ; Marta Stanisławska: mmstanislawska@gmail.com ; Hien Thuc Trinh: hientt@uel.edu.vn ; Edyta Rutkowska-Tomaszewska is Associate Professor and the University of Wroclaw and the Head of the Department of Finance Management at the Institute of Economic Sciences, Faculty of Law, Administration and Economics, University of Wroclaw, Poland. ; Marta Stanisławska is Assistant Professor in the Department of Economy and Finance, Faculty of Technical and Economic Sciences, Witelon State University of Applied Sciences in Legnica, Poland. ; Hien Trinh, PhD in Law, Lecturer in the Institute of International and Comparative Law, University of Economics and Law, Vietnam National University, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. ; Edyta Rutkowska-Tomaszewska - University of Wroclaw, Poland ; Marta Stanisławska - Witelon State University of Applied Sciences in Legnica, Poland ; Hien Thuc Trinh - University of Economics and Law, Vietnam National University Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam ; Access to commercial finance for SMEs with the support of public institutions, https://alebank.pl/dostep-mmsp-do-fi nansowania-komercyjnego-ze-wsparciem-instytucji-publicznych/?id=376412&catid=22872&cat2id=25928. ; Acharya V.V., Engle III R.F., Steffen S., Why did bank stocks crash during COVID-19?, "National Bureau of Economic Research" 2021, https://www.nber.org/papers/w28559. ; Aji B.S., Warka M., Kongres E., Credit Dispute Resolution through Banking Mediation during Covid-19 Pandemic Situation, Budapest International Research and Critics Institute-Journal, https://doi.org/10.33258/birci.v4i2.1823. ; Baicu. 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